U.1 DROLLOI 31

1. Suevery of Case

a. The DA in this case is name ROTEL (true asses), boni 19 September1931 in Derlin. Prom an unstated date until the begimning cf1949MANTEL larked for Din's Co. in Berlin. At the latter time hebemuse involved in an unspecifted Seregelaritys fled to the SovietZone to *void the teneaquAmeeep and round WM* in the ermine ninesat Atte. In the auteen of 1950, SAMEL became involved in anothernirregalarite (this one invade% falsificationa of the arelyelaof uranium) and in Detember again nod going to aothor in Devlin/Spandau- (West Seotor) and seeking AttlifilLOSEXIIAT to obtain statusas a political refugee. lie returned to Mos where he eve arrestedon 9 !fay 1951. Transported to Narleberet and sentenced the tofifteen year's,. he was returned to Au.. Here he wastold (by personsunspecified) that he could escape his sentence only by agreeingtework for the SUS (specified by ZIPME as I1VD). In July 1951 he Ibegan working as an informant at shaft 64 in AU00

Somewhat later MOM was sent to visit • his father, living somewherein the Soviet Zone, end attempted to detencinel‘hat he as doing andwhat ties he had with other formor °Meer*. This attee0 was largelyunsuceassfel. He ute than &rafted to repeat the =mowers the targetthis time bang his unale.

C. The "uncle (bar eeertsWY nab"' than bleed tie) is Xerle•Beina SZUMOWiborn 22 January 1915. EifaTfLOW was theseaiving with rANTALts nether,whom be later married (about June 1953). =MOW had been an agentofZIP 'Pa te General Agfavry (GV) 0 since April 15521 a fact which theMIS apparently knew when targeting him. At an unspecified tineMUT, visited STIVOLOV and told his of his coepulsory association with=Ss including the assignment to ameba 8=104 The latter proeptl,,yreported to &Mats and arrangements were made via =MOW for aBerlin meeting of MA= and V-4360„ a representative of GY G.

• This meeting took place in a cafe on 17 July l$52. V-4360 queriedi4ANT&L about the uranium works at Aue. The latter t s answers weresubsequently evaluated as true but of little sigdficences and hIPI?Eltcould not determine whether the lack of significant informationresulted from ignorance or deliberate reticence. V.4360 further

1

determined that most of the 104 given WM were aimed at the recruit.meet of ScItraii in_ rder to penetratitithmet4 westeor IS which he use

specific qiestione

asked of him by his Nanette's* Mend and the answersSU

given both tobe repeated to his S control officer. (COMMn ivie Lid gado anerror here. The questions are detailed and *how knowledge of theAue niZteth) lialfra was further to describe his uncle's "r-cosemden(i.e. V4360) as an agent of the laser itiniatry (i.e., Ministry ofAll.Zrosan Attain', not believed to have an intelligence arm of itsown); as having ties to Mt Blank (German remilitarisation). MIMIwas able to identify his recruiters the woe officer who succeeded him,an interpreters the aditreas at which his sus agent meetings were held,phone numbers there, and License numbers of three vehicles used..(COMRTI Pereonall.ties reentioned ere, respectively, a Major or Lt. Col.iltu SUCILTUKAIN, a Sr, Z. inn SWOCIN, and Rita rowam., Traces onthe first and last were negative and on =MIN were inconclusive. Thelicense numbers also remained unverified.) Meetinge were arranged byletters sent to MANTIS', in his sas alias, Klaus VOGT or WIG?.

Cl) Elements of control were mixed from tile outset. HAN= itas fondof his mother who lived in West Seats and wee pro-West. On the

. other band. his wife and child lived in the Soviet 4one; and hismer/4" 4Peared haPPY. Declatelfied end Approved for Release

by the MU Intelligence AgencyDate:

EXFOProNSSection3(b)(2)(/) F •riv ai • • C3

.(2) Ca) . rik;i1CtkiLd1

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

y

.(2) A sictplo • ce4e ..was errenged •so..thet liAgTill., in.*: .letter • to hie .. ..•otOther, Could report the •Seelet freeeption Of his infoftatiers 1:bout .

, his unclete.triend. (00tiptft. •• This 'step eeetare.unnaeessery• and ineetsure.) . . • • .

ea On 23 .ituttnst 1952, an :SKIS Ordersat • waratt sawn vieStod .3.,MIlows, • . .

(For unstated reaseae, V4360 sae nett Preeent, 4tboutib he ntir..hionitappeared an :24 .snd .25 August.) . 017 . 0 prOtiteted .00 :;ateries5 of meeting*ithieh . then • began by keeping :$411.Thit".unadvieed of ' .the- locatien WW1 •the last norrant, by oharigintmetritet.with eeeth . .noteting, Wiwi Iv. •

•tootitottrig . ..ourrosuoloe of oloottrigo,:(ithich rIesas. that the *ZS, •destAte these ."preeentions, was ectunterlling.) . . 944340 Ieter•debriefed STitaTLOI, who. attributed the 041,otint trait! to .1WITElt- after •hie' return 10: Aue . on 24 4124 /9.521. • • • . '' ' '

(1) In order to keep the Wettelitt..15'interested SIM-KV decided. that ••. :14ANT4, 'released - fteit-KOtoth £.G to give hi* . toore .:tine for •

