TWN Africa - ISSUE Vol. 21 No. 2 2018 US$5.00 GB₤3.00 €5twnafrica.org/wp/2017/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/African...ISSUE Vol. 21 No. 2 2018 US$5.00 GB₤3.00 €5.00 Find out what’s

ISSUE Vol. 21 No. 2 2018 US$5.00 GB₤3.00 €5.00

Find out what’s on the African Agenda

The African continent is mostly reported as a land of poverty, civil strife and endless lines of begging hands. Problems facing the continent are portrayed and communicated mostly by foreign eyes through the monop-oly-controlled news media.

By publishing African Agenda, Third World Network Africa aims to provide a different, more complex and nuanced perspective. Open your eyes and ears to an African perspective on critical issues such as trade, the environment, gender and sustainable development.

CONTENTS COVER05 Emerging challenges face Africa’s Continental Free Trade Area

09 COMESA grappling with itself: ready to up to the African Continental Free Trade Area

11 AfCFTA - hasty decisions and incoherences

14 Africa cannot wait

16 African Continental Free Trade Area: Facts and figures

INTERNATIONAL17 The colonization of Palestine: Rethinking the term ‘Israel Occupation’

19 Will rising international concern over new debt crisis be matched by action?

22 What’s different about Trump’s tariffs?

WOMEN24 Women miners stake a claim in Zimbabwe

pOLITICs26 Bitterness and pessimism persist in Cote d’Ivoire

28 The Ituri debacle

RIGHTs30 Selling birthrights

FOOD33 UN’s Zero Hunger goal remains a daunting challenge

AGRICULTURE36 Offshoring Indian agriculture: Is India becoming a GMO trash can?

Editor-in-Chief: Yao Graham

Editor: Cornelius Adedze

Design: David Roy Quashie

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African Agenda is published by Third World Network (TWN) Africa.

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page 8 photo: ECOWAS leaders at a summit

African Agenda Vol. 21 No. 24

African AgendaVol. 21 No. 2 5

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Emerging challenges face Africa’s Continental Free

Trade AreaOneofAfrica’sflagshipinitiativesforintegration,theAfricaContinentalFreeTradeArea

(AfCFTA), recently signed faces challenges at the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) level, especially in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

writes *Sylvester Bagooro.

Hardly had the ink dried on Af-rica’s Continental Free Trade Area agreement signed by 44

countries on March 21 in Kigali, Rwan-da than the challenges confronting it raised their brows. These challenges centre chiefly on the harmonization of regional offers as a customs union, policy incoherence with other trade frameworks such as the Eco-nomic Partnership Agreements (EPAs),

insufficient involvement of key actors at the national and regional levels. All these are compounded by the very ambitious speed of the negotiations of the AfCFTA. These could pose enormous challenges to the operationalization of the trade pact especially within ECOWAS unless they are sufficiently and radically addressed. The challenges came up during the ECOWAS Trade Experts and Trade Min-isters Meeting held in Abuja, Nigeria,

from the 21-24th May 2018 as well as during an Africa-wide Multi-stakehold-er forum in Accra convened by Third World Network-Africa from the 12-14th June 2018. Some of the challenges are not new as they have been flagged by many stakeholders in previous forums by private sector players, civil society and some government officials. Though there is agreement that the AfCFTA is an op-portunity to address Africa’s longstanding


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development challenges they hold the view that it should emerge from a broad consultative approach which will give it much more legitimacy and ownership by stakeholders across the continent. Ul-timately, if handled well the trade pact may also repair the damage caused by external trade agreements to the devel-opment policy space and instruments on the African continent. A common market, a single currency buoyed by free movement of people and goods are the ingredients of Africa’s integration agen-da and the Africa Continental Free Trade Area is one of its pillars. The African Union Assembly had launched the AfCFTA negotiations during the 25th Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Governments on June 15, 2015 in Johannesburg, South Africa. On 21st March 2018, forty-four (44) Heads of State signed the Frame-work Agreement on the AfCFTA as well as the Protocol on Trade in Goods and Protocol on Trade in Services. With focus on ECOWAS, the Re-gional Trade Ministers meeting discussed a range of issues including the AfCFTA, the uneven development in the region regarding the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union, a Common Trade Policy for the region as well as challenges of the Com-mon External Tariffs (CET) as the region moves fully towards a Customs Union. On the challenges, first, was the issue of harmonizing the offers of in-dividual member states into a regional offer informed by broad consultation at both the national and regional levels within the tight schedules of negotia-tions. From the onset of the negotiations on the AfCFTA, member states within ECOWAS should have approached the negotiations as a regional bloc as befits a Customs Union which had begun the implementation of its Common External Tariffs (CET) since 2015. But that was not the case. So, during the ECOWAS ministers’ meeting, the Ministers urged the ECOWAS Commission to elevate its participation in the meetings and also adopt a regional approach to the liberalisation demands of the AfCFTA. (90 percent of the goods would be liber-alised with 10 per cent for sensitive and

excluded products as well as the services commitments). Hence ECOWAS mem-ber states emphasized during the meet-ing that to preserve the effectiveness of the Free Trade Area between the coun-tries of the African continent, a region-al compromise must be reached for the Community as an offer that preserves the cohesion of the region. However, the roadmap at achiev-ing the regional offer poses a challenge rather than a concrete solution. The meeting recommended that the ECOW-AS Commission work out a regional of-fer and that should be circulated to all ECOWAS Member States for comments latest May 31, 2018. Following which member states should hold national con-sultations with different stakeholders; customs departments; trade ministries; private sector and civil society and the outcomes transmitted to the ECOWAS Commission no later than 15 June 2018. A regional meeting would then be con-vened to agree on the Draft Offer that will then serve as a basis for the negotia-tions on market access by 05 July 2018. (As I write this article in July, Ghana as a country, has not held any known nation-al consultation based on the demands of the Trade Ministers meeting. The situa-tion is likely to be same in other ECOW-AS member states). Related to the above is the develop-ment in Nigeria regarding the AfCFTA, where President Mohammed Buhari, put off the signing of the trade pact based on concerns raised by local stakeholders. In fact, Nigeria’s situation is a classic mani-festation of the defective processes of the AfCFTA. Nigeria had to pause to con-sult other stakeholders such as the Man-ufacturers Association of Nigeria, trades unions among others before the Presi-dent could append his signature to the trade agreement. “In trying to guarantee employ-ment, goods and services in our country, we have to be careful with agreements that will compete, maybe successfully, against our upcoming industries,” Buhari told a news conference during a visit by South African President Cyril Ramapho-sa. Continuing, President Buhari said, ‘“We are a vast nation of nearly 200 mil-

lion people, with diversity of language, culture, natural endowments and aspi-rations. However, what we all have in common is that at all levels, Nigeria is a trading nation. “No nation can survive on its own. Trading is important and the terms of trade are important. Therefore, there is a need to ensure our national interests as well as our regional and international ob-ligations are balanced.” Even with the consultation by the Nigeria Office for Trade Negotiation (NOTN), concerns for the defective pro-cess continue to reverberate. As reported in oraclenews.org, on July 4, 2018, the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) stated that the outcome of the consultation by the Office for Trade Ne-gotiation has even left them more wor-ried than before. According to MAN’s President, Dr Frank Jacobs, “we are now even more worried that, in spite of the widespread concerns that necessitated Mr. President’s reservation of his signa-ture at the summit in Kigali, the subse-quent activities of the NOTN were not tailored towards addressing those con-cerns. Rather than squarely addressing those critical issues, all efforts were geared towards extolling the laudable objectives of the AfCFTA, its potential benefits and what Nigeria is expected to benefit from its implementation.” Another sticky issue is the ECOW-AS Community levy and the demands by Article 7 of the Protocol on Trade in Goods to abolish such levies on goods from other African countries. Currently ECOWAS imposes 0.5 percent import duty on goods originating from third parties. The Levy is the core financial instrument on which the Communi-ty relies to deepen regional integration through the functioning of Communi-ty institutions and implementation of regional integration activities. This was instituted after unsuccessful attempts to mobilise resources through other instru-ments. The Community Levy provides a predictable and autonomous source of financing which has led to significant achievements in the region. However, its application could be in conflict with Ar-ticle 7 of Protocols on Goods unless pro-vision is made in the AfCFTA agreement


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for its stay. The article states that ‘State Parties shall progressively eliminate im-port duties or charges having equivalent effect on goods originating from the territory of any other State Party in ac-cordance with their Schedules of Tariff Concessions…’. So, at the ECOWAS meeting, some member states called for its application to be limited only to countries outside Africa. This was informed by a study conducted by the African Development Bank (AfDB)on the fiscal implications of eliminating the Community levy that suggests that there will be “no life-threat-ening” effects to the region if the levy were abolished since income from the rest of Africa through the levy is estimat-ed at only 4 per cent. That notwithstand-ing many other stakeholders disagreed on the basis that analysis by the AfDB omitted two critical effects-a) the possi-bility of trade creation in Africa that may lead to increased importation from Afri-

ca and reduction of imports from Europe and Asia; and (b) the possibility of Asian and European firms relocating to Africa to take advantage of the liberalised conti-nental market. Following discussions and debates at the experts’ level the Ministers recom-mended that ECOWAS should take ad-vantage of Article 19 of AfCFTA and the discussion of the financing modalities of AfCFTA to make a case for the need to continue the operation of the ECOWAS Community Levy pending the time that alternative modalities can be secured. In furtherance of this, ECOWAS should negotiate for the introduction into the text for the continuation of the ECOWAS Community Levy until an equally effective alternative financing method has been set up by the Region. The challenge would be whether ECOW-AS would succeed with its demands in the broader membership of other African states who are party to the AfCFTA.

Also threats to ECOWAS integra-tion agenda as a Customs Union and AfCFTA came up. Key among them is EPA agreements between some members of ECOWAS and the European Union. Currently, ECOWAS has no regional agreement on the EPAs with the Euro-pean union. However, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire have separate agreements with the EU and the implementation of these agreements would derail the integration agenda as a Customs Union. This could lead to the suspension of the applica-tion of the ECOWAS CET by these two countries as well as the exclusion of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana from the benefits of the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS) and the possible resto-ration of customs barriers and tariffs by the other Member States. In the light of these challenges posed by the EPAs, some stakeholders have called for the renegotiation of the EPAs in the context of the Brexit which


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is enough justification since the politi-cal development within the EU has de-valued whatever value the EPA offered at the time these two countries signed. Some member states also appealed to the EU to show flexibility. Lastly, the speed of the negotia-tions has profound implication on the quality of consultation and the eventu-al outcome of the AfCFTA. Hence, the Africa-wide Multi-stakeholder consulta-tion in Accra, which brought together government officials, trade unions, poli-cy institutions, and parliamentarians rec-ommended, among other things, a pause in the pace of the AfCFTA agenda for stock-taking. According to conclusions drawn from the meeting, the fast-paced negotiations have already led to a num-ber of hasty decisions and incoherencies. The meeting thus called on members states to, before the next stages, pause to take stock and assess the actual measures in place in Africa at the national, regional and continental levels for the AfCFTA to be meaningful for Africa’s structural eco-

nomic transformation. The tight schedule at the region-al levels are due to the schedules of the continental processes. At the 6th Meet-ing of African Union Ministers of Trade (AMOT) which ended in Dakar, Sene-gal, on 4th June, the Ministers called for analytical work to inform the prepara-tion of Schedules of Tariff Concessions for Trade in Goods and to make them available to member states no later than end June 2018. This is to be followed by the preparation of templates for Sched-ules of Tariff Concessions for Trade in Goods and Schedules of Specific Com-mitments on Trade in Services by the end of July 2018. Also, the meeting of the 12th Af-CFTA-negotiation forum was tentatively scheduled to be held in September and it is expected to approve the templates for the operationalization of the AfCFTA. The Schedules of Tariff Concessions for Trade in Goods and Schedules of Spe-cific Commitments on Trade in Services will be submitted to the January 2019

Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government for adoption. This makes it difficult for broad consul-tation with all stakeholders at both the regional and the national level. African Union officials said countries that have signed the agreement will need to submit a schedule of tariffs by December, add-ing that they expect intra-African trade to double over the next four years once tariffs are reduced. Some analysts argue that Africa’s low level of intra-regional trade is one of the reasons for Africa’s enduring poverty and lack of a strong manufacturing base and therefore see AfCFTA as one of the planks in changing the situation. Whilst this may be true if the AfCFTA, has to be meaningful and impactful, it must not be rushed else its implementation may be problematic.

* Sylvester Bagooro is Programme Offi-cer, Political Economy, Third World Net-work-Africa.

ECOWAS leaders at a summit

The Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA), featuring COMESA, the East African Community

and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), was launched on June 10, 2015 in Egypt, to open up a market of 700 million people in the re-gion, with a GDP of over $1.4 trillion. It is expected to come into force in

April next year after at least 14 countries endorse the deal, and will smoothen the path to achieving the African Continen-tal Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) launched early this year. But the slow progress in ratifying the TFTA instruments has brought to the fore the challenges countries face in trying to open up their markets.

