UCL SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY International Public Policy ... · International Public Policy Review Volume 9, Number 2 2015 ... Neil Mitchell, ... ZAZA RINALDI. PAOLA VANEGAS

International Public Policy Review

Volume 9, Number 22015

UCL SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY

International Public Policy Review

Volume 9, Number 22015

UCL SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY

5

IPPR 2015EDITOR’S NOTE

Dear Readers, You are currently holding the 2014 – 2015 Edition of the International Public Policy Review, a journal whose aim is to provide academics and scholars with the latest thoughts and advances from up- and-coming students of public policy.

I am delighted to have helped construct this year’s Journal, which showcases the best work that UCL Students have produced. Each paper has been selected and reviewed by their peers, and highlights some of the major issues of public policy today.

Given the result of the General Election, and an unexpected majority government, issues of public policy can expect to come to the fore across a wide variety of areas. As politicians seem unwilling to commit to substantial research on various aspects of public policy, there is a mounting need for public policy academics and students to step up. We hope that the Journal is able to make a contribution (however modest) to the ongoing public policy debate.

I would like to thank all the members of the editorial board, without which this journal would not be possible. I am grateful for your time, dedication, and support throughout the process of getting this to print.

My thanks must also go to the members of the department who offered advice and help throughout the process. Finally, I would like to thank Apsara Flury, our designer who helped produce the smart incarnation of the Journal you now hold in your hands.

We know, as ever, there is more that can be done, but we believe our work this year has laid the foundations for future success and encouraged the department to invest more resources and time in the journal to further professionalize it.

We believe that in the coming years the journal can fulfill its mission and help advance the field of public policy more generally.

Chris Rogers,Editor In ChiefIPPRUCL School of Public Policy

K.R.

6 7Chris Rogers

Aliana Greenberg, Sofie van Heijningen

Cherie Koh

Apsara Flury

1st Byte, London

Klisman Murati

Alessandra Bocchi Kithmina Virochana HewageSahana Kumar Livio Liechti

School of Public PolicyThe Rubin Building29/31 Tavistock SquareLondon WC1H 9QU

+44 (0)20 7679 4999Email: [email protected]

FOREWORD

It is my pleasure, as acting head of the Department of Political Science and School of Public Policy, to write the forward for this edition of the International Public Policy Review. The Department began as Britain’s only department focused on graduate teaching and research. It has enjoyed a period of rapid growth in recent years and very much in keeping with UCL’s founding tradition in political economy retains an explicit focus on public policy, which, as we con- ceive it brings together the study of all fields of politics, including international relations, political theory, human rights as well as public policy-making and administration. And it has brought together our students with this publication.

Students from across the Masters Programmes offered at SPP specialize in a range of fields, including the Europe Union, Security, the Environment, Global Governance and Ethics, Legal and Political Theory, Human Rights, Democracy and the problems of divided societies, Domestic and International Public policy. Our students go on to accept jobs in fields as diverse as development agencies, government advisors and positions within NGO.

The task for research in public policy is to keep pace with the speed of political change both on a domestic and global level. Whether in or out of the EU, the world presents opportunities, constraints, and the enduring challenge of finding ways to cooperate in addressing our common problems. Our hope is that the department can equip students with the substantive knowledge and research methods necessary to join the policy community of tomorrow.

This edition gives a taste of the work that is going on here and the problems our students are addressing, from how issues rise on the global agenda to international organisations and regulations and getting state actors to comply. Antimicrobial resistance, dementia, terrorism, transparency and foreign direct investment are some of the issues occupying our students.

I hope that this journal will provide you with some insights into the work of UCL students but also contribute to your understanding of some of the wider public policy issues of the day. Finally, let me offer my thanks to the students. We keep them busy enough with formal programme requirements. This journal is a testimony to their energy and motivation.

Neil Mitchell,IPPR UCL School of Public Policy

N.M.IPPR 2015COLOPHON

EDITOR IN CHIEF

MANAGING EDITOR

ONLINEEDITOR

DESIGN

PRINTING

PRESIDENT

EDITORIALBOARD

CONTACT

Part APolicy Evaluation

Policy Evaluation

Food Insecurity: Have “Transnational Advocacy Networks” Under the Banner of Food Sovereignty Effectively Influenced Policies to Eradicate Food Insecurity?

How Effective are Training Programmes on Income Generation? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Colombia

A Clear Advantage: The Benefits of Transparency to Foreign Direct Investment

Prize Winning

Making Conditionality Work? Actor Socialisation through Network Governance in the European Neighbourhood

Analysis

Is Poststructuralism Just Another Version of Constructivism? Reconsidering the Way Constructivism Is Taught in IR Theory

Managing Microbes: Global Public Policy Problems in Combatting Antimicrobial Resistance

The Future of Dispute Settlement under International Law in Light of the US Supreme Court Ruling in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum

Why Do States Give International Development Assistance?

What Accounts for the Rise of Dementia on the International Policy Agenda?

Interview

Interview with Ben Stewart, Greenpeace Activist and Author of the New Book: Don’t Trust, Don’t Fear, Don’t Beg

Bibliography

IPPR 2015INDEX

ZAZA RINALDI

PAOLA VANEGASRODRIGUEZ

ELAINE SHEN AND MIKE SLIWINSKI

PHILIPP SCHROEDER

THEO AIOLFI

SOFIE VANHEIJNINGEN

KITHMINA VIROCHANA HEWAGE

KATELIN RAW

RACHELPOYNOR

ALESSANDRA BOCCHI

A

10

18

26

B

38

C

64

74

84

92

100

D

108

E

119

10 11Food Insecurity: Have “Transnational Advocacy Networks” Under the Banner of Food Sovereignty Effectively Influenced Policies to Eradicate Food Insecurity?

Z.R.A IPPR 2015POLICY EVALUATION

FOOD INSECURITY: HAVE “TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORKS” UNDER THE BANNER OF FOOD SOVEREIGNTY EFFECTIVELY INFLUENCED POLICIES TO ERADICATE FOOD INSECURITY?

Food insecurity pertains to the inability of people to access or purchase food, this problem is primarily caused by multinational corporate control of today’s food system (McMichael, 2005, p. 271; Sen , 1997, p. 23). Understanding corporate control asplaying a causal role in food insecurity, this essay focuses onnon-state actors that seek to influence international policy and limitcorporate domination of the food system. The last 20 years hasseen the emergence of a food sovereignty transnational network onthe global stage that radically seeks to redefine policies aroundfood (Borras, 2008, p. 260). Drawing upon Margaret Keck andKathryn Sikkink’s “transnational advocacy network” framework (1998), I examine the food sovereignty network through the five stagesof influence offered in Keck and Sikkink’s analytical model (1998, p.25). These stages are, the ability to set agendas in the internationalstage; influence discursive positions; affect institutional procedures; and influence policy (1998). I argue that the food sovereigntytransnational advocacy network has only been effective horizontally in its ability to unify and assert a common language thatchampions the principles of food sovereignty across regions.This network has laid necessary foundations that pre-requisite effective policy change by bringing international attention to theconcept of food sovereignty. What this network lacks however, is theability penetrate policy making at the top. By that I mean directlyengage with and influence neoliberal and multilateral corporates thatdominate and define the food system.

Origins of food insecurity: structural inequalities transcending state bordersWe live in a world of food insecurity and widespread chronic hunger. The Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) (2014) estimates between 2012 – 14 at least 805 million people were chronically undernourished. This estimate shoots up and is more alarming when hunger related to energy deficits “hidden hunger” (von Grebmer, et al., 2014) is included. Up to 2 billion people worldwide lack basic vitamins and minerals (FAO, 2013) and are una-ble to reach adequate development, both physical and cognitive (Rosamond, 2014, p. 3). Food insecurity does not result from the world’s inability to produce enough food (Sen, 1997, pp. 20 – 24), nor primarily the damaging effects climate change has on agriculture (Akram-Lodhi, 2013). Despite climate change affecting food production, the world today produces more than enough food to sustain the entire population (Holt-Gimenez & Patel, 2009, p. 21). Food insecurity is a problem without a passport because it is born out structural imbalances and global relations of inequality in the world’s food system. Unequal relations that result in a system that produces enough food, yet the developing world accounts for 98

ZAZA RINALDI

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Z.R.A

percent of the world’s hungry (FAO, 2010) whilst at the same time producing 70 percent of the world’s food (Gonzalez, 2011, p. 78).

Described as what Philip McMichael (2005, pp. 271 – 273) calls a “corporate food regime,” the neo-liberal and capitalist nature of today’s food system leaves farmers “vulnerable to dispossession as a precondition of the construction of world agriculture” (2005, p. 271). This food regime progressed in three stages. First, colonial-ism, which diverted agricultural land into export production anddiminished the self-sustainability in the global South, creating dependence on food imports (McMichael, 2005; Gonzalez, 2011).Second, was the Green Revolution 1960 – 90, which modernizedagriculture and industrialised high yielding seeds introducingvarieties of maize, rice and wheat (Gonzalez, 2011, p. 79). Thoughcredited as development, these new seeds not only created dependence on fertilizers and pesticides manufactured by corporations inthe global North, but also displaced small farmers who lackedresources for high irrigation and synthetic agro-chemicals crucial forhigh yield of these seeds (Gonzalez, 2011). The final stage,were structural adjustment programs in the 1980’s and 90’s, underthe auspices of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund(IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Through reductionsof tariff barriers, trade liberalization and free trade agreementsthat disproportionately favoured the United States and Europe, theglobal South’s food system was left unprotected from foreigndominance (Holt-Gimenez & Patel, 2009, p. 25). Foreign dominancethat today has left world’s smallholder farmers marginalised inthe global market, dependant on imports yet defenceless and disad-vantaged by transnational corporate input and output prices ofworld agriculture (Gonzalez, 2011, p. 80).

Non-state actors in the global arena: Food Sovereignty and “Transnational Advocacy Networks” Introduced in 1996 at the World Food Summit in Rome by the global peasant movement, La Via Campesina (Akram-Lodhi, 2013, p. 1), “food sovereignty” is a socio-economic opposition to theneoliberal corporate food regime. At the heart of this idea pushed bya transnational network of 200 million farmers, landless, indig- enous and agricultural workers across the world, is the demand forsocial control of food systems and the right for people to determine their agricultural policies as a precondition for a world withouthunger (Patel, 2009, p. 671; 682). The first step of policymakingis agenda setting, and collectively food sovereignty advocates havesuccessfully reframed the agenda on food insecurity (Borras,2008, p. 270). No longer is food insecurity purely a question of devel-opment and food aid from donor countries, but instead the issue ofpeasant and smallholder farmer marginalisation is brought topublic debate by this advocacy network. The change in agenda is

evident when comparing dialogues on food insecurity between the 2008 Food Crisis that saw record levels of hunger and present day as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) approach their deadline. In 2008 the World Bank recommended increase in food aid as the crucial remedy to food insecurity (Holt-Gimenez & Patel, 2009, pp. 6 – 7), while in 2014 the UN themed “Interna- tional Year of Family Farming” recognises family and small-scale farming instead as a determinant for eradicating global hunger (UN News, 2013). The food crisis made evident that record hunger occurred hand in hand with record grain harvests (Holt-Gimenez & Patel, 2009, p. 7), therefore strengthening food sovereignty advocates opposition to corporatism. The food sovereignty network has effectively changed what Keck and Sikkink call the “value context” of political debate (1998, p. 25). Advocates like Via Camp-esina and the World Farmers Organisation (WFO) for example, gave speeches reaffirming their principles on a global platform at the “International Year of Family Farming” closing ceremony. This highlights the power transnational advocacy networks have in radical-ly shifting the ontology of policy problems. In this case, these networks have reframed food insecurity to a global discussion about food sovereignty as opposed to production and donor aid.

The next measure of the effectiveness of transnational advocacy networks is their ability to produce “discursive change” (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 25). Discursive change refers to the ability to commit policy actors, which are states and international organisa-tions, to principles introduced by transnational advocacy networks or that actors refer to these principles when characterizing their own behaviour or that of others (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 25; 192). Regarding food sovereignty, discursive change in food insecu-rity would mean actors become critical of corporate agribusiness controlled food systems and view small farmer driven agro-eco-logical food control in a favourable light. Both the UN year of family farming and first official discussion at the FAO’s headquarters in September 2014 on agro-ecology, which involved speakers from Via Campesina (2014), demonstrate that multilateral organisa-tions now hold small-scale farming as a norm to consider in order to eradicate hunger. Further UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food Olivier de Schutter, explicitly draws from lessons of food sovereignty in his speech at a conference held at Yale Univer-sity (de Schutter, 2013). Schutter commended efforts of food sovereignty advocates and highlighted that agribusiness had damag-ing effects on ecology and impoverished small-scale farmers (de Schutter, 2013). What further accounts for the discursive change is the legal framework drawn upon by food sovereignty advocates (Holt-Gimenez & Patel, 2009, p. 100). Adopting a universal language of the right to be free from hunger in Article 25 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights (UN, 1948), this network re-empha-

IPPR 2015POLICY EVALUATION


14 15

Z.R.A

sises “the right to feed oneself and his family” into their normative argument (Holt-Gimenez & Patel, 2009, p. 100). The assertion that no state or individual should deprive anyone from being able to feed themselves (Holt-Gimenez & Patel, 2009) can be char-acterized as “accountability politics” that pressure policy actors to alter their position in line with ideals pushed forward by transna-tional advocacy networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 24).

Looking at the third and fourth stages of Keck and Sikkink’s model together, procedural change and policy change, gives a better picture of the important progression transnational networks need to fulfil to be effective. Procedural changes without policy changes are simply talks about rights or talks with action. Food sovereignty advocates have effectively mobilized themselves across regions onto the international stage and engaged in dialogue with important global actors. The official collaboration between Via Campesina and the FAO gives the food sovereignty network a greater platform for increased contact with key players in the global arena (FAO, 2013). Consequently this breaks the monopoly of conservative groups, reaffirming the voice of food sovereignty, and illustrating what Borras (2008, p. 271) describes as having “politicized the process of interaction.” There however remains a consid-erable gap between procedural change and influence in policy change of target actors. For example, although the International Plan- ning Committee for Food sovereignty (IPC) and Via Campesina became members of the reformed UN Committee of Food Security (CFS) (Campesina, 2013, pp. 4 – 5), the body responsible for the monitoring the MDGs achievement in food security, private sector actors and the WTO remained members of the CFS (2013, p. 5). This was despite the transnational network’s denunciation of the WTO as having no legitimacy to preside over the issue of food insecurity (2013, p. 5). The “Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests” published by the CFS indicate the lack of real policy change and intransigence of the powers that have monopoly over the food system (2013, p. 10). On the topic of land grabbing, large scale-acquisition for commercial farming was not banned therefore leaving peasants and small farmers at the mercy of the multinational corporations. The lack of binding instruments and regulatory power in the voluntary guide-lines (2013, pp. 10 – 11) show that transnational networks so far have failed to counter the hand of multinational domination in agriculture.

This leads to the final stage of influencing state behaviour, were the food sovereignty network has also been marginal in success. There has been fragmented success across the world with some countries adopting food sovereignty into their national policies. Venezuela, Nepal and Ecuador are amongst countries that are including peasants in dialogue of how best to implement food sover-eignty (Patel, 2009, p. 768) and recently in the Dominican Republic

more than 60 members of parliament called for drafting a law on food sovereignty (FAO, 2013). Another example is Bolivia, whose president Eva Morales has adopted food sovereignty and is very explicit in his views that multinational corporations must be “eliminated” from the policy arena of food security (Morales, 2014). These countries however only present a small fraction in the world and a small fraction of countries that are host to members of the food sovereignty network. Importantly attitudes of states in the developed world characterise the resistance of beneficiaries of an unjust system to lessen their grip on the food system. A crucial example here is the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition which claimed the initiative would boost agriculture and reduce poverty in Africa (Provost, et al., 2014). Contrary to what it claims, the G8 initiative only worsens food insecurity through the intensification of agribusiness and subsequent marginalisation of small farmers (2014). More problematic for the food sovereignty network is the reality that these G8 initiatives are also supported by states in the Global south, even though their populations are disproportionately food insecure. The governments of Ethiopia, Ghana and Malawi for example have welcomed these initiatives putting aside vast areas of land for commercial farming (2014), therefore ex- acerbating corporate control and undermining the efforts of food sovereignty advocates in negating the policies around food insecurity.

Conclusion: Policy making, advocacy networks, and reflections on Global Civil Society Essentially, food sovereignty transnational advocacy networks have not effectively changed policies geared towards solving food insecurity. They go as far as changing the nature of the debate, reframing the value context in which actors operate, and to an extent securing dialogue with key actors in the international arena. They do however fall short of achieving policies that limit corporat-ism and have not altered the behaviour of states as demonstrated by the G8 initiative. The food sovereignty transnational advocacy network however, does not reach a dead end in the international arena nor should scholars turn their attention away from these non-state transnational actors. Their failure at present day does not render this network as having no capacity to effect policy in the future. To understand this further it is worth looking at transnational advocacy networks in a broader framework of global civil society. The existence of global civil society is not without its contestations in political science with some scholars who go as far as arguing that it does not exist (Barterlson, 2006, pp. 271 – 273). I assert howev-er that a network of 200 million peasants that cuts across geo- graphies and cultures under the banner of food sovereignty consti-tutes to a global civil society. This network fits both Lipshutz



16 17

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and Keane’s identification of global civil society as social and political spaces that are neither bound by the nation state or state boundaries (Barterlson, 2006, p. 375).

These political spaces shaped by non-state actors are porous, and are created and re-created as non-state actors shape and read just themselves in response to the globalising processes (Cole-man & Sarah, 2006, p. 246). This bears implications for the transnational network discussed in this essay, that there is no con-crete definition of food sovereignty. The lack of concrete definition, further exacerbated by Via Campesina’s insistence that food sovereignty should be defined relative to each country (Patel, 2009, pp. 665 – 667), opens the door for critics who see the lack of definition as a poor starting point for policy implementation. This ambiguity of food sovereignty however works in favour of a global civil society (Patel, 2009, p. 665). The fluidity in the idea of food sovereignty (Patel, 2009, p. 665) means that global civil society maintains the potential to evolve and restructure its position in the international arena. Via Campesina’s radical calls to removing the WTO and private actors from food policies (Campesina, 2013, p. 5) are unrealistic, as these multinational actors will not just simply disappear. However, the malleability of food sovereignty within the global civil society context creates the potential to engage and compromise with multinational corporations on the issue of food insecurity in the future.

Global civil society signals that the game of governance has changed. Away from the state centric view of policymaking, we see the multiplicity of actors in the international arena who influence the process of globalization from below (Coleman & Sarah, 2006, p. 246). Keohane and Nye observe that today’s politics are more fragmented and no longer dominated in a top down or hierarchical structure (Coleman & Sarah, 2006, p. 246). The presence of untraditional actors like Via Campesina and the IPC suggest that international regimes, like the corporate food regime, are decomposable and penetrable through bottom up activity (2006, p. 246). Food sovereignty claims to be, and within reason, a process of democratisation from below (Patel, 2009, p. 669; 667). Transnational advocacy networks should not be deemed as having no real authority in the global arena. It is important to understand that global civil society is still evolving and perhaps we should mark the Food Crisis in 2008 as the starting point of substantial influence of food sovereignty non-state actors, making it a relatively new in the global arena and having the potential to evolve and become increasingly effective with time.

Policy makers in the domain of food insecurity ought to pay more attention to food sovereignty. The answer to eradication food insecurity is not in increased aid and multinational large-scale farming. Food sovereignty advocates powerfully dispel any

illusions that agribusiness will benefit the world’s hungry and increase their access to food. They demonstrate the power of constructivist approaches in shaping the policy, through ideas and normative principles. Poor agricultural labourers and small farmers at the heart of food sovereignty cannot go it alone and will need to open up more dialogue with the state and corporations (Patel, 2009, p. 691). A top down process where states, especially in the developing world, start to move towards and support initiatives of small-scale farming is inextricable to solving food insecurity. Food sovereignty activists will increasingly become a serious social and political force to contend with in the future of food politics. Perhaps with an extensive media campaign to raise awareness on the inequalities of the food system in the average minds of people in the developed world, food sovereignty advocates can even further politicize their cause. There remains an even greater potential to mobilizing mass support using the power and symbolic language of human rights. Incorporating the right to be free from hunger (Assembly, 1948) is a good foundation for a future legal and regulatory framework that can bind states and corporations to comply with measures that decrease food insecurity.

Plaza Mayor León



18 19How Effective are Training Programmes on Income Generation? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Colombia

Colombia faced a deep economic crisis at the end of nineties with severe negative social implications, especially, on poor people. In response, the Colombian government designed and executed

“Youth in Action” programme to increase the employability of disadvantaged young people.

The paper “Subsidizing vocational training for disadvantaged youth in Colombia: Evidence from a Randomized Trial” (Attanasio, et al., 2011) analyses the impact of this training program in Colombia in 2005 using a randomized sample. The main findings of the study suggest that the training programme had positive impacts on earnings and employment principally for women. This essay will replicate the main results of the study and will focus on the programme effects for men and women in terms of labour market variables.

Even though, economic growth and macroeconomic stability are the key to reactivating the economy and consequently employment, literature suggests that there is a discrepancy between demand and supply for youth unemployment. The employer’s requirements differ from young people’s skills (ILO, 2013). This essay will analyse hetero-geneous effects based on the type of training received.

The essay has three main sections. The first section will pres-ent the replication exercise of the original article which focuses on the treatment effects of the programme by gender. The second sec-tion will propose an improvement of the study by explaining the impact of the programme by the type of training. Finally, the third section will present the conclusions of the analysis.

Original Study: Randomized Trial in ColombiaThe Colombian government designed the “Youth in Action” programme to help vulnerable people to overcome the consequences of the late nineties recession. The main objective of the programme was to provide six months training to poor young people and give a conditional cash transfer in order to facilitate their employability and access to the labour market.

To evaluate the programme, there was a randomized experiment in 2005. Training institutions selected 50% more of the appli- cants than their capacity before the start of the programme. The randomized process selected the people who ultimately received the training (treatment group) leaving the rest as a control group. To analyse the impact of the programme in different labour market variables, the study proposed the following model:

Yij = α Ri + τj + ρ Xi + θij

in which, Yij are variables related to labour market conditions for the person i in the group j as detailed in Table 1. Ri indicates whether the person was on the treatment or control group. τj represents

P.V.R.A HOW EFFECTIVE ARE TRAINING PROGRAMMES ON INCOME GENERATION? EVIDENCE FROM A RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT IN COLOMBIA

PAOLA VANEGAS RODRIGUEZ

Nowadays, youth unemployment is an important problem around the world. In 2005, Attanasio, Kugler & Meghir analyses the impact of “Youth in Action” program implemented in Colombia to increase the employability of disadvantaged young people. Using a randomized experiment, they found positive results of the programme for women in terms of earnings and employment. The results for men are not significant. This paper will present an improvement through the analysis of the results by the type of training that young people received. The new findings suggest a new field to explore because the results may be affected by the requirements of the labour market and the economic activity of the training in addition of gender.


20 21To sum up, the programme had a positive impact on women in labour market variables such as employment, worked time, and earnings.

In contrast, the results for men are not as positive as in women. Figure 2 presents the results of the two models. Panel A shows a negative relationship with self-employment earnings, which is significant at 10% level. It seems that being part of the programme reduced the self-employment earnings by 10.8% for young men. Panel B does not show any significant relation, except tenure. Consequently, there is no evidence of potential positive effects of the programme on labour market conditions of male young persons.

Are the Results Different if the Analysis Includes the Topic of the Training? Skills mismatch, defined as the imbalance between the labour supply and demand, seems to be an issue that affects youth unemployment. The education system needs to focus on the labour market requirements in order to minimize the gap between youth and total unemployment. For that reason, vocational training has been increas-ing across countries (Duell & Vogler-Ludwig, 2011) in order to solve the barriers that youth people faced.