.4;800440s toad have to be reinstated there at an inalystfgeologisto(Teo other teen WerEt. ' dt#044ipzed to :cake this 410vce •pestd,ble, a feet .••whieh made 14Abilr4 unpepalar with is new eollegoes..) •

... . ..(2) On • 3 August 1954 SUBSSIX . . presented lama, to A new 3414.•type

.. who 'introduced himself as .Ivan . StR0EWIT0e48.'• • . (00ittkigns The closest

. .trace here is to a';ilaji*'$61t0a010.0, reported' in SAV465. of .',.,... -: • .• August 1$1:7.. to bays bean tin sal.,,, Officer at the Hotel Imperial

in iteitstini. • ' l'hYsicel . descriptions show parellele.'and no serious. dieerepaneieei ) ....11011.1111,...vae :seked . if he • had not been requirect•te

eigh . a .secrecy or IVehity.. pledge,....by his . ooze* comrade, 04140, •' and was • confronted by distrust which he found it difficult...to Allay.• • BO was informed that penetration of his uncle's ergeniwatien was now

. . his sole •essigneent. :lie was givin . e few &aye of practical training. to . help hitUpley his double. role. (tor exeoPle, VhsTet 0,1thaeetts•of

• .particular , interest to the SitIS were discussed in...NOTAiS• presence•by his uncle and the torapOs friend, ROM was to •ahini leek . Of

. • interest'8nd even eteer the conversation into .other channels, . he. was to write nothing. He watt to a* . the Western IS to .builsi *

courier channel into bial;. ,... tie bowie Study his uncle and .determine••his Week' poirtts., ; .. 14 was to:attecOt to bring his Uncle. to Zest . •

.' Berlin, "where STrigTLOW woad be *vetoed * . bank A00024 Of 54900to 100,000-1)11 in his own none. • HANTiel was to ropoo my: . ato*or....frim

. • • the 'weitern IS, , except • poets - in order to create the inpreettien •that he was an idealistic . Qu:stiont shout' 4040 could be 'answered insofar.as MT1. knew the •aneitire from his own •experience. The S.SD • wasto be kept from all .keosiledge. of the 0:mei

. (3) Kgrfal, reported a .neer license number, also unc*eakeble.

•. (14 The MS paid mum,' Ca. PM• (Post or West not stated) 1290- between• .. 21: July and 1 September .1952, but was warned to leave all but

twenty :inerke behind"befOre .:going . to his next meeting with his uncle.

f. At the alone:of-the series of sleeting* on 23 ..., 25 Augeet 1952, 1144360gale* ;e1ANTEL the folloWing . instructions: • ; -

(1) To describe omitting •places ..eceurately.

(2) TO .state that he did riet., believe that his uncle Could be recruited.

(3) To repeat to the SUS new technical ID' a re Aue.

(),) To inform the MIS that no ,decision about a courier had yet beenreached.

g. Checking possible losses Una determined that HANEL knew the trueidentities of his uncle end of one other agent, not involved in thecase, plus in alias of v-4360. The &Una cs stiff, as orgonorn1precautionary measure* directed QV to start sealing off .-STIUMCM.i...

(f)

^77-,

MANTAL next wrote STRETLOW to propose meetings on 18 and 19 October1952. Because V.4360 was in, STRALOW postponed until 25 - 26 October.V-430 was still eick* and memos had 10=AL /wits his report.Highlights follows

(1) On 24 October a tau WIER", possibly of Oerman origin, debriefedhANTALin /we about his work in the uranium mine there.

(2) Personnel of SKIS Aue traveled frequently to Dresden.

(3) MANTSL provided information about uranium production at Aus4 partof which he declared had been euthorised for release by the SR'Sbut part of which had been specifically prohibited. &valuationshowed all of his information* however* to be largely worthless;LIP1/14t Massed nene of it in information reveries

(4) The SHIS had even MAUL the following IDIss'

To recite his costs and problems to V44360 in order to provehis readiness to carry out assignments.

To *peek to his uncle alone* hint at a brighter future andnote his reaction.

To attempt to determine* from his mother* albeit cautiously,the *unclo s e financial circumstances.

If alone in the uncle's home* to mote (but not write out)any names and addresses found there* not forgetting that heeight have been left "alone under observation for the expresspurpose of testing.

To tell V.4360 that continued trips to Berlin would be too .dangerous for MANTEL.

To tell the Western IS that he should not be *eked to providetechnical informatien about Aue for this sake of his ownsecurity, and that his value 1/4 in a penetration of the salsa.(CO.as ZIPPEA headquarters had reached the same conclusiont)

(5) MANTEL was given these and other* less important IDI s in writtenform; at the bottom of the sheet was a pledge not to exceed instruc-tions* which he signed in the oarsr name elsus VW?.

h. V=4360 next met HAMEL on 6 Deessexus l$52 in West Derlin, Surveillancerevealed no counteresurveil-lancee (V-4360 used the standard ,technique ofmeeting MAI= and STROTLOW in a Public place and then directing them toa hotel room.) mars'. reported as follows:

(1) He had told the SRID that the absence of V-4360 had been causedby illness.

