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Page 1: ISSUE Vol. 16 No. 3 2013 US$5.00 GB£3.00 €5 · mining conglomerates to play one country against the other in their inordinate drive for profit. In the 1980s and 1990s thanks to

ISSUE Vol. 16 No. 3 2013 US$5.00 GB£3.00 €5.00

• NAIROBI MASSACRE AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR TERROR IN EAST AFRICA

Page 2: ISSUE Vol. 16 No. 3 2013 US$5.00 GB£3.00 €5 · mining conglomerates to play one country against the other in their inordinate drive for profit. In the 1980s and 1990s thanks to

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African AgendaPublished by TWN Africa

pages 12 & 13 photo: A mine site

African Agenda is published six times a year by Third World Network (TWN) Africa.TWN is an international network of groups and individuals who seek greater articulation of the needs and rights of the peoples of the Third World, especially marginalised social groups, a fair distribution of the world’s resources and forms of development which are ecologically sustainable and fulfil human needs. TWN Africa is grateful to Oxfam-NOVIB, Development

and Peace, InterPares (Canada), TrustAfrika, Rockefeller Brothers Fund and Rosa Luxemburg Foundation.

COVERKeita stirs up Mali's mining sector with review of contracts ……………………………......................... page 5

Major amendments to Guinea's Mining Code ……………..... page 7

Let the glitter of tanzanite affect our lives ………………….... page 9

Equity between state and investor in Africa's mining industry …………………………................................... page 11

Zimbabwe Indaba makes case for communities……………... page 14

Zambia govt to tighten mining sector rules…………………. page 15

DEVELOPMENT“SAP worked in Africa” -World Bank……………………….. page 16

How the World Bank's SAP impoverished Africa…………..... page 18

Africa likely to lose in G8 “tax haven” deal…………………... page 20

Intra-African trade continues to plummet - says UNCTAD………………………………........................... page 22

Short-term fixes - the bane of West African agriculture…………………………………….......................... page 24

Africa's farmers seek private money………………………..... page 26

POLITICSNairobi massacre and what it means for terror in East Africa……………………………........................ page 28

Can the African Court save us from the ICC? .............................. page 29

Mali’s post election challenges ……………………….............. page 31

HEALTHCameroon's sick at risk from fake drugs…………………....... page 34

WOMENMost brides in Niger are children…………………………... page 36

RIGHTSGaps in Guinea's penal system rob children of their rights……………………………….............................. page 37

Contents

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AFRICA is caught once again in the 'bust' ofthe 'boom- bust' cycle of mineral price fluc-tuations just at the time it is on the move toreform its mining policy framework toenable it gain more from its mineralresources. Accidental or timely some maysay, but no matter the situation, Africancountries must not be intimidated intoreversing or changing gear through themachinations of the transnational miningcompanies supported by their home gov-ernments.

Some African mineral-endowed coun-tries have begun introducing reforms in themining sector, thanks to the African MiningVision (AMV), hoping to reap as muchbenefit as possible from their mineralsinstead of the current situation wheretransnational mining companies rip themoff through dodgy contracts. These con-tracts most of which are shrouded in secre-cy and mired in corruption between thetransnational companies and the politicalelite of African countries are largely detri-mental to Africa in its development efforts.The contracts have also led to the encour-agement of illicit financial outflows fromAfrica as the mining companies aided bytheir registration in tax havens and dodgyaccounting procedures 'spirit' away millionsof dollars from the continent.

The AMV, adopted five years ago byAfrican countries, as an answer to stemmingthe hemorrhaging of Africa's naturalresources by transnational companies is yetto be systematically implemented by mostAfrican countries. As a comprehensive min-ing policy framework that aims at usingAfrica's natural resources to transform theeconomy from a commodity-based one toan industrial one, the AMV has not drawnthe much needed attention from Africancountries. Indeed, instead of going with thesea of change that the AMV proposes in theuse of mining as a catalyst to Africa's indus-trialisation, African countries are tinkeringwith the status quo by implementing mini-malist reforms in contracts and tax regimes. The 'cherry-picking' approach of selectingsuch issues as contract and tax regimes areno solutions to problem. A comprehensivepolicy change that moves mining from an

enclave activity to an industry with linkagesto the rest of the economy just like in thedeveloped countries is what is needed. Themajor overhaul of the policy regime thatwill bring the necessary change to Africa'smining sector has remained largelyuntouched.

It is in this regard that Guinea, Maliand Niger have been touted for showing theway in spearheading reforms in their miningsector even though their reforms have notgone far enough. (See pages 5-8, Keita stirsup Mali's mining sector on review of con-tracts and Major amendments to Guinea'smining code). Niger has begun an audit ofthe French mining giant Areva as its 10-yearuranium mine's contract comes up forrenewal at the end of the year. The aimaccording to the country's Mining ministeris to increase tax takes from the companyand also make sure Areva puts in infrastruc-ture investments like roads especially a1,000 km road from the mining region ofArlit to Niamey, the capital. Niger hopes itsreforms should increase its revenue fromuranium to at least 20 percent of its budgetfrom the previous 5 percent.

Ghana, one of the major mineralendowed countries in Africa, has also put inplace for the past couple of years a miningcontract review committee. Even with theseminimalist efforts, the mining companiesare not taking these intended reforms lyingdown. They have threatened in variousways, overt and covert, to protect the statusquo. Using, as an excuse, the current fall inmineral prices, they want to preempt thereforms by threatening to lay off workers orclose down mines for being unprofitable.The result is that some African govern-ments are in two minds, carry out theseminimalist reforms and lose even the littlerevenue and employment opportunitiesfrom the mining companies' operations orallow the status quo to continue.

The solution as envisaged in theAfrican Mining Vision is a regional/conti-nental approach that would not allow themining conglomerates to play one countryagainst the other in their inordinate drivefor profit. In the 1980s and 1990s thanks toStructural Adjustment Programmes cham-

pioned by the Bretton Woods institutions,most African countries in their quest forFDI to revive the mining sector gave overlyliberal terms to the mining companies.Indeed, the situation induced what becameknown as a 'race to the bottom' as the coun-tries competed to give the most liberal andwelcoming terms to the companies. The sit-uation must be reversed now as at leastthere is in place a continent-wide miningdocument, the AMV, which offers an alter-native continental mining framework seek-ing to improve the fortunes of mineralendowed African countries.

What African countries need to do is,promote and incorporate the AMV intotheir national laws and ensure its imple-mentation. There are fears, however, thateven the AMV, an African-scripted docu-ment may in the end be captured and mis-interpreted by the very people and institu-tions who are currently beneficiaries of thestatus quo. This is so because African coun-tries and their agencies like the AfricanUnion are looking to the likes of Australia,the European Union, Canada and otherswhose companies have entrenched inter-ests in Africa's minerals to support thefinancing of the Africa MineralDevelopment Centre (AMDC) which is toserve as the continental coordinating pointfor the implementation of the AMV. ForAfrican countries to take the commandingheights of their mineral economies, it isimportant that they fund institutions suchas the AMDC which is to play a critical rolein transforming Africa's economy throughjudicious use of its minerals.

African civil society groups must also'push' their governments to implement theAMV if there is to be a policy change in themining sector. To achieve this, they mustsend the AMV message to as many citizensand citizen groups as they can to ensure theAfrican citizenry buy into the AMV and arethus empowered to hold their governmentsaccountable for the implementation of theAMV. This calls for the involvement oflabour unions, women's groups, youthgroups, students, traditional leaders, localbusiness groups and faith-based groupsamong others.

EDITORIAL

4 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.3

African governments must letthe African Mining Vision work

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AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.3 5

Keita stirs up Mali's miningsector with review of contracts

MALI now has a new and democraticallyelected president. President IbrahimBoubacar Keita who was elected in a run-offelection took the oath of office inSeptember for a five-year term.

Uniting the country is at the top of hisagenda after the bitter war that pitchedTuareg rebels and elements of Al Qaeda inthe Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) against theweak and disorganized army. The French-led military intervention has enabled the

Malian Army, with additional support fromECOWAS and the UN to take back thecountry, at least for now.

But also important on the new presi-dent's agenda is how to get the best out ofthe country's mining sector which is gaininggrowing importance in the Malian econo-my. Mali, which produces about 50 tonnesof gold each year, is Africa's third largestproducer coming after South Africa andGhana. Mining contributes 25 per cent of

Mali's GDP and 75 per cent of national rev-enue.

Just days in office, the Keita adminis-tration has announced its intention to carryout a “complete inventory” of the extractivesector, notably minerals and oil. This isunderstood to mean a decision to reviewmining contracts, titles and licenses.According to the new Mines Minister,Boubou Cisse, the outcome of the invento-ry will trigger a review and renegotiation of

Mali's new government's decision to review all mining contracts in the wake of the

country's new mining code has yet to provoke a reaction. A similar exercise in neighbouring

Guinea following review of its mining code in 2011 has yet to yield intended dividends,

writes *Kwesi W. Obeng.

COVER

President Keita

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any contract which undercuts the interest ofMali.

According to the United NationsConference on Trade and Development,Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows toAfrica went up by 5 per cent to US$50 bil-lion in 2012 even as global FDI fell by 18per cent. FDI levels in sub Saharan Africaare now more than double the levels of tenyears ago. A substantial share of this FDIwent to the extractive sector with new dis-coveries of minerals, oil and gas fromSenegal in the west of Africa to Kenya in theeast coast of the continent.

Mali's mining sector is considered agrowth industry. However, like many othermineral-rich African countries, Mali has amining code but not a mining policy. Thecountry recently reviewed its mining codeostensibly to improve the mining sector'soverall contribution and linkage to the larg-er Malian economy which until the year2000 was largely dependent on cotton,another primary commodity.

The political instability which immedi-ately followed the adoption of the newCode in 2012 stalled its promulgation intolaw. The new Mining Code has since comeinto force. The code is supplemented by anew Mining Regulation. The implementa-tion of the new code has pitched the coun-try against major mining companies operat-ing in the country.

The Malian economy took a hit in2012 to register a negative growth of -1.5per cent against an initial estimate of +5.6per cent. The economy is now projected torebound to +5.4 per cent this year (and+5.1%) in 2014). Central to this optimisticoutlook is the assumption of a rebound inproduction of gold especially and to a lesserdegree cotton and rice and the creation of athird mobile network operator along withthe resumption of international assistanceto cushion the economy. However, thecountry is unlikely to measure up to theseupbeat projections precisely because of thepolitical and economic uncertainties thatcharacterized the first half of this year.

In spite of the central role of gold inMali's economy over the last decade, thereis hardly any endogenous creation of addedvalue through beneficiation neither has itspurred the creation of national operatorsand service providers. This, in part, is whathas informed the new Malian Mining Code.However, unlike neighbouring Guinea'snew mining code adopted in September2011, Mali's new code is not a comprehen-

sive restructuring of the country's miningregime. The framework of the regime firstadopted in 1991 and revised in 1999remains substantially the same, albeit with anumber of innovations and amendmentsessentially to protect Mali's interest. Thenew code also toughens procedures foracquiring permits.

The new changes in the code aregeared significantly towards the promotionand implementation of some form of trans-formation within Mali and to ensure thedevelopment of local communities, protectthe country's fragile ecological environmentand ensure site rehabilitation and mine clo-sure.

In terms of participation, Mali's newmining code retained the state's right to a 10per cent non-dilutable free carried interestin the capital of a company holding anexploitation permit, in addition to an optionto acquire another 10 per cent for cash.Contrast that with Guinea where the newcode nearly doubled to 35 per cent thestate's share in mining projects (this includea 15 per cent golden share) and 0.5 per centshare in projects to local government withregards to gold and diamond and one percent in respect of bauxite and iron.

But Mali's code also introduced theoption for local private investors to acquirefor cash at least five (5) per cent of theshares of the exploitation company, butunder the same conditions as other privateshareholders.

The code has introduced new albeitrather flexible beneficiation rules requiringmining companies to carry out with thetreatment and refining of minerals in unitsbased in Mali. In addition, the code hastightened company obligations in relationto the protection of the environment andnew rules on mine closure and site rehabili-tation.

It also imposes civil liability on theholder of an exploitation permit in respect

of damages or accidents caused by oldequipment, even after the closure of themine and issuance of an environmental dis-charge.

According to Mamadou Goita, this is adirect response to the growing disquiet overdestruction of the environment especiallyas surface mining has expanded since 1999.National civil society organizations arequite happy with the innovations in the newcode, according to Goita who is the execu-tive director of the Institute of Research andthe Promotion of Alternatives inDevelopment (IRPAD) in Mali.

Mali's new code also takes communitydevelopment seriously. The code obligesmining companies to file CommunityDevelopment Plans (developed in consul-tation with local communities, local andregional authorities) along with exploita-tion permit applications. TheseCommunity Development Plans must beupdated every two years.

On stability regime, the new miningcode introduced no significant changeswith the exception of the provision for newexclusions covering rights, taxes and royal-ties set by international institutions towhich Mali is a party. The new code halved,to 10 per cent, the tax rate on capital gainarising from the assignment of a miningtitle.

AngloGold, Gold Fields, IAMGold,Cluff Gold and Randgold Resources aresome of the major mining corporationsoperating in Mali.

The challenge for the new presidentwill be how to safeguard the peace after thebrief war and translate the country's miner-al wealth to both restore fiscal stability andrevive the productive capacity of Malians toaddress the deepening poverty levels in thecountry.

It remains to be seen what the “com-plete inventory” of Mali's mining sector willyield. A similar exercise in Guinea has yet toyield meaningful dividends. Kabinet Cisséexecutive director of the Center forInternational Trade Development(CECIDE) in Guinea in a recent interviewwith African Agenda noted that a similarproject in Guinea lacked teeth as theprocess was heavily hinged on the goodwillof companies to re-negotiate the terms.

* Kwesi W. Obeng is assistant editor, AfricanAgenda.