The “Youth in Action” programme could be a good opportunity to solve these problems. The replication exercise pretends to analyse the impacts between the different types of courses in the randomized experiment. The hypothesis is that there are heterogeneous effects depending on the type of training that disadvantaged people received.


the site-by-course fixed effects. The study encloses city, training institution and course in the same groups. Xi shows control variables such as pre-treatment characteristics and θij is the error.

In order to solve the above equation, the paper ran two models. The first one (Panel A) does not include control variables (Xi) and the second one (Panel B) includes control variables as pretreatment characteristics. Both models were run independently for men and women.

The first model applied seven linear regression to evaluate the impact on being in the programme for each labour market variables explained in Table 1. The model absorbs city, training institutions and course. The second model uses a linear regression to explain the impact of the programme in five continuos variables (days worked, hours per week worked, tenure, wage and salary earnings and self-employment earnings) and run a logit model to explain the impact on the two binary variables (employment and paid employ-ment). Figure 1 presents the results of the programme on women and Figure 2 the results for men.

Panel A from Figure 1, shows that the probability of having employment increased for the people who participated in the programme, 6.1 percentage on employment and 7.1 percentage on paid employment. Likewise, the number of days and hours worked increased for the treatment group. The outcomes in terms of earnings show that the wage and salary of women was 39,369 Colombian pesos higher after the training. The mean of earnings of women in the control group was 177,160 Colombian pesos, which means that by being part of the programme income increased on 22%.

On the other hand, Panel B includes control variables such as pre-treatment characteristics. The results are similar to the previous model. The effects on employment are not significant but paid employment increased by 6.8 percentage points. Days per month and hours worked per week increased by 1.1 and 2.8 respectively. The outcome on earnings shows that the income of treatment women was higher by 19.5% in contrast to control young women. Self- employment was not significant in the model.

Figure 1 Treatment Effects of Training on Female Employment and Earnings

Table 4A. Panel B – Course Fixed Effects and pretreatment characteristics

(1)Employment

mfx dydx

0.043(0.027)1,367

(2)Paid Employment

mfx dydx

0.068**(0.029)1,474

(3)

Days / Month

1.172*0.6141,767

(4)

Hours /Week

2.856**(1.398)1,767

(5)

Tenure

-1.43**(0.619)1,756

(6)Wage and Salary

earnings

34,668***(9,743)1,767

(7)Self-employment

earnings

1,950(3,569)1,767

Variables

Select

Observations

Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** P<0.05, *P<0.1

Figure 2 Treatment Effects of Training on Male Employment and Earnings

Table 4B. Panel A – Course Fixed Effects

Table 4B. Panel B – Course Fixed Effects and pretreatment charcteristics

(1)

Employment

-0.025(0.022)1,468

(2)

Paid Employment

0.024(0.027)1,468

(3)

Days / Month

-0.56(0.62)1,468

(4)

Hours /Week

-2.37(1.48)1,468

(5)

Tenure

-3.18***(0.91)1,464

(6)Wage and Salary

earnings

15.466(12,819)

1,468

(7)Self-employment

earnings

-11,610*(5,959)1,468

(1)Employment

mfx dydx

-0.002(0.003)

791

(2)Paid Employment

mfx dydx

0.006(0.013)1,037

(3)

Days / Month

-0.545(0.618)1,464

(4)

Hours /Week

-2.27(1.471)1,464

(5)

Tenure

-2.772***(0.900)1,460

(6)Wage and Salary

earnings

13,691(12,819)

1,464

(7)Self-employment

earnings

-6,731(5,389)1,464

Variables

Select

Observations


Variables

Select

Observations



22 23


DataThe data available on the original article presents the code of each course training during the programme. However, for the purpose of determining the skills mismatch level, it was necessary to know the name of the course in order to classify them. Looking at the information system of the programme it was possible to create the groups based on the name and objectives of the training courses.

To classify the courses, the present study uses the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) created by the United Nations. Figure 3 presents the main categories of the ISIC to analyse the performance of an economy. The present analysis took into account only the first division of the classification.

There were 206 different courses in the sample. The fifteen

dummy variables to identify each category were established using ISIC Rev 4. These variables were included in the original article data to develop the new model.

Figure 4 shows the distribution of the categories on the sample. It is important to notice that some categories do not include a significant number of observations and hence we must be cautious with some results.

ModelThe purpose of the research is to determine if the impact of the programme differs depending on the type of the course. The equation that the improvement exercise will use is:

Yij = α Ri + δj + ρ Xi + εij

As in the original model, Yij represents a group of the variables related with labour market (Table 1) for the person i in the group j, Ri

indicates the treatment or control group, δj represents the fixed effects only with the city and the training institutions. The improvement exercise does not include the course in the fixed effect. Xi shows pretreatment characteristics. Finally, εij is the error term.

The proposal model estimated 15 regressions (one for each category) and replicated the exercise for each labour market variable. Overall, the proposal ran 105 regressions. To explain the main results of the extension exercise, the analysis presents only for three categories that were significant for the analysis. Figure 5 exposes the outcome for construction, manufacturing, and human health and social work.

Construction has a significant and negative relation with employment. Training on construction decreased the probability of being employed by 13.2%. At the same time, the time worked (days and hours) decreased for the young people who were trained in construction sector.

The tenure decreased and it showed a negative significant relation. Likewise, the tenure on administrative and support services diminished. However, it is expected this negative relation with tenure isdue to the time invested on training. Wage and salary earnings do not have a significant relation in the model. Nevertheless, self-employment earnings decreased by $47.019 Colombian pesos when people work in the construction sector.

Figure 3 International Standard Industrial Classification – ISIC

1. Accommodation and Food Service Activities2. Administrative and Support Service Activities3. Agricultural, Forestry and Fishing4. Arts, Entertainment and Recreation5. Construction6. Education7. Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning Supply8. Human Health and Social Work9. Information and Communication

10. Manufacturing11. Other Service Activities12. Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities13. Transportation and Storage14. Water Supply, Sewerage, Waste Management and Reme-diation Activities15. Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles

CATEGORIES

Figure 5 Treatment Effects of Training on Employment and Earnings by Economic Activites (1)

1. Construction

-0.132**(0.065)

104

0.010(0.089)

104

-4.898**(1.915)

104

-9.277*(4.871)

104

-13.307***(4.403)

104

37,190(46,437)

104

-47,019**(19,473)

104

Select

Observations

2. Human Health and Social Work

0.150**(0.065)

206

0.071(0.069)

206

4.841***(1.616)

206

12.182***(3.815)

206

-0.162(1.082)

206

85,743***(29,067)

206

18,397*(9,595)

206

Select

Observations

3. Manufacturing

0.084**(0.042)

439

0.117**(0.048)

439

2.719**(1.132

439

5.663**(2.632)

439

-0.810(1.499)

439

49,283***(18,966)

439

-10,404(9,266)

439

Select

Observations


Figure 4 Distribution of the sample into the main categories

Administrative and Support Service ActivitiesWholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor Vehicles and MotorcyclesManufacturingTransportation and StorageProfessional, Scientific and Technical ActivitiesHuman Health and Social WorkArts, Entertainment and RecreationAccomodation and Food Service ActivitiesInformation and CommunicationConstructionElectricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditionning SupplyAgricultural, Forestry and FishingOther Service ActivitiesEducationWater Supply, Sewerage, Waste Management and Remedation Activities

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800


24 25


Construction sector does not have a positive relation with the labour market variables. It is important to show that 80% of the participants of the programme who study construction activities were men. It is likely, that this outcome affects the effects of training on male presented in the original article.

On the other hand, human health and social work has a positive relation with the labour variables. Firstly, people who were trained in this career had a 15% chanceof being employment. Likewise, the hours worked per week and the days worked per month were higher for people who studied this area of knowledge.

The outcomes on earnings are also significant and showed that the wage and salary were higher by 85,743 Colombian pesos. The mean for the control group trained on human health and social work was $161,737. Consequently, the programme increased the salary earnings by 34%. 73% of the young people who studied this field were women. This result may bias the original article conclusions because the results should be biased by the training activity instead by the gender.

In third place, manufacturing has a positive relationship with the employment. People who work on manufacturing process have 8.4% higher more probability of being employed and 11.7% of have paid employment. Days worked per week and hours per week were higher on 2.7 days and 5.6 hours. Finally, the wage and salary earnings for these young people increased in 49,283 that represent an increase of 21.6%.

ConclusionsThe present essay proposes an extension of the article “Subsidizing vocational training for disadvantaged youth in Colombia: Evidence from a Randomized Trial” in order to discuss the type of training received by young people. Some scholars suggest that there is a mismatch skill and in many cases, people are not prepared for the labour market needs. Consequently, the essay proposes an alternative model analysing the impacts of the programme by eco-nomic activities instead of gender using the International Stand- ard Industrial Classification. The results can be summarised as follows:

ConstructionThere is a negative and significant relation with labour market variables for people who were trained in this field. The likelihood of having a job was less, the time worked decreased and self- employment earnings diminished. In addition, 80% of the people who studied this field were men.

Human Health and Social Work There is a positive and significant relation with variables such as employment, hours worked, days worked, wage and salary earnings and

self-employment earnings for people who studied this topic. 73% of the people that were trained in this field were young women.

ManufacturingThere is a positive and significant relation with labour variables such as employment, paid employment, time worked and wage and salary earnings. Both men and women studied this field (40.5% and 59.5% respectively).

These new results suggest a possible bias on the conclusions of the original study because the type of the course may affect the impact of the programme. It is likely that the programme has a positive effect on women and men and the difference remains in the requirements of the labour market.


26 27Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is a critical goal in the growth and sustainability of a healthy economy. Nations in pursuit of development can fuel their growth in part by encouraging a steady flow of outside capital; this can prove particularly important for nations in which domestic savings and investment capital are scarce. The availability of capital, the structural ability to direct such capital, and economic risk factors are common forces which affect the amount of FDI received by a country. FDI represents a fixed invest-ment, so foreign investors incur special risks when making this kind of commitment. These investments are typically illiquid and generate payoffs only with a long-term time horizon. In this setting, transparency regarding the state of the economy takes on greater importance.

One particular challenge to the exploration of the relationship between transparency and FDI is measuring transparency precisely. Broadly understood, economic transparency refers to the public availability of accurate aggregate economic data. Even this broad understanding is bound by a number of conditions that require clarification and nuance, particularly regarding the access to and quality of such data. Our study utilizes the HRV Index of transparency, developed by Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland (Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland 2013), because it takes a multi-faceted approach to understanding transparency. By evaluating the provision of macroeconomic data and controlling for the fixed differences in data provision, the measure treats both inclusion and omission of such data as indicative of the overall transparency of the country. This index is therefore both inclusive of a wide range of data and tailored in its relevancy to the countries it aims to quantify.1

We contend that as a nation’s transparency increases, the amount of FDI received will also increase. Governments that accurately collect and effectively disseminate aggregate economic data are more likely to see greater inflows of FDI.

Our study differs from the previous literature in both quantita-tive and substantive ways. By incorporating countries of diverse geography, economy, and political identity, and examining these countries over three decades, our study takes a more comprehensive approach to evaluating the relationship between trans-parency and FDI. The utilization of the HRV Index serves as a more objective measure for the purpose of accurately capturing transparency in practice. Our analysis takes a broader scope than previous studies, which are limited by data provision, and tests the relationship between transparency and FDI for 125 nations between the years 1980 – 2010. Our findings confirm our hypothe-sis: we find a positive relationship between transparency and FDI that is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level.

E.S. & M.S.

1 See Section 4 for a detailed explanation of the HRV Index.

A A CLEAR ADVANTAGE: THE BENEFITS OF TRANSPARENCY TO FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

A Clear Advantage:The Benefits of Transparency to Foreign Direct Investment

Does transparency attract foreign direct investment (FDI)? Our study takes a new approach, focusing on the dissemination of economic data as a key facet of transparency. We argue that the more transparent a government is in terms of the release and dissemination of economic data, the greater FDI that country will receive. Using the Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland (HRV) Index, which tracks data dissemination to the World Bank over 30 years in 125 countries, we demonstrate through quantitative analysis that there is a positive correlation between transparency and FDI. Our findings remain robust after controlling for a wide range of country-specific economic factors. We conclude that greater transparency does, in fact, correlate with greater FDI.

ELAINE SHEN ANDMIKE SLIWINSKI


28 29Ultimately, this study aims to show that increasing transparency does in fact cause greater amounts of FDI.

Our study proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we explore the existing literature on transparency and FDI, noting its strengths and shortcomings. Next, in Section 3, we elaborate on the theoreti-cal underpinning of our study to explain why the value of FDI increases with greater transparency. Section 4 and Section 5 respectively describe our independent and dependent variables and our methodological approach to analyzing the data. Our results are presented in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7 by discussing the implications of our findings, as well as areas for potential future research.

Existing Measures of TransparencyThe research in the field of transparency and its effect on economic factors often evaluates transparency alongside corruption and democracy – factors which impede the isolation of the effect of aggregate data dissemination specifically. Furthermore, the studies analyze a limited set of countries and years, which narrows the scope of their analysis and its broader significance. Our investigation addresses conceptual discrepancies and dataset limitations in these studies in order to make the relationship observed between transparency and FDI clear. Despite these differences, we draw from existing studies to form our baseline specifications.

Transparency is often measured in relation to business practices or government corruption. This association, though theoret-ically defensible, conflates the identity of transparency with other institutional and political factors. The inclusion of these factors makes the measurement of this broader definition of transparency more difficult. This in turn makes the link between transparency and FDI less clear. Zhao, Kim, and Du (2003), for example, study the relationship between corruption and FDI. Though their analysis operates on similar causal grounds as our own assertions, their study’s primary focus is not on transparency as understood as the provision of aggregate economic data, but rather on a broader characterization of a nation as “corrupt” in business practices. They evaluate corruption by ranking countries based on the competitiveness of businesses domestically and abroad. This study is hindered in its reliability by the highly subjective nature of its independent variable.

Jensen’s work on regime type and FDI inflows (2003) evaluates whether or not democracy has a significant effect on economic variables, including FDI. His findings indicate that regime type, measured using the Polity III Project dataset, influences the amount of FDI received by a country, finding specifically that more democratic governments tend to attract more foreign investment. Jensen’s multi-angled approach to testing the relationship includes controls for regime type, trade level, and market size as possi-

ble influential factors. His study, like that of Zhao, Kim, and Du (2003), does not objectively define transparency, but rather considers it indirectly through democratic governance. Our study accounts for the close relationship between democracy and transparency by controlling for the former.

The existing measures of transparency are flawed by their subjectivity. While these variables purport to provide a quantifiable insight into transparency, they fail to do so without introducing bias. One such variable is the Freedom House ranking of press freedom (Freedom House 2013), which is an annually-published measure of how free a nation’s press is. This measure is generated by a group of experts from Freedom House and is based on their qualitative, subjective analysis of “country narratives”. These narra-tives include political regime, media, and other social factors. The measure is flawed since its only quantitative facet is a trichoto-mous label of “Free”, “Partly Free”, or “Not Free”. Additionally, it does not examine the availability of aggregate economic data.

The Heritage Foundation creates an Index of Economic Free-dom, which is a wide-ranging unit that aims to capture everything from individual economic freedoms to property rights and govern-ment corruption (Heritage Foundation 2014). Again, this is compiled by experts at the Heritage Foundation in a largely subjec-tive process. As a result, the scope of the index confounds the variable of transparency with the other variables it examines. Even indices that focus directly on the quantitative effect of public sector corruption in business, such as the Transparency International Corruption Index (Transparency International 2013), are based on subjective expert opinion. The Index measures the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale from 0 (most corrupt) to 100 (least corrupt), accounting for bribery, scandals, and overall repu-tation of businesses. In short, measures such as the Freedom House rankings, the Heritage Foundation Index, and the Transparen-cy International Index may properly examine the quality of economic data provided, but do not fully consider the dissemination of that data or its objective provision by individual governments.

In contrast, other studies utilize more objective quantitative measures such as newspaper circulation (Adserá, Boix, and Payne 2005). This measure aims to capture not the substantive quality of information provided, but rather its dissemination. While this does consider the reach of data, which is not addressed by Freedom House, the Heritage Foundation, and Transparency International, it lacks qualitative substance. Newspapers, for example, could be provided en masse by the government, but may contain inaccu-rate information. There exists, then, a dilemma between finding a transparency measure which is both objective and accurately cap- tures the data provision of an entire country.

E.S. & M.S.A A CLEAR ADVANTAGE: THE BENEFITS OF TRANSPARENCY TO FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT


30 31Our study utilizes the HRV Index in order to reconcile the dispar-ity between the quality and dissemination of aggregate economic data. The HRV Index, as stated before, looks at the credibility and provision of data from countries to the World Bank’s WDI database, and therefore is both objective and pertinent to our study.

Furthermore, while the studies performed by other scholars in the field (Drabek and Payne 2002; Seyoum and Manyak 2009; Gelos and Wei 2002) may be similar to our own in vision and theory, they tend to be limited to a narrow timespan of approximately three years and about 20 – 50 countries. By limiting the scope of investigation, these studies may miss patterns that are only evident over longer periods of time, an important consideration when manag-ing investment. A study with so few countries either runs the risk of focusing too narrowly on a certain subset (i.e. developing nations, as in Seyoum and Manyak 2009) and thereby missing the experience of different subsets, or not thoroughly investigating each subset to make credible claims (i.e. only looking at a small number of countries in Africa, as in Drabek and Payne 2002). Our dataset, which contains 125 countries over 30 years, addresses the selection bias found in these studies in order to offer a more comprehensive analysis. This, in turn, informs our theoretical underpinning of the relationship between transparency and FDI.

Why Transparency Matters for FDIInvestors have a long-run stake in an economy when they undertake FDI. At lower levels of transparency, where the provision of aggregate economic data by governments is low, we expect to see less interest by foreign companies to entrust these nations’ economies with their investments. By contrast, countries that provide more credible information about their economies can attract more foreign investment. The logic for the relationship we propose is three- fold. Greater transparency is advantageous because it 1) reduces detrimental fixed costs associated with opaque regimes, 2) de-creases a company’s risk by facilitating the accurate prediction of returns, and 3) better facilitates a company’s ability to manage the investment through knowledge of macroeconomic policy.

First, increased transparency is linked with lower costs for companies with foreign investment endeavors (Zhao, Kim and Du 2003). It is not the nature of the data itself that is as influential in the explanation of this factor, but rather whether aggregate economic data is provided at all: countries which provide less data tend to do so because of inefficient or ineffective bureaucracies. This increases the transactions costs of doing business in that country by adding potential hidden costs such as slow licensing procedures, unpredictable or unclear changes in regulations on investments, and even bribes in order to accomplish regular business functions. It is in the best interest, therefore, of companies seeking to direct their

investment capital to do so in transparent regimes, and thereby avoid the associated structural costs of opaque economic data provision.

Since FDI comes from companies that seek to establish direct business investments in a country, it is more than merely buying stock in a foreign company. FDI is the wholesale establishment of business in a country—be it the building of factories, the opening of offices or vendors, or the joint ownership of domestic companies. As such, these companies seek, as with any investment, a degree of certainty in the security of their investment, particularly as FDI has a longer return horizon. If a country provides aggre-gate economic data, which includes the performance of the market as a whole, a company can more accurately predict the value of risk costs for that investment, which translates in turn to their ability to anticipate returns. While there would still be the normal risk associated with any business investment, transparency reduces the additional risk of an unclear economic profile in a country.

Lastly, transparency provides the added benefit of characteriz-ing an economy’s performance over time. This includes the actions of central banks, fiscal actors, and other macroeconomic forc-es and their summative effects on companies in that country. Monetary policy actions, which cause changes in real interest rates, have a very direct effect on investor decisions, and companies seeking to invest in foreign countries would benefit from knowledge of such macroeconomic policy. Additionally, information about how a certain country reacts to economic fluctuations and crises can provide illustrative insights into how investments in that country are affected. The provision of aggregate data would therefore help companies more accurately predict the stability of their investments in light of the business cycle.

On short, we contend that transparency has a substantial effect on increasing FDI because it makes investment less costly, more predictable, and more secure. These costs are progressively lower as transparency increases, and it is this fundamental causal mechanism which leads us to expect greater FDI with increas-ing transparency. In the next section, we describe how our measure of transparency demonstrates the benefit that aggregate data provision has on FDI.

Descriptive DataWe test the relationship between transparency and FDI using the HRV Index for our independent variable and the net inflows of FDI in millions of 2005 constant United States dollars (USD) for our dependent variable. These variables are defined in detail herein, as well as analyzed for their accuracy and precision in measuring our desired phenomenon.



32 33of almost $7.4 billion of FDI. It seems that there is a positive relation-ship between the level of transparency and the amount of FDI a country receives. This is shown in Figure 2, which presents a graph of the relationship between transparency and foreign direct investment (natural log of net inflows, BOP). However, the understand-ing gained from looking at only the descriptive statistics and graph leaves out numerous other important considerations, and ultimately may provide an erroneous analysis of the data. Due to the problem of multicollinearity, multiple factors may be driving the relationship between the level of transparency and FDI. It may also be the case that a limited set of countries is responsible for the relationship observed. In our Methodology section (Section 5) we describe a more sophisticated analysis, utilizing controls for the possible mitigating factors and country-specific conditions, which allows us to assert with greater confidence that there is a statistically significant relationship between transparency and FDI.

Figure 2 This graph demonstrates the relationship between transparency and FDI (net inflows).

MethodologyOur study uses an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to exam-ine the relationship between transparency and FDI. We control for a set of relevant factors discussed below. Additionally, all of our models control for country fixed effects and year fixed effects in order to address any unobserved heterogeneity across countries or over time.

Independent VariableWe use the HRV Index as our measure of transparency because it objectively measures the dissemination of credible aggregate economic information. The HRV Index is a continuous variable scaled from -10 to 10, with -10 being least transparent and 10 being most transparent. In this index, a country’s transparency is treated as a term that predicts the provision or omission of data using a Bayesian item response theory model. The creators of this Index select 240 economic indicators which aim to capture the transparency of the countries evaluated. These indicators come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), a wider set of 1,265 variables which detail a wide range of data across a variety of topics. The HRV Index pares down the dataset by dropping variables that are not measured in the time frame of the study, which are 1980 – 2010.

Furthermore, HRV drop data that is irrelevant to certain coun-tries (such as development assistance incomes for non-aid- receiving nations); data that is produced by outside agencies and not directly provided by individual governments; data that is a subset of a larger indicator (such as male labor force participation rate vs. total labor force participation rate); and data that reports the same variable in different units (such as measuring GDP in current USD, current local currency units, constant USD, etc.). The number of countries evaluated by HRV is limited to 125 because all microstates and all countries that did not exist, or which were unified from separate countries, between 1980 – 2010 are dropped. This leaves, in total, a dataset of 3,875 observations for the 125 countries over 31 years.

Dependent VariableFor our dependent variable, we focus our examination on the net inflow of FDI into a country. FDI is the value of direct investments in production or businesses in a foreign country, and we measure FDI in net inflows of millions of constant USD (World Bank 2013). We choose this measure as our dependent variable because among economic variables, we believe it to be the easiest to isolate from other influential factors; other possible variables such as foreign aid are affected by a wide array of economic, political, and social influ-ences (Lawrimore and Varghese 2014, Sielaff and Skillman 2014, Gadea and Gopalkrishnan 2014).

The descriptive statistics of our dataset, at first glance, support the hypothesis that FDI and transparency are indeed related. Tables 1a and 1b provide the statistics of our independent and depend-ent variables. We find that for countries with an HRV Index value of less than or equal to 0, the mean values of FDI are lower than those greater than 0. Values less than or equal to 0 have an average FDI of about $4.9 billion, while those greater than zero have an average


transparencyindex-10

-10

-50

510

15

-5 0 5 10

Inforeigndirect Fitted values


34 35The control variables are drawn from relevant literature. Some studies argue that the amount of FDI that a country receives is impacted by the size of its economy (Drabek and Payne 2001; Zurawicki 2003; Seyoum and Manyak 2009; Jensen 2003). We thus control for the natural log of GDP. We also control for the natural log of GDP per capita and GDP growth rate (Lim 1983). Jensen (2003) further suggests controlling for export growth rate and trade2, and argues that it is important to control for natural resource dependency when looking at FDI inflows to account for the correla-tion between FDI and natural resource wealth (2008). We control for these variables accordingly in our models.