(2) He had stated that a Harr RICHT144 (alias of V.928* not involved butknown as ZIPP&Rite to Meta') had replaced V-4360. (COMMLNTs Noone bad authorised SAM= to ten this, lie, which was obviously bothneedless and very dengeroutei , Neither ;area nor POD comments onthis fact.) '

(3) Re was told to press again for a couriere 4 (cOMMANTs As build-uPeaeorial and to avoid the SUS insistlece on a courier* OV (1 hadrequested permission to else M N= a middle-grade $/W system,already ,blown, and seemingly had authorised METAL to tell theSoviets that he would be given Of) stimm, was to tell V-4360 thatS/W could be only a temporary solution and that a courier was madenecessary by elANTais Increasing difficult: in reaching Berlin-

(h) He was given a new emergency telephone number in rreital.

-3.

(5) was advised to reeenette hie differences with his wife.(COMM'," :Bore the MIS makes its Met slip, although neitherMAUL nor KIPPhil seems to have, euee;ht it. As was learned muchlater, tearfitlit s wife had been eeparately recruited by the MISwithout his leueoledge; in fact, she concealed this fact fromhim until after the case had ended. The SUS apparently fearedat this time that marital strife siOt lead to a serious riftand thus to their loss of a window into this Da case.)•

(6) Ile was briefed on CIO. (CCOSNTs Why is not clear. The SRISknew that STUMM and t4t360 were iilFraites, though perhaps notat this time.) According to this information, cao consists offour parts* espionage, sabotage, diversion, and surveillance.It uses both single agents and nets; Germane are frequently used.It uses the *most brutal manse ; and if BANTU fell into CIC hands,he weld be finished.

(7) Me was briefed for his next trip from Dresden to Berlin.

(8) Between 27 October and 5 December 1952, the $US paid MaNilil•something more than 1000 re. (mo(?s It is worth noting that

apparently acting in accordance with orders*

did notWish to accept DM 50 offered him by V-11360 at this meetiaeg andhad to be persuaded by his uncle.)

V4360ethen briefed sow, as fella/it

(I) Re hod actually been ill at the tiles of the latrt meeting.

(2) Re gave MANTSL the SA mentioned above and instructed him in itsuse. SOUL was given the (ZIPPeR) cover name of Karl W.

(3) Re told mom to toll the XAIS that the results produced to datedid na warm:* the use of • courier.

On 16 December 1952, Mira. paid his mother and STBSTICid an unexpectedvisit. Little of importance resulted. .t4ANTEL stated that the MS hadbeen very happy to get the VW but had not yet, been able to analyse it.On 26 !larch 1953, OV 0 reported that some time before 15 February V-4360,'till ill, had been replaced by V-856. (00101/0?ts This atm broughtto 4 vs, 4 the number of IS personalities that MASTSL was able to reportto each side.) 111-856 debriefed NARA in Berlin on 15, 16, and 17 February1953, (commas On the 15th for b hours', on the 16th for B hours, ndon the 17th for 2 hours. This thevemehey stay ()owlet have' been shoreetedby one day, thus lessening subsequent SeIS suspicion that MOM° wasgiving the opposition too much cooperation,) CI measures, as describedabove, were taken.

(1) It developed that MANTSL had given the MIS completely detailedand accurate physical descriptions of SMETWei and V-4360, as wellas a photograph of the former. Re reported addresses "used" (in*that sense is not clear) by SITSTIACF

(2) Further, ROM had again invented a story and related it to theSoviets. he had said (Which was untrue) that he had been visitedin December 1952 by a courier calling himself nliatiofft . he describedIBt ri given him by this non-existent courier and the courier himself.tetween Christmas and the 1SswTear, he told them, and again on6 January 1953, he was again visited by this courier. Allegedlythe SEIS now footed that MOM* would visit UMW to wife!Accordingly a party was given, during which Helf/XLts wife was advisedthat her husband was a Soviet agent. (CONteilas It this storycontains am truth, which is doubtful, then the purpose of "giving"this information to Christie MEM was to continue to protect hercover Viepset.Arie her tusetband, since she had already known the factfor a long time.) klAfifiL, whose wife now signed a secrecy pledge,felt that in effect she had now been recruited by the SRIS. Despitethese developments, ;IANTSI. invented a fourth visit from eliAUPT*

in aid...January 0530 during which RHAUPP vas supposed to havestated that because of tightened SSD controle no further couriervisits would be paid.

(3) On 11 rebrum 1953* another MIS meeting was held at whichformerly identified Soviet officers appeared plus a new eau, notidentified. HAN= was asked if he were willing to bring hismother into East Berlin and agreed in principle but said thatShe would not cone. The Soviets shifted to the uncle. They knewthati4ANTELts nether had asked him to buy a rag for her, Theyproposed that HAN= lure STUMM into the Seri* sector onpretence of ;feeding his advice in the purchase of the rug. Hewas to take him to a specified carpet. shop. SSD personnel inUP* uniforms would then conduct an area oho* of documents.NANTil, would give the Soviets a sigted confession of hie workfor it Western IS, implicating STRZTWit • On the basis of this000:01101013 riltihnOW would: be pressured to work for the. Sal&

(a) MANTEL was then told which persons working on vObjekt 96ttoshaft 249, Aue mines he could name to the Western IS andwhich persona he could not name, (Ho supposedly named allwhom he blew.)

(b) The agent was told to ask the Western IS for a watch-sised*mere.

(c) He was to tell the Western IS that he had to know in advancethe time and place of meetings with the courier, so that theletter toad not go to HOW* home and meet his wife.