At the 20th COMESA Summit in Lusaka, Zambia, it emerged that only Kenya, Uganda and Egypt have endorsed the agreement. It was expected that the Council of Ministers and the Heads of State Sum-mit would put pressure on the remaining countries to ratify the deal. COMESA’s outgoing chairman,


COMEsA grappling with itself: ready to open up to the African Continental Free Trade Area?Only three of 27 members of the Common Market for Eastern Africa (COMESA) bloc have endorsed the tripartite free trade area deal, three years after it was launched, shining the

spotlight on their commitment to opening up the region’s market, writes *Allan Olingo.

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COMESA summit in sesion


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Madagascar President Martial Rajaonari-mampianina, appealed to member coun-tries to prioritise endorsing the agree-ment “so that it may be used as a basis for implementing the African Continen-tal Free Trade Area.” But in their statement at the end of the summit, the heads of state only acknowledged the progress made in pre-paring the instruments for the Digital Free Trade Area (DFTA), such as the Electronic Certificate of Origin. They encouraged the member states that are ready to implement the DFTA to do so on a pilot basis. “The heads of state stressed the im-portance of prioritisation programmes that promote small-scale cross-border trade, taking into account gender em-powerment and poverty eradication, and called for the extension of these pro-grammes to cover both goods and ser-vices,” the statement reads.

Direction In mid-June, the region’s ministers met in Cape Town to give direction on the implementation of both the TFTA and the continental market, where mem-bers set yet a new deadline of April 2019 for countries to complete the ratification process. On tariff negotiations, the min-isters set a new deadline of December 2018. The meeting also adopted the tri-partite agreement on the movement of business people, after outstanding issues were addressed by the chiefs of immigra-tion. “As the tripartite has higher levels of deeper integration, and shorter time-frames in light of the upfront elimina-tion of Customs duties on 60 to 85 per cent of total tariff lines, its implementa-tion should be fast tracked as a building block for the AfCFTA. “So far 49 out of the 55 African countries have signed the AfCFTA deal. Kenya, Ghana, Niger, Rwanda, Chad and eSwatini (formerly Swaziland) have ratified the agreement. However, Rwan-da and eSwatini are yet to ratify the TFTA Agreement. “We appeal to all member states to ratify the Tripartite Agreement so that it enters into force not later than April

2019,” the ministers said in their state-ment.

27 countries At the end of June, only 22 of the 27 countries had signed the TFTA agree-ment, with Botswana being the latest sig-natory in January. The countries that have so far signed the agreement are Angola, Burundi, Bo-tswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, State of Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauri-tius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Su-dan, Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, eSwatini, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Uganda, which has ratified the tri-partite agreement but is yet to deliver it to COMESA, has yet to ratify the Af-CFTA. In June, Kenya’s permanent repre-sentative to COMESA, Sophy Kombe presented the ratification instrument to the chair of the Tripartite Task Force, for-

mer Secretary-General Sindiso Ngwenya. Rwanda, which has been seen as the champion of free markets, is yet to rati-fy the tripartite agreement, despite being among the first AU members to ratify the AfCFTA. When contacted, Rwanda’s Trade and Industry Minister Vincent Munye-shaka referred The East African to Prime Minister Edouard Ngirente, who attend-ed the COMESA summit. “The Prime Minister, as leader of government business, is better placed to provide more information. However, we expedited the AfCFTA agreement and ratification because we believe in continental trade to achieve our target of increasing intra-Africa trade to spear-head integration. It is a big opportuni-ty because Africa is the future,” said Mr Munyeshaka. The East African understands that some countries have taken time to sign the agreement because of some miss-ing legal information, while the reasons given for the lack of ratification is that countries are still aligning some of the annexes with their domestic laws. The first phase of the negotiations, which involved tariff negotiations among member states and regions that do not have preferential arrangements among themselves has taken long, delaying the second phase. For instance, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), comprising Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Af-rica and Swaziland, is still negotiating tariff liberalisation with the EAC and Egypt, and it has yet to start negotiations with individual countries like Djibouti, Sudan and Eritrea. Negotiations between SACU and EAC have two major outstanding areas; automobiles and dairy products. In addition to the tariff negotia-tions, there are efforts towards conclud-ing a protocol on movement of business-persons, which is a side agreement. The member countries have also ad-opted an industrial development frame-work and a plan to co-operate on infra-structure development.

*Allan Olingo is a business journalist from Kenya.

“The first phase of the ne-gotiations, which involved tariff negotiations among

member states and regions that do not have preferen-tial arrangements among

themselves has taken long, delaying the second

phase.”


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3. The three days of discussion situated the AfCFTA and its frame-work agreement in the long standing African aspirations for, and traditions of engagement around, continental integration, and explored the extent to which the AfCFTA takes these forward, as well as the challenges that need to be addressed. The discus-sions were informed by the preliminary conclusions of studies commissioned by TWN-Africa on the implications of the AfCFTA agreement for the sub-regions and economies of Economic Com-munity of West African States (ECOWAS), the East African Com-munity (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). There was additional input from a representative of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). These werecomplementedbycommentsfromgovernmentofficialsfromsome countries in the respective regions, as well as by the per-spectives of private sector groups, trade unions, women’s groups and other civil society organisations. What follows is a summary of these discussions and the conclusions drawn.

4. There is no doubt about the commitment of the African peo-ple to Africa’s economic integration as part of the process of the structural transformation of Africa’s economies for an equitable

development that meets their needs and aspirations. The AfCFTA offers an opportunity to take the agenda of integration forward. However, for this integration agenda to be realised, the terms and conditions offered must be appropriate to the imperatives of the continent’s structural economic transformation. Otherwise, the AfCFTA would instead be a step backwards.

5.Fromthisperspective,thediscussionsreflectedonthecontentof the AfCFTA agreement as adopted, in particular on the provi-sions of the protocols relating to the trade in goods and on trade in services,aswellasontheprocessesadoptedtowardsratificationand implementation of the agreement, including further negotia-tions envisaged for protocols on investment, intellectual property and competition policy.

6. It is the view of the meeting that the overall challenge of the AfCFTA framework agreement lies in the interface between the terms of the protocols already adopted and the other policies and initiatives that already exist and those that need to be put in place to build productive capacities in the domestic economies, and to ensure that domestic producers, traders, workers, farmers, and

Third World Network-Africa hosted an Africa-wide multi-stakeholder consultation on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in Accra, Ghana, from June12-14. The over 40 participants which included officials from national governments, the regional economic communities (RECs), the

Africa Union Commission, private sector operators, trade unions and other labour-related organisations, farmers’ groups, women’s organisations, and non-governmental organisations discussed the agreement adopted by African Heads of State and Government in Kigali, Rwanda on March 21,

2018. Below is a summary of the conclusions reached.

AfCFTA - hasty decisions and incoherences

Panelists at consultation


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otheroperatorswithintheAfrica’seconomiesarethemainbenefi-ciaries and engines of Africa’s transformation. Some of those pol-icies and initiatives already in place include such continent-wide policies such as the African Mining Vision (AMV), the Comprehen-sive African Agriculture Development Programme(CAADP), the Ac-celerated Industrial Development for Africa (AIDA) and the Action Plan to Boosting Inter-African Trade (BIAT) as well other continent wide and regional level policies related to infrastructure such as energy,transport,financeamongothers.

7. In talking about appropriate interface, the meeting was NOT calling for these related policies to be included as part of the terms of the protocols already adopted on trade in goods and services. Instead participants were concerned that the terms of the protocols on goods and of services do not contain the appro-priateflexibilityorspacethatwouldenablethekindsofactionsneeded to be taken in those other related polices. Where such flexibilitiesexist,othertechnicalpoliciesandconditionsaswellascommitments compromise their use. More importantly, the terms of the protocols are more likely to constrain the related policies meant to enable domestic producers and other economic oper-ators,especiallythemorevulnerableandfragiletobenefitfromcontinent wide trade liberalisation. The worry therefore is that, if this is not addressed, the provisions of protocols as they stand are morelikelytoworktothebenefitofthestrongerandmorediversi-fiedeconomiesinAfrica,aswellthestrongereconomicoperators,both African and foreign, in economies across Africa.

8. In thespecificareaof trade ingoods,anumberofconcernswere expressed. Prominent among these is the decision to re-move all tariffs on 90% of imported products, and thereby leav-ing 10% for the protection of sensitive and/or strategic sectors or products. Participants are concerned that this is not adequate to afford the necessary space and support to a wide-range of small-er and medium domestic enterprises as well as those operating in relativelymoredifficultcircumstanceswhichneedspacetodevel-op their capacities to compete against bigger and relatively more endowed operators from other countries. (This is in spite of the cautionary note by some participants that a 10% margin for sen-sitive products may have the effect of not facilitating intra-African tradeasasmallpercentageofexclusioncouldcurbasignificantamount of trade).

9. Furthermore, participants have been aware of the availability of safeguard measures in the protocol on trade in goods. But ex-perience with these safeguard measures, as well the levels of ca-pacity in Africa to apply these safeguard measures, suggest that these are not appropriate to deal with the challenges at stake.

10. In the light of the above, it is important to re-examine the tariff liberalisation threshold, as well as the time for the start of the im-plementation of these tariff concessions, in order to ensure ade-quate space and preparatory time. It is equally important, further-more, that the actual process of exchanging tariff concessions is done with clear focus on how the 10% allowed for sensitive prod-ucts and the exclusion list can be composed so as to yield optimal space and support for the vulnerable and strategic sectors.

11. In this regard, participants are concerned that a number of uncertainties can frustrate this process. One of these relate is whether negotiations of tariff concessions will involve individual countries or the regional economic communities. This uncertainty is of special concern as the RECs are already advanced in having common tariff postures in addition to other advances in their re-gional integration processes. It is the view of the participants the RECs are a better platforms for such detailed negotiations than the individual member countries and should thus assume a more prominent role in these negotiations.

12. Beyond the question of tariffs, there are issues relating to the annexes on Rules of Origin, Standards, and Sanitary and Phy-tosanitary Standards (SPS). In these areas, participants are con-cernedthatthenatureofrulesshouldbeofsuchflexibilityastoprovide for Africa-wide access for African enterprises, but at the same time robust enough to defend against non-African products and enterprises. Thus creativity in formulation of these rules is important as against simply copying rules from other countries and economies.

13. In the light of such a range of complex issues that need to be resolved at national and regional levels for the tariff issues to be addressed in an optimal manner, participants expressed further concern with the short time frame expected for the tariff conces-sions to be carried out, as well as with the limited space for other stakeholders to participate in the process.

14. In relation to trade in services, participants recognise the im-portanceofservicessectorssuchasinfrastructure,finance,ener-gy to Africa’s integration and economic development. At the same time, however, they are of the view that there are other and more sustainable approaches to providing these essential and strategic needs than through liberalisation of trade in these areas, and the attraction of foreign investment.

15. Furthermore, in the areas that have been determined as pri-ority for liberalisation of trade in services, it is not clear whether countries have determined these areas because of the capacity of their own service providers to supply those services competi-tively, or whether this is in expectation of foreign providers to build domestic capacity. Decisions of the Heads of State and Govern-ment of Africa on the Action Plan to BIAT which were pointed out as providing a guide to the rationale for choosing these sectors do not address this ambiguity, especially as those decisions only highlight the importance of those sectors for Africa’s development and do not necessarily imply liberalisation as the only means for meeting these priorities. Thus the ambiguity signals a confusion ofmotives thatneed tobeclarified inorder formore reasonedevidence-based decisions to be taken.

16. Participants are also concerned that due to decades of struc-tural adjustment programmes, and the extensive autonomous liberalisation of services undertaken in many African countries, most of the services sectors of these countries, and especially those selected as priority for action, are dominated by foreign non-African suppliers. This could imply that the further liberali-


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sation of services will serve to spread the dominant positions of these suppliers across Africa, to the likely detriment of domestic and national providers. This is even more likely as the measures contained in the protocols that are meant to ensure the African originsandqualificationofserviceprovidersdoesnotprovideade-quate means, if any, to differentiate on economic grounds service providerswhicharenon-African.ThiscouldfacilitatefinancialandotherresourceoutflowsfromAfricaratherthantheirreinvestmentin African economies.

17. There are also issues of availability of data and basic informa-tiontocomposeanactualprofileoftheservicesector,thetypesofoperators, their interlinkages with strategic sectors of the econo-mies, etc, so as to inform reasoned decision as to what kinds and levels of commitments to make in relation to which sectors.

18. In this regard, participants are again concerned with the short time-lines within which further steps are expected to be undertak-en in relation to the protocol on services. More time is needed for the necessary action at national and regional levels to prepare a meaningful engagement and adoption of optimal measures.