Controls for democracy and natural resource dependency, measured by total natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP, are used to account for the possibility that the political regime of a country influences its prospective investments. Some studies (Jensen 2003; 2005; 2008) discuss the relationship between democracy and lower levels of risk, suggesting that this increases the amount of FDI that a country receives. Russett and Oneal (2001: Chapter 6) argue that democracies are more likely to trade with other democracies. By controlling for level of democracy, we also control for political corruption, which is often associated with certain political regime types (Lederman, Loayza, and Soares 2005). We use Polity IV’s Polity2 data as our measure of democracy, where democ-racy is measured on a 0 – 20 scale with 0 representing a low democ-racy level and 20 representing a high democracy level (Polity IV 2014). In Model 2, level of democracy is statistically significant, but it does not remain statistically significant as further controls are introduced.

Finally, we control for other economic factors that might affect investment in a country. These controls include real interest rate (in percentage), exchange rate (in average LCU per USD for a given period of time), and inflation in consumer prices, in annual percent. We base these controls on studies done by Drabek and Payne (2001) and Zhao, Kim, and Du (2003) that look at the relationship between transparency and FDI. Additionally, Seyoum and Manyak (2009) use CPI to control for the impact inflation would have on FDI.3 All three economic variables do not remain statistically significant or impact the relationship between transparency and FDI.

We recognize the potential endogeneity in the relationship between FDI and transparency in that there may be other omitted variables or reverse causality. It is possible that there are other factors driving the relationship, or that FDI causes an increase in transparency. However, we address this by controlling for a wide

range of factors that may influence the relationship. Our findings are robust, as the relationship remains statistically significant after applying a number of controls. Furthermore, after controlling for country fixed effects and year fixed effects, our results remain signifi-cant at the 99 percent confidence level, leading us to conclude that there is a relationship between FDI and transparency and that our results are not driven by the unique conditions of particular countries or any other influential factors. In future studies, we plan to use other methods such as an instrumental variable approach and the differences in differences method to address endogeneity. This is discussed further in the Conclusion section (Section 7).

ResultsTransparency and the natural log of FDI are the primary independent and dependent variables.4 Model 1 presents an OLS regression of transparency and the natural log of FDI. Controls for variables that are expected to affect net inflows of FDI are then added in. These controls include GDP (taken as a natural log), GDP growth (annual % growth), a trade variable that measures imports and exports as a percentage of total GDP (Jensen 2003), and democracy (measured with Polity2).

Model 3 utilizes the same controls as Model 2, but adds additional controls for GDP per capita (taken as a natural log), exports (annual % growth), real interest rate, exchange rate, inflation (CPI, annual %), and natural resource dependency (resource rents as a % of GDP). Finally, in Model 4 the statistically insignificant controls are dropped, leaving the controls of GDP, GDP growth, GDP per capita, exchange rate, and natural resource dependency.

Our results demonstrate that there is a statistically significant correlation between transparency and FDI. Even after controlling for the wide variety of factors, our results remain statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.5

ConclusionThe relationship between our variables empirically demonstrates that as a nation’s transparency increases, the amount of FDI it receives also increases. The provision of aggregate economic data is therefore clearly linked to inflows of investment from abroad. The causal logic states that due to the lower cost of business in transparent regimes, the increased ability to predict returns, and the added stability of investments through traceable economic policy, foreign investments are more favorable in transparent countries. Our data confirms this relationship, which remains robust when controlling for mitigating economic factors that could otherwise influence FDI.

A

4 In our appendix, we include Table 4, a comprehensive table of the bivariate regression between the independent variable (transpa-rency, HRV index) and depending variable (natural log FDI, net inflows), including all the controls that were used. 5 The Regression table for the data is available upon request.

E.S. & M.S.

2 Kim, Zhao, and Du (2003) use the export growth rate to quantify trade relations, measuring how a country’s external trade could affect its foreign direct investment inflows. Jensen uses a trade variable of exports plus imports divided by GDP to measure overall trade interactions with foreign countries, with respect to the size of the country’s economy. We utilize both measures and find that after controlling for other factors, neither trade variable is statistically significant. 3 Consumer price index (CPI) is utilized as the measure of inflation in our study because the GDP deflator only accounts for dome-stically produced goods and excludes price changes in imports

A CLEAR ADVANTAGE: THE BENEFITS OF TRANSPARENCY TO FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT


36 Our finding has pragmatic implications for both economic and political actions in nations evaluating future policy. Given the interplay between transparency and FDI, nations seeking to improve the attractiveness of their economies to foreign investors can improve their provision of accurate and accessible aggregate data. By doing so, they can demonstrate to investors the quality of their investment by presenting their economy candidly. Transparency serves as a benchmark of reliability. Greater FDI can serve as a source of capital in savings-strapped economies, which can facilitate greater production activity.

Further studies into the relationship between transparency and other economic variables could provide interesting insights into ways that transparency helps growth as a whole. While we narrowed our study to FDI, other influential growth factors like foreign aid, trade activity, and GDP growth rate could also be affected by trans-parency. These factors may contribute to a more complete picture of economic growth theory and the factors that affect it.

We recognize that our own study does not completely account for endogeneity in the relationship between transparency and FDI. Nonetheless, we begin to address this through our control variables, lagging the dependent variable, and country fixed effects. Further utilization of techniques such as an instrumental variable approach or the differences-in-differences method would enhance our ability to argue a causal link. A measure of countries providing funding to other countries for the express purpose of encouraging them to release economic data could be used as such an instrumental variable, while the differences-in-differences method would utilize a natural experiment to isolate our independent variable.

A transparent economic profile presents a country with an opportunity to increase its FDI. Our study lends strength to the notion that FDI is affected by investor pragmatism, and that if a more complete economic picture is provided, a country can increase investor confidence and thereby capital. When it comes to investment, the ready provision of aggregate economic data provides a clear advantage.

A

Part BPrize Winning


38 39In its 2014 progress report on the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the European Commission notes that the success of political and economic reform efforts of ENP countries in line with the European Union’s (EU) objectives has been largely uneven (European Commission 2014). While some of the EU’s ENP partner countries showed remarkable progress in complying with EU policy objectives, implementation prospects for EU rules seemed a lot less favourable in others (European Commis-sion 2014).

This assessment leaves researchers interested in the expan-sion of the EU’s rules beyond its borders with a puzzle. Which factors can explain why some of the EU’s neighbours fare better in complying with its rules than others? Arguing that the application of conditionality, offering third countries political and material rewards in return for compliance with the EU’s policy objectives, is unlikely to succeed in its own, this study assumes that functional cooperation through networks between EU officials and actors in ENP countries’ administrations can socialise the latter into embracing the EU’s norms and values, in turn enhancing the prospects for compliance with EU rules in ENP countries.

In order to test the plausibility of this argument, a new panel dataset providing information on variation in the features of network cooperation between the EU and ENP countries was compiled, providing researchers with a better understanding of how cooperation in the context of the ENP looks like on the ground, going beyond the analysis of formally agreed upon policy objectives. Fixed and random effects regression analyses are used to analyse the effects from variation in the novelty of institutional structures in ENP countries, the intensity of cooperation between EU officials and actors in ENP countries’ administrations, the coherence of the EU’s approach in promoting its rules, and policy areas’ varying degrees of politicisation.

This study is organized as follows: first, the theoretical founda-tions to analyse the EU’s rule expansion beyond its border are outlined, highlighting the effects of network governance in the context of the ENP. Then, a set of hypotheses detailing the causal pattern between compliance with EU rules in third countries and features of network cooperation between the EU and ENP partners is developed, drawing on insights from the socialisation literature. There-upon, the study’s research design is described and the results of the regression analyses presented. Finally, the findings of this study are discussed, followed by a concluding summary.

Expanding EU Rules Beyond EU BordersRecent academic literature examining the effectiveness of EU foreign policy in influencing policy arrangements in third countries, particularly within the EU’s neighbourhood, has produced a wide

B P.S.IPPR 2015PRIZE WINNING

MAKING CONDITIONALITY WORK? ACTOR SOCIALISATION THROUGH NETWORK GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD

This study seeks to explain variation in compliance with European Union (EU) rules among the EU’s neighbouring countries com- prised by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Assuming that the application of conditionality, offering third countries political and material rewards in return for compliance with the EU’s policy objectives, is unlikely to succeed in its own, this study argues that functional cooperation through networks between EU officials and actors in ENP countries’ administrations can socialise the latter into embracing the EU’s norms and values. Cooperation through functional networks thus in turn enhances the prospects for compli-ance with EU rules in ENP countries. A new panel dataset providing information on variation in the features of network cooperation between the EU and ENP countries was compiled to conduct regres-sion analyses examining the effects from variation in the novelty of institutional structures in ENP countries, the intensity of coopera-tion between EU officials and actors in ENP countries’ administrations, the coherence of the EU’s approach in promoting its rules, and policy areas’ varying degrees of politicisation, on compliance prospects for EU rules in ENP countries.

Making Conditionality Work? Actor Socialisation through Network Governance in the European NeighbourhoodPHILIPPSCHROEDER

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array of factors affecting compliance prospects for EU rules beyond its borders. Among the most prominent factors are the reinforcement of compliance with EU rules through political and material rewards (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz 2008: 190), the provision of advice on how to adapt to EU models of policy-making through transnational expert networks (Börzel & Risse 2012: 197), the degree of preferential fit between the political agenda of elites in third countries and EU rule objectives (Ademmer & Börzel 2013: 581), and the EU’s coherence in the use of its foreign policy instruments (Thomas 2012: 457). Comparable to the mixture of factors affecting EU Member States’ compliance with supranational legislation within the EU (Toshkov 2010), the largely inconclusive results produced by the academic literature suggest that there is no single factor accounting for compliance with EU rules in third countries in its own. Instead, it is more likely that variation in the EU’s success of expand-ing its rules beyond its borders can be attributed to an interplay between several factors, leaving researchers with the question which of these factors predominantly drives compliance with EU rules in third countries, and under which conditions.

Modes of EU External GovernanceLavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009: 796) note that the institutional forms through which the EU seeks to promote its rules beyond its borders vary between different policy areas and regions, which in turn has repercussions on the mechanisms of EU rule expansion. Understanding governance as institutionalised forms of co-ordinated actions that aim at the production of collectively binding agreements, they draw on the concept of external governance modes, which serve as heuristic devices to distinguish between these different institutional forms characterising EU-third country relations (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009: 795 – 796).

EU external governance modes display variation on two dimensions: the regulatory level of rule expansion and the organizational level of rule-making (Lavenex et al. 2009: 815). The regulatory dimension is based on the concept of legalization (Abbott et al. 2000: 403 – 404), with rules displaying variation in their degree of obligation (i.e. whether rules are legally binding), their degree of flexibility (i.e. whether there is room for rule interpretation), and their degree of delegation (i.e. whether compliance with a rule is subject to judicial or political control). On the other hand, according to Lavenex et al. (2009: 815), the organizational dimension refers to the institutionalisation of EU-third country relations, asking whether coordination is characterised by formal and centralized macro- institutional structures (centralization), whether interactions occur on a pre-set and frequent basis or in an ad-hoc fashion (density), and whether the subject of co-ordination is confined to rules prede-termined by the EU or characterised by a common agenda (exclusive-

ness). Based on variation on the regulatory and organizational dimensions, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009: 796 – 800) differen-tiate between three different types of external governance modes: hierarchical governance, network governance, and market governance.

On the regulatory dimension, hierarchical governance is defined by a strong role of European law, predetermined obligations for third countries set by the EU’s acquis communautaire and independent judicial review of third countries’ conduct, while its organizational dimension is characterised by a profound asym- metry between the EU (the ruler) and third countries (the ruled), formal and centralized macro-institutions, and little room for third countries to negotiate on their commitments (Lavenex et al. 2009: 815). Thus, hierarchy can be described as “a relationship of superiority and subordination in which one party unilaterally expands predetermined parts of its regulative boundary to the other without, however, allowing for the latter’s participation in the determination of these obligations or organizational inclusion in the policy frameworks where these obligations are shaped” (Lavenex 2008: 941).

Network governance, on the other hand, describes a relation-ship in which actors are formally equal, with third countries jointly agreeing with the EU on the focus of their policy cooperation, enabling the former to bring in their own priorities (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009: 797 – 798). Furthermore, in a network frame-work, central co-ordination structures go along with decen- tralized interactions, which are dealing with international law and voluntary agreements that are inspired but not predetermined by the EU’s acquis, and are not subject to judicial but political moni-toring (Lavenex et al. 2009: 815 – 816). Accordingly, Lavenex (2008: 943) notes that in contrast to hierarchy, “[t]he process-oriented, horizontal, voluntaristic and inclusionary attributes of network governance allow for the extension of norms and rules that goes along with participatory openness in decision-making processes and practices”.

Finally, similar to network governance, market governance is characterised by a formal equality between the EU and third countries, yet “outcomes are the result of competition between formal-ly autonomous actors rather than the result of hierarchical har- monization or networked co-ordination” (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009: 799 – 800).

Knill and Tosun (2009: 875) emphasize that the concept of external governance modes helps to understand the causal relationship between (non-)compliance with EU rules in third countries and the myriad of factors, which are assumed to influence the EU’s effectiveness in promoting its rules beyond its borders, overcom-ing the black box problem that arises in all modes of causal inference.

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Rule Expansion in the EU’s Neighbourhood: Challenging Hierarchy and ConditionalityAmong scholars seeking to explain (non-)compliance with EU rules in third countries, the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has received special attention (Kelley 2006; Youngs 2009; Langbein & Börzel 2013). In the light of an increasingly complex interdependence between the EU and its neighbouring countries, the Euro-pean Commission issued a strategy paper in May 2004, initiating the ENP as a basis to develop new policies towards the EU’s Medi-terranean and East European neighbours (European Commis- sion 2004). The ENP comprises 16 of the EU’s regional neighbouring countries – Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine – offering them a privileged relationship based on a mutual commitment to common values, and cover- ing a broad range of sector policies reaching from employment and social policy, to agriculture and rural development, climate change and energy security, as well as support to health, education, culture and youth (European External Action Service 2014). While the ENP was modelled on the EU’s enlargement process, it specifically refrains from offering ENP countries a membership perspective (Kelley 2006: 30).

In the recent academic literature, specific attention has been devoted to the contrast between expanding EU rules to ENP countries through horizontal network governance and hierarchical EU policy transfer through conditionality (Lavenex 2008: 941). Several scholars have highlighted the positive effects of conditionality – a “bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward, under which the EU provides external incentives for a target government to comply with its conditions” (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004: 662) – on compliance with EU rules in third countries (Sedel- meier 2012: 36; Trauner 2009: 775). For instance, analysing the effectiveness of the EU’s democracy promotion in its Eastern and Mediterranean neighbourhood between 1988 and 2004, Schim-melfennig and Scholtz (2008: 188) assume that political accession conditionality, defined as the credible perspective of becoming an EU member after thorough reform, is a necessary condition and instrumental in overcoming domestic obstacles to institutional and policy reform in third countries. Their results show that EU political accession conditionality is indeed a robustly significant, strong and positive correlate of democratization in the European neighbour-hood (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz 2008: 207 – 211). Taking into account that political accession conditionality is less likely to provide credible incentives for ENP countries lacking a formal membership perspective, Trauner (2009: 775 – 776) argues that the EU man-aged to fill its conditionality approach under the ENP with more substance by offering policy related incentives, i.e. through relaxing

EU-third country visa regimes in exchange for reform of domestic justice and home affairs.

Nonetheless, notwithstanding the potential success of policy-specific conditionality, several scholars question the transform-ative power of the ENP in the EU’s neighbourhood, as implementation costs for EU rules are likely to be too high for third country governments in the absence of a credible membership perspective (Gould 2004: 195 – 196; Schimmelfennig 2005: 835; Schimmelfennig 2009: 20 – 21). Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2008: 21 – 212) assume that the ENP will have at best uncertain and inconsistent effects, as it in addition to the lack of a membership perspective does not set high political standards for participation. This assumption appears to be justified given the largely successful transfer of EU rules to enlargement countries (Sedelmeier 2012: 35), contrasted by a relatively lower success of the EU’s promotion of its acquis in ENP countries (Ademmer & Börzel 2013: 582). However, given that policy-specific compliance exists side by side with resistance against EU demands for change in ENP countries (Ademmer & Börzel 2013: 581), it is possible that the features of conditionality might be complemented by other mechanisms, leading to the expansion of EU rules beyond its borders (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004: 662). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004: 662) note that the mechanism through which third countries comply with EU rules might relate to processes of persuasion and learning, assuming that EU officials can socialise actors in third countries into changing their preference and beliefs in line with EU objectives. A focus on ENP country actors’ preferences and beliefs appears promising, as Ademmer and Börzel (2013: 581) argue that in the absence of a credible membership perspective, policy-specific conditionality will only be successful if it goes hand in hand with the +preferential fit between an EU policy and the political agenda of incumbent elites.

Network Cooperation in ENP CountriesReferring back to Lavenex and Schimmelfennig’s (2009: 798) heuris-tic device of external governance modes to describe institutional forms of EU-third country relations, the ENP appears to resemble the features of network governance, rather than hierarchy. Within the framework of the ENP, third countries define priority areas for their co-ordination with the EU, which are then codified in mutually agreed upon ENP Action Plans (Youngs 2009: 897). The policy priorities outlined in these Action Plans are then translated into multi- annual National Indicative Programmes for each ENP country, detailing the specific actions to be taken to implement the envisioned aims and objectives (European Commission 2004: 24 – 25). These actions, providing sectoral technical assistance to ENP countries in the defined priority policy areas, are financed by the European

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Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which was designed to assist the implementation of the ENP through a single policy-driven instrument, and replaced a number of existing instruments under the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) and European-Mediterranean partnership (MEDA) programmes prior to the ENP (Official Journal of the European Union 2006).

Furthermore, within the National Indicative Programmes particular attention was devoted to institution building in partner countries through the instrument of Twinning (European Commission 2004: 25). Twinning was made available for the EU’s Mediter- ranean ENP partner countries in 2004 and its Eastern neighbours in 2005, and is defined as a tool for cooperation between a sub- unit of the public administration in a neighbouring country and the equivalent institution in an EU member state (Freyburg 2011: 1009 – 1010). In the context of a Twinning project, a team of Europe-an experts relocates its offices to ENP country administrations in order to assist the beneficiary departments in seeking an effective response to policy problems through training and reorganization as well as by drafting laws and regulations modelled after the EU’s acquis (Freyburg 2011: 1009 – 1010).

Accordingly, the involvement of ENP countries in the formula-tion of their commitments under the ENP and the fact that the speed of the envisioned harmonisation is determined by political elites in ENP countries, indicates an at least formal equality between the co-ordination parties (Youngs 2009: 897). Furthermore, the joint elaboration of ENP Action Plans, the joint evaluation of progress in Association Councils, as well as attempts to establish stable communication between sectoral experts in the framework of the ENP, represent elements of network governance (Lavenex & Schimmelfen-nig 2009: 798). Emphasizing especially the importance of technical cooperation between EU and third country experts, Wolczuk (2009: 191) notes that “the enactment of EU-defined polity and policy changes requires not only consistent, visible commitment and support from the highest state authorities, but it also needs to be institutionalised in an appropriate coordinating framework and accompanied by the development of considerable administrative capacity”. Analysing the ENP’s impact on policy changes in Ukraine between 2005 and 2007, she concludes that, although the overall implementation of Ukraine’s Action Plan was slow and incomplete, the ENP had a tangible effect on actors within the state administration (Wolczuk 2009: 208). This assessment falls in line with findings highlighting that transnational expert networks established through the ENP foster interaction between EU and third country actors on a technical level, exposing elites in third countries to the EU’s acquis and administrative policy-making on the level of administrative experts (Freyburg et al. 2009: 918), and changing domestic

elites’ dispositions to EU rules through communication and personal experiences (Freyburg 2011: 1005).

Overcoming Reform Obstacles through Network GovernanceBased on the observations outlined above, this study argues that although the application of conditionality – particularly policy- specific conditionality – is not absent in the EU’s attempts to expand its rules to ENP countries, it is eventually the interaction between state actors in ENP countries and EU officials through network cooperation, which induces the former to lower their reservations against domestic reform along the EU’s objectives. Offering policy- specific rewards in exchange for the implementation of EU rules in ENP countries is unlikely to succeed on its own, given that political elites in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes in ENP are unwilling to bear the political and material costs of democratic reform in the absence of a credible membership perspective (Schimmelfen-nig 2005: 835). However, arguing that political elites’ preferences and beliefs are not static but subject to potential change, close and frequent interactions between state actors in ENP countries and EU officials through network cooperation, can initiate processes of socialisation and social learning, changing the formers’ preferences and interests along EU objectives, in turn increasing the likelihood for ENP countries to positively respond to policy-specific rewards and comply with EU rules (Börzel & Risse 2012: 195; Freyburg et al. 2009: 918; Freyburg 2011: 1004, Youngs 2009: 897). Yet, as researchers are still faced with variation in compliance with EU rules across policy areas and ENP countries, the following section will combine findings from the literature on socialisation and the EU’s external governance in order to develop testable hypothesis to assess the plausibility of the argument outlined above.

Causal Patterns of EU Rule Expansion through Network GovernanceThe notion that technical cooperation and interpersonal communica-tion between actors can serve as the vehicle to affect changes in preferences and beliefs reinvigorates a neo-functionalist line of reasoning (Checkel 2005: 802). Beyers (2005: 908) notes that socialisation is a crucial component in neo-functionalist definitions of European regional integration, arguing that “interactions cutting across national borders gradually socialize actors, supranational and domestic elites, into adopting pro-European norms and practices”. Hooghe (2005: 858) defines this process of socialisation as “the process of inducting individuals into the norms and rules of a given community”. Actors are assumed to switch from choosing between different policy options based on a conscious instrumental calculation of costs and benefits, to behaving in line with new, external norms by learning a role, or even adopt interests and beliefs

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of the community they become part of, because they perceive these new norms as the right thing to do (Checkel 2005: 804). Thus, actors gradually switch from a logic of consequences, basing their behaviour on cost-benefit calculations, to a logic of appropriateness, embracing and eventually internalizing previously foreign norms (Checkel 2005: 804).

The EU’s socialising potential has been highlighted by a number of scholars (Beyers 2005; Hooghe 2005; Kerr 1973; Johnston 2005). While the exposure of actors in ENP countries to EU affairs is a necessary condition for socialisation processes to take effect, variation in the nature of the institutions involved in EU-third country cooperation, the intensity of the cooperation, features of different policy areas, and the EU’s coherence in promoting its rules beyond its borders are assumed to account for varying compliance patterns across policy areas and countries in the frame-work of the ENP.

Novelty and UncertaintyWolczuk’s (2009: 208) analysis of the ENP’s success in inducing policy reform in Ukraine revealed that the domestic institutional context in ENP countries matters in overcoming obstacles to policy reform along the EU’s aims and objectives. She observes that following an intensification of cooperation with the EU, new adminis-trative structures were created within Ukraine’s bureacracy, which acquired the necessary expertise and competences to align Ukraine with the provisions of EU cooperation, and subse- quently “became key agents for Europeanisation of Ukraine within the ENP” (Wolczuk 2009: 195). Thus, her observations warrant a closer look at ENP countries’ administrative structures responsible for handling EU cooperation.

Hooghe (2005: 866) emphasizes that socialising effects in international institutions largely depend on actors’ experiences within these institutional contexts. Arguing that initial experiences are more influential than subsequent ones, she assumes that actors in novel institutional contexts are more likely to be disoriented and eager to conform with new norms and perceptions, and thus more susceptible to persuasion efforts and more disposed to copy what others do (Hooghe 2005: 866). Furthermore, Checkel (2001: 562) assumes that argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when actors are in novel and uncertain institutional envi- ronments, as they are more cognitively motivated to analyse new information. Promoting argumentative and deliberative behaviour in novel institutional contexts in turn goes hand in hand with a greater likelihood of actors changing their interests, beliefs and perceptions, as actors’ goals switch from attaining their fixed prefer-ences to seeking reasoned consensus (Risse 2000: 7).