(d) Ile was directed to ask STRIMOW whether he knew personallyhis East ZOTIO subsourees and attempt indirectly to ascertaintheir identities. As with other questions, he was specificallywarned not to ask the question more than once. (COleteh"Tt Thereis only one slight indication that STILETLOW had any subsources,?AVM had once weltered to the SUS, however, a guess thathe did.)

(e) After STRETLOW had been pressured into working for the SAM,norm would continue to keep him under observation.

(1s) On 12 February 1553, another SEW meeting enabled Nina to describethree new persona, one of them a driver whose name or alias he •learned; a new license number (by now he had reported about a douse),and a new Welt**. He was driven from Aue to the control pointof the Berlin sector border in a threercar, elevenostau caravan.After being shown the carpet shop to which be was to bring STRalalihe tots sent OVOr to 1eat Berlin. He returned alone, stating thathe had been unable to find STRSTIOW.

(5) Haying thue debriefed HAIM' on' MU activiti*, V-854 obteined:from hie technical reports on Alte, which HAMM had allegedly Copiedin his office end smuggled into "West Berlin on his person. He thendirected YAWL to 'tell O. Zitis that 1:4436o Was still ill and thatanother *le officer, name Unknown, had taken over, : This case •officer was very dissatisfied with NARTZWe eork, which retained:tutsatiefactm despite the use of a *trier. / tor this reason ItHAO.PTD.would not be sent to HANTALL . 'iliny more, MANTEL was . to be sufficiently*tie* political)/ to reassure SSD etc. was further to state'that he had been given refresher tridrdng in S/W and Would perhapsbe given the developer at the next meeting, tie that the new**officer could write beck to hineti ID'S for Aeo . were now made very

. general, so that the could no longer draw inferences about theextent of the enetyl a knowledge,: !lividly, he wee to report the nextmeeting site and state that he Wiwi& be advised of the date by toil,

(0) To his report of this meeting it.,456 appended a good analysis of theagent, stating that he was entirely :materialistic and *hid beconsidered pro.4PfElt . Only in .matters concerning the safety Of hismother and STREW:Y.4

The new case officer also warned =UMW not to go to EastBerlin under any air.nuastances. (MUST* This decision soyhave been right, but it does not sear to have been reached afterany consideration of the alternative. Had STRETLOW been persd.ttedto be named" by the SUS =Mit would have had a DA about whoseloyalty* to Gamey and ZIAlt there 930031$ to be absolutely nodoubt.)

1. On 29 March 1953, the next meeting between V45,6 end MOM took placein West Berlin. s'nETU* had been spirited away tram his hems byZIPPER with the cover story that he had business in Berm, to protecthis against powsible kidnapping.. (It had been determined that .heseated to be under surveillence,)

(1) MANTEL reported that he had had to submit written reports to theSUS on his lest meetings with V■1356 and to cover each story twice,writing on different days.

(2) The SRIS refused to release any more data frost Aue. The agent wasto explain to 411VER the reasons why such information could nolonger be obtained,

mom. was diso to gather every possible piece of information aboutV-856 and STRETIDW.

MANTEL was now to state to STRETLOW that Western IS materielirolicating himself and swum had been found by the Soviets inPIANTEIAs quarters. if STRETLOW would double for the Soviets, theywould not hang him when they marched into West Berlins If thisplan failed, ST1UET1OW and Nairn' s mother were to be lured intoEastt. Berlin on a new pretext.

(5) It was learned that the Soviets had succeeded in surveilling anearlier meeting of V44.56 and WPM.

(6) V.856 indicated sharp dissatisfaction at this meting and t oldHARM that there was little point in prolonging so unprofitsblean arrangement.

m. ZIPPER now began to feel that the play should be ended. NA= wasproviding no more useful, information end was suspected (probablycorrectly) of having reported accurately to the SRIS everything he knew,with the single exception of the fact that be was 'performing the sameservice for ZIP—Pat. It was therefore decided to mere STRETLOw andfamily, including NANTELls mother, to West Germany« Should the =ISthen send NOM to visit his parents in the American sone, ZIPPO,would be interested in continuing the play because (they felt) theywould have improved control,

n. V456 next met wuvria. and STUMM in West Berlin on 16 June I$Oand ;alma, alone on 17 mid le June., No new and significant operationaltechniques appeared (on either side) because the play was now narrowingdown. (Consequently these meetings are herewith reported in far less detail.)

(1) MANTEL reported that he had provided the Soviets with a print of thehouse key to STRETLOW • s apartment and with a detailed sketch of theapartment.. It appeared that the Soviets were now planning a directkidnisprdng, (Earlier the Soviets had tckon man to Chesnits anddictated to him a letter to STRETI)W stating that the Soviets hoddiscovered that he was working for a Western IS and would executehim unless STRVII.OW cooperated with thsa The Soviets later decidednot to use this letterk

(7)

41-1

(2) The SUS gains Meal a series ot plausitas excuses to explainhis lack of inforuation on the mines at Aues