19. A range of cross-cutting issues were also discussed. One of the most prominent relates to special and differential treatment. Participants noted the extent to which the conception of SDT ad-opted have followed in the footstep of the WTO and other global trade-regimes in narrowing the concept away from differential and more favourable treatment developed and applied under UNCTAD prior to the WTO. In that earlier conception, countries with differ-ent capacities adopt different types and levels of obligations and stronger economies undertook to support the weaker ones. By contrast, in the more narrow form as now applied, all countries in spite of their strengths are expected to assume essentially the same obligations and only have different time periods in which to implement them. Participants wondered whether, given the pe-culiarity of African conditions, the former conception is not more appropriate. It was also pointed out that experience shows that extended implementation period alone has not been effective in elevating the status of LDCs to the required level. At the same time, participants are aware that the SDT should not be a tool which ends up creating essentially different tracks for different countries. In this regard, a further concern is how the SDT pro-visions in the AfCFTA can be aligned with those in the RECs for optimumbenefit.

20. Participants drew attention to developments outside Africa such as Brexit, as well as to commitments made by African coun-tries to third parties such as to Europe under the Economic Part-nership Agreements (EPA). As these can serve to complicate and undermine what ever positive elements could be attained under the AfCFTA, it is necessary that the AfCFTA should be an opportu-nity to review these developments and also re-open the EPAs for revision.

21. In addition, participants agreed on the need for a stronger recognition that trade and development policies are gendered in their nature, implications and impacts, in much the same ways as these policies differently affect groups in society in terms of class

and other power-based relations. Therefore all proposed mea-sures and policies must be assessed in terms of their implications for these gender and other power-based social imbalances and the means necessary for addressing them.

22. A number of proposals were explored to address some of these challenges discussed above. Some of these include:

a) the enhanced role for the RECs in the further negotiations in relation to the protocols on goods and services as wells proposed negotiations on other issues; at the same time, national level consultations should be better structured and strengthen for more effective input into the role of the RECs; b) a proper sequencing of the decisions on tariff concessions, and in particular their implementation, with national and regional policies and strategies so as to enable optimum benefittoAfricaneconomiesandtheircitizensinthevarious roles in the economy;(c) the need for proper studies at national and regional levels on the proposed issues and measures to inform negotiations;(d) an audit of the policies in place, especially in the area of servicesaswelltheprofileofserviceproviders,nationaland foreign, African and non-African(e) better recognition for and the inclusion of informal trade in the negotiations;(f) conscious and systematic provision of information to citizens about AfCFTA processes and substance by governments, the RECS and the AUC;(g) the necessity for a structured mechanisms for the systematic and effective participation by all stake-holders, including civil society organisations, the private sector and the RECs in the further processes of the AfCFTA going forward. These mechanisms should operate from national, regional to continental levels, and should make special effort to include the women’s groups, farmers, workers, small and medium enterprises, national and domestic producers and other strategic as well as other more vulnerable socio-economic constituencies.

23. Above all participants recommended there should be a pause in the pace of the AfCFTA agenda for stock-taking. The ambitious pace set by Heads of State and Government who in 2012 instruct-edofficialstoachieveaCFTAbytheindicativedateof2017hasalready produced a number of hasty decisions and incoherencies. Therefore before the next stages, it is important to pause to take stock and assess the actual measures in place in Africa at nation-al, regional and continental levels for the AfCFTA to be meaningful for Africa’s structural economic transformation. There should be a relaxation of the August to September 2018 deadlines for tariff concessions, services offer, and further negotiations on the proto-cols on investment, intellectual property competition policy.

24. The meeting recommended further action in the areas of ad-ditional research and studies, information availability and dissem-ination, networking and capacity building, and to this end com-mitted themselves to working with each other, across nations and with governments and intergovernmental organisation at regional and continental levels.


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I don’t think the (AfCFTA) agenda is overambitious as it seeks to achieve Africa’s progress towards integra-

tion which is long overdue and is only a framework within which the agreements can be negotiated. Africa needs to be ambitious. This is just about trade but it can expedite Africa’s quest for economic integration. Perhaps it is an ambitious project but Africa needs it. The commit-ment at governmental level is impressive and it is possible to achieve it. We need to be aggressive about it. The issue of time has been raised many times but the point is we can focus on that and forget about other critical is-sues. Whether it is fast tracked or done gradually, we will not have a perfect out-come/document. The global, continental and regional dynamics always change and things will change accordingly so we can’t wait for a perfect time. Again as you are aware, at the re-gional level there is the EPA with the EU to grapple with but we think the Af-CFTA should take precedence over the EPA hence the need to have it done first. Which comes first, integration or EPA? Clearly the integration spearheaded by the AfCFTA. If the AfCFTA is not fast tracked, Africa may go in different di-rections and we never get to integrate as an economic bloc. The AfCFTA will be an instrument that will set the tone for how Africa, all 55 countries, deals with the outside world. What we have now is a well thought out agreement.

TimeWe need to be time-sensitive as well,

as things are going on at the global level in a fast tracked manner and we cannot keep waiting. Whether we do it faster or gradually, nothing is going to be perfect. The truth of the matter is there are delays from some member countries. This could be taken care of by sensitization and con-sultation which are key so that key stake-

holders like the private sector, labour unions, parliamentarians etc can have their say and appreciate the process oth-erwise you go one step and take two steps back. So the delays and failure to ratify some of these agreements happen. This is the reason why the AU has embarked on the sentisation and has a well-crafted public information programme, some of which are already happening in various countries. Admittedly, at the regional and national level there is a lot of work to do so we need to coordinate them and make the AfCFTA happen. Let us not however forget that the AU itself is a membership-driven union with issues brought before it by mem-bers. For instance, the ministers of trade have agreed on a work programme. On the part of the AU Commission, they are doing sensitization for the Pan-African Parliament and same thing for the pri-vate sector eg the Afro-Champions Club, the springhead of many African busi-nesses.

Deadlines Deadlines yes but let’s agree that this whole thing started in 2012 and the agreement came only this year. Of course, it was supposed to be signed last year, 2017. We shouldn’t just relax. We have to work with deadlines. Let’s not

forget that Africa’s intra-continental trade is the lowest in the world and this is something we need to work on quickly and the AfCFTA is the right approach. The AfCFTA, is only one of the initia-tives towards Africa’s integration. BIAT, talks about various initiatives and under seven clusters and the AfCFTA is just one, when we bring all the clusters to-gether, it will be a great thing for Afri-ca, so AfCFTA should not be seen as a stand alone. It’s the right thing to do to increase intra-Africa trade.

Challenges The major challenge, however, now is things going on in different directions as countries belong to various RECs, some overlapping and hence poses prob-lems with harmonization. Again, the ability and readiness of countries to use their resources to make something good of this agreement. Individual countries and RECs have a great role to play in all these if we are to make any serious head-way thus navigating these and quickly too, is a major challenge. Productive ca-pacity, is also great challenge in Africa, with most of the economy informal as well. The great dependence on the export of raw materials instead of manufactur-ing is another major drawback. I think also the problem is in the process as we are not giving ourselves sufficient time to cover each subject adequately. Otherwise, the agenda is clear and linked to Agenda 2063. If things are properly done, we will be able to achieve our goals. If we do it in a pressure-cooker manner, it might not achieve what we want. It will be difficult to implement agreements that countries don’t understand. When countries have the same understanding of the issues it will be easier to implement them and achieve our goals. All these challenges notwithstanding, the AfCFTA, will help Africa to industrialise, provide a bigger

Africa cannot waitOn the sidelines of the Africa-wide Multi-stakeholders’ Forum on the AfCFTA, held in Accra,

Ghana, *Million Habte of the African Union Commission and *Ambassador Nelson Ndiragu express their views on the agreement.

Million Habte


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The AfCFTA’s agenda is based on issues that will address Africa’s problems towards integration

and we need to have some agreements in place on each of the subjects to be able to move forward. However, the problem is the process as we are not giving ourselves sufficient time to debate and to be able to cover each subject sufficiently. The agen-da is ok and it is not only linked to Agen-da 2063 but also its flagship. The only challenge is we are doing it in a hurry. We should take time to discuss it, under-stand it so when we have an agreement all of us will be on the same page. If the framework agreement is properly done, we may be able to achieve our goals but if done in a pressure-cooker manner it might not achieve what we want because it will be difficult to implement agree-ments that countries don’t understand. When countries have the same under-standing of the issues it will be easy to implement. Presently, we have the framework agreement in 3 areas, but not the nitty gritty. For example, on trade in goods, there is no agreement on sensitive goods, exclusion list etc and all these can be frustrating. African countries trade in very narrow lines of export now if these are taken as exclusion list by some coun-tries it could block up to 70 percent of intra-African trade. If you take services too we have agreed on the broad sec-tors but within each sector there are sub-sectors, the details of which we have not worked out and if we don’t have all these done and properly too, we are in danger of not achieving the objectives of the AfCFTA. Let’s not forget we have to translate all these into figures and these take time even with goods and services is not going to be any easier. If we get things right, we will be able to stimulate and improve intra-Africa trade which is the whole essence of the AfCFTA. In-deed, BIAT, agrees with African heads of

market for investment and more employ-ment to the teeming unemployed youth of Africa. The AfCFTA is only half-way in the process of where Africa wants to reach. Maybe even less than that because after AfCFTA, there is the Customs Union, monetary union etc and finally an African Economic Community. So it is a process, a phase towards that.

The agendaPresently we have agreed on three ar-

eas. We have not agreed on the nitty-grit-ty, for example in goods, sensitive goods and these can frustrate the objective of this agreement. These details we have not worked out and it could take much lon-ger than we are thinking to reach agree-ment on these issues. Trade-in-goods, we

have dates but not the figures yet. Under services it depends on what we want at subsequent sub-sectors—the whole aim is to stimulate and improve intra-Africa trade and if we can achieve this then we will have arrived.

* Million Habte

agenda. Of course, domestic policies have to change accordingly. Some are hesitant and all that won’t help. It is better they start implementing the agreement and see whether there are problems. If there are problems there are provisions in the agreement that call for remedial mea-sures, review mechanism to mitigate the situation so these are available and can be made use of.

Impact studies the answer? The level of intra-Africa t rade i s so low that I don’t see the fear. We may not even need impact studies. If trade within Africa were more than that with the rest of the world, our fears may be justified but our tariff lines are few, the volumes are very low, and that renders an impact study unnecessary. The loss of revenue etc are really perceptions as we saw in the case of COMESA. When COMESA reached the FTA status, those countries that felt they needed to be compensated did not need or use the funds set aside for it because they realized they did not need it. The reverse was the outcome as they got more revenue from the COME-SA FTA. Based on this any fears maybe misplaced. Perhaps there is need for more sensitization and information flow to al-lay the fears of countries as far as revenue loss etc are concerned given the COME-SA experience. Additionally, we have to stop looking at the short run because what matters is the long run. In the long run, this continent will be better off. In the long run this continent will be en-gaging the rest of the world as one so we will be able to influence global economic decision making. The future is bright for Africa. We only need to get out of the fear syndrome and start implementing the agreement.