Combining Wolczuk’s (2009: 195) observations and the assumptions of the socialisation literature on actors’ behaviour in novel institutional contexts suggests that newly established administrative structures in ENP countries responsible for co-ordinating EU support (institutional novelty) provide a favourable institutional context for changes in third country elites’ preferences and beliefs along the objectives of the ENP. Based on this assumption, the following hypothesis can be formulated:

H1: Greater institutional novelty increases the likelihood for compliance with EU rules in third countries.

Given that EU-third country cooperation within the ENP generally does not run through a single institution but usually involves a wide variety of stakeholders in third countries, the specific assumption of this study based on H1 is that newly established struc-tures in ENP countries’ state administrations dominating EU cooperation are more likely to promote compliance with EU rules in third countries, than if they take up subordinate roles, or if no specific structures for EU cooperation are established at all.

IntensityFreyburg (2011: 1009 – 1010) notes the importance of the depth and frequency of EU-third country cooperation within the ENP, particularly highlighting the effects of Twinning projects, as they “are based on intensive working relations on a day-to-day basis between European and neighbourhood country officials for a considerable period of time”. Analysing two EU-Moroccan Twinning projects, her study showed that despite a seemingly stable authoritarian regime in Morocco, close technical cooperation between EU and ENP country officials did not only leave its imprint in domestic law codes, but also positively shaped the attitudes of state officials towards democratic governance (Freyburg 2011: 1017).

Her findings echo arguments brought forward by the literature on socialisation in international institutions. Building upon the necessary condition of actors’ exposure to EU affairs for the transfer of European values, Beyers (2005: 911) argues that especially time-demanding and intense interactions induce actors exposed to EU affairs to change their interests and beliefs along EU objectives and norms. Essentially, it is assumed that a frequent and close contact within an institutional context between actors promoting a particular norm and actors exposed to this – to them foreign – norm allows the latter to better understand how to behave appropri-ately in this context, and eventually internalize this new norm through social learning and normative suasion (Checkel 2005: 810 – 811).

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Again, combining the findings highlighted by Freyburg (2011: 1017) and the assumptions of the socialisation literature suggests that particularly time-consuming and intense interactions between EU and third country officials (intensity) induces the latter to depart from a strict adherence to the norms and values prevalent in their domestic context and more closely align their behaviour to European norms and values. Thereupon, the following hypothesis can be formulated:

H2: Greater intensity of cooperation increases the likelihood for compliance with EU rules in third countries.

Within the context of this study, given that all ENP countries are subject to cooperation projects financed by the ENPI, while the use of Twinning projects intensifying interactions between specific administrative units in ENP countries with their counterpart from an EU Member State varies across countries (Freyburg 2011: 1009 – 1010), it is assumed that actors in ENP country administrations benefitting from Twinning projects are more likely to promote domestic compliance with EU rules, than actors experiencing less intense interactions with EU officials.

CoherenceWithin the academic literature seeking to explain the (in-)effectiveness of EU foreign policy, variation in the degree of coherence among EU Member States in employing the EU’s foreign policy instruments is frequently cited as one of the most decisive factors (Smith 2006; Groenleer & Van Schaik 2007; Thomas 2012). Defining policy coherence as the adoption and pursuit of determinate common policies by EU Member States, Thomas (2012: 458 – 459) notes that for the success of EU foreign policy it is essential that EU Member States commonly agree on well-defined policy objectives and in turn fully support whatever policy has been agreed upon. This assumption resonates with findings regarding the expansion of EU rules beyond its borders, highlighting that the more a rule is supported from within the EU, the more likely it is that third countries will accept this rule as the basis of negotiations, adopt it, and apply it (Schimmel- fennig & Sedelmeier 2005: 19).

Inter alia examining socialisation effects of coherence in international institutions, Hooghe (2005: 865) notes that the sociali-sation literature predicts that cohesive organizations are better at socialising agents than fragmented organizations. It is assumed that actors fashioning a coherent approach in promoting their norms and values can act as authoritative figures of a group, enhancing their prospects of changing others’ interests and perceptions through arguing and persuasion (Checkel 2005: 812 – 813).

In the context of the ENP, it can thus be assumed that EU officials who can build on well-defined policy objectives and unequiv-

ocal support from EU institutions and Member States for these objectives (coherence), are better at socialising actors in ENP countries into conforming to the EU’s norms and values, in turn enhancing the prospects for compliance with EU rules. Thus, the following hypothesis can be formulated:

H3: Greater coherence increases the likelihood for compliance with EU rules in third countries.

As this study covers the period from 2006 until 2013, coopera-tion projects between the EU and third countries agreed upon and financed in the context of the TACIS and MEDA programmes are included in the analysis. Based upon H3, this study specifically expects that projects implemented in the context of the ENP are more likely to increase compliance with EU rules in third countries than TACIS and MEDA projects, as they can build upon well-defined policy objectives outlined in the National Indicative Programmes, which in turn reflect objectives for all 16 ENP countries commonly agreed upon by EU Member States, and are financed through a single instrument, the ENPI.

PoliticisationThe effects of different policy areas on the prospects of success of foreign policy have long been debated in the academic literature (Potter 1980: 406). Inter alia examining the effects of variation in the degree of ENP policy areas’ politicisation, Freyburg (2011:1010) argues that “if inter-administrative cooperation occurs in less politicized settings, interaction among the participants is more intense and trustworthy, which, in turn, makes attitude change towards democrat-ic governance more likely”. Similar effects can be expected from the publicity of a policy area, as the stakes in a policy issue are increasing with the publicity of negotiations, making reasonable deliberation less likely and actors more resistant to others argumenta-tive influences (Chambers 2004: 399). Yet, given that the degree of publicity of transnational cooperation through expert networks such as in the ENP is generally low (Freyburg 2011: 1010), a focus on the politicisation of policy issues appears justified.

Analysing the effects of political deliberation in the EU’s Coun-cil of Ministers, Naurin (2010: 33) observes that deliberation between actors is more likely to take hold in less politically heated conditions, specifically non-politicised, technical issues and soft law, than under more demanding political circumstances. He argues that actors’ high stakes in a particular policy issue increase the pressure on negotiators, in turn restricting their thinking and making them “more defensive, more focused on protecting their own interests, less prepared to reach out to others and to open their minds for the arguments and perspectives of others” (Naurin

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2010: 34). Thus, high politicisation of a policy issue leads to bargaining among actors, involving a greater focus on rational calculation rather than openness to others’ perceptions, and diminishing the prospects for socialisation effects (Naurin 2010: 34).

Accordingly, in the context of the ENP it can be expected that policy areas in which actors in ENP countries have relatively low stakes and little to lose in the face of reform, are more likely to set the stage for argumentative deliberation and a change in actors preferences and interests, than reform in policy areas which touch upon the political and material power bases of domestic elites in third countries (politicisation). Thus, the following hypothesis can be formulated:

H4: Greater politicisation decreases the likelihood for compliance with EU rules in third countries.

Comparing compliance with EU rules in ENP countries in two policy areas with varying degrees of politicisation, this study specifically expects that the analysis of the policy area with a lower level of politicisation is more likely to produce statistically significant effects, as well as stronger effects of the independent variables included in H1 – H3 (institutional novelty, intensity, and coherence), than the policy area with a relatively higher level of politicisation.

Research DesignIn order to test the hypotheses outlined above, a new dataset providing a closer insight into network cooperation between the EU and all but one of the ENP countries during the period from 2006 until 2013 was compiled.1 The following sections provide an overview over the operationalization of the independent and dependent variables, introduce a number of control variables included in the analysis, and specify the method of data analysis.

The Dependent VariableSeeking to clarify the different stages of compliance with EU rules in third countries, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009: 800) dif- ferentiate between rule selection, rule adoption and rule application. Rule selection measures whether and to what extent EU rules constitute the normative reference point of EU–third-country relations, while rule adoption refers to whether EU rules selected for international negotiations and agreements are then also transposed into third country’s domestic legislation (Lavenex & Schimmel- fennig 2009: 800 – 801). Essentially, these two stages focus on third countries’ level of rhetorical commitment and pledges to reform policy arrangements in line with EU objectives, as well as formal

measures to translate EU rules into domestic legislation (Langbein & Börzel 2013: 572). Yet, rhetorical commitment to EU rules and formal adoption do not necessarily result in rule application, which asks whether EU rules are in fact acted upon in political and administrative practices in third countries, thus constituting the deepest impact of EU external governance (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009: 801). Freyburg et al. (2009: 928 – 929) observe that although the EU’s ENP has had an impact on legislation in third countries, the application of these legislative measures has been considerably weaker. Despite the higher obstacles to rule application, as this study neither focuses on the negotiations on the contents of ENP Action Plans nor political processes in ENP countries leading to the adoption of EU-conform legislative measure, but the actual effects of EU-third country cooperation through network cooperation, the definition of compliance with EU rules here follows the logic of rule application.

To measure compliance with EU rules, two policy areas of EU-third country cooperation were selected, which both represent key cornerstones of the ENP framework and provide indicators, which allow the assessment of changes in third countries’ actual policy practices: the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms and measures to support the development of diversified energy sources in ENP countries.

A commonly used indicator assessing countries’ compliance with internationally accepted human rights standards is Freedom House’s Freedom in the World index. Building on survey ratings and narrative reports, the index provides an assessment of the application of political rights and civil liberties in 195 countries, ranking them on a scale from 1 (free country) to 7 (not free country) in 0.5 intervals (Freedom House 2014). Data providing information on the selected 15 ENP countries’ human rights performances is available for the period between 2006 and 2013. To make the interpretation of the analyses’ results more straightforward, the index is recoded into a 13-point scale, with lower scores indicating weaker compliance and higher scores indicating stronger compliance with international human rights standards.An indicator allowing for the assessment of third countries’ success in promoting the diversification of energy sources is provided by the World Data Bank’s Alternative and Nuclear Energy Use index, which measures the percentage of a countries’ non-carbo-hydrate energy use of their total energy use (World Data Bank 2014).2 As ENP countries’ percentage scores theoretically range from 0 (no use of alternative energy sources at all) to 100 (only use of alternative energy sources), higher scores on the index indicate a greater diversification of energy sources. The World Data Bank’s

1 Due to data scarcity across several of the examined variables, Palestine was excluded from the analysis. 2 Non-carbohydrate energy here refers to energy sources, which do not produce carbon dioxide when generated, and inter alia include hydropower and nuclear, geothermal, and solar power (World Data Bank 2014).

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Alternative and Nuclear Energy Use index does not provide data on the selected ENP countries for every single time period, thus to ensure a balanced panel dataset, missing data for single years was replaced by countries’ average percentage score of the previous and subsequent years, or the equivalent of the previous year if the missing data occurred in the final time period of this study.

The Independent VariablesAs this study is interested in examining the effects of variation in the features of cooperation networks involving EU officials and third coun-try actors in the framework of the ENP, the analysis of publicly available Action Fiches for EU cooperation projects in its neighbour-ing countries, ENP Country Progress Reports and additional sources of information published by the EU, build the backbone of the ENP Network Cooperation Dataset compiled for this study. Especially the EU’s Action Fiches provide ample information on the actors involved and actual procedures of cooperation between the EU and third countries, both for the TACIS and MEDA pro-grammes as well as the ENP. Outlining detailed objectives of individ-ual cooperation projects, describing stakeholders and institutions involved in the projects in ENP countries, providing information on complementary actions as well as detailing implementation calen-dars, these documents allow researchers to gain a better understanding of how cooperation between the EU and ENP countries looks like on the ground, going beyond the analysis of formally agreed upon policy objectives contained in the ENP’s Action Plans. Where possible, the rather technical information contained in these documents was supported by a more narrative context provided by ENP Country Progress Reports, press releases and ENP memos, which were largely used to cross-verify the assessments made based on the information contained in the Action Fiches. For those years where Action Fiche documents were not available for individual countries, complementary information contained in subsequent years’ documents was used to reconstruct and appropri-ately code EU-ENP cooperation. An overview over all documents used to compile the panel dataset for this study is provided in Annex 1.

In order to measure three of the four independent variables outlined above – institutional novelty, intensity and coherence – a qualitative content analysis of these documents was conducted. The variables’ categories were refined during a pre-test of the documents including four countries from the EU’s Southern and East-ern neighbourhood: Armenia, Egypt, Tunisia and Ukraine. The coding manual providing specific information on recording units and the coding protocol is included in Annex 2. For every single year it was analysed whether an ENP country benefitted from a cooperation project relating to the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as the diversification of energy sources. Thereupon,

individualvalues for the independent variables institutional novelty, intensity and coherence were coded for these projects. Furthermore, given that the actual implementation of cooperation projects did not start before the signing of a financing agreement between the EU and the respective ENP country, which was generally completed before the end of the year the project was agreed upon, the variable’s values were coded starting in the following year.

Based upon insights from the pre-test of the qualitative content analysis instrument, the independent variable institutional novelty was measured on a 4-point scale. If no cooperation project relating to either human rights or energy policy was implemented in an ENP country during a specific year, this country received the value 0 (no cooperation). Years in which a human rights or energy policy cooperation project was implemented, yet lacked an involvement of newly established administrative structures in ENP countries, were coded as 1 (low institutional novelty). If new administrative structures were involved in the implementation of a cooperation project, yet played a subordinate role to other parts of an ENP country’s bureaucracy, the value 2 was assigned (medium institutional novelty) for this particular year. Finally, if an ENP country established a new administrative unit responsible for co-ordinating EU support, which took up a leading role in the implementation of an ENP cooperation project, the value 3 (high institutional novelty) was assigned for this year.

Basing the understanding of the intensity of cooperation on Freyburg’s (2011: 1009 – 1010) assessment that EU-ENP country cooperation building upon a Twinning project constitutes a particularly intensive type of interaction, the independent variable intensi-ty was measured via individual dummy variables for both policy areas. ENP countries were assigned with the value 1 (high intensity) for years in which a Twinning project relating to the promotion of human rights and the diversification of energy sources was implement-ed, and the value 0 (low intensity) for years in which no such project was implemented.

In order to measure the effects of varying coherence in the EU’s approach to promoting its rules in third countries, this study compares the effects of actions financed under the TACIS and MEDA programmes, and actions financed in the context of the ENP through the ENPI. In adopting the ENPI as its single instrument to finance the promotion of EU rules in third countries replacing a number of previously existing instruments, the EU attempted to enhance the coherence of its approach (Official Journal of the European Union 2006: 2). In addition, given that the ENP brings the EU’s Mediterranean and Eastern neighbours into a single policy framework building on common overall aims, it is assumed that the ENP also ex- emplifies a more coherent approach in terms of its policy objectives, compared to the EU’s TACIS and MEDA programmes. Thus,

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coherence is measured via a dummy variable, with ENP countries assigned with value 1 (higher coherence) for years in which a cooperation project financed by the ENPI in the context of the ENP was implemented, and the value 0 (lower coherence) for years in which a project financed in the context of the TACIS or MEDA programmes was implemented.

Finally, in order to measure the independent variable politicisation, Freyburg’s (2011: 1010) insights on the classification of the politicisation of policy issues in the context of the ENP as low, medium or high derived from interviews with third country state officials, journalists, and non-governmental activists as well as representatives of international organizations, EU Member States and European Commission delegations, are used. Here findings show that policy issues touching upon internally sensitive issue and material and political power bases of incumbent elites in third countries can be regarded as highly politicised, whereas issues impeded by lesser political considerations display lower degrees of politicisation (Freyburg 2011: 1010 – 1011). Specifically, pitting economic development objectives against political power interests of elites in third countries, it can be assumed that the latter shows a higher degree of politicisation than the former. (Freyburg 2011: 1010 – 1011). Relating these observations to the two policy fields selected for this study, it can be assumed that cooperation projects relating to the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms are impeded by a higher degree of politicisation than projects promoting the diversification of energy sources: while the latter are likely to pit business interests in third countries against policy objectives outlined in EU cooperation projects, making the implementation of EU rules more costly for third countries, it can be assumed that these costs are still lower for political elites in ENP countries than those con- nected to the implementation of EU rules on human rights, as restric-tions on media freedom, political opposition and the rule of law are likely to be closely linked to the survival of incumbent authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes in ENP countries. In order to measure the effects of politicisation, the results of the analysis of the effects of the independent variables institutional novelty, intensity and coherence are compared for the two policy areas, expecting in line with H4 that substantive effects of cooperation in energy policy are likely to be higher than in human rights policy.3

Control VariablesAs it cannot be assumed that (non-)compliance with EU rules in third countries can be entirely explained through variation in the features of network cooperation between EU and ENP officials, several additional factors need to be controlled for in the context of this

study. While Freyburg et al. (2011: 1043) found that EU membership aspirations of ENP countries, which can be assumed to increase third countries’ expected rewards from EU cooperation despite the lack of a formal membership perspective offered through the ENP, did not have an effect on compliance prospects with EU rules, other scholars highlighted that a high capacity of third countries’ bureau-cracies increases the prospects for their compliance with EU rules (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009: 805). Here, capacity is defined as a state’s ability to act based the sum of its legal authority as well as its financial and human resources (Börzel et al. 2010: 1369). An indicator commonly used to measure state capacity is the Worldwide Governance Indicators project’s Government Effectiveness index (World Bank Group 2013). Based on 32 data sources, the index provides information on the perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy for- mulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies (Kaufmann et al. 2010: 4). The index provides data up until 2012, thus to ensure a balanced panel dataset, values for the year 2013 were based on countries’ values from the preceding year.

In addition, influences from other international and transnational actors are likely to affect compliance prospects with EU rules in third countries (Langbein & Börzel 2013: 577). Although the EU is often portrayed as a key promoter of convergence with EU policies, Langbein and Börzel (2013: 577) argue that “the EU is far from being the only, and not necessarily even the most important, external actor that shapes policy change”. In order to control for projects from other international actors such as the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank, as well as transnational actors such as the United States’ Agency for International Development, which are assumed to reinforce compliance with the EU’s aims and objectives (external support), a dummy variable is created, with the value 1 assigned for ENP countries in years in which EU cooperation projects were complemented by support from other international and transnational actors, and the value 0, if EU projects lacked this support.Simultaneously, particularly in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood influences from the Russian Federation, which seeks to establish a common economic space among the Commonwealth of Inde-pendent States, compete with EU efforts to promote compliance with its rules (Langbein & Börzel 2013: 577 – 558). Assuming that Russian influences on the EU’s Eastern neighbours are constant over the time period covered by this study, again a dummy variable (regional competition) was created with the value 1 assigned for ENP coun countries in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood and the value 0 for Mediterranean ENP countries.

3 A more detailed analysis of the variables is available upon request & online

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Method of Data AnalysisTable 2 and Table 3 show the transition probabilities for values of the independent variable institutional novelty in the context of EU- ENP country cooperation in the two policy areas selected for this study.4

The results displayed in Table 2 show that in the field of human rights policy, years in which a particular ENP country did not benefit from an EU cooperation project where followed with a probability of 14.3 percent by a year in which this country implement-ed a cooperation project without the involvement of new administra-tive structures, and with a probability of 7.1 percent by a year in which an EU cooperation project was implemented with the help of new administrative structures, playing a subordinate role. Furthermore, years in which newly established administrative structures played a subordinate role where followed with a probability of 12.5 percent by a year in which they were upgraded into a leading role.

Somewhat similar – yet overall weaker – patterns can be observed in Table 3 for the field of energy policy. Years of no cooper-ation between the EU and ENP countries were followed with a probability of 2.9 percent by years in which a cooperation project not involving new administrative structures was implemented, with a probability of 5.9 percent by years with projects implemented through new administrative structures playing a subordinate role, and with a probability of 1.5 percent by years in which new administrative structures played a leading role in the co-ordination of EU affairs. However, the results show that no transitions from the values low and medium (and logically high) institutional novelty can be observed, indicating a greater continuity in the set-up of ENP countries adminis-trative structures responsible for handling EU cooperation in the field of energy policy, than in the field of human rights policy.

The conclusion that values of the independent variable institu-tional novelty increase over time (although in a weaker fashion in energy policy than in human rights policy), appears to also hold for the independent variable intensity. Figure 1 shows the number of Twinning projects implemented in human rights and energy policy between 2006 and 2013. The displayed results indicate that the number of implemented Twinning projects increased over time, with the values of the independent variable intensity being more stable in the field of energy policy, than in human rights policy.

Panel data in which values of independent variables change over time can be analysed via fixed-effects and random-effects regression models. The fundamental difference between the two models is that for random-effects models variation between the analysed entities (here the 15 ENP countries) is assumed to be random and un- correlated with the included variables, allowing time-invariant variables to play a role as explanatory factors, while fixed-effects models allow unobserved individual effects from different entities to be correlated with included variables and remove effects from time-in-variant characteristics of these entities (Greene 2012: 410 – 411). In order to determine which of the two models is appropriate for the analysis of panel data, Hausman’s specification test was conducted, testing the null hypothesis that unique errors are un-correlated with the included regressors (Greene 2012: 419). Hausman’s specification test for panel data on EU-ENP cooperation in human rights policy shows that the null hypothesis can be rejected (p < .05), thus a fixed-effects regression model is appropriate to analyse the effects of the included variables on ENP countries’ human rights performance (Model 1). For panel data on EU-ENP country cooperation in energy policy, Hausman’s specification test fails to reject the null hypothesis (p > .05), indicating a random-effects regression model is appropriate to analyse the effects of the variables effect on ENP countries’ use of alternative energy sources (Model 2). Thus, in Model 2 effects of the time-invariant variable regional competition need to be included, which are absorbed in the fixed- effects regression of Model 1.

Data source: ENP Network Cooperation Dataset

6

5

4

3

2

1

020132012201120102009200820072006

Twinning Projects in Human Rights Policy Twinning Projects in Energy Rights Policy

Figure 1: Number of Twinning Projects in ENP countries in Human Rights and Energy Policy Values on x-axis display years (2006 – 2013); values on y-axis display absolute frequencies

4 All statistical analyses were conducted using STATA 12. The complete log-file for the analyses is provided if requested. All subse-quent tables appear in the appendix and are available upon request

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ResultsTable 4 reports the regression results of Model 1. Due to heteroskedasticity in the panel data, the fixed-effects model uses clus-tered standard errors and includes effects of a lagged version of the dependent variable with a lag length of one year, to try to control for auto-correlation in the dependent variable. The lagged version of the dependent variable has a highly statistically significant effect on the dependent variable (p < .001), indicating a high likelihood that the dependent variable’s value in a given year can be explained by its value in the previous year, which is however a pervasive char-acteristic of panel data (Stock & Watson 2012: 405).

The results of Model 1 show that of the included independent variables only effects of institutional novelty are statistically significant at p < .05. Based on the results, we can be 95 percent confident that for a given ENP country, as institutional novelty increases over time by one unit, its recoded Freedom in the World index score increases by 0.64 units. As the coefficient for institutional novelty is both statistically significant and positive, Model 1 provides tentative support for H1. However, it needs to be noted that the observed effect from institutional novelty is relatively small, given that the dependent variable is measured on a 13-point scale. As effects from the independent variables intensity and coherence are both negative and not statistically significant at p < 0.05, Model 1 fails to provide support for H2 and H3.

Somewhat relaxing the requirements for statistical significance, Model 1 also shows that effects from the control variable capacity are statistically significant at p < .10. However its negative coefficient runs counter to the expectation that a higher administrative capacity facilitates the implementation of EU rules in third coun-tries. Instead, the results show that we can be 90 percent confident that for a given ENP country, as capacity increases over time by one unit, its recoded Freedom in the World index score decreases by 1.42 units.

Table 5 reports the regression results of Model 2. Again, due to heteroskedasticity in the panel data, the random-effects model uses clustered standard errors and includes effects of a lagged version of the dependent variable with a lag length of one year, which are statistically significant at p <.001. Unlike in Model 1, the results from Model 2 show that none of the effects from the included inde-pendent variables is statistically significant at p < .05.