0.ZIPPL1 eas by now, eager to get out of the play but felt that droppingany Swoon: *aurae at that time (the time of the uprisings throughoutthe 8onone) mad look add. It was planned that STU/14W would makea job application in BO= to kit Blank and that MANTEL would reportthis devalopesnt to the Soviets. (001MiTt This play amen to be badtiming on the part or ZIPPER; it might easily have impelled the Sovietsto try an immediate /meta of =TM. Since STASTLCii *ems to havebeen under MIS surveillance at this time or shortly before this time,ZIPPER may have feared that if BMWs continued for a time to reporthis presence in West. Berlin after 37= and family had actuallymoved out, the SAIS would have /mown that MOTE& wets lying and arrestedhim. Similarly, heaving MOTU in the dark until the move hid been madewould have been out of keeping with tte previously established patternof family intimacy and could have led the $1,13 to the realisation thatHANIbilL had betrayed their plane to kidnap aTASTiOW. Since karma haddecided that it had no equity left in this play, it would have seemedmost logical to move the 3TBSTIOW and Nam. families to West Gementsimultaneously, without any prior notice to the SILLS. At the same timea fake arrest of worm and wife in West Berlin amid have been arranged(or WM *arrested* in blest Berlin while Chalets and child worevisiting her in-laws) to throw the SUS oft the trail Ord prevent themfrom attempting to trick KAM& down as a traitor.)

EGIA-5680, 30 September 1994 reports that whereas 4ML's initialreporting on the Aue mines had been largely valid and valuable, his laterreporting was *partially inaccurate, partially improbable, and not worthyof dissemination.*

q. 1,̀,setober 1953, reporta that the 'wife of NOM had vieitedSTRATUM and family and had mode obvious attempts to . secure informationabout 3TRETLOW which would :confirm his IS states end even facilitatekidnapping. One Kurt 1.11liTI1t9'E10 (true name), who knew srwarLow tieringthe ear, had also approached him end attempted to obtain informationfrom hift under such circumstances that it seemed probable that he,like HAVIZIO* wife, was acting on SA:LS order*. WM bed thereforeevacuated STRE11001 to the Stuttgart area and wate attempting to get hima Soh in the border poliemai':

r. After arriving in Western Germany (apparently in early october 1953)0STSZTIOW received two letters from /1ANT34.. These letters may have beenwritten at 3113 direction or direct instigation. (*MOM AlthoughWW1 and STRATLOW had arranged a fantasy code to indicate by letterswhether STA/MOW wee in immediate danger or ickdrapong, uppsa doesnot seem to have provided than with some ample trick for example,the omission of a aymbol otherwise inserted - to enable sratrum todeterodne whether liANTZL• las writing under compulsion or of his owninitiative. If the reason tb64.. this step was not talon . was that ZIPP2Rcould not be sure that NAM& would Use the indicator honestly, thenthe Play sitouid have been terminated long before it wae.) These lettersstate the f011owingt

(1) NANT4 was ready to travel to West Germany, leaving wife end childbe)'ind, to investigate the :possibility of getting Work and startinga new life there.

(2) mint wanted to know when SIUTLOW Or his mother planned to CO=beak to Berlin to pick up belongings left that*.

a. when MANT61. returned to the Seasons on 18 June 1953 ((me paragraph 1.n„above), the uprisings were in Dan swing. . To protect himself, herevealed to a Soviet officer that he was an SUS agent* He was temporarilyjailed in Sarlshorst but was then driven to tee, where he met one of hisformer case officers and it neweenieri, Becauee of the uprising, MARTAL was

P.

used tolperarily as an'infermant retmrting on dangerous or dissidentworkers at the Xue mines. (There 4041444 was a tabotage ring vhich10111:84. .penetrated . m4 betrayed to the Soviets; he also iippeated . in: •court . es a .ettness egiaire" tatobert of this ring.) The followingpareOphs Ineenerise$ briefly, ,developments betWeen ..7ttne and December • •1953, • .Ween this operation ended with all Members of both faMilies • .(NANTEL . Ond TiliZTLOW) in Wetter*" Gerreaut4 (MOW* The aixty..ilvePage ZIPPER memo covering this period Contains a geed deal of elotifi-

, mutt detail, .on theSUS. end on -WPM* The time sib:Yowl for this. study of ø.DROIXERY 'cedes is drawing to a Close and a detailedanalysis Of this lengthy . report cannot be undertaken now. It is fait,however, that this report, as well or IQ DitOLLSIM emeseil through/0$should also be inumearised and analysed later. Finally, on the )311.sis

of all twentp.One cases, conclusions .should be dreen.

.• (I) In the middle of July ISO the 'SUS offices at Ir. 9cerdeklerstrmeseAiley wore turned back to the Germans. subsequent agent meeting:

. with WARM were held in vehicles.

• (2) Chris* MAXIM visited her , parents.1z1.4,aw in West Berlin from12 to lit September 1953. This visit was 3R1.%direeted; its purposewas primarily to determine whether STREIII0W0 on the verge ofmoving to West Gormeny, would help NU= to settle there too.

