Yll Bajraktari and Emily Hsu

Developing Media in Stabilization and Reconstruction OperationsSummary and Recommendations• In war-torn societies, the development of independent, pluralistic, and sustainable

mediaiscriticaltofosteringlong-termpeaceandstability.Post-conflictcivilianpopula-tionsareparticularlyvulnerabletomanipulationbymassmediaastensionsrunhighandthepossibilityofviolentrelapseremainsstrong.Manyciviliansharbordeepskepticismandmistrustofthemedia,beingaccustomedtoplatformsthatarecontrolledeitherbythestateorbypoliticalgroupslookingtofurthertheirpoliticalagendas.

• Aneffectivemediastrategycanmitigatepostwartensionsbyelevatingmoderatevoicesanddampeningextremistones.Itcancreatepeacefulchannelsthroughwhichdiffer-encescanberesolvedwithoutresorttoviolence.Thecreationofarobustmediaculturewillalsoallowcitizenstobeginholdingtheirgovernmentaccountableforitsactionsandensuringitscommitmenttodemocracy.

• Effortstodeveloplocalmediainstitutionsshouldbeundertakenseparatelyfromattemptstodevelopstrategiccommunications.Inanincreasingnumberofnon-permissiveenvi-ronments (i.e., environmentswhere security isnot fullyestablished), thedistinctionbetweenthesetwoendeavorsisblurredbecauseofamistakenassumptionamongsomeplayersthatbothactivitiessharethesamepurposeandgoal.

• Apoorlydevelopedmediastrategycanbedetrimentalinawar-ravagedcountrystillrifewithviolence.Ahastilyconceivedplanmayreinforcedivisionsbetweenwarringpartiesorcreateaweakmediasectorthatisvulnerabletoexploitationbywarlords,politicalpatrons,andspoilers.Mediadevelopmenteffortsalsofailwhenthepublicdoesnottrustthemtoestablishacrediblesourceofinformation.

Stabilization and ReconStRuction SeRieS no. 7 octobeR 2007

about the RepoRt

ThisreportispartofaseriesproducedbytheUnitedStatesInstituteofPeace’sFillingtheGapsprogram,

whichaimstosystematicallyaddressthecausesoffailureinspecificareasinreconstructionand

stabilizationoperationsandtogeneratepolicyoptionsforthoseintheU.S.governmentandelsewherewho

leadandstaffthesemissions.FillingtheGapsisdirectedbyDanielSerwerandmanagedbyBethCole

oftheInstitute.

YllBajraktariisaformerprogramspecialistattheUnitedStatesInstituteofPeace’sCenterof

InnovationonMediaandConflict;heisnowattheKennedySchoolofGovernmentatHarvardUniversity.

EmilyHsuisaprogramspecialistattheInstitute’sCenteronPost-ConflictPeaceandStabilityOperations.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not

advocate specific policy positions.

contentS

Introduction2PredeploymentPhase:MappingandStrategizing3

DeploymentPhase:BuildingandDeveloping8ExitPhase:TransitioningandSustaining14

Conclusion15MatrixofRecommendations17

Stabilization and U n i t e d S t a t e S i n S t i t U t e o f P e a c e

Reconstruction series

1200 17th Street nW • Washington, dc 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063 • www.usip.org

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• Ideally,giventhemedia’scapacitytoshapewar-torncountries,intervenersshouldapplyacoherentstrategy inthepursuitofmediadevelopment.Unfortunately,nosuchstrategyyetexistsandthusintervenershavelittleguidanceastowhattoolsandmethodsworkbest in thedevelopmentofmedia institutions. In fact,mediadevelopmentisstillconductedonanadhocbasisfromconflicttoconflict.

• This report seeks to fill this strategic gap.More particularly, it recommends thatintervenerstakethefollowingseriesofstepsastheygenerateastrategyformediadevelopmentinpost-conflictzones.

Predeployment Phase: Mapping and Strategizing

• Mapouttheexistingmedialandscape

o Identifythepostwarconditionofthemediainfrastructure,mediapersonnel,andotherresourcesthathavesurvivedtheconflict

o Assessthehistoryofstate-mediarelations

o Analyzethepotentialmarketforsustainablemedia

• Createastrategyfordevelopingmedia

o Coordinateallrelevantplayersinmediadevelopment

o Identify spoilers and create a plan to isolate extremist voiceswhile elevatingmoderateones

o Plantoestablisharesponsiblemediasectorbeforethefirstpostwarelectionsareheld

Deployment Phase: Building and Developing

• Buildafoundationforthemediasector

o Establishamission-ownedoutlettomonitorandcounterhatespeechwhilepro-motingpeaceoperations

o Createarepresentativemediacommissiontoestablishmediastandards

o Createlegalunderpinningsformediaduringthetransitionorhelpthegovernmenttodoso

• Createmediaoutletsanddeveloppersonnel

o Encouragecreationofadiversearrayofmediaoutletsandensuremediaacces-sibilitybydifferentsegmentsofthepopulation

o Establisheffectiveon-the-jobtrainingprogramsandmechanismsforevaluatingtraineesanduniversity-basedtrainingprograms

o Create local associations of journalists, publishers, and editors to strengthenleadershipandconnectlocalmediaactorstointernationalmedianetworks

Exit Phase: Transitioning and Sustaining

• Transitiontolocalcontrolandensurelong-termsustainability

o Graduallygivefullcontroltolocalmedialeaders

o Ensurearobustmediamarketinwhichprivateoutletsareself-sustaining

o Createanindigenousmechanismtocontinuemonitoringhatespeech

IntroductionAshistoryhasdemonstratedrepeatedly,massmediacanbeapowerfultoolinfanningtheflamesofconflictandincitingbloodshed.InNaziGermany,tociteaparticularlynotori-

about the inStituteTheUnitedStatesInstituteofPeaceisanindepen-

dent,non-partisaninstitutionestablishedandfundedbyCongress.Itsgoalsaretohelppreventandresolveviolentconflicts,promotepost-conflictpeacebuilding,

andincreaseconflict-managementtools,capacity,andintellectualcapitalworldwide.TheInstitutedoes

thisbyempoweringotherswithknowledge,skills,andresources,aswellasbyitsdirectinvolvementin

conflictzonesaroundtheglobe.

boaRd of diRectoRSJ. Robinson West(Chair),Chairman,PFCEnergy,Washington,D.C.•María Otero (ViceChairman),

President,ACCIONInternational,Boston,Mass.•Holly J. Burkhalter,VicePresident,Government

Affairs,InternationalJusticeMission,Washington,D.C.•Anne H. Cahn,FormerScholarinResidence,Ameri-

canUniversity,Washington,D.C.•Chester A. Crocker,JamesR.SchlesingerProfessorofStrategicStudies,

SchoolofForeignService,GeorgetownUniversity,Washington,D.C.•Laurie S. Fulton,Partner,Williams

andConnolly,Washington,D.C.•Charles Horner,SeniorFellow,HudsonInstitute,Washington,D.C.

•Kathleen Martinez,ExecutiveDirector,WorldInstituteonDisability•George E. Moose,Adjunct

ProfessorofPractice,TheGeorgeWashingtonUniver-sity,Washington,D.C.•Jeremy A. Rabkin,Professor

ofLaw,GeorgeMasonUniversity,Fairfax,Va.•Ron Silver,Actor,Producer,Director,PrimparousProduc-

tions,Inc.•Judy Van Rest,ExecutiveVicePresident,InternationalRepublicanInstitute,Washington,D.C.

MeMbers ex officio Condoleezza Rice, SecretaryofState•Robert M.

Gates,SecretaryofDefense•Richard H. Solomon,President,UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace(nonvoting)

•Frances C. Wilson,LieutenantGeneral,U.S.MarineCorps;President,NationalDefenseUniversity.

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ousexample,massmediawasusedtostoketheanti-SemitismthatledeventuallytotheHolocaust.In1994,totakeamorerecentexample,RwandanHutususedhateradiotomobilizeagenocidalcampaignthattookthelivesofeighthundredthousandTutsisinjustfourweeks.1

Butwhilethemedia’spowertoprovokeviolenceiswellknown,lessappreciatedisitsabilitytofosterpeaceandstability—somethingitcandoinvariousways:• Apluralisticmediasectorputsanendtothedominanceofanarrowrangeofextrem-

istviewsbygivingcitizenstheopportunitytoaccessadiversearrayofvoiceswithcompetingperspectives.

• A transparentmedia canbecomea credible sourceof information andapeacefulchannelforpublicdialogue.

• Anindependentmediaculturethatservesthepublicinteresthelpskeepthegovern-mentaccountabletothepeopleandenablescitizenstomonitorthestate’scommit-menttoreformanddemocratization.