Although the coefficient signs for the independent variables institutional novelty and intensity are positive and point in the direction hypothesised by H1 and H2, the lack of statistically significant effects from the included independent variables in Model 2 leads to the conclusion that Model 2 fails to provide support for H1, H2 and H3.

Of the included control variables, only regional competition is statistically significant at p < .05. Regression coefficients of

random-effects models are somewhat more difficult to interpret than fixed-effects regression results, as they include both within- and between-entity effects. A possible interpretation here is that the coefficient represents the average effect of regional competition over the dependent variable, when regional competition changes over time and between countries by one unit. However, the positive sign of the coefficient again runs counter to the expectation of the effects of regional competition, given that influences from Russia in the Eastern neighbourhood rivalling EU influences can be expected to hold the percentage of alternative energy use of ENP countries’ total energy use constant or even decrease this percentage, instead of increasing it.

Turning to compare the results from Model 1 and Model 2, the results fail to evidence support for H4. Given that none of the effects from the independent variables institutional novelty, intensity and coherence had a statistically significant influence on the dependent variable in Model 2, while at least institutional novelty displayed statistically significant effects in Model 1, it can be concluded that the assumed lower degree of politicisation of EU cooper-ation projects aiming at a diversification of energy sources in ENP countries did not increase the prospects for compliance with EU rules in ENP countries.

DiscussionThe results outlined above show that this study fails to provide support for hypotheses H2, H3 and H4, while only tentative support can be provided for hypothesis H1. This study’s findings suggest that when EU officials interact with their counterparts from ENP countries in the context of cooperation projects aiming to promote the application of EU rules on human rights and fundamental freedoms, they are more successful in fostering compliance with the EU’s rules, if ENP actors are employed in novel administrative structures established by ENP countries to handle EU affairs. It is assumed that the underlying mechanism of this effect is that ENP actors in novel institutional context are less subject to entrenched norms and values prevalent in stable administrative structures of their semi- democratic and authoritarian regime, and in turn more open to new perspectives and beliefs conveyed by EU officials.

Particularly surprising is that no statistically significant effects of the included independent variables can be observed in the context of EU-ENP country cooperation on energy policy, as it was assumed that actors in ENP countries’ state administrations would be more inclined to embrace the EU’s norms and values in policy areas with lower degrees of politicisation. However, notwithstanding the possibility that H2 and H3 simply find no support in the context of the ENP, there are several methodological and data limitations which presumably affect the results of the regression analyses in this

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study. First, the overall number of observations for both regression models (n = 120) is relatively small, potentially increasing the size of standard errors and making it more difficult to observe statistically significant results. Secondly, two reservations need to be made with regard to the data used for Model 2. On the one hand, particularly high outliers in the dependent variable in Model 2 are likely to bias the model’s regression estimates, while on the other hand, a Variation Inflation Factor (VIF) test shows that the VIF for Model 2 is higher than 2.0, indicating multicollinearity among the independent variables included in Model 2. This finding can be largely attrib-uted to the inclusion of several dummy variables in the model, and the fact that the values for the independent variable institutional novelty in the field of energy policy are relatively stable over time and are mostly concentrated in the categories no cooperation and low institutional novelty (see Table 3). Finally, as the assumed mecha-nism underlying the logic for the inclusion of the selected independ-ent variables is socialisation, it is possible that effects cannot be expected in the same year an ENP cooperation project is imple-mented, but rather occur at a later point in time. Thus, it would be appropriate to correlate the independent variables for one year (for any given country) with the values of the dependent variable one or more years later. However, in the context of this study this option is hardly feasible, given that it would further reduce the number of observations below n =120.

The overall conclusion that can be drawn from the limitations outlined above is that in order to achieve tangible findings on the effects from variation in the factors surrounding network govern-ance in the context of the ENP, the number of observations needs to be increased and policy areas included which display a greater variation in the included variables, both between countries and over time.

ConclusionThis study sought to explain why some of the EU’s neighbouring countries included in its ENP framework comply with EU rules, while compliance prospects are less favourable in others. Arguing that the application of conditionality, offering third countries political and material rewards in return for compliance with the EU’s policy objec-tives, is unlikely to succeed in its own, following from the lack of a membership perspective for ENP countries, it is assumed that interactions and functional cooperation between EU officials and actors in ENP countries’ administrations can socialise the latter into embracing the EU’s norms and values. This in turn is assumed to increase the likelihood that ENP countries positively respond to EU conditionality, as the perceived costs for compliance with EU rules are mitigated.

P.S.MAKING CONDITIONALITY WORK? ACTOR SOCIALISATION THROUGH NETWORK GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD

Focusing on effects from variation in the novelty of administrative structures in ENP countries, the intensity of cooperation between EU officials and actors in ENP countries’ administrations, the coherence of the EU’s approach in promoting its rules beyond its borders, and variation in the politicisation of the policy areas cooperation projects are implemented in, a newly compiled panel dataset was used to conduct regression analyses in order to explain variation in the application of EU rules in ENP countries. The results of the analyses indicate that of all the included independent variables, only variation in the administrative structures of ENP countries involved in implementing the EU’s cooperation projects matters. It appears that actors employed in administrative structures established in ENP countries to handle EU cooperation can act as key agents in promot-ing the application of EU rules in their domestic context, as it can be assumed that they are more open to socialising influences from EU officials.

However, methodological and data limitations warrant an increase of the number of observations and the inclusion of policy areas displaying a greater variation on the values of the independent variables, in order to achieve more tangible results of the analyses. Furthermore, qualitative analyses can be conducted in order to more closely examine the mechanisms of socialisation in the context of the ENP, outlined in this study.

Part CAnalysis

64 65Is Poststructuralism Just Another Version of Constructivism? Reconsidering the Way Constructivism Is Taught in IR Theory

C IPPR 2015ANALYSIS

In the late 1980s and 1990s, in the context of the end of the Cold War, International Relations scholarship was shaped by the so-called “Fourth Great Debate”1. This debate arose after the “inter- paradigm debate” (Wæver 1996) of the 1980s, in which neorealist and neoliberal scholars, who shared a rationalist and positivist epistemology, argued on the outcome of international cooperation (Reus-Smit 2013, 217), eventually reaching what became known as the “neo-neo” synthesis or consensus (Nye 2008, 653). The “Fourth Great Debate” was divided on the lines of positivism and post-positivism, a division acknowledged by Robert Keohane in his 1988 presidential address to the International Studies Associa-tion (Keohane 1988) where he respectively labeled these two positions as “rationalism” and “reflectivism”. Within this broad umbrella, many traditions of thought developed and contributed to the scholarly literature in International Relations, loosely united by a rejection of the main tenets of rationalism. Among these, poststruc-turalism and constructivism deserve specific attention. Both are recent theoretical approaches which developed as coherent traditions of thought during the “Fourth Great Debate” and share an important number of theoretical connections.

And while social constructivism acquired a mainstream status in IR scholarship, notably through Wendt’s seminal works (Wendt 1992, 1999) which received significant attention from proponents of rationalist approaches, poststructuralism remains out of the mainstream scholarly debates. Indeed, its propositions and intellectual stance, often categorized as anti-scientific by positivist scholars (Keohane 1998), may be considered as nothing more than a radical extension, a more “extremist” take on constructivist ideas. However, claiming that poststructuralism is “just another version of constructivism” with a more radical outlook, a stance that students may adopt following IR theory classes where social constructivism typically precedes poststructuralism and receives more attention, is both a misleading statement and an over- simplification.

In this article, I will elaborate on the links between poststructur-alism and constructivism by showcasing some of their similarities and, more importantly, their differences. My analysis will be based firstly on a historiographical discussion, in which I seek to demonstrate that poststructuralism cannot be “another version” of constructivism because not only poststructuralism formed as a coherent approach in International Relations before constructivism (Reus- Smit, 2013), but also because constructivism finds a significant part of its intellectual roots in poststructuralist works (Price & Reus-

T.A.IS POSTSTRUCTURALISM JUST ANOTHER VERSION OF CONSTRUCTIVISM?RECONSIDERING THE WAY CONSTRUCTIVISM IS TAUGHT IN IR THEORY

1 There is disagreement on whether there is three or four “Great Debates”. Some scholars divide neatly the inter-paradigm debate and the debate between positivists and post-positivists as respectively the Third and Fourth Great Debates (Wæver 1996, De Carvalho et al. 2011). Others only focus on the positivism/post-positivism debate, describing it as the Third Great Debate (Lapid 1989, Price & Reus-Smit 1998). In this essay, I choose to follow the former interpretation.

THEO AIOLFI The scholarly discipline of International Relations (IR) was deeply shaped by the “Fourth Great Debate” which opposed neo-positivist approaches, firmly rooted within a “scientific” conception of analyzing global politics, and post-positivist approaches, that chal-lenged the very notion of science and the possibility to reach objectivity in international studies. At the conclusion of this debate, social constructivism emerged as a powerful tradition of thought, now occupying a significant place in the syllabus of every IR theory class. Poststructuralism, typically taught after constructivism, did not receive the same level of attention and its radical premises may make it seem like nothing more than an “extremist” take on constructivist ideas. This article argues against the position that poststructuralism is just another version of constructivism and its argument is two-fold. Firstly, it builds a historiographical account of IR to remind that poststructuralism precedes constructivism, which itself owes a significant share of its intellectual roots to poststructuralism. Secondly, using the distinction between conven-tional and critical constructivism, the article highlights that the dividing lines between constructivism and poststructuralism are not clearly defined but have been blurred by the emergence of critical constructivism.

66 67Smit, 1998). Following this historiographical argument, I will engage in a more thorough discussion of the differences between constructivism and poststructuralism.

In order to do that, it is necessary to elaborate on the distinction within the constructivist literature between conventional/“thin” constructivism, and critical/“thick” constructivism (Katzenstein 1996, Adler 1997), which allows for a more nuanced analysis. After establishing this important divide in the constructivist tradition, I will then explore the major differences between mainstream constructivism and poststructuralism, and then dedicate another part of my analysis to the more subtle differences between critical constructivism and poststructuralism. Finally, I will synthesize the argument of this essay in a brief conclusion detailing the main points of my argumentation.

Historiographical Argument While acknowledging Schmidt’s thoughtful criticism of the mythological dimension of the “Great Debates” and his doubts about their actual relevance (2002), I will nonetheless engage with the Fourth Great Debate as the basis for my historical analysis of the literature in International Relations. During the inter-paradigm debate, the proponents of neorealism and neoliberalism, originally divided on the results of cooperation within an anarchic international system, agreed on a consensus regarding rationalist epistemology, based on the “choice-theoretic assumptions of microeconomic theory” (Reus-Smit 2013, 220). Three salient points of agreement are highlighted by Reus-Smit: 1) “political actors [...] are assumed to be atomistic, self-interested and rational”; 2) “actor’s interests are assumed to be exogenous to social interaction”; 3) “society is [...] a strategic realm in which individuals or states come together to pursue their predefined interests” (ibid.).

In reaction to this “neo-neo” consensus, the Fourth Great Debate was the opportunity for critical theorists to deeply and strongly challenge neorealist and neoliberal thinkers. Despite strong differences within critical international theory, Price & Reus-Smit mention “four common intellectual orientations”: 1) “Epistemologically, critical theorists question positivist approaches to knowledge, criticizing attempts to formulate objective, empirically verifiable truth statements”, 2) “Methodologically, they reject the hegemony of a single scientific method”, 3) “Ontologically, they [stress] the social construction of actors’ identities, and the importance of identity in the constitution of interests and action”, 4) “Normatively, they condemn value neutral theorizing, denying its very possibility” (Price & Reus-Smit 1998, 261), a position also expressed in Cox’s famous aphorism: “Theory is always for someone, and for some purpose” (Cox 1981, 128).

Within the broad spectrum of post-positivist scholars, we can distinguish between modernist scholars, “inspired by the writings of

T.A.

Frankfurt School theorists such as Jürgen Habermas” (Reus- Smit 2013, 221) and post-modernist, or poststructuralist scholars, “drawing on the French social theorists, particularly Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, [who] adopted a stance of ‘radical inter- pretivism’ [opposing] all attempts to assess empirical and ethical claims by any single criterion of validity” (ibid.), a position Hoffman characterized as “anti-foundationalism” (1991, 170).

Despite the strong challenges it opposed to rationalist approach-es, Reus-Smit argues that “the first wave of critical theory had a distinctive meta-theoretical or quasi-philosophical character” (2013, 221) and many of the opponents of critical theory denounced its relative lack of substantive input. Mearsheimer for instance, claimed that “critical theorists have offered little empirical support for their theory” (1994, 44), while Keohane argued that their “greatest weakness [lay] not in deficiencies of their critical arguments but in the lack of a clear reflective research programme” (1988, 392). Authors from a poststructuralist background claimed that these criticisms were misguided attempts to force poststructuralism to fit within a narrow rationalist epistemology (Hansen 2006, 25; Walker 1989), the mere demonstration of a “hegemonic discourse” seeking to “define what counts as legitimate knowledge in the field of International Relations” (Reus-Smit 2013, 222).

However, a shift occurred within the Fourth Great Debate in the beginning of the 1990s, described as the “constructivist turn” (Price & Reus-Smit 1998, 263). It was characterized by its clear emphasis on empirical analysis, a move prompted by the rationalist challenge described above to move beyond theoretical critique toward substantive analysis. Indeed, some constructivist scholars used this opportunity to “demonstrate the heuristic power of non- rationalist perspectives” (Reus-Smit 2013, 223). This “constructivist turn” can also be explained by the socio-political context of the end of the Cold War, which both “undermined the explanatory hegemony of the dominant rationalist theories” and “the critical theorists” assumption that theory drove practice in any narrow and direct fashion” (ibid.). This led to the emergence of a new generation of scholars who “embraced the propositions of critical international theory, but who saw potential for innovation in conceptual elaboration and empirically informed theoretical development” (ibid.). While keeping in mind its strong intellectual ties with sociology (Palan 2000; Finnemore 1996; Wendt 1994, 394), social constructivism thus draws on “ontological propositions, analytical strategies and methodological approaches contained within critical social theory” (Price & Reus-Smit 1998, 261), including notably poststruc-turalism to a large extent.

This brief summary of the historiography of International Rela-tions during the Fourth Great Debate demonstrates that it is anachronistic to claim that poststructuralism could be another version

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68 69of constructivism. Indeed, although both approaches emerged coherently in the scholarly literature of International Relations during this Debate, poststructuralism precedes constructivism, which itself finds its raison d’être and intellectual roots in poststructuralism. On the contrary, if I had wanted to build an elegant but simplistic answer to the problematic developed above, I could have provoc-atively advocated that it is actually constructivism which is “just another version” of post-structuralism with a less theoretical and more empirical outlook, and not the other way around.

Conventional Constructivism and Critical Constructivism However, such an argument would be underestimating the differences between both approaches and would not do justice to their theoretical subtleties. Therefore, it is important to build on this histo- riographic account of the emergence of poststructuralism and constructivism to explore the deeper but fundamental differences between them. It is particularly hard to find a consensual and un- equivocal definition of poststructuralism, mainly because “over the years, very little work had declared itself to be postmodernist or poststructuralist”, an absence of self-declaration which meant that most attempts to describe and present poststructuralism as a unified tradition of thought were carried out by its opponents and critics. (Hansen 2006, 4).

In opposition with poststructuralist scholars, constructivists have been “willing – or perhaps even [saw as a] strategic advantage – to embrace a disciplinary label” (Hansen 2006, 4). This was maybe encouraged by the fact that “constructivism is a social theory and not a substantive theory of international politics” (Barnett 2013, 157), which means constructivism can be seen as a broad theoretical umbrella which accommodates an impressive number of different approaches (Palan 2000, 576). Reus-Smit argues that they all share “three core ontological propositions”: 1) “the importance of normative or ideational structures as well as material structures”; 2) the assertion that “identities constitute interests and actions”; 3) the claim that “agents and structures are mutually constituted” (2013, 224 – 225).

Before engaging any further on this issue, I believe that, because of the great variety of works labeling themselves as constructivist, which often vary dramatically in terms of epistemological and methodological commitments, it is necessary to use a fundamen-tal distinction to clarify any further analysis: the division between “conventional” and “critical” constructivism (Hopf 1998, 181 – 185). This distinction, which will be detailed in the following para-graphs, is widely acknowledged in the scholarly literature, though the labels may change: “thin” and “thick” for Katzenstein (1996),

T.A.

“mainstream/dominant” and “critical” for Macleod2 (2004, 15), “soft” and “hard” for Palan (2000, 576), “modernist” and “postmod-ernist” for Price & Reus-Smit (1998, 267 – 268) or Klotz & Lynch (1999, 55). It is important to stress that the distinction I make, following Macleod (2004), is a departure from Hopf’s which equates “critical constructivism” to “critical theory” (Hopf 1998, 185), therefore neglecting the specificities of the critical strand of construc-tivism.

Poststructuralism and Conventional Constructivism For Palan, “soft constructivists are an eclectic lot consisting of practically anyone who shows interest in culture, identity, norms and accept the notion that ‘actors’ interests are not fixed but change and arise out of a social context” (2000, 576). This extremely broad and provocative description calls for more details. Convention-al and critical constructivism are divided along many lines, and share some of these lines of divisions with poststructuralism. Indeed, as critical constructivism and poststructuralism share many similar tenets, it is hardly surprising to find common theoretical grounds between both approaches. Thus, I will first detail the differences between conventional constructivism and both critical constructivism and poststructuralism in this part of my essay. Then, I will distinguish critical constructivism from poststructuralism in the following part.

The first difference between these approaches lie in the famous distinction made by Cox (2014, 158) dividing problem-solving theories, like conventional constructivism, and critical theories, like poststructuralism and critical constructivism. On the one hand, problem-solving theories ask “why-questions”, they “take the world as [they] find it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized as the given framework for analysis” (ibid.) and try to explain the underlying patterns or causal relations behind a given issue, wondering why does a certain phenomena take place in a a-historical world. On the other hand, critical theories ask “how-questions”, they are “critical in the sense that [they] stand apart from the prevailing order of the world and ask how that order came about” (ibid. Emphasis added).

Going back to Keohane’s categorization evoked previously, another difference is that critical constructivism and poststructuralism can be described as “reflectivist” (Keohane 1988) and postpositivist approaches when conventional constructivism is closer to a form of, arguably transformed but nonetheless positivist epistemology. Alexander Wendt, undoubtedly the most prominent conven-tional constructivist3, claimed boldly that “when it comes to the epistemology of social inquiry, I am strong believer in science – a

2 Some articles were originally written in French, like Macleod’s (2004) or Klotz & Lynch’s (1999). All translations are mine and are as faithful as possible to the original text.

3 Macleod argues notably that “dominant constructivism is largely inspired by Wendt’s works” (2004, 15)


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70 71pluralistic science to be sure, in which there is a significant role for ‘Understanding’, but science just the same. I am a ‘positivist’” (1999, 39). Hopf also points to this fact claiming that “where construc-tivism is most conventional is in the area of methodology and epistemology” (1998, 182), quoting Katzenstein when he denies that he uses “any special interpretivist methodology”, claiming instead that his position does not depart from “normal science” (1996, 67).

Adler and Barnett believe that (their strand of) constructivism should “clearly distinguish itself from poststructuralism and other non-scientific approaches” (1998, 12), while it should aim to reach what Adler famously called the “middle ground” (1997) between rationalist approaches and critical theory. This vision of constructivism is also shared by Wendt who hopes “to find a philo-sophically principled middle way” (1999, 2) in this approach. Macleod points to the fact that conventional constructivists “use their proximity with positivism on an epistemological ground and their ontological innovations” (2004, 17) to dialogue and elaborate a link of complementarity with the “neo-neo” approaches. Smith argues strongly that there is a major flaw in Wendt’s aspiration: “Centrally, there is the difficulty that he is not really a reflectivist at all, but, rather, is a rationalist (and a statist and a realist!), and thus his attempt to bridge the gap is always going to be unsuccessful because he is actually not sitting between the two positions, but instead is on one side.” (Smith 2001, 188).

Smith’s criticism also highlights another difference between Wendt’s constructivism and both poststructuralism and critical constructivism: its statism and its reproduction of the dichotomy between the “inside” and the “outside” of global politics, e.g. the domestic/national sphere and the foreign/international sphere, a posi-tion vehemently rejected by poststructuralists (Campbell 1998) and critical constructivists (Bigo 1998, 56).

Poststructuralism and Critical Constructivism In the words of Hansen, “as the presentation of poststructuralism is misleading, so too is the one of critical constructivism and the ostensible boundary between them.” (2006, 221). Macleod argues that “if we cannot talk about a proper critical constructivist project, most of its proponents would easily agree on the three princi-ples suggested by Weldes et al.” (2004, 18). These principles are: 1) “What we understand as reality is a social construct.”; 2) “The constructions of reality mirror, enact or reify power relationships. In turn, some actors or group of actors play a privileged role in the production and reproduction of these realities.”, 3) “A critical constructivist approach denaturalizes dominant constructions, offer indications on the transformation of common sense, and facilitate the imagination of alternative ways of living and thinking. It problema-

T.A.

tizes the conditions of what it claims; in other words, critical constructivism is reflexive.” (Weldes et al. 1999, 13).

The differences between critical constructivism and poststructuralism are much more subtle than the ones between conventional constructivism and poststructuralism, but they can be divided in two dimensions. Firstly, there are purely theoretical differences, regarding mostly epistemology. Secondly, there are meta- theoretical differences, concerned with the strategic choice of the label “constructivism” which determines the position of critical constructiv-ists within the academic field.

On the theoretical side, although critical constructivists often use poststructuralist concepts and thinkers, like Foucault and Derrida, “they accept implicitly or explicitly a form of foundationalism” (Macleod 2004, 19) in opposition with poststructuralism’s categorical anti- foundationalism. However, when conventional constructivist like Wendt accept explicitly a foundationalist framework (1999, 39), critical constructivist are closer to the form of “minimal foundationalism” that Hoffman (1991, 169 – 185) contrasted with anti-foun-dationalism. It implies that “while they recognize the contingent nature of all knowledge, the inherent subjectivity of all claims and the connection between knowledge and power”, they believe “some criteria [are] needed to distinguish plausible from implausible knowl-edge claims.” (Reus-Smit 2013, 221).

On the meta-theoretical side, critical constructivists “seek to remain within the constructivist tradition because they share its general vision of a socially constructed world, while being on a position to criticize the dominant stream of constructivism on the grounds of its epistemological and ontological conservatism.” Macleod 2004, 18). As described with genuine honesty by Marcus, despite critical constructivists are “strongly allied intellectually to the poststructuralist critics”, “they clearly do not want to be ignored by the main-stream to the same extent” (Marcus 1999, x). Hence, one can argue that labeling oneself as a “constructivist” is a strategic choice to obtain more visibility and recognition within the epistemic community, which also allows, on a more positive note, critical constructiv-ists to be in the best position “not to occupy an delusional ‘middle way’, [but] to maintain the dialogue between post-positivists and positivists” (Macleod 2004, 19), a position acknowledged by David Camp-bell in the epilogue of his second edition of Writing Security (1998, 222 – 225).

Conclusion Throughout this article, I aimed to demonstrate that beyond some clear similarities between eachother, it is misleading and simplistic to argue that poststructuralism is just another version of constructivism. A brief summary of the history of the discipline showcased that poststructuralism emerged prior to constructivism as well as the theo-


IPPR 2015ANALYSIS

72 73retical reasons, notably the relative absence of empirical work from poststructuralist writers, leading many scholars during the Fourth Debate to adopt a distinctively constructivist approach. Building on the distinction between conventional and critical constructivism, a more detailed theoretical discussion highlighted the deep differences that oppose poststructuralism and conventional constructiv-ism, as well as the more nuanced elements that distinguish poststructuralism and critical constructivism. The position of the latter, which Fierke (2001, 122) argues is “at the boundary” between empirical and critical scholarship, offers promising insights for future research.