COVER

6 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.3

“In spite of the central role of

gold in Mali's economy over

the last decade, there is hardly

any endogenous creation of

added value through benefici-

ation neither has it spurred

the creation of national opera-

tors and service providers.”

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7AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.3

COVER

In September 2011, the Guinean authorities completed a comprehensive review of the

country's mining code to attract investors, improve the country's stakes and address under-

development and poverty. The West African country is home to about half of the world's known

bauxite reserves with high alumina content and the largest untapped iron ore deposits.

Major amendments toGuinea's Mining Code

THE main amendment was taxes on baux-ite. These taxes were brought down toabout US$4 (four dollars) per tonne of rawbauxite exported instead of US$11 - 13 pertonne previously. Another major amend-ment is that taxes on corporate profits werereduced from 35 per cent to 30 per cent.Customs duties on equipments for process-ing were reduced from six per cent (6%) tofive per cent (5%) and for mining fromeight per cent (8%) to six-and-half per cent(6.5%).

In addition, maximum areas coveredby exploration permits were reviewed tak-

ing into account the concerns of operatorsin the mining sector to encourage prospect-ing and avoid the freeze of resources (from350km2 to 500km2 for bauxite and ironand 50 to 100km2 for other minerals).Local employment and community devel-opment were emphasized.

These amendments, according to theConakry government, confirm its “new pro-business approach” to accelerate invest-ments in the mining sector and sustain eco-nomic development.

Here are highlights of the new mininglegislation.

Exploration permit (Article 19): If the permit is not transferable, the holdersare allowed to conclude technical partner-ships to develop their mineral deposit andstimulate the development of the miningsector in Guinea.

Work commitment (Articles 34

and 41):Commitments to the implementation ofthe mining and concession permits wererestated and strengthened to avoid thefreeze of resources and extension of con-struction periods. Meanwhile, processing

Bauxite by rail to Conakry’s port for export :

Guinea, like many other African countries,

exports its minerals unprocessed

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8 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.3

COVER

projects shall benefit from an additionalyear to reach the mining phase.

Investment threshold for mining

concessions (Article 37):Investments in the mining of some sub-stances (iron, bauxite) are structurally high-er than those of other minerals (gold, dia-mond). Consequently, the minimuminvestment threshold required to obtain amining concession (US$1billion) isreduced to US$500 million for mineralsother than bauxite, iron and radioactivesubstances.

Transfer of interests in mining

titles and taxation of capital

gains (Article 91, and article 88):Rules governing the transfer of interests in acorporate body holding a mining title werestrengthened and clarified to facilitate theeffective supervision of financial transac-tions by the state and the payment of a fairshare of capital gains made by operatorswhile protecting investors against slow orarbitrary decisions. Article 88 was updatedto take into account a possible withdrawalof mining title in case of non payment oftaxes on capital gains.

Mining infrastructure (Article

121): Mining companies are responsible for theconstruction of mining infrastructure,based on their operational needs. Theambition of the Government is to becomein the end the owner of all mining infra-structure and related ones. Mining compa-nies themselves will operate such infrastruc-ture or call on an independent operator orregulator, especially in the case of sharedinfrastructure. Aware of the financing obligations of min-ing companies, the Government amend theduration before the takeover of the infra-structure by the state to correspond to theperiod required to recoup investments plusfive years to ensure fair returns for investors.

Public purpose (125):Emphasis is laid on the consent of landowners for the use of the land by miningtitle holders before the option of the decla-ration of public purpose.

Control of transfer pricing

(Article 138-A):In response to companies' concerns and in

line with international best practices, theproposed rule is such that the State mustapprove prices or price formulas containedin long term purchase contract and or longterm price agreements. If the company doesnot want to submit to this rule, the Statemay use a pre-emptive right on quantities ofminerals sold at prices below those of freecompetition.

Incentives for processing

(Article 139):

Financial incentive measure were intro-

duced by instituting a single export tax

payable only on unprocessed substances

and by reducing the non contributory

interest of the States in processing projects.

State Share (Article 150):

The State's Share in mining companies cap-

ital is key element of the Government's

mining policy and the rate of contributory

and non contributory share remain the

same as in the 2011 Code. However, it is

specified that the sale of the non contribu-

tory share of the State is prohibited.

Mining Royalties (Articles 161 à

163):

Royalties on bauxite were reduced from

0.55% to 0.15% of the price of a ton of alu-

minium LME for raw bauxite exported from

Guinea. Half of this royalty (0.075 %) rep-

resent a tax on the extraction of any bauxite

and the other half in an export tax imposed

on unprocessed bauxite only. These royal-

ties take into account the grade of the ore

and will be adjusted based on the quality of

the bauxite. The standard ore grade has

been reduced from 50% to 40%. The

Government is of the view that the tax

regime will enable alumina and bauxite

project to obtain adequate returns.

Activity Phase and Mining List

(Articles 166 to 168):

To clarify procedures while limiting the

widespread use of exemption granted dur-

ing the exploration and construction phas-

es, the activity phase of mining companies

have been specifically defined. Customs

incentives granted at each phase must go

through the mining lists approval procedure

which has been clarified in order to

strengthen the regulation and improve the

business environment.

Tax on corporate profit (Article

176):The tax on corporate profit has beenreduced from 35% (general regime) to 30%in order to align Guinea's tax regime onthose of countries in the sub region.

Value Added Tax (Article 176):All imported goods on the mining list areVAT exempt during the exploration andconstruction. At the mining phase the VATis payable.

Customs duties (Articles 171-A,

172, 174, 174-1, 178, 179 and

180): The provision on customs duties have beenspecified and clarified for simplified and rig-orous application. All companies areexempted from customs duties during theexploration and construction phase as stat-ed in the 2011 Mining Code and in accor-dance with international practices. Thecustoms duty rate on materials and equip-ment for the extraction of mineral at themining phase has been reduced from 8% to6.5%. Heavy fuel meant for mineral extrac-tion, concentration and processing activi-ties are exempted from VAT and customsduring all the phases of activity.

Operational barriers (Article 181-

C):This provision which is in conformity withinternational best practices will help pre-vent the abuse of exemptions granted tocompanies during the exploration and con-struction phase. For example, a companycannot benefit from incentives granted inrespect of an exploration permit for importsmeant for mining and other activities.

Stabilization of tax and customs

regime (Article 182):The stabilization period has been extendedfrom 10 to 15 years in accordance withregional and international standards. Whilethe tax rates are stabilized, the bases are notin order to take into account future GeneralTax Code reforms that will help protect theState against tax revenue erosion due to theabusive use of some deductions (financialcharges, etc.) Only the royalties' base(extraction and export taxes) is stabilized togive assurances to investors.

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9AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.3

TANZANITE is a blue/purple variety ofgemstone used for necklaces and earringsand Mirerani home to this gem, is some15minutes drive from the KilimanjaroInternational Airport in the northern partof Tanzania. Mirerani is however, a sharpcontrast to the mineral wealth in the bowelsof its earth and its rich cultural heritage.This mining community is surrounded bybeautiful hills where authentic Maasai cul-ture mixes well with tanzanite mining.

The beautiful tarred road from eitherArusha or Mosi, two major cities close tothe mining community, however, ends atthe Kilimanjaro International Airport andthe rest is a dusty undulating road passingthrough an arid stretch of land.

Though mining has been going onsince the late 1960s when tanzanite was dis-covered, Mirerani located in the ManyaraRegion, is just another poor resource richAfrican community. Besides tanzanite, the

community is also awash with other richstones such as green garnet, red garnet,moonlight and rodlight.

Small scale miningThrough a lot of advocacy by various

civil society groups however, theGovernment of Tanzania has facilitated awell regulated small scale mining industry,which has literally made illegal mining unat-tractive and virtually non-existent, the local

The people of Mirerani, where the precious gem Tanzanite can be found want their

government to facilitate the creation of a local industry around the precious stone. They

believe that it is the surest way that the problems of poverty, unemployment and nonexistent

infrastructure can be addressed, writes *Fred Avornyo.

Let the glitter of tanzaniteaffect our lives

COVER

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10 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.3

COVER

miners said. About 70 percent of the popu-lation of Mirerani is engaged in one form ofactivity or the other related to mining withover 50 women miners according toHussein Msokoto, a small scale miner andVice Chairman of Manyara RegionalMiners Association (MAREMA)

During a recent fieldwork by journal-ists from Ghana, Uganda and Tanzania toMirerani, Council Members of the LocalAuthority and members of the associationsof small scale miners, told the journalists ofthe urgent need for government to set up anExport Processing Zone (EPZ) in the com-munity. Such a body, they noted will createa hub for a local tanzanite industry wherethere will be value addition to the gembefore they are sold locally or exporteddirectly from the town. An EPZ, they say

will provide ready market for the gemsmined by the small scale miners at a fairrate, while it will also create jobs for thosewho cut and polish them as well as attractinvestors, and generate more businesses inthe area.

Poor infrastructureMirerani township Chairperson Albert

Siloli who also addressed the journalists,said despite the taxes and levies paid, gov-ernment has done very little to support thecommunity which is so dependent on themineral resource. He spoke of the badroads, poor health and educational facilitiesamong others. He acknowledged that gov-ernment supported tanzanite exhibitions inArusha and California in the United Statesof America but said such fairs should also beheld in Mirerani in order to create a vibrant

local economy around the gem. He stressedthat setting up the EPZ was crucial and hasthe potential to turn around the deprivednature of the mining community.

Siloli was also not happy about the lackof support from the large scale mining com-panies. He accused them of failing toemploy the youth from the community.The community also accused the govern-ment of taking concessions away from themand reallocating them to the big miningcompanies.

Some major mining companies includ-ing TanzaniteOne, Kilimanjaro Mines andTanzanite Africa operate from the Mireranicommunity, but the contracts with theirgovernment remain a secret. This is a majorfactor accounting for tension between thecommunity and the large mining compa-

nies which has sometimes resulted in fatali-ties, police arrests and brutalities, the smallscale miners alleged.

This is because the leadership of themining community has no idea about theobligations of the major mining companiestowards them and yet they expect sufficientinvestments in the community by the bigminers. The local authorities claim that sev-eral attempts to meet with the large scaleminers have proved futile.

Non-transparencyThe opaqueness of the contract

between the government and the large min-ing companies which is symptomatic ofmany other resource rich Africa countries isbelieved to be stifling the potentials of min-ing in Tanzania. Hamis Lyoba, chairman ofArusha Regional Miners Association

(AREMA) for 18 years, and now an advisorto the group, decried government's refusalto make these contracts public. His grouphas been advocating better conditions forsmall scale miners and pushing for betterdeals from big mining companies but Mr.Lyoba and his group are also challengedbecause they are clueless about what is con-tained in the contracts that their govern-ment has signed with the foreign investors.He told the group of journalists, who alsovisited his Arusha office that he wants gov-ernment to publish its mining contracts sothat they would know what rights have beenextended to them and what their obliga-tions are to government and the people ofTanzania.

Meanwhile, an extensive gas field hasbeen identified off the coast at Songo Songoand Mnazi Bay in Tanzania and these are inthe process of being developed.Unfortunately, just like the mining con-tracts contract the government has signedwith Statoil, a Norwegian state company,also remains a secret.

Mustafa Mhinda Amani, founder andExecutive Director of Haki Madini, , a localcivil society group which has been fightingfor the betterment of the lives of locals inmining, said the export of tanzanite andother gemstones without creating a localeconomy amounts to transferring jobs outof Tanzania to other countries. He notedduring his interaction with the journaliststhat over 70,000 jobs have been created outof tanzanite in India, while the youth in theresource rich African country cannot findwork to do. He also urged the Tanzaniangovernment to focus attention on thenationals to ensure that more of the wealthgenerated from the rare gemstones andother minerals stay within the Tanzaniaeconomy.

* Fred Avornyo is a freelance journalist basedin Accra, Ghana.

“The opaqueness of the con-

tract between the government

and the large mining compa-

nies which is symptomatic of

many other resourced rich

Africa countries is believed to

be stifling the potentials of

mining in Tanzania.”

Tanzanite ring

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THIS year's strategy meeting of the AfricanInitiative on Mining, Environment andSociety (AIMES), the 14th in the series,was held in Accra, Ghana's capital against abackdrop of a sturdy growth rate rightacross Africa and a consequential renewedinterest in the continent as an emerging“growth pole”.

This optimism is feeding a growingnotion of an “Africa rising”, if even this issometimes misplaced. The benefits of thegrowth of the last decade fuelled in largeparts by high global prices for Africa's pri-mary commodity exports have mainly

inured in favour of transnational corpora-tions which dominate the sector. Africangovernments and national elites have alsomonopolised the relatively minor pickingsthat are left over.

The meeting was also organised againsta gradual softening in the prices of somemajor minerals, notably gold and iron ore,and the peaking of global efforts, if evenhalf-hearted, to tackle the broken interna-tional tax regime that allows rich multina-tional companies to shift elsewhere thehuge profits they generate from their opera-tions in Africa without paying the appropri-

ate taxes to African states.The Africa Mining Vision (AMV),

adopted by African leaders four years ago,makes the case for Africa as a continent toharness its vast finite natural resources tounderpin a broad-based growth to struc-turally transform its raw material export-dependent economy.

Today, Africa's minerals are mainlyexported as ores, concentrates or metalswithout any significant value-addition. Ineffect, there is a large untapped potential formineral beneficiation and the creation ofhigh quality jobs.

African governments challenged to reinforce ongoing fiscal reforms and mining contract renego-

tiations with other measures to improve the equity between state and investor in the booming

extractive sector and also to finance the AMV in full, writes *Kwesi W. Obeng.

Equity between state and investorin Africa's mining industry

Decades of mining has hardly improved the quality of life for ordinary people

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It is to improve the equity betweenstate and investor in the extractive sectorthat many African governments haveembarked on fiscal reforms and contractrenegotiation in the last few years of the cur-rent commodity price boom. Needless tosay, these reforms fall far short of the radicalshift away from the prevailing dominantmining regime that the AMV advocates.