* Ambasador Nelson Ndiragu

Ambasador Nelson Ndiragu

state and governments that by 2022 in-tra-Africa trade should double. Current-ly, intra-Africa trade is put between 12-15 percent but it is hoped that by 2022, this could be 30 percent. We just need to be innovative. We said the RECs are the building blocks of the AfCFTA but we did not actively involve them in the negotiations yet at the lower level we had the task force, a task force which did not do its work because it was sidelined. If we want to speed up things we need to revive the task Force which will then engage the RECs to help coordinate and harmonise issues. For example, individual countries have all kinds of agreements with ex-ternal countries and there are Customs Unions within some RECs and all these need to be tackled for a meaningful Af-CFTA to be achieved. Even ratification of the agreement has become problem-atic, in COMESA, it’s only Kenya and Rwanda that have done so, in ECOWAS only Ghana, so already we can see the challenges the RECs face. All these have to be addressed for the RECs to be mov-ing together. If we agree to implement it as it is, it could be the appropriate measure but if some are willing and others are not, it won’t be. You know the taste of the pud-ding is in the eating. Countries have to do something towards the integration


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1. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) will cover a market of 1.2 billion people and a gross domestic product (GDP) of $2.5 trillion, across all 55 member States of the African Union. 3. The population of Africa is projected to reach 2.5 billion by 2050, at which point it will comprise 26 per cent of what is projected to be the world’s working age population, with an economy that is estimated to grow twice as rapidly as that of the developed world. 4. With average tariffs of 6.1 per cent, businesses currently face higher tariffs when they export within Africa than when they export outside it. AfCFTA will progressively eliminate tar-iffs on intra-African trade, making it easier for African businesses to trade within the continent and cater to and benefit from the growing African market.6. The UNECA estimates that AfCFTA has the potential both to boost intra-African trade by 52.3 per cent by eliminating im-port duties, and to double this trade if non-tariff barriers are also reduced.7. Africa’s industrial exports are forecast to benefit most from AfCFTA. This is important for diversifying Africa’s trade and encouraging a move away from extractive commodities, such as oil and minerals, which have traditionally accounted for most of Africa’s exports, towards a more balanced and sustainable export base. 10. Perhaps most importantly, AfCFTA will also produce more jobs for Africa’s bulging youth population. This is because ex-tractive exports, on which Africa’s trade is currently based, are less labour-intensive than the manufactures and agricultural goods that will benefit most from AfCFTA. By promoting more labour-intensive trade, AfCFTA creates more employment.12. While African countries that are relatively more industri-alized are well placed to take advantage of the opportunities for manufactured goods, less-industrialized countries can benefit from linking into regional value chains. Regional value chains involve larger industries sourcing their supplies from smaller in-dustries across borders. AfCFTA makes the formation of regional value chains easier by reducing trade costs and facilitating invest-ment. 13. Agricultural countries can gain from satisfying Africa’s growing food security requirements. The perishable nature of many agricultural food products means that they are particularly

responsive to improvements in customs clearance times and lo-gistics that are expected of AfCFTA. 14. The majority of African countries are classified as resource rich. Tariffs on raw materials are already low and so AfCFTA can do little to further promote these exports. However, by lowering intra-African tariffs on intermediates and final goods, AfCFTA will create additional opportunities for adding value to natural resources and for diversifying into new business areas.18. The Boosting Intra-African Trade (BIAT) Action Plan is the principal accompanying measure for AfCFTA. It outlines the ar-eas in which investments are required, such as trade information and access to finance, to ensure that all African countries can benefit from AfCFTA.19. AfCFTA is a flagship project of Agenda 2063 of the African Union — Africa’s own development vision. It was approved by the African Union Summit as an urgent initiative whose imme-diate implementation would provide quick wins, impact on so-cioeconomic development and enhance confidence and the com-mitment of Africans as the owners and drivers of Agenda 2063.20. What does AfCFTA mean in concrete terms?i. African businesses, traders and consumers will no longer pay tariffs on a large variety of goods that they trade between African countries;ii. Traders constrained by non-tariff barriers, including over-ly burdensome customs procedures or excessive paperwork, will have a mechanism through which to seek the removal of such burdens;iii. Cooperation between customs authorities over product standards and regulations, as well as trade transit and facilitation, will make it easier for goods to flow between Africa’s borders;iv. Through the progressive liberalization of services, service suppliers will have access to the markets of all African countries on terms no less favourable than domestic suppliers;v. Mutual recognition of standards, licensing and certification of service suppliers will make it easier for businesses and individ-uals to satisfy the regulatory requirements of operating in each other’s markets;vi. The easing of trade between African countries will facilitate the establishment of regional value chains in which inputs are sourced from different African countries to add value before ex-porting externally; vii. To protect against unanticipated trade surges, State Parties will have recourse to trade remedies to ensure that domestic in-dustries can be safeguarded, if necessary; viii. A dispute settlement mechanism provides a rule-based av-enue for the resolution of any disputes that may arise between State Parties in the application of the agreement;

Upon conclusion, the “Phase two” negotiations will provide a more conducive environment for recognizing African intellectu-al property rights, facilitating intra-African investment, and ad-dressing anti-competitive challenges.

*Excerpts from a compilation by the African Trade Policy Centre (ATPC) of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in associa-tion with the African Union Commission.

The African Continental Free Trade Area: Facts and FiguresCFTA milestone timelineJune 2015: Negotiations launchedFebruary 2016: First negotiating forum heldMay 2016: Adoption of 12 negotiating guiding principlesFebruary 2017: First meeting of the 7 technical working groupsJuly 2017: Agreement to liberalize 90% of products at the sixth negotiating forumDecember 2017: Agreement on AfCFTA text and protocol on servicesMarch 2018: Final phase 1 negotiating forum convenedEnd 2018: Beginning of phase 2 negotiations


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The colonization of palestine: Rethinking the term ‘Israeli

Occupation’It is often argued that Israel is an Occupier that has violated the rules of Occupation as stated ininternationallaw.Thiswouldhavebeenthecaseayear,twoorfiveyearsaftertheoriginal

Occupation had taken place, but not 51 years later. Since then, the Occupation has turned into long-term colonization, writes *Ramzy Baroud.

June 5, 2018 marked the 51st anni-versary of the Israeli Occupation of East Jerusalem, the West Bank and

Gaza. But, unlike the massive popular mobilization that preceded the anniver-sary of the Nakba – the catastrophic de-struction of Palestine in 1948 – on May

15, the anniversary of the Occupation is hardly generating equal mobilization. The unsurprising death of the ‘peace process’ and the inevitable demise of the ‘two-state solution’ has shifted the focus from ending the Occupation per se, to the larger and more encompassing prob-lem of Israel’s colonialism throughout

Palestine. The grassroots mobilization in Gaza and the West Bank, and among Palestin-ian Bedouin communities in the Naqab Desert are, once more, widening the Pal-estinian people’s sense of national aspira-tions. Thanks to the limited vision of the Palestinian leadership, those aspirations


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have, for decades, been confined to Gaza and West Bank. In some sense, the ‘Israeli Occupa-tion’ is no longer an occupation as per international standards and definitions. It is merely a phase of Zionist coloniza-tion of historic Palestine, a process that began over a 100 years ago, and carries on to this date. “The law of occupation is primari-ly motivated by humanitarian consider-ation; it is solely the facts on the ground that determine its application,” states the International Committee of the Red Cross website. It is for practical purposes that we often utilize the term ‘occupation’ with reference to Israel’s colonization of Pales-tinian land, occupied after June 5, 1967. The term allows for the constant empha-sis on humanitarian rules that are meant to govern Israel’s behavior as the Occu-pying Power. However, Israel has already, and repeatedly, violated most conditions of what constitute an ‘Occupation’ from an international law perspective, as ar-ticulated in the 1907 Hague Regulations (articles 42-56) and the 1949 Fourth Ge-neva Convention. According to these definitions, an ‘Occupation’ is a provisional phase, a temporary situation that is meant to end with the implementation of internation-al law regarding that particular situation. ‘Military occupation’ is not the sovereignty of the Occupier over the Occupied; it cannot include transfer of citizens from the territories of the Occu-pying Power to Occupied land; it cannot include ethnic cleansing; destruction of properties; collective punishment and annexation. It is often argued that Israel is an Occupier that has violated the rules of Occupation as stated in international law. This would have been the case a year, two or five years after the original Occupation had taken place, but not 51 years later. Since then, the Occupation has turned into long-term colonization. An obvious proof is Israel’s annex-ation of Occupied land, including the Syrian Golan Heights and Palestinian

East Jerusalem in 1981. That decision had no regard for international law, hu-manitarian or any other. Israeli politicians have, for years, openly debated the annexation of the West Bank, especially areas that are pop-ulated with illegal Jewish settlements, which are built contrary to international law. Those hundreds of settlements that Israel has been building in the West Bank and East Jerusalem are not meant as tem-porary structures. Dividing the West Bank into three zones, areas A, B and C, each governed according to different political diktats and military roles, have little precedent in international law. Israel argues that, contrary to in-ternational law, it is no longer an Occu-pying Power in Gaza; however, an Israel land, maritime and aerial siege has been imposed on the Strip for over 11 years. With successive Israeli wars that have killed thousands, to a hermetic blockade that has pushed the Palestinian popula-tion to the brink of starvation, Gaza sub-sists in isolation. Gaza is an ‘Occupied Territory’ by name only, without any of the humani-tarian rules applied. In the last 10 weeks alone, over 120 unarmed protesters, journalists and medics were killed and 13,000 wounded, yet the international community and law remain inept, un-able to face or challenge Israeli leaders or to overpower equally cold-hearted Amer-ican vetoes. The Palestinian Occupied Territo-ries have, long ago, crossed the line from being Occupied to being colonized. But there are reasons that we are trapped in old definitions, leading amongst them is American political hegemony over the le-gal and political discourses pertaining to Palestine. One of the main political and legal achievements of the Israeli war – which was carried out with full US support – on several Arab countries in June 1967 is the redefining of the legal and political language on Palestine. Prior to that war, the discussion was mostly dominated by such urgent issues as the ‘Right of Return’ for Palestinian

refugees to go back to their homes and properties in historic Palestine. The June war shifted the balances of power completely, and cemented Amer-ica’s role as Israel’s main backer on the international stage. Several UN Security Council reso-lutions were passed to delegitimize the Israeli Occupation: UNSCR 242, UN-SCR 338 and the less talked about but equally significant UNSCR 497. 242 of 1967 demanded “withdraw-al of Israel armed forces” from the terri-tories it occupied in the June war. 338, which followed the war of 1973, accen-tuated and clarified that demand. Reso-lution 497 of 1981 was a response to Is-rael’s annexation of the Golan Heights. It rendered such a move “null and void and without international and legal affect.” The same applied to the annexation of Jerusalem as to any colonial con-structions or any Israeli attempts aimed at changing the legal status of the West Bank. But Israel is operating with an en-tirely different mindset. Considering that anywhere between 600,000 to 750,000 Israeli Jews now live in the ‘Occupied Territories’, and that the largest settlement of Modi’in Illit houses more than 64,000 Israeli Jews, one has to wonder what form of military occu-pation blue-print Israel is implementing, anyway? Israel is a settler colonial project, which began when the Zionist move-ment aspired to build an exclusive home-land for Jews in Palestine, at the expense of the native inhabitants of that land in the late 19th century. Nothing has changed since. Only facades, legal definitions and political discourses. The truth is that Palestinians continue to suffer the consequences of Zionist colonialism and they will contin-ue to carry that burden until that original sin is boldly confronted and justly reme-died. * Ramzy Baroud is a journalist, author and editor of Palestine Chronicle.

Culled from Third World Network Fea-tures.


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Will rising international concern over a new debt crisis

be matched by action?The number of poor countries facing major debt crises has doubled since 2013, says IMF;

but are remedies robust enough? Asks *Mark Perera.

In March, the IMF turned up the vol-ume on warnings of a new debt crisis in the Global South. In a report look-

ing at macroeconomic developments in 59 of the world’s poorest countries (low-income developing countries or LIDCs), the IMF paints a bleak picture of rising debt risks and what this means

for development spending. Forty per cent of LIDCs are now deemed to be at high risk of or in debt distress, with the most dramatic increas-es in debt vulnerabilities since 2013 gen-erally being seen in Sub-Saharan Africa. Meanwhile, only one in five are consid-ered to be at low risk: the lowest propor-

tion since 2007.

What’s driving the downward debt trend?

Eurodad and other civil society or-ganisations have for several years been highlighting issues that are driving this deterioration in debt indicators, and the


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IMF’s new report echoes many of these concerns. These include falls in commod-ity prices hitting LIDCs reliant on com-modity export earnings; a changed, and increasingly fragmented creditor land-scape, with more commercial lending meaning many impoverished countries are more exposed to market risks; the lack of transparency surrounding lending to LIDCs; and the potential risks to pub-lic finances posed by public-private part-nerships (PPPs) and other, often hidden, state contingent liabilities. (Concerns over PPPs are so great amongst CSOs that more than 150 organisations have launched a manifesto and campaign call-ing for an end to the promotion of PPP contracts.) The report also acknowledges that reducing volumes of aid flows in the form of grant assistance to LIDCs have put added pressures on national budgets. The rise in debt stocks in LIDCs, along with the growing dependence on commercially-priced debt, means the absolute and relative costs of servicing debts are growing. The more money a government has to divert to its cred-itors, the less it has to spend on devel-opment, and the IMF’s report points to this: public investment fell in about 70% of the countries with large fiscal deficits, suggesting debt servicing is absorbing a greater share of public funds. Indeed, Eurodad member Jubilee Debt Cam-paign recently released figures showing developing countries debt payments in-creased by 60% between 2014 and 2017, reaching their highest level since 2004. Meeting the SDGs under such circum-stances is, as the IMF itself recognises, a serious challenge for these countries.

policy incoherence still a major concern

Despite the urgency of its warnings, the shadow of IMF policy incoherence still looms large over the report. The IMF projects that debt lev-els in LIDCs will fall over the coming years, basing this assumption on debtor governments implementing “significant fiscal consolidation” – i.e. austerity mea-sures. In fairness, the report acknowledg-es that in reality this optimistic outlook is unlikely. Moreover, it states that without any debt relief or restructuring, signifi-

cant reductions in debt stocks are rare. IMF data identifies only seven such cases since 2000, and in only one of these – Nepal – did fiscal consolation apparently play an “important contribution to debt reduction.” In light of this, one would imag-ine that the Fund has concluded that it should adopt a new approach in its pol-icy advice on debt management. Sadly, however, fiscal consolidation appears to remain a key tenet of its proposed solu-tions to current LIDC debt vulnerabili-ties. In view of the findings it describes, and coupled with the ever-expanding body of evidence of the negative impact that austerity is having on human rights, why does the IMF resort to prescribing more of the same? It seems neither the economic argument, nor the legal argu-ment in defence of austerity, are particu-

larly strong. This incoherence extends to the re-port’s consideration of PPPs. The fiscal risks and paucity of data associated with these sorts of investments are starkly laid out: the volume of PPPs in LIDCs has increased rapidly in recent years, and they are seldom well captured or consid-ered in debt sustainability assessments. The report goes on to note that “for a handful of countries with relatively large PPP capital stocks, the estimated fiscal impact of [projects falling into trouble] would exceed 10% of GDP.” Yet despite all of this, the IMF seems still to proselytize for infrastruc-ture investment through PPPs, albeit with the caveat that only projects with “credibly high economic rates of return” should be financed. The proposed buffer to the negative fiscal impact from PPPs is “skilled negotiation and rigorous risk assessment.” The impression remains that the priorities of investors are being placed above the development effective-ness of such investments, and that in-sufficient consideration is being given to safeguarding effectively the burden of fis-cal risk that LIDCs may be taking on via PPPs. Thorough cost-benefits analyses and fiscal risks assessments before every project is approved are now more needed than ever.