Indeed, critical constructivism is often hardly mentioned, if at all, in IR theory classes, which can be partly explained by the lack of unity within the main proponents of this approach. However, as the paradigmatic lines of division in IR are getting blurred, critical constructivism occupies a bridging position between not only conventional constructivism and poststructuralism, but also more generally between neo-positivism and post-positivism. In IR theory classes, it could become the missing link between the “tamed” version of critical theory that constructivism became with the rise of its main proponent, Wendt, and more radical approaches. In the broader scholarly debate, critical constructivism’s location at paradigmatic crossroads could contribute to a richer complementary dialogue, thus diminishing the parochialism in IR heavily criticized by Lake (2011). Both of these elements make for a convincing case to reconsider the way constructivism is taught and canonically descibed in the literature, both externally in relation to poststructuralism and internally in relation to its more critical wing.

T.A.C IS POSTSTRUCTURALISM JUST ANOTHER VERSION OF CONSTRUCTIVISM?RECONSIDERING THE WAY CONSTRUCTIVISM IS TAUGHT IN IR THEORY

IPPR 2015ANALYSIS

74 75

IPPR 2015THEORY ESSAYS

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is one of the most, if not the most, pressing global health challenges of our time. In June 2013, the Science ministers of the G8 declared that antimicrobial drug resistance is the “major health security challenge of the twenty first century”. AMR is a true “problem without a passport”; it affects the populations of states across the world and cannot be com- batted without a collaborative global strategy. If global public policy problems impeding the implementation of this strategy are not overcome, the increasing economic and health burden and future threats caused of AMR are predicted to be immense. , In the face of a this growing global public health burden and significant future threat, the continuing absence of globally implemented policy on combatting AMR is problematic.

As most of the existing academic research on global public policy regarding AMR has been undertaken by clinical specialists and global health professionals, it is interesting to explore how theoretical perspectives from public policy studies and IR could support our understanding of the problem. In the essay, two theoretical approaches, John Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Analysis (MSA) and liberal institutionalist theories of collective action problems , will be adopted. These theoretical models will be applied to two case studies; one drawn from successful global policy coordination on AMR, the other from failed global implementation of policy propos-als. Through investigating the reasons behind respective success and failure in these cases of successful, the explanatory power of these theoretical models will be assessed.

AMR: History, Causes and (Potential) ConsequencesAMR, including (but not limited to) multi-drug resistance (MDR) and antibacterial/antibiotic resistance (ABR), is the consequence of the natural adaptation of microorganisms to selective pressures caused by the overuse of antimicrobial drugs. Most notably, resistance of microorganisms to antimicrobial drugs have been observed in cases of tuberculosis, malaria, HIV/AIDS and various usually hospital-borne pathogens such as MRSA. AMR is prevalent all over the world and thus has associated costs in both the developed as well as the developing world.

The first warnings of the dangers of AMR were issued as early as 1945 by Alexander Flemming and Howard Walter Florey on acceptance of the Nobel Prize for their discovery of penicillin. How-ever, it was not until the 1980s until organizations and professionals began to recognize AMR as a global problem. While between 1930s and 1960s the discovery of antibiotics and other antimicrobials had spurred research into new effective agents in the first half of the 20th century, from the 1960s development of new antimicrobials had slowed down. Faced with the high costs of developing

S.v.H.MANAGING MICROBES: GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY PROBLEMS IN COMBATTING ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCEC


Could theoretical models from public policy and IR theory help us understand why global cooperation in developing and implement-ing policy on AMR has been reasonably successful in some cases, but very difficult in others?

SOFIE VANHEIJNINGEN

Use of first-line antimicrobicals

instead of advanced/combined

therapies

Incorrect use of antimicrobials by

patients

(Over)use of antimicrobials in farmed animals, aquaculture etc.

(Over)prescription of antimicrobials by

prescribers

Lack of R&D into new antimicrobials

Use of less effective counterfeit

antimicrobial drugs

AntimicrobialResistance

(AMR)

76 77approved new drugs and several large-scale failures to find fundamentally different new antimicrobials, pharmaceutical research and development became increasingly dedicated to more lucrative drugs targeted at chronic diseases faced by the developed world. This decline and continuing lack of investment in research into novel antimicrobials has resulted in the current situation, in which the “research and development (R&D) pipelines are nearly dry.”

Apart from a nearly empty bank of ready-to-use new antimicro-bials, the current global threat and health burden of AMR is the product of the cumulative interaction of several other causal factors, as set out in Table 1. Some of these causal factors, such as the (over)prescription of antimicrobials and the (over)use of antimicrobi-als in farmed animals can be considered as a negative externalities of clinical and veterinary health care. The fact that in many countries the use of existing antimicrobial drugs has been and still is only minimally regulated contributes to the large effects of these negative externalities. The development of new antimicrobials is ineffective unless combined with globally implanted surveillance and antimicrobial stewardship policies to limit these causal factors behind AMR. Table 1. Causal factors in AMR based on the WHO Global Strategy for Containment of Antimicrobial Resistance

The potential global consequences of increasing, unchecked AMR are frightening. Already, 23 000 people die each year due to MDR pathogens in the U.S. alone. Similar rates can be observed in the European Union (EU) and the associated costs of the infections with resistant microorganisms within the EU have been estimated at a yearly 1.5 billion euros. However, AMR does not only bring about increased morbidity and economic costs, widespread AMR would also bring about a return to pre-anti-microbial health care.

IPPR 2015THEORY ESSAYS S.v.H.MANAGING MICROBES:

GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY PROBLEMS IN COMBATTING ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE

AMR as a Global Public Policy ProblemThe policy problems associated with AMR fit conceptual criteria of global public policy problems as proposed by Marvin Soroos; AMR has raised serious concern throughout the world (1) and has been taken up by multiple international organizations, of which several (including the WHO and the EIO) have open membership to all states (2).

In some ways, AMR is very similar to climate change as a global public policy problem; in both cases potential long-term costs are extremely serious and the causes can be (at least partly) found in negative externalities of common practices across the world. As the WHO declared in 2001, “[n]o single nation, however effective it is at containing resistance within its boundaries, can protect itself from the importation of resistant pathogens through travel and trade.” Policy solutions combatting AMR can be implemented on a national level, but they must be adopted worldwide in other to be effective. Containing AMR and the availability of effective antimicrobials can thus be seen as global public goods, from which all states can benefit.

The global public policy problem of AMR suffers from an extra complicating factor in the sense that, in many areas, effective global policy will require the cooperation of all states. The reason for this is that the lowest common denominator, or “weakest link”, determines actual global AMR policy outcomes; whether this con-cerns controlling the international transmission of resistant microbes or slowing the emergence of resistant microbes through antimicrobial stewardship. This further complicates the development and implementation of global public policy, as the policy base-line must be achievable by all states to have significant effects.

Theoretical ModelsThe requirement for full compliance in many AMR policy areas makes it likely that global policy iteration and implementation will suffer from severe collective action problems. Within the IR school of liberal institutionalism much work has been done on developing theoretical frameworks for understanding these collective action prob-lems and how to overcome them. Collective action problems considered by liberal institutionalist theorists include free-riding and the prisoners’ dilemma and strategies to overcome these problems often involve information/preference sharing and routinized interaction through international institutions. In order for this theoreti-cal model to “fit” and hold significant explanatory power, a case must satisfy the following conditions:

(C1) States are the primary agents involved in developing and implementing policy.

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78 79(C2) The development and implementation of policy is affected by collective action problems, and

(C3) these collective action problems can be/are overcome through collaboration in international institutions.

The latency between official warning of the dangers of AMR in the 1980s and actual policy development and implementation in the 1990s gives rise to the idea that other factors might affect global and national agenda-setting as well. John Kingdon’s acclaimed theoretical framework of Multiple Stream Analysis (MSA) could poten-tially shed some light on the uptake of AMR as a policy issue by national governments and international institutions. The core assump-tion behind the MSA model is that there are three “streams” that affect actual (incremental) policy change: a policy problem (problem stream), available policy solutions (policy stream) and political will (politics stream). When these streams come together, a policy “window of opportunity” opens and there is a possibility for the policy issue to rise on the policy agenda or even for existing policy solutions to be implemented. MSA has been previously successfully applied to global public policy problems by various scholars, including those considering problems affecting global health. In order to test the explanatory validity in the case-studies, findings must affirm the following conditional hypotheses:

(C4) Policy change happens at key moments, during which the three (problem, policy, politics) streams intersect and a policy window opens.

(C5) Policy entrepreneurs take advantage of these policy windows and affect incremental policy change by putting the issue on the agenda/affecting implementation progress.

Case Study I: EU and TATFARThe most notable cases of cooperation in the coordination and implementation of policy to combat AMR can be found in the inter-EU collaboration and the EU – U.S. AMR taskforce. As early as 2001, the European Commission presented a global strategy for the containment of AMR. This strategy was translated into actual (EU-level) policy four years later and became one of the major policy programmes for the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), established in 2005. In pursuit of a mutual goal to increase international cooperation on AMR, the U.S. and EU launched official collaborative efforts in 2009. The Transatlantic Task- force on Antimicrobial Resistance (TATFAR) was established follow-ing the November 2009 US – EU Summit Declaration.



The fact that cooperation has been particularly successful within the EU as an international organisation provides significant evidence for C1 – C3. Collective action problems are overcome in this case by building on existing partnerships and exchanges through international institutions, so that previous cooperation in other areas benefits collaboration on AMR. One could even argue that this occurs through a process of functional spill over, which has been theoretically developed in context of EU integration by liberal insitutionalist theorists such as David Mitrany.

The timing of the launching of both the inter-EU strategy as well as TATFAR, confirms that policy change has happened at key moments when problem, policy and politics intersected (C4). Policy proposals on AMR were developed in the WHO in the late 1990s, but both the European Commission and the WHO only proposed official global strategies in 2001. In this year, partly thanks to efforts of WHO officials and (non)governmental advocates, the policy issue of AMR “heated up” through warnings from IOs, researchers and medical specialists. The role of policy entrepreneuri-alism within the political stream (C5) can also be recognized, especially in the case of TATFAR. Both President Obama US Presi-dent Obama and then-President of the EU, Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt from Sweden, were instrumental in directing policy attention towards the problem of AMR and setting up the taskforce.

While the application of these theoretical frameworks in this case of AMR policy seems relatively fruitful, it must be noted that both the EU programmes as well as TATFAR focus heavily on the area of research funding and research coordination. In these policy areas, not only is full compliance not a requirement, but problems are not mainly caused by negative externalities of common state practice. Collective action problems might thus actually be not as severe, which is supported by the fact that most international, public-private and/or inter-sectoral partnerships on AMR have been successful formed with a research focus. This counts for government-led programmes as discussed above, but also for programmes without the direct involvement of states. The Asian Network for Surveillance of Resistant Pathogens (ANSORP), a nongovernmental, international research group on AMR in Asia is a good example of such collaboration.

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80 81Case Study II: Implementation of WHO policy suggestions in developing countriesWhile a significant number of developed countries have taken up and implemented the policy packages proposed by the WHO in 2001 through a national task force and strategy, this is not the case in the rest of the world. Admittedly, there are some exceptions, such as the strategy proposals in the Chennai Declaration by India, but these initiatives are still to be widely reproduced elsewhere.

As the implementation responsibility of these policies re- lies primarily on national governments (C1), collective action problems are likely to have hampered significant progress (C2). In contrast to the focus research which was demonstrated to be prevalent in EU and TATFAR collaboration, the 2001 WHO policy package was largely dedicated to precisely those policy areas that impinge upon negative externalities. However, states might be reluctant to combat these externalities without the insurance that other states will do this as well. The reasons for this is that short-term losses will be encountered, while a prisoners’ dilemma arises at the same time. For cooperating states, the publication data on national AMR surveillance could give them a competitive dis- advantage (and absolute losses) when compared to states who do not do so. Still, surveillance of resistant pathogens is essential if tailored, disease-specific strategies to combat AMR are to be implemented successfully at local level. The latest WHO report on AMR surveillance confirms that collective action problems remain and that too little has been undertaken unilaterally or collaboratively by states thus far and there is still an “urgent need” for global AMR surveillance data.



The main problem with applying MSA to this case is that there simply are not enough findings of successful global incremental policy changes to go on. It is more complicated to convincingly demonstrate how policy streams have not intersected yet, compared to demonstrating when they do so. Still, on a global level, some policy entrepreneurialism can be recognized (C5), especially when it comes to disease specific programmes. A good example of this can be found in the advocacy for MDR tuberculosis by Bill Gates. Still, it would be interesting to re-apply this model if more cases of successful implementation can be observed.

Still, it is clear that many of the problems which has hampered significant progress in policy adoption come from areas which are not directly covered by these theoretical models. The most obvi-ous of these problems is perhaps the fact that many countries lack the strong health care systems or resources to effectively implement policy on AMR. A different problem is that most policy requires significant inter-sectoral cooperation, which is complicated logistically because of the large numbers of institutions that need to work together (often for the first time). Both of these barriers do not fit within a traditional collective action problem or MSA framework.

Policy recommendations and conclusionsBased on the insights that the theoretical models yield in the above case studies, the following policy recommendation s can be formulated:

1. Bilateral and multilateral partnerships should be encouraged by the WHO, as building on pre-existing relationships has proved beneficial as seen in case study I.

2. Collective action problems prevalent especially in case study II show that policy suggestions from above are not enough to compel states to undertake action and combat the negative externalities causing AMR. Policy suggestions must become enshrined in interna-tional law, thus I propose

i. The extension of the WHO International Health Regulations (IHRs) to create a legal obligation for signatories to set up an inter- sectoral task force charged with the monitoring and surveillance of antimicrobial resistance in humans and animals.

3. The establishment of a global fund, coordinated by the WHO and the UN Development Programme, to support resource-poor countries in setting up the inter-sectoral task forces required by the new IHRs.

C

World Health Organization

82 834. IOs, national governments and NGOs should focus to increase awareness of AMR not just among clinical professionals, but also among the general public. This would increase the likelihood of policy windows to open as the problem stream will become more obvious, and policy entrepreneurs are more likely to respond to public demands.

These recommendations extend beyond the recommendations of others, especially in the case of recommendation (2). The incorporation of previous WHO policy suggestions into international law will certainly be difficult. However, when combined with policy recommendation (3), signatories would be more likely to see the goals set as achievable, while at the same time benefiting from the short- and long-term benefits of developmental aid.

The application of theoretical frameworks from public policy (MSA) and IR theory to AMR as a global public policy problem yields mixed results based on the discussed case studies. While both theoretical frameworks largely fit the case of successful cooperation within the EU and between the EU – U.S., we should be sceptical about the validity of these frameworks when it comes to wider global policy problems in AMR. The second case study shows that when the global policy implementation considers areas corre- sponding to the elements of AMR caused by negative externalities, a wide and complex range of problems arise. These include but also extend beyond collective action problems or non-intersecting poli-cy streams (such as difficulties with inter-sectoral cooperation and lack of resources).

The example of AMR as a global public policy problem is demonstrative of the heterogeneity of policy areas (and thus potential for global solutions) within a single policy problem. The most important conclusion we can draw from this is twofold. Firstly, from an academic perspective, there is a clear need for a variety of theoretical frameworks and methodological tools to understand fail- ings or successes within single global public policy problems. IR theory and public policy theories certainly have a role to play here, but their limitations must be critically appreciated. However, especial-ly when considering AMR (perhaps less so in areas such as climate change, or conflict), more scholarly analysis from IR or public policy perspectives could be valuable. Furthermore, a greater variety of academic perspectives would certainly also be conducive to more effective policy recommendations for combatting AMR and other global problems. The huge challenges faced in the case of AMR as a global public policy problem are daunting, but because of these difficult conditions, any (if incremental) successful progress could serve as indications for potential policy opportunities in other global public policy areas.


GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY PROBLEMS IN COMBATTING ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCEC

84 85The Future of Dispute Settlement under International Law in Light of the US Supreme Court Ruling in

Kiobel v.

Royal Dutch Petroleum


Dispute settlement in the present day is much more complex than what it was several decades ago. The most frequent disputes in contemporary international politics are not necessarily between states, but rather a state and individuals and/or non-state actors. With such developments, the matter of dispute settlement has brought about a separate dimension, especially regarding corporations. The US Supreme Court recently decided in Kiobel, that there is a broad presumption that congressional statutes are not meant to regulate extra-territorial activity unless there is a clear statement in the statutory text.1 In doing so, the courts opted against expanding the subject matter jurisdiction of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). It is argued by many that such a decision severely impedes the progress of international human rights, especially in concern to establishing corporate responsibility. This paper will argue against this position and posit that the decision in fact opens up several other means for expanding international law with respect to corporate responsibility, liability and accountability as well as state obligations to their citizens under custom and treaty law. It would be further argued that such alternative means provide a more sustainable path towards the establishment of corporate accountability whereby regional legal structures provide credence to a universal platform. Further- more, the future of the ATS and the ramifications of this decision on the Respondents in Kiobel will be discussed briefly as well.

Emergence of Regional CourtsAs of today, very few international instruments exist to provide remedies to international human rights violations, barring domestic legal structures. Therefore the ATS was a crucial component in providing an additional source of providing remedial jurisdiction. Thus far three regional, treaty based bodies for the adjudication and reparation of human rights violations committed against individuals exist under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS), Council of Europe, and the African Union. The current standing of courts under these regional bodies though can only hold States accountable for human rights abuses.2 However, with the growth of Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) and the increasing frequency of alleged human rights abuses that occur in many developing nations, the necessity for an institutional framework that is given jurisdiction over non-state entities and persons, similar to corporations, have become even more prominent.

The emergence of regional courts with jurisdiction over persons is the logical progression in the evolution of international law. The advent of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) followed by the International Criminal Court (ICC) marked the jurisprudential evolution of international law in holding states and individuals

K.V.HTHE FUTURE OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW IN LIGHT OF THE US SUPREME COURT RULING IN KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM

1 Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 561 US (2010)2 International Justice Resource Center (Web). http://www.ijrcenter.org/ihr-reading-room/regional/

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KITHMINAVIROCHANA HEWAGE

The growing influence of Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) has necessitated an evolution of international law to deal with complex legal disputes. The decision by the United States Supreme Court against expanding the subject matter jurisdiction of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum was deemed to have impeded progress towards establishing comprehensive international norms and laws regarding corporate responsibility. This essay contests that claim and argues that the apparent defeat opens up several alternative methods that provide more sustainable and inclusive means that expand corporate responsibility, liability, and accountability as well as state obligations to their citizens under custom and treaty law.

86 87respectively. It should be noted that both institutions were reactive in nature towards developments in international affairs. Therefore, in the face of greater corporate influence, courts with jurisdiction over non-state entities such as corporations would fulfill the evolu- tionary expectations of international law. Given the Kiobel decision and the resulting absence of any international mechanism, such bodies are, arguably, a manifestation by necessity rather than mere choice. The proposed African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) can be noted as the first of many regional courts to be created in the future under this rationale. Interestingly, “the proposed expansion of the court would create the world’s first combined state-level and individual-level criminal accountability mechanism for human rights violations on an international scale.”3

The structure of regional courtsUnder contemporary international law there is no significant jurisdiction beyond a set scope such as jus cogens violations, outside domestic courts when it concerns individuals. The emergence of region-al courts, however, is likely to address this weakness, as it would have the ability to tailor its jurisdiction to a broader theme of violations such as corruption, trafficking, illegal exploitation of natural resources and offences committed by corporations. For example, an Ec- uadorian judge ordered Chevron to pay a compensation package of $9 billion after being found responsible for polluting remote tracts of Ecuadorian jungle in 2011.4 This is one of many examples where courts have expanded jurisdiction signaling a growing trend in the potential expansion of international law as well. Therefore it is not inconceivable that the international community starts expanding international jurisdiction to similar crimes. Though some argue that such expansions may infringe on national sovereignty, it is important to note that regional courts would work along the principles of complementarity. Moreover, similar to the limitations posed under Filartiga with the ATS, it would be necessary that domestic remedies be exhausted and it is likely that we see analogous courts being established in regions such as Africa, Latin America, South Asia and South-East Asia.

The establishment of regional courts of this nature would circumvent the limitation of extra-territoriality that most victims of human rights violations in the present day face. As seen in Kiobel, foreign courts are hesitant to expand its jurisdiction to cases that originate outside its borders with a lack of territorial nexus and limited connec-tion to the national interests of the respective state. Regional courts however would not have to face the issue of extra-territoriality since firstly, they will be working under the auspices of consent

3 Rau, Kristen, Jurisprudential Innovation or Accountability Avoidance? http://ehis.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?-sid=10594686-95f5-4c73-80a5-39c8ccc41980%40sessionmgr14&vid=2&hid=101

4 The New York Times, Ecuador Judge Orders Chevron to Pay $9 Billion (2011) http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/15/world/ame-ricas/15ecuador.html?_r=0


THE FUTURE OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW IN LIGHT OF THE US SUPREME COURT RULING IN KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM

by members to the regional body, and secondly, the origins of the alleged crime would have occurred in the said region.

State Obligations and Duties to its CitizensThe question of state-to-citizen obligations is one that has arisen frequently over the past few years in political discourse. The international community has, in general, accepted that states have certain fundamental obligations towards its own citizens such as protecting it from mass atrocities and have therefore concluded that sovereignty is in essence, a responsibility. Such a position is crystalized through the passing of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) through UN General Assembly Resolutions as well as the invocation of the doctrine when discussing matters pertain-ing to international peace and security such as the UN sanc- tioned invasion of Libya. Therefore given the establishment of such a doctrine in common practice, international law is likely to inte- grate state-to-citizen obligations within its sphere of jurisdiction more directly.

Furthermore, international law has also evolved to an extent where states are responsible for the protection of its citizens from harm from third parties, also known as the horizontal effects doctrine. For example, the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) article 2(1) states that, “each state party… under-takes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present covenant.”5 Essentially, this demonstrates that a state has a positive duty to ensure that, under domestic law, there exist obligations to protect against human rights violations by non-state actors that harm the rights of third parties.6

That said it would be interesting to note if judicial frameworks proposed would establish what can be termed as a dual man-date to bring both states and individuals within the jurisdiction of the same court. The proposed ACJHR, for example, has created such a dual mandate within its court structure. However upon close inspection, it should be noted that to mitigate potential conflicts of interests, it would be best that separate courts be created to deal with state responsibilities and individual accountability. Many allegations that are brought forth to international tribunals of this nature would undoubtedly address situations where there is at least some complicit involvement of state actors. Therefore, if both state and individual considerations were to be made through the same court, political considerations are likely to influence proceed-ings. Moreover, it should be noted that international structures such as the ICC have already been established to deal with state

5 UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)6 Muchlinski, Peter, Implementing the New UN Corporate Human Rights Framework: Implications for Corporate Law, Governance and Regulation. Business Ethics Quarterly, 151 (2012)

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88 89actors responsible for violations of international human rights. As such, there is potential for jurisdictional overlap between regional courts and the ICC. Therefore, given these complications, the model of a dual mandate of jurisdiction would be counter-intuitive to the objectives of regional bodies that wish to expand the scope of international humanitarian law.

Corporate Responsibility, Liability and AccountabilityTechnological changes and the resulting evolution of the world economy have granted greater prominence to Multi National Corpo-rations. These entities carry significant clout in terms of capital and therefore have a major say in the inner workings of nations, especially in developing countries. Though there is no explicit treaty agreed upon by the international community regarding corporate responsibility, liability and accountability, recent trends in legislature on the domestic and regional scale are good indicators about the future of corporate responsibility in international law. Many nations have begun to create domestic legislature concerning corporate practices similar to those of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights approved by the UN Human Rights Council. As a result, “corporate responsibility in the area of international human rights has ceased to be a matter of voluntary policy and has become a matter of legal accountability.”7 These individual state actions are likely to translate into regional legal structures as is seen with the ACJHR, which would establish a consensus towards a new form of international customary law. Considering the renewed advo-cacy of Non-Governmental Organizations and other human rights advocates regarding corporate legal accountability along with recent state practices, it is very likely that an international treaty is created through the United Nations as well.