Thepositivecontributionthatthemediacanmakehasgivenmediadevelopmentacentralroleinstabilizingsocietiesemergingfromconflict.Evenso,thereisstillnotried-and-tested strategy towhich interveners can turnwhen seeking todevelopmedia inpostwarzones.Thisstrategicgapisreflectedinthechallengesthatplaguepractitionersinalmosteverymission.Someofthesameissuesthatconfrontedpost–WorldWarIIrecon-structioneffortsinGermanyandJapan,forexample,surfacedagainintheBalkansinthe1990sandmorerecentlyinIraqandAfghanistan.Recurringchallengesincludereconcilingthetensionbetween,ontheonehand,winning“heartsandminds”and,ontheother,promotingindependentjournalism;determiningthebreadthofmediaregulation;dealingwithhatespeechandinflammatoryjournalism;coordinatingtheactivitiesofexternalandinternalplayers;andensuringtheviabilityofmediaafterintervenersdepart.

To address this critical gap, this report identifies important tasks that intervenersshould consider in fashioning a strategy for independent, pluralistic, and sustainablemedia. Drawing on best practices from past and present postwar media developmentefforts,thereportpresentsastrategythatencompassesthethreephasesofaninterven-tion:predeployment,deployment,andexit.

Predeployment Phase: Mapping and Strategizing

Mapping the Media Landscape

Lesson: Identify media outlets and personnel that have survived the conflict and could potentially support media reforms and the development of society as a whole.

Thenatureandextentofpostwarmediaresourcescanvarywidely.Practitionersshouldbeginbycreatingathoroughmapofthecountry’sexistingmedialandscape,includinganassessmentofthepostwarstatusofthemediainfrastructure,mediapersonnel,andtheintendedmediamarket.Identifyingavailableresourceswillhelpshapethecourseofthemediastrategy.

Insomecases,practitionersfindthatmanymediaresourceshavesurvivedthewar:broadcastingcapacity(antennas,forinstance),printingpresses,andtransmissionsystemsmaystillbeintactandasignificantnumberofjournalistsmaystillbeatwork.AfterthefightingendedinBosnia,forexample,manyradiostationsandbroadcastcenterscontin-uedtofunction,albeitunderthecontroloftheleadersofpoliticalfactions.Iraq’sformerMinistryofInformationretainedareservoirofjournalistictalentaftertheBa’thistregimefellandmanyofthesejournalistswereeagertocreateanindependent,grassrootsmedianetworkaftertheirexperienceunderauthoritarianrule.

Practitioners should begin by

creating a thorough map of

the country’s existing media

landscape.

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Manywar-torncountries,however,areleftwithfewornoviableresourceswithwhichtolaunchamediasector.SuchwasthecaseinAfghanistan,wheretheTalibanabolishedvirtuallyallformsofmediainthelate1990s.InKosovo,allterrestrialbroadcastcableswere destroyedduring thewar andhad to be replaced. Indonesians ransackedmediaoutletsduringtheirwithdrawalfromEastTimor,leavinglittlebehindwithwhichtobuildanewmediasector.

InLiberia,thePartnershipforMediaandConflictPreventioninWestAfrica,formedataconferenceheldattheMediaFoundationforWestAfrica(MFWA)inJuly2003,soughttoprovidesupporttomediaaffectedbyconflict.AnassessmentmissiontoLiberiainlate2003,undertakenincooperationwithUnitedNationsMissioninLiberia(UNMIL)andtheUNOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs(UNOCHA),includedexpertsfromtheUNEducational,Scientific,andCulturalOrganization(UNESCO),thePanosInstituteWestAfrica,MediaRightsAgenda,MFWA,InternationalMediaSupport,theInternationalFederationofJournalists,InternationalFreedomofExpressioneXchange,andArticle19.Thismissionproducedadetailedplanformediainterventionthataddressedthereformofmediapolicy,thecapacityofthemediafortheelections,publicservicebroadcasting,assistancetoregionalbroadcastmedia,andsupportforprintmedia.ItalsoproposedaninstitutionalframeworkformediaandtheestablishmentoftheLiberiaMediaCenter.2(AttherequestofUNESCO,themissionalsocontributedtotheneedsassessmentthatwaspreparedjointlybytheUNDevelopmentProgramandtheWorldBankandthatbecamepartof“Results-FocusedTransitionFramework“thebaselinedocumentforinternationaldonorassistanceinLiberia.)

Eachsituationandsocietyposesitsownchallenges.Forinstance,buildingamediasectorfromscratchcallsforsignificantfinancialinvestmentinfacilitiesandtraining,butitalsoenablesimplementerstoavoidthedifficultiesofmanagingexistingoutletsandofdealingwithjournalistswhohavegrownaccustomedtoastatusquoandwhoresistreforms.

Lesson: Assess the history of the media’s relationship with the government and with society prior to and during the conflict.

Understandingthemedia’straditionalroleinasocietyisimperativefordetermininghowbesttocultivateasustainablenewmediaculture,onethatfacilitatesasenseofinde-pendenceandownershipbythepeople.Acentrallycontrolledpublicbroadcastingmodel,forexample,maynotbethebestoptionforasocietyemergingfromtotalitarianruleandseekingpluralismandindependence.

Likethepostwarconditionofmediaresources,therelationshipthatexistsbetweenmediaandthegovernmentorsocietywillvaryfromconflicttoconflict.Inmanywar-torncountries,themediawillhavebeenheavilystatecontrolledandallowedlittle, ifany,independence. In Liberia, Charles Taylormonopolized the country’smedia institutionsduringthecivilwar(1989–96),shuttingdownaslewofindependentradiostationsthatsoughttoofferanalternativevoicetothatofthegovernment.ThesestationsincludedRadioMonrovia, which broadcast news on the International Red Cross; Star Radio, ahumanitarianradiostationfundedbytheU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment;andRadioVeritas,whichwasrunbytheCatholicChurch.3

InBosniaandRwanda,thedominantmediaresourcesresidednotonlywiththestatebutalsowithnationalistorethnicpartiesseekingtoinciteviolenceagainstopposingpartiesandtofurthertheirpoliticalagendas.InresponsetotheApril1994assassinationofPresidentHabyarimanaofRwanda,Hutuextremists launcheda radiostationwhosebroadcastswouldincitetheHutupopulationtowageagenocidalcampaignagainsttheTutsisandenablegenocidairestocoordinatetheiroperations.Radio-TelevisionLibredesMilleCollines(RTLM,orFreeRadio-TelevisionoftheThousandHills)wasinitiallyignoredbytheinternationalcommunity,whichconsideredthepropagandatobesooutrageousthatitwouldnotbetakenseriously.4

Like the postwar condition of

media resources, the relationship

that exists between media and the

government or society will vary

from conflict to conflict.

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Lesson: Assess the viability of a self-sustaining media market and identify available resources for creating a steady stream of revenue for a private market.

Aspastmediadevelopmentendeavorshaverevealed,mediamustbeunderstoodnotonlyasaproducerofnewsbutalsoasacomplexinteractionofeconomic,social,andpoliticalforces.Theeconomicaspectisoftenoverlookedinmediadevelopment,eventhoughitiscentraltocreatingaself-sustaining,market-drivenmediasector.

Tofactorineconomicforces,intervenersshouldconductaneconomicbusinessanalysistoidentifyavailablefunding,advertisingpotential,andothersourcesofrevenuethatcansustainaprivatemediamarket.Measuringthesizeofthemarketwillhelpplannersdeter-minehowmanyradioortelevisionstationscanbesupported.Althoughmediainstitutionsoftenenjoyafloodofcapitalattheoutsetofreconstructionandstabilizationmissions,theirlongevitydependsonthecultivationofarobustmarketabletogenerateasteadystreamofadvertisingrevenue.Withoutsuchrevenue,anyadvancesmadeinanimmaturemediasectorwilllikelyfalterwhengrantsexpireandinternationalsupportwanes.

ThesituationinBosniareflectstheimportanceoffactoringeconomicforcesintothemediastrategy.Theradioandtelevisionsectorstodayareoversizedforthemarket,forcingchannelstocompetefiercelywithoneanotherforadvertisementrevenuewhileweakeningthe impactof international investments.In2000,theIndependentMediaCommissionreportedthatthereweremorethantwohundredregisteredradiostationsandseventy-onetelevisionstations—forty-twointheFederationandtwenty-nineinRepublikaSrpska.AnIREXProMediastudyoftheadvertisingmarketinthecountrysuggeststhatitgeneratesonlyenoughrevenuetosupportahandfulofstations.Oversaturationofthemarketalsomakesitdifficultforlistenerstofocusonasinglestationandforcesfinancialinvestmentstobespreadthinlyacrossmanyoutlets.5

Creating the Media Strategy

Lesson: Create a plan for coordinating all the relevant players in media development.