Time for a rethink on solutions Beyond the mixed signals, there are some signs that the Fund is beginning to look seriously at systemic, multilateral steps to prevent and resolve debt crises. Motivated by the changing nature of the creditor landscape, and the diminishing importance of traditional lenders such as Paris Club nations (22 rich countries that have for decades been the largest bilater-al sovereign creditors), the Fund is call-ing for across-the-board efforts towards more responsible sovereign financing, including thorough steps to increase the availability of information on the terms, amounts, and conditions of debt. Here, the IMF points to better due-diligence by lenders and encourages endorsement of the G20 Operational Guidelines on Sustainable Financing. While the general thrust of the IMF’s appeals is welcome, the report fails to acknowledge work

“In light of this, one would imagine that the Fund has concluded that it should

adopt a new approach in its policy advice on debt

management. Sadly, how-ever, fiscal consolidation appears to remain a key

tenet of its proposed solu-tions to current LIDC debt vulnerabilities. In view of the findings it describes,

and coupled with the ever-expanding body of evidence of the negative impact that austerity is

having on human rights, why does the IMF resort

to prescribing more of the same?”


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done within the UN system to push this agenda forward, including the UNCT-AD principles on responsible sovereign lending and borrowing, which take other dimensions into account, such as giving more attention to development concerns than the G20 guidelines. Significantly, however, the report also underlines the increasing challenge that this landscape poses to the timely, orderly and fair resolution of debt crises, and urges lenders to develop modalities for debt restructuring operations – call-ing for “prior agreement among official creditors on the general ‘rules of the game.’” The Executive Board assessment of the report goes further than the staff authors and explicitly calls for “concerted efforts from the multilateral communi-ty,” expressing support for an “improved framework for debt restructuring in cases where debt burdens have become un-sustainable.” A few Executive Directors also flag the possibility of a new wave of multilateral debt relief. While, again, existing UN work on the framework for such a multilateral debt restructuring mechanism is not overtly referenced, the

Executive Board assessment does send a positive political signal. So-called “rules of the game” have to be developed, and

importantly, this has to be done via a genuinely multilateral exercise, to ensure the interests of debtor nations are ade-quately defended.

Carpe diem As Einstein famously didn’t say, “in-sanity is doing the same thing over and over again, and expecting different re-sults.” The IMF’s diagnosis of the current health of LIDCs’ debt is timely and un-ambiguous. What it must now do is heed its own warnings, and secure multilateral solutions rather than continue to pre-scribe ineffective medicine in the form of austerity and risky PPP investments. This report contains welcome calls to address once and for all the absence of a com-prehensive and fair regime for handling sovereign debt restructuring. Govern-ments must now act, and follow this up by restarting international discussions on a debt workout mechanism.

* Mark Perera is Senior Networking and Advocacy Officer at Eurodad. The above article is reproduced from Eurodad.org 26 March, 2018.

The IMF’s diagnosis of the current health of LIDCs’ debt is timely and unambiguous. What it must now do is heed

its own warnings, and se-cure multilateral solutions

rather than continue to pre-scribe ineffective medicine in the form of austerity and risky PPP investments. This

report contains welcome calls to address once and

for all the absence of a com-prehensive and fair regime for handling sovereign debt

restructuring.

The World Bank’s Jim Yong Kim with IMF’s Christine Lagarde


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What’s different about Trump’s tariffs?

At Davos in January, US President Donald Trump warned that the US “will no longer turn a blind eye to unfair economic practices” of others, interpreted by many as declaring world trade

war, writes *Jomo Kwame Sundaram.

Before the US mid-term elections in November, Washington is ex-pected to focus on others’ alleged

“massive intellectual property theft, in-dustrial subsidies and pervasive state-led economic planning,” pointing to China without always naming names. With the Republican Party already united behind his tax bill, Trump senses an opportunity to finally unite the party behind him and to continue his campaign for re-election in 2020. Since January, Trump has taken steps threatened in his mid-2016 election

economic policy document, drafted by US’s National Trade Council head Peter Navarro and Commerce Secretary Wil-bur Ross. In particular, he has imposed tariffs and other restrictions on imports to revive US manufacturing. Import tar-iffs of 25% and 10% on steel and alu-minium respectively have been imposed by invoking Section 232 of the US 1962 Trade Expansion Act, allowing unilateral measures to protect domestic industries for “national defence” and “national se-curity”. Trump’s action was supported by a

US Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security report, released earlier. It made the case for imposing im-port tariffs on both metals for national security reasons as “national security can be interpreted more broadly to include the general security and welfare of certain industries, beyond those necessary to sat-isfy national defense requirements….”

Trade war memories After his announcement, several major trading countries and blocs retal-iated or threatened to retaliate against US

First families of China and US in happier times


INTERNATIONAL

imports, raising the prospect of a trade war. The resurgence of US trade protec-tionism poses two threats. The US has a long history of using “anti-dumping measures,” especially on steel. Earlier, imports of washing machines and solar panels were restricted by Trump after the US International Trade Commission de-clared that they unfairly hurt domestic manufacturers. The US President has also threat-ened to impose “reciprocal taxes” against countries imposing tariffs on US exports. This threat has invoked references to the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. Its Re-publican sponsors, Senator Reed Smoot and Congressman Walter Hawley, then argued that it would protect US jobs by shielding American industries from im-port competition by imposing tariffs on over 20,000 imported goods. This aggressive protectionism then precipitated the collapse of global trade, as its trade partners then restricted US export access into their own markets. The ensuing trade war undoubtedly ex-acerbated the Great Depression. Recent developments have understandably re-vived fears of a new trade war, with simi-lar consequences.

Undermining trade multilateralism The US’s unilateral actions have seriously challenged the multilateral framework of World Trade Organization (WTO) trade rules. The Trump adminis-tration has been challenging post-Bretton Woods rules-based trade multilateralism, which sought to develop international trade regulation. Besides many rhetor-ical attacks on the multilateral trading system, the Trump administration has largely avoided engaging with the WTO while also avoiding violating the letter of existing trade agreements. Undermining the WTO and its rules is hardly new for the Trump ad-ministration, but what is rarely acknowl-edged is that it also represents continuity with previous presidents including his arch-nemesis, Obama’s. Both administra-tions have blocked appointing WTO Ap-pellate Body (AB) members, effectively undermining the WTO’s dispute settle-ment process. The AB should have seven members, but will soon only have three

members left, undermining its function-ing. Aggrieved WTO members wishing to challenge alleged violations of its rules have no redress without a functioning AB. Advocates of international trade liberalization have long claimed that it boosts growth and makes everyone bet-ter off in the long run, although many acknowledge shorter term casualties in “uncompetitive” economic activities. With successful political mobilization around growing doubts over such claims, these claims have lost credibility, feeding the tide of ethno-populist-nationalism in the West. Freer trade has widely distributed benefits in terms of lower consumer pric-es while seemingly concentrating costs on displaced producers. Conversely, tar-iffs meant to protect particular industries have concentrated benefits while widely distributing costs. Thus, even without considering the consequences of retal-iatory trade measures by others, some (e.g., US steel) jobs may be saved while consumers pay more for “downstream” products, threatening related jobs down-stream. Consumers, however, are unlike-ly to act politically because they have to pay a little more for some goods, whereas workers are more likely to be mobilized if their livelihoods are threatened by for-eign import competition.

Is Trump all that different? Trump has long complained about US and foreign trade policies. He seems to believe that trade is a zero-sum game in which the goal is to export more and to eliminate the US trade deficit. Import-ing from another country implies that country has “won” and the United States has “lost”. Thus, his version of US “sov-ereigntism” links trade to national pride. Thus, he accuses others, especially Chi-na, of “laughing at us.” As trade issues are about US jobs, pride and dignity, costs or losses become “a small price to pay”. Thus, imposing tariffs will show foreign-ers that the US is strong, and cannot be taken advantage of. With this logic, “winning” may involve losing although the tariffs will benefit relatively few workers in protect-ed industries at the expense of the vast

majority of other workers in downstream industries and consumers. But long-standing economic imbalances and in-equities are unlikely to be well addressed by protecting a few politically influential industries. For half a century, the US has gone back and forth with trade liberalization, often coming dangerously close to trade warfare. President Ronald Reagan’s 1980s protectionism is rarely acknowledged as he is now the paragon of US economic neoliberalism. (Current US Trade Rep-resentative Robert Lighthizer earned his reputation in Reagan’s administration.) His trade restrictions used loopholes in trade agreements to raise tariffs and limit many imports besides forcing political al-lies to accept “voluntary restraints”. Dani Rodrik has argued that Reagan’s protec-tionism “let off political steam”, enabling the US economy to recover and global-ization to accelerate. International economic liberaliza-tion or globalization since Reagan has also transformed the international con-text and the consequences of Trump’s recent measures. Unlike Reagan who arm-twisted political allies to accept his demands as necessary concessions during the Cold War, Trump’s “US sovereign-tism” is based on “victimhood,” invoking the image of an ex-hegemon, and makes no pretensions of being mutually advan-tageous or reciprocal. Yet, prematurely “crying wolf” about trade war may also accelerate trade war momentum as it remains unclear how international policy is made and changed in Trump’s White House. While possibly ominous of much more to come, premature, exaggerated criticism of his unilateral trade measures may be-come “self-fulfilling,” given the political need for continued ethno-populist and nationalist mobilization against enemies, real or imagined.

*Jomo Kwame Sundaram is a prominent Malaysian economist, Visiting Senior Fel-low at Khazanah Research Institute, Visit-ing Fellow at the Initiative for Policy Dia-logue, Columbia University, and Adjunct Professor at the International Islamic Uni-versity, Malaysia.


WOMEN

Women miners stake a claim in Zimbabwe

Women in Zimbabwe are not about to be left out of the artisanal and small scale mining sector writes *Sally Nyakanyanga.