One of the most daring proposals through the draft protocol of the ACJHR is the matter of criminal jurisdiction over corporations. Though such a measure demonstrates a firm willingness on part of the African Union to regulate corporate actions, imposing criminal jurisdiction over corporations is likely to diminish the practical advocacy of international law. Whereas in a criminal case the proof has to be “beyond a reasonable doubt”, the standard for a civil case is relatively lower and requires a standard pertaining to the “pre-ponderance of evidence”. Given the complex nature by which MNCs are formed and operate around the world, it would be near impossible to meet the standard of a criminal case. These allocations of blame become even more complex with the implicit nature of actions carried out by individuals violating international human right, opening up the possibility for heads of corporations to invoke ultra vires and thereby abdicate themselves from blame. Moreover,

7 McBarnet, Doreen; Schmidt, Patrick, Corporate Accountability through creative enforcement: human rights, the Alien Tort Claims Act and the limits of legal impunity. The New Corporate Accountability, 142 (2007)


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failure on part of criminal prosecution is likely to impede the success of civil cases as well. A similar structure of delineating between civil and criminal jurisdiction can be observed through the framework of international law in concern of states. Whereas the state, as an entity, is not subject to criminal jurisdiction, the actions of a state are actionable to civil jurisdiction. Therefor, it would be best to follow a similar structure in terms of corporations, whereby the entity is not bound by criminal jurisdiction.

Future of the ATS and the perspective of the respondentsWith the decision in Kiobel, it is widely believed that the influence of the ATS has diminished considerably. One of the highlights of the Kiobel decision was regarding extra-territorial jurisdiction. Given that many cases brought under the ATS are regarding foreign conduct, and often through actions of foreign subsidiaries, and rarely with any action by corporate actors based in the United States, the ATS will inevitably lose its significance as an alternative interna-tional court. However, given the wording of the decision, including the concurring opinion, the ATS’ future will continue to be significant in concern towards American actors. This is even more evident given that the court refrained from overturning Sosa or Filartiga. Moreover, with developments around the world regarding such matters, it is also likely that the ATS acts as the basic framework for any domestic developments.

From the perspective of the respondents in Kiobel, the decision marks a significant victory. However, this victory would have positive consequences to the respondents only in the short term. The Kiobel decision has resulted in the international community, through the leadership of developing countries and NGOs, taking more proactive measures to address corporate responsibility. In essence, the Kiobel decision can be considered the catalyst towards substantive changes that are likely to occur in international law in the foreseeable future. Moreover, with the advent of regional courts, corporations similar to that of the respondents, have opened themselves up to even more severe penalties that what it would have under the ATS, especially if the ACJHR approves of criminal jurisdic-tion over corporations.

ConclusionA movement towards expanding international human rights over the past few years, coupled with the Kiobel decision, has led to two major outcomes. Firstly, the international community has now been granted an opportunity to take up proactive measures to initiate the expansions in human rights law that it desires. In order to do so, the actions of individual states, and eventually, regions will be crucial in establishing a universal norm. As has been stated before, in

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the absence of treaty law, international norms are capable of redefin-ing the boundaries of international law. Furthermore, with an increase in lobbying efforts by advocates, it is probable that corpo-rate legal accountability is codified in an international treaty. As such, expansions of international law would essentially take a “bottom-up” approach whereby the limits of dispute settlement get defined an aggregate of individual state action, rather than any direct imposition.

United States Supreme Court

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92 93Why Do States Give International Development Assistance?


In this essay I argue that although the EU prides itself on being a normative world power and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) defines poverty eradication as the EU’s primary objective when allocating aid, development policy has always been aimed at strategically interesting countries. Moreover, recent substantive and institutional changes to EU development policy uncover a specific strategic objective, namely security.

Extensive quantitative research has been carried out on finding what determines aid allocation on a global scale statistically. Altruistic donors allocate aid independently of their relationship with developing countries and focus on a country’s need and merit (Berthélemy, 2006, p. 189), whereas egotistical donors are drawn to countries that may be of a strategic interest to them. The vast majority of donors belong to the latter group (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). To narrow down the scope for this essay, I focus on the paradox between this finding and Europe’s self-image as a normative power, which would pay more attention to recipient need and merit to create a better world. In discussing this I will pay less attention to facts and figures, as these data are widely and readily available, and more to discourse and substance with the intention of presenting a critical picture of the EU as a normative power. The EU serves as a justified case study for several reasons. Development coopera-tion is one of the few policies where the EU can draw on the power of the purse instead of just relying on its regulatory capacity (Orbie & Versluys, 2009, pp.75 – 76); its development budget is larger than any of its member states’ and accounts for 10% of the world’s official development assistance (ODA). Furthermore, the EU has a coordinating role to ensure complementarity between EU aid and member states’ aid and thus has an impact on the development policies of the national governments as well. Finally, arti-cle 208 of the TFEU puts economic need first: “Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduc-tion and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty.” By deduction we can assume that if the EU proves to be mainly driven by strate-gic self-interest, altruistic aid donors may not exist.

This essay is structured as follows. First it gives a short over-view of existing quantitative research on motives of global aid. The consensus is that strategic interests drive aid. Next I discuss the concept of Europe as a normative power, which is the prevailing self-image of the EU. The logical assumption then is that the EU is a more altruistic donor. I go on to uncover this is not the case. I do this first by looking at which countries have received EU aid since the beginning of European integration, namely (former) colonies during the Cold War and neighbouring states to the EU during the nineties. Secondly, I show how 9/11 and the European Security Strat-egy (ESS) that followed have influenced development policy substantively, using the Cotonou Agreement as an example. Security

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KATELIN RAW Statistical analyses on global aid have shown that donors’ motives are primarily driven by self-interest. This sharply contrasts with the EU’s self-image as a Normative Power Europe. This essay illustrates how EU development policy, despite its formal primary objective being poverty eradication, is not an altruistic exception to the self-interested rule. Firstly, the EU has historically favoured countries based on its strategic interests in a given global structure. Differences in aid allocation can be noticed between the Cold War era, the nineties and post-9/11. Secondly, aid has been increasingly aimed at security objectives rather than development objectives. 9/11 and the European Security Strategy have been a catalyst in this respect, which influenced the first revision of the Cotonou Agreement. Moreo-ver, the new European External Action Service has institutionally taken over (parts of) the decision-making processes regarding aid from the Development Directorate General. This essay concludes that the securitization of aid does not only influence the budget, the aims, the channels and the institutional autonomy of EU development policy, but also negatively impacts the EU’s international legitimacy as a normative power.

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seems to have become the specific kind of strategic interest that shapes European development policy. Institutionally this has also surfaced. The creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) erodes EU development policy. I conclude that this “securiti-zation of aid” has a negative effect not only on EU aid, but also on its normative power.

Motives Behind Global Aid Research has shown a consensus on the effectiveness of development aid, in the sense that without it, growth would be slower (McGillivray et al., 2005; Feeny & McGillivray, 2008). However, developing countries are still accused of wasting aid (Alesina & Dollar, 2000, p. 33). In a widely cited and influential paper, Alesina & Dollar (2000) research whether this “wastefulness” can at least partly be attributed to the donor countries: is aid allocated to countries that (donors hope) can effectively translate assistance into poverty reduction through sound policies? Or is aid allocated to countries that might be of a different “strategic interest” to the donors? The authors look for the relative importance of both dimensions – recipient need and merit versus strategic interest – and nuance past research rejecting altruistic foreign aid altogether (Schraeder, Taylor & Hook, 1998; Feeny & McGillivray, 2008). Their paper concludes that strategic interests such as a former colonial relationship (e.g. France, the UK) or UN voting patterns (e.g. Japan) more than recipient need and merit determine which country receives aid thus undermin-ing aid efficiency. In the margin, democratization is rewarded. The result is that there is only a weak association between aid allocation and poverty, democracy and good policy (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Berthélemy & Tichit, 2004; Berthélemy, 2006). Surpris- ingly, research by Dreher, Nunnenkamp & Thiele (2011) shows that on average, new donors like China and Brazil care even less for recipient need and merit than old donors.

A different type of research looks at trends in aid allocation over longer periods of time. It shows global political structures are important. The impact of former colonial ties on aid flows is still strong, but has decreased since the end of the Cold War in favour of a different strategic interest: trade, and the competition for export markets. This is especially true for smaller donors (e.g. Belgium, Italy) who need to spend their limited aid budget effectively (Berthélemy & Tichit, 2004; Barthel et al. 2014).

Normative Power EuropeThese generalizations contradict the EU’s supposed role in global politics. An influential role concept is Duchêne’s Civilian Power Europe (CPE), which describes Europe as the continent of a very a- military people since the Second World War (Orbie, 2009). This psychological process of using one’s own history as a reference

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1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9E2B_yI8jrI. This is a remarkable example of cultural othering. NB: the ad was pulled by DG Enlargement.

point to be better today is called “temporal othering”, a process that Diez (2004) believes is applicable to Europe’s identity as a civilian power.

Duchêne’s CPE concept was never really developed into a comprehensive scheme. Ian Manners (2008) uses CPE as the foundation for his more refined concept of a Normative Power Europe (NPE), which is focussed on Europe’s normative means rather than its civilian ends. NPE describes Europe as a new kind of power that does not draw strength from its military capacity like traditional powers, but from its normativity.

The sense of NPE is widespread in Brussels. European politicians experience the EU as a force for good, especially in contrast with the US (Orbie, 2009, p.3). Diez (2004; 2005) is worried this is a sign that what used to be temporal othering by the EU has since the end of the Cold War turned into geographic and cultural othering1. He urges for more reflexivity before Europe falls back into the trap of traditional geopolitics.

Official discourse shows signs of NPE too. The Laeken Decla-ration on Europe’s new role in a globalised world (2001) – to give just one example – calls the EU a “power seeking to set globalisa-tion within a moral framework, in other words to anchor it in soli- darity and sustainable development”. Former European Commission President Barroso believes in NPE as well and uses the abolition of the death penalty as an example of how other countries follow in the EU’s footsteps (Peterson, 2007). Apparently the belief in NPE is not constricted to European borders: the EU was rewarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 for its “successful struggle for peace and reconciliation and for democracy and human rights.”

EU, the Ever-changing DonorEurope as a normative power sharply contrasts with the self-interest-ed motives of aid donors. Surely an expressly normative institution like the EU would be a more altruistic donor, taking into account the other’s need over its own interest? A short history of European development cooperation suffices to determine the opposite is true.

During the Cold War the EU nourished its (former) colonial ties with the group of African, Pacific and Caribbean states (ACP) through special association agreements. The EU was driven by an altruistic sense of historical obligation towards these countries, but also by the need to ensure the ongoing supply of raw materials to Europe and opening up these countries to more European trade and investment (Carbone, 2011). In this particular geopolitical context of bipolarity aid was also used to buy influence away from com-munism (Faust & Messner, 2005; Woods, 2005).

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2 The Lisbon Treaty amends the two core treaties of the EU : the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the TFEU.

This “EurAfrica” relationship (Carbone, 2011, p. 2) gradually normalized after the Cold War. The changed political context forced the EU to rethink its foreign strategy. EU aid to the ACP declined from 66.3% in 1989/90 to 42.8% in 1996/97. By contrast, aid to other areas grew from 33.7% to 57.2% during the same period (Olsen, 2004, p. 85). Primary beneficiaries of this change were EU neighbours and in some cases future member states: the former communist and Soviet states in Central and Eastern Europe and North African and Middle Eastern countries (Appendix 1). These numbers prove international development interests cannot be seen separately from foreign policy.

EU development policy has also gone through changes on an institutional level. The Maastricht Treaty entered into force in 1993, creating a (albeit shared) EU competence for development poli-cy with the goal of “campaigning against poverty” (art. 130(1)). However, problems of coordination and coherence and severe staffing shortages rendered EU development aid slow and ineffective. Consecutive Commissions have tried to remedy these issues through institutional reforms aimed at increasing coherence between governments (vertically) and EU policies (horizontally) (Orbie & Versluys, 2009, pp.68 – 72).

The most important change for EU development policy was the Lisbon Treaty2 (2009). Encouraged by the successful discourse of “euro strategists” for a more strategic and assertive international Europe, the Treaty created a single institutional framework for EU international relations, development and foreign policy with a simplified chain of command: a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) backed by a EEAS. These institutions’ main aim is to ensure the consistency of EU’s exter-nal action (Hadeshian, 2010; Zwolski 2012). The Treaty defines EU development aid’s “primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty” (TFEU, art. 208). We will look into the EEAS more critically below, when assessing the significant consequences for development policy these institutional changes have.

Trends in aid allocation show the EU might not be as normative as it would like to be, or at least not in the area of develop-ment policy. The EU chooses recipients of its aid based on strategic interests in a given global structure. If egotistical motives have the upper hand in aid allocation, does the EU at least up- hold its primary objective of development aid as adopted in the TFEU: poverty eradication? Again, NPE falls short.

Securitization of EU AidThe New York terrorist attacks of 2001 ushered in a new age for EU development policy. Responding to the specific security threat


of terrorism, the European Council adopted the ESS in 2003. It acknowledges the two-way relationship between development and security, but also recognizes a dominance of the latter by claiming, “security is a precondition of development” (p. 2). The ESS argues for the integration of EU external instruments and policies to achieve an “extended security”, based on military and civil instruments (Faust & Messner, 2005, p. 425).

The Cotonou Agreement was up for its first revision in 2005, an opportunity to put the new security-development nexus into practice. The Agreement between the EU and the ACP encapsulates the most comprehensive cooperation relationship the EU has, aimed at poverty eradication in the region (art. 1). Mackie (2008, pp. 149 – 151) identifies important changes to Article 11 (“Peace Building, Conflict Prevention and Resolution”) that reflect the post-9/11 security concerns. For example it includes new articles on the fight against terrorism and on co-operation on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the latter stressed as being “an essential element of this agreement” (art. 11B(1)). Furthermore, the African Peace Facility is used for peacekeeping and peace enforcement with money from the European Development Fund (EDF), the budget used for ACP development cooperation. Peace missions do not count as ODA; this means part of the EDF is not used for development goals, but for security goals, and this is not compen-sated by additional budgets for development (Orbie & Versluys, 2009, p. 82).

Institutionally the influence of security concerns has also surfaced, primarily through the new EEAS. EU development policy finds itself affected in different ways: overall ODA strategies will be mapped out by the EEAS, the EEAS’ core competency will be the management of delicate linkages between security and develop-ment and the country and regional desks formerly at the Devel- opment Directorate General will be moved to the EEAS, to name but a few changes (Furness, 2010).

Closer cooperation between development and security policies is necessary for the EU to be a more coherent international actor. However, relevant actors have expressed their concern that development will become subservient to strategic security concerns in the EU’s post-Cold War desire to be a significant international player (Olsen, 2004; Woods, 2005).

The phenomenon of security concerns influencing development aid is called the “securitization of aid”. For Buzan & Hansen (2009) securitization refers to “the process of presenting an issue in security terms” (p. 214). The 2011 Concord & AidWatch report defines it more critically: “the blending of defence and development objectives and the allocation of aid according to perceived security threats and challenges, rather than according to poverty eradication goals” (p. 8).

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NPE No More?To sum up, aid securitization is worrying for development policy in four ways – its money, its aims, its channels and its institutional autonomy:

After 9/11 the world shifted into a structure constantly seeking security from terrorism. The EU followed suit. The new ESS- influenced agenda of state failure prevention in development policy is concentrating funds on 20 – 30 states with limited reference to development, away from other agendas like the Millennium Development Goals and climate change (Faust & Messner, 2005; Con- cord & AidWath, 2011).

Secondly, most EU aid goes to Afghanistan, Iraq and its neighbouring states, instead of the least developed countries (Orbie, 2012). This means money is going to less poor, but more un- secure regions, disregarding of the “poverty eradication” goal institu-tionalized in the TFEU.

Woods (2005) articulates a third relevant issue that has not been discussed yet. In pursuit of their own strategic goals, aid is increasingly unique to the donors’ interests. Multilateral institutions are less called upon to coordinate aid in a coherent manner across the world. This results in competition amongst priorities and aid chaos in recipient countries.

Finally and most worryingly, EU development policy is being eroded institutionally. The abolition of the Development Council in 2002 was a first major modification. Development issues have since then been discussed in the General Affairs and External Relations Council (Orbie & Versluys, 2009, p. 82). As discussed, the EEAS took over a substantial part of development policy competency. Today aid is being allocated by an institution primarily concerned with foreign policy, with limited involvement of development experts and actors (AidWatch & Concord, 2011, p. 8).

I have argued that the securitization of aid has a considerable impact on development policy, but it has threatened – and maybe even damaged – the EU at a more fundamental level: its identity as a NPE. The EU used to be considered a new kind of superpower that was not based on power politics. Orbie (2012) argues that this is no longer the case; it has succumbed to “superpower temptation”. In its never-ending quest for coherence between policies with a view to assert itself as a more robust international actor, the EU might have lost the very thing that made it such an effectively legitimate international actor in the first place: its normativity. However, as much as it is true that aid securitization has negative consequenc-es for EU development policy and NPE, the development community cannot escape the fact that security issues and development aid have a very complex, interdependent relationship and that these policies cannot be seen separate from each other.


Conclusion In this essay I answered the question why states give international development assistance. Rather than focusing on just hard numbers3, I have looked at historical changes in aid allocation and institutional structures and have based my argument on logic and deduction, using the EU as a justified case study. I have done this primarily to make the most use out of limited space, but also to look at the process of securitization in a more comprehensive way to present the reader with a holistic understanding of EU development policy.

A lot of research has been done on the motives steering aid allocation worldwide, and the general message is clear. Donors give aid primarily for their own strategic interests, undermining recipient need and merit. The paradox between global aid motives and NPE is scrutinized in this essay and two dimensions are uncovered. First, a short history of EU aid allocation shows that receiving countries have always had a special relationship with the EU, situated within a global structure. Second, NPE becomes even more dubious when we look at the institutional changes EU development policy has gone through over time. After the Cold War the EU tried to break free from bipolarity and secure its own powerful place in world politics. Plagued by the lack of coherence between different policies on the one hand and between development policies at national levels and EU level on the other, the Lisbon Treaty sought to satisfy the euro-strategists’ call for more international credibility, catalyzed by 9/11 and the ESS. It established a position for a HR and the EEAS. The securitization of aid in its allocation and its policy has enhanced the effectiveness of EU external policy, but not in favor of EU development aid. More reflexivity and a better balancing act are needed.

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100 101What Accounts for the Rise of Dementia on the International Policy Agenda?


In his role as G8 president, the UK prime minister David Cameron coordinated the first dementia summit on 11th December 2013. The summit was significant to the extent that it may here be taken as symbolic of the moment when, on a global level, dementia’s “time [had] come” (Kingdon 2003: 1). Since, to my knowledge, this is not a case which has been examined within existing policy literature, I base my analysis of the summit on the declaration signed following the event, as well as on speeches from G8 ministers made available on government and NGO websites.

Although generally acknowledged as a growing problem, before December 2013 dementia was not prominent on the agendas of the international policy community. Unlike other global disease pandem-ics to date, dementia is non-communicable and the presence of the disease in one state does not have a palpable impact on anoth-er. At the same time that G7/8 leaders met to discuss strategies for coping with dementia, the international community grappled with devising an adequate response to Ebola which appeared dramatically more in need of coordinated international action. Nonetheless, estimates suggest that the cost of dementia to the global economy is over $604 billion a year and rising1, meaning that affected states cannot ignore the need to rapidly develop policies which will address the enormous burden the disease places on society.

Dementia falls into the category of policy problems which by their nature are internal to states, and yet succeed at appearing on the international policy agendas because their consequences are experienced almost universally (Soroos, 1990: 311). These kinds of simultaneous problems are just one classification of policy problem which has led to the emergence of global public policy processes (Stone, 2008: 25) but which could, in theory, be tackled purely through domestic policymaking. Although the economic and societal threats posed by dementia are shared by almost all states, it does not necessarily follow that international policy coordination is required.

Although there were some precedents to the G8 dementia summit,2 dementia has not historically appeared high on the agendas of international organisations. This summit was novel in bringing together health ministers, pharmaceutical companies, researchers, charities and representatives from the WHO and OECD with the aim of discussing “how to shape an effective international response to dementia”.3 Leaders from G7/8 member states are ideally placed to build political and personal relationships, share policy knowledge, and encourage action from the IMF and World Bank ( Karns and

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This article seeks to make sense of the rise of dementia on the international policy agenda. Using existing theoretical approaches to agenda-setting I consider why a domestic public health problem has recently come to be framed as a global public policy problem requiring a coordinated international response. I conclude that policy entrepreneurs are crucial in framing domestic issues as global ones and in moving these issues onto international agendas. In light of the policy challenges which aging societies will continue to pose in the future, I recommend treating “global action on dementia” as a blueprint for other kinds of “simultaneous” policy problems (Stone: 2008) and further embedding the World Dementia Council in an international organisation such as the World Health Organisation.

1 WHO (2012) Dementia: a public health priority, p. 90.2 For example, the 2012 WHO report declared that ‘coordinating and direction is required nationally and internationally in view of the global nature of the coming epidemic and its profound fiscal and societal impacts’ (p.90). A passing reference is also made to dementia in the 2013 Report of the Oxford Martin Commission for Future Generations (p.29).3 G8 Dementia Summit Declaration.

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Mingst 2010: 421). Since dementia is currently felt most acutely in more economically developed states and its impacts are economic, the G8 appears an obvious forum for addressing the issue.

The challenges posed by dementia are not however limited to wealthier states. The World Health Organisation predicts that by 2050 71% of the 150 million people projected to have dementia will live in low and medium income countries.4 The G7/8 health ministers have therefore acknowledged that “the economic challenge will intensify as life expectancy increases across the globe” and consequently “also want to engage other countries with a similarly strong interest in dementia”.5 At the summit they committed to “the ambition to identify a cure or a disease-modifying therapy for dementia by 2025 and to increase collectively and significantly the amount of funding for dementia research to reach that goal”.6

One outcome of the summit was the creation of the World De- mentia Council, composed of pharmaceutical company representa-tives, civil society groups, public health professionals and government ministers. The Council is designed to encourage innovation in dementia research and attract international investment and is headed by the World Dementia Envoy. Creation of the Council is significant because it ensures that even if dementia loses its high agenda status, and the issue enters a “post-problem stage” (Downs 1972: 40), that a setting exists for sustained global action.

Various theories exist as to why some issues receive attention at any given time. Particularly within technical areas, “epistemic communities” may be seen to have a role in raising the profile of certain issues. Haas (1992) has shown how epistemic communities (made up of professional experts with authority on a particular issue) are successful in exerting influence over decision makers in times of uncertainty and are therefore “significant actors in shaping patterns of international policy coordination” (Ibid.: 35). According to Haas, collaboration between states which are not materially dependent on one another usually indicates the existence of an transnational epistemic community (Ibid.: 17). The ideas of these commu-nities may be taken up by international organizations (such as the World Health Organisation) and in turn “diffused” to decision makers in other states (Ibid.). Since the scale of the future impact of dementia is uncertain, policymakers’ understanding of the problem must be due to medical experts from within these epistemic communities. Their influence may help to explain why policymakers across states are aware of dementia as a problem and are therefore receptive to proposals of international cooperation on the issue. However, the existence of epistemic communities is not alone

sufficient to explain why dementia would shift from “systemic” to “formal” agendas (Kingdon 2003: 16) or to account for the occur-rence of the dementia summit.

By assessing the numerous actors and processes which lead to problems receiving attention at any given time, Kingdon’s multiple streams model offers a more nuanced approach. Although Kingdon’s insights into the agenda-setting process are discussed at the domestic level, many of the central concepts can be applied at the global level. Fundamental to the multiple streams model is the notion that the separate “streams” of politics, policies and problems run through the policymaking process and that when these streams converge an item is likely to receive attention on a governmental agenda. The model also employs the concept of the policy entrepreneur and it is this aspect of the model which I consider most significant in accounting for the rise of dementia on the international policy agenda.