Thecoordinationof internationaldonors,non-governmentalorganizations(NGOs),andothercommonplayersinmediadevelopmentiscriticaltothelong-termsuccessofthemedia sector. In some cases,media development sponsorships come from a range ofdiverseorganizations,whichmakesa focusedeffortmore challenging.Bosnianmediadevelopment,forexample,enjoyedsupportfromseveralinternationalorganizationssuchastheCouncilofEurope,theSoutheastEuropeanStabilityPact,aswellasNGOssuchasIREXProMedia,Internews,MediaPlanInstitute,MediaCenterSarajevo,andtheOpenSocietyFoundation.

Better communication and planning among all the actors involved helps to avoidduplicativeeffortsandcementalliances.Creatingjointworkinggroupsortaskforcesthatmeetregularlytodiscussmediadevelopmentactivitiescanbeveryeffective.TheSerbianexperienceisamodeltolearnfrom;itenabledtheinternationalcommunitytocollec-tivelychallengeSlobodanMilosevic’sclampdownonmediafreedoms.InSerbia,periodicmeetingswereheldamonginternationalmediapractitionerstosharebestpractices,formcoalitions,andaddressotherchallenges.Themeetingswereheldregularly,eventhoughthepoliticalsituationwasinconstantflux.

Bycontrast,inIraqthetaskofmediadevelopmentwasgiventotheU.S.DepartmentofDefense(DOD),whosemajorcontractorshadlittleornorelevantexperience.ScienceApplicationsInternationalCorp.(SAIC),alongtimeDODcontractor,wasawardedaninitialcontractof$15milliontoundertakesomethingithadneverdonebefore—transformanentirestate-runmediasystemintoanindependent,BBC-stylenationalnewsservice.TheresearchandengineeringfirmreceivedthegrantjusteightdaysbeforetheinitialU.S.offensivetookplace inIraq.Moreover,supervisingSAICwasaDODofficespecializinginpsychologicalwarfareoperations,whichmanybelievecontributedtotheperceptionamongIraqisthattheIraqMediaNetwork(IMN)wasmerelyamouthpiecefortheCoali-tionProvisionalAuthority.Beforeanothercompanywonthecontractthroughacompeti-

(continued)

To factor in economic forces,

interveners should conduct an

economic business analysis

to identify available funding,

advertising potential, and

other sources of revenue that

can sustain a private media

market.

Better communication and

planning among all the actors

involved helps to avoid duplica-

tive efforts and cement alliances.

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tivebiddingprocessinJanuary2004,SAIC’sperformanceinIraqwasconsideredcostly,unprofessional,andafailureintermsofestablishingtheobjectivityandindependenceoftheIMN.

Coordinationofstrategiesandthemanagementofcompetinginterestsamonginterna-tionalplayersarealsocriticaltosuccessfulmediadevelopment.AdifferenceinapproachbetweenEuropeanandU.S.mediadeveloperscreatedfrictionanddelayedtheprogressofdevelopingthemediasectorsinKosovoandBosnia.TheEuropeansfavoredapublicservice broadcast approach, looking to pool media efforts with the Organization forSecurityandCooperationinEurope(OSCE).Theirfocuswasonmonitoringmediaoutletsandtrackingtheiroutputsinordertomaintainafragilepeace.TheAmericans,however,insistedonsupportingprivatebroadcasterstopavethewayforamarket-drivenmedia.TheU.S.approachemphasizedminimalstateregulation,allowingforthedevelopmentofastrongmediafoundationforprivate,independentmediaoutlets.6

Similarly, in Cambodia, a lack of consensus among international funding agenciesand NGOs was problematic. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) wasestablished in1991,whenNGOactivitywasexplodingacross the internationalarena.Alackofcoordinationandvettingofstrategiesresultedinaseriesofadhocjournalisttrainingprogramsthatdidlittletojumpstartavibrantmediacultureinthecountry.Thefragmentedeffortleftbehindamediasystemthatwasfragile,vulnerabletoexploitation,andeconomicallyunsustainable.

Lesson: Identify potential spoilers, and their associated infrastructure, who may seek to dominate media channels or continue to broadcast or print hate speech. Identify and elevate repatriates or local leaders with the potential to lead indepen-dent media development.

Themediastrategyshouldincludeaplanformarginalizingextremistvoicesthatseektodiscredittheinternationalmissionand/orpromotetheirviolentpoliticalgoals.DuringitsmissioninCambodia,UNTACwascontinuallyaccusedbyoppositiongroupsofbeingapuppetoftheVietnamesegovernment.Opponentsofthepeaceattackedthetransitionalauthority,warningtheCambodianpeoplethatUNTACwasathreattothecountry.

ThislessonisalsoclearinthecaseofBosnia,wherenationalistfactionsretainedcon-trolovermediaresourcesafterthewarandusedthemtopursuedivisiveobjectives.Eachofthethreemainterritories—RepublikaSrpska,theBosniak-controlledpartoftheFedera-tion,andtheCroat-controlledpartoftheFederation—heldfasttotheirparty-controlledmedia,scramblingtorepairdamagedtransmittersandextendtheirfrequenciesaswidelyaspossible.Todiversifyeach region’saccess to informationandminimize the impactof eachparty’snationalisticmessages, theOSCE (taskedby the1995DaytonAccordstoorganizeelections) tried toestablisha setofmedia regulations.These regulationsrequiredmediaoutletstomeetanairtimequotaforoppositionpoliticalparties,reportinformationaccuratelyandtruthfully,andavoidairingprovocativeprograms.Althoughtheycompliedtoalimiteddegree,themediaoutletsinallthreeterritoriescontinuedtoresistpressures.

Inamore specific case, irresponsibleuseof themediahasprolongedethnicdivi-sionsandhinderedprospectsforreconciliation.InKosovo,theAlbaniannewspaperDitaaccusedalocalUNworkerofhavingbeenaSerbparamilitaryandpublishedhishomeaddress.Withintwoweeks,thenamedindividualwaskidnappedandstabbedtodeathbyvigilantes.UnderordersfromtheKosovoUNadministrator,thepoliceandNATOforcesshutdownthenewspaperforeightdaysonchargesthat itwasencouragingvigilanteviolence.

Oneapproachthathasbeeneffectiveinmitigatingextremistvoicesinvolvesmediapoliciesthatleveltheplayingfieldandboostmoderatevoicesduringelectoralcampaigns.AsuccessfulprograminAfghanistansoughttoprovideequalairtimeopportunitiesforemergent leaders during the 2005 Wolesi Jirga and Provincial Council elections. The

Coordination of strategies and

the management of competing

interests among international

players are also critical to suc-

cessful media development.

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Afghan Media Commission implemented the Sponsored Advertisement Program (SAP),which allotted equal advertising spaces for parliamentary candidates. Reflecting theprogram’ssuccess,nopoliticaladvertisementsotherthanthoseprovidedforunderSAPwerebroadcastontelevisionsorradiosonceSAPwasinplace.Inapost-electionassess-ment,candidatessaidtheyfoundthesystemtobeveryuseful,particularlywomen,whowereotherwiseexcludedfromcampaigninginmosquesandschools.Seventy-sixpercentoffemalecandidatesusedthesystem,asopposedtofifty-sixpercentoftheirmalecoun-terparts.SAPwasthelargestprogramofitskindinanyinternationalmission.

Inadditiontomarginalizingextremism,intervenersshouldalsoidentifyrepatriatesorlocalleaderswiththeexperienceandcredibilitytoleadindependentmediadevelopment.Selectingcapableindividualsforthisrolecanbeasensitiveanddifficultprocess.Practi-tionersshouldlookforleaderswhoareabletofightcorruptionandcanresistmanipula-tion,upholdprofessionalstandards,andprioritizethepublicinterest.Theseindividualsshouldbewellrespectedwithintheircommunities.

Lesson: Plan for an accountable media sector to begin operating before the first postwar elections are held.

Settinganappropriatetimelineformediadevelopmentiscrucialinthecontextofotherstabilizationandreconstructionactivitiesthatmayberunningintandem.Inparticular,havingaresponsibleandaccountablemediasectorinplaceisinstrumentalinconductingfreeandfairelections.Mediashouldprovidebalancedcoverageofcandidatesandtheirplatforms,publicizinginformationonelectionprocessesthatmaybeunfamiliartocertainpopulationsandexposingsocietytothefundamentalconceptsoffreemedia.