Tapiwa Moyo, 40, religiously leaves her home each day when the first cock crows and joins a

throng of women who have taken up ar-tisanal mining in her community. Moyo spends the better part of her day tramping to and fro, carrying sacks on her back packed with river sand that she sifts through in hope of finding flecks of gold. Working with their limbs in muddy water up to the knees, the wom-en see small-scale mining as a path to im-

prove their livelihoods and bolster scanty family incomes. “As an unemployed single mother, I’m left with no choice but to find means to fend for my five children who are of school-going age. I have no one to cover my back, as such I joined other wom-en in artisanal mining for a living,” says Moyo. Mining in Zimbabwe has been large-ly a men’s affair, but women are slowly making inroads in the sector. Despite the

rudimentary methods still used in artis-anal mining, women are now wielding picks and shovels alongside men as they scavenge for valuable minerals. But Dorcas Makaza-Kanyimo, the acting director for Women and Law in Southern Africa (WLSA), Zimbabwe, says more must be done to pave the way for real gender equality in the sector. “There is need for reduction of costs of mining claims, provision of suitable loan facilities for women to be able to


WOMEN

access capital to start mining thereby enabling them to purchase the needed mechanized equipment for their mining operations,” Makaza-Kanyimo told IPS. Women comprise 11-15 percent of the estimated 50,000 small-scalers min-ers in the country. A 2017 report entitled Women’s Economic Empowerment in SSB – Recommendations for the Mining Sector, reveals that though the mining sector remains a key driver to economic growth and transformation in Sub-Saha-ran Africa, rarely has it delivered benefits in reducing poverty and improving liveli-hoods for the majority of the population. “Women in particular have strug-gled to avail themselves of the benefits and opportunities of large-scale mining operations and often disproportionately suffer from the negative impacts of the industry,” the study says. Dorcas Makaza-Kanyimo agrees. “The Ministry of Mines should run pro-grams that promote women in mining in terms of allocating machines, and allow women to access these loans with min-imum requirements in terms of collat-eral as women don’t have the collateral required by banks,” she told IPS. WLSA Zimbabwe provides educa-tion and outreach to ensure women in the extractives industry understand the legal framework. “We have been supporting these women on how one can get a legal min-ing claim, as we know most women are mining illegally as artisanal miners and operating in an unregulated environ-ment. This makes women vulnerable as a lot of things happen in that environ-ment – women can experience violence, rape, be elbowed out by men and cheated by gold buyers when they try to sell their gold,” says Makaza-Kanyimo. Currently, Zimbabwe is still gov-erned by the 1961 Mines and Mineral Act, which was enacted during the co-lonial era. Calls are now mounting to ensure the new mining statutes are more gender responsive. The country is going through a re-form process called the Mines and Min-eral Bill, which is now in parliament and was up for its second reading on March 12. However, groups such as WLSA Zimbabwe say it should explicitly pro-

vide for women to get an equal share of mining claims. “As women miners, we need a friendly environment, particularly revis-ing the costs of owning a mining claim. We are unable to own these mining claims because we don’t have the means – that’s why you find many women in [un-regulated] artisanal mining,” says Moyo.As the world celebrated Internation-al Women’s Day under the theme “The Time is Now – Rural and Urban Activ-ists Transforming Women’s Lives,” gen-der-responsive policies for women in the extractives industry could play an im-portant role in their economic empower-ment and development. In Africa, where most countries are endowed with rich mineral resourc-es, women remain largely impoverished and their participation in the extractives sector is marginal. Though no countries have a fully gender-balanced approach, South Africa has been praised as a pro-gressive example – and one Zimbabwe should examine as it creates its own com-prehensive policy. “Issues of gender are very much included in the South Africa mining charter, although they still have their challenges on implementation of certain aspects in terms of their mining law, but they have made great strides in terms of achieving gender equality,” Maka-za-Kanyimo added. The majority of women engage in

small-scale artisanal mining, and WLSA Zimbabwe notes that South Africa’s law provides for mining syndicates and consortiums so groups can buy mining claims together. As such, women miners like the Mtandazo Women Miners Association in Gwanda, Matebeleland North have recorded some success stories. Sithembile Ndhlovu, the founder, has since bought three mining claims of her own. These women have also been encouraging each other by forming savings and loan groups in order to raise money to buy mining claims. “I was seeing them (men) manag-ing to drive their own cars and feeding their families. I was going to work every day, but could see that the money was not sustaining me and my family,” says Ndhlovu. The Mtandazo Women Miners As-sociation is made up of 32 small-scale miners and its members have received training on the fundamentals of mining from the Zimbabwe School of Mines. Women miners are strongly encouraged to register and regularise their mining operations, which enables them to have access to loans and possibly equipment that opens up new opportunities. “As a country, it’s imperative that we have a mining policy that is responsive to women’s needs in the sector. We should stand in solidarity with women who are organizing against destructive extractiv-ism. Women have realized that they are mostly impacted in the extractive indus-try,” Makaza-Kanyimo added. Tapuwa O’bren Nhachi, research coordinator at the Center for Natural Resource Governance (CNRG), says the Mines and Minerals Bill needs to recog-nize artisanal mining as an activity which contributes to the economy. “We need to decriminalize it so women can operate in a free environ-ment without being harassed,” Nhachi told IPS. Nhachi added his organization has since trained 27 women artisanal miners who are now operating in syndicates and have their own claims.

*Sally Nyakanyanga wrote this for the IPS.

“As women miners, we need a friendly environment, par-ticularly revising the costs of owning a mining claim.

We are unable to own these mining claims because we

don’t have the means – that’s why you find many women in [unregulated]

artisanal mining,”


POLITICS

Bitterness and pessimism persist in Cote d’Ivoire

Some 3,000 people were killed in post-election violence after Laurent Gbagbo, in power since 2000, re-

fused to concede defeat to Alassane Ouat-tara in the December 2010 presidential election. Ouattara, who had headed a rebellion that controlled the north of the country since 2002, has been the coun-try’s head of state since April 2011. A final cluster of verdicts, delivered mid-January, brought to 588 the total years of jail terms handed down to peo-ple implicated in the unrest. Yet all the convictions have involved people in the Gbagbo camp. They include former first lady Sim-one Gbagbo – jailed in 2015 for 20 years for attacks against the state, insurrection, and undermining public order – and Gbagbo himself, found guilty of looting the Central Bank of West African States and several commercial banks in 2010. Gbagbo was tried in absentia. Since his April 2011 arrest by French forces, he has been detained by the International Criminal Court in The Hague on charges of crimes against humanity. For the loot-ing, the former president and three for-mer ministers were sentenced last month to 20 years in jail and ordered to pay some 329 billion CFA francs (about $660 million) in damages and interest. In a country still bitterly divided on the political front and prone to sporad-ic army mutinies as well as outbreaks of violence, perceptions of one-sided courts serve as an unwelcome destabilising fac-tor, analysts and observers say. “From the moment we had selective justice after the post-election crisis, the entire process towards real peace in Côte d’Ivoire was flawed,” said Aboudramane Bamba, a political analyst who teaches

law at a private university in Abidjan. “Judges have been endlessly convict-ing to keep the government happy. But they haven’t realised that they have dis-tanced the country from reconciliation by pushing it further into uncertainty, which could reignite the same problems

we’ve had in the past,” he warned. Accusations of wrongdoing go both ways. In the wake of the 2010-11 violence, the National Commission of Inquiry said Ouattara’s forces had been responsible for 727 deaths and that Gbagbo’s troops

Bringing war criminals to justice is a cornerstone for building reconciliation and stability in countriesemergingfromarmedconflicts.ButinCôted’Ivoire,sixyearsoftrialsinvolving83

suspects have left many people bitter and pessimistic, just as the country starts to gear up for pivotal 2020 elections, writes *Alex Adele.

Gbagbo and Ouattara in happier times


POLITICS

had killed 1,452 people. International human rights groups and the UN put the death toll much higher. In a single day in late March 2011, Ouattara’s forces allegedly massa-cred 800 civilians in the western town of Duékoué. Around the same time, they also executed Gbagbo supporters in Yopougon, a district of Abidjan.

same old bitterness Simone Gbagbo’s March 2017 acquittal on further charges of crimes against humanity – two years after her earlier conviction and sentencing – is seen as a missed opportunity for Presi-dent Ouattara to have made a powerful gesture by releasing all political prison-ers. “He did not seize the moment,” said Bamba. “Since then, it’s been the same old bitterness among Ivorians.” Danielle Boni-Claverie, who heads the opposition Union Républicaine pour la Démocratie party, echoed these con-cerns: “Seven years after Mr Ouattara came to power, the two camps are still facing off in this country… whereas there should only be one camp: reconciled Ivo-rians,” she said at a news conference in early January.

“It’s proof that reconciliation has not been effective until now. The govern-ment has not shown itself willing to find sincere and calming solutions so that a climate of confidence takes root among Ivorians.”

promotion, not prosecution Touré Mamadou, spokesman and deputy secretary-general of the ruling Rassemblement des Républicains party, told IRIN that Ouattara had worked hard to foster “reconciliation and dia-logue with the opposition”, and called for justice to be allowed to take its natu-ral course. “There is a process of normalisation, and the courts are doing their job,” he said. “They should be left to do so in to-tal independence.” But this is not how things are viewed by the other side. In the run-up to the 2015 presiden-tial election, the opposition’s hopes for some judicial balance were raised when four former commanders of pro-Ouat-tara forces now serving in the army were charged with atrocities and war crimes. They included Losséni Fofana, who is alleged to have led the notorious March 2011 attack on Duékoué. Not only did the case never go to

trial, but in December 2017 the four were promoted to senior army ranks and given important command posts. “It’s an attitude that threatens the rule of law,” Israël Yoroba, who heads Action Pour la Protection et la Défense des Droits de l’Homme, a human rights NGO, told IRIN. “The judicial system is an important part of the reconcilia-tion process. But again we are wondering why it is not taking the trouble to do its work.” Losing faith in the courts, some Ivorians are also growing increasingly frustrated with a civil society they feel has become largely impotent after losing several senior figures to government jobs. “Seeing that the opposition has giv-en up, our civil society could have stood up to the government to demand equi-table justice or at least call for a general amnesty. Unfortunately, it is silent and cannot mount any kind of fight,” said Timothée Trazié, a civil servant. “We don’t have an independent justice sys-tem; we don’t have a credible opposition; and we don’t have a strong civil society. Two years ahead of the next presidential election, we’re up against a brick wall.”

*Alex Adele is a journalist based in Abi-djan, Cote D’Ivoire.

Gbagbo and Ouattara in happier times


POLITICS

The Ituri debacle

The roots of the violence are framed in media reports as eth-nic, but analysts and local ob-

servers say powerful political and com-mercial interests are what is really driving and exploiting the inter-communal ten-sions. Between 1999 and 2004, some 50,000 people, mostly civilians, were killed in Ituri in fighting between differ-ent communities, sometimes backed by Uganda and Rwanda. After more than a decade of relative peace, violence flared again in December and resumed in Feb-ruary on an even larger scale. More than 300,000 people have been displaced and thousands of homes torched in at least 70 villages, according to ACAPS, an in-dependent humanitarian information service. While there is little direct evidence, experts, Ituri residents, and the powerful Catholic clergy have all suggested that unseen forces are driving the violence.

Jason Stearns of the Congo Research Group, noted that inter-communal ten-sions had been “relatively well managed” since 2007. Marcel-Heritier Kapitene, a former opposition activist who lives in exile in Belgium, where he works as a research-er on Congolese politics and mineral extraction at GRIP, a peace and security institute, warned that if competition over natural resources is the key underlying factor, as he fears, then the situation is likely to deteriorate. “It could spread to other areas with a heavy human toll,” Kapitene said. “If a tribal militia allied itself to such and such Congolese or foreign armed group to try to have a certain dominance of minerals, gold, and above all timber, there is reason to fear the consequences could be much more severe.” He added that, in Ituri: “People are dying; not because they are of one eth-nicity or another, but because they share

the same land with minerals.”

Unfinished peace According to Thierry Vircoulon, an analyst with the International Crisis Group, many of Congo’s recent flare-ups, Ituri’s included, are fuelled by politics, often at multiple levels. “Their immediate causes are local conflicts that have never been complete-ly extinguished and which have been fanned by a national dynamic,” he said, noting an intense power struggle for ad-ministrative control in Ituri. Vircoulon said the locations, per-petrators, and targets of the current vio-lence in Ituri were similar to those at the start of the 1999-2004 fighting. He not-ed a sense of “déjà vu” and suggested the roots of the previous conflict had never been properly addressed. “It was neutralised by the joint ac-tion of international forces and the Inter-national Criminal Court, before which

A recent wave of targeted attacks has left a trail of death, destruction, and mass displacement in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s northeastern province of Ituri. Reports by *Fiston

Mahamba and Claude Sengenya.

Congolese refugees hit the road


POLITICS

several militia leaders were tried,” he said, referring to Operation Artemis, a French military mission briefly deployed in Ituri in 2002 under an EU banner. For Nicaise Kibel’Bel Oka, director of the Eastern Congo Centre for Geopo-litical Study and Research, chief among those unresolved issues are long-running land disputes between the predominant-ly agricultural Lendu and the cattle-rear-ing Hema. Through Artemis and the ICC trials, “the international community thought it had restored stability to Ituri,” he said. “Sadly not.” “The little peace that reigned for the last 10 years was only ephemeral. It’s what we call a graveyard peace, un-sustainable. It wasn’t enough to stop the resumption of violence, given that mem-bers of the two communities never hand-ed over weapons they can still use at any time, and that the land disputes between them are still in place.”

Who is killing whom, and where Lieutenant Jules Ngongo, the army’s spokesman in Ituri, said that youths from Lendu villages have been attacking and torching Hema villages and, more re-cently, targeting army positions. The violence has been concentrated in Ituri’s Djugu Territory, which lies to the north of the provincial capital, Bunia. The neighbouring territories of Mahagi and Irumu have also been affected. The attackers have given no reasons for their actions, and no rebel leader from the dozens of armed groups operating in eastern Congo has expressed common cause with them. “The security and intelligence ser-vices are trying to find out if this is an organised movement, who its leader is, or whether it is a movement of armed ban-dits,” Ngongo said. He explained that the attacks were mostly carried out with knives, arrows, and machetes rather than firearms, but said the assailants had taken some guns from the army posts they raided. Jean-Bosco Lalu, a civil society lead-er in Ituri, said he hoped further light would be shed on the perpetrators and their motives when the 40-odd people who had been arrested in connection

with the attacks appear in court. So far, the police have yet to release the identities of those detained. “Here in Ituri, there is nothing like an ethnic or inter-ethnic war,” local bish-op Dieudonné Uringi told Radio France Internationale in mid-March. The fact the attackers had communication equip-ment, money, and were well organised suggested that “invisible hands” were manipulating them, he said. After a meeting in late February, bishops and archbishops from the region issued a statement warning of powerful forces trying “to pit ethnic communities against each other [that] seems destined to empty these areas of their inhabitants for unknown interests.”