Themed “The Africa Mining Vision:From Promise to Realisation” and co-spon-sored by the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP) and Third WorldNetwork African (TWN-Africa), the meet-ing brought together 40 representatives ofnon-state actors and key social constituen-cies from Africa to deepen their knowledgeof the content of, status and processesaround the ongoing mining reform agendaat various levels and define an advocacyagenda and strategy for the network inrespect of the AMV reform agenda.Presentations were made on a range of top-ics including “Contracts Negotiations andStruggles”, “Leakages and Illicit Flows,“Linkages and Diversification”,“Implications of Trade and InvestmentRegime for AMV” and a three-memberpanel debate on the “Strengths andWeakness of the AMV”. Sixteen countryreports on the extractive sector were alsopresented.

A key feature of the new optimismabout Africa's economic future, as noted bya number of speakers, is the broadening ofconsensus for a re-orientation of policiestowards an agenda for structural transfor-mation of Africa's economies, even as it ispossible to discern a spectrum of meaningsand consequences in the use of the concept“structural transformation”.

Central to most of the conceptions ofAfrica's structural transformation is recog-nition that Africa's economies shouldevolve from their raw material commodityexport dependence, a feature which hasbeen accentuated by the ongoing commod-ity boom, and must embark on a course ofcommodity-based industrialisation andtransformation. This position re-empha-sizes a central thesis of the AMV.

Mineral prices have been decliningsince 2011, however reliable indicatorspoint to an intensification of miningdependence by African economies. This ofcourse resonates with the logic of an AfricaRising or Africa as a global growth pole assome prefer to call the phenomenon, whichassumes a certain predication of strategy.

The current narrative, Yao Graham co-ordinator of Third World Network Africasaid, underlines three important elements,namely minerals as engine of growth; agrowing African middle class; and Africa'sfinancial market as rich pickings by financialspeculators.

However, the decade-long economicexpansion in Africa, as rightly noted by adeclaration from the AIMES meeting, hasnot translated into improved conditions ofliving for ordinary Africans. Indeed, manyAfricans remained trapped in the circle ofjoblessness, material deprivation, poverty,insecurity, loss of livelihood and mining-related environmental disasters.

It is in the face of this reality that manymineral-rich African countries have set inmotion measures towards reforming theirextractive sector regimes, mainly fiscalregimes and renegotiation of contracts toimprove the benefit of the sector to theireconomies. The latest to rejoin the list isMali. President Keita's governmentannounced days after coming into office on

September 4th that the administration willundertake a “complete inventory” of itsmining contracts and licenses. This exerciseis expected to lead to renegotiation of min-ing contracts and licenses. Mali is Africa'sthird largest gold producer.

But these reforms are insufficient toresolve the fundamental issues aroundAfrica's extractive industry to fire up sus-tainable growth and the structural transfor-mation of the continent's primary commod-ity export dependent economies.

Take for example Guinea, home toover a third of the world's known bauxitereserves, it is one of the first countries tohave published all its mining contractsonline but is today grappling with one of theworld's biggest mining contract scandals.

At the regional level, the SouthernAfrican Development Community (SADC)for example has adopted a model bilateralinvestment treaty. In West Africa, a projecton defining the ECOWAS MineralDevelopment Policy is ongoing.

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The AMV has emerged as an importantreference point for a wide range of actors,from bilateral and multilateral political andfinance institutions, through campaigningCSOs, mining multinational corporationsto intellectuals of varying orientations - withall of them expressing their support for it inwhole or in parts.

Participants at the Accra meeting wereconcerned that four years after African lead-ers adopted the AMV there is very littlemovement on its implementation. There isalso a lack of public awareness about thetransformation agenda, although the policyprocess the AMV has initiated represents aprogrammatic crystallisation of the ques-tioning by governments and communitiesas well as decades of demands by CSOs forreform of the operative mining regime.

The AMV is in many ways caught in aweb of contested interpretations and thereis the danger that donors may dismember itby picking and choosing what they wantfrom it.

In a two-page declaration, AIMES

lauded African governments' active pursuitof revising fiscal terms in laws and contractswith mining corporations in a bid toimprove equity between state and investor.The group however noted that these stepsdo not go far enough and therefore urgedAfrica governments to reinforce efforts atfiscal revision and contract renegotiationswith other measures including a strongercommitment to public accountability forcontract renegotiations as well as improvestates' capacity to prevent illicit flows fromthe sector through legal and institutionalreforms and cooperation with CSOs.

Illicit outflowsIllicit financial outflows constitute a

major source of revenue leakage from Africaas it runs down foreign exchange reserves,depresses investment inflows, underminesdomestic resource mobilisation efforts,shifts the burden of taxation on to the poorand worsens poverty on the continent.

This form of tax evasion and tax avoid-ance facilitated by the global tax regime,

costs African countries an estimated US$40billion each year. That is about half of whatSub-Saharan African countries expend onhealthcare each year.

This is on top of excessive concessionsto international mining companies operat-ing on the continent. The practice is heavilydetrimental to these economies becausemineral extraction in Africa is also largely anenclave economic activity with limited link-ages to the larger economy. Tax revenue istherefore an important source of beneficia-tion to these economies.

AIMES also challenged African gov-ernments to own the AMV package, takesteps to operationalise it as an organic poli-cy package and take responsibility for fund-ing the AMV's implementation, includingfinancing the African Mineral DevelopmentCentre, rather than adopt the same donor-aid dependent approach.

For non-African governments anddonor organisations which proclaim sup-port for the AMV, AIMES challenged them“to support the leadership role and agendaset by African governments and their peo-ple, rather than use their resources andleverage to distort the implementation fortheir own interests”.

Established in 1998, AIMES is a pan-African network of CSOs working on min-ing and development issues. It bringstogether a broad array of non-state actorgroups working on different aspects of min-ing and development but unites themaround the theme of mining's role inAfrica's development.

The coalition comprises organisationsfrom Africa's key mining countries and hasbeen an important framework and platformfor capacity building, mutual support andcollective advocacy engagement.

The annual review and strategy meet-ings of AIMES have served as an importantplatform for capacity building, collectivereflection on issues, shared analysis andadoption of common campaigns and strate-gies.

The practice of rotating the meetingsamong AIMES members in different coun-tries has helped strengthen the domesticlegitimacy and influence of AIMES mem-bers who have hosted the annual meetings.The last review and strategy meeting inHarare, Zimbabwe, brought together 40participants from 16 countries.

* Kwesi W. Obeng is assistant editor, AfricanAgenda.

A mine site

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14 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.3

WE, members of civil society, communitybased groups and activists, traditional lead-ers, faith based organisations, youth andwomen groups, the media, with regionalrepresentation from South Africa ,Mozambique and Zambia having gatheredat the 2nd Zimbabwe Alternative MiningIndaba (ZAMI) in Harare, from the 10th -11th of September 2013 at the Crown PlazaHotel, jointly hosted by ZimbabweEnvironmental Law Association (ZELA)and the African Forum and Network onDebt and Development (AFRODAD)under the theme “Community Rights, theKey to Empowerment”,

CONFIRM that the ZAMI is a yearlyalternative platform for different partici-pants to share and exchange ideas, experi-ences and strategies on how to promote therights of communities affected by miningoperations and noting that those affected bymining operations are not always affordedan equal opportunity by private sectoractors who organise Mining Indaba's andother platforms to participate and sharetheir problems;

CONVINCED that while Zimbabwe isresource rich, there are high levels of pover-ty and under-development in many com-munities and that communities that aredirectly affected by mining operations andcitizens in general, have not benefited fromthe mineral wealth;

HAVING deliberated during theZimbabwe Alternative Mining Indaba, wespecifically demand that the Zimbabweangovernment;1. Enacts legislation that will transformthe extractive sector from being a raw mate-rial activity to an industrial one throughpromotion of value addition. This shouldbe done through the passage of a newMining law than the current Mines andMinerals Act which is old. 3. Uses the Africa Mining Vision (AMV)

to strengthen the provisions of the currentdraft Minerals Policy and other legislationgoverning the mining sector. 4. Strengthens the capacity of theZimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA)and other revenue collection institutionsfor maximum mineral revenues collectionto eliminate tax evasion and avoidance.Further, government should provide scopefor further consultations with communitiesand civil society on the formulation of theIncome Tax Bill on issues related to miningrevenue collection.5. Undertakes a comprehensive geologi-cal survey and audit of the mineralresources in the country to ensure that min-ing contracts are negotiated from a geologi-cally informed position.6. Ensures enhanced transparency andaccountability throughout the whole min-eral value chain from the negotiation andawarding of mining contracts, public disclo-sure of contracts, production figures andmineral revenues. In this case there is needfor continued implementation of theZimbabwe Mining Revenue TransparencyInitiative (ZMRTI) to enable the publicdisclosure and publication of mineral rev-enue for purposes of transparency andaccountability.9. Adopts clear and transparent mecha-nisms for the implementation of theIndigenisation programme in the miningsector and to ensure that all laws and poli-cies are clear and easy to interpret andapply.10. Ensures that Community ShareOwnership Trusts be provided with finan-cial performance information of the compa-nies in which they own shares and get ShareCertificates. In this regard, CommunityShare Ownership Schemes should also pro-vide information to community membersabout how much they are receiving andhow the funds have been used. Therefore,

information should be made publicly avail-able. 11. Passes laws to legalise artisanal miningand organize them into groups to ensurethey comply with environmental laws andensure that they pay reasonable taxes com-mensurate with their operations and means.In addition, Small Scale miners should beprovided with adequate financial and tech-nical support. 12. Develops a gender sensitive MineralsPolicy and ensure adequate participation ofwomen and other marginalized groups dur-ing the consultation processes towards thedevelopment of the policy. 13. Provides adequate financial and tech-nical resources to the Zimbabwe HumanRights Commission to investigate andmonitor cases of human rights violations inthe mining sector, especially environmen-tal, economic, social and cultural rights.14. Ensures that the EnvironmentalManagement Agency improves its environ-mental monitoring activities in miningareas and compel mining companies torehabilitate and reclaim open pits createdby mining operations in areas such as theGreat Dyke. The EnvironmentalManagement Agency and the Ministry ofEnvironment must take comprehensivesteps to address the plight of communitiesliving along Save River and Odzi Riverwhich are being affected by diamond min-ing companies operating in Marange tostop polluting the rivers. In the same veinmining companies operating in Marangeand other mining areas must adopt properenvironmental management systems tocurb and control pollution of rivers anddams.15. Protects and promotes the rights ofmine workers and Chinese mining compa-nies in particular must abide by the labourlaws of Zimbabwe.

COVER

At its recent Alternative Mining Indaba, Zimbabwe civil society groups have called for special

attention to be paid by their government to communities in mining areas. Below are excerpts

from the Declaration of the Indaba.

Zimbabwe Indaba makes case for communities

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THE Zambian government is set toimprove regulation and monitoring of themining sector to increase its contribution tothe country's Gross Domestic Product(GDP), Mines deputy minister RichardMusukwa has said.

Musukwa said the strategic focus ofgovernment on mining during the 2014 to2016, would be to improve regulation andmonitoring of the mining sector to enable itincrease its contribution to GDP.

To achieve this, the deputy ministersaid the government would concentrate onkey issues which include, mine technicalaudits, monitoring of the gemstone sector,geological and structural mapping, mineralexploration and resources survey, increas-ing mines safety department capacity andpromotion of value addition in the miningsector among many others.

Musukwa explained that currently,government had insufficient capacity formonitoring the mining industry in thecountry and as a result, it had no reliableproduction statistics database, making itdifficult to verify production costs and salesdata declared by the mines as a basis for roy-alty and tax computations.

Hence, Government would begin con-ducting mine technical audits to ensure cur-rent taxes and mineral royalty were com-plied with.

Zambia is Africa's top copper producer.In 2009, the government scrapped 25 percent windfall tax introduced a year earlier inresponse to pressure from mining compa-nies.

President Michael Sata's governmentdoubled royalties on copper to six per centin 2012 on assumption of power to fundincreased spending on the social sector andagriculture.

Musukwa reiterated that government

would continue to attract Foreign DirectInvestment in the mining sector but not atthe expense of exploiting Zambians, Mines,Energy and Water Development DeputyMinister Richard Musukwa has said.

The deputy minister said this when hepresented a paper on government prioritiesin the extractive industry in Lusaka onSeptember 13.

He said President Michael Sata'sadministration recognised the importanceof private investment in the development ofthe mining industry and would, therefore,endeavour to work closely with the industryin implementing the process.

"Care will be taken to ensure thatZambia maintains the favourable invest-ment climate for continued growth of thesector," Musukwa said.

Government would like to see thispartnership exhibited in ExtractiveIndustries Transparency Initiative (EITI)in all areas for transparency and accounta-bility.

Musukwa said the government realisedthat investors needed to get a fair return ontheir investment, but that this would not bedone at the expense of Zambians.

He said the government would contin-ue to support the implementation of EITIas it was one tool being used to promoteaccountability and transparency in the man-agement of mineral resources in Zambiaand it was his desire to see many Zambiansusing the initiative to ensure accountabilityand transparency.

Government has been and will contin-ue implementing measures that would leadto increased benefits from mineralresources for the people of Zambia, while atthe same time, ensuring that miningremains profitable for the investors.

Musukwa said government would start

monitoring the gemstone sector to ensureits contribution to the treasury.

He noted that the gemstone sector hadfor a long time been neglected, hence itsinsignificant contribution to Governmentrevenue. If monitoring is enhanced the sec-tor's contribution can be raised to that ofthe base metals.

He also said the lack of geologicalinformation not only hindered investmentbut also makes it difficult for government toobtain a fair deal from the concessions inthe sector.

Focus would be on minerals for whichthere have been inquiries by potentialinvestors and these include rare earth ele-ments, limestone, gypsum, clays and alumi-nous rocks.

Government will continue to promotethe setting up of value addition industries asway of increasing benefits from mineralresources.

Zambia has a wide range of mineralswhich can be used to expand the manufac-turing industry, thereby creating more jobsand increasing contribution to governmentrevenue.