Apositiveexampleofthemedia’sinfluenceinelectionsinvolvestheworkoftheU.S.AgencyInternationalDevelopment’sOfficeofTransitionsInitiative(OTI)inBosnia.InthefirstpostwarBosnianelection,in1996,U.S.-backedcandidateBiljanaPlavsicranagainstRadovanKaradic,anationalistcandidatewhohassincebeenaccusedofgenocide.Atthetime,Karadic’sstronghold,RepublikaSrpska,allowedveryfewindependentmediaoutletstooperatewithin its territory.Between February1996andNovember1998,however,OTI awarded $6.3million in grants to various independentmedia outlets throughoutthecountry,includingRepublikaSrpska,whichincreasedtheamountofavailablepublicinformationaboutthecontestbetweenPlavsicandKaradic.Throughtheexpandedworkofthesenewindependentjournalists,Plavsicwasabletoconsolidateherpowerandwinastrongerconstituency.7

In Cambodia, UNTAC, recognizing that building a free presswould take years andthatfreeelectionswouldbeimpossiblewithoutafreepress,establishedRadioUNTAC,thefirstbroadcaststationrunbyaUNpeacekeepingmission.RadioUNTACwascreditedwithbringingcrediblenewsandinformationtothepublicandwithhelpingtoproduceaturnoutof95percentofvotersinthe1993electionsinspiteofanaggressivecampaignbytheKhmerRougetodissuadethepublicfromgoingtothepolls.8Thisachievementunderscorestheneedforawidelyaccessibleandcrediblenewsoutletasacriticalcompo-nentinatransitionalenvironment.AlthoughRadioUNTACstandsoutasthebestpracticeoffacilitatinganopenandtrustedinformationenvironmentconducivetoelections,afreeandindependentpresswithlegalprotectionshasstillnotbeenestablishedinCambodiaduetogovernmentcrackdownsonthemedia.

Inthe2005Afghanparliamentaryelections,mediacoverageofthecampaignwasben-eficialtotheAfghanpeople,theelectoralcandidates,andthemediaentitiesthemselves.Forthepublic,mediacoverageoftheelectionsprovidedcriticalinformationaboutcandi-dates’platforms,votinglocations,andtheelectoralprocess,whichwasnewtotheAfghanpeople.Forthecandidates,theexperienceofusingthemediatocampaignexposedthemtoliberalconceptsoffreemediaandobjectivereporting.Forthemediasector,electioncoverage became a capacity-building experience. Through SAP, Afghan television andradiostationslearnedhowtorunalargeadvertisingprogramefficientlyandtocreate

(continued)

In particular, having a respon-

sible and accountable media

sector in place is instrumental

in conducting free and fair

elections.

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politicaladvertisementsinconcise,two-tofive-minutepackages.Outletsalsolearnedtoadheretoprofessionalstandardsandtoapplymedialawsdesignedtoencourageeven-handedcoverageofcandidatesregardlessoftheirgenderandpartyaffiliations.

Bycontrast, inKosovo, theU.S.-supportedmedia initiativewasnot launched longenoughbeforethefirstpostwarKosovarelection,heldinOctober2000,tohavemuchimpactonthoseelections.U.S.-supportedprivatemediaentitiesdidnotgoontheairuntilSeptember2000,seventeenmonthsaftertheSerbianwithdrawal,adelaythatmediaobserversconsideroneofthebiggestmistakesmadeduringthepre-electionperiod.Asaresult,therewasinsufficienttimetotrainjournalistsbeforetheyhadtocoverthepoliti-callysensitiveelections.

Inadditiontoensuringthepresenceofamediasectorduringelections,practitionersshould seek to maximize diversity and pluralism. In Bosnia, before the first postwarelectionswereheld,manymediaoutletsexistedbuttheyweredeeplyveinedbyethnicfaultlines,whichresultedinstationspromotingsectariancandidates.TheUNOfficeoftheHighRepresentative(OHR)realizedthatwithoutanefforttodiversifythemediaandcreateastrongermultiethnicvoice,theelectionswouldmerelyempowerthenationalistleaderswhohadbegunthewarinthefirstplace.TheOHRestablishedtheIndependentMediaCommission(IMC)inBosnia,whichaimedtomonitorhatespeechandpromoteatolerantanddemocraticsocietythroughindependentmedia.TheIMCalsoadoptedpoliti-calcampaigncoverageguidelinesintendedtoensurefaircoverageofandequitableaccesstoallpoliticalparties.

Deployment Phase: Building and Developing

Building a Foundation for the Media Sector

Lesson: Create a mission-owned outlet to deliver critical information about peace operations while monitoring and countering hate speech. Also consider ways to provide alternative programming.

Developingamaturemediasectorcantakeyears,ifnotdecades.Oneofthemostimmedi-atemediatasksinapost-conflictenvironmentistocreateanoutletoroutletswiththecapacitytomonitorandcounterhatespeechwhilepromotingadurablepeace.

VirtuallyeveryUNmissionsinceUNTAChascreateditsownradiooutlettoservearangeoffunctionscriticaltomaintainingpeace.Cambodia’sRadioUNTACwasapositivemodelformission-ownedradiostations.RadioUNTACwasthemostpopularradiostationinthecountryduringtheUNmission,deliveringinformationonhumanitarianassistanceinitiatives,disarmamentsites,electoralprocesses,andothermissionactivities.9RadioUNTACalsocounteredhatemessagesthatsoughttounderminethemissionobjectives,includingrumorsthatUNpersonnelposedathreattociviliansandthatvotingdeviceshadbeentamperedwith.

Thestationdenouncedelectoralviolenceandreassuredvotersthatstepswerebeingtakentoensuretheirsafetyandthattheirvoteswouldbecastsecretly.Italsoprovidedfreeandequalopportunitiesforpoliticalpartiestoairtheirmessagesandmadeastrongefforttoinformallvoters,manyofwhomwereilliterateandhadlimitedaccesstotelevi-sion,aboutallthecandidatesandtheirplatforms.

Asidefromtheirinformationalactivities,mission-ownedradioshavealsosetpositiveexamplesforlocalmediaoutlets.Withinthreeweeksofitsdeployment,theUNTransi-tionalAuthorityinEasternSlovakia(UNTAES)hadsetupRadioUNTAESinpartnershipwithlocalbroadcasterRadioVukovar.Overtime,RadioUNTAES,whichwascommittedto unbiased reporting of UN efforts, became widely credited with “mellowing” RadioVukovar’s programming. Like Radio UNTAC, Radio UNTAES provided election coverage,

One of the most immediate

media tasks in a post-conflict

environment is to create an out-

let or outlets with the capacity

to monitor and counter hate

speech while promoting a

durable peace.

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includingnewsofelectiondevelopmentsandpracticaladviceonvotingprocedures.Italsoofferednonsensationalcoverageoftheexhumationsofmassgraves.

But,likeanyregulatoryentity,mission-ownedradioscanpresentchallenges.Creatingamediaentitythatiscontrolledbyanintergovernmentalorganization(IGO)andthatdominatesthe localairwavescanconflictwitheffortstocreatetheperceptionoftheestablishmentofanindependent,transparentmedia,eveniftheIGO’scontrolismeanttobetemporary.Itcanalsoweakentheindigenouscapacityformediadevelopmentandalienatethelocalpopulationfromaprocessthatwillbevitalforthecountry’sdemo-craticprogress.Furthermore,oncethemissioniscomplete,manyinternationaljournalistsreturntotheirhomecountries,leavingfewlocalpractitionerswiththeskillstocontinueoperations.

Lesson: Create a representative media commission to regulate media entities and establish norms that are consistent with international standards.

Ahealthymediasectorrequiresacrediblestatemediacommissiontoestablishstandards,monitormedia abuses, andaddress complaints. The inability to reign in irresponsiblemedia can be detrimental inwar-torn societieswhere ethnic tensions are still strongandviolentrelapseremainsapossibility.Tobeeffective,however,theseregulatoryenti-tiesmustbefairandtransparent,withclearlydefinedpowerstoavoidopportunitiesforabuseofauthority.Thetaskofcreatingamediacommissionisadelicateone,becauseindigenouspopulationsmaybewaryofgivingthestatesuchauthority,especiallyifthepre-conflictregimewasadictatorship.