The view of the refugees Across the border in Uganda, among the 50,000 residents of Ituri who have fled, giving up their homes and their live-lihoods, there are strong opinions about who or what is responsible. “It’s all about oil and elections,” said an Ituri politician and businessman now staying in a refugee settlement. “All these people you see here come from the areas which are full of oil de-posits,” said the man, who asked not to be identified by name. “The government of [President Joseph] Kabila is using the Lendu to hoodwink the international community that the conflict is a result of past differences between the two com-munities,” he said. Major international oil firms are financing the conflict, he added, but he offered no evidence. “They think relocating and compen-sating these people from the prospecting oil areas to allow their exploration will cost them a lot of money,” he said. “So it’s easier to start violence, kill and chase away the Hema instead of incurring costs.” “People are dying; not because they are of one ethnicity or another, but be-cause they share the same land with min-erals.” Even if there may be a causal con-nection between oil and violence in Ituri, there is no evidence that the oil compa-nies are instigating the bloodshed. The potential link between oil and violence was noted in a 2013 risk assessment commissioned by French oil giant To-

tal, which last month had its exploration rights in Ituri extended. “Should one community or group feel excluded or perceive that the benefits of labour, social projects and/or compen-sation are inequitably distributed, it is likely to create resentment among other communities or groups, and to increase existing divisions and tensions,” warned the assessment. Conflicts could wors-en “when compensation is due on land whose ownership is under dispute,” it said, pointing to evidence that even at the time of the report’s writing conflicts over land were “resurging partly because people hope to benefit from oil.” Another not necessarily competing theory is that Kabila has a hand in the unrest as he seeks to use it to justify de-laying elections and remaining in power – his mandate expired in December 2017 and polls are now scheduled for this De-cember. “Kabila is ordering the Lendu to cause havoc so that elections don’t take place in DRC,” said Phoebe Dz’venga, a farmer and mother of five who is also among the Ituri residents who fled to Uganda. “When there is war, no elec-tions can be organised.” Kapitene, the researcher and for-mer opposition activist, said politics was also spurring violence in other parts of Congo, such as Kasai, northern Katanga, and parts of the Kivu. In all these places “Congolese politicians will look for all kinds of ways to derail the electoral pro-cess, or postpone it indefinitely,” he said. “Ituri’s proximity to South Sudan and several uncontrolled parts of the Kivu mean it is affected by the prolifera-tion of light arms,” he noted. “For those who fish in the troubled waters of Con-golese politics, it is unfortunately a god-send.” Among those echoing this analysis was Xavier Macky, who heads Justice Plus, an NGO based in Bunia. Ituri is an ideal choice of location for political troublemakers “because they know that peace is still fragile there and they think it’s easier to manipulate the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups who are still travelling the hard road of reconcili-ation,” he told IRIN.

* Fiston Mahamba and Claude Sengenya, are both freelance journalists.


RIGHTS

selling birthrightsIn Africa, the outright dispossession of a people of their inheritance and livelihood through bu-reaucraticfiatsandhandingthemovertocorporateinterestshasnotabatedasthepoorfisher-

folks of a community in Uganda woke up to the crude reality, writes *Mary Serumaga.

The fishermen of Kabarole Dis-trict appear to have blown the whistle on an audacious act of

bio-piracy. They brought to the attention of the authorities that they were being barred from access to the 53 crater lakes that they have fished in from time im-memorial. In law this is known as a cus-tomary right. It cannot be extinguished simply by putting up barbed wire or waving guns about. But that is just what the District Fisheries Officer of Kabarole tried to do when he leased all 20 lakes to

Ferdsult Engineering Services who then proceeded to “re-stock” some lakes and claim ownership of all of them. A solution seems to have been reached under which the local commu-nities will form an association and col-lect money among themselves to do their own re-stocking (as they have done in the past) without the help of vampire-in-vestors. The Uganda Consortium on Corporate Accountability is tweeting the process as it unfolds. While the people of Kabarole may

be focused on their fishing rights, it is possible, in fact likely, that they have been robbed of a lot more. The tourism potential of the crater lakes needs no ex-planation. Then there are potential bio-logical assets. A lot can be learned from the Lake Bongoria saga in Kenya. Lake Bongoria in the Kenyan arm of the Rift Valley is a habitat to the type of organism known as an extremophile. Extremophiles can withstand extreme heat, cold (as in the Arctic), saltiness and acidity, as in Lake Bongoria. As such they

Fishing in Ugandan waters

can be put to industrial use. The Bongo-rian variety was found to be useful as an agent in detergents where, withstanding hot water, it devours vegetable and ani-mal stains during laundry. They are also used to soften and “stone-wash” denim to produce the type that differs from the stiff hard to wash denim of the 70s. Scientists from Genencor Interna-tional BV, a Dutch company, discovered extremophiles and their potential uses. Without the knowledge of most Kenyans they set up camp at Lake Bongoria and spent six months harvesting extremo-philes. Returning to Europe, they cloned them and sold them to Proctor & Gam-ble, the detergent manufacturers. The Kenya Wildlife Services pursued them in court for a share in the hundreds of mil-lions of dollars they have earned. Selection of development projects in Uganda depends on whatever a pass-ing entrepreneur suggests. As in colonial times when colonialists bought up large tracts of land, drove off the locals and sat on them as a future investment, so Ugan-dan elites acquire rights in national assets and hawk them to speculators who pay the individual public officials and not the state. To tire of restating this fact would be a failure in patriotism. Having been divested of State enter-

prises and borrowed more money than the State can reasonably be expected to repay, Uganda remains only with her bio-diversity and natural resources. It is no accident that it is these that are cur-rently in the news as a source of contro-versy; illegal sand-mining, illegal timber harvesting from and sale of parts of for-est reserves, illegal collection of loam soil from forests, the shooting of elephants from helicopters, and now the sale of lakes. The sale of lakes was mentioned in Parliament for the first time in 2012 when Lulume Bayiga, Member of Par-liament, raised it and the Speaker or-dered an investigation. His constituents, fishermen from Damba, Taave, Kimmi, Mbivu, Bulago and Sowe islands had complained to him of being driven out of the area by an investor and their fish-ing gear confiscated. Prior to that, during the 2011 elec-tion cycle, opposition party leader Kizza Besigye was threatened with arrest for “telling lies” by the incumbent presiden-tial candidate when Besigye informed the public that clandestine transfers of pub-lic goods were taking place. It is a mark of our collective apathy that these allegations were not followed up so that the sale of the Kabarole Crater

Lakes now comes as a shock. Not that the authorities are always keen to act. Some years ago this writer reported illegal sand mining on the shore of Lake Victoria at Bbunga, a Kampala suburb. A large community of miners established themselves there and truck-loads of sand were carried away at the rate of eight trucks an hour at the peak of the operation. The National Environment Man-agement Authority (Nema) sent an offi-cial who I offered to show around. He avoided me by arriving and leaving thirty minutes before our scheduled appoint-ment and we did not meet although he talked to the miners. After two fruitless visits to Nema offices and several tele-phone reminders, another Nema official informed me rather gruffly that the op-eration had been regularised and that an individual had been granted a license to mine the sand and there was therefore no longer any basis for complaint. The original official could not be contacted because he had died. The area once cov-ered in papyrus and acting as a filter for the several natural springs in the area on which many rely for drinking water is now a barren expanse of dust and weeds.


RIGHTS

“Selection of development projects in Uganda depends

on whatever a passing en-trepreneur suggests. As in

colonial times when co-lonialists bought up large

tracts of land, drove off the locals and sat on them as a future investment, so Ugan-dan elites acquire rights in national assets and hawk them to speculators who pay the individual public

officials and not the state. To tire of restating this fact

would be a failure in patriotism.”

Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni


RIGHTS

Nema performed a bit better in 2016 when it allegedly rejected an envi-ronmental impact assessment backing an application from Mango Tree Group, a Chinese company, to mine sand in and around Lake Victoria. Those objections included the fact that altering the water table would destroy the ecosystem and devastate the livelihoods of lakeshore dwellers, which is why it is illegal to dis-turb lake and riverbeds. The Mango Group, originally in Uganda to build ships, went ahead to mine sand in the lake and on the shore. A local newspaper quoted the Executive Director of Nema as saying, “Initially, there were fears that the activities of the firm will endanger our environment and destroy fish breeding grounds along the shores of the lake. But our technical team together with that of the district estab-lished that they will cause no harm to the environment,” Nema denied reversing its position in a later edition of the same newspaper. The Mango Group has the backing of General Caleb Akandwanaho, brother to President Museveni, who announced

that the mining would continue despite Nema’s objections. Akandwanaho (aka Salim Saleh) added that the choice was between youth unemployment and pres-ervation of the sand. The first excuse, that the mining was to make way for a dock was replaced with the explanation that the sand is required for the new Standard Gauge Railway. This does not explain why foreigners must be awarded the responsibility of meeting the growing need for building materials given that youth unemploy-ment is well over 60 percent. Artisanal sand miners in Lweera wetland who are being pushed out by yet more Chinese have asked the same question. Finally, in January 2018 it was an-nounced that Mango Tree Group has fi-nally been given a license to dredge sand from Lake Victoria by State Minister for trade and industry Michael Werikhe. This time the project is being presented as a dock required to transport passen-gers to Kenya and Tanzania – suggesting the sand is merely a by-product. Clearly Nema is unable to protect the environment and its army of offi-

cials is a further drain on the treasury. Parliament and the Ministry of Natural Resources are similarly impotent. Local Government headed by political appoin-tees have nothing to offer. At this point, it is left to the Ugandan public to inter-vene. It is not unreasonable to ask for a statement from the government to con-firm that in fact no senior members of the government or individuals related to them by blood or other ties, has a fi-nancial interest in Lake Victoria, Lake Edward, Lake Albert, Lake Kyoga, the River Nile, or in Ferdsult, the purported leaseholder of the Kabarole Crater Lakes. The public needs to be assured that such public goods have not been assigned or mortgaged to investors or creditors whether local or foreign and that no such divestiture is planned. Public officials should from now on be required to declare their affiliation with foreign investors.

*Mary Serumaga is a Ugandan writer and wrote this for ‘The Daily Monitor’

Locals fishing


FOOD

UN’s Zero Hunger goal remains a daunting challenge

By IPS World Desk

The United Nations, which is bat-tling some of the world’s worst humanitarian crises in Asia, the

Middle East and Africa, still remains fo-cused on one of its equally daunting un-dertakings: how to achieve Zero Hunger by 2030.

UN’s zero hunger challenge But the latest figures released in a joint study by the European Union (EU), the Food and Agriculture Organi-

zation (FAO) and the World Food Pro-gramme (WFP) highlight the gravity of the situation just last year alone when some 124 million people in 51 countries faced acute food insecurity — 11 million more than in 2016 (even while the num-ber of people living on the edge of starva-tion and hunger remains at 815 million worldwide).The 2017 increase, according to the ‘Global Report on Food Crises’, is largely attributable to new or intensified con-

flicts and insecurity in Myanmar, north-east Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan and Yemen. Prolonged drought conditions have also triggered poor harvests in countries already facing high levels of food inse-curity and malnutrition, both in eastern and southern Africa. And UN Secretary General, Anto-nio Guterres warned last January that hunger is on the rise the world over, with Africa registering the highest rates.


