CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

TURKEY: AFTERMATH OF THE

POLITICAL CRISIS

WELCOME AND MODERATOR:

THOMAS CAROTHERS,

VICE PRESIDENT FOR STUDIES, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT

SPEAKERS:

HENRI J. BARKEY

NONRESIDENT SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT

IAN LESSER,

SENIOR TRANSATLANTIC FELLOW, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 2008

Transcript by Federal News Service Washington, D.C.

THOMAS CAROTHERS: If I could have your attention, please, we’re going to get underway. Good morning. Welcome to the Carnegie Endowment. I’m Thomas Carothers, vice president for studies here at the endowment. I’m filling in for Marina Ottaway who had to go back to Europe on family matters. It’s my pleasure to be the moderator for today’s session. As all of you know, Turkey narrowly avoided an extremely serious political crisis this summer. But the basic conflict in the society between a secular establishment that is in some ways unyielding in power, and new political forces above all those of an Islamist character that are currently running the government continues. I was in Istanbul this summer for a few days in meetings, and I was really struck by the depth of aggravation on both sides of these matters. And I was sitting one evening in a fish restaurant on the Bosporus and I think you all probably know how beautiful that can be, and it was a lovely summer evening and I was sitting there with some Turkish friends, and they said, well, we’re here in the middle of a country in crisis. And it was the most beautiful evening and pacific, and they said, you wouldn’t know it, but this country is headed for serious trouble if we’re not all ready there. And when I returned to Washington, I was struck by – as is the case with, as you know, many countries in the world – how little attention there was here in Washington to this crisis, and how little understanding of its severity and potentially very bad consequences both for Turkey and for the region. This is a crisis which is very significant for Turkey’s own existence, in a sense, as a society, both a political society and as a cultural society. It’s also very serious for Turkey-European Union relations and obviously the future of potential Turkish membership. And it’s also very serious in other Muslim countries because Turkey is an example, in some ways, of the question of reconciling modern Islamist forces into a society that has traditionally been run by a secular establishment. And I’ve been struck by how the United States government has continued to hold out the Turkish model to Arab countries, even as the Turkish model begins to look perhaps more of a negative example, in some ways, than a positive one. So we have a lot to talk about and we’re very fortunate today to have two of Washington’s – well, partly, Washington’s but other parts of the country – leading experts on Turkey. We’re going to hear first from Henri Barkey, and it’s my pleasure to say that Henri has recently joined the Middle East Program here at Carnegie as a nonresident senior associate. In his day job, he’s a professor at Lehigh University and also chair of the international relations department there. He has a long and distinguished record of work on not simply Turkish politics but matters relating to the region generally. And he also served in the State Department in the late 1990s in the policy planning office, and so has practical policy experience as well. He’s written widely on the issue, and co-authored or edited or authored several – actually five books which are listed here, in the biographies that we have. Then we’ll hear from Ian Lesser. Ian is currently a senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, and has served in distinguished capacity in a

number of think tanks, including the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Pacific Council on International Policy, and the Rand Corporation. And he has also served in the 1990s in the State Department in the policy planning Office, as well, a few years before Henri. So we’re going to start with Henri, and then Ian, and then we’ll have an open discussion. HENRI J. BARKEY: Thank you, Tom, for this introduction. Technically, since I followed Ian into the State Department in the same office, I think, he should have gone first, but anyway. (Chuckles.) What I’ll talk about is essentially the domestic consequences, and through the domestic consequences, maybe, some of the international aspects of this crisis. There’s no question that Turkey really dodged a bullet this summer. I remember going to Turkey this summer. As I landed in Turkey, I was convinced 100 percent that the party was going to be closed and Turkey was going to go into a crisis. But in the three weeks that it was there, you could slowly see a change in atmosphere and a change in the doubts starting and people questioning whether or not the party was going to be closed. And I have to say there were some very few and lonely voices out there, but I’m not talking about the ruling AKP, which have to put up a brave face. But some very interesting voices that made very convincing arguments as to why the party would not be closed. And by the time I left I was from 100 percent I had gone down to 50-50; at least, I was safe, that’s what I thought. And the truth is that this was actually a very interesting situation in the following sense. When you look at the case, it was very political. It didn’t have much juridical substance. And you would think that once a case like that is started – and in Turkey, there’s no question that the judicial authorities act, to some extent, in unison with other secular members of the establishment. It seemed to me that when the case was initially launched that the intention was to close the party. So the decision had been made the moment the case was opened.

Something changed, and that’s what was interesting about it. Something changed, and what is it that changed, because when you look at the ultimate court decision, the court voted six – six members of the court voted to close the party. You need seven to close. So one person, essentially, could have made a world of difference in Turkey.

It turns out, I think, what happened was the members of the court also were under enormous pressure from their own environment, their own public. And at the same time, the secular establishment including the military started to feel the heat not just from outside, but also internally, and started to realize that closing a party was not going to solve the situation. Closing the party would not – yes, they could have banned Erdogan. They could have banned many members of the party, but the party was going to rejuvenate itself, and Erdogan was going to do that. And the thing that people, I think, started to realize is that Erdogan is a phenomenon. It is a not a party. It is Erdogan. Erdogan is, himself, an institution.

Erdogan has emerged, I think, in Turkey like no other politician we have ever seen in

Turkey who has the ability to connect with people in such a way that there’s nothing the secular establishment can do. All they can do is play on the margins. Maybe the party will lose three points, four points, five points, but not much more. Whatever happened, the party was going to come back. And people started to worry about not only the international

consequences but what kind of – (inaudible) – or maybe more revolutionary, if you want, aspect a new government – a new regime in Turkey with AKP coming back in another fore would have taken. I think that was probably what started to worry.

And in a way, by starting something that they could not finish, this case essentially is

a major setback for the secular establishment. This was, in a way, the last quiver – the last arrow in their quiver to stop the AKP through political and non-violent means. There is no other option from now on. The next option is to send the tanks into the streets, and, clearly, that’s not going to happen in Turkey. I mean, I think, the days of tanks in the streets are over. Turkey has passed that. We have seen other forms of interventions by the military but I think this judicial guard was the last one.

So where does this take us? My – in a piece that I wrote for Carnegie, also, I made

this argument that, I don’t think, Turkey is out of the woods in terms of a political crisis. Yes, they’ve avoided this particular political crisis but, I think now we’re moving towards a situation in Turkey where you will see a reckoning of some sort. What do I mean by that?

First of all, if you look at the record of AKP, in part, they did very well at the

beginning of their reign so to say. And then they lost the steam, if you want. And maybe you can say they got lazy. Maybe they became too interested in domestic business affairs or corruption. Whatever it is, the one thing that actually is interesting about this court case is that the court case served to slap AKP – wake up AKP from its slumber, right.

And now AKP is faced with this very hard choice because they have now realized, I

mean something they already knew but now they realize they have to confront the one major issue in Turkish political life and that’s the role of the military. And where we’re going now, in my view is – and I’m not saying it’s going to happen in the next three months, and it’s not necessarily going to happen over six months but remember that AKP has now four more years to govern. And in the next four years, we are going to move towards a major clash of Turkish institutions.