(3) For two weeks after his wifets return, MAN= was unable to establishcontact with any MIS case officer at any of the three telephotonumbers given hie for the purpose. (Neither POD nor AIPPAR reporting

. 4211144418 this hiatus.) When wan finally did mike contact, itwas with a new case officer who directed 14M& to bend his effortstoward myrtle to West Oermany. Toward this and hiNTSI. was toarrange a West Berlin meeting with SMZfLOW at which all plans forthe more would be completed. Ids wife and child were to follow hisshortly, so that the suepicions of the Western' IS would not beroused. (C0t0110iTs There lie reason to believe that the new case

*nicer, 0 VITRO!, was sincere When he made this stateeent to ROM.It is surprising, however', that the SRIS for the sake of the agent'scover, would toes aside their only eleteht of control. Di thistime STRETLOW end JUJU bad moved to Western Germany; the MIS hadabandoned plans to kidnap him. It was then planned to send MANTEL,eon of Miintrtif s wife, with his own We and child, into westernGermany to live and from that ventage point to continuo to reporton snernow. It may be that NANWAve above-cited betreyal of aneworkers had inspired sleek* unlimited SRIS confidence in his andthat the SR= was therefore willing to risk continuing a ploy inwhich all control elements would vanish. Rai it is even harderto understand what they expected to get. )MTEL had told `PETRQVthat there was no farther change of doubling STRMOW $ and 0 PKTROVbad appereartay agreed, adding merely that there were ways to makeIS 'fork distasteful. to STRIMAYa. It is true that their risk worldbe for less with tikkral in the AllariCraft Zone; but this kind etnegative thinking does not justiAr the continuing of an operationand is wholly at odds with the aggressiveness which the SUSdisplayed throughout this case.)

(4) 4i PETROV made it clear that 41ANTIVe control had shifted from hisformer case officers in Mae to 0 PETROV, who worked out of Berlin.

(5) %am was to accept any offers of schooling from his Western IS.O KOROT added that his predecessors had, however, managed the caseso poorly that it was Walikely that HUM woad be given sehogling..„

• (6)• ' Normal and emergency conk.* arrangements were made by TROYagainst the day when MOTEL would be living in West Oermsoy.

(7) fil PLTROV expressed a desire to meet UL's wife, and such ameeting was arranged, although not through Komi a intervention.

t. The above developments were reported by MUM to STRETLOW in Wet'Berlin on 23 - 25 October 19530 when &TIMM was pinking up the restof his possessions. TIMM directed MAN= to report the followingto 0 PETROV.

(1) . STRICLOW Was about to receive. a new intelligence asesignment,concerning whit* leo detail* were • known • as yet.

(2) STUMM/ . reauested NOM to delay his move to jest Oerarray untilhe'hieself was "settled..

(3) SIRICIOW would help MANTEL to gain recognition as a politicalrefugee, but he would have to support himsalt while settling inWest Oermany because he had not worked long enough for the westernIS to have earned assistance.

• (4) It might be possible for HOTEL to work IS-wise for STRCLOW, butthe possibility we indefinite.

u. MANTEL not tb PETROV in Berlin on S November 190 and was taken to asafehouse on Waldow ale* in the Earlshorst compound. (Compare withthr naou,say 222.1).) • nornoir stated that MANTIZts wire to least Oeremnywould be delayed by the Ong( flap (desertion of a =M(te in Berlinto the Soviets) because ZIPM would noir be esooptionally suspiciousof anyone arriving from the P..onst bone * Re added that he believed=mod to be working for ZIPPRB. He also stated that pressure wouldbe the only means of indneing 3/MTIA4 to wort for the MIS.

v. On 27 November 1953 41ANTBI. net PETROV and a new personality, Oeorg,in Berlin. 4 PETROV provided detailed instructions for a reemitneat- ofSTRIVIUM•

(I) MAU= was to go to his mother and state that he had been subjectedto SRIS interrogation and had broken, implicating his stepfather,STRETIOW. The Soviets were holding H4NITZ1 s wife and child toinsure his own returns It he returned without having recruitedSTRETLOW he and his wife would be given lite inprisoreaest; thechild wofAld become a word of the state. •

After the mother had had time to work on the stepfather* FIANTELwas to approach his directly and repeat the story. STRETIOW wasthen to be guaranteed asneorty for work against the U$SR, freedomfrom all financial worries, asylum in the &mono in case of need,security (he would not be required to travel to the Sovsone andcould meet 81313 agents in Switzerland, Sweden, or Vinland), andthe slue of 100,000 Ai deposited in any bank as security for thesepledges. ttiNTSL was to be dropped out of the picture after•STRUM began werkii,

(3) If STReflOW. refused, .liANTEL was to stete that the :Soviets' woulddeal with MANTEL and family as outlined *0,04. In addition, thew*ad -rehash an. expose or STRETLOW and ZIPPIM Which would notonly 'force ZIPPER to drop STEETIOW but would . aleo make it-impoesiblefor the latter Week:tuft ether-employment elsewhere in Welton •Oermanyt:

(4) To prove good feith, SRr:was to write a revert listing all be •

knee about the structure Of' eases or =mute*, goo'Anything known dbeet Ant nenk!i

(2)

(5) If STitETLOW disappeared for eny•length of times mama. use toreturn to the SeVainest AS rapidly as Possible. If ST4Tlati askedfor a description of $ PETROV, he Was to be *nattered truthfullyin ell particulars except PETROV.s height.

w. STRISTWW was compelled to *aka 'his OVA *Mitt= and decided to SOOfor time. (comtirri Its is by no means Clear why atrium:xi had not beengiven detailed instructions on how to deal with this situation.ZIPPER certainly had more that ample Warning or Soviet intentions.)

,(I) de agreed to work for the SUE.

(2) Re required that the SUS understand that his work for thee wasnot idealistically "Stinted.

(3) 41* required that he be given a contact in Switzerland.