The precise role of a media commission will vary according to the maturity of acountry’s media sector. Afghanistan’s first media commission, established in 2005,focusedoneducational initiativesto introduce liberalmediaconceptstoAfghansandeducatepeopleontheroleofmediainpoliticsandsociety.Althoughthecommissionwaslimitedinscope—itsmandatewastomonitormediacoverageofthe2005electionsandhandleanyviolationsofmedialaws—itwasabletoachievenoteworthysuccessbyestablishingmediastandardsthroughouttheAfghanprovinces.BasedinKabul,thecom-mission—whichwascomposedof threenational commissionersand two internationalcommissioners—workedcloselywiththeJointElectoralManagementBodytodelivercriti-calinformationtothepublicwhileestablishingamonitoringunittotrackmediacoverageandensurecompliancewithacodeofconductforthemassmedia.10

Toimplementthemonitoringmandate,thecommissioncontractedwithInkeshafCon-sulting,anAfghaniconsultingfirmthatspecializesinmediamonitoring.Thefirmtrainedsixty-eightmonitorstotracktheoutputfromnearlysixtymediaoutletsnationwide.Work-ingfromofficeslocatedacrossseventeenprovinces,themonitorsincludedrepresentativesfromthePashtun,Tajik,andHazaraethnicgroups,aswellastwelvewomen.Monitorsweretrainedinmethodology,dataentry,andotherrelevanttasks.11

Bycontrast,themediacommissionsinBosniaandKosovoassumedabroaderroleovertheirmediasectors,withgreaterauthoritytoclampdownonnationalisticpropagandabroadcastbyparty-controlledoutlets.Bosnia’sIndependentMediaCommission(IMC)hasajurisdictionalreachthatextendsacrossallofthecountry’soutlets,withfullauthoritytograntandrescindoperationallicenses,ordersanctions,andseizeequipment.12Priorto1997,theIMCwasknownastheMediaExpertsCommission(MEC),whosemandateincluded setting forth rules and regulations on the content of media outlets. Someof these policies included “providing true and accurate information,” “refraining frombroadcastingincendiaryprogramming,”andenablingpartiestoadvertiseonstationsrunbytheirpoliticalopponents.Althoughtheregulatorybodywasresistedbylocalstationsandwas,bymanyaccounts,largelyineffective,theMECproducedsubstantivesuccessesforthemediasector.Journalistspraiseditforraisingtheprofessionalbarforjournalismduringelectoralcampaignperiodsandforseekingtoenhancethepersonalsafetyandprofessional freedomof journalistsbydocumenting complaints andviolationsof their

(continued)

To be effective, however, these

regulatory entities must be fair

and transparent, with clearly

defined powers to avoid oppor-

tunities for abuse of authority.

10

rights.Duringthe1998elections,theIMCaddressedmanycomplaintsaboutextremistlanguagebeingusedincertainoutlets.

In2000,theUNestablishedtheofficeoftheTemporaryMediaCommissioner(TMC)inKosovo,whosejobitwastomonitorpressreports.TheTMChassincebecomeanadvocateforresponsiblemediaandhasimposedfinesonpressoutletsthathaveviolatedtheUNmedialegalframeworkandtheCodeofConductforthePrintMedia.ThecommissionerfinedBotaSot,adailynewspaper,formakingunsubstantiatedaccusationsthattwoAlba-nianeditorswereworkingwiththeSerbiansecretservice,aclaimthatputthejournalists’livesindanger.TheTMCeventuallyusedaccumulatedrevenuefromthefinetoestablishanawardforjournalism.13

Lesson: Create the legal underpinnings for media on a transitional basis and assist the indigenous government in passing sound media laws that protect journalists’ freedom of speech while also protecting individuals from libel or slander.

Thecreationofafullyfunctioningmediasectorrequiresintensiveworkonvariouslevels.Oneofthemostfundamentallevelsinvolvesimplementingastronglegalframeworkthatsafeguardsthegreatestpossiblefreedomsforthepressandlaysdownarobustfoundationonwhichtobuildradio,television,andprintoutlets.

Establishingorreformingalegalmediaframeworkcanentailarangeoftasks,includinglobbyingformediasafeguardsinthecountry’sconstitution,establishingacodeofethicsforjournalists,transformingstate-controlledbroadcastersintopublicservicebroadcast-ers,amendingthepenalandcivilcodetoprotectjournalistsagainstdefamationcharges,andadoptinglawsoninformationaccesstoensuretransparencyofpublicadministration.Manydifferentorganizationshavebeeninvolvedinreformingmediaregulationsandlaws.InEastTimor,InternewswasthekeyactorindraftingpresslawsandlobbyingtheTimorconstituentassemblyforsixmonthstoincludemediafreedomsinthestateconstitution.OtherNGOs—Article19,theWorldPressFreedomAssociation,andtheJournalists’Asso-ciationofEastTimor(TJLA)—contributedtotheprocessbyprovidinglegaladviceandassistanceinlobbying.TheTJLAalsocreatedaself-regulatingcodeofethicswithhelpfromInternewsandtheUNTAESOfficeofCommunicationandPublicInformation.14

Medialawsshouldbestatedasunambiguouslyaspossibletoavoidmisunderstandingin implementation.In2004, theAfghangovernmentpassedamedia lawestablishingtheNationalCommissionofElectronicMediaBroadcast.AlthoughthecommissionwasdesignedtoregulateandmakepolicyforAfghanmassmedia,itwasmisunderstoodtobeanexecutiveauthoritywithcontroloverAfghanistan’smainpublicradioandtelevisionstation,RadioandTelevisionAfghanistan.ForAfghans,whoareunlikelytobewellversedinliberalmediavocabulary,thelawdoesnotsufficientlyexplainthedifferentrolesofpolicymakingbodies,regulatoryauthorities,andmediaoperators.15

Anotherindispensableaspectofmedialawistheprotectionofjournalists.Protectingjournalists’rightshasbecomeimperative.Eachyear,accordingtotheCommitteetoPro-tectJournalists,dozensofjournalistsaremurderedfortheirworkasreporters,whilehun-dredsmorearepersecutedbygovernmentsoroppositiongroupsandfacedeaththreatstotheirfamiliesandthemselves.Inawell-knownBosniancase,ZeljkoKopanja,theeditorofBanjaLuka’s(RepublikaSrpska)Nezavisnenovine,wastargetedbecauseofhiscoverageofSerbianwarcriminalsandlostbothofhislegsinacarbombing.16

Oncemedialawsareinplace,intervenersmustseektoensurethatstatejudiciarybod-ieshavethecapacityandthewilltofullyenforcetheselawsandtodosoasconsistentlyaspossible.TheweaknessoftheAfghanistanjudicialsystem,forexample,hasenabledwarlordstoenforcetheirownmediapolicieswhileignoringnationalstandardsonfreespeech.Theabsenceofaviableinstitutionalframeworkformediahasunderminedtheenforcementofmedialaws.Cambodiatodaystilllacksaneffectivemeansbywhichtofilecomplaintsoflibel,leavingthemediaunfetteredbyprofessionalstandardsandmorelikelytobreedacultureofjournalisticimpunity.Atthesametime,thegovernmenthas

One of the most fundamental

levels involves implementing

a strong legal framework that

safeguards the greatest possible

freedoms for the press and lays

down a robust foundation on

which to build radio, television,

and print outlets.

11

arbitrarilysanctionedoutlets,creatingaclimateofuncertaintyinwhichtherearenouni-formcodesofconductforjournalists.Effectivejusticemustalsobeadministeredagainstperpetratorsofthreatsorviolenceagainstjournalists.

Developing Media Outlets and Personnel

Lesson: Establish a diverse array of media outlets, including private and public enti-ties and radio, television, and print outlets. Assess country demographics to maxi-mize media accessibility by different segments of the population (e.g., minorities, women, youth, the illiterate).

Oneofthemostvisiblestepsinamediadevelopmentstrategyinvolvesestablishingmediaoutletsthatprovidethepublicwithtruthful,objectiveinformation.Thekindsofoutletsthatarecreatedwillshapetheoverallsuccessofthestrategy.Ultimately,practitionersshould seek to create a diverse array ofmedia outlets that includes awide range ofvoices,includingwomenandminorities,notjusttheleadersofdominantfactions.Greaterdiversitytypicallyproducesamoreopendebateandamorecompetitivemediamarket,whichiscriticaltothelong-termsustainabilityofmediaoutlets.Apluralisticmarketalsohelpstodiluteradicalviewsandelevatemoderatevoices.Competingviewsalsoimproveopportunitiesforpeacefulpublicdialoguethatwillstrengthendemocraticvaluesofnon-violenceandcompromise.