What the court case ultimately served to do is to undermine every institution in

Turkey: the parliament, certainly the judiciary, and certainly the military and to some extent the AKP. So from all of this we are – the only way that Turkey is going to emerge is through this confrontation over the role of the army in Turkish politics. Now, I’ll come back to that in a minute.

But I also want to say, let me just say a few things about AKP. I mean, as I said,

AKP kind of fell into a slumber and this court case woke them up. They – look at AKP’s cabinet composition. It is mostly made up of people, almost all of them save one, by men, all of whom were behind Erdogan at the beginning when the party won power in 2002. Every single party needs new faces; every single party needs to rejuvenate itself. And to – I think Erdogan and the party did a huge mistake in not changing the cabinet, in not bringing in new faces for two reasons: one, because you get tired. I mean if you’re a minister for six years, you get tired, you get lazy. One.

Two, within AKP there’s a lot of people who are very unhappy because you have

350 members in parliament and anybody who knows anything about the Turkish parliament,

you know, you’re either a minister or you’re the vice president of the party. The rest of the MPs do nothing. They’re not expected to do anything. All they have to do is show up and vote the way they’ve been told to vote, and that’s it. They have no staff to speak of. They don’t engage in really legislation writing, so they’re bored. And some of them are very, very sophisticated people. Some of them have long – some of them were professors, and I really believe professors know a lot. And some of them were scientists who were all brought in and you don’t bring people in to the little office in parliament and have them drink tea all day.

So there is – people in the AKP will tell you – we can fill, they say, five or six

different cabinets with the members we have. So it’s time for Erdogan to start changing. So I suspect that one of the things that Erdogan will do when parliament reconvenes is to revamp the cabinet. On top of that, what he also needs to do – and this is one thing that became very obvious in the crisis – is that Erdogan and AKP have really only paid lip service to women. This is a party that actually has a lot of depth in terms of women MPs who are, as I said, professors, and others, and scientists. And the only member in the cabinet is one person who’s been there for six years, and she’s, of course, in charge of women’s affairs. I mean, this kind of tokenism at the time when a party has a serious problem with not all women, in fact, more women voted than men voted for AKP in the 2007 election, so we should be careful about – it doesn’t have a problem with women, per se. It has a problem with certain segments of the female population in Turkey, but that segment is very important. That segment is one of the most important sources of opposition to the AKP philosophical opposition. So AKP needs to revamp.

But let’s assume for one moment, that it does all of this, so that there is a new élan,

you would say. So where do they go next? Well, it’s very clear from what Erdogan has said that he wants to work on the EU. And he also needs to work on the domestic Kurdish issue in northern Iraq. Those are the two major crises in all, issues that face Erdogan in the near future, both of which are topics that are fundamentally very difficult for the establishment to deal with.

The Kurdish question is not just the PKK and it’s not just northern Iraq. The

Turkish Kurds in many different ways are organizing in an unprecedented scale and then the political scale. The PKK is really a side show. And there’s a great deal of ferment and movement within among Turkish Kurds. At the time of globalization and at the time in Iraq you have a federal Iraqi state emerging, not dealing with this issue, I think, is going to create longer and very serious problems down the road for Turkey. Now, AKP has a huge advantage. AKP got more than 50 percent of the Kurdish vote in the Southeast in 2007. So it has a base over which it can start working on the Kurdish issue. It hasn’t recently and there is a great deal of unhappiness among Kurds about this. But there are local elections coming up and AKP really wants to make a big showing in local elections in the Southeast so there is a chance that it will do that.

But all of this, essentially, when also you look at Europe, and I want to essentially,

end on this, really has to do with how to change the constitution. And, in fact, the trick and the most critical next issue in Turkey is going to be the constitution. Because whether or not you look – whether it’s the EU process or it’s the Kurdish question or even if it’s the question of Islam, at the root of the issue is the constitution which was, as most of you

remember, was essentially a military constitution that was voted on in 1982. Yes, it got 92 percent of the vote in the referendum. But anybody who was in Turkey at the time, as I was, watching this, will remember that you could not organize or you could not say anything in opposition to the constitution. You could only come out in favor of the constitution but not against the constitution. So in a way to have 92 percent of the vote means absolutely nothing.

And this is a constitution that is, in a way, has turned out to be a straightjacket for

Turkey. It needs to – it needs a constitution that’s more flexible, that bleeds, if you want, and can adapt too. But that’s where the division is – the battle is going to be engaged between the secular establishment and especially the military and AKP if it does go down that root because the constitution for many in the secular establishment is, in many ways, the last line of defense. The moment you start tinkering with the constitution, the moment you start liberalizing the constitution in the eyes of many, you don’t know where this is going to take you, right, whether or not it will lead you to, say, much greater freedom on the question of Islam, on the question of ethnicity, also, when the goal, ultimately of the military. So you have – this is going to be the issue.

But what’s very interesting is that we are dealing in Turkey with a state that is

fundamentally very ideological. It has an ideology. And it has an institution that not only protects but promulgates this ideology. So – and that institution, obviously is the military. But look at the last two weeks in Turkey. If you were to read the newspapers, who is the most important person in Turkey if you were to read the papers? It is the new chief of staff: what the chief of staff says, what he didn’t say, what the other commanders of the – whether it’s the air force or it’s the land forces commanders, what they said in certain speeches, are all covered as the most important and major news in Turkey. Now, in which country in the world do we know that this – in the West democratic states to which Turkey belongs do we see this kind of political system where the generals trump the politicians? What the generals say gets reported ad nauseum.

But actually, there is a reason why they get also reported because what they say is

important. And that’s the trick. And if you look at what the general said, the incoming general said on – during the transition period, it is actually quite scary. The incoming commander of the land forces who is going to be chief of staff of the Turkish military in two years’ time basically came out swinging against the United States and against the EU because, in his mind, they are the forces that are pushing globalization. And globalization is the most important evil in the world. This is Kosaner.

Now, the chief of staff was far more complimentary to the United States. The U.S.-

Turkish relationship have never been as good. We are cooperating on security issues. It was kind of a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde or the good-cop/bad-cop type of messages that were coming out. But, nonetheless, on both sides, I mean both generals did also lay down very strict red lines which got, of course, interpreted by the press kind of as a warning to AKP and as a warning not to change the constitution and so on and so forth.

So where do you go from here? I mean, one look to look at this is to say, the

military, which used to be kind of an almost Nasserist in terms of progressive force, has now become a very conservative force. And the best example of this is what – (inaudible) – who

many people in this town know – looked the other day, he said, he found the quote from the previous chief of staff who said, no, I’ll translate as I go along, he says, since we have no chance of swimming against the tide, all we can do is to manipulate, if you want, the way forward. All we can do is to make sure that it is in the context of the Ataturkist thinking system, thinking system, and it has to conform to the republican ideas. All we can do is essentially correct the course, but we cannot swim against the tide. So we have to, essentially, show resistance.

But this is the problem in Turkey. The fact of the matter is, because Turkey does

not have an opposition party worth its salt, it is the military that has become the main opposition party. And when you have the military as your main opposition party this is not, obviously, very conducive to a democratic dialogue because the military always trumps you in many respects. So this has to change.

But the way – and I’ll finish on this note – I mean, to me, what the most pessimistic

of the future is that there is no opposition; there is no political opposition that can be both supportive of the government and also make sure that the government doesn’t make too many mistakes, essentially, what opposition does in most modern societies. Today, the Social Democratic Party, the CHP, that is the opposition, has essentially become, I don’t know, I mean I don’t even know what to call it. I mean it’s going to be probably kicked out of the Socialist International because it has become so nationalist and – party. And it has openly supported the court case against AKP. So in the long run, until you have a new opposition party, I think this crisis is going to continue because we will see the divisions in society between those who are still for the establishment, for the secular establishment and will look at the military for guidance and the rest of society who are not necessarily enamored with AKP but will have to go with AKP because AKP offers the only option for change.

MR. CAROTHERS: Thanks very much. Q: Can I ask a point of clarification? Who was the person that you quoted at the

end, we can only effect on the margins? MR. BARKEY: This was Buyukanit, the outgoing chief of staff. MR. CAROTHERS: Good. Now, we’ll turn to Ian Lesser. IAN LESSER: Tom, thanks very much. And thanks for the invitation to be here.

When Henri and I discussed this earlier, we thought we would bring kind of a basic division of labor that he would do the domestic and I would do the foreign policy piece of this, but obviously these things are so closely interwoven, and in fact, that’s sort of my first of three observations that I would make to you, which is, that although there are obviously very deep social and political dimensions to this – and I agree very much with what Henri said about it being ongoing, and not resolved – I was quite struck, I’m still quite struck, about the extent to which the external aspects are interwoven in this crisis and, I think, continue to be, in fact.

Even in its legal dimensions, the actual indictment against AKP was quite striking in

the fact the number of references to the United States, to the European Union as somehow

facilitating anti-secular activity in Turkey and so forth, and references, in fact, in to American strategy in the Middle East as being integral to this. So it was woven into the indictment. It was woven, I think, we would agree, into the Turkish debate as this crisis unfolded over a period of a year or and in various ways. This notion of how the West would react, of what it would mean for Turkey to have one outcome or another, legally, politically, et cetera, was really very much part of this debate.

And so I would say the foreign policy dimension was always there. Henri has

mentioned this atmosphere of overheated nationalism in Turkey. I think this is, in fact, extremely important, not only because it’s important in many, many levels, it’s important in a way because it’s pervasive. It’s not just that it’s one sector that is talking in this way. It’s actually a very big part of the discourse in Turkey. Now, AKP, arguably, has been the least nationalistic in the formal sense, the most open to globalization and other things, international ties and so forth, but I mean, it’s very, very clear, when you look at the polling that’s been done by GMF but also others over the last years and we’re about to release another poll this year without spilling too much of this says some similar things. There is still a great reservoir of nationalism, xenophobia, even inward-looking mood in Turkey.

This crisis in some ways exacerbated that, I think, to the extent it exacerbated both

philosophically but also just in terms of the energy that’s available for doing foreign policy when you’re mired in internal crisis. Now, in a way, it was surprising that a lot of these initiatives with Syria, and Israel, and other things kept going throughout the period of this crisis, and I think, there’s a very important reason for that. And I think it’s explained this way, that, you know, to a large extent since the beginning of AKP rule in Turkey, AKP has seen this kind of activist foreign policy as a way of validating itself with the international community, with Turks, and with others. I don’t think that’s gone away. It was a way of AKP presenting itself as a normal actor, a normal actor in the Western context, a normal actor in other settings. I don’t think that will change.

Turkey has benefited in some way by the fact – in many ways, in fact, that it has a

highly professional foreign service. It has a highly professional military. Others who interact in the international community keep going and they keep doing their thing despite the political crisis. But behind it, there has been very substantial change in the way Turkey has been doing foreign policy in the last years, and this is my second point, that this crisis which is not really passed, except perhaps in an immediate sense, also coincides with some very tough international challenges for Turkey. And I would suggest that these challenges are actually getting tougher.

AKP has adopted philosophically in its behavior a very different-looking foreign

policy posture in recent years. I think there is something to this. There is something of a new look in Turkish foreign policy. I would ask whether this is really sustainable given the kinds of things that are going on around Turkey and in the international environment. I think, in a way, despite some of the very tough problems that Turkey has had to face principally in northern Iraq but there are some others, security problems and so on, that Turkey has benefited from a relatively permissive international environment for the last years.

I know that will – many Turks would disagree with that, but, I think, it’s basically true. If we leave aside Iraq – a big thing to leave aside, but leave that aside for the moment – you had high rates of growth in the Turkish economy. You had an international economic system that permitted that. There was kind of – there were openings in the Middle East, openings in the relationship with Russia very importantly, other things. Turkey wasn’t being pressed very hard by the West on various kinds of things. It was a relatively permissive environment in which to conduct this kind of strategic depth foreign policy that AKP has talked about in which there was a much more balanced engagement with the world. And, I think, it’s absolutely true, and it goes back to this issue of identity which is, in some ways, integral to the internal crisis.

But Turkish foreign policy under AKP really is, in a way, more balanced. This is a

crowd that is more comfortable than its predecessors, in going to Damascus, or going to Tehran, or even going to Moscow. So this the Muslim, the Middle Eastern, the Eurasian dimensions of Turkish policy have really grown a pace. It’s not that the Western orientation has gone away. I think AKP is correct when they talk about that, but it’s certainly more balanced; it’s more diverse.

But there is also in that a risk that it becomes too diffuse. And here is, I think, this is

the basic point, that I think Turkey may now face some much tougher choices. Ahmet Davutoglu other advisors, AKP have talked about this notion of strategic depth in Turkish foreign policy. I think, ironically, I wouldn’t describe it that way. I know that’s not what he means by it; he’s talking in geographical terms. But, in fact, Turkey has had in recent years a policy of foreign policy in width, not in depth. It’s sort of been doing everything in lots of different places, and the environment has permitted that. I think that’s going to get a lot tougher. I don’t think that’s going to be so sustainable. And, I think, now maybe Turkey needs to think much more about its foreign policy priorities, and not simply the activism of its engagement. Obviously, the backing off of this immediate crisis will allow more energy to go into this.

But I’ll just mention very briefly a couple of examples without going into them in

depth. I mean, Georgia, the crisis in Georgia – this really does put in very stark terms Turkey’s ability to keep going with a policy that balances an ever-closer relationship with Russia economically, even politically, even strategically as some would argue and its desire to keep this NATO reassurance and deterrence and all of the rest of it, and to stay in the European mainstream on foreign policy issues, including Russia. Not going to be so easy to do that going ahead. Iran, the same, especially with new elections here, the elections here – I mean, you may face some very important break points in terms of American policy towards Iran. How is Turkey going to react to that? Will it be so easy just to stay in the mainstream?

On the European Union, AKP came in to office for various reasons being very

supportive of EU-inspired reforms and movement towards candidacy – well candidacy and then making the candidacy effective. But there are going to be tough choices there now, too. Clearly, Turkey is not going to progress in this project without some movement on Cyprus. There may really be opportunities to validate that movement on Cyprus. What is Turkey going to do? How do you sell that to the nationalists, and so on? So we could go on with this list, but I think, the basic point holds that the kind of policy Turkey has had that’s

informed a bit by this increasing Muslim identity comes out of the domestic scene, may be less sustainable as we look ahead.

And my third and final point is about the U.S.-Turkish dimension in all of this. You

know, again, I think, there was so much rhetoric about the U.S. role supposed, imagined, real, the effect on U.S.-Turkish relations supposed, imagined, real, depending upon the outcome of the court case, it was always closely interwoven. I mean people who follow this, and even people who don’t really follow it are very well aware of the sharp deterioration of public attitudes towards the United States in Turkey over the last years is really – is going to be something very tough to reverse for any administration, I think, going ahead. And indeed, for any new Turkish – for the Turkish government going ahead, it’s just a very tough scene to deal with. This sovereignty consciousness, the nationalism, all of this is going to be tough to reconcile with an activist American policy.

But, I think, the point Henri was talking about this a bit earlier, it’s not just that it’s

public attitudes. That’s important because public opinion now matters in Turkish foreign policy. It’s not just that. It’s elite attitudes as well, and in particular, elite attitudes in this sort of unnamed opposition that you talk about. I mean our traditional interlocutors in the security arena in Turkey have become very cool, have become very cool and, in fact, they were precisely the people who were talking among others about a kind of Eurasian alternative and so forth.

That’s something that we’re going to have to deal with, I think, for some time. It’s

not necessarily going to go away. A couple of things, the priorities, without saying too much about this, it’s obviously about Iraq, and Northern Iraq, and the Kurds, where Turkey is going to be looking for help from us. But it’s, of course, not just about that. It’s about Iraq policy, per se, long term. So it’s in a way, the Kurdish issue. It’s Northern Iraq, plus, plus, plus Turkey is going to be dealing with the reality of whatever we do or don’t do or how we leave in Iraq for some time to come.

The second point is about diversification in the relationship. I mean a lot of it has

been about security and it’s had a kind of distorting effect. And in recent years, under AKP because of the economic growth in Turkey it’s been possible to envision you know a very substantial increase in the economic dimension of the relationships. It hasn’t, perhaps, gone as far as a lot of people would like. It hasn’t really moved as quickly as it could. AKP is probably and AKP people in that milieu in Turkey are probably the most interested in developing that aspect of that relationship. There are others, of course. So as long as AKP is in place, I think there is probably some prospect of doing more on that diversification but, again, you know, the environment is changing. And it may, in fact, become more and more relevant again to talk about security issues, very hard security issues with Turkey. We wouldn’t have said that five years ago, but with the more competitive relationship with Russia on the horizon there are going to be some very tough choices in that regard in the Black Sea and elsewhere.

And the last point I would make and perhaps it’s natural for me to say this from

GMF but, I think, it’s true, actually, is that we probably will have to think less in terms of bilateralism in the relationship. That’s the part that’s really very tough to manage, and in some places, you can’t really avoid it and it’s necessary. But, in fact, I think the more the

relationship between Turkey and the United States can be embedded in a working, useful, forward-moving relationship across the Atlantic the choices for Turkey get a lot easier, more comfortable. And, I think, the relationship gets much easier to manage. So let me just stop with that. Thank you.

MR. CAROTHERS: Thanks very much. Let me just start with the first question,

Henri, really just ask you to just elaborate a little bit on the question of constitutional reform. I wonder if you could say just a bit more about it, in that is this an avenue – given, as you say, the imbalance of political forces in Turkey and the weakness of the opposition, is the constitutional reform process a way to create a political negotiating process that may be an avenue out of crisis and conflict? Or is it more likely a path into touching the nerve issues that are simply irreconcilable? In which – or is that the dilemma of constitutional reform?

MR. BARKEY: Yes. No, you’re right. I mean this is exactly the dilemma. If you –

there are a lot of very touch issues in Turkey, but I don’t see why they should be touchy in the sense of why is it impossible to talk about them in public. The Turkish system has always been very wary of bringing these issues into the public and because you’ve had an elite that hasn’t trusted the population.

However, I actually think that you have a very bizarre situation in Turkey where the

public is far more democratic than its leadership and that includes AKP too. There was a wonderful book that a friend of ours, Ghassan Salame once edited called “Democracy without Democrats” and this is exactly what Turkey is in some respects. I mean the public is democratic, the public actually believes in elections. People go and vote in elections because they do expect that change will follow, that their lives are influenced, much more so than in our country or maybe many persons in Western Europe, that the lives can be changed by going to the voting booth.

And Turks have been now voting with interruptions admittedly but since 1950 in

open and unquestionably free elections, except for that 1992 constitutional change. So every time they have voted, they have voted for something, very often for change. They have thrown out the bums. In 1999, the former Prime Minister Mr. Ecevit came in and was the largest party. He came in first in the elections. Three years later in the next elections, he got 1 percent of the vote. I mean really they threw the bums out. And it wasn’t just him. I mean it was a three-party coalition. Every single member – every single party in the coalition got decimated, right, and they voted for somebody else.

So Turks actually do believe that they make choices, and those choices matter. The

problem is in the constitutional system that has – that it’s really designed to protect the state from the public, rather than the other way around, and protecting the individual from the state. The state is sacrosanct and the state has to be protected at all costs. That’s the philosophy behind the Turkish constitution. And that’s what has to fundamentally change.

You know, like in every society, you have fringes in Turkey. You have lots of

fringes. We have fringes. I mean but you have to figure out a system where those fringes – you only exclude the fringes, and you don’t exclude any – most of the public very often or large segments of the public as they do now.

So can it be done? I mean the political party, incidentally, has to be democratized as well. I mean, AKP came to power – we’ve actually initially had a very democratic, internal democratic system. But soon thereafter, it abolished it. And, in fact, in Turkey, it’s really a one-man, one-vote system, where the one man is Erdogan, and the one man is Mr. Baykal. You know, they decide and everybody follows like sheep. That’s not what political parties are supposed to be.

Now, AKP happens to have genuine roots, but when you look at the opposition

CHP, precisely because it doesn’t have any roots and it’s a one-person party, all it does is put ads on television and newspapers and expect that people will vote for them. They don’t have any local organization and don’t do any local politicking. But in many ways, the constitution has to be able to create a situation where you open up – you free the system. And there are many taboo subjects in Turkey, but it’s also interesting that you can, sometimes, take them on. Look, tomorrow, I guess, the Turkish president is going to go to Armenia to watch – Gul. That’s one of the big taboo issues. I mean, I think, he’s being very courageous by going there, I mean, by essentially – it’s not – nothing is going to come out of it except it’s a symbolic act. But it is so hard even to do that in Turkey because – precise because of the way the system has been set up.

MR. CAROTHERS: Okay. Let me turn to the audience for questions and

comments, yes. And if you could just say your name. Actually, we have a microphone because we’re filming, if you don’t mind. It’s just coming over your shoulder there, thanks.

Q: Hi. I’m Rick Johnson with Citigroup. Thank you, gentlemen. Very insightful

presentations. Two questions. One, where do you see the Armenian resolution next year going and the impact it will have on our bilateral relationship? Secondly, as you just mentioned on the political-parties laws, will amendments to the constitution possibly fix that problem? I mean, in my own personal opinion – I’ve been going to Turkey since 1985 – that’s the root of Turkey’s problems.

MR. CAROTHERS: Ian, why don’t you start by commenting on the first of the two

parts of the question? MR. LESSER: Sure. Well, this is going to come up again, there’s no question about

it that it’s going to come up again. The question is, how will it be treated here, and what will be the basis for is evolution? You know, there are big variables here, including our own elections, and the candidates have rather different views about this. That will be part of the mix. But, I think, the basic parameters will be as they’ve been in the past. One is a long-standing one, which is that we will begin to see this as the thing gets debated in a more – in a heavier way in Congress and elsewhere in strategic terms.

And, you know, I doubt that the debate about that is going to be very different a year

from now than it was the last time. You know, we’re still going to be highly dependent on the strategic relationship with Turkey in many ways that we’ll be – the people will be able to discuss. And so I think that will weigh very heavily for any administration, just as it weighed for the Clinton administration, just as it weighed for the Bush administration. I don't think that’s going to go away.

The other variable is a little newer and, of course, it relates to what we were just talking about. I mean, I think, to the extent that there really is – there really are signs of an opening in a relationship between – state to state relationship between Turkey and Armenia, that makes a big difference. I think that could be, in some ways, the leading variable, and I think, that’s well-recognized in Turkey.

MR. CAROTHERS: Any further comment, Henri? MR. BARKEY: Yes, no. I actually don’t think it’s going to come up in the first year

of any new administration. Obviously, who wins will have some kind of an impact. But my understanding was that there was actually a great deal of push-back in Congress last year when this came up. And some of the push-back was actually quite, shall we say, nasty. And therefore, I don’t think it’s going to come up anytime soon, at least not in 2009. It makes much more sense for it to come up in 2010 because it’s a congressional election year.

That said, President Gul’s visit to Armenia tomorrow is also definitely a move with

an eye on what happens here, because the more Turkey opens up or shows that it’s trying to open up, and the fact that he’s been wrongly criticized at home for doing this. I mean, they’re accusing him of being a traitor and, I mean, again, the opposition was particularly nasty, the secular opposition, to this move. To the extent that it is seen as an attempt by the Turkish government to, actually, despite the odds to open up, I think, it’s going to resonate in Washington. I think it’s going to, I think, let even those who are for the resolution to maybe have second thoughts. I mean there will always be a call that will say resolution or nothing. But, I suspect this is going to help.

As for your question on political parties, I don’t necessarily think that’s the only

issue. I mean I think the political-parties law has to be radically altered. And you have to democratize political parties. But it’s not just that. It’s also the balance in society between the state and the individual. I mean you can’t democratize only the parties without democratizing the underlying institutional structure, right. And that institutional structure is the relationship between the individual and the state.

So, yes, the constitutional changes will help that but they have to go much further

than that. There has to be a real just radical change of the constitution. MR. CAROTHERS: Yes, there. Q: Thank you. I’m Rafi Danziger from AIPAC and I have two questions. One, to

Professor Barkey, you talked about the weakness and stagnation of the opposition party which, of course, is well-known. Are there any next generation people emerging who might actually bring some life into the party?

And to Ian, with regard to relation between Turkey and Israel, on the one hand, you

have APK inviting Hamas to very high level to Ankara right after Hamas is elected. Now they invited Ahmedinejad to Istanbul so he doesn’t – to go to the mausoleum. And on the other hand, the bilateral relationship is really quite close at just about every level, security, economic, political, what’s going on? What exactly is the nature of the relationship? Where do you think it’s going to go?

MR. CAROTHERS: Henri, do you want to start with the question about next

generation? MR. BARKEY: By – the opposition leader has done a wonderful job of kicking out

anybody who would be a threat to him. And there are – I mean there are lots – I mean look, this is a country of 70 million people. I mean, this is one-fourth of the United States. So there are lots of people who are capable and would be able to take on the mantle, but it’s very hard under the current structure. I think, if it comes, it will have to come from the outside.

There is talk now of a new party being formed by some very senior, very seasoned,

very well-respected folks on the center-left, again. But, you know, they’re also going against a very formidable force who is Erdogan. So you need more than being an establishment person you need, also, somebody who’s going to spark an opposition movement.

I mean, there’s also a structural problem in Turkey in that if you look historically, the

right has always been dominant in Turkey. The left, the best they got was, I think, in 1977 they got 41 percent of the vote. That’s the highest the center left has ever gotten in Turkey. All right, so structurally the country votes right anyway. So the hope is that maybe a center left a new leader who’s charismatic but who can also bring up new issues will create a party that may get close to increase the percentage, but it’s going to be very hard to undermine AKP’s lockdown on the system.

MR. CAROTHERS: Ian, would you like to address the other question? MR. LESSER: Rafi, thank you. I mean, I think, you know, when you ask the

question about Turkey in relation to Iran or Hamas, I mean, you’re really getting, I think, to the heart of this question of whether Turkey can sustain this kind of gravity-defying, you know, or maybe a better way to put it is to kind of keep itself as a double-gravity state where it’s sort of doing all of these things at once.

And the Turkish preference, and I think, this is true for AKP, but it would also be

true for another government in Turkey, it would be to try to keep doing all of those things and balancing them. You know, you have to live in the same neighborhood with Iran and all of the rest of it, requirements of public affinity and strategic depth, as they say, and all of the rest of it require that we have some engagement, we the Turks have some engagement with Hamas and so on. That, you know, ideally and at the same time, they want to have the defense industrial relationship and the economic relationship with Israel and the benefits that the Turkish elites, anyway, assume flow from that in terms of relations with the West. So you want to do all of that together.

The question that I have is whether that really is sustainable. And I can see in this

case, at least, to take Iran at least two things that would make this less sustainable. I mean one, would be you know very clear evidence of Iran as a nuclear-ready or near nuclear power or nuclear power for that matter. I mean Turkey can have all of the engagement with its neighbor Iran that it likes, but at the end of the day, Turkey doesn’t want to see a nuclear

Iran, doesn’t want to see more nuclear powers in its region. Turkey is all ready very exposed to that problem.

And, I think, the debate in Turkey about that is becoming more serious. You know,

is at the hawkish end of the NATO spectrum when it comes to thinking about Iran? No, it’s not. But it’s getting more serious, so that’s one element.

The other would be Turkey’s European project. If we take AKP at its word and the

candidacy – they do a lot to reinvigorate the candidacy, both in terms of internal reform but also in terms of foreign policy. This is going to be one of the measures. And when the European Union looks at and rates Turkey’s foreign policy performance, as it does periodically, Turkey tends to come out to pretty well, against most of the measures including policy towards Iran, where the EU has a unified position theory Turkey is pretty much in the European mainstream; much closer, in many ways, to Brussels, than to Washington.

If European policy on Iran for precisely the same reasons becomes much tougher

then, again, I think it’s going to be harder for Turkey to sustain. You can also lay out scenarios that pull in the other direction that have to do with a kind of new American president in Tehran, this kind of Nixon-and-China thing that would revolutionize the relationship and take much of the pressure off of Turkey. Much of the same would go for Hamas and so on. You know, if there is movement between Israel and the Palestinians, you know, this makes a much more comfortable atmosphere for Turkey to pursue this kind of double gravity policy. But that’s a very idealized situation. And, I suspect, again, you know, my thesis is that this is going to become less sustainable, not more.

MR. CAROTHERS: Henri, would you like to – MR. BARKEY: Look, what the Turks are trying to do now is – at least this

government is trying to do is to make Turkey a significant international power. They really do want to play in the big leagues. They think they have the wherewithal economically, politically, militarily, and in some ways they’re right. I mean, compared to previous governments that shied away from any international role, now they are very, very aggressively pursuing an international role.

They will most likely get a Security Council seat in the next year. They’re opening 15

embassies in Africa in the next few months. You know, there’s a – they’re all doing – this is all part of the getting the Security Council. But the Security Council seat is part of the strategy of being an active international player. But the interesting thing about Israel and Hamas and all of that stuff is that they also even though AKP is fundamentally, I think, unsympathetic to Israel, they understand one thing, though, in order to be an effective power you have to have good relations with both sides.

So in that sense Turkey will, under AKP, will continue to have good relations with

Israel because otherwise, it loses its bargaining power. I mean, in a way – so Hamas, I think, inviting Mashal was a mistake because of who Mashal is. Had they invited Haniya, it would have been probably easier to accept. But in the case of – I think they also are making mistakes. I mean this is not a very seasoned internationally sophisticated season. But they are working in another direction.

And I just want to make one comment. I mean, in a way, you also have to think of

the Armenia visit by Gul also inline with that. I mean Turkey keeps telling everybody you have to talk to everybody, yet it doesn’t talk to Armenia. So now, this is also a way for the Turks to say look we have difficult relations with the Armenians, but we have a dialogue with the Armenians.

MR. CAROTHERS: Yes, sir. Q: Umi – (inaudible) – TB Television. Henri, just to clear something. Why

shouldn’t an Armenian genocide thing come up next year? I mean at this point we all ready know that the next Congress will be dominated by democrats, both houses. And Obama has all ready pledged to recognize the killings as genocide, by them likewise. If I were Adam Schiff, I would submit the next resolution on the day Congress opens next year. What should stop it next year? Why shouldn’t they do it as early as they can regardless of developments between Turkey and Armenia, who would stop them?

MR. BARKEY: First of all, I don’t know if Obama is going to win. You know why

my preferences are in this matter, but the – I suspect that any administration that comes to power next year will have its hands full with so many difficult issues, the most important one being Iraq.

Yes, Adam Schiff will probably introduce the resolution because he has to introduce

the resolution on day one of the new Congress, but that doesn’t mean that it’s going to be acted upon, all right. And let’s face it, last year, they could have passed the resolution if they wanted to but they didn’t. All right, in a way, think about it this way, passing the resolution last year would have been even more advantageous for the democrats because it would have put the Bush administration on the defensive and would have had – forced the Bush administration to do something that is seemingly unpopular like this in some parts of the country. They didn’t do it. So why would they do it if even a democratic administration comes to power.

I mean, there’s governance, and there is being opposition. I mean, so I suspect, if

they didn’t do it last year which was also an election year, and I mean, is this year, it seems to me that it’s probably unlikely, but that’s my interpretation. I mean I don’t know.

MR. CAROTHERS: Okay, there’s the microphone. Q: Thank you very much. My name is Barkam Pazar (sp), first secretary from the

Turkish Embassy. I would like to make some points on different remarks that you made to your speech.

First to Mr. Barkey, you mentioned that the case was quite political and the decision

was all ready given, was all ready made since the beginning. I think all of the constitutional courts are, in some way, political, that’s why sometimes constitutional law is also called political law. And in the Supreme Court in the U.S. also you have very politically sensitive issues just like water-boarding, and the decision on water-boarding or abortion is also of a political nature.

But if we talk about, I mean, the way you depicted the judicial system, the judiciary in

Turkey casts a lot of doubt about its credibility. But in that it’s convenient also to state in that point that Turkey recognizes the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. And that even if the party was disbanded they would have a source of last recourse. So this is a very important point that should be noted, I think.

You have also mentioned that this was a major setback for the secular system. I

don’t take it like that. I would kindly disagree.

MR. BARKEY: I said secular establishment, not the system. Q: Secular establishment, okay. Well, I think, we are drawing also lessons from negative experiences. It’s clear that this was an important crisis. But all of the segments of the society, of the population now, have drawn the lesson that polarization in Turkey won’t help the interests of anyone. So Turkey was a democratic and secular country before that case, and it is so now with a little bit more experience. That’s all that changed, I think. Everybody has taken the message that – has drawn the message that it should draw from that case. You also said that the constitution – a new constitution is necessary but it’s very difficult to change the constitution. I also disagree with that because since the last couple of years we have all ready amended one-third of the constitution. And we have made very, very important amendments. We have abolished capital punishment. And we have also made many, many other changes. So this is not a taboo anymore for Turkey. And I believe in the days to come or in the months or years to come, the constitution is going to change – and in the right direction in consultation with the European Union and in line with the values that we share with the West. You have also said that some commanders are talking against the European Union and the relations with the U.S. They might have said things that you didn’t like, or that have resonated here in a negative way, but the actually military has been a staunch supporter of westernization and the relations with the United States is very important, and this is not going to change. So these kinds of statements don’t necessarily mean that there is – there will be a big change in our relations with the United States or with the European Union in the future. I mean, we should put that very straight. Mr. Lesser – MR. CAROTHERS: Not too much longer, but a few more points.

Q: Okay. Just a last one. You suggested that the Turkish foreign policy advanced in width but not in depth. And, I think, our position in Cyprus to accept the Annan referendum plus the idea of creating a joint historian commission with Armenia is proving actually that the opposite was true. Also, we have played an important role for the negotiations between Israel and Syria which is also something that should be mentioned. And we have launched the neighboring company initiative with Iraq which, I think, proves that Turkey is not only moving in width but also in depth.

And that’s all. Thank you very much. MR. CAROTHERS: Thank you. Henri, would you like to make any comments in

response? MR. BARKEY: I mean, very briefly, look, changing a constitution, making

amendments to the constitution is one thing, changing the spirit of the constitution is another. What I was trying to say earlier is that the basic philosophy behind the constitution in Turkey has to change, which is the relationship between the state and the individual and that’s hard. Look it’s hard, let’s not make any bones about it. It’s very hard. If it was easy it would have been done by now. And, in fact, every time there’s been an attempt at changing some of those basic issues there have been a very strong counter reaction.

So you seem to be saying that – I mean you seem to be agreeing with me that there’s

going to be a change. And I say, also, there’s going to be a change. But I’ll I’m saying it’s going to be hard, and let’s see.

As for whether or not some generals were misquoted here or misunderstood, I was

just reading from the Turkish press. I mean the Turkish press was saying, and I can give you – I have in front of me the references, and the quote of what, for example, General Kosaner said about the evil of globalization and how the United States and the EU seems to be behind this evil. I didn’t make it up. I mean, this is what he said. And I also said that Basbug said very good things about the Turkish-American relationship.

All I’m trying to tell you is that there seems to be a great deal of unease and conflict

in Turkish society that has to work itself out. And part of it is why are we reading about the generals – I mean is it that we have to look always at the generals and what the generals say? That’s my fundamental point about Turkish politics. I mean you don't essentially, when you read The New York Times or the Washington Post look at what Mullen has to say every day and what he thinks about politics. For that matter, in any other Western society to which Turkey belongs.

MR. CAROTHERS: Okay. Ian, did you want to comment? MR. LESSER: Yes. Well, thank you. I mean I – let me just clarify what I meant to

say about – in this comment about width versus depth. I mean, it’s obviously, in some ways, a play on this notion of Turkish policy is strategic depth, which is, you know, there’s a famous book about it and foreign policy advisor to the government talks about this and so on. I know what he means by that. But what I’m saying is that in reality this has given more weight to diversification and a kind of broad engagement and doing all sorts of things, in all sorts of places, whether it’s opening up many, many, new embassies in Africa, or it’s doing things with Iran, or it’s doing things in the Middle East, considering Eurasian strategies, new energy pipelines, all of this kind of stuff, it’s all worthy. These are not bad things. And, in fact, the example that you give of Cyprus and the Annan plan is an extremely positive one.

But the point that I would I make is that foreign policy is also about priorities, and

about being fairly clear about where the center of gravity of Turkish strategy ought to be

over the next decade, say. And, I think, Turkey because of the environment over the last years, and a desire to play this broad gage, engaged role that Henri was talking about has not – has perhaps neglected this a bit.

And, I think, you know, it’s really an argument for saying that Turkey is going to

have to decide whether it wants to sort of come back to the core business of joining Europe, let me put it this way. I mean, that’s what I’m saying is really code for that. There may be a very strong NATO dimension to that too which we might not have thought a few years ago because the sort of competitive relationship with Russia is coming back in a way that’s not very predictable at the moment, but is obviously getting tougher.

And this, I think, is just going to make – it’s a less luxurious environment for Turkey

to make foreign policy, that’s the point. I think, though, that you’re quite right especially to mention the Annan plan and so on because perhaps in the near term Turkey will have, you know, new choices to make about what it’s going to favor and foster on Cyprus with Europe in mind, not just because that would be a good situation to resolve in its own right, but because it’s critical to Turkey moving forward with its EU candidacy. That’s sort of what I was trying to suggest with this choice, priorities, rather than width of engagement.

MR. CAROTHERS: I was about to just take one last question, but suddenly a whole

bunch of hands have come up which sometimes happens at meetings in Washington. Just right when you think you’re getting to the end, suddenly everyone wakes up, and I think, our last questioner stirred things up a bit, which is good. So what I’m going to do, actually, is just take three, which I’ve seen, you and then you two there. Ask the three of you to go ahead and pose your questions. You guys might want to take a few notes, and then we’re going to try to finish up by about 10 minutes to 10 or thereabouts. So if you could just keep your questions fairly straightforward or brief, that would be helpful. Yes.

Q: I think you both for your presentations. Rich Kramer (sp) from the National

Endowment for Democracy. Mr. Barkey, I have a question particularly about CHP. We’ve seen that over recent years they’re not fairing well in the elections, and most recently we’ve seen that there are certain institutional levers which are not as effective as they once were. Does this mean that CHP might actually be able to kind of go look in the mirror and determine whether or not it’s time to think about reform? Maybe there’s a different way they should be doing business in order to reach out to a broader, perhaps new constituency in Turkey? Thank you.

MR. CAROTHERS: Good, and then the woman right here in the front. Q: Guler Koknar, Turkish Coalition of America. Henri, you mentioned that this is

now the time for sweeping constitutional change. And I want to underscore my colleague’s remarks here that this constitution, as it is today, is certainly not any longer 1982 constitution. Civil society has thrived in Turkey for the last 15 years. The constitution has certainly allowed for greater dissent. Minority – we don’t call them minority but human rights based on ethnicity and other variables so to say is certainly much freer than it was under the 1982 constitution’s original form.

But sweeping constitutional reform on the very tenants of this republic, is it indeed, such a good time to aspire for that, given the fact that you, underlying that there is no relevant or viable opposition in the parliament, that vast groups, vast percentage of the Turkish population are either not represented because they don’t want to work for the opposition or are represented by default by the AKP. And that the military based on the domestic and international pressures upon it will not be able to exert meaningful or legitimate pressure on this debate. And the record of AKP as it was making the constitutional reforms was not very good in terms of involving civil society and the process and going back to society and asking them if they, indeed, want to have these changes.

So is this really the climate in terms of democracy in allowing dissent and opposition

and a healthy debate for sweeping constitutional reform? MR. CAROTHERS: Okay. And then one more question right behind you. If you

could just pass to the Jim Holmes. Q: Thank you. Jim Holmes, American Turkish Council. A quick comment, and

then a brief question. The quick comment is that we’ve talked a lot about how Turkey is changing. And, I think, it’s well for us to keep in mind that the United States has changed dramatically over the last decade, decade-and-a-half as well.

And that leads to the question, and the question is to ask you to look at Washington

rather than at Ankara, and interpret for me, if you can, why it is that with the centrality of Turkey integral to so much of U.S. interests why does it continue to be such a grudging after thought for the United States to integrate Turkey into its foreign policy?

MR. CAROTHERS: That’s a very nice ending question. And as well as the question

on constitutional reform. I think, let’s just go in our order here Henri, and then Ian, and then we’ll finish up.

MR. BARKEY: Let me start with the CHP. Will there be in CHP? I tried to say

earlier that I’m not sure. I mean, I think, eventually Mr. Baykal is going to die, maybe then. No, I’m not being facetious. And sometimes, I thin, if I was ever born again, I want to come back as Mr. Baykal in life because he has the best job in the world. He gets up in the morning, shaves, he looks at the papers, has his coffee, gets into a government limousine, goes in front of the television, attacks the government. Then goes in the afternoon takes his nap and then goes and makes another speech. He has no responsibility. But he has the cameras following him aware. I mean, he’s the second most important person to – I mean, I’m being facetious. I mean I don’t see any reason why the party should change at the moment because he hasn’t done it. I mean you would think that if you lose election after election after election that somebody will say it’s time. And every time there has been individuals who have maybe thought about it he has gotten rid of them because of the way the party structure is.

Which goes back, again, which links us to the constitution and the question about

whether or not this is a good time precisely because CHP is so weak, precisely because there is no opposition. I agree with you that AKP mismanaged the constitutional debate at the beginning. And, I think, they had to open the debate – I mean they chose imminently good

people who – to write the constitution. And then these guys wrote the constitution and they completely forgot about it. I mean this – as I said, I think, this is a party that was in a slumber. But whether or not this is a good time, I think, there is never a good time, maybe, but there is also the cost of delay.

The issues that Turkey has to deal with in the coming years given the change in

Turkey economically, given the change in the international situation that Ian described, given especially on the question of the Kurds, it isn’t that Turkey has relaxed a great deal on the Kurds, let’s face it. I mean it is still a very restricted society. People are jailed for very simple things. And it is a system where – a friend of mine got this wonderful dissertation at Georgetown where it is really an arbitrary state. Where you can say something, you won’t be prosecuted because of who you are, but somebody may say exactly the same words, but that person will be persecuted. You can’t have a system like that. And this is the system that Turkey has.

I agree, the constitution has changed, it has been changed a lot. Of course, between

1982 and today, I mean, the world has changed. Turkey itself has. I mean look, Turkey was a country that only exported $2 billion worth of goods. Now it is close to $150 billion. I mean the transformation in Turkey, we all have – we’ve all seen it. That constitution had to be changed. But in the fundamental ways in which it has to be changed, that hasn’t come. And, I think, it is something that is blocking Turkey. I mean otherwise, why is that, as I said, why is that Turk’s talk about what the chief of staff thinks. This is not a healthy system where the chief of staff’s thinking is more important in many ways than most political institutions.

And that, you know, you can’t – you know we can’t – you can’t have a democracy

and have the person who controls all of the guns be the most influential person in a society. That doesn’t – it’s not –

Q: (Off mike.) MR. BARKEY: Well, I mean, just read the papers for the last few weeks, I mean,

and look at what it is that is being discussed. Looking at it from – and, I mean, and I think, it is time to the constitution – change the constitution.

But anyway, why is it a grudging after thought. Jim, look, you were in the USG, so

you know in some ways better than I do. I mean in part it is because of what Turkey was. You know in the 1970s, the United States government by fear decided to move Turkey from the Middle East to Europe. And in the process, thought that it could actually redraw the natural maps of the region. Maybe it was good. Maybe it was bad. But clearly many of the issues in which Turkey is important has to do with the Middle East.

But you know how diplomacy works. Turkey is in the European Bureau on many

issues, and you saw this in the military, you see it in the State Department, and you see it in the White House, everywhere, Turkey is right at that border. And on the main issues, for example, Iraq, Syria, Iran, it becomes an after thought. And in Europe, it is not as significant in its role in Europe as it is in the Middle East.

Therefore, that simple move from the Middle East to Europe, I think, kind of created artificial lines that have been very difficult to bridge. I mean, we saw, for example, with CENTCOM and EUCOM in the Iraq war. The Iraq war is being run by CENTCOM. CENTCOM has its own priorities. It doesn’t have any Turkey specialists, right. But EUCOM has it, but EUCOM has no role in Iraq.

And the same thing, I think, I mean from our experience in the State Department, as

well. That’s why it is – and I mean Turkey itself has – I mean it’s not just wee who have an identity problem with respect to Turkey as to but Turkey itself has had this identity problem, and in some ways, as Ian said today, I mean in one way – in some ways it has actually deepened which is – I mean I don’t look at it as negatively maybe as Ian. I think what Turkey is trying to do is long overdue, right. Turkey can transcend those boundaries. I think it should do it. But from our perspective, we haven’t figured it out. Maybe they need a special coordinator for Turkey how’s that.

MR. CAROTHERS: Ian, any closing thoughts on that last question? MR. LESSER: Sure. Yes, I mean, Jim, it’s an extremely interesting question. I

mean, and let me just make a couple of comments about it. The first it’s in a way – it’s a great question, it’s also weird that we don’t get it because if you look at the strategic cultures of the two countries they have some rather striking similarities, I mean, especially vis-à-vis, if you compare it to Europe, the sovereignty consciousness, the security consciousness, lots of things are actually very common, maybe not the most useful things to have but still very common and shared in the society. So there is a basis for a shared world view, but you’re quite right to ask the question of why we’ve had such difficultly in engaging Turkey properly and taking Turkey, as Turkey seriously.

I think part of the answer starts with the comment that Henri just made which is that

we have tended to think about the relationship and Turkey’s important, pivotal state, et cetera, in terms of real estate, geopolitics, our own power projection requirements which, you know, flowed rather naturally from Cold War realities, maybe they’ll come back and become more relevant again which will solve our problem but, I don’t think so, entirely. But that’s part of the problem. It’s not just about real estate, clearly.

It’s also about policy planning. It’s about doing the same policy coordination. It’s

about convergence, and there we’ve really dropped the ball. I think, it’s not just Washington; it’s also Turkey on a lot of different subjects, many in the Middle East, not just in the Middle East. Other things – we’ve tended to see our interest in turkey in a way as derivative of other things, of our Russia policy or our Balkan policy or our policy in the Black Sea or whatever it might be? Why don’t we take Turkey qua Turkey seriously? Well, it’s tough. And, I think, one of the reasons it’s been difficult to do that, and of course, you deal with this every day in your business. I think the problem is the constituency for Turkey here has been too small and too narrow and too brittle. It’s a strategic constituency. It’s a defense constituency. It is, to an extent, now over the last two years a bit of investment in constituency.

It’s not like talking about India. Wouldn’t it be great, if you could – if that analogy

was closer, you know? Where we haven’t had – we’ve had a lot of difficulty constructing a

strategic relationship with India. You’ve got Hollywood/Bollywood, and Silicon Valley/Bangalore and all of these kinds of people-to-people things going and we don’t have this with Turkey. We have quite the opposite: a very traditional geopolitical, geostrategic frame. So that’s, in a way, my explanation of what the problem has been.

And the irony of that, of course, is that to the extent that some of these traditional

strategic problems come back, I was half joking, it maybe solves some of this but that’s really not the way you would want to solve the problem on this thing. It’s just a byproduct. The consistency, I think, is kind of equal or –

MR. CAROTHERS: All right, well, we’ve traveled quite a bit in the last hour and 15

minutes from this specific to the general and from the political to the strategic. I want to thank both Henri Barkey and Ian Lesser for their very useful presentations and comments and also your questions and participation. We look forward to seeing you again. Thanks very much.

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