Kingdon notes that in most case studies of agenda-setting there will be one or more individual who played a key role in raising the profile of a particular agenda item ( Ibid.: 180). These individuals often have a combination of a “claim to a hearing”, “political connections” and “persistence” (Ibid.: 181) and, while pursuing a particular goal, have a role in “coupling” the streams, often taking advantage of policy windows which may appear in the political or problems streams (Ibid.: 203). Below I set out how each of the streams may be identified at a global level when assess-ing dementia as an agenda item and highlight the role that Cameron had in joining them when coordinating the dementia summit.

The “problems” stream refers to the way in which some issues come to occupy the attention of policymakers. “Focusing events” provide one means by which conditions become defined as problems (Ibid.: 197), but in the case of dementia, “indicators” of the growing scale of the problem, in the form of rates of incidence of the disease and care costs highlighted by epistemic communities includ-ing the WHO, are more likely to have drawn attention to the issue. The “politics” stream contains the political developments which make both agenda and policy change more likely (Ibid.: 20). At the global level, continuing fears of both economic instability and population aging may have helped to ensure that G8 member states were receptive to a proposal of joint action on dementia. Finally, the “policies” stream contains the possible solutions generated by policy communities which, to be seriously considered, must fit with a number of criteria including “technical feasibility”, “fit with dominant values and the current national mood” and “budget worka-bility” (Ibid.: 19 – 20). Cameron’s proposed solution during the summit of commitment to sustained international collaboration and investment ostensibly met these criteria and was therefore unlikely to

4 WHO (2012) Dementia: a public health priority, p. 90.5 G8 Dementia Summit Declaration.6 Ibid.

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be rejected by other leaders. Kingdon notes that the streams meet at critical moments when “a problem is recognized, a solution is developed and available in the policy community, a political change makes it the right time for policy change, and potential constraints are not severe” (Ibid.: 165). Policy entrepreneurs are often responsible for “coupling” these streams, particularly during an opening of the “policy window” (Ibid.: 203). Such a window of opportunity may be seen in the form of Cameron’s G8 presidency which he took advantage of to push for action on an issue of personal concern. While a single actor cannot be alone responsible for directing the debates which lead to the emergence of policy problems, the role of policy entrepreneurs in agenda-setting should not be under- estimated (Nay 2012: 68).

The G8 dementia summit signified the first time that a prime minister used his G8 presidency to initiate action on one particular disease.7 As such, Cameron’s leadership appears as a crucial factor in the rise of dementia on the international policy agenda. Change cannot always be attributed to policy entrepreneurs but, in cases where change necessarily involves disturbing the status quo, successful policy entrepreneurship is likely to have been a cause (Mintrom and Norman 2009: 650). Policy entrepreneurs are often seen to guard against opposition to their proposals by building “coalitions” which can demonstrate broader support (Ibid.: 653). Such a motivation might be seen in the way that Cameron assigned some of his agency to Dr Dennis Gillings (also born and edu- cated in the UK) when appointing him as World Dementia Envoy. Equally, by committing to doubling UK funding for dementia, Cameron also appears to be “leading by example” (Ibid.) and encour-aging other states to do the same.8

At the global level there is no single authoritative decision maker who can dictate international agendas (Stone, 2008: 26). However, status such as G8 presidency does afford leaders the opportunity to focus attention on issues of collective concern. Although Kingdon’s multiple streams model addresses domestic policy agendas, his conception of “streams” can help to explain how leaders take advantage of both global economic conditions in the politics stream and of globally relevant ideas moving in the problems and policies streams in order to push for certain kinds of action. I would argue that the concept of the policy entrepreneur can be extended to heads of government who see international cooperation on an issue as beneficial to their national interests. This also explains why, when a policy entrepreneur is successful in highlighting the benefits of global cooperation, a domestic issue might move onto an internation-al policy agenda.

Where the multiple streams model and the role it ascribes to policy entrepreneurs may fall short in addressing this case study is its application to a prime minister. Kingdon characterises typical policy entrepreneurs as individuals who strive to get the attention of decision-makers (journalists, lobbyists, civil servants and academics, for example) and who invest considerable time and effort in pushing forward their proposals (Kingdon 2003: 204). As a decision-maker himself, Cameron initially appears not to fit this description. However, as Ackrill notes, Kingdon’s distinction between policy entrepreneurs and decision-makers is perhaps overly blunt. By distinguishing between Kingdon’s description of policy entrepreneurs and the concept of policy entrepreneurship in general (2011: 74), Ackrill argues for seeing policymakers as “commissioners of ideas and proposals in response to policy windows” (Ibid.: 75) who select from available ideas produced by their agents. This modification of the concept of policy entrepreneurship helps to explain Cameron’s delegation of authority to the World Dementia Council. Since a solution to dementia does not yet exist, Cameron (or another policy entrepreneur) can select from any future proposals generated by the Council and in so doing defer to specialists in the face of uncertain conditions (Haas 1992: 14).

Central to policymaking is the process of defining certain conditions as problems requiring action (Anderson 1978: 20). These problems, as defined by the actors involved in agenda-setting, can be employed in the pursuit of political power and resources in addition to specific policy goals (Peters 1994: 10). The role of policy entrepreneurs within the multiple streams model acknowledges the importance of political self-interest (Zahariadis 1999: 78). While it is not possible to identify Cameron’s exact motivation for moving dementia onto the G8’s agenda, it is quite possible that he considered such a move beneficial to his own national political interests. The case of the G8 dementia summit therefore also raises questions about the distinction often made between domestic and international policy agendas. Even when pursuing domestic goals, policy coordination between states is increasingly vital due to economic interdependence (Haas, 1992: 13). When viewed as an economic rather than a health issue alone, the rise of dementia on the international policy agenda constitutes less of a puzzle, since economic threats may serve as key drivers to action. I would argue that domestic policy problems are more likely to feature on international agendas when problem definition is not contentious and collaboration is in the economic interests of multiple states.

The challenge now is of maintaining dementia’s position on the international policy agenda and ensuring that the commitments made in the declaration are observed. The “legacy events” which have taken

7 The Guardian, 11 December 2013.8 Announced at the Global Dementia Legacy Event in London on 19 June 2014.

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place in Canada9 and Japan10 during 2014 (both long after the end of Cameron’s G8 presidency) suggest that broad commitment to continued action on dementia has been achieved at least in the short term. However, if dementia is to be fully recognised as an issue for global public policy, with the resources and backing of the entire international policy community, expansion of the World Demen-tia Council to the level of an international bureaucracy such as UNAIDS may be required in order to generate a more expansive international response.11 With the 2008 financial crisis undermining the G7/8 member states’ dominance in the world economy (Karns and Mingst 2010: 422), alongside the widespread acknowledgement that dementia will increasingly affect developing countries, dementia equally warrants a place on broader international agendas such as that of the G20. Civil society groups have already had a role in applying this kind of pressure, and may continue to do so.12

Global public policy relating to health issues has traditionally focused on managing and preventing communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS. The G8 summit on dementia is therefore in some ways unprecedented and unique, and it must be acknowledged that a single case study cannot generally offer any new theoretical generalisations (George and Bennett 2005: 111). However, the scale of the challenges posed by an aging global population13 means that we may increasingly see states defining other domestic problems (such as, perhaps, high dependency ratios) as global problems requiring a coordinated international response. Since “de- stabilizing trends” in global health require increasingly innovative responses in order to protect human security (Benatar 2012: 129), global cooperation is not only likely but essential. It is reasonable to assume that international policy coordination on dementia and other issues related to aging (or, indeed, other non-communicable diseases) is more likely to be successful than on many other policy areas since states have more to gain in collaborating than they have to lose. As such the action the G8 has taken thus far on dementia may serve as a useful blueprint for future efforts to collabo-ratively tackle domestic problems which are experienced by numerous states simultaneously.

9 See Canadian Institutes of Health Research (2014) Summary Report: Second Global Dementia Legacy Event.10 See Ministry of Health Labour and Welfare, Japan (no date) Global Dementia Legacy Event Japan. 11 See Nay (2012) for details of UNAIDS’s bureaucratic influence with the UN.12 See Alzheimer’s Disease International (2014, 13 March) Sign the petition: ‘Make dementia a priority agenda item at the G20’.13 See UNFPA and HelpAge International (2012) Aging in the Twenty-First Century.

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Part DInterview

108 109Interview with Ben Stewart, Greenpeace Activist and Author of the New Book: Don’t Trust, Don’t Fear, Don’t Beg

D IPPR 2015INTERVIEW

ALESSANDRABOCCHI

A.B.INTERVIEW WITH BEN STEWART, GREENPEACE ACTIVIST AND AUTHOR OF THE NEW BOOK: DON’T TRUST, DON’T FEAR, DON’T BEG

ALESSANDRA BOCCHI How did you first get interested in environmental activism?BEN STEWART I got interested in the environment a few years before the issue exploded, in around 2000/2001. I read a lot about it and saw there was a job at Greenpeace. At the time I was working at Amnesty International and I decided that I would go for it, and I think if Greenpeace wouldn’t have worked on climate change I wouldn’t have been so interested. And weirdly, when I joined, as a Press Officer the working on the climate change campaign was like the bum deal – no one wanted to do it. It was considered the boring campaign that didn’t get a lot of media. But I was really excited to work on climate and I’ve been there for thirteen years now. Its weird, the climate story gets some people onboard and turns other people off, and part of my job is to work out how we get the world turned on the climate change story.

A.B. Were you aware of the risks involved before leaving for missions in the Arctic?B.S. I have been in other missions in the Arctic and there’s always a briefing before people leave. One has to educate oneself to a certain extent about what is going on, but Greenpeace always gives a briefing about the risks and the dangers. There was a lot of controversy after the one where activists went to jail in Russia – about whether they were told enough and whether Greenpeace was naïve, and when I wrote this book about it I brought this question up by putting both points of view forward.

A.B. What were the biggest struggles you had to face as an activist?B.S. The feeling that you don’t make any difference. I’ve done some big direct action that took us a lot of time and effort and emotional energy to organise and then you do it and nothing happens as a result – no media coverage and the government doesn’t change any- thing. It is that feeling of profound impotence that really kills you, combined with a vague hope that this time it will be different. I was once part of a group of people that tried to organise the shut down of a power station, and we got a hundred and fourteen people together to do this under extreme secrecy. We were preparing to go in at 3 am and then two hundred riot police came in through the windows and arrested us all, and it turns out that one of our numbers – one of the hundred and fourteen that was working for six months on this, was actually an under cover cop and had been one for seven years. Some of my friends had known this guy for seven years, as a very close friend, and then found out he was an under cover police man, and that was quite crushing for all of us. We were con-victed in court and it was overturned later because of the corruption this undercover agent had engaged in, but that was probably my most difficult moment of activism; that action being blown, and then discovering later that a friend was an undercover policeman.

110 111A.B. Can you explain a bit more about your sense of impotence – that there’s no significant public reaction to the issues you are raising?B.S. I gave a large part of my life to this cause – I have spent a lot of time away, I have made relationships difficult and spent a lot of time in court and given so much time to it in general, and there’s a debate as to whether we’ve actually gone anywhereforward than we were a decade ago. I would make a strong argument for us having made progress but sometimes it’s difficult to see.

A.B. Your book has received significant media attention. Do you think it will contribute to increase some tensions between Russia and the West?B.S. I hope not. I think to be honest Putin doesn’t really know or cares about a book, but other officials might not. However, there are Russian heroes that I talk about in the story. Many Russian people went to go protest to have them released. There were about thirty-five thousand Russian members of the public that wrote to the ministry of home affairs to write a petition calling for their release, showing general public dissidence in Russia. There were many Russian heroes here. There is going to be a film of the book. I think the Russian state will notice it, but I hope it won’t be seen as an anti-Russian film; it will hopefully be about people that are willing to risk their liberty for a cause they believe in.

A.B. Do you think Russia views Greenpeace as an extension of Western power?B.S. I’m not sure if the Russian people do or even if the Russian state does, but it declares that it does. Now that might be paranoia or a strategy. When we were running this campaign to get our friends out of jail, we were accused of being CIA agents or working for west-ern oil companies, we were perceived as being biased against Russia and targeting Russia specifically. There was a film in Russia about how Greenpeace was part of western oil companies, when Putin eventually announced an amnesty for the activists, he said they were allowed to go home but that in his opinion they were acting on behalf of western oil companies – which is absurd, western oil companies hate us! They have jailed us; they target us. So I don’t know whether the Russian state genuinely believes that, or whether they were trying to facilitate their strategy against us but it was very important that we challenged that, and we tried very hard to do so. Part of our strategy was to make sure people in Russia perceived us as an independent organisation, not an extension of western power and governments.

D IPPR 2015INTERVIEW A.B.

A.B. One way to challenge that would be to have more Russian people involved?B.S. Yes, we have a Russian office and we try to put them front and centre and we try to avoid having westerners be interviewed on Russian TV – we put Russians up instead. However, this was very difficult, Russian media always tried to accuse us and we had a tough time getting our story out to them.

A.B. Do you think NGOs make a big impact on international environ-mental policy, or do you think governmental organisations (as the UN) are more effective in rendering states environmentally active? If not, why do you think NGO’s are more effective?B.S. I think they play very different roles. Often the role of NGOs is to get an issue on the political agenda. NGOs create public concern, which in turn creates political pressure to make leaders do something. Organisations like the UN are often the body that facilitates a deal. I think that direct action and general campaigning is what speeds up the international organisation. However, if you have an issue like the ozone layer which is profoundly concerning to a large number of people, it’s still quite difficult to get stories like that on the agenda, they just don’t fit a normal framework of story telling in the media because they are often seen as remote from us – as if they were part of a distant future. To make climate a big issue activists have brought it alive, injecting life into the story, and I think that’s a really important process – to move climate into the centre of the global conversation. We are criticised a lot for it – for trivial- ising these kind of issues – what people say is that you shouldn’t protest or get involved in direct action but just put the science in front of leaders and they will do the right thing. However, I think that view is naïve and doesn’t appreciate how power operates in the world; leaders will generally only do something when they know they will pay a political price if they don’t. Our job as NGOs is to make sure that leaders suffer by doing the wrong thing and benefit from doing the right thing. The UN doesn’t do that, it’s not its job to and it’s not in a position to. The UN won’t put pressure on David Cameron for putting a regressive policy on solar – those kinds of things have to come from below. When I went to Copenhagen in 2009 I was really struck by this dynamic; there was this idea that everyone was going to be talking about climate change and that the meeting in Copenhagen would require leaders to get something done. It did not turn out that way at all. None of those leaders were feeling the political pressure from the public to strike a deal. Obama arrived and made a really disappointing speech, and I remember thinking that moment, that there was a really powerful movement in the US that made him give that speech – the Tea party. They mobilised and ensured that if Obama did what we wanted him to do he would pay a price for it.

INTERVIEW WITH BEN STEWART, GREENPEACE ACTIVIST AND AUTHOR OF THE NEW BOOK: DON’T TRUST, DON’T FEAR, DON’T BEG

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A.B. Do you think making leaders pay a reputational cost is the only way to achieve something from them?B.S. To some extent. Campaigning groups aren’t good enough at patting leaders on the back when they do the right thing. When they do though, no one notices. Greenpeace is often accused of doing only “stunts”, and hammering corporations and leaders. The fact is – we do a lot more. But there’s a media filter where all the press releases, that I sent out, about solutions to climate change and congratulating leaders that I might have just burned instead. The media is just not interested. We play this interesting game where we want to raise the issue onto the agenda and so we have to be confrontational, the media is not interested in what we have to say unless we play this part for them. We try to break out that script to try to have a more nuanced and subtle conversation and its not always easy – we are often ignored. If you look at NGOs that are purely policy based you probably haven’t heard of most of them, because nobody cares, but they should. It’s just a better story to portray NGOs as extreme and confrontational. If you want to raise public and political consciousness in the right way you have to use different tools.

A.B. In terms of using these tools, what advocacy or operational difficulties do NGOs, like Greenpeace, usually face in advancing their causes?B.S. Apathy is the main issue. Climate is a bad issue because its happening very slowly and all the of the dynamics that exist in making an issue have some success don’t exist in climate debate. It’s slow process that requires faith in complex science to believe in it. Also, there’s a perception that if you get involved for the environment it has a negative effect on your life – for example, you have to stop flying etc. Lots of that isn’t true but that’s the easiest story to tell. Most people have aspirations to have a completely unrestricted consumer lifestyle – that is the dominant ideology of our time.

A.B. So isn’t this the consumerist ideology the main cause of public apathy towards issues like climate change? B.S. It’s a huge issue, yes. Naomi Klein talks a lot about it in her book This Changes Everything; it’s a great book. I buy into a lot of it although not all of it. But that’s what she would say – action on climate change and the neoliberal economic model are at odds with each other. I guess we’re talking about something slightly different – the attitude that people have about wanting material wealth is the prison through which people see the climate issue. But, with climate change we haven’t got time for an anti-capitalist revolu-tion. I’m not saying that’s necessarily what we want to see but we have to get real action on this in ten or twenty years time and

A.B.

challenging adherence to consumer culture feels quite impossible. I feel that we will have to work within that framework.

A.B. A positive effect of operational work is that through direct action it tries to solve the issue directly rather than trying to raise awareness when there’s general public apathy. However, a big cause of this apathy is that most people don’t know what they could do; so operational work could reduce this effect by offering opportunities in terms of tackling the issue at grassroots levels. What do you thing regular people could do to help the environment in their every-day life?B.S. That’s very true, that most people don’t know what they could do. However, in your every day life people have two powerful moments. One happens every day. Every day they make consumer choices and the global consumer can change the direction that governments take. If you make decisions about refusing to buy things from unsustainable sources, corporations and governments react to that pressure. The second thing is to choose whom to vote for – using their vote to punish leaders who are environmentally regressive. If you look at the last UK general election the issues that we’re trying to raise weren’t discussed. Cameron was able to say he run the greenest government ever and then call all the green agenda green crap and seemingly not pay a price for it. So people should demand this kind of stuff. But I don’t think voting is the only thing people can do – people can mobilise to pressure politicians and corporations to do the right thing. Its easier than ever to lend your name and your time to a cause, and only by mobilising and having millions of us pushing against really profound forces we can get a change. This is not a static situation where we’re pushing into a void – there are well-organised groups pushing against the green agenda. The profit motive for many companies is a huge push back and so we need to be much stronger. Any profound change is never given to; you have to demand it.

A.B. Why do you think the Russian state views environmental activism as such a threat?B.S. Two things. Firstly the Russian state at the moment is unnaturally dependant on oil and gas. I can’t remember the exact figures but about fifty per cent of state revenues come from fossil fuels right now. We’re an organisation that wants to challenge this and there is obviously going to be a tension there. Also, at the moment there’s a suspicion about any organised protest movement – environmental protest movements have been percussive to a wider movement. If you look at the Chernobyl nuclear disaster where the soviet regime was untruthful, that caused a huge uptake in activism in the Soviet Union. So the government is trying to pass a bill


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to make it more difficult for all NGOs to operate there. Also, there is hardly any parliamentary opposition in Russia at the moment, so they see NGOs as the main opposition.

A.B. Where do you see the future of the Arctic?B.S. Well, the main thing happening in the arctic is that the ice is melting. The cap is going to be gone in some months. You have this supreme irony – these huge oil companies are following the ice melting routes to drill for the same fuels that caused the melting in the first place. This is insane. The political impunity that oil companies have is absurd. There is also a militarisation of the artic – Russia, the US and Canada are seeing a lot of hope in projecting military forces in the area, so there is a lot going on in the arctic.

A.B. Why do you think many states are so passive in tackling global warming, despite so much scientific evidence?B.S. I don’t think our brains are well wired to deal with it. If there’s an abstract threat we are slow in tackling it. If you’re house is burning down you’ll do something to stop it. If you have a small problem that is accumulating then our mechanisms don’t kick in because there’s no sense of an emergency. We don’t like changes as human beings, for many people things are just fine the way they are, even if they know with scientific evidence what is happening. And this is an issue of intergenerational justice as well. We are probably going to be ok, but our kids probably not, and their kids most probably not. Many psychologies on climate change state the difficulty of tackling this issue.

A.B. What is your opinion on nuclear energy as being the new alternative for cleaner energy in the future? B.S. I see the solution in solar. I’m not one of those environmentalists that are completely against nuclear power, but I don’t think it will solve the problem because it is too slow, expensive and risky in countries where there are no regulatory safeguards that ensure that things can be done safely. However, I see things in a hierarchy of bad things. The first thing I would shut down is coal fired power stations which are the most carbon intensive way of generating electricity, then after that we need to get off gas, and then nuclear, and after that aim for a renewable network. It will take a long time to get there and a lot of money.

A.B. Do you think power interests primarily dictate environmental foreign policy?B.S. Yes largely. On the one hand British governments say that they are committed to giving up coal in Britain. But if you look at their foreign policy they are happy to support other states in using coal. I know this is cliché view, but it is also held by Alan Greenspan –

A.B.

that the Iraq war was primarily driven by power and oil interests. The influence of oil in foreign policy will only change when we don’t need oil anymore. There are many reasons why a solar revolution will be a fine and beautiful thing for the planet.

A.B. What countries, in your opinion, are the biggest threats to the environment in the future?B.S. India at the moment, it is exploding in terms of the resources it is consuming, it has a huge population that it is trying to take out of poverty and it’s in the danger of taking the decisions that China made as well. The Indian government needs to alleviate the profoundly big issue of poverty that people suffer from, but it has to do so in an environmental sustainable way as well.

A.B. The main argument, however, of emerging economies like India and China, is that Western countries have already developed and have caused to a great extent problems such as pollution and climate change, so now they have a right to this. What do you think about this argument?B.S. It’s a valid argument. I think to solve it we need to try and help these countries pay to develop in a clean way. Because CO2 knows no borders, we have to work together. We have gotten pretty rich by adopting this energy model. It seems hypocritical and that’s why we need to help them develop in a way that doesn’t harm the environment, or else we will trash the environment three hundred and sixty degrees. The best compromise is a deal where we help those countries pay for this possibility.

A.B. How can governments, in your opinion, increase incentives to invest in renewable energy?B.S. I think this development requires subsidy from governments. The British government said it would remove its subsidies now – the Chinese government has instead invested hugely in solar, they are going to outplay us in terms of the energy and technologies of the 21st century.

A.B. What do you think underdeveloped countries, struggling from corruption, warfare and poverty should do to resolve energy vast energy inefficiencies, which don’t seem to be a priority?B.S. It’s difficult, I don’t want to be the typical white western campaigner and say – “start being energy efficient.” People are trying to sur- vive so it’s not a priority for them. The countries that have gotten rich running fossil fuels should pay at least some of the costs for other countries and help them develop cleaner technologies. The richer world has to start giving.


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A.B. Do you think economic growth and environmental preservation are mutually exclusive? If not, how do you see the two coming together?B.S. This is the one of the main things – to de-couple economic growth from carbon emissions. In China CO2 emissions are com-pletely decoupled now from economic growth – so this feeling isn’t there anymore. The way to do this if government’s aren’t doing it already is to force them to take up cleaner technology. A deal at the UN could to so effectively.

A.B. What do you mean by “force”?B.S. By demanding new alternatives, we have to intervene in the market. The ultra free market fundamentalist will decide that the market will decide the best thing for us but I don’t think that’s the case. We have to intervene in the market very aggressively, individual countries have to be forced as well but we also need a global multi-lateral deal. Sounds like a cliché but the world does need to come together. Part of the role of NGOs, going back to the start of the conversation, is to force that dynamic.

A.B. Where do you see global warming and the environment ten years from now, if things continue to unfold this way?B.S. Copenhagen was five years ago and the last chance for a deal, but it didn’t turn out the way we thought it would. What I fear is that in time it will be a lot clearer that climate change is a big deal, but people will still be sceptic, so we might make progress in cleaner energy but not maybe not enough because of this scepticism. Climate change is this very slowly unfolding story; I feel that it will unfold some way but that it will only take a profoundly huge global disaster to wake people up. I hope it won’t get to that.

A.B.INTERVIEW WITH BEN STEWART, GREENPEACE ACTIVIST AND AUTHOR OF THE NEW BOOK: DON’T TRUST, DON’T FEAR, DON’T BEG

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What Accounts for the Rise of Dementia on the International Policy Agenda?


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