TheRadioTelevisionofKosovo(RTK),createdbytheOSCE,isconsideredoneofthemostsuccessfulexamplesofaninclusive,multiethnicoutletestablishedinapost-conflictcountry.AsKosovo’ssolepublicbroadcaster,RTKsoughttoexpanditsaccessibilitytothecountry’sdiverseethniccommunitiesbyimplementingprojectstoprovidecaptionsforforeignfilmsinthemanydifferentlanguagesspokenbythevariouscommunities.In2004,RTKalsobegantoofferdailynewsbroadcastsintheSerbianlanguageandinitiatedprogramsdirectedspecificallyatvariousethniccommunities.AlthoughRTKwasinitiallyrunbyaboardofdirectorscomprisingbothinternationalsandlocals,governingauthoritywaslatertransferredtolocals.17

Similarly,inBosnia,theOSCEestablishedRadioFERNinJuly1996,whichbecamethefirststationinthecountrytobeoperatedbyamultiethnicstaffofjournalists.Thenewsitproducedwasalsomultiethnicinnature;eventually,thestationbecameindependentoftheOSCEandservedasthefoundationforthecountry’spublicradiostructure.18

Todeterminethemostsuitableformsofmediaforaparticularcountry,intervenersshouldcollectdemographicinformationonlanguage,literacyrates,andaccesstoelec-tricity, television, and radio.Widespread illiteracy and poverty in Afghanistan, Timor,Cambodia,andRwanda,forexample,warrantedgreaterinvestmentinradioratherthannewspapers.Limitedaccesstoelectronicsandelectricitycouldprecludetheuseoftelevi-sionstationsasmajormediaoutlets.Bycomparison,Iraqhasahighrateofliteracyaswellassubstantialaccesstosatellitetechnologies,whichhasresultedinthespreadofnewspapersandsatellitetelevision.AccordingtoInternews,televisionstationstendtobethemediaofchoiceinEuropeanandEurasianregions,withradio,theInternet,andnewspapersgettingsecondaryattention.InAsiaandAfrica,whereliteracyratesarelow,radioisthemostpopularmedium.Asageneraltrend,theroleoftheInternetinthespreadofinformationhasbecomeincreasinglyimportant.19

Another consideration involves determining the suitablemix of public and privateoutlets.Bothtypeshavetheirbenefitsanddrawbacks.Publicoutletssometimeshavemorecredibilitywiththepublicbecausetheyexistostensiblytoservepublicinterests,buttheyalsotendtosufferfromlowlevelsofinternationalassistance,whichconstrictstheirabilitytoproducehigh-qualityprogramming.Privateoutletstendtolackaclearmechanismforpublicservice,buttheyofferdiversity,adecentralizedmediaculture,and

Ultimately, practitioners

should seek to create a diverse

array of media outlets that

includes a wide range of

voices, including women and

minorities, not just the leaders

of dominant factions.

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prospectsfordevelopingaself-sustaining,market-drivenmediacorps.Someintervenersbelievethatasustainabledemocracyrequiresbothpublicandprivatemedia.TheU.S.andEuropeanapproachestomediaoutletdevelopmentthatarefundamentallydistinct,asmentionedearlier.WhereasEuropeansfavortransformingandstrengtheningpubliclyownedentities,U.S.mediadeveloperstendtofocusonfosteringnew,independent,pri-vatelyownedoutlets.

Theeconomicsituationofthecountrymaydrivetheoutcomeofthepublic-privatedebate.Inmanylessdevelopedcountries,especiallyinAfrica,thelackofarobustmarketformediaexplainswhyprivatelyownedmediaoutletsarefewinnumberandovershad-owedbythestatemediastructure.Small,independentmediaentitiesaremorelikelytobefoundinmoredevelopedcountries,suchasinAsiaandtheMiddleEast.

OnesuccessfulexampleofsupportingprivatemediafeatureswhateventuallybecameAfghanistan’sfirstprivateradiostation,RadioArman.TheU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopmentgave$2.2milliontothreeAfghan-Australianbrothers.Withinmonths,thebrothershadsuccessfullyestablishedthecountry’sfirstradiostation;theylaterstartedthe country’s first private television station, Tolo TV. This example is unusual insofarasinternationalfundingwasgiventoalocalentitythatalsouseditsowninvestmentmoney.20

Lesson: Establish effective journalism-training programs and institutions. Create a follow-up mechanism to ensure proper training of journalists.

Practitionersshoulddeveloprigorousmediatrainingprogramstoeducatepersonnelonjournalisticstandardsofprofessionalintegrityandindependence.Manyreportersinpost-conflictsocietieshaveworkedonlyunderauthoritarianregimesandlackexperienceinrunningindependentmedia.Trainingprogramsmustbedesignedwithlong-terminterestsinmind;theyshouldofferacomprehensiveeducation,includefollow-upinitiatives,andrunforalongtime.

Asuccessfultrainingprogramshouldeducatepeopleintheconceptsoftruth,impar-tiality,publicservice,andjournalisticethics.Businessconcepts,suchascompetitioninthemediamarketandmanagementandadministrativecapacities,mustalsobetaught.Stationmanagersshouldunderstandhowtorunabusiness,includinghowtocreateandmanageasalesdepartment,runclassifiedadvertisements,arrangedistribution,andman-agerevenue.

OnepositivemodelformediaeducationistheSorosMediaCenterinSarajevo,estab-lishedin1995byfinancierandphilanthropistGeorgeSoros.ManynativejournalistsinBosniapointtothecenterasahighlysuccessfultraininginitiative.Afterseveralyearsofoperation,thecenterwasturnedovertoBosniansasanindependentjournalismschool.

Careshouldbetakentocontinuetomonitortraineesafterthecompletionoftheirtrainingprograms.Toooften,NGOsarepreoccupiedwithbeingabletoreportthatahighvolumeoftraineeshavecompletedaprogramandoverlooktheimportanceoftestingtraineesafterthecourseiscompletedandhelpingthemsecurelocaljobs.Intervenersshouldassessnotonlythetraineesbutalsothetrainingprogramsthemselvestodeter-minetheirlong-termeffectivenessincreatingacompetentcadreoflocaljournalists.InCambodia,internationaljournalismtrainingprogramshadlimitedimpactbecausetheyweretoonarrowlyfocusedonshort-termgainsandfailedtofollowupwithtraineesaftertheprogramshadbeencompleted.ManyKhmerjournalistsleftthecountryaftertrainingorwenttoworkforwireservices.

Another task essential for long-term success is to establish vocational and post-graduatecoursesattheuniversityleveltoencouragestudentstopursuejournalismasaprofession.Trainingprogramsmustalsoget“buyin,”oracceptance,frommanagersandmediaownerstomaximizethebenefitsoftraininglower-leveljournalists.Additionally,intervenersmustgroomlocalindividualstobecometrainersthemselvesandthusbeable

Training programs must be

designed with long-term inter-

ests in mind; they should offer

a comprehensive education,

include follow-up initiatives,

and run for a long time.

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tocontinuetheeducationprocessonceinternationalprogramshaveconcluded.Thefirstwaveoftrainersistypicallymadeupofforeignjournalists,butsubsequentwavesshouldfeatureanincreasingnumberoflocals.Intervenersshouldalsoconsiderusingjournalistsfromthesurrounding regionas trainers; suchpeoplewill likelybetterunderstand thehistoryandcultureofthehostcountrythanwilltrainersrecruitedfromdistantpartsoftheworld.

In addition to training journalists, interveners must make a determined effort toeducatethebroaderpublicaboutliberalconceptionsoftheroleofmediainpoliticsandsociety.Manypost-conflictsocietiesareunaccustomedtohavingmorethanonedominantmediaoutlet,whichistypicallycontrolledbythestate.Moreover,somecitizensaredeeplysuspiciousaboutthemedia,havingbeenaccustomedtothedistortionsandhalf-truthsthatstate-ownedmediaoutletsoftendisseminate.Others,especiallyindeeplydividedsocieties,areeasilymanipulatedbyhateradio.Giventheseconditionsanddeep-seatedpreconceptions,substantialinvestmentmustbemadetoinformandeducatethepublicontheroleoffreeandindependentmediaindemocraciesandtheimportanceithasinprotectingtheirrightsandspotlightingabusesofgovernmentpower.

ManyNGOs specializing inmedia development have implemented educational pro-grams,holdingworkshopsandpublishinginformationalmaterialstoeducatejournalistsandgovernmentofficialsontheproperrelationshipbetweenthestateandmedia.

Lesson: Create professional associations of journalists, publishers, and editors to strengthen leadership, promote the principles that undergird an independent media, and encourage accountability and compliance with community standards. Connect local journalists with international networks to enhance accountability.

Intervenersshouldfacilitateinteractionamongbroadcommunitiesofindependentjour-naliststobolsteracultureofprofessionalismandencouragehighstandards.Byengagingin awider support network, journalists avoid being isolated from their domestic andinternationalcolleaguesandarebetterpositionedtoresistmanipulationbythestateorotherentities.