Last year, the country's FinanceMinister, Alexander Chikwanda announcedthat Zambia will not reintroduce a miningwindfall tax. It therefore remains to be seenwhat form the tightening of mining rules asannounced by the government onSeptember 13th will take.

Switzerland's Glencore, London-listedVedanta Resources Plc and First QuantumMinerals are some of the major internation-al mining companies operating in Zambia.

* Judith Namutowe is a journalist with theTimes of Zambia. This article was first pub-lished by Times of Zambia.

Zambia lost a great opportunity with the windfall tax when the metal price was high. Now the

price is set to decline but the Zambian government says it is determined to tighten mining sec-

tor regulations, writes *Judith Namutowe.

Zambian govt to tighten mining sector rules

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DEVELOPMENT

16 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.3

THE World Bank's influence as a politicalactor across the African continent has beenon the wane for the past two decades. It hascome in for heavy criticism from some cor-ners of the activist, political and academiccommunities for the social and distribution-al effects of the economic policies both itand its sister institution, the IMF, have pre-scribed.

Following the rise of Chinese and othernon-traditional sources of capital, theWorld Bank's dominance as a developmen-tal lender has been called into question.Despite a forced rethink in some policyframeworks and recently being outspent byChina, the World Bank continues to be asizeable economic and norm-creating insti-

tution. Think Africa Press recently inter-viewed Shantayanan Devarajan, the ChiefEconomist of the World Bank's Africa divi-sion, who defends the World Bank's record,provides his analysis of the economic situa-tion on the continent and plots wherethings may lead.

Across Africa, there is still a worryingpreponderance of poverty and food insecu-rity. How can this be reconciled with theassertion in Africa's Pulse (the WorldBank's biannual Africa publication) that“African countries are among the fastestgrowing countries in the world”?

A taxi driver in Senegal told a colleagueof mine, “I cannot eat growth”. I think thatcaptures the average African's view.

"Structural Adjustment Programmesworked in Africa" - World Bank

The World Bank's chief economist for the Africa division, Shantanayan Devarajan, credits “Africa

Rising” in part to World Bank and IMF policies, writes *Lambert Mbom.

“Across Africa, there is still a

worrying preponderance of

poverty and food insecurity.

How can this be reconciled

with the assertion in Africa's

Pulse (the World Bank's bian-

nual Africa publication) that

“African countries are among

the fastest growing countries

in the world”?

Accra city centre, (insert) Shantanayan Devarajan

of the World Bank

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African economies are growing mostlybecause commodity prices are very high, sonatural resource prices are high - such as oiland gas - and many of these countries areexporters of natural resources like Ghana,Gabon, and Nigeria.

Also, investment is growing in Africaand so you are seeing quite a lot of foreigninvestment coming in as well as domesticinvestment. The investment rate, which isusually a predictor of future growth, meansyou are building capacity and capital stockis rising.

But, I think, it is fair to say the taxi driv-er in Senegal has a point because whilepoverty is declining, it is not declining at afast enough pace. While the economicgrowth is a result of commodity prices, thepoor are working in agriculture and there isno direct link between the growth in naturalresources and agricultural growth.

Agricultural productivity has not beengrowing very fast across the board andmany of these countries that are seeing veryhigh growth rates are actually seeing verylittle agricultural growth - which has a highconcentration of the poor.

Most Africans, the ones in rural areas aswell as people in the urban areas, are in theinformal sector. And there is a reason forthat: they cannot afford to be unemployed.Most of the unemployed in Africa are peo-ple with secondary school degrees, whohave finished secondary school or even uni-versity. They are the ones who can actuallyafford to sit around and wait for jobsbecause their families can support them.

Most Africans are working very hard,full time but in very low productivity jobs -like selling vegetables in the streets, or theguys who clean your windshield and try tosell you stuff while you are stuck in traffic.They are working in order to make a livingbut the problem is that they are working invery low productivity jobs.

How do you translate this into

poverty reduction?First, increase the productivity of agri-

culture. There are different ways to do it;there are good ways and bad ways. Whatgovernments have traditionally been doingis to say 'lets subsidise farmers' - subsidisingfertilisers or seeds.

The trouble is that this helps the large-scale farmers. When you subsidise fertilis-ers, the larger farmers use a lot more fertilis-ers than small-scale farmers. We need tocome up with different ways of ensuring

that farmers can benefit from the mineralwealth - including giving them cash trans-fers directly that will enable them to buy fer-tilisers rather than subsidise fertilisers.

Second, and very importantly for theinformal sector, is the need to improve theskillsets. One of the reasons people are inthe informal sector is because they do nothave access to education. Something like50% of those working in the informal sectorhave not finished secondary school.Strengthening the education system andteaching those skills that are not part of thetraditional curriculum - soft skills, team-work and work ethic - are crucial so thatthese people and their children have achance of moving out of the informal sectorinto the formal sector.

Lastly, infrastructure is important.Another reason why agricultural productiv-ity is low is because farmers do not haveroads on which to take their produce to themarket. This often gets neglected in favourof a flashy big motorway in an urban area.These are the basics; this is an opportunitythat may not come around very often. Rightnow, mineral prices are very high and Africais the place where there seems to be themost undiscovered minerals. This could bea window into which Africa can translatethis opportunity into sustained growth.

Discussions of the economic growthdrivers never mention the StructuralAdjustment Programmes that the WorldBank and IMF promoted in Africa. Is this adeliberate acknowledgement of the criti-cisms levelled at them?

There is no question that one of themajor reasons for Africa's growth over thelast 10-15 years is because macro-economicpolicies have improved. Average inflation ishalf of what it was in the 1990s. Fiscaldeficits are down. Current account deficitsare down.

The reason is that African policymak-ers followed Structural AdjustmentProgrammes over the last 10 - 15 years. Itworked, it delivered results. It deliveredeconomic growth and poverty reduction.You can't dispute that.

Today, non-fragile African countrieshave the best macro-economic policies inthe whole world compared to other low-income countries. This has been a tremen-dous change.

This is why it is a puzzle or may be,seems like a puzzle: why is it that the struc-tural adjustment programmes of the 80sand 90s are so criticised?

I think that there is a difference and thisis the critical point: It is not that the policieswere wrong but that there is a big differencewith those policies being designed inWashington, London and Paris versus thosepolicies being designed in Abuja, Yaoundéand Nairobi. And I think that is the differ-ence we are seeing. After debt relief, Africanpolicymakers decided they had to have aplan. They sat down and worked it out andthey came out with the exact same policiesas the Structural Adjustment Programmes.

If you look at the programmes of the2000s and compare them to the SAP, theyare exactly the same but there is a big differ-ence if it is home-grown and owned ratherthan externally imposed and I think that isthe big difference.

There's a lack of reliable statistics forAfrica. Where are these figures coming fromand how problematic is this?

There is a huge problem with statisticsin Africa. No question about that. These fig-ures are coming from best estimates wehave. We are not trying to project anythingother than do some real estimation.

And the other thing we try to makesure we do is not rely on any one estimate.We do not for instance take a whole view ofa country just by viewing the GDP. We lookat poverty, which is evaluated in a com-pletely different way from GDP. This isdone by individual household consumptionsurveys. This involves actually meeting andasking a household how much they are con-suming. And then you triangulate.

These are not statistics based on justone or two estimates. But that said, I thinkthere is a real problem because the capacityis very weak and frankly the political sup-port for statistics is very weak in Africancountries.

I want to see more and more Africanpolicy makers championing statistics. It'seasy to see why there isn't such politicalsupport for this - statistics can make foruncomfortable reading, they might actuallyexpose the failure of governments. But thatis precisely why we need it. Statistics aren'tjust for economists, they are for the people.They are for citizens to know, so they candecide whether what the government says itis trying to achieve it is actually working.

Credit: Think Africa Press.

* Lambert Mbom is a freelance reporter work-ing in Washington DC..

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DEVELOPMENT

SUCCESS has many fathers, while failure isan orphan, as the saying goes; and now thatAfrica is witnessing an era of economicgrowth, many are lining up to claim thecredit for it. A number of African countriesare experiencing economic growth fuelledby their endowment with commodities at atime of surging prices as well as improvedpolitical environments, prudent macroeco-nomic management, rising domestic con-sumption and strong public investment.

The Bretton Woods institutions - theWorld Bank and the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) - are emboldened

by these developments and have laid claimto the success story currently coming out ofAfrica. Recently, in an interview with ThinkAfrica Press, the Chief Economist of theBank's Africa Division, ShantanayanDevarajan, credited Africa's robust eco-nomic performance to the policies of theWorld Bank and the IMF.

The success came, according to him,because African policy makers followed theBank's policy of Structural AdjustmentProgrammes (SAPs) in the past 10 to 15years. The SAPs, he claims, “delivered eco-nomic growth and poverty reduction”.

Really?There is abundant evidence to the con-

trary. Before we look at these contraryviews, let us provide a background to theSAPs in Africa.African countries ran to the World Bankand IMF for loans as a result of a seriousfinancial crisis that engulfed them in thewake of the debt crisis in the 1970s. Inreturn for providing loans to stabilise theseeconomies, the Bank, under the StructuralAdjustment Programmes, imposed condi-tions on the borrowing nations. Theseincluded a massive reduction in the role of

How the World Bank's SAPsimpoverished Africa

In response to the World Bank's claims that the SAPs are to be credited for Africa's current

economic growth, *Carlos Lopes argues the contrary and that it has had a devastating impact

on the continent.

Conakry : protesters in the Guinean capital, (insert) Carlos Lopes of UNECA

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the state in the economy, the deregulationof the economy, trade reforms and privati-sation of public enterprises.

The official intended consequences ofthe SAPs were to structure the economiesof the developing countries in the likenessof the American economy. However,instead of providing for growth and devel-opment, its impact was largely negative.

Liberalisation of domestic markets sentprices through the roof, increased unem-ployment, worsened poverty and createdsocial unrest. Newly privatised enterpriseswere required to rationalise their produc-tion methods and this translated intoincreasing unemployment as a result ofreduction in the workforce. In addition,globalised financial markets together with aderegulated financial environment inducedwild swings in exchange rates and extremevolatility of markets. The conditions alsofocused on lowering inflation and budgetdeficits, devaluing local currencies andremoving price controls.

Mixed resultsThe 29 sub-Saharan countries which

signed up to the arrangement during the1987-1991 period experienced mixedresults, according to the Bank.

Most assessments of the impact ofSAPs on African countries and on develop-ment on the continent are to a large degreenegative. The reduction of the role of thestate resulted in the downsizing of the civilservice, a decline in real wages and cuts inpublic expenditures. Along with the weak-ening of bureaucratic capacity and publicinstitutions, these factors compromised theprovision of basic services and investmentin infrastructures, which eventually led to areduction in private investment.

Although the policy restored macro-economic stability in some countries, eco-nomic growth stagnated and social condi-tions worsened considerably. For example,the decay in public health services inNigeria made people to coin the phrase thatgovernment hospitals had become “merepreliminary consulting rooms”.

Many families were destroyed as theirbread winners, who were rationalised out ofemployment or whose take-home pay couldhardly take them home, were no longer ableto cater for their dependants. One reportsaid, thanks to the SAPs, some men inZambia left home and abdicated their

responsibility to their wives.Due to its one-size-fits-all nature, the

adjustment programmes were unable torespond to specific country conditions andchanging circumstances, leading to a lack ofshared vision between the Bank and recipi-ent governments concerning the aims of theprogrammes. No wonder they did not getthe buy-in of many nations. In the endmany opted out and, in the case of Nigeria,Ethiopia and others, developed their ownhomegrown equivalent.

The SAPs' devastating impactIn 2011, the Economic Commission

for Africa (ECA) noted that the negativeimpact of SAPs was particularly visible inthe African industrial sector. TheCommission observed that growingdependence on imported goods driven bythe SAPs' trade liberalisation eroded theweak industrial base of most Africaneconomies.

Effects on income and welfare weremagnified by an increased debt burden,

deteriorating terms of trade, declining flowsof private capital and accelerating capitalflight. The lack of industrial development inAfrica is at least in part a consequence, if nota result, of these interventions. In most ofthe cases, industries are yet to recover fromthe SAPs period.

More importantly, as many countryexamples in Africa demonstrate, the imple-mentation of SAPs compromised govern-ment capability to design and put intoaction long term economic and social devel-opment strategies that are critical for

enabling the private sector to develop andcompete globally.

SAPs left behind, bright future

ahead?

In their 2013 report, the ECA further

highlights the failings of the SAPs: “They

did not raise productivity, boost manufac-

turing export performance or enhance value

addition.” It also claims that the policy actu-

ally hurt technological capability and skills.

”Today, the weak African industrial struc-

ture still has to move out of the shadow of

those interventions - a task made more

onerous by the new international context,”

it said.

Now, thanks to a surge in the price of

their natural resources and the develop-

ment strategies and good economic man-

agement of more development-oriented

governments, African nations are emerging

from that period with some optimism. The

headlines in the international press these

days usually proclaim “Africa Rising”. The

trend has been helped by the emergence of

China, Brazil and India that have ramped up

demand for African raw materials for their

burgeoning manufacturing industry.

Chinese investment and aid has also helped

to build roads, hospitals, railroads, and

other infrastructure on the continent.

To keep the continent on the rise, the

ECA is robustly arguing for governments to

be involved in developing their countries

rather than toe the IMF/World Bank line of

promoting market fundamentalism with lit-

tle or no state involvement. The

Commission is of the opinion that if Africa

could leverage on its primary commodities

to industrialise through adding value to

them and linking the commodity sector to

the rest of the economy, then the 21st cen-

tury could indeed be Africa's. The recent

successes of Asian countries who did not

take the prescriptions of the Washington

Consensus bear testimony to the strength

of the model.

Credit: Think Africa Press.

* Carlos Lopes is the Executive Secretary of theEconomic Commission for Africa. Dr Lopespreviously served as executive director of theUN System Staff College in Turin from 2007to 2012.