The Secretary General said agricul-tural and livestock productivity in Africa was under threat largely due to conflict and climate change. He added, “climatic shocks, environmental degradation, crop and livestock price collapse and conflict are all interlinked.” Still, the United Nations seems de-termined to work towards its targeted goal of Zero Hunger by 2030. But how feasible is this? Asked about the impediments facing that goal, Dr Marta Antonelli, Research Programme Manager at the Barilla Cen-ter for Food & Nutrition Foundation (BCFN), told IPS reducing the number of chronically undernourished people in Africa is one of the most urgent challeng-es that the world needs to face. She pointed out that food insecu-rity, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, is related to a variety of interconnected factors, such as extreme poverty, un-di-versified livelihoods, weak institutions and governance, and, especially, adverse climatic conditions and social conflicts.“Climate change and severe extreme weather events could have a tremendous impact on crop yields, livestock, fish stocks and therefore affect farmer’s in-comes (especially subsistence smallholder farmers) who become more vulnerable to food insecurity.” Dr Antonelli said measures to tackle hunger in Africa include the harmon-isation of governance of food security, sustainability and nutrition; building institutional responses to reduce extreme poverty and inequalities; supporting more efficient agricultural systems; ICTs and technology innovation. Additionally, it also includes sup-porting farmers to diversify livelihoods and reduce vulnerability; restoring land and increasing integrated land and wa-ter management to improve harvests; identification of strategies for building resilience to shocks through adaptation to climate change, institutional response mechanisms; and finally monitoring and reporting of the UN’s Sustainable Devel-opment Goals (SDGs) through genera-tion and sharing of reliable data. The BCFN Foundation, a non-prof-it, independent think tank working for food sustainability, addresses today’s ma-

jor food related issues with a multidisci-plinary approach — from the environ-mental, economic and social perspective. That goal is to secure the wellbeing and health of people and the planet. Asked what role BCFN can play, as part of its contribution to a resolution of the food crisis, Dr Antonelli said the coexistence of hunger and obesity, the overexploitation of natural resources and food loss and waste: these are the three paradoxes identified by the Barilla Cen-ter for Food & Nutrition Foundation. According to BCFN, it recognises three imbalances that beset the global food system: food waste (nearly 1/3 of world food production), hunger in the face of epidemic levels of obesity (2.1 bil-

lion people impacted), and unsustainable agricultural systems (1/3 of world grain production is used for animal feed, food-stuffs are used for first generation biofu-els instead of feeding people. Dr Antonelli said: “Since 2009, we use a multidisciplinary approach to study and analyse the relationship between food and scientific, economic, social and environmental factors. Through research, dissemination and public engagement, our contribution to shift towards more sustainable food systems includes the Nutritional and Environmental Double Pyramid, the Milan Protocol, the publi-cation of Eating Planet.” Moreover, in 2016, BCFN launched the Food Sustainability Index (FSI), de-veloped by The Economist Intelligence Unit with the Barilla Center for Food & Nutrition. The FSI analyses, ranks and maps 34 countries worldwide on a range of indicators, from food waste per capi-ta to agricultural biodiversity and CO2 emissions from agriculture, to determine the sustainability of their food systems. “We fund young research through the ‘BCFN YES!’, a contest open to PhD candidates and young research fellows around the world. The award is given in recognition and support of innovative projects on food and sustainability. We also believe that involving media and journalists is also pivotal to shed a light simultaneously on local and global food sustainability, inform people on supply chains and inform their choices.” For this reason, the BCFN launched in 2016 the Food Sustainability Me-dia Award, which invites journalists, bloggers, freelancers and individuals to submit work, either published or un-published, on food safety, sustainability, agriculture and nutrition. (www.good-foodmediaaward.org). BCFN has also developed a series of educational programmes for school chil-dren and the MOOC on “Sustainable Food Systems: a Mediterranean Perspec-tive” realised in collaboration with the Sustainable Development Solutions Net-work (SDSN) Mediterranean with SDG Academy and The University of Siena, with a major educational purpose. It consists of a series of pre-recorded lectures, readings, quizzes, discussion

FOOD

“Food insecurity, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, is

related to a variety of inter-connected factors, such as extreme poverty, un-diversi-

fied livelihoods, weak in-stitutions and governance,

and, especially, adverse climatic conditions and

social conflicts.“Climate change and severe

extreme weather events could have a tremendous

impact on crop yields, live-stock, fish stocks and there-fore affect farmer’s incomes

(especially subsistence smallholder farmers) who

become more vulnerable to food insecurity.”


FOOD

forums and deals with environmental and climate-related challenges basing upon Mediterranean experience, how sustainable farming systems is being uti-lized as a roadmap for positive action and implementation of Sustainable Develop-ment Goals. Asked about the importance of food sustainability– including eliminating waste and reducing obesity – as a key fac-tor in reaching the 2030 goal, Dr Anton-elli said the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sus-tainable Development and its 17 SDGs establish a global set of objectives for all countries in the world to be achieved by the year 2030. SDGs range from the eradication of poverty and hunger, to the need to act for climate mitigation, to the promotion of education and gender equality, to pre-serving natural resources such as water in sufficient quantity and quality for hu-man needs.

Food access, utilisation, availability, quality and sustainability are at the core of all SDGs and represent a pre-requisite to implement the 2030 Agenda in all countries in the world. Agriculture accounts for one third of global GhG emissions, cover 38% of the world’s land surface (an area still in expansion), accounts for 70% of water withdrawals and 80% of desertification.The number of hungry people, she point-ed out, is rising again and exceeded 815 million in 2016; overweight and nutri-tion challenges affect two billion people both in the North and the South of the world; and about one third of the food produced for human consumption gets lost or is wasted. “We cannot transform our world without fixing the food system first.” Asked about the countries making the most progress in the Food Sustain-ability Index, she said the FSI Index

shows that, when defining food sustain-ability by looking at country’s perfor-mance in sustainable agriculture, nutri-tional challenges and food loss and waste, the top scoring countries are France, Ja-pan, Germany, Spain, Sweden, Portugal, Italy, South Korea and Hungary. The presence or absence of sound and well-implemented policies is funda-mental in shaping the score of the coun-tries analysed. Generally speaking, high human development is moderately cor-related with higher sustainability of food systems. The analysis performed in 2017 on the Mediterranean countries revealed that the southern and eastern Mediter-ranean countries are those struggling the most in achieving sustainable food sys-tem, especially in the area of food loss and waste, whereas they perform relative-ly better across the nutritional challenges indicators.

Graziano da Silva, FAO boss


AGRICULTURE

Offshoring Indian agriculture: Is India becoming a GMO

trash can?GMOs are being pushed relentlessly in India despite several high-level reports advising against

the adoption of GM crops, writes *Colin Todhunter.

The regulatory system for GMOs (genetically modified organisms) in India is in tatters. So said the

Coalition for a GMFree India (CGMFI) in 2017 after media reports about the il-legal cultivation of GM soybean in the country. In India, five high-level reports have already advised against the adoption of GM crops:

1. The ‘Jairam Ramesh Report’, imposing an indefinite moratorium on Bt Brinjal [Feb 2010];2. The ‘Sopory Committee Report’ [August 2012];3. The ‘Parliamentary Standing Committee’ [PSC] Report on GM crops [August 2012];4. The ‘Technical Expert Committee [TEC] Final Report’ [June-July

2013], and5. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Science & Technology, Environment and Forests [August 2017].

Given the issues surrounding GM crops (including the now well-docu-mented failure of Bt cotton in the coun-try), little wonder these reports advise


AGRICULTURE

against their adoption. Little wonder too given that the story of GM “regulation” in India has been a case of blatant viola-tions of biosafety norms, hasty approvals, a lack of monitoring abilities, general ap-athy towards the hazards of contamina-tion and a lack of institutional oversight. Despite these reports, the drive to get GM mustard commercialised (which would be India’s first officially-approved GM food crop) has been relentless. The push for approval is currently being challenged in the Supreme Court, even though, despite serious concerns, the Ge-netic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC) deemed it necessary to give it the nod. GM mustard is being undemocrati-cally forced through with flawed tests (or no testing) and a lack of public scrutiny: in other words, unremitting scientific fraud and outright regulatory delinquen-cy. This crop is also herbicide-tolerant (HT), which is wholly inappropriate for a country like India with its small biodi-verse farms that could be affected by its application.

GM Crops Illegally Grown Despite the ban on GM cops, in 2005, biologist Pushpa Bhargava not-ed that unapproved varieties of several GM crops were being sold to farmers. In 2008, Arun Shrivasatava wrote that ille-

gal GM okra had been planted in India and poor farmers had been offered lu-crative deals to plant “special seed” of all sorts of vegetables. In 2013, a group of scientists and NGOs protested in Kolkata and else-where against the introduction of trans-genic brinjal in Bangladesh – a centre for origin and diversity of the vegetable – as it would give rise to contamination of the crop in India. As predicted, in 2014, the West Bengal government said it had received information regarding “infil-tration” of commercial seeds of GM Bt brinjal from Bangladesh. In 2017, the illegal cultivation of a GM HT soybean was reported in Guja-rat. Bhartiya Kisan Sangh (BKS), a na-tional farmers’ organisation, claimed that Gujarat farmers had been cultivating HT crop illegally – there is no clearance from the government for any GM food crop. There are also reports of HT cotton illegally growing in India. All of this is prompting calls for probes into the work-ings of the GEAC and other official bod-ies. CGMFI spokesperson Kavitha Ku-ruganti says that the regulators have been caught sleeping. It wouldn’t be the first time: India’s first GM crop cultivation – Bt cotton – was discovered in 2001 growing on thousands of hectares in Gu-jarat, spread surreptitiously and illegally by the biotech industry. Kuruganti said

the GEAC was caught off-guard when news about large scale illegal cultivation of Bt cotton emerged, even as field trials that were to decide whether India would opt for this GM crops were still under-way. In March 2002, the GEAC ended up approving Bt cotton for commercial cultivation in India. To this day, no lia-bility was fixed for the illegal spread. The tactic of contaminate first then legalise has benefited industry players before. In 2006, for instance, the US Department of Agriculture granted mar-keting approval of GM Liberty Link 601 (Bayer CropScience) rice variety follow-ing its illegal contamination of the food supply and rice exports. The USDA ef-fectively sanctioned an “approval-by-con-tamination” policy.

Illegal GM Imports Now, in 2018, Kuruganti says that a complaint lodged with the GEAC and a Right to Information (RTI) applica-tion seeking information regarding the illegal GM soybean cultivation in the country has stirred the apex regulatory body to bring the issue to the notice of the Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT), months after the issue became public. In reply to the RTI application, the GEAC responded by saying it had re-ceived no complaint about such illegal

“Despite the ban on GM cops, in 2005, biologist Pushpa Bhargava noted

that unapproved varieties of several GM crops were being sold to farmers. In 2008, Arun Shrivasatava wrote that illegal GM okra had been planted in India

and poor farmers had been offered lucrative deals to plant “special seed” of all

sorts of vegetables.”GMO farm


AGRICULTURE

cultivation. Kurauganti says this is a bla-tant lie: the BKS had collected illegally cultivated soybean samples for lab test-ing and the report was sent to the GEAC along with a letter of complaint. GM HT soybean has not been granted permission for field trials, let alone large-scale culti-vation. It is also understood that apart from the BKS, the Government of Gujarat also alerted the GEAC to the illegal cul-tivation. Kuruganti says: “The fact that the GEAC is writing now to the DGFT to take action (on preventing the illegal GM imports), makes it clear that it lacks any real intent to take serious action about the violations of its own regulations. It also indicates that it is putting up a show of having ‘done’ something, before an upcoming Supreme Court hearing on PILs related to GMOs.” Her assertion is supported by Rohit Parakh of India for Safe Food: “Commerce Ministry’s own data on imports of live seeds clearly indicates that India continues to import genetical-ly modified seeds including GM canola, GM sugar beet, GM papaya, GM squash and GM corn seeds (apart from soybean) from countries such as the USA… with no approval from the GEAC as is the re-quirement.”

Kuruganti concludes that the reg-ulatory system is a shambles and is not preventing GMOs from being illegally imported into the country or planted. Moreover, the ruling BJP has reneged on its election promise not to allow GM without proper protocols.

Offshoring Indian Agriculture It is not a good situation. We have bogus arguments about GM mustard being forwarded by developers at Delhi University and the government. We also have USAID pushing for GM in Punjab and twisting a problematic situation to further Monsanto’s interests by trying to get GM soybean planted in the state. And we have regulators (deliberately) asleep at the wheel. The fact that India is importing so many agricultural commodities in the first place doesn’t help. Relying on im-ports and transnational agribusiness with its proprietary (GM) seeds and inputs is not a recipe for food security. In the 1960s, Africa was not just self-sufficient in food but was actually a net food exporter. Today, courtesy of World Bank, IMF and WTO interven-tions, the continent imports 25% of its food, with almost every country being a net food importer. Is this what India wants? Based on

its rising import bill, self-reliance and food security seems to be an anathema to policy makers. In response to the government’s de-cision to abolish import duty on wheat in 2017, Ajmer Singh Lakhowala, head of the Punjab unit of Bharatiya Kisan Union, said sarcastically: “The import of cheap wheat will bring the prices down. It appears the government wants the farmers to quit farming.” As I have previously outlined, at the behest of the World Bank and courtesy of compliant politicians in India, it certain-ly seems to be the case. Self-sufficiency is not to the liking of the US and the World Bank. Wash-ington has for many decades regarded its leverage over global agriculture as a tool to secure its geostrategic goals. Whether it involves the import of subsidised edible oils, wheat, pulses or soybean – alongside the ongoing neglect of indigenous agriculture and farmers by successive administrations – livelihoods are being destroyed, food quality is be-ing undermined and Indian agriculture is slowly being offshored.

* Colin Todhunter is an independent writ-er. The above article is reproduced from Third World Network Features.

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