Anassociationofmediaoutletscanbroadlyrepresentthemediacommunitywhenitsinterestsareatstake.Positivetasks forsuchanassociationmight includedevelopingwidelyacceptedstandardsofjournalismandnegotiatingwiththegovernmentwhenitisdesigningmediapolicies.Moreover,forinterveners,supportingacommunityofmediaoutletsmaybemorebeneficialintermsofstimulatingdiversitythansinglingoutindi-vidualoutletstosupport.

Anumberofexistingentitieshelpconnectjournalismcommunitiesacrosstheworld.OnenotableexampleistheInternationalJournalists’Network,whichissponsoredbytheInternationalCenterforJournalists.ItsWebsite(www.ijnet.org)containscollectionsofmedialawsandcodesofethicsadoptedworldwide,aswellascontactinformationformedia assistance organizations around the world. The organization also tracks mediaassistanceprogramsandseekstocoordinatedonoractivitiestopreventduplicationandtomaximizeimpact.

AusefulmediastandardsentityinBosniaiswww.mediaonline.ba,aWebsitededicatedtomonitoringmediainthatcountry.CreatedwithhelpfromtheFrenchgovernmentin2000,thesiteprovidesaforumformediaexpertsandjournaliststocommunicateandshareexperienceswithcolleaguesfromothercountriesthatarealsointransition.TheorganizationcomprisesanetworkofcorrespondentsthroughoutsoutheastEuropewhotrackmediadevelopmentintheirowncountries

InternewscreatedtheGlobalForumforMediaDevelopmentin2005tohelpconnectmediaassistanceorganizationsandimprovestrategiesandpoliciesfordevelopingmediaaroundtheworld.Theforum’sfirstconferencebroughttogethermorethanfivehundredparticipantsfromninety-sevencountries.21

By engaging in a wider support

network, journalists avoid being

isolated from their domestic and

international colleagues and

are better positioned to resist

manipulation by the state or

other entities.

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Exit Phase: Transitioning and Sustaining

Transition to Local Control and Ensure Long-Term Sustainability

Lesson: Transition control to local media leaders to avoid an erosion of capacity when the international mission concludes.

When developing media, implementers should assist new media outlets with an eyetoward developing local capacity while mitigating dependency on the internationalcommunityandotherexternalentities.Thestrategyshouldinvolveweaningoutletsoffexternal support as soonaspossible, forcing them tobecome self-sustaining.Privatemediaoutletswillbecomesustainablebasedonadvertisingrevenue,theavailabilityofwhichwillultimatelydependontheabilityofanoutlet’sprogrammingtodrawviewersorlisteners.

Asuccessfulmodelforempoweringlocalmediaisthemission-ownedradiostationinBosnia,whichassistedastudentgroup(theStudents’UnionofBosnia-Herzegovina)inestablishingastationwiththeslogan“106.5—Keepin’YouAlive,eFMRadio.”Thestationstartedbroadcastingfromawreckedmilitiabarracks inSarajevo’s“snipers’alley”with$20,000worthof equipment fromUnitedNationsMission inBosnia andHerzegovina(UNMBIH).Withadditional fundingandassistance fromtheEuropeanUnion,Norway,Canada,andIFOR,eFMbecameatwenty-four-hourmediaoutlet,broadcastingmusicandentertainmentaswellasnews.(OneexclusiveinterviewthatgarneredthestationrespectandpopularitywaswiththechiefprosecutoroftheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia.)ThestationisstillpopularandtodaybroadcastsnotonlytotheSarajevoareabutalsobeyond.Itisnowpartnerswithotherlocalbroadcastersunderanumbrellacorporation,CrossRadio,which incorporatesCroatian,KosovarAlbanian,andSerbianbroadcasters.eFMhasalsobecomeatrainingcenterforthestudents,teachingthemnotonlytheartsofjournalismbutalsohowtomanagearadiostation.

Lesson: Develop a robust media market in which private outlets can be self-sus-taining over the long run, after international funding wanes. Establish funding mechanisms for local outlets to ensure continued funding to cover operating costs, training, and so forth.

ArecurringchallengeformediadevelopersinvolvescreatingasectorthatissustainablebeyondthemandateoftheUNmissionandisnotdependentoninternationalaid.InEastTimor,theUNTransitionalAdministration(UNTAET)ranpopularradioandtelevisionstationsthatreachedallpartsofthecountry.ProgrammingonthestationsfocusedonprovidinginformationontheTimoreseelectionsandincludedUNnewsandentertain-ment.ButdespitetheirsuccessamongtheTimoresepopulation,thestationswereunabletocontinuebeyondtheUNTAETmandatebecauseno localbroadcastingcompanywascapableofassumingoperations.ThestationswereshiftedtotheNationalPublicBroad-castingAuthority,apublicservicemanagedbythestate.

Likewise,inCambodia,RadioUNTACwaspopularamongthepopulationbutfalteredafterUNTAC’smandateended.Localjournalistslackedthetechnicalknow-howtosustainthestationanddidnothaveadequatefundingtocovertransmittercosts,sparepartsforrecordingequipment,andotherimportantassets.

Without the ability to fundoperationsover the long term,media entitiesbecomevulnerable to manipulation by political patrons who do have the funding to supportmediaoperations.Suchdependencyonexternalfundingthreatensoutlets’credibilityandindependence.ManyCambodianoutletstoday,forexample,remainhostagetopoliticalpatrons,whoshapemediacontenttofavortheirownagendas.

Toexpeditethedevelopmentofasustainablemediamarket,intervenersshouldnur-tureaprivatemediamarketthatcanbegintosustainitselfbasedonmarketdemand.

A recurring challenge for media

developers involves creating a sector

that is sustainable beyond the man-

date of the UN mission and is not

dependent on international aid.

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Accordingtoindustryexperts,ittakesmorethanfiveyearstogetamediamarketupandrunning.Themarketrequiresfourkeycomponents—contentcreation,distribution,viewership,andoutsiderevenues—thattogethercreateapositivefeedbackloopthatcanbecomeself-propagatingwhenproperlynurtured.

Althoughapreviouslyclosedsocietywillinitiallyconsumeagreatdealofnews,theeconomicsustainabilityofamediaoutletwilldependontheentertainmentitprovides.Ingeneral,mediaenvironmentsconsistoverwhelminglyofentertainment,whichdrivesratingsandtheoveralleconomicsofamediamarket.Hence,intervenersshouldintroduceentertainmentcontenttomediaoutletstofosterthesustainabilityofthemarketovertime.

Lesson: Create an indigenous mechanism to continue monitoring hate speech.

Once the international presence diminishes, having a permanent entity dedicated tomonitoring media development is critical to fostering a healthy, independent mediasector.Itisparticularlyimportanttomonitorhatespeech;iftheabilitytomonitorandrespondtohatemediadeclines,anyprogressmadetothatpointinmediadevelopmentcanbeeasilyreversed.

Although Radio UNTAC was applauded for stimulating the growth of independentbroadcastmediainCambodia,thetrendreversedwhentheradioshutdown.Withintwoyearsofthestation’sdemise,thenewCambodiangovernmentpassedamedialawpermit-tingthestatetocensormediathatitconsidersathreattonationalsecurity.Oppositionpartiesarenolongerallowedtobroadcastinthecountryanddissentingjournalistsaresubjectedtointimidation.

Elections in particular require robustmediamonitoringmechanisms. Three entitiesmost commonly take up monitoring responsibilities: electoral management bodies;international electoral observationmissions; andNGOs andother civic bodies. Duringparliamentaryelections,theAfghanMediaCommissionsuccessfullyimplementedamoni-toringprogramthatreachedacrossallseventeenprovinces.TheMediaMonitoringUnittrainedAfghanmediamonitorstomonitorAfghanmediaduringtheelectoralcampaign.Followingtheelections,themonitorswerehiredbyanAfghancompanythatcontinuestomonitorlocalmedia.22

ConclusionWhileeachpost-conflictsituationwillinevitablyposeuniquechallengesformediaprac-titioners,experiencehasshownthatsome issuespresent themselves—inone formoranother—inalmostalloperations.Ifpractitionersnotonlyrecognizethesechallengesbutalso learnhowtheyhavebeenhandled inother interventions, thenpractitionerscan shape their media development strategies accordingly and avoid repeating pastmistakes.

Intailoringanappropriatemodelformediadevelopmentinagivensociety,interven-ersshouldconsiderthefollowing:• Therelationshipthatexistedbetweenthegovernmentandmediaoutletsbeforeand

duringtheconflict.Insomeinstances,thisrelationshipmayinsomeinstancehaveledtoorfedviolence.