“The Economic Commission for

Africa (ECA) noted that the

negative impact of SAPs was

particularly visible in the

African industrial sector. The

Commission observed that

growing dependence on

imported goods driven by the

SAPs' trade liberalisation erod-

ed the weak industrial base of

most African economies.”

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THE tax haven “deal” that was agreed atJune G8 summit in Northern Ireland maynot benefit African countries, according toaid agencies and a group of high levelAfrican former leaders led by Thabo Mbeki,former president of South Africa.

Mbeki, who chaired the high levelgroup on the topic also in June said thatAfrican countries are losing around $50 bil-lion a year in irregular financial flows, main-ly tax havens - a figure higher than what they received in official aid.

According to the June 18 G8 deal, newrules will be put in place to disclose the realowners of companies, as they have been

hiding their identities in order to enjoy taxhavens.

Leaders of the G8 major economiesalso agreed on new measures to clampdown on money launderers, tax evaders andcorporate tax evaders. Governments agreedto give each other automatic access to infor-mation on their residents' tax statuses.

They will also require shell companies -often used to exploit tax loopholes andinvest money anonymously - to identifytheir effective owners.

The measures are designed to combattax evasion as well as legal tax avoidance bylarge corporations that make use of loop-

holes and tax havens.But the deal fell short of what cam-

paigners had demanded by not committingcountries to making information public,only sharing that information with other taxauthorities.

Mr Mbeki and his group expressedtheir concern that the deal does not appearto enable African nations to know whatinformation to request with regard to inter-national firms which operate in their coun-try, particularly those about whom con-cerns have been expressed over the strip-ping out of vital natural and mineralresources.

Africa likely to lose in G8 'tax haven' deal

African countries are losing around $50 billion a year in irregular financial flows, mainly tax

havens - a figure higher than what they received in official aid. But the recent G8 measures to

crack down on 'tax havens'may not benefit African countries, writes *Paul Redfern.

G-8 leaders at a roundtable

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To enable African countries to do this,aid agencies argue, there should have beenpublic registers of the companies con-cerned, not just a sharing of informationbetween tax authorities.

The UK-based aid agency War onWant's tax campaigner Murray Worthysaid: “If all of these promises become realitythis could have an enormous impact ontackling one of the greatest scandals of ourtime. But there is a long way to go and todayall we have is a general statement of princi-ples with no detail and no deadlines.”

He added: “As always, the devil will bein the detail, and there's no detail here. Talkof stopping companies shifting profits toavoid taxes is a huge step forwards, butwe've heard great promises from the world's heads of state before - it's what they do thatcounts.”

Tanzania is among the worst affectedcountries and is estimated to be losing up toUS$1.1 billion or five per cent of its poten-tial GDP because of tax exemptions toentice businesses into the country.

This reiterates a 2012 sentiment bylobbyists Tax Justice Network-Africa andthe campaign group ActionAid that EastAfrican countries were losing US$2.8 bil-lion in revenues a year to exemptions, withTanzania consistently giving away the high-est amount.

But Alvin Mosioma, the co-ordinatorof Tax Justice Network-Africa, who is push-

ing for the removal of tax exemptions forTanzania's gold mining sector says waiversdo not necessarily attract investors.

“When you look at the top 10 reasonsgiven by investors as enabling factors youfind they mention things like rule of law,human resources capacity and infrastruc-ture, issues that are more influential and sig-nificant than just tax incentives,” said MrMosioma.

Zitto Kabwe, who chairs Tanzania'sParliamentary Public Accounts Committeeand is shadow finance minister, said themain problem is that the exemptions, whichamount to a tenth of the government'sannual budget, are often opaque. It isunclear who is receiving them and howmuch they are worth.

Now the Tanzanian government plansto reduce the tax incentives it offers to com-panies. But the country finds itself in adilemma facing other governments in EastAfrica as well, as their economies develop, with critics arguing that global organisa-tions are sending mixed messages on thesubject.

On the one hand the IMF is urgingTanzania to reduce its tax exemptions,while on the other, the World Bank's annu-al global ranking of business environmentsrewards countries that offer such incentives.

The International Monetary Fund esti-mates that Tanzania's tax revenues, 15 percent of GDP, are 5 percentage points below

its potential. Speaking at the G8 Summit, African

Development Bank president DonaldKaberuka said it was laudable that the G8was putting emphasis on the issues aroundresource mobilisation through greatertransparency on taxation issues in Africa'snatural resources.

Citing a larger internal governanceagenda in the sector of natural resources, hecalled on the international community todo its part, to ensure balanced contracts,minimise tax avoidance and evasions, andbring light and transparency in the naturalresource sector, which is often very opaque.

Kaberuka said this was the only wayAfrican countries will find the financialresources they need to fund infrastructureand trade corridors, which are now verydependent on donor funding.

He said that the African DevelopmentBank was fully behind this agenda and hadput in place the Africa Legal SupportFacility four years ago which has beeninstrumental in assisting a number of coun-tries to negotiate complex contracts andunbundle others with the aim of ensuringthat they (countries) get what they deserve,investors get the return they look for andeveryone is a winner.

Paul Redfern writes for the The East African.This article was first published by the EastAfrican.

Tax waivers do not necessarily attract investors; they impoverish these African countries

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INTRA-AFRICAN trade presents opportu-nities for sustained growth and develop-ment in Africa. It has the potential to reducevulnerability to global shocks, contribute toeconomic diversification, enhance exportcompetitiveness and create employment.

African governments have made sever-al attempts to exploit this potential ofregional trade for development, the mostrecent being the decision by African leadersat the African Union summit in January2012 to boost intra-African trade and fast-track the establishment of a continental freetrade area.

Against this background, UNCTAD'sEconomic Development in Africa Report2013 subtitled Intra-African Trade:

Unlocking Private Sector Dynamism focus-es on how to strengthen the private sectorto boost intra-African trade.

The report notes that in recent yearsthe share of intra-African trade in totalAfrican trade fell from 22.4 per cent in 1997to 11.3 per cent in 2011. Intra-African trade(both exports and imports) totalledUS$130.1 billion in 2011. These statisticsmay be underestimates, given the preva-lence of informal cross-border trade on thecontinent, but they are nevertheless lowwhen compared to other parts of the world.For example, over the 2007-2011 period,the average share of intra-regional exportsin total exports was 11 per cent in Africa,compared with 50 per cent in Asia and 70

per cent in Europe. The report argues that although the

elimination of trade barriers is important, itwill not have the desired impact if it is notcomplemented by efforts by governmentsto increase the variety and sophistication ofthe goods that their economies produce -the process that economists call expandingproductive capacity. That involves meas-ures such as upgrading infrastructure,improving the skills of domestic work-forces, encouraging and enabling entrepre-neurship, and increasing the size of existingmanufacturing firms so that they can satisfylarger markets and produce their goodswith greater economies of scale.

Intra-African trade continuesto plummet - says UNCTAD

Steel rods for construction

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Having cleared the field for increasedregional trade - and the economic growththat it promises - African nations need toprovide the goods to sell to each other, orforeign competitors will fill the vacuum, theEconomic Development in Africa Reportcontends. It also recommends that Africangovernments strengthen the private sectorby making finance more accessible and lesscostly, and by enhancing mechanisms forgovernment consultation with the privatesector.

Short-term unexploited opportunitiesfor regional trade in Africa are to be foundparticularly in agriculture, the report says.Africa has about 27 per cent of the world'sarable land, and that can be used to expandagricultural production. And yet manycountries on the continent import food andagricultural products from countries out-side Africa. For the period from 2007 to2011, the study notes, 37 African countrieswere net food importers, and 22 were netimporters of agricultural raw materials. Butonly about 17 per cent of the continent'sworld trade in food and live animals tookplace within Africa. The report argues that akey challenge for African policymakers ishow to exploit these opportunities forregional trade, the so-called “low-hangingfruit”, and to ensure that the gains accruepredominantly to Africa.

But the greater long-term opportunity -and greater challenge - is to improve indus-trial capacities to provide the goods forwhich regional trade typically increasesdemand, the report says. The benefits ofgreatly expanding regional trade - amplyillustrated in Asia - are that selling in nearbymarkets gives firms cost advantages throughproximity, potentially reduced transportexpenses, better knowledge that allowsgoods to be fitted to local conditions, and, ifsufficient customers can be found, enoughcritical mass to justify expanding industry,the report notes.

Some of the potential is apparent inexisting trade flows: African countries tendto export a higher percentage of manufac-tured goods to each other (43 per cent of allintra-African trade), while manufacturedgoods account for only 14 per cent of totalAfrican exports to overseas markets.

The challenge is clear, too. Africaaccounts for only 1 per cent of global man-ufacturing. And manufacturing representsabout 10 per cent of African GDP, com-pared to 35 per cent for East Asia and thePacific and 16 per cent for Latin America

and the Caribbean. The low level of manu-facturing development in Africa means thatmanufactured goods - such as cars,machines, and electronic gadgets - must beimported from overseas, a problem that isalso an opportunity. If various national mar-kets can be effectively integrated into a larg-er regional market, the report says, thereshould be sufficient numbers of customersto support the expansion of industry withinthe region.

An additional challenge noted by thereport is that Africa has some of the highestcosts in the world for transporting goods. InCentral Africa, transporting one ton ofgoods along the route from Douala inCameroon to N'Djamena in Chad costsUS$0.11 per kilometre, which is more thantwice the cost in Western Europe ($0.05)and more than five times the cost inPakistan ($0.02).

The report contends that the nature ofthe goods produced and exported byAfrican enterprises matters for the growthand expansion of intra-African trade.African countries produce and export a nar-row range of goods, most of which are pri-mary commodities such as oil, natural gas,and metals. Over the period from 2007 to2011, two products accounted for over 80per cent of exports to other African coun-tries from Algeria, Angola, Mali,Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria. Africa's lackof economic diversification and weak man-ufacturing base inhibit intraregional trade,

the study says.The report says that unlocking the

trade potential of the private sector requiresthe distinctive features of Africa's enterprisestructure that inhibit regional trade to beaddressed. For example, African firms tendto be very small, which makes it difficult forthem to operate at the minimum scale nec-essary in order to be competitive. The aver-age size of a manufacturing firm in sub-Saharan Africa is 47 employees, comparedwith 171 in Malaysia, 195 in Viet Nam, 393in Thailand, and 977 in China. There arealso weak linkages between small and largefirms in Africa, making it difficult for smallfirms to benefit from the skills and innova-tion capabilities of large firms, with direconsequences for the growth of small firms.Other structural problems of Africa's con-stellation of enterprises include a high shareof informal firms, low levels of export com-petitiveness, and a lack of business innova-tion capability.

In addition, it is vitally important forAfrican countries to maintain peace and sta-bility as a prerequisite for strengthening pri-vate-sector development and boostingintra-African trade, the report says. Recentevidence, for example, has shown that thepolitical conflict in Côte d'Ivoire that beganin the late 1990s reduced intra-trade withinthe West African Economic and MonetaryUnion (WAEMU) by around 60 per centover the period from 1999 to 2007.

DEVELOPMENT

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE REPORT

• The report provides some facts on intra-African trade and highlights distinc-

tive features of Africa's enterprise structure that have to be addressed to pro-

mote intra-African trade. It also examines the challenges for intra-African trade

posed by non-implementation of regional trade agreements and provides new

insights into how to enhance implementation of existing regional agreements.

• The report argues that for African countries to reap expected gains from

intra-African trade and regional integration, they will need to place the building

of productive capacities and domestic entrepreneurship at the heart of the poli-

cy agenda for boosting intra-African trade. In this context, the report recom-

mends that African Governments should promote intra-African trade in the con-

text of developmental regionalism.

• In particular, it stresses the need for a shift from a linear and process-based

approach to integration, which focuses on elimination of trade barriers, to a

more development-based approach to integration, which pays as much atten-

tion to the building of productive capacities and private sector development as

to the elimination of trade barriers.

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Short-term fixes - the bane of West African agriculture

Boosting agricultural productivity in the Sahel region is crucial to reduce chronic food in

security, improve families' nutrition, promote economic growth and help build people's

resilience, say experts, but governments still under-fund the sector, as do international donors

who favour short-term fixes.

WHILE there has been a renewed interestin investing in agriculture over the past fiveyears, partly spurred by a drive towardsmore self-sufficiency given rising food

prices (which spiked in 2008 and remainedhigh), the sector is still under-served inWest Africa.

In 2009 the Economic Community of

West African States (ECOWAS) renewedthe 2003 Maputo pledge to commit at least10 percent of their national budgets to agri-culture. But as the accord approaches its 10-year anniversary later this month, only 10 ofthe 54 African Union countries have metthis goal.

While growth in small-scale agriculturecan benefit the poor twice as much asgrowth in other sectors, global develop-ment aid for agriculture declined by 77 per-cent between 1983 and 2006, according to areport by Oxfam.

In Senegal, for example, where agricul-ture accounts for nearly 14 percent of thecountry's GDP and employs more thantwo-thirds of the labour force, ActionAidsays the government invested just 4.7 per-cent of its budget on agriculture in 2012.

Consciousness did rise, however, in2008, when food prices spiked and WestAfrican governments realized they wereoverly dependent on imported staplegrains.

"Many countries realized that beingtoo dependent on the international marketwas not sustainable, and from that momenton, said 'OK, if we want to be able to feedourselves and if we want to improve thefood security of our populations, we need tohave a minimum level of food sovereignty.And to do this, we need to invest more inagriculture'," said Eric Hazard, campaignmanager for Oxfam's GROW campaign.Since then "agriculture has been back onthe agenda in the region."

But in those countries that haveachieved the 10 percent goal, such asBurkina Faso and Niger, Hazard said thequality of the investment remains an issue.

"When you secure, say, 17 percent ofyour budget for agriculture, but only spend65-70 percent of that on farmers, and the

DEVELOPMENT

Vegetable farmer nurturing her plants

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rest goes to expenditures of the Ministry,such as meetings, salaries, 4x4s, etc., youhaven't really hit that 10 percent mark," hetold IRIN.

Benefiting the poor Investment in smallholder farmers is

especially important, as not only do theycontribute to an estimated 80 percent of thecontinent's food production, but they arealso among the region's most vulnerableand food insecure people.

"In most countries in West Africa, themajority of the population lives in ruralareas, where agriculture is the mainprovider of food and income," said NGOCatholic Relief Services' (CRS) regionaltechnical adviser for agriculture MireilleTotobesola Barbier. "But production assetsand financial access constraints, limitedknowledge of improved production tech-niques and marketing skills, all impedegrowth [in the sector]," she said.

In the Sahel, repeat drought alsoimpedes projects to boost production. Itcan take 3-4 years to recover from a crisislike the 2012 drought, and only if thoseyears are good, said Food and AgricultureOrganization (FAO) regional head PatrickDavid. "There has been a gradual erosion offarmers' livelihoods in the Sahel - more andmore farmers are moving to cities," he said.

When a harvest fails, small farmers willsell the few animals they have; pull theirchildren from school; become furtherindebted; exhaust their food and seedstocks; become more food insecure; andwill be all the weaker in the face of the nextcrisis. This is the cycle of impoverishmentin the Sahel, said David.

Burden on aid agencies The lack of or poorly directed govern-

ment funding has put increased pressure onaid agencies to secure donor funding, whichis a struggle.

"Donors are often more keen to givemoney toward emergency or crisis situa-tions [as opposed to long-term develop-ment projects], where you might not seethe impact of the investment right away,"said the World Food Programme's WestAfrica focal point for its Purchase forProgress scheme, Isabelle Mballa.

FAO for example, called for US$122million to aid agriculture in the 2012 Sahelfood security crisis, but only 48 percent ofthe requested funds were received.Activities that suffered included seed distri-

bution, soil and water conservation proj-ects, vaccinating animals, sending fodder toanimals, and other schemes.

This year, agriculture has received just23 percent of the agricultural funds it hascalled for, for the Sahel.

This underfunding has especiallyaffected smallholder farmers, who oftencannot afford basic inputs, such as seedsand fertilizers, and cannot access credit. Notonly does their overall agricultural produc-tivity suffer, but a lack of investment putsthem at an increased risk of vulnerabilityduring times of crisis and increases theirdependence on external food aid.

FAO has three main areas of emer-gency response in the Sahel: supportingfamilies to plant market gardens in the dryseason; supporting rain-fed planting duringthe July-September rainy season; and help-ing families practice planting when waterrecedes from flood plains from August toDecember.

This year's poor funding responsemeans "it's too late to do any more for thisyear's rain-fed harvest," said David. AsRobert Piper, humanitarian coordinator forthe Sahel, put it, "The window is closed."

What smallholder farmers need Todd Crosby, the assistant director for

YaaJeende, USAID's Feed the Future'sSenegal programme, told IRIN: "The idea[behind investing in smallholder farmers] isto give them everything they need in orderto succeed. It's to provide them with thingslike seeds, fertilizer, tools, and crop and live-stock insurance. Teach them better landpreparation and irrigation techniques, ifthey need. Help them get their product tothe market."

By doing so, farmers can not only pro-duce more, high-quality crops - which willincrease their incomes - but can also helpreduce the rates of undernutrition and mal-nutrition in the country.

Research from Feed the Future, whichworks with 12 African countries to reducepoverty and undernutrition through invest-ing in agriculture, says it was able toincrease the value of food exports by $84million in 2012 by focusing on smallholderfolders. This has meant that more thanseven million smallholder farmers in theregion saw increased profits last year.

CRS's Development AssistantProgramme in Burkina Faso helpedincrease the crop yields of millet andsorghum by an average of 30 percent

between 2004 and 2010, simply by teachingsmallholder farmers how to better managewater, preserve good seeds for replanting,and other activities.

Despite these and other successes,donors shy away from funding smallholderfarmers, favouring emergency aid or larger-scale agribusiness.

"These small farmers, they are seen asnot being competitive with large-scale pro-ducers, because they don't have the tools,the technology, the resources or themeans," said WFP's Mballa. Many believesmallholders cannot produce quality prod-ucts in sufficient quantities. "But if they[smallholder farmers] are just given a littlehelp, they too can be successful. Being asmall-scale farmer does not mean you can'tbe productive and that you cannot earnmoney."

Try machines USAID's Crosby said there now needs

to be shift towards mechanized agriculture,as well as agricultural credit for smallholderfarmers. "Smallholder farmers often lacktractors and other machinery in the field,and there's only so much you can do with ahand hoe. But in order to get those tools,you need to have access to credit." He toldIRIN.

While there are currently a variety ofmicrofinance schemes that offer farmers'agricultural credit, Oxfam's Hazard saidmost have loan rates of 14-30 percent,which makes it nearly impossible for smallfarmers to earn enough money to pay backthe principal plus interest within the six-month lending period, and still earn a prof-it.

Many of these microfinance schemesalso tend to target larger-scale, urban pro-ducers.

"It's a lot harder to work with small,rural farmers because they're much moredispersed and also riskier, than a few bigcompanies or producers," Crosby said."Their [smallholder farmers'] livelihoods -and the ability to pay back the loan - oftendepend on weather and other factors out-side their control."

Crop and livestock insurance is oneanswer - it could help reduce some of theproduction risks, and make farmers moreadaptable and resilient to climate change.The question is: where are the investors tomake this work?

Credit: IRIN

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AFRICA currently imports almost 40 bil-lion dollars worth of food a year, but itshould implement measures to attract pri-vate sector investment in agriculture inorder to reduce its food import bill andincrease its self-reliance, experts in the sec-tor tell IPS.“ In the next 10 years, African countriesshould not rely on food aid, but should pro-duce their own food and buy from withinAfrica when they run out of food,” agricul-ture researcher and director of the BarefootEducation for Africa Trust, ProfessorMandivamba Rukuni, told IPS.

“Food self-reliance means wealth cre-ation and farmers should be directly linkedto markets. More people will have moremoney in their pockets if more smallholderfarmers are farming profitably, and this canbe done,” Rukuni said.

African countries, according to anAlliance for a Green Revolution in Africa(AGRA) African Agriculture Stats Reportlaunched in Maputo, Mozambique's capital,on Sep. 4, produced 157 million tonnes ofcereals and imported 66 million tonnes in2010. In August, the Forum for AfricaResearch in Africa put the continent's cur-

rent food import bill at more than 40 billiondollars, money it said would be better spentenabling African farmers to become self-sufficient.

African heads of state and governmentcommitted themselves to improving agri-cultural and rural development in Africa inthe Maputo Declaration of 2003. It includesthe ambitious goal of governments allocat-ing at least 10 percent of national budgets toagriculture and rural development.

But in the last 10 years, only a few ofthe 54 African Union (AU) member stateshave made this investment. These include

By Busani Bafana

Africa's farmers seekprivate money

Citrus farmers

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Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigerand Senegal. A further 27 have developedformal national agriculture and food securi-ty investment plans under compacts.Compacts are a result of country roundta-bles that bring together key players in agri-culture to agree on investment priorities.

Currently one of the few countries pri-oritising investment in agriculture isNigeria. In that West African nation, thegovernment developed the NigeriaIncentive-based Risk Sharing System forAgricultural Lending (NIRSAL), whichseeks to reduce the risk in the agriculturalfinance value chain by building long-termcapacity and institutionalising incentivesfor agricultural lending. The goal of NIR-SAL is to expand bank lending in the agri-cultural value chain.

Nigeria's minister of agriculture andrural development Akinwumi Adesina toldIPS that Nigeria was leveraging 3.5 billiondollars for agriculture from local banks. Thegovernment is shouldering the risk in a bidto attract the participation of the privatesector.

“We are developing an approach for

the private sector to have access to financebecause without finance you cannot domuch,” Adesina told IPS. “We are workingon new financing instruments that willallow our capital markets to work for agri-culture. Agriculture accounts for 44 percentof our GDP and 70 percent of all employ-ment but it has only two percent of all banklending in Nigeria.”

Meanwhile, Rukuni told IPS that whilemost African countries have not been ableto commit 10 percent, they have seen thewisdom of doing so.

“Although 10 percent is a nice figure totalk about, it is not a magic figure. What ismore important moving forward is catalyticpublic financing, where government, itsexperts, farmers and private sector worktogether and really understand here it isimportant for government to invest to trig-ger private sector investment,” Rukuni said.Citing China, India and Brazil as examplesof public-private partnerships at work,Rukuni said it was time for Africans tounderstand that there is no competivenessin agriculture without governments and theprivate sector setting joint targets in infra-structural development, for instance.

“The biggest trick is the private sectorputting more money into agriculture,” hesaid. “There is nowhere in the world todaywhere you can get the government or indus-try moving if government and the privatesector are not working together.”

The AGRA report notes that despitehaving over 70 percent of prime uncultivat-ed land, land holdings in Africa continue toshrink. This shrinkage has impacted on theproductivity of the 33 million smallholderfarmers responsible for up to 90 percent ofthe continent's agricultural output.

The alliance estimates that a one per-cent growth in agriculture will increase theincome of the poor by more than 2.5 per-cent, yet only 0.25 percent of bank lendingin the Common Market for the Eastern andSouthern Africa region goes to smallholderfarmers.

AU Commissioner responsible foragriculture and rural development, RhodaPeace Tumusiime, told IPS that investmentin African agriculture has become moreurgent than before and this was reflected inthe political movement towards the devel-opment of national agriculture plans as pro-posed under the Comprehensive AfricaAgriculture Development Programme(CAADP) framework of eliminatinghunger and reducing poverty.

“The 70 percent of the population whodepend on agriculture is a big figure, so if wefocus on improving the situation of this 70percent, poverty will be eradicated. We donot want a situation where the economiesare growing but agriculture is not,” she said.

In a March 2013 report, “GrowingAfrica: Unlocking the Potential ofAgribusiness”, the World Bank projectedAfrican agriculture would top a trillion dol-lars in 2030 on the back of increaseddomestic and international demand forfood. The bank also urged African govern-ments to improve their agriculture policiesand promote agribusiness as a driver ofgrowth.

Abraham Sarfo, agriculture, technicaland vocational education advisor at theNew Partnership for Africa's Development,told IPS that agriculture used to be part ofdual development planning but was now onthe continental agenda through the Africa-driven CAADP agenda of eliminatinghunger and reducing poverty through agri-culture.

“A sector that contributes over 30 per-cent of the economy of a country and is stillat subsistence level shows how it is under-developed compared to mining or ICT thatattract the private sector,” Sarfo told IPS.He called for the increase of innovativefinancing models that will remove risk inagriculture investment to attract the privatesector.

Phillip Kiriro, president of the EastAfrica Farmers Federation, which repre-sents about 200 farmer bodies told IPS thataccess to critical inputs and better technolo-gies has slightly improved in the last 10years but governments still need to helpfarmers live off their land.

* IPS

“Despite having over 70 per-

cent of prime uncultivated

land, land holdings in Africa

continue to shrink. This shrink-

age has impacted on the

productivity of the 33 million

smallholder farmers

responsible for up to 90

percent of the continent's

agricultural output.”

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28 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.3

POLITICS

THE occupation of the upscaleWestgate Mall in Nairobi,Kenya by the militant group Al-Shabaab is now over, leaving atleast 70 civilians dead. Thestandoff lasted for four days andis likely to boost the image ofthe militant group in the region.Here's what you need to knowabout the group and what itmeans for Africa's terrorismlandscape:

What is al-Shabaab?Al-Shabaab is a militant

Islamic group based in Somalia,with the expressed intention ofestablishing a fundamentalistIslamic state in Somalia.Though group is affiliated withAl-Qaeda, it also represents adiversity of interests and cannotbe considered a homogenousentity. Though many observersreported that the African Union's campaignin Somalia had weakened the group, therecent attack on Westgate Mall suggeststhat the movement has gained an interna-tional following and remains a force to bereckoned with in the region.

How were these attacks carried

out?Reports vary, but 10 to 15 gunmen

were able to take control of the Westgateshopping mall and fend of Kenyan securityforces for more than 72 hours. The attackwas far from spontaneous; some reportshave suggested that machine guns werestored in the mall the night before the attackand that the gunmen had studied the layoutout of the mall extensively prior to theattack. Reports suggested that the attackswere possible because of colluding mallemployees and the Kenyan government's

inability to police its border with Somalia.There is still significant confusion as to thenationality of the gunmen, with somereports suggesting that Americans andBritons may have been involved, in additionto Arabs and Africans.

The attackers' motivation was similarlyunclear. Some survivors report that civilianswere questioned at gunpoint about theirreligion, suggesting that this was a religious-ly motivated attack, but other reports havefound that Muslims are among the scores ofcasualties. Some analysts have suggestedthat al-Shabaab's targeting of the WestgateMall is retribution for Kenya's support forthe UN peace-keeping mission in Somaliaand for Kenya's political and security tieswith the United States.

What is the significance of this

attack?While the motivation behind this

attack is unclear, the implications for securi-ty policy in East Africa are stark. ThoughSomalia has long been a base for militantIslamic groups, this attack may suggest thatSomalia and al-Shabaab are now the locusof global militant Islam. The reports sug-gesting that British and American citizenswere among the gunmen indicate thewidening scope of al-Shabaab's influence.The efficiency with which this attack wascarried out suggests that the “global war onterror” Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyattaalluded to may be increasingly fought onAfrica's Eastern coast, as opposed to in theMiddle East. If this attack was, in fact, aresponse to Kenya's cooperation withUnited States military operations in theHorn of Africa, increased US involvementin the region may only fan the flames of dis-content.

Credit: Hilary Matfess and The Atlantic.

On September 21, a band of jihadists from Somalia's Al-Shabaab militant Islamic group

mounted an attack on Nairobi's Westgate Mall slaughtering dozens including a leading

Ghanaian poet, university lecturer, politician and diplomat Prof Kofi Awoonor.

Nairobi massacre and what it means for terror in East Africa

A mother and daughters duck from flying bullets. All three were rescued unhurt.

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29AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.3

POLITICS

CERTAINLY, anything can happen. Butfor things to happen we must first set thestructures right. Can the ICC Kenyan casesbe referred to the African Court of Humanand Peoples' Rights? No, they can't. At leastnot yet!

Why? Because the nature of thesecourts is radically different.

What is the ICC? It is a criminal court.

This means that the State takes the personto court for committing a crime.

What is the African Court on Humanand Peoples' Rights? It is a human rightscourt. This means that the person takes theState to court for violating his or her rights. Sadly, the nature of the ICC and the AfricanCourt of Human and Peoples' Rights areradically different.

Can this be resolved? Only mass actionby African States can resolve this. It is com-plex.

Are they up to the task? Only Godknows.

We should keep in mind two keytreaties here: the Constitutive Act of theAfrican Union and the African HumanRights Charter.

Can the African Court save us from the ICC?

At least two sitting African leaders are facing charges at the International Criminal Court in the

Hague. Couldn't these leaders be tried by the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights? The

nature of the ICC and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights are radically different. It is

complex and only mass action by African States can resolve this, writes *Luis Franceschi.

Facing the ICC : President Uhuru Kenyatta and Vice President William Ruto

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POLITICS

30 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.3

Article 5 of the Constitutive Act of theAfrican Union foresaw the creation of theCourt of Justice of the African Union. ThisCourt was created on paper but it is not yetoperational.

The African Human Rights Charter didnot expressly consider a human rights court,but implied it.

This Court, the seat of which is inArusha, Tanzania, was created and is nowoperational. It took almost two decades tomaterialise. It became a reality atOuagadougou, Burkina Faso, in January2004.

How were these courts born?The African Courts have been born

through “protocols” or additional treatiesnegotiated by the African Union.

In Africa we have drafted and adoptedthree main protocols in this area: Protocolof the African Court of Justice (creating theAfrican Court of Justice), Protocol of theAfrican Court of Human and Peoples'Rights (creating the African Court ofHuman and Peoples' Rights) and theProtocol of the merger of these two courts,a marriage that begot the African Court ofJustice and Human Rights. This one isknown as “the Merger Protocol.”

Currently, there is only one activecourt at the Continental level: The AfricanCourt of Human and Peoples' Rights.The African Court of Human and Peoples'Rights

RatificationThe protocol that created this Court

has been ratified by only 26 African States,out of 54 members of the AU.

Only six of these States have signed thedeclaration allowing individuals and NGOsto access the Court.The Court has been actively engaged in asensitization exercise throughout Africa.The fruits are a work in progress.

Two courts are an expensive venture tomaintain.

The African Court of Human andPeoples' Rights is perhaps the best funded,in relative terms, among its Inter-Americanand European counterparts.

Its 2010 budget reached US$7,939,375. It is a small court, still with acomparatively low volume of work andcomposed of part-time judges. If the AUdoubles this expense it can go bankrupt.

Certainly, the European Court ofHuman Rights had a 2010 budget allocation

of more than US$ 70 million, but it issuedhundreds of judgments and it seats 47judges on a full-time basis.

The Inter-American Court has a budg-et of around USD 4 million. Its work vol-ume and output is also far superior to theAfrican Court's.

The idea of merging the Court ofJustice of the African Union and the AfricanCourt on Human and Peoples' Rights wasfirst raised in 2003.

However, opponents of the mergerargued that the process would relegatehuman rights issues.

The negotiations became heated andthe Executive Council of the African Unionruled that: “the African Court on Humanand Peoples' Rights shall remain a separateand distinct institution from the Court ofJustice of the African Union...”

Surprisingly, the merger issue re-emerged in 2004 during the third AUOrdinary Session. It was decided “that the

African Court on Human and Peoples'Rights and the Court of Justice should beintegrated into one Court.”

MandateThe Commission criticised this move

harshly. It said that the two courts had“essentially different mandates and litigantsand that the decision could have a negativeimpact on the establishment of an effectiveAfrican Court on Human and Peoples'Rights.”

Three years later, in Sharm El-Sheikh,Egypt, the 'Protocol on the Statute of theAfrican Court of Justice and Human Rights'(the Merger Protocol) was adopted at theAfrican Union Summit.

At this point it was clear that the merg-er was irreversible.

This merged court, the African Courtof Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) isnot yet operational.

The merged court does not include inits protocol a criminal chamber. This matteris under study. It will take long.

As Justice Ben Kioko says, if a criminalchamber is finally added the African Courtand the ICC could have concurrent jurisdic-tions and be guided by the principle of com-plementarity.

There are still political, legal and finan-cial contentious issues which the AUexperts are trying to resolve.

It would be wonderful if they managedto get it through. It may not be perfect, butas the Egyptian proverb says: A beautifulthing is never perfect.

What is certain is that nothing will hap-pen until the whole legal mayhem isresolved.

A number of structures within theAfrican human rights systems were created,willingly or unwillingly, toothless.

To change this requires African politi-cal will and financial independence.

Otherwise we will multiply organs andincrease expenditure, but no change will beforthcoming.

The big question is: Will the Assemblyof Heads of State and Government of theUnion be up to the task?

They should know that they may beturning Arusha into our own Hague… andbe ready to pay for it and live with it.

* Dr Luis Franceschi is the Dean of StrathmoreLaw School and a regular contributor to theDaily Nation, Kenya.

“In Africa we have drafted and

adopted three main protocols

in this area: Protocol of the

African Court of Justice (creat-

ing the African Court of

Justice), Protocol of the African

Court of Human and Peoples'

Rights (creating the African

Court of Human and Peoples'

Rights) and the Protocol of the

merger of these two courts, a

marriage that begot the

African Court of Justice and

Human Rights. This one is

known as “the Merger

Protocol.”

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31AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.3

ON September 4, 2013, the new presidentof Mali was inaugurated. Ibrahim BoubacarKeïta was voted into office in August withan overwhelming majority. It had been ahigh-risk election, held against the back-ground of a multidimensional crisis withregional consequences. With Keïta's acces-sion to power, efforts to resolve the complexcrisis facing Mali enter a new phase, whichwill be decisive in terms of consolidating thesecurity and political gains of the pastmonths.

The transition period, which is nowcoming to an end, had two main functions:

to manage the crisis in the north and toorganise countrywide elections. The firstaim was partially accomplished through themilitary intervention of France's OperationServal and the African-led InternationalSupport Mission to Mali (AFISMA). As tothe second, a preliminary peace agreementwas signed between, on the one hand, theMalian transitional government and, on theother, the National Liberation Movementof Azawad (MNLA) and the High Councilfor the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), whichhad taken control of the Kidal region afterthe military intervention.

The Preliminary Agreement for thepresidential election and inclusive peacetalks, signed on June 18 in Ouagadougou,Burkina Faso, was to be implemented intwo stages. First, it had to create conditionsallowing presidential elections to be heldacross the country, including in the Kidalregion. Second, after the election, it had toensure the continuation of an inclusive dia-logue that would lead to the signing of afinal and comprehensive peace agreement.

The presidential election passed thecrucial test on July 28 and August 11, 2013,when its two rounds of voting took place.

POLITICS

Mali's post elections challengesWith President Keïta's accession to power, efforts to resolve the complex crisis facing Mali enter

a new phase, which will be decisive in terms of consolidating the security and political gains of

the past months, write *Lori-Anne Theroux-Benoni and Baba Dakono.

Tuareg rebels

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POLITICS

32 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.3

Given the political, logistical and securitychallenges, the presidential elections wereconsidered successful both nationally andinternationally. First, the entire country wasable to participate, although the voting inKidal turned out to be largely symbolic.Second, no major security incidents werereported during the polls.

Third, participation rates in the firstand second rounds exceeded all predictions,amounting to 48.98 per cent and 44.41 percent respectively. While analysts initiallyfeared that the president-elect would lacklegitimacy, Keïta, leader of the Rally forMali (RPM), was elected with an over-whelming majority of 77.62 per cent in thesecond round. And while there was concernabout post-election protests calling theresults into question, Keïta's rival, SoumaïlaCissé, representing the Union for theRepublic and Democracy (URD), conced-ed defeat even before the announcement ofthe provisional results.

In terms of the challenges ahead, Keïtaurgently has to address the thorny securityissues in northern Mali, including the prob-lem of Tuareg armed groups, as well as Araband Songhai militias. In this regard, theinclusive dialogue, a central part of the rec-onciliation process, will deal with the fol-lowing themes: the administrative and insti-tutional organisation of Mali, particularly inthe northern regions, the strategy forregional and local integrated development,and the reorganisation of the defence andsecurity forces, as well as the socio-econom-ic disarmament, demobilisation and reinte-gration programme for the northern armedgroups.

The inclusive dialogue will also discussthe improvement of administrative, eco-nomic and political governance, the returnof refugees and internally displaced personsand their resettlement, and the protectionand promotion of human rights, justice andreconciliation.

According to the PreliminaryAgreement, the Dialogue andReconciliation Commission plays a centralrole in the dialogue process, which shouldlead to a final comprehensive peace agree-ment. Keïta also plans to organise a nation-al conference on northern Mali. This con-ference, which will be a prelude to negotia-tions for the final comprehensive agree-ment, will lay the foundations for dialogueand reconciliation.

To fully address the security issue,Keïta, with the support of external partners,

will also need to tackle the reform of thedefence and security sectors, a theme thatfigured prominently in the election cam-paign. The development of regional cooper-ation will also need to be adequately takeninto account to address the security dimen-sion of Mali's problems.

Other major challenges are consolidat-ing the political gains and continuing theinstallation of democratic institutions,including the renewal of the NationalAssembly. The deputies' mandate, whichhad expired over a year ago, was extended toallow the Assembly to serve until the nextparliamentary elections. However, eversince the transitional governmentannounced that the first round of these elec-tions would take place on 27 October 2013,the Malian political class has been divided.

Part of the political class, especiallysupporters of the United Front for theProtection of Democracy and the Republic(FDR), feel that the elections should beheld as soon as possible. Others, especiallythose close to the coalition led by Keïta,believe it is important to use the pre-elec-tion period to better address those aspectsthat proved problematic during the presi-dential election, including the question ofvoters who recently turned 18, refugees andinternally displaced people. The next stepsin the democratic process will largelydepend on the ability of the government tocreate the conditions for a constructiveworking relationship with the opposition.In addition, in some areas of Mali, especial-ly in the Kidal region, the parliamentaryelections could lead to violent power strug-

gles between or within communities.Finally, the new president is expected

to start showing results in terms of thecountry's economic recovery. The Malianeconomy was badly affected by the securityand institutional crisis. On May 15, 2013, ahigh-level conference of donors for thedevelopment of Mali was held in Brussels, atthe end of which €3.25 billion was raised tofinance a “2013-2014 plan for the sustain-able recovery of Mali”.

The introduction of good governancepractices remains the cornerstone for themobilisation of these external resources.The success of the economic recovery,beyond the support of the internationalcommunity, also depends on the ability ofthe new government to create conditionsfor the development of economic activitiesin peripheral regions.

The success of the presidential electionis a victory for Mali and its partners.However, it should not overshadow theimportant challenges that lie ahead. The fullimplementation of the PreliminaryOuagadougou Agreement must remain apriority for the new Malian authorities andexternal partners. Close attention must bepaid to the post-election talks, as well as todefence and security sector reform, theorganisation of parliamentary elections andeconomic recovery.

* Lori-Anne Theroux-Benoni, SeniorResearcher, and Baba Dakono, Junior Fellow,Conflict Prevention and Risk AnalysisDivision, ISS Dakar

Kids in Kidal celebrate government recapture of town

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33AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.3

POLITICS

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34 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.3

WHEN Francois Biloa fell ill with malaria,his family did what they had always done inthe past - they gave him anti-malaria drugsand antibiotics bought from the local mar-ket. Only when his condition worsened andhe became bedridden and fell unconscious,did his family take him to a local clinic inCameroon's capital Yaoundé.

According to the clinic's health atten-dant, six out of every 10 patients there hadbeen using illegal or counterfeit drugs read-ily available in this Central African nation'smarket place prior to admittance.

“We bought medicine from a storebecause it worked for us with [previous]malaria attacks and it is very affordable.With just about two dollars we usually

afford a [fake] Coartem packet, which is afull treatment for malaria,” Biloa tells IPSfrom his hospital bed.

In pharmacies, a packet of Coartemcosts seven to eight dollars, while on theillicit market a packet can be bought for lessthan three dollars. A medical consultationcosts four dollars on average.

“But in this hospital, I am told my bill isnow over 75 dollars. The doctor says that Ihave a resistant strain of malaria and alsotyphoid fever,” Biloa says.

“I felt like I was dying during myattempted treatment at home. I only startedregaining energy and full consciousnessafter [coming to] this clinic.”

In markets and on roadsides across

Yaoundé, fake and illegal drugs are stackedon wooden racks and tables, openly dis-played for sale. Trading in these drugs is ille-gal. The are available as a result of weak reg-ulation, poor health services and high med-ical costs.

There are no precise figures on thequantity of illegal drugs enteringCameroon, but up to 70 percent of drugssold here are traded on the black market,says Christophe Ampoam of the NationalCouncil of the Pharmaceutical Society ofCameroon.

According to Ampoam, this trade inillicit medication is so well organised thatgovernment officials and the police arehelpless to halt it.

Cameroon's sick at riskfrom fake drugs

Fake drugs continue to wreak havoc on unsuspecting Africa's sick population as

*Monde Kingsley Nfor writes.

HEALTH

M-Pedigree’s innovation allows drug buyers to verify the

authenticity of a medicine via SMS

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35AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.3

“The trade in illicitdrugs in Cameroonoperates like a verypowerful mafia-like net-work, which is very dif-ficult to dismantle. It isestimated that invest-ment in illicit sales ofmedicines is five timesmore lucrative thanthrough the regular sys-tem. Local officialsdread dismantling thenetwork because it hasalso infiltrated the judi-cial and customs sys-tem,” Ampoam tellsIPS.

“Corrupt regulato-ry and legal systems areeasily exploited bycriminal smugglers andadditional rules haveonly increased corrup-tion.”

Ampoam says thatmost of the counterfeitdrugs are made in theMiddle East and Eastand South Asia, yetmany carry the inscrip-tion 'Made in Germany'. They are smuggledinto Cameroon by sea and through theporous borders this country shares withNigeria and the Central African Republic.

“Although it is difficult to give an exactstatistic on the percentage of illicit drugsfound in local markets today, the availabili-ty of drugs in local markets, makeshiftshops, on the streets and along the high-ways tells of the deplorable situation inCameroon,” he says.

The World Health Organisation(WHO) estimates that worldwide 200,000deaths per annum could be prevented ifpeople did not use counterfeit drugs.According to the International PolicyNetwork report, fake tuberculosis andmalaria drugs alone are estimated to kill700,000 people globally each year.

“Most of the drugs in circulation havebeen banned in certain countries becausethey are toxic or counterfeit. Some have thecorrect ingredients but in low quantities.Some of the drugs are samples or medicinesdonated by NGOs,” Ampoam explains.

Marlise Loudang, director of the phar-maceutical inspection service at the min-istry of public health says that government

teams in every region across the country areclamping down on the illegal trade, but sofar efforts have been unsuccessful.

“Self-medication [with illegal andcounterfeit drugs] is a big public healthproblem in Cameroon that affects almostevery family. This stems from the easyaccess to drugs of doubtful origin and qual-ity all over the national territory,” Loudangtells IPS.

Marcel Olinga is a vendor of counter-feit and illegal drugs and says that eventhough authorities have raided him, it hasnot deterred him from continuing. “Once ina while the police come around and seizemy drugs, but it is a loss worth incurringbecause the raids are not regular and ourmain stocks are never where we sell.”

Olinga says he makes about 40 dollarsa day.

“We receive many customers daily.Some come with prescriptions from doc-tors others seek our advice before buyingand some simply demand what they want,”he tells IPS.

According the WHO, there are 13,514patients for every doctor in Cameroon,although some say the ratio is higher, espe-

cially in rural areas. Poverty also limitsmany from seeking medication from hospi-tals and health clinics.

“Some patients run from costs of con-sultation in hospitals and fall in the hands ofillegal drug vendors who are ready to selldrugs at prices far more below the legalmarket price,” Williams Takang from theYaoundé University Teaching Hospital tellsIPS.

“Self-medication [with illegal andcounterfeit drugs] results in commonhealth problems in local hospitals and theworst of these cases are in hospitals found inpoor neighbourhoods and rural communi-ties where the poverty level is very high andaccess to a doctor is costly,” he says.

“The intake of fake and illegal medi-cines can lead to life-threatening conse-quences especially for diseases with highmortality rates like malaria. Unfortunatelymost of the patients suffering from thesecommon diseases put themselves on med-ication without any prior medical consulta-tions,” Takang says.

* Monde Kingsley Nfor writes for IPS fromYaounde, Cameroun.

HEALTH

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WOMEN

36 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.3

FOR El Hadji Souley Moussa, a 60-year-oldretired bank employee in Niger, “marryingoff a daughter when she is young is a sourceof great pride. This way, she is protectedfrom pregnancy outside of marriage.”

It is no wonder that a population andhealth survey conducted in 2012 by theMinistry of Public Health, and released thisJuly, revealed that 75 percent of girls getmarried before the age of 18 in this Saheliencountry of 16 million in West Africa.According to the study, young girls agedbetween 15 and 19 years are the most vul-nerable.

In 2011 the United Nations Children'sFund State of the World's Children reportranked Niger first on its list of countrieswith a high prevalence of early marriages.Yahaya Issa, a guidance counsellor at theMinistry of National Education, told IPSthat parents who marry off their youngdaughters usually cite their religion as thereason.

“For us Muslims, marriage holds animportant place in our lives,” AminatouAbdou, 53, a housewife in Niamey told IPS.She married off her two daughters at theages of 15 and 16. “It is unacceptable forMuslim daughters to have no husband afterpuberty.”

Not all Muslims share this view. “Thereis misinterpretation of the religion. Islamadvocates social wellbeing. This is why I amagainst prematurely marrying off a daughterbecause this has bad implications for herhealth,” Malam Issa Dogo, a religiouspreacher, told IPS.

“Those who marry off their daughtersearly do so because of ignorance. Islam is areligion which is against lack of knowledge,”he added.

According to Abdou Sani, an anthro-pology doctorate student at the Universityof Abidjan, people use religion as a false pre-

text. The real reasons for these early mar-riages are ignorance and poverty, he said.“In most cases, these young girls are mar-ried off to older people who are financiallywell-off or have a high social status,” he toldIPS.

Early marriages result in early pregan-cies, which compromises the girls' future asmany do not go to school once they are ofmarriageable age. Medical sources indicatethat 40 percent of young brides fall preg-nant a few months after marriage.

“Socio-cultural pressures, particularlythe desire to have a child before the firstmarriage anniversary often forces the younggirl to prove her fertility a few months aftermarriage,” Salissou Habou, a sociologist inNiamey, Niger's capital, told IPS.

According to 2011 statistics from theMinistry of Public Health, teenagers make

up 19 percent of women of reproductive ageand contribute 14 percent to the totalfemale fertility in this country.

“Less than 40 percent of teenagers gofor antenatal care,” Hadjara Tinni, a mid-wife based in Niamey, told IPS.

According to Tinni, because younggirls fall pregnant before their bodies aremature, they are twice as likely to die duringchildbirth than women who over the age of20.

According to the Ministry of PublicHealth's 2011 survey, the rate of maternalmortality in Niger is 554 deaths per 100,000live births - among the highest in the world.Teenagers account for 13 percent of thesedeaths.

“Survivors often suffer from illnessessuch as obstetric fistula,” Hassan Idrissa,another midwife in Niamey told IPS. InApril 2013, out of 163 obstetric fistula vic-tims counted in the country's six healthcarecentres, 80 percent were married before theage of 18, the Ministry of Public Health stat-ed.

“We must educate and keep young girlsat school in order to put an end to this situ-ation,” urged Hadiza Issoufou, a teacherand member of the Nigerien Association forthe Defence of Human Rights.

However, the draft law drawn up in2002 setting the minimum age for marriageat 18 is still being opposed by religious asso-ciations.

“The situation of teenage girls is amajor concern, but unfortunately a largesegment of the population is ignorant aboutthe problem,” declared Dr. MakibiDandobi, Nigerien population minister onWorld Population Day on Jul. 11.

* Souleymane Maazou writes for IPS from

Niamey, Niger.

Most brides in Nigerare children

In Niger, 75 percent of girls get married before the age of 18 writes, *Souleymane Maazou.

“Early marriages result in

early pregancies, which com-

promises the girls' future as

many do not go to school once

they are of marriageable age.

Medical sources indicate that

40 percent of young brides fall

pregnant a few months after

marriage.”

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37AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.3

RIGHTS

IN a police station at Port de Boulbinet, inGuinea's capital, Conakry, a teenagerbrushes his hand across the foot of a friend -a sign of asking forgiveness.

As part of mediation by police officersand an aid worker from the local NGOSabou-Guinée, the youth is begging pardonfrom his companion for having attackedhim. Officers had detained the two the pre-vious day for brawling in public. Thanks tothe intervention, led by Sabou-Guinée, apolice commander agrees to let them goinstead of sending them to the central

prison - a common route for minors andolder offenders alike, even in cases of pettycrime.

The mediation approach is supposedto be the rule, but it's the exception inGuinea, child rights experts say.

Guinean law says that when a minor isapprehended for a crime, authorities shouldmake detention a last resort, giving prece-dence to mediation and family involve-ment, awareness raising, and other preven-tive measures. In initial questioning, chil-dren are to be accompanied by a parent or

guardian and a lawyer. But in this, and inmany other procedures, the system fallsshort.

Children are routinely deprived of legalrepresentation because of a severe shortageof state lawyers handling minors' cases;there are just 10 for the whole country,according to the International Bureau forChildren's Rights (IBCR).

As of 2009, the latest year for whichdata are available, 611 children weredetained in Guinea, among them 86 girls,according to a 2012 study by IBCR, the UN

Gaps in Guinea's penal systemrob children of their rights

Guinea's children thanks to some gaps in their penal system are robbed of their rights as the law

which calls for use of detention as a last resort is thrown aside, according to a *IRIN report.

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38 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.3

Children's Fund (UNICEF), Save theChildren and Sabou-Guinée. UNICEF saysthe number probably still hovers around600.

“You can find minors who did nothingworse than steal some food or a smallamount of money spending six months, ayear or more in the central prison, havingnever seen a single judge,” said a gendarmein Conakry's Matam neighbourhood whorequested anonymity. “Rather than con-tributing to their reintegration into society,we are hardening their hearts.”

Olivier Feneyrol, head of the interna-tional NGO Terre des Hommes (TdH) inGuinea, puts it this way: “Every time we puta child in prison, we produce a delinquent.”

ImplementationThis is one of the things Sabou-Guinée

looks to prevent, as its workers regularlymake the rounds at police and gendarmeposts in Conakry and other parts of Guinea,intervening on behalf of minors in troublewith the law.

Guinea passed a children's rights law in2008, based on international conventionsthe country has ratified; it sets out rules forhandling minors suspected of crimes.

"Every time we put a child in prison, weproduce a delinquent."

“Guinea has a very good law. The prob-lem is in its application,” said ThiernoSadou Diallo, a Conakry-based legal scholarwho worked on this issue for years withSabou and TdH. “For example, outside ofConakry, we don't have tribunals specializ-ing in handling minors [as the law calls for].This means in the rest of the country, thesame personnel are treating both adults' andminors' cases, yet the latter require a spe-cialist in children's rights.”

International children's rightsresearchers have expressed concern thatchildren in police custody and in detentionare subjected to ill treatment and torture.

Justice Ministry spokesman IbrahimaBéavogui told IRIN: “Those charged withhandling minors' cases lack the resources tofollow these cases closely and carry out theirwork properly… But it is not only a ques-tion of resources. It's a question of special-ized education and training for all judicialpersonnel.” He said proper handling ofminors is part of ongoing reforms inGuinea's justice system.

As part of its intervention TdH trainspolice, gendarmes and judges in Conakry.

“After one seminar, we went to the cen-

tral prison,” said the Matam gendarme, whoparticipated in a training about minors'rights. “Seeing young people locked upthere - that really hit me.”

He said one colleague wept when ayouth at the prison recognized and greetedhim, saying: “Do you remember me? You'rethe one who ordered me sent here.” Theyouth had been in detention for a year.

Detention without trial is not just aproblem for minors in Guinea, Béavoguisaid. “Even in temporary custody, you'll seepeople spending a week or two without aninitial questioning. All the way down theline, the system is dysfunctional.”

He said Guinea has a lot of work to do“to make the judiciary strong and independ-ent”.

When they learn of minors who areremanded into custody, Sabou-Guinéeworkers follow up to see that the detaineesdo not spend longer awaiting trial than thelaw stipulates - four or six months, depend-ing on the degree of the crime, renewableonce - in quarters separate from olderoffenders.

In cases where the authorities opt foralternatives to detention, the aid workersvisit minors' homes, checking that stay outof trouble, and assisting them in gettingtraining or work when possible.

“This is about protecting minors'rights, but it's also for the whole of society,in that it educates and monitors youths whomight otherwise fall into a life of crime,”said Sabou-Guinée's Maurice Kamano.

Rights and responsibilitiesWhen Kamano visits various police sta-

tions throughout Conakry, he is greeted likefamily. Police officers and gendarmes askhim for updates on cases. Many of the offi-cers joke with him. “Ah, the kids' lawyer ishere,” chimes one. “No special treatmentfor kids today - a crime is a crime,” quips apoliceman.

Joking aside, those involved in the pro-grammes do not say minors who have com-mitted crimes should get away with them.

“On the contrary,” said TdH's Feneyrol.“The idea is to protect the child's rights andfind alternatives to putting minors in prisonwith hardened criminals.”

For lack of means, Guinea does nothave detention facilities for minors, andorganizations like Sabou and TdH encour-age alternatives such as community serviceand education centres - approaches provid-ed for in Guinean law.

“It would take significant resources toset up the infrastructure needed for minorsin trouble with the law,” said Feneyrol. “It'snot just about creating a separate prisonbuilding for children. You've got to havestaff specially trained in children's rightsand programmes adapted to minors.”

Legal scholar Diallo says: “The objec-tive of justice when it comes to minors is tohelp these young people reintegrate intosociety. From questioning to detention tojudgment, the idea should be to help themget back on the right track, come back to thefamily and community, and becomeupstanding adult members of society.”

Looking forwardThe officers at the port police station

said they face touchy decisions daily as theylook to uphold these principles, protectminors' rights, and at the same time keeporder. Their hands are full with unoccupied,unruly youths, and they say drugs are amajor problem. “There's a pill the kids taketoday - renders them utterly irrational anddefiant,” one policeman said.

Aid worker Kamano runs into someyouths at the port who are trying to stay onthe right track. As they approach, he mar-vels at how they have grown. Years ago, hehelped them when they were children drift-ing through the streets and flirting withcrime. Today, they make money cleaningfish, transporting goods in pushcarts anddoing other odd jobs at the port.

Amadou Condé, 23, says Kamanohelped him out years ago, when he was inthe streets. Condé received training in car-pentry, but later left that to clean fish, whichpromised quicker money. He makes justenough to get by, but wants a better life forhis five-year-old son, so he now hopes toestablish himself as a carpenter.

“I want to put my son in school,”Condé said. “He mustn't live this unstablelife I've lived. I want a better future for him.”

* An IRIN report from Conakry, Guinea.

RIGHTS

"Every time we put a child

in prison, we produce

a delinquent."

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