(a) lie required an immediate meant, of 3000-5000 MI to assist himself.and featly should they- have to flee

(5) He required a large, umspesisis sum as guarantee that hiematerial would not be published for its propaganda value, the*

i exposing him.HARM returned to Berlin on 3 December astp and soon indicated byletter that all was well and that he would return to West Germany on13 December. When he did so, he reported that Georg had token himover during the absence of PETROV, O Georg had interrogated hiesin detail about the nrear4tment0 of STRETLCAit and had Made him writeout and sign a full account. Uwe he had stated the followings

(I) The next smnowrovisria, meeting .sas to be delayed.

(2) sTaanow was to sand his wife to the Soviet Zone as a. hostage;IIAMTEL would be in the American Zone during the same period as acoturter-hostage.

(3) minnow would meet an SRIS repreeentative tn Vienna in two weeks.STRETIOW was to furnish detailed information about ZIpPER.

(1.) STRETLOW we to get DX 500 against true name receipt.

MARTEL returned to neat Germany on 13 December 1953 and sent bib ,wifeprearranged telegram.. She fled, in accordance with prior arrange-.

meats. All Principals ware reunited in Wuersburg. Since the situ;had made propaganda hay out of the GEIER case and ziPPit feared thatit might do the sane thing with W DROLLER' 11, ZIPPER beat them to thepunch with brief articles in three newspapers. &MEM* went back toBerlin in February 1954 for the last time, to arrange the slapping Ofhis furniture to WeSt Germany. While there he was approached by pare**whom he suspected of acting on MIS order's. There were no further.developments.

2. Analysis and Comments*

a. 141 DROLlitid 11 is not a DA case in the usual *sense of the word but ratherthe account of what happened when two hostile intelligence servicesbecame aware that their shared agent was little awe than a mailman,delivering all the packages in his possession to both sides with afine lack of discrimination. This result was achieved because of arather high level of professional competence displayed by both sides.The agent, only nineteen or twenty years ol,d, when pressured into workingfor the SUS" and not yet twenty-one when the doable play started, isobviously no mach for the ',serious professionals Soviet and Gersten,with Item he must deal. (In fast, MANTEL recognised this fact himselfat times and in the latter part of the ease, because frightened.)ZIPPER.* decision to enter upon the Play was made quickly, if notprecipitately, and without taking time to assess MANTELls suitabilityfor his role. (In fact, the standard procedure of studying a potential,DA carefully and writing an objective character analysis before *sharkingupon the play is not followed by . UPPER.: In cases studied to date,

tm

X.

either no analysis is made * or it is made after ZIPPE# is *omitted.)

ZIPPRe counter-punchee throughout the operation* leaving the initiativein SR1S hands. This tecbnique is valid . as long as the opposition doesnet realise that it is dealing with a double* so that it is imperativefor the agent to centime all estebliabed be/levier patterns. Itbecomes inapplicable when each side realises the true =Aare of the case.The SRIS had clearly a defined geal in this operations to penetrateZIPPER* first via MANTEL* then via STRZTLOW* and finally through ebet-ever coptacts STRETLOW had. It pursued this goal aggressively andfairly consistently* although it did !aver between plans to obtainphysical possession or STRBTLOW and plans to leave bin in West Berlinor West Germany veil* putting him under pressure. ZIPPER* on the otherhead* wavers violently en such basic issues as whether the case shouldbe pro/onged or tenmilmeeee whether its goal should include technicaldata or uranium mining in Aue or not and whether MANTEL was deceivingthem or dealing honestly with them.

It is doubtful that OV 0 revealed the tall extent of AANTeles kneeled&of that organisation. He knew STRULOW's superior * at least by dise -a fact which appeared only after POE, following a headquarters *wry*asked this question directly. It abould be pointed out that a naturaltendeney on the pert of Z1PP1 to reveal homers to POD about its ownpersonnel and working methods than is necessary makes it difficult totot up the probable profit and less **luxes in their DA operations. Onthe basis of information. available* 00 DROLL4RY 11 looks like a draw.

The above eonclusions however* is based upon the *ssueption that MANTELand* more particularly* his vete* were successfully interrogated byZIPPER after the case ended. Christ* MANTZL is certainly a highlYsuspicious person. In the early phases or the operation she maderepeated pro-Russian statementsi -which she later tried to explain away.The date of her recruitment is uncertain and ay well have preceded -even by a lengthy period - her husband's knowledge of that recruitment.She concealed from him the receipt of gifts or cash. He professed tobe unaware of her basic political convictions. She asked Frau STALTLOWfor a medicine which would cause an abortion and at the same timeurgently requested that the mother conceal her pregnantly from the son*suggesting a-possibility that someone other than MANTEL e and perhapsoven e soviet -vas responsible for her preenancy. In its close-outreport P00 mentions that ebristaMeeraidel bear watching * but neitherthe seeps taken nor the results are reported. If MANTaL has remeinedin touch with ZIPPZR* if his wife is in the picture* and it she is intouch with the MIS, than there can be no doubt about who won thisball gene.