• Theeconomiclandscapeofacountryanditsmarketpotentialtosustainmediaoutletsonceinternationaldonorsandfoundationshavedeparted.Aftercarefullyconsideringallthecomponentsofthemediasector,internationalplayersshouldcalculatehowbesttodistributeresourcestoenhancetheprospectsofthatsectorbecomingself-sustaining.Intervenersshouldalsofocusonthecreationoflocalcapacitytomaintainthemediaoutletsevenaftertheintervenersaregone;localbuy-inandownershipareimportantinensuringlongevityandsuccess.

Once the international presence

diminishes, having a permanent

entity dedicated to monitoring

media development is critical to

fostering a healthy, independent

media sector.

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• Thepresenceorabsenceofinstitutionalmechanismstoregulatetheconductofthemedia.Wherenoeffectiveinstitutionsexist,intervenersshouldcreateamechanismsuchasamediacommissiontohelpensure thatmediaoutletsplaybythe rules.Intervenersshouldalsoconsiderestablishingindependentassociationsofjournalists,editors,andpublisherstohelpprotectjournalists’rightsandpromotehighprofes-sionalstandards.

• Thetimingofelections.Organizingfreeandfairelections isusuallyan importantmilestone in the development of societies emerging from conflict. However, suchelections shouldbeorganizedonlyafter freeandnonpartisanmediaoutletshavebeen established in a country to ensure proper representation of all the actorsinvolved.

Freemediacanserveasapowerfultoolinsocietiesemergingfromconflict.Ifinter-venerscancreateamediasectorthatisnotonlyindependent,self-sustaining,andself-regulatingbutalsoinclusiveanddiverse,theycanhelptogiveavoicetothosepeoplewhoweresilencedduringtheconflict,initiatingopenandhonestdialogueaboutboththeviolentpastandapeacefulfuture.

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DEVELOPInG MEDIA In STABILIzATIOn AnD RECOnSTRUCTIOn MISSIOnSpRedeployment phaSe

1.MaptheLand-scape

a.Maptheexistingmedialandscapeinthecountrybyidentifyingmediaoutletsandpersonnelthathavesurvivedtheconflictandcouldpotentiallysupportmediareformsandthedevelopmentofsocietyatlarge.

b.Assessthehistoryofthemedia’srelationshipwiththegovern-mentandwithsocietypriortoandduringtheconflict.

c.Assesstheviabilityofaself-sustainingmediamarketandiden-tifyavailableresourcesforcreatingasteadystreamofrevenueforaprivatemarket.

2.CreateaStrategy

a.Createaplanforcoordinatingalltherelevantplayersinmediadevelopment by creating joint working groups or task forces(donors,trainers,NGOs,IOs,etc).

b. Identify potential spoilers, and their associated infrastruc-ture,whomayseektodominatemediachannelsorcontinuetobroadcastorprinthatespeech.Identifyandelevaterepatriatesor local leaderswith the potential to lead independentmediadevelopment.

c.Planforanaccountablemediasectortobeginoperatingbeforethefirstpostwarelectionsareheld.

deployment phaSe

1.BuildaFounda-tionfortheMediaSector

a.Createamission-ownedoutlettodelivercriticalinformationabout peace operationswhilemonitoring and countering hatespeech.Alsoconsiderotherwaystoprovidealternativeprogram-mingforthepublic.

b.Createarepresentativemediacommissiontoregulatemediaentities and establish norms that are consistentwith interna-tionalstandards.

c.Createthelegalunderpinningsformediaonatransitionalbasisandassisttheindigenousgovernment,ifapplicable,inpassingsound media laws that protect journalists’ freedom of speechwhilealsoprotectingindividualsfromlibelorslander.

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2.DevelopMediaOutletsandPer-sonnel

a.Establishadiversearrayofmediaoutlets, includingprivateandpublicentitiesandradio,television,andprintoutlets.Assesscountrydemographicstomaximizemediaaccessibilitybydiffer-entsegmentsofpopulation(e.g.,minorities,women,youth,theilliterate).

b. Establish effective journalism-training programs. Create afollow-upmechanismtoensurepropertrainingofjournalists.

c.Createprofessionalassociationsofjournalists,publishers,andeditors to strengthen leadership, promote the principles thatunderpin an independentmedia, and encourage accountabilityandcompliancewithcommunitystandards.Connect local jour-nalistswithinternationalnetworkstoenhanceaccountability.

exit phaSe

1.EnsureSustain-ability

a.Transitioncontroltolocalmedialeaderstoavoidanerosionofcapacitywhentheinternationalmissionconcludes.

b.Developarobustmediamarketinwhichprivateoutletscanbeself-sustainingoverthelongrun,afterinternationalfundingwanes.Establishfundingmechanismsforlocaloutletstoensurecontinuedfundingforlocalinitiativestocoveroperatingcosts,training,andsoforth.

c.Createanindigenousmechanismtocontinuemonitoringhatespeech.

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notes1. RussellSmith,“TheImpactofHateMediainRwanda.”BBC World Service,December3,2003.

2. InternationalMediaSupport,Annual Report, 2004–05(Copenhagen:InternationalMediaSupport,2005),www.i-m-s.dk/Media/PDF/IMS%20Annual%20Report%202003-2004.pdf.

3. PeterFeuilherade,“LiberiaCondemnedforRadioShutDown.”BBC World Service,February2,2000.

4. “HateRadioJournalistConfesses,”BBCWorldService,May15,2000.

5. MatthewBurton,“TheInternationalCommunityandMediaDevelopmentintheNewBosnia”(April2001),www.impublished.org/bosnia.htm.

6. U.S.MissiontoKosovo,“USAIDDirectorCalls forLevelPlayingField forKosovarTVStations,”(pressrelease,April26,2002).

7. MonroeE.Price,ed.,“RestructuringtheMediainPost-ConflictSocieties:FourPerspectives:TheExperienceofNon-GovernmentalandIntergovernmentalOrganizations”(backgroundpaperforUNESCOWorldPressDayConference,2000).

8. GordonAdam,Radio’s Peacekeeping Potential: Crosslines(Ireland:Crosslines,1995).

9. SusanManuel,“UNMediaandPostConflictPeace-Keeping”(articlepreparedforUNESCOseminar,“Sup-porttoMediainViolentConflictandCountriesinTransition,”May3,2004),http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15499&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.

10. Afghan Media Commission,AfghanMediaCommission,Media Commission Final Report(Kabul:AfghanMediaCommission,2005).

11. Ibid.

12. TarikJusic,“MediaLandscape:Bosnia-Herzegovina”(publishedontheEuropeanJournalismCenterWebsite,1999),http://www.ejc.net/media_landscape/article/bosnia_herzegovina/.

13. AnnaDiLellio,Curbing Kosovo Media Excess(London:InstituteforWarandPeaceReporting,2002).

14. Article19andInternews,Freedom of Expression and the Media in Timor-Leste(December2005),http://www.article19.org/pdfs/publications/timor-leste-baseline-study.pdf.

15. Afghan Media Commission,AfghanMediaCommission,Media Commission Final Report.

16. Amnesty International, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Country Report (New York: Amnesty International,2000).

17. RadioTelevisionofKosovo,Annual Report, 2004,http://www.rtklive.com/eng/2004_en.pdf.

18. Price,“RestructuringtheMediainPost-ConflictSocieties.”

19. “Internews:HowWeWork,”http://www.internews.org/why/default.shtm.

20. DavidRohde,All Successful Democracies Need Freedom of Speech: American Efforts to Create a Vibrant Free Press in Iraq and Afghanistan(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,2005).

21. “Internews:HowWeWork.”

22. AfghanMediaCommission,Media Commission Final Report.

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Of Related InterestThisreportispartofaseriesofspecialreportsissuedbytheUnitedStatesInstituteofPeace’sFillingtheGapsseriesofworkinggroups.Thespecialreportsaddressthecausesoffailuresinspecificareasinreconstructionandstabilizationaswellasgeneratepolicyoptions.Precedingreportsintheseriesincludethefollowing:

•Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction,CraigCohen

• Transitional Governance: From Bullets to Ballots, Beth Cole DeGrasse and ChristinaCaan

• Filling the Gaps: Managing Natural Resource Wealth,JillShankelman

• The Role of Women in Stabilization and Reconstruction,CamillePampellConaway

• The Urge to Remember: The Role of Memorials in Social Reconstruction and Transitional Justice,JudyBarsalouandVictoriaBaxter

•Employment Generation and Economic Development in Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,JohannaMendelson-FormanandMerriamMashatt

Pleasevisitwww.usip.orgtodownloadthisandrelatedreports.