Turkey and the European Union.pdf

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Turkey and the European UnionA Journey in the Unknown

NATHALIE TOCCI

turkey project policy paper

Number 5 November 2014


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policy paper

Number 5, November 2014

About CUSE

Te Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings fosters high-level U.S.-European dia-

logue on the changes in Europe and the global challenges that affect transatlantic relations. As an integral

part of the Foreign Policy Program, the Center offers independent research and recommendations for U.S.

and European officials and policymakers, and it convenes seminars and public forums on policy-relevant

issues. CUSEs research program focuses on the transformation of the European Union; strategies for en-

gaging the countries and regions beyond the frontiers of the EU including the Balkans, Caucasus, Russia,

urkey and Ukraine; and broader European security issues such as the future of NAO and forging com-

mon strategies on energy security. Te Center also houses specific programs on France, Italy, and urkey.

About the Turkey Project

Given urkeys geopolitical, historical and cultural significance, and the high stakes posed by the foreign

policy and domestic issues it faces, Brookings launched the urkey Project in 2004 to foster informed public

consideration, highlevel private debate, and policy recommendations focusing on developments in urkey.

In this context, Brookings has collaborated with the urkish Industry and Business Association (SAD)

to institute a U.S.-urkey Forum at Brookings. Te Forum organizes events in the form of conferences, sem-

inars and workshops to discuss topics of relevance to U.S.-urkish and transatlantic relations. Te urkey

Project also produces a range of policy-relevant publications to encourage independent thinking and debateon how the United States should engage this pivotal country. With this goal in mind, the urkey Project

Policy Paper Series publishes quarterly reports on a range of issues that are shaping U.S.-urkish relations.

Previous urkey Project Policy Papers can be accessed at www.brookings.edu/turkeyprojectpapers

Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is in its

absolute commitment to quality, independence, and impact. Activities sup-

ported by its donors reflect this commitment, and the analysis and recom-mendations of the Institutions scholars are not determined by any donation.


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Turkey and the European UnionA Journey in the Unknown

NATHAL IETOCCI

The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings

Turkey project1

Turkey has always been, is, and will likely re-main one o the most important countries orthe European Union. In terms o its significanceor the EU, urkey stands on par with Russia in

the neighborhood, and a step down afer the Unit-

ed States and China on the global scene. Te im-

portance o urkey or Europe is rooted in the

historic ties between the two sides, dating back

to Ottoman times. Be it through war, diplomacy,

commerce, art, cuisine, or intermarriage, urkey

has always been an integral part o Europes histo-

ry. Over centuries, relations between the two were

characterized by cooperation and convergence

or instance, the deep economic, cultural, artistic,

and societal exchanges between the Ottoman Em-

pire and European powers and city-states in the

fifeenth through to the seventeenth centuries. At

the same time, conflict and competition were ram-

pant, notably the Ottoman-Habsburg wars, until

the European balance o power in the eighteenth

century. But even in times o war, a code o honour

existed between the warring parties, in a sign orecognition and legitimization o one another.1By

the mid nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire

had been admitted into the Concert o Europe and

quickly became party to the evolving rudimentary

international law at the time.2

Tis contrasting mix o conflict and cooperation

has rested at the heart o the contested identity

construction o both urkey and Europe rom thevery outset. On the one hand, the early urkish

Republican project was adamant in asserting its

European credentials at all costs, even i this meant

playing up the inherited nineteenth century slogan

o the ailing Ottoman Empire as the sick man o

Europe.3On the other hand, urkey stood on the

rontiers o the early ideas o European unification

in the inter-war years. For pragmatic and strategic

reasons, urkey was ultimately included in Aris-

tide Briands Commission o Enquiry or Europe-

an Union within the ramework o the League o

Nations, while it was excluded rom the more ide-

alistic pan-Europe proposal sponsored by Richard

Coudenhove-Kalergi.4

rue to history, urkeys relations with the Europe-

an integration project have been dense, contested,

and tortuous since the outset.5Despite their inten-

sity and duration over the decades, the end pointo the relationship remains unknown to this day.

In light o this, this paper briefly recounts the evo-

lution o the EU-urkey relationship and outlines

three possible scenarios or the uture. It concludes

by discussing the implications o these scenarios

or the United States.


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Turkey and the European Union

A Journey in the Unknown2

TURKEY AND THE EU: TOWARDS ANUNCERTAIN FUTURE

The prospect o ull membership was embeddedin the 1963 Association Agreement betweenurkey and the European Economic Community(EEC). In 1987, urkey submitted a ormal request

or ull membership, which was rejected by the Eu-

ropean Commission in 1989 on the grounds that

urkey maniested grave democratic deficiencies.

Notwithstanding, the door to urkeys EU entry

was not shut. Te Commissions Opinion on ur-

keys membership application in 1989 confirmed

that urkey, unlike Morocco, which also applied

or membership in 1987, was eligible or ull EU

membership.6Te prospects or urkeys EU mem-

bership brightened in 1996, when urkey entered

the EU customs union, marking the beginning o

higher levels o economic integration and, in An-

karas eyes, the prelude to ull EU membership.7

Te accession process was not to begin immedi-

ately, however, as in 1997 the European Council in

Luxemburg underlined that urkey, while eligible,

still did not meet the standards or EU candidacy.8

Te watershed came in December 1999, when the

European Council in Helsinki granted urkey its

long-sought candidacy,9albeit not opening acces-

sion negotiations as was done or all the other en-

largement countries at the time (the Central and

Eastern European countries, Cyprus, and Malta).

Te argument was that in order to open accession

talks, urkey had to ulfil the Copenhagen polit-

ical criteria or membership and make progress

towards resolving the Cyprus problem as well as

bilateral conflicts with Greece.10In turn, the Com-

mission was given a mandate to monitor progress

in urkeys domestic perormance and to draf

an Accession Partnership document or urkey,

recommending areas or urkish reorm. Te EU

also upgraded and adapted its financial assistance

to urkey, redirecting aid to provide more explicit

support or urkeys reorms.

Te acceleration o urkeys reorm momentum

particularly afer late 2001, defined by many as

a silent revolution in the country,11 spilled into

urkeys EU accession process, especially when

the Copenhagen European Council in December

2002 concluded that it would determine whether

and when to open accession talks with urkey in

December 2004. Te approaching green light or

the opening o negotiations set a target and a time-

line in the reorm programme o the Justice and

Development Party (AKP) government electedin November 2002. urkeys progress in reorms

spurred the December 2004 European Council to

conclude that urkey sufficiently ulfilled the po-

litical criteria and that accession talks could begin

in October 2005.12

Paradoxically, afer the opening o accession nego-

tiations in 2005, the momentum in urkeys acces-

sion process was lost. urkeys accession negotia-

tions proceeded at a snails pace in their early years

and stalled altogether between 2010 and 2013.

By mid-2014, a mere 14 out o 35 chapters had

been opened and only one chapter (science and

research) provisionally closed. Multiple vetoes by

the European Council, France, and the Republic o

Cyprus have meant that most chapters o the ac-

quiscommunautaire up or negotiation are rozen

and that no chapter can be provisionally closed.13

Since the turn o the century, urkey has thus been

part o the EUs accession process. Although the

accession process ormally began afer decades o

contractual ties between urkey and the European

integration project, the process has been in a co-

matose state or the best part o the last decade.14


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Turkey project3

For all candidates beore urkey, the accession

process has always culminated in ull membership.

Yet in urkeys case, the path to membership has

been raught with roadblocks and hurdles, making

the final destination uncertain at best.

Te singularity o urkey emerges vividly rom a

cursory glance at the accession timelines o oth-

er candidate countries beore (and contempora-

neous to) it (See able 1). urkey represents the

only case o an accession process that has lasted

over a decade. Spains accession process was pro-

tracted, particularly considering that at the time

the European Community was ar less developed

in terms o its laws, rules, and procedures than itis today. Polands accession, alongside other Cen-

tral and Eastern member states, also lasted almost

a decade. In the case o Poland and Croatia, acces-

sion was complicated by the act that the EU is ar

more developed today than during previous en-

largement rounds. Notwithstanding, urkey clear-

ly stands in a league o its own. Having applied or

European Community membership in 1987, ur-

key has been in the accession process or almost

three decades. Unlike any other candidate beore

it, its membership is nowhere in sight. Despite all

the complications o the enlargement process to

the Western Balkans,15 ew question these coun-

tries will eventually enter the Union. Such certain-

ty does not maniest in debates about EU enlarge-

ment to include urkey. Notable in this respect

is the programme which Commission President

Jean-Claude Juncker presented to the European

Parliament in July 2014: under my Presidency o

the Commission, ongoing negotiations will con-

tinue, and notably the Western Balkans will need

to keep a European perspective, but no urther en-largement will take place over the next five years.16

On urkey, the Commission President did not ut-

ter one word.

Furthermore, EU itsel is in a proound state o

transormation since the eruption o the eurozone

crisis in 2010. Te crisis has represented the Unions

quintessential existential moment. Tis, coupled

with the ensuing deep socio-political cleavages be-devilling the EU, brought the integration project

to a brink. Either the monetary union would col-

lapse, bringing along with it the entire European

edifice, or the EU would ultimately exit the crisis

as a prooundly transormed deeper Union.17Since

European Central Bank President Mario Draghis

assured he would do whatever it takes to save the

single currency in 2013, the spectre o complete

ragmentation hasor the time beingbeen

shelved. And yet, the contours o a post-crisis EUare still not clearly delineated. Instead, what is clear

instead is that i the EU successully concludes its

banking union, proceeds towards a fiscal union,

bolsters its democratic legitimacy, and tackles cru-

cial policy challenges spanning across deence, en-

ergy, migration, and inrastructure matters, it will

Table 1: Stages in the EU Accession Process - Turkey in Comparative Perspective

Spain Austria Poland Turkey CroatiaApplication submitted 1977 1989 1997 1987 2003

Commission Opinion 1978 1989 1997 1989 2004

Candidate status 1978 1989 1997 1999 2004

Accession talks start 1978 1993 1998 2005 2005

Accession talks end 1985 1994 2003 - 2013

Accession 1986 1995 2004 - 2013


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be a prooundly different union rom the one we

know today.18

Surprisingly, the tumultuous developments in the

EU over the last our years have not had a visible

impact on the content o the enlargement policy.

When compared to the heydays o the eastern en-

largement in the early 2000s, there has been a clear

reduction o the political priority attached to en-

largement. Te Western Balkans and urkey have

both been victims o this scaling down o Euro-

pean attention. However, the actual content o the

accession process has remained untouched. While

the EU as a whole may evolve into a ederal enti-

ty, through concentric circles, hub-and-spokes ormultiple clusters in the years ahead, so ar, none

o these possibilities have been actored into the

enlargement policy. Enlargement proceeds in

slow-motion, as i the world stood still. And yet

at some point, when the dust settles and the uture

EUs contours are revealed, the enlargement pro-

cess will necessarily have to catch up with reality.

Whether this will acilitate or hamper EU enlarge-

ment remains to be seen.

For urkey, the eurozone crisis at a time when the

urkish economy continued to perorm well led the

government to take an increasingly skeptical view o

EU membership. Strikingly, then-Prime Minister o

urkey Recep ayyip Erdoan, when addressing the

AKP Congress in 2012, did not include EU mem-

bership in his vision speech or 2023.19His minister

responsible or relations with the European Unionin urkey, Egemen Ba argued that urkey would

probably never become a member o the Union be-

cause o the prejudices o some o its members.20As

the Independent Commission on urkey also not-

ed, support or EU membership once at 73 percent

in 2004, dropped dramatically afer 2007, hovering

between 34 percent and 48 percent over the last sev-

en years.21Tis loss o enthusiasm was partly driven

by a growing conviction in urkey that the countryaced double standards with respect to the acces-

sion criteria. Te vocal (albeit tautological and thus

unnecessary) insistence that negotiations would be

open-ended, ollowed by growing calls rom Ger-

man Chancellor Angela Merkel or a privileged

partnership, which was backed by the then French

President Nicolas Sarkozys urkey-scepticism, only

hardened Ankaras views urther.22


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Turkey project5

THREE SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE

This brie excursion into the evolution o theEU-urkey relationship reveals its proounduncertainty. A pessimistic snapshot o the rela-

tionship today points towards a uture o progres-sive estrangement, competition, i not outright

conflict between urkey and the EU. At the same

time, a longer-term and more dynamic assessment

o the relationship would caution against excessive

pessimism, pointing to the depth and longevity

o the relationship and its cyclical ups and downs

over the decades. With this background in mind,

this paper will attempt to map the trajectory o

EU-urkey ties and their possible evolution in the

uture. In order to guide this endeavour, this pa-

per sets orth three scenarios or the uture o the

EU-urkey relationship. It deliberately constructs

the three scenarios as ideal types that oversimpli-

y reality, while acknowledging that in reality not

all their elements may be mutually exclusive. Tus,

their purpose is not descriptive but analytical and

their content regulative rather than constitutive.

Tese scenarios are not meant to be accurate pre-

dictions o the uture. Rather, they are meant to beterms o reerence or an assessment o the uture

trajectory o the relationship, and an assessment o

whether urkey and the EU are likely to tend more

towards convergence or conflict. In what ollows,

the paper briefly outlines what these three stylized

scenarios might look like.

Competition

A first scenario is that o a growing competition

and conflict between urkey and the EU. Te EU

would continue to pretend it is negotiating mem-

bership with urkey. But even urkeys supporters

in the EU would lose aith in the process. O these

supporters someItaly, Spain, Portugalwould

continue to be primarily concerned with their re-

covery rom the economic crisis. Others, such as

the UK, would be preoccupied with their own re-

lationship with the EU and the prospect o Britains

exit ahead o the 2017 reerendum.23 Te Eastern

European members would devote all their oreignpolicy efforts to conronting a resurgent Russia in

the near abroad. Afer the 2014 European Parlia-

ment elections, with the ormidable rise o pop-

ulism and the radical right notably in France, the

anti-urkey constituency at EU level would grow.24

With the 2014 turnover o the EU leadership, en-

largement policy would be seriously downgraded

in the Juncker Commission. Te Council would

not reach a unanimous decision to abandon theaccession process. Although urkeys EU mem-

bership does not garner an EU-wide consensus, a

unanimous decision to rescind urkeys enlarge-

ment perspective is even less likely.25

However, observing these dynamics, the decision

to abandon the process would be taken by urkey

itsel. Having won both the presidency in 2014

and secured a ourth electoral victory at the 2015

parliamentary elections, Recep ayyip ErdoansAKP would ormally abandon the accession pro-

cess with much anare. With its domestic hold on

power consolidated and populism on the rise in

urkey too, the AKP would begin to see the EU as

more o a liability than an asset. Te assets rom

the accession process would be considered as no

longer politically easible. For too long, negotiation

chapters were either opened at a snails pace or not

opened at all. Te prospects or ull membershiphad been pushed so ar down the line, they were no

longer credible. Furthermore, as the unchallenged

political orce in the county with the ability to push

singlehandedly or reorms, the urkish leader-

ship would openly declare it saw no value added

in joining the EU. It would no longer need the EU


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or its domestic political project. Te urkish gov-

ernment would continue pushing or reorms it

saw fitnotably on the Kurdish questionbut the

authoritarian and populist bent that has charac-

terized urkish leadership in recent years, such as

the backsliding on undamental reedoms and theerosion o checks and balances would significantly

deepen.26Tus, a solution to the Kurdish question

would be partial and unsustainable at best. For

urkey, the EU accession process would represent

a liability: an annoying reminder o the countrys

democratic deficits. In the governments eyes, time

would have come to put an end to the hypocrisy.

In this scenario, urkey would not necessarily headtowards economic crisis. As a country lacking nat-

ural resources whose development hinges on inte-

gration in the global economy, urkey would con-

tinue reaching out to regional and global markets

as a trading state.27Tere would also be an effort

to maintain a degree o discipline in its macroeco-

nomic policies. urkeys openness would also in-

clude the EU, which would remain its greatest eco-

nomic partner. However, the contractual basis or

the EU-urkey economic relationship would bescaled down rom a customs union to a ree trade

agreement.28Given the absence o a membership

perspective, the downsides o the customs union

notably the act that urkey must automatical-

ly comply with the terms o ree trade agreements

the EU signs with third countries without the

latter having an obligation to conclude ree trade

agreements with urkeywould simply be too

high. Te political class in urkey would agree onthe desirability o scaling down the economic re-

lationship with the EU, reeing its hands to pursue

a pro-active and reciprocal external trade policy.

Tus, urkey would sign ree trade agreements

with a wide range o countries and regional group-

ings. Te EU would be one among many that was

no longer a privileged partner. Tis would allow

the export-oriented urkish economy to continue

growing. However, political intererence in mar-

kets would grow, structural reorms would remain

incomplete, and the government would increasing-

ly reverse hallmark regulatory reorms o the early2000s.29 As a consequence, urkey would sustain

only a 2-3 percent average growth rate that would

not be sufficient to jump into the high-income

country category.

In security terms, urkey would increasingly be-

have like a lone wol, acting unilaterally, bilater-

ally, or multilaterally with European and non-Eu-

ropean partners alike on a transactional basisdepending on the issue at stake. Ankara would be

increasingly drawn into the turmoil bedevilling the

Middle East and Eurasia pursuing policies marked

by distinctive sectarian undertones. Be it in Syria,

Libya, Egypt, or Palestine, urkey would automat-

ically side with Sunni Muslims, above all those

representing Islamist (and in particular Muslim

Brotherhood) politics.30 Its policies in the Middle

East would be viewed in Europe with scepticism

and concern. Furthermore, the unsolved Cyprusconflict would continue to block a constructive re-

lationship between the EU and NAO.31Occasion-

al dialogue and cooperation with the EU would

take place, but as a whole both urkey and the EU

would watch one another with circumspection and

no longer see each other as partners o choice.

In terms o energy, urkey would continue to act

as an important partner or the EU, but Ankarawould not adopt the EU energy acquis given the

suspension o the accession process. In addition,

it would not accede to the Energy Communi-

ty and it would continue to depend heavily on

Russian gas. Azerbaijans control over the urk-

ish gas network would hamper urkeys poten-


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Turkey project7

tial to allow other energy sourcesnamely rom

the Eastern Mediterranean and Iraqto reach

Europe through urkey. Furthermore, the per-

sistence o the Cyprus conflict and the continu-

ing tensions in Israeli-urkish relations would

translate into Eastern Mediterranean gas beingliquefied and sold to Asian markets rather than

becoming a valuable additional resource in the

EUs energy security equation. Neither Cyprus

nor Israel would eel comortable exporting gas

to or through urkey.32

In regards to migration and mobility, urkeys mi-

gration transition would remain incomplete. Its

level o economic development would be such thatalongside growing immigration rom Arica, Eur-

asia, and the Middle East, urks would continue

immigrating into Europe, albeit at the reduced lev-

els witnessed over the last decade.33With deepening

turmoil in the southern neighbourhood, irregular

transit migration rom urkey into the EU would

persist as a thorn in the side o the relationship,34

while urkeys open visa policy towards its neigh-

bours would continue to raise eyebrows in Brussels.

Te double deal reached in December 2013 on a re-admission agreement and visa liberalization road-

map would break down, as a urkey estranged rom

the EU would ail to garner the necessary qualified

majority in the Council o the EU on visa liberal-

ization. In turn, Ankara would step back rom its

commitments on readmission.

Growing political, economic, security, and societal

estrangement would finally impact upon the ide-ational relationship between urkey and the EU.

Both urks and Europeans would end up agreeing

urkey is not a European country, which would no-

ticeably complicate the integration o urkish mi-

grant communities into the EU, who would become

increasingly susceptible to the diaspora policies o

the urkish government aimed at leveraging Euro-

urks or the purposes o sel-aggrandisement.35

Cooperation

A second scenario would see the EU and urkey

reaching a new ramework or cooperationbased

on respective complementarities.36 In this sce-

nario, both sides would abandon the accession

process, but like an engaged couple that consen-

sually acknowledges they were never meant or

one another, the EU and urkey would abandon

their wedding plans, and instead remain good

riends. urkeys domestic political development

would unold independently o the EU. urkeysgovernment would develop into an increasingly

centralized presidential or semi-presidential sys-

tem37with autonomy granted to the Kurdish com-

munity. Despite ailing to achieve a new civilian

constitution under the presidency o Recep ayy-

ip Erdoan, urkey would resolve its decades-old

Kurdish question on the basis o amnesty to PKK

militants and some orm o territorial autonomy

or the south-east. At the same time, urkey would

witness an increasingly centralized system o pow-

er, in which checks and balances rule o law weak-

ens and civic rights and reedoms are curtailed.

Te EU would continue to express praise or steps

like the Kurdish peace process and criticism or

setbacks like the erosion o separation o powers

and rule o law, but its sway over urkeys political

dynamics would be on a par with that o the Unit-

ed States, creating ripples without lasting impact.

urkey would conclude that it is in its national in-

terests to maintain a multi-vectored oreign policy,

which does not accord exclusive privileges to any

one partner. Afer much soul-searching, it would

admit that it sees no place or itsel in the tightly

integrated Union that would rise rom the ashes o


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the eurozone crisis. Tese eelings would intensiy

i sovereignist member states such as the UK exit

or redefine their relationship with the EU. At the

same time, urkey would openly admit that part-

nering with the EU on a unctional basis would

be in its best interest. Te ormerly taboo concepto a privileged partnership, originally coined by

Angela Merkel, would become championed by

urkey itsel, albeit worded differently. Te EU, or

its part, would sigh in relie. Particularly or oppo-

nents o urkeys EU membership in Paris, Berlin,

and Vienna, Ankaras gracious abandonment o

the process without any slamming o doors would

be seen as the best o possible worlds.

In this scenario, the EU-urkey customs union

would persist and be upgraded to cover services,

public procurement, and possibly agricultural

products as suggested by the World Bank.38 Such

a development may also be driven by the prospect

o negotiations between the EU and the U.S. on a

ransatlantic rade and Investment Partnership

(IP) being concluded. In order to hedge against

the trade diversion risk stemming rom IP, ur-

key would either succeed (alongside NAFA andEFA countries) to dock itsel to IP, or pursue

a twoold strategy o seeking a ree trade agreement

with the U.S. alongside an expansion o the cus-

toms union with the EU to all policy areas covered

by IP.39In this scenario, it would be in the EUs

interest to ensure that urkey is given a chance to

dock as long as IP is indeed concluded with

provisions that allows or its enlargement.40

Cooperation on security matters would also deep-

en. Since 2010, oreign policy cooperation between

the EU and urkey has expanded. Te urkish For-

eign Minister has occasionally participated in the

EUs inormal oreign ministers meetings (known

as Gymnich meetings) and has attended meet-

ings with the EUs Foreign Affairs Council, both

individually and with Foreign Ministers o other

EU candidate countries. Tese ora or high-lev-

el dialogue would be institutionalized and regu-

larized. Tey would also be complemented with

regular meetings at director and working grouplevels.41 Institutionalized oreign policy dialogue

would not automatically lead to cooperation. In

act, urkish and European oreign policies would

only converge on specific topics and occasions. But

institutionalized dialogue would serve to gauge

respective oreign policy positions and strategies,

seeking concrete cooperation avenues i and when

both sides saw fit. Foreseeably, there could be

useul cooperation on some dossiers, notably theBalkans, while positions on Middle Eastern and

Eurasian questions would only partially and occa-

sionally overlap.42One only needs to think about

the partial convergence o views between urkey

and the EU on issues such as the Ukraine crisis,

the ISIS threat or the conflict in Gaza to appreciate

the limits o oreign and security policy coopera-

tion in this scenario.

Additionally, there would be unctional coopera-tion on asylum, immigration, and visa policies. ur-

key would obtain visa ree entry into the EU afer

much lobbying with EU member states.43Its solid

cooperation on readmission, the tightening o its

borders, and upgrading o its migration governance

would all contribute to the successul conclusion o

a visa liberalization roadmap.44 Furthermore, EU

member states would agree on the need to elimi-

nate the visa restriction on urkey, which or yearshas caused tension in the relationship. Particularly,

in view o the aded prospect o EU membership,

EU member states would agree on the need to grant

urkish nationals visa ree entry to the EU as a con-

solation prize.


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Turkey project9

On energy policy, the Azerbaijan-urkey-EU

linkage through ANAP and AP would persist,

but this would only represent a partial response

to the EUs energy security puzzle. Te Southern

Corridor would not be ully realized as a corridor

o multiple routes transporting multiple energysources, while urkey would ail to develop into

an energy hub or Europe. Tis is because urkey

would not implement the EUs energy acquis, and

its close relationship with Azerbaijan coupled with

troubled relations with Iraq, Israel and Iran would

prevent it rom becoming a reliable hub or multi-

ple sources o energy or Europe.

Lastly, there would probably not be a resolutiono the Cyprus conflict. Nonetheless urkey would

implement the Additional Protocol to the cus-

toms union agreement vis--vis Cyprus. While

this would be inconsequential as ar as accession

negotiations are concerned, given their ormal in-

terruption in this scenario, the implementation o

the Additional Protocol would greatly improve the

climate o relations between urkey, Cyprus and

the EU and possibly acilitate urkish-Cypriot par-

ticipation in the EUs internal market.

Convergence

Te final scenario illustrates urkeys convergence

with the EU through ull membership. Tis scenar-

io oresees the European Union exiting its current

crisis and reocusing on the enlargement process

towards both the Balkans and urkey and possibly

other Eastern neighbours. A post-crisis EU wouldeature a more integrated core consisting o the

eurozonewhich would complete its monetary

union through a unctioning banking union in ad-

dition to accelerated steps towards fiscal union. But

deeper integration would also spill into other policy

domains, notably in areas o security, energy

and migration policy.45 In these areas, geograph-

ic cores o the EU may be limited to the inner

core o eurozone member states, but could also

extend to comprise all EU members. Deeper EU

integration coupled with a revamped enlargement

agenda through differentiated integration wouldallow new members such as urkey to enter the

EU, but not necessarily its most ederal elements.46

Te success and sustainability o this model would

hinge on the United Kingdoms enduring, yet re-

modeled, membership in the EUs outer circle.47

Within this new governance model or the EU, en-

largement in general and enlargement to include

urkey in particular, would become significantly

less divisive. urkey would opt to remain in theouter circle, so long as it were in the company o

other heavyweight member states such as the

U.K. and its EU membership would become less

contested by inner core members such as France

and Germany.

urkeys ull membership in the EUbut not in

the eurozonewould provide sufficient support

or the country to complete its transition to a ma-

ture liberal democracy. Tis could include a defin-

itive and comprehensive resolution o the Kurdish

question through a new civilian constitution en-

shrining an inclusive definition o citizenship and

the ull extension and consolidation o rights and

reedoms. Tis transition would experience ups

and downs, but the general trend would be uphill.

urkeys economic development would go hand

in hand with its political transition. urkey wouldcontinue opening up to regional and global mar-

kets, but economic anchoring to the EU would

deepen in terms o the share and quality o trade

and investment. Interestingly, 2013 has already

marked a turning point in urkeys external trade.

While previous years saw a progressive reduction


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o the EUs share o urkeys exports, that percent-

age is rising again, while urkeys share o exports

to Russia, Iran, Iraq and China is alling. Although

urkeys overall increase in exports or the first 7

months o 2013 to 2014 was 6 percent, its share o

exports to the EU was more than double that fig-ure.48Trough such anchoring, urkey would also

tackle its major structural economic deficiencies: it

would achieve a higher savings rate, cure its chron-

ic current account imbalances, reach a healthier

energy mix, invest in education and R&D, and

assure a complete separation between politics and

economic markets. Tese are adjustments and re-

orms that urkey needs to carry out i it is going

to avoid the middle income trap.49

Given urkeys ull membership would entail a

resolution o the long-standing Cyprus question,

this scenario would also see strides orward in

the security and energy realms: NAO and the

EU would establish a harmonious unctioning

relationship, possibly with Common Security

and Deence Policy (CSDP) becoming de acto a

European caucus in NAO.50 Following years o

progressive de-alignment,51 urkey would alignitsel with CFSP statements and positions, greatly

enhancing the EUs oreign policy projection, par-

ticularly in the troubled neighbourhood.

With the resolution o the Cyprus question and

the consolidation o a urkish-Israeli political

rapprochement, Cypriot and Israeli gas, alongside

Azeri (and Iraqi) gas would flow through urkish

networks to Europe, strengthening both the EUs

and urkeys energy security. urkey would also

ully adopt and implement the energy acquisand

enter the Energy Community, becoming a verita-

ble energy hub or Europe and the lynchpin in a

multiple pipeline southern energy corridor.52

In regards to migration and mobility, urkey

would complete its transition rom an emigration

to an immigration country. Due to economic de-

velopment and reaching o a demographic plateau,

urkish immigration to Europe, notwithstanding a

ull liberalization o the our EU reedoms, would

be contained.53urkey would adopt a more restric-

tive visa policy towards its neighbours, while at the

same time acting as a liberalizing member state inthe Council o the EU. As an EU member, urkey

would also be ully cooperative and more capable

in dealing with irregular migration, while at the

same time allying with southern member states

like Italy and Greece to push or more equitable

intra-EU burden-sharing on asylum and irregular

migration.

Finally, majorities both in urkey and the EU

would converge on an inclusive definition o iden-

tity. urkey would not be exclusively European, but

its European-ness would be theprimus inter pares

component o its identity. Likewise, the attachment

o most Europeans to their local and national iden-

tities would persist, but with the accomplishment

o a post-crisis EU that is more united, effective

and politically legitimate, their attachment to civic

values enshrined in tomorrows Union, inclusive o

urkey, would also grow incommensurably.


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Turkey project11

TRANSATLANTIC IMPLICATIONS OFTURKEYS UNCERTAIN EUROPEANFUTURE

Turkeys European uture remains highly un-

certain. Tis paper has outlined the range opossible destinations, which while hypothetical

and stylized, highlight the diametrically opposite

trajectories EU-urkey relations could take. Next,

the paper turns to the repercussions these scenari-

os may have or the United States.

oday in Washington, there are ew who still be-

lieve in urkeys EU membership. Whereas the

United States had been a(n excessively) vocal ad-vocate o urkeys European integration through-

out the 1990s and early 2000s, urkeys EU acces-

sion is rarely talked about within the Beltway these

days. Partly due to the more low-key approach o

the Obama administration towards Western Euro-

pean affairs and due largely to the objective slow-

down o the accession process, Americans have by

and large given up on urkeys EU membership.54

Te scenarios outlined above unambiguously pointto the act that EU-urkey convergence remains a

critical U.S. interest. In the event o an EU-urkey

competitive scenario, the U.S.-urkey relationship

would probably suffer, adding unpredictability and

unreliability to the turbulence in the Middle East,

where the U.S. would remain immersed much to

its chagrin. With the rise o extremist ideologies,

undermining o state borders, and unprecedented

levels o violence and deepening socio-economicmalaise, ensuring urkey is saely embedded in the

Euro-Atlantic community is crucial. In a scenario

o complementarity, with which many toy with on

both sides o the Atlantic, the detachment o ur-

key rom the Atlantic community would be atten-

uated and slow down, particularly i a ormula is

ound to include urkey in IP.55Tis point was

actually made by ormer Minister o Foreign A-

airs Ahmet Davutolu when he argued that IP

would help to anchor urkey in the West in an ar-

ticle.56

It is crucial to recognize that a complementarity

scenario that alls short o EU membership would

ail to benefit the United States in a comprehensive

manner. Here it is worth recalling the main reason

why Washington adamantly insisted on urkeys

European integration back in the 1990s. It did so

partly to rally credit in Ankara and to seek greater

strategic cohesion within the Atlantic community.

But the main reason why the U.S. vocally support-ed urkeys EU membership was because it appre-

ciated that only through a mixed domestic-oreign

policy project such as European integration, could

urkeys domestic transormation be truly encour-

aged. Tere are clear limits to how much an exter-

nal actor, even one as powerul and close as the

U.S., can do to sustain a comprehensive domestic

reorm process in urkey. In this respect, the EU

has transormative power the U.S. lacks. Only a

ully democratic and prosperous urkey can rep-

resent the model partner Barack Obama boasted

it was in the early days o his presidency.

What can the United States actually do to put the

EU-urkey relationship on healthier ooting in to-

days context? American officials should continue

to support urkeys EU membership. Europeans

instinctively point out that the United States can-

not persuade the Union to include urkey into itsold. Tis is true, but it is equally true that i the

United States were to abandon the goal o urkeys

European integration, urkeys EU vocation would

not be well served. In the 1990s the United States

played a pivotal role in triggering closer ties be-

tween urkey and the European project.57I played


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quietly behind closed doors, this role continues to

be important, particularly so at a time when Euro-

pean introspection has been triggered by the euro-

zone crisis.

Lastly and most importantly, the U.S. is the only

external actor that can contribute to removing the

major obstacle in the side o the EU-urkey rela-

tionship: the Cyprus conflict. Peace talks in Cyprus

were revived in February o this year, but afer a

hopeul start, they soon ran into the quicksand o

pessimism and mutual recrimination so abundant

on the island. No matter what the potential boun-

ties o reconciliation may bebounties which are

increasingly apparent today in view o EasternMediterranean gas findsi lef to themselves, Cy-

priots are unlikely to reach a solution to the conflict.

Te perceived risks in taking a step into unknown

territory is simply too great when measured against

the certainty o the present, which is anything but

dire when compared to the rest o the war-ravaged

region. And yet, a relatively peaceul present is Cy-

pruss biggest curse, which not only reduces the

parties incentive to reach a comprehensive settle-ment, but also distracts international attention away

rom the conflict, particularly at a time when the

wider region is ablaze. Vice-President Bidens visit

to Cyprus in May this year could have marked the

beginning o renewed U.S. attention to the conflict.

A U.S. political investment in the Cyprus peace pro-

cess could concomitantly spur cooperation on East-

ern Mediterranean gas, open the way to EU-NAO

cooperation whose urgency is highlighted by theUkraine crisis, and re-dynamize the EU-urkey re-

lationship, warding off the spectre o conflictuality

in the U.S.-EU-urkey triangle.


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Turkey project13

CONCLUSION

Drawing rom the complex history o urkeysrelationship with Europe, the trajectory ourkeys European uture is at once predictable

and highly uncertain. What can be saely predictedis that this close and complex relationship will last

in uture, in both its collaborative and conflictual

elements. Much like the centuries-long history be-

tween the two was marked by cyclical moments o

cooperation and conflict, the depth o current eco-

nomic, political, security, societal and cultural ties

is such that it is difficult to imagine a clean break

in urkeys relationship with the EU. Te very

identities o urkey and Europe are inextricably

tied to one another and when your identity crisis

has lasted or some 200 years it is no longer a crisis.

It is your identity.58 At the same time, the uture

trajectory o the EU-urkey relationship remains

highly uncertain. In outlining three scenarios orthe uture, this paper has extrapolated elements

rom current reality that demonstrate that at the

current juncture all three scenarios, or combina-

tions therein, remain distinct possibilities. While

both urkey and the EU are in the same metaphor-

ical boat, the boat is on a journey whose destina-

tion is unknown.


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ENDNOTES

1. Selim Deringil,Te urks and Europe: TeArgument rom History,Middle Eastern Stud-ies, Vol. 43, No. 5, (2007): 709-723.

2. kr Haniolu, A Brief History of the Late

Ottoman Empire, (Princeton University Press,2010) and William Hale, urkish Foreign Poli-cy, 1774-2000, (London: Frank Cass, 2002).

3. Bernard Lewis, Te Emergence of Modern ur-key, 3rded. (Oxord University Press, 2002)andNiyazi Berkes, Te Development of Secularismin urkey(New York: Routledge, 1998).

4. Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe(New York: A. A. Knop, 1926). Couden-hove-Kalergi is considered one o the atherso European unification. Following his visit to

modern urkey and meeting with Atatrk, heincluded urkey and the Balkans in his 1934writings on political Europe. See Dilek Bar-las and Serhat Gven, urkey and the Ideao a European Union in the Inter-War Years,1923-39,Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 45, No.3, (2009), pp. 425-446.

5. Tere is a burgeoning literature examiningthis relationship, or example, Ahmet Evin andGeoffrey Denton (eds.), urkey and the Euro-

pean Community (Opladen: Leske u. Budrich,1990); Meltem Mfler-Ba, Te Never-end-

ing Story: urkey and the European Union(London: Frank Cass, 1998); Esra LaGro andKnud Erik Jrgensen (eds.), urkey and theEuropean Union: Prospects for a Difficult En-counter (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan,2007) and Firat Cengiz and Lars Hoffman(eds.), urkey and the European Union: FacingNew Challenges and Opportunities(New York:Routledge, 2014).

6. Commission opinion on urkeys request for ac-cession to the Community, Commission o theEuropean Communities, SEC (89) 2290 final,Brussels: 20.12.1989.

7. Heinz Kramer, Te EU-urkey CustomsUnion: Economic Integration Amidst Politicalurmoil, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 1, Issue1, (1996): 60-75.

8. Luigi Narbone and Nathalie occi,Runningaround in circles? Te Cyclical Relationship

Between urkey and the European Union,Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans,Vol. 9, No. 3, (2007): 233-245. See also AtilaEralp, Te Role o emporality and Inter-action in the urkey-EU Relationship NewPerspectives on urkey, No. 40, (Spring 2009):

149-170.9. Ziya ni, Luxembourg, Helsinki and Be-

yond: owards an Interpretation o Recenturkey-EU Relations, Government and Oppo-sition, Vol. 35, No. 4, (2000): 463-483.

10. Te Copenhagen political criteria were estab-lished by the European Council in Copenha-gen in 1993. Tey define the political condi-tions that render an EU candidate countryeligible to open accession negotiations withthe EU. Tese conditions include the stabili-

ty o institutions guaranteeing democracy, therule o law, human rights, and respect or andprotection o minorities. Presidency Conclu-sions, European Council, Helsinki, December10-11, 1999.

11. Independent Commission on urkey, urkeyin Europe: More than a Promise, Report of theIndependent Commission on urkey, BritishCouncil and Open Society Institute, (2004)http://www.emmabonino.it/campagne/tur-chia/english.pd.

12. Ziya ni, Domestic Politics, Internation-

al Norms and Challenges to the State: ur-key-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era,urkish Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1, (2010): 9-34 andPaul Kubicek, Political Conditionality and theEUs Cultivation o Democracy in urkey, De-mocratization, Vol. 18, No 4, (2011): 910-931.

13. Te EU roze negotiations in eight chaptersand blocked the possibility to close chapterswith European Council Decision, GeneralAffairs and External Relations, Brussels, De-cember 11, 2006.

14. Nilgun Arsan and Atila Eralp, What WentWrong in the urkey-EU Relationship? in

Another Empire? Kerem ktem, Ayse Kado-lu and Mehmet Karl (eds.), (Istanbul: BilgiUniversity Press, 2012).

15. Dimitar Bechev, Te Periphery of the Periph-ery: Te Western Balkans and the Euro Cri-sis, Policy Brie (London, United Kingdom:


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Turkey project15

ECFR, August 2012) http://www.ecr.eu/page/-/ECFR60_WESERN_BALKANS_BRIEF_AW.pd

16. Jean-Claude Juncker, A New Start or Europe:My Agenda or Jobs, Growth, Fairness andDemocratic Change, European Commission

(July 2014): p.10 http://ec.europa.eu/about/juncker-commission/docs/pg_en.pd

17. Loukas soukalis, Te Unhappy State o theUnion, Policy Network (March 2014) http://www.policy-network.net/publications/4602/Te-Unhappy-State-o-the-Union

18. Nathalie occi (ed.), Imagining Europe: o-wards a More United and Effective EU,(Rome:IAI Quaderni, 2014) http://www.iai.it/content.asp?langid=2&contentid=1138 and KemalDervi and Jacques Mstral (eds.) Europes Cr-

ss, Europes Future (Washgnton DC: Brookn-gs, 2014).19. Sami Kohen, AKP Convention Spells Out

urkeys Foreign Policy Platorm, al-Moni-tor, October 5, 2012 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/10/akp-oreign-poli-cy-congress.html

20. Alex Spillius, urkey will probably never bea memberTe elegraph, September 21, 2013http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/10325218/urkey-will-proba-bly-never-be-EU-member.html

21. Independent Commission on urkey urkeyin the EU: Te Imperative for Change, TirdReport, (Istanbul: Open Society, 2014), p. 9http://www.independentcommissionontur-key.org/report_2014.html

22. Ali Resul Usul, Is Tere Any Hope on theRevival o EU-urkey Relations in the NewEra? urkish Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2, (June2014), pp. 283-302.

23. Charles Grant, Why a British exit is not inev-itable, Euractiv, 18/04/14, http://www.eurac-tiv.com/sections/uk-europe/why-british-ex-it-not-inevitable-301659

24. Eduard Soler i Lecha, Crises and Elections:What are the Consequences or urkeys EUBid?, Global urkey in Europe, Policy Brief,(Rome: IAI, 2014) http://www.iai.it/content.asp?langid=1&contentid=1082

25. Gerald Knaus, A very special relationship. Whyurkeys EU accession process will continue,(Berlin-Istanbul: European Stability Initia-tive, 2010) http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=118

26. mer apnar, End o the urkish ModelSurvival, Vol. 56, No. 2, (April-May 2014):1-16.

27. Kemal Kirici, Te ransormation o urkishForeign Policy: Te Rise o the rading State,New Perspectives on urkey, No. 40, (2009):2957.

28. Sait Akman, Te urkey-EU Customs Union:From an asymmetric relationship to balancedtrade, Journal of urkish Weekly, Septem-ber 30, 2013 http://www.turkishweekly.net/op-ed/3112/-the-turkey-eu-customs-union-

rom-an-asymmetric-relationship-to-bal-anced-trade.html29. Ziya ni and Mustaa Kutlay, Rising Pow-

ers in a Changing Global Order: Te PoliticalEconomy o urkey in the Age o Brics, TirdWorld Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 8 (2013): 1409-1426.

30. Selim Idiz, Te Sunnification o urkish For-eign Policy, urkey Pulse,Al-Monitor, March1, 2013 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/akp-sunni-oreign-pol-icy-turkey-sectarianism.html# and Behll

Ozkan, urkey, Davutoglu and the Idea oPan-Islamism Survival, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Au-gust-September 2014): 119-140.

31. Mehmet Cebeci, NAO-EU Cooperation andurkey, urkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 10, No.3 (2011): 93-103 http://www.turkishpolicy.com/dosyalar/iles/Munevver%20Cebeci(1).pd

32. Ayla Grel and Fiona Mullen, Can EasternMediterranean Gas Discoveries Have a Posi-tive Impact on urkey-EU Relations? Globalurkey in Europe Policy Brief(Rome: IAI, 2014)http://www.iai.it/content.asp?langid=1&con-tentid=1080

33. Ahmet duygu and A. B. Karaay, Demogra-phy and Migration in ransition: Reflectionson EUurkey Relations, in Seil Paac Eli-tok and Tomas Straubhaar (eds.), urkey, Mi-

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Immigration Systems, (Florence: EuropeanUniversity Institute, 2011).

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vol_12-no_1-unver.pd36. Sinan lgen, Avoiding a Divorce: A Virtual

EU Membership or urkey, Carnegie EuropePaper, December 2012 http://carnegieeu-rope.eu/2012/12/05/avoiding-divorce-virtu-

al-eu-membership-or-turkey37. Ergun zbudun, Presidentialism vs. Parlia-mentarism in urkey, Global urkey in EuropePolicy Brief,(Rome: IAI, 2012) http://www.iai.it/pd/GE/GE_PB_01.pd

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content.asp?langid=1&contentid=1079; Ke-mal Kirici, Will the Readmission AgreementBring the EU and urkey ogether or Pull TemApart? CEPS Commentary, February 4, 2014http://www.ceps.eu/book/will-readmission-agreement-bring-eu-and-turkey-together-or-pull-them-apart

44. Juliette olay, Te EU and urkeys AsylumPolicy in Light o the Syrian Crisis, Global ur-key in Europe, Policy Brie (Rome: IAI: 2014)http://www.iai.it/content.asp?langid=1&con-

tentid=104045. Nathalie occi, Imagining Europe and KemalDervi and Jacques Mistral op. cit. (2014)

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48. Calculated rom provisional data rom theurkish Statistical Institute, www.tuik.gov.tr.

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Turkey project17

cession Negotiations: Focus on Natural Gas,Global urkey in Europe, Policy Brief, (Rome:IAI, 2013) http://www.iai.it/content.asp?lan-gid=1&contentid=1019; Gareth Winrow, Re-alization o urkeys Energy Aspirations: PipeDreams or Real Projects? urkey Project Poli-

cy Paper, No. 4, (Washington, D.C.: BrookingsInstitute, April 2014) http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/04/realization%20turkeys%20energy%20aspira-tions%20winrow/turkeys%20energy%20aspi-rations.pd

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55. Kemal Kirici, IP and urkey: Te Geopo-litical Dimension in Te Geopolitics of IP:Repositioning the ransatlantic Relationship for

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Argument rom History,Middle Eastern Stud-ies, Vol. 43, No. 5 (2007): 709-723.


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N is Deputy Director o the Is-tituto Affari Internazionali and Special Adviser

to the EU High Representative/Vice President o

the Commission.She is also editor o Te Interna-

tional Spectator. She held previous research posts

at the ransatlantic Academy, Washington, the

European University Institute, Florence, and the

Centre or European Policy Studies, Brussels. Her

book publications include Multilateralism in the

21st Century (Ed. with C. Bouchard and J. Peter-

son 2013, Routledge); urkeys European Future:

Behind the Scenes of Americas Influence on EU-ur-key Relations (2011, New York University Press);

Te EU Civil Society and Conflict(ed. 2011, Rout-

ledge); Civil Society, Conflict and the Politicisation

of Human Rights (ed. With R. Marchetti, orth

2011, UN University Press); Cyprus: A Conflict at

the Crossroads(ed. with . Diez, 2009, Manchester

University Press); Te EU and Conflict Resolution

(2007, Routledge); and EU Accession Dynamics

and Conflict Resolution(2004, Ashgate).

THE AUTHOR


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The Turkey Project at Brookings1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW

Washington, D.C. 20036brookings.edu

Documents

Turkey and the European Union.pdf