ZIPMR staff personnel (BV 4 CIV 04 and 40ei.e it headquarters C$ men)were clearly shocked to learn that HUM had furnished far more infor-nation to the SRIS than he had been authorised to do (accurate descrip-tions, photo of STUMM, tracing of the key to STOTLOW le apartment*full details an agent meetings with ZIPPea personnels eto•)• It isfelt that 4IPTE1t's °att.:tote of MUM and STR4T104 tends to be coloredby the feet that they are Oermens* that STNETLOW was an army officer*and that these men and their families were under Soviet pressure or thethreat of such pressure* Thus* ZIPPER attempts to sake out a case fornot allowing an SUS recruitment of STRSTLOW on pounds that little couldbe gained* whereas the facts of the case suggest that much could havebeen gained (note desire of MIS to met srumati in Vienna and theoffer to provide a omeewtinSmitaerland* Sweden* or Flamed). Moreover*STRETWW could fax' mere reasonably have been expected to remain loyalto ZIPPLR than could be expected of MANTS1m One suspects that thedecision not to risk this play was based on the tabjectise factors citedabove rather than the argueente advanced.

Both ZIPPiet and the SUS are influenced by immune considerations,though the SKIS is ter less affected. The Soviet recruitment ofMANTEL is based on cold-blooded pressure (trumped-up arrest, sentencingto fifteen years, and then the offer earl alternative), and all plansto recruit STRETLOW are also based an pressure. On the other hand,there is no use of the control teeter represented by MANTElt s wife andchild. (They are never jailed, for example.) or 10 nearly se muchpressure placed onturra himself, through the unserved fifteen-yearsentence, as might have been expected. ZIPPER goes =eh further in thisregard, as has been noted above. Their/Intl decision to end the caseis clearly motivated almost entirely by concern teethe safety (ratherthan security) of the principals.

UJ maLLEar 31 provides en interesting insight into SRI 'S (believed 14VD)handling techniques. Worthy of note are skillfuloase of pressure inthe recruiteent of MANTEL; professionalism re meeting arrangements;steady pursuit ofasingle target from beginning to end of the case;vez7 detailed briefing of MAIM (up to the point at which he becamesuspected of telling ZIPPER the much)) re-interrogation, as SOP, onearlier reports, thus forcing MARTEL into divulging much more than hehad intended ow4tat authorised to divulge; practical training,particularly in security, given by the case officer and tailored tothe operation, rather than theoretical schooling (which would have beengrist for ZIPPER's mill); keeping the opposition offebalance byunexpected moves. (MANTEL pows unannounced visits, for exaefile, tohis mother and stepfather; his site also visits them at inconvenienttimes). Also worth noting is the detail with which the kidnapping ofSTRETLOW had been worked out, althou the SKIS did slip in revealingthe fell plan to MANTEL before its execution. Finally, the recruitmentof eANTELl s wife, which seems to have preceded a second recruitment,apparently staged for his benefit when her agent status had to berevealed to hits* and using her as a check on MANTEL and STRETLOW,merits note.

h. ZIPPER handling is also professional, even if allouance is made for thefact that our knowledge of the case comes entirely from ZIPPER. Agentmeetings are well protected (with counter-surveillance spottingcounteresurveillance!) MANTEL and STRETLOW are well screened off fromZ/PPER. The use of a blown S/W as bald-up material laabright idea.ZIPPER briefings of MANTEL appear much leas detailed * but this is thenatural result of assuming the piggies role. (Moreover, it mee. bestroked that in this type of case any detailed briefing is an error,since it will be repeated in equal detail teem opposition. Certainlythe one set of Itos provided MANTEL by MITER and dealing withtechnical matters at Aue must be considered an error.) aeon, handlingof STRETLOW was insufficiently imaginative, so that at times - forexample, when the SRIS recruitment pitch is finally made - he is forcedto rely on his own judgement, without Prior briefing. On the whole,however, ZIPPER does a competent job in the realm of tradecr aft. Thefact that the SeIS draw a stalemate in this match 'in which 4IPPERstarted out with evident advantages, results not irom superiors=techniques but from decisiveness, The MIS knew from the beginning whatit wanted to get and consistently acted in accordance with this Akron*,whereas ZIPPER shows up better defensively (i.e., at keeping the SUSfrom attaining this goal) than offensively (i.e., at cashing in on its ownopportetnities.)

i. Both sides reached, in time, the realisation thattney were dealing witha messenger bey rather than an agent whose loyalties would lead him towork against either. The Soviet attempt to lure 4I11ER into sending acourier into the East or enamels/ is amueinelr countered byZIPPER's retort that the SIIIS was not giving ?ANTAL intelligence ofenough value to warrant the use (1.ex exposure) of a courier, bothsides are, however, somewhat unrealistic from this point on, since itis evident that neither is going to tell MANTEL anything that the otherreally wants to know, yet each continues to try to penetrate the otherthrough MANTEL,

ICJ DROLIZRY 12,

1. Thin case also does not merit detailed handling because (a) no DA or evenOE interest is demonstrable and (b) the contra figure shifted identities/ , sand cover stories so frequently that at date of last ZIPPSR report(3 December 1952) neither identity nor background had been establishedbeyond doebt.

2. ax 14EIa. ( ssible true name), possibly born 7 September 1920 in Gerbersdorf,Silesia, appeared Istanbul in October 1952. At the German'Babas:et in_Ankara he had told a fictitious story of being a PW escaped frac the USSR.Sent to Istanbul and turned over by the Turkish Security Service to KUBAIKthere he "confessed" (another lie) that he had been sent into Turkey bythe SAIS. Transferred to OtireaRie and'1.1Mta"t custody* he was repeatedlyinterrogated. About 15 January 1953 ZIPPSR turned hie over to the Kripo(0arman criad,stal police) because of suspicion that he was identical with aman wanted for bigamy and fraud: