Explaining the Success of Popular Protest in Tunisia: Intra-Elite Relations and the Distribution of Patronage Amidst the Arab Uprisings Abstract: Initially, the success of the Tunisian uprising appears attributable to the popular protests that rocked the country between December 2010 and January 2011. However, this narrative ignores the role internal elite dynamics played in removing President Ben Ali from office. Studies of transitions away from authoritarian rule acknowledge a link between the withdrawal of elite support for the incumbent and regime change. This paper proposes an explanation for why elites withdraw their support for the incumbent. I argue that the elite cadres surrounding authoritarian incumbents are drawn from three distinct, each of which posses their own distinct interests and preferences towards regime change, and when these interests are not realised elites actors withdraw support for the incumbent. Utilising the distribution of material patronage as the sole explanatory variables I illustrate this argument through a discussion of Ben Ali’s Tunisia. Utilising an analytic narrative I find that the distribution of material patronage contributed to an erosion of the Ben Ali regime from within, which consequently left it vulnerable to popular protest. Introduction The Arab uprising rocked the authoritarian status quo in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as the changes affecting Tunisia, Egypt and beyond saw scholars and policymakers question long-held assumptions about the region (Gause, 2011; Pace and Cavatorta, 2012). While the uprisings require cautious analysis many in the scholarly field attributed the temporary upending of the regional status quo to newly emergent unstructured popular mobilisation and cyber activism (Teti and Gervasio, 2011). However, this focus on popular mobilisation ignores the active role regime elites, notably the military, played in shaping regime change (see Bellin, 2012). In order for popular protests to drive regime change in authoritarian systems an interaction between the masses and the elite must occur (Penner Angrist, 2013). First, popular mobilisation must sustain itself over a significant period, and second, the incumbent regime must fail to respond to this mobilisation. It is this second set of phenomena I am interested in as popular mobilisation can tell us very little about regime change on its own because the strength of mobilisation is often facilitated by incumbent weakness (Levistky and Way, 2010: 69). Dalacoura’s (2012: 69) analysis of the Arab uprisings makes this very point asserting that the retention of key allies differentiated between those instances where regime occurred and where it did not. This distinction neatly builds upon established scholarship on institutional authoritarianism, which argues that the withdrawal of elite support for the incumbent precipitates regime change in authoritarian systems (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006; 2007). Thus, the withdrawal of elite support allows protestors to knock down a broken and battered door rather than solely drive change. This raises an interesting: why would elite actors withdraw their support for the incumbent during popular uprisings? I argue that elite actors perceive their interests and preferences towards regime change differently based on the institutional structures in which they operate. I illustrate the argument by tracing the distribution of material patronage within Ben Ali’s ruling coalition. Material conditions inspired much of the popular anti-regime sentiment during the Tunisian uprising (Hibou at al., 2011) but the question of whether it

affected elite behaviour remains unanswered. To test the argument I employ a framework that articulates elite interests and preferences towards regime change. The aim of this article is twofold. First, it demonstrates that the distribution of material patronage shaped elite preferences toward regime change as it contributed to an internal erosion of the Ben Ali regime that left it vulnerable to protest. Second, the framework grants us an opportunity to refine our conceptual understanding of elite behaviour in the MENA through incorporating specific institutional elite interests into our analysis of political developments in the region. Retaining Elite Support and the Distribution of Material Patronage Studies of institutional authoritarianism argue that the withdrawal of elite support for the incumbent precipitates regime change in authoritarian systems (see Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006; 2007). Where I speak of the elite I utilise the definition of the ruling coalition, those ‘individuals who support a dictator and, jointly with him, hold enough power to guarantee a regime’s survival’ (Svolik, 2012: 5-6). Put simply, the elite are the essentials without whose support a leader would be finished (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2011: 5). The importance of retaining elite support was not lost on the MENA’s incumbent autocrats who established systems to both support themselves and guard against threats from within (Brownlee, 2007). This system of ‘authoritarian upgrading’ allowed incumbents to accommodate and manage changing political conditions within their regime and throughout society all while maintaining their hold on power. In its broadest sense authoritarian upgrading does not constitute a single model or template but rather a number of different strategies that incumbents can utilise in concert with one another (Heydemann, 2007). In seeking to maintain elite support incumbents rely on a number of strategies including patrimonialism (Sassoon, 2012), shared political agendas (Perthes, 2004), maintaining international support networks (Yom and Al-Momani, 2008), legitimation strategies designed to demobilise the opposition (Schlumberger, 2010), and, material distribution strategies centred on rentierism and economic liberalisation (Brynen et al., 2012), which this paper discusses. In analysing the distribution of material patronage this paper seeks to capture its political affects not monetary ones to determine elite interests and preferences towards regime change (Tsourapas, 2013). Capturing these affects is important because accruing material patronage represents a symbolic commodification of power that signals the elite status of recipients to both those within the regime and society (Nitzan and Bichler, 2002: 36-38). To analyse the distribution of patronage I utilise Richter’s (2007) ‘fiscal sociology of resilient authoritarianism’, which analyses the distribution of material patronage to select actors in society rather than the revenues accrued by rentierism or the expected benefits of economic liberalisation. Tracing the distribution of patronage brings with it the added benefit of mitigating the effects of economic fluctuations as this paper is seeking to analyse the effects patronage has on elite actors not the wider economy. In the MENA the distribution of material resources of material resources takes three forms. First, the region’s militaries are typically granted privileged access to economic resources. This includes high levels of defence expenditure compared to countries outside the region (The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), 2012), access to advanced military equipment and training (Kamrava, 2000), access to

social benefits such as subsidised housing and healthcare systems, and, for retired officers well-placed jobs in the state bureaucracy (Bou Nassif, 2013). In certain countries including Egypt, Syria and Algeria the military established either direct business interests or acted as an interlocutor between private business interests and the state (see Joya, 2011; Haddad, 2012; Cook, 2007), which allowed the military to defray much of the costs of looking after it members financial interests (Owen, 2012: 45). The region’s security services were also looked after in a similar manner being afforded access to increased budgets since the 1990s that only provided for better equipment but social benefits such as apartments and plots of land (Owen, 2012; Sassoon, 2012: 212). Second, incumbent regimes distributed material patronage through managing the economic liberalisation process. With the exception of the oil monarchies, the MENA’s states entered structural adjustment programmes negotiated with the World Bank and IMF on a selective or partial basis throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In economic sectors where the incumbent’s interests were threatened regimes either modified or inhibited reforms to such an extent that their potential impact on the distribution of power became minimised or ignored altogether (Schlumberger, 2008). This selective reform process did not halt the privatisation of state-owned enterprises. It rather saw the personalisation of these entities as they were sold off to members of the incumbent’s family or close allies; which consequently saw important economic sectors remain in regime hands and utilised for private rather than public gain. Finally, employment in the public sector gave elites in the bureaucracy a stake in the regime. The regulatory reforms that were the consequence of economic liberalisation granted bureaucrats the opportunity to establish rent-seeking relationships with members of the business community (Heydemann, 2007: 14-15). Regime officials did this through the arbitrary reward of tax and customs exemptions and other forms of privileged treatment, such as expediting requests, over which they possessed considerable discretion. The distribution of material patronage bound the elite to the incumbent; although this relationship was weighted in the latter’s favour. Because of the hierarchical nature of the relationship the incumbent can decide which members of the elite may access patronage (Schlumberger, 2008: 626). This allows the incumbent to balance competing elite interests and prevent any elite segment from possibly developing into a threatening alternative power centre. However, the distribution of patronage nonetheless carries risks for the incumbent. In light of the uprisings the ‘upgrading authoritarianism’ argument encountered significant difficulties as the changes sweeping the region cast doubt on its validity and the mechanisms through which ruling elites reconfigured society to manage changing political and economic conditions (Pace and Cavatorta, 2012). An important criticism placed at the feet of the argument is the missing facet of ‘unintended consequences’ and the unforeseen outcomes that authoritarian upgrading might have (Haugbølle and Cavatorta, 2012: 99). Reconfigurations that sought to strengthen authoritarianism but they also carried the potential to influence the relationship between regimes and society in a manner antithetical to elite interests. Consider the unintended consequences of distributing material patronage to the elite. Incumbents may have bound the elite to their rule but the societal impacts of these actions, corruption, inequality and structural unemployment, set regimes on a collision course with their people (see Achcar, 2013). However, unintended consequences largely

ignored intra-elite relations and the question of whether incumbents contributed to their own demise. For example, would the sale of state-owned assets to the incumbent’s family negatively affect the interests of the military, and, would the consequences of this action give the military pause to consider its support of the incumbent? This question remains unanswered for reasons. First, the methods employed to retain elites support are tested without accounting for their relative importance and efficacy, a consequence of pre-uprising scholarly inquiries in MENA that selected cases based on the positive observation of the dependent variable, which tended towards authoritarian maintenance (Albrecht, 2015: 40). Interesting questions therefore remain unanswered: which methods of elite management matter, when do they matter and are different elite actors vulnerable to different factors? Second, the institutional makeup of the region’s elite cadres receive little attention, which prevents us from making an informed judgment as to what strategies aid us in our understanding of elite behaviour. Categorisations of the region’s autocracies tend towards the abstract (Lust, 2011) or the overly detailed (Hibou, 2011), both of which make comparison impractical. Where the elite is analysed it focuses on individual segments, such as the military, and their relationship with the incumbent. Accordingly, we cannot perceive how different segments of the elite perceive material patronage’s effect on their interests. In order to answer the question the following section proposes a theoretical framework that takes the institutional makeup of the region’s elite cadres into account. At this point I should note that the analysis of the Tunisian case and its utilisation of a single explanatory variable, the distribution of material patronage, does not provide a satisfactory answer as to which methods of elite management are important and effective. However, the beginnings of this discussion have been addressed by Albrecht (2015) in his work on military coup-proofing in Egypt and Syria. The Theoretical Framework: Articulating Elite Interests If the denial of interests sees elite actors withdraw their support for the incumbent it should be detailed how this process works. To articulate elite interests I draw on the scholarship on institutional authoritarianism. Although drawing on institutionalism to articulate agency may seem counterintuitive the structures in which elites operate define their agency rather than marginalise it (Stacher, 2012: 34). Rather than constrain actors institutions provide them with a range of defined options they can pursue. To articulate agency I draw on Geddes’ (1999a; 1999b; 2003) institutional typology of authoritarian systems, which is widely used to analyse the relationship between elite behaviour and regime change, and classifies authoritarian regimes as either military, single-party or personalist in nature, each of which possesses distinct interests and preferences regarding regime change. However, I differ in my application of Geddes’ typology. Whereas the typology is traditionally deployed at the macro-level of the regime I do so at the level of the ruling coalition, the previously discussed elite individuals, who jointly with the incumbent hold enough power to ensure a regime’s survival, which allows us to map elite interests onto pre-existing elite structures in the MENA. Roger Owen (2012: 38-39) describes the MENA’s presidential systems as comprising an alliance of the military, the ruling party, the security services and the incumbent’s extended personal network of family and friends, each of which corresponds with one of the military,

single-party and personalist cadres. The particularities of these components may vary in terms of formal structures and terminology but each draws upon the same group and shares the goal of maintaining the incumbent’s hold on power. The military cadre comprises the senior ranks of officer corps who directly or indirectly influence policymaking (Geddes, 2003: 51-52). The military cadre’s interests lie in the survival and efficacy of the military institution, which imply a concern with internal cohesion, the territorial integrity of the nation, autonomy from civilian intervention and provision of sufficient budgets with which to procure ultramodern equipment and attract high quality recruits (Stepan, 1971, Nordlinger, 1977). These are interests the military cadre feels it cannot realise unless sufficiently provided for. Such interests indicate that the military cadre will only favour regime change if it believes the civilian government prevents the achievement of these goals. The military cadre would prefer to remain in the barracks but if its institutional integrity is threatened, it will countenance regime change (Nordlinger, 1977: 142). Through professionalization programmes, high budget expenditures, and in some cases, the opportunity to engage in business ventures (Bou Nassaf, 2013), incumbents largely realised the interests of, and secured the support of, their officer corps. However, to further ensure the loyalty of the military cadre incumbents typically appoint a senior general to the position of Defence Minister (Owen, 2012: 46). Although reluctant to consider the regime change the military cadre will do if its institutional integrity is threatened. We can thus hypothesise that the denial of military interests within the ruling coalition will lead the military cadre to withdraw its support for the incumbent and voluntarily exit the ruling coalition during popular uprisings. The single-party cadre comprises the party’s leadership office, which controls the career path of party officials and organises the distribution of benefits to regime supporters (Geddes, 2003: 52). The interests of those in the single-party cadre are relatively straightforward: they want to remain in office. Some enjoy the prestige of office, others the opportunity to shape policy and others the access to illicit benefits (Geddes, 1999a: 129). In order to remain in office leaders require the support of the incumbent, which necessitates maintaining loyalty and commitment to the party’s ideals (see Sassoon, 2012: 47). Those in the single-party cadre access material patronage in a number of ways. First, those elected to parliament use their position to gain privileged information regarding privatisations and sales of state land to partner with select business actors in return for a portion of the profits (Blaydes, 2011: 128). Second, party members in the bureaucracy perform the same task and utilise their access to form partnerships with select business actors (King, 2003; 2009). And third, elected party members directly distribute patronage to party members in their constituencies through the provision of government jobs and infrastructure projects, such as building schools or roads (Bin Nefisa and Arafat, 2005: 121). Although the single-party cadre contains factions that form over a number of issues, such as policy or succession, all party members realise they are better off if the party remains united. As such, the single-party cadre will tolerate the short-term denial of interests in expectation of access to future spoils (Geddes, 1999a: 134). Consequently, single-party elites would not willingly exit the ruling coalition because of endogenous factors (i.e. the distribution of material patronage) and will instead take a long-term

view. However, the single-party cadre will withdraw from the ruling coalition if external shocks, such as a popular uprising, threaten its interests and survival (Geddes, 1999b: 8). In the absence of these shocks, endogenous factors or internal rivalries are unlikely to destabilise the single-party cadre. We can therefore hypothesise that single-party cadres will not voluntarily exit the ruling coalition because of endogenous factors during the occurrence of popular uprisings. However, if exogenous factors threaten the interests and/or survival of single-party cadres, they will withdraw from the ruling coalition. The personalist cadre consists of two distinct groups: i) the extended family and friends of the incumbent; and ii) the various security services (police, paramilitaries, intelligence services) housed in the Ministry of Interior (MOI). The incumbent determines the scope of family power but sons, and sometimes sons-in-law, assume a wide variety of roles including potential successor, political manager, economic manager or military commander. In Egypt Gamal Mubarak performed the role of potential successor, political manager and economic manager while Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh commanded Yemen’s Republic Guard at his father’s behest (Owen, 2012). Incumbents also surround themselves with friends who use their privileged access to obtain favourable business opportunities in exchange for political and economic support (see Heydemann, 2004). The security services’ mission differs from that of the military cadre: theirs is the defence of the regime not the nation (Droz-Vincent, 2014: 183). They are guided by a particular internal logic that needs to identify, monitor and control threats to the regime and they accomplish this mission not just through repressive measures but bureaucratic interference (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 3). Access to material patronage retains the loyalty of those in the personalist cadre and consequently all within this group have strong reason to support the incumbent. Furthermore, because all members of this group are thoroughly enmeshed in the region’s corruption and lack an independent political base from which to realise their interests if regime change were to occur they will not willingly abandon the incumbent (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 86). Accordingly, we can hypothesise that members of the personalist cadre will not voluntarily exit the ruling coalition during the occurrence of popular uprisings. In summary cadres react differently when their interests are not realised. If the military institution is threatened the military cadre will withdraw support for the incumbent, the single-party cadre will not withdraw support for the incumbent unless exogenous conditions compel it to do so, and, the personalist cadre is set against regime change. I should note that the three cadre types used in this paper constitute ideal types, which do not reflect the interests of individual elite actors within each cadre; rather they reflect the institutional interests of each cadre as a whole (Izquierdo Brichs and Lampridi-Kemou, 2013: 10). Thus, each cadre subsumes individual elite interests in order to improve the cadre’s overall position. In terms of the military institution the interests articulated are those of the military not an individual general. The focus on institutional interests does not diminish the research’s argument as it seeks to make a theoretical interpretation of events not provide specific details on the interests of individual elite actors. To test the hypotheses the paper utilises an analytic narrative to test for interest realisation before the Tunisian uprising and supplements secondary sources with background interviews conducted in Tunis in January 2015.

The Distribution of Material Patronage and Interest Realisation in Ben Ali’s Tunisia Ben Ali’s Ruling Coalition and Economic Policy in Tunisia Ben Ali’s ruling coalition consisted of the military cadre embodied by the Tunisian armed forces, the single-party cadre of the Rassemblement Constitutionnelle Démocratique (RCD), and, the personalist cadre of the Tunisian MOI and Ben Ali’s extended family, particularly his in-laws, which will hereafter be called The Family. The RCD leadership primarily consisted of technocrats who lacked either the political experience or political base from which to challenge Ben Ali but possessed the requisite qualities to assist the President in advancing his agenda (Alexander, 1997: 188). The RCD became an ‘organizational sinew’ of the regime that served Ben Ali’s interests rather than rule in partnership with him (Penner Angrist, 2007: 188). Because of his background in both the military and the MOI Ben Ali also brought the armed forces and the security services into the political fold as members of both institutions were placed into leading state and party positions (Murphy, 1999: 171). However, the military cadre’s prominence as a political actor was not long lived, as Ben Ali began to distance the armed forces from the centre of power (Hanlon, 2012; Brooks, 2013). The gradual isolation of the armed forces and the depoliticised nature of the RCD saw power and prestige gradually move towards the MOI and The Family, who started to exert a significant political and economic in influence in the mid-1990s. Upon coming to power Ben Ali became convinced that economic liberalisation could transform Tunisia into a developmental state akin to China that would deliver improved living standards under the leadership of an authoritarian regime (King, 2009: 178-181). To this end, Ben Ali’s technocrats crafted a number of five year plans with the support of the World Bank and the IMF that would progressively liberalise the Tunisian economy through macroeconomic stabilisation policies, the privatisation of state assets, stock market liberalisation and foreign direct investment (FDI) (Murphy, 1999). Initially, these policies were successful and Tunisia witnessed real and dynamic growth during the 1990s (Sfeir, 2006). However, it eventually became apparent that the regime’s economic policies served the interests of the few intimately connected to Ben Ali and not only did this have severe social consequences, which are discussed elsewhere (see Hibou et al., 2011) but it also contributed to the destabilisation of the ruling elite. The Single-Party Cadre: The RCD and the Distribution of Opportunity The RCD did not directly distribute patronage to its members. The party instead functioned as interlocutor between its members in the business sector and the bureaucracy in which the latter aided in expediting requests for authorisation, credit and licences in exchange for a share of the profits (Hibou, 2011: 89). According to a member of the Tunisian business community RCD membership was a facilitator that allowed businessmen to access indirect advantages, such as bypassing state building regulations, not available to those outside of the party.1 Because RCD membership allowed individuals to directly intercede with the bureaucracy the party became a

1 Personal Interview with Selim Ben Yedder, CEO of Cynapsys Tunisia, IT Company, Tunis, January

7, 2015.

network of clienteles designed to realise its members’ interests. Party leadership also took advantage of this situation and Ministers utilised their inside information and influence to ensure that their business contacts had preferred access to government contracts, which allowed them to receive profitable kickbacks.2 Membership of the RCD thus brought together a diverse range of actors who often possessed competing interests such as trade unionists, business owners, rural landowners, peasant farmers and civil servants and gave each a stake in the Ben Ali regime (King, 2003: 90-91; King, 2009: 173-174). This system also had the added benefit of binding the RCD to the regime as it inhibited reform from within according to a Tunisian civil society activist who stated that ‘[O]nce you take advantage of the system you can’t come out against corruption because you’ve already taken advantage of it. This way the system keeps growing from the grassroots upwards’.3 Furthermore, the existence of RCD cells in public sector firms’ also meant that workers risked losing their jobs if they challenged the party (Penner Angrist, 1999: 95). The consequences of disloyalty saw many party members actively support the RCD; they participated in public meetings and were present on elections days to mobilise the party vote (Hibou, 2011: 89). However, the system’s perceived strengths masked weaknesses brought about economic liberalisation, which saw the state divest itself from a number of economic activities via privatisation. This severed a number of ties that bound the RCD to the bureaucracy and with these ties lost the party lost its ability to exert influence and distribute opportunities to members (Murphy, 1999: 232; Hibou 2006: 196). The state’s exit form the economy was not simply the consequence of liberalising the economy but of deliberate political calculations that saw material power accrue within the personalist cadre. Well-connected businessmen that were part of or close to Ben Ali’s extended family benefitted disproportionally from the privatisation of the public sector to the detriment of those small and medium-sized businesses that were courted to join the RCD when the regime was in its nascent stages (Penner Angrist, 2013: 551-552). Over time, this led the small and medium-sized business sector to view the economy as being in thrall to big business and The Family (Cammett, 2007: 125-126). The Personalist Cadre (1): The Family and Tunisia IncorporatedThe liberalisation of the Tunisian economy saw the privatisation of state-owned enterprises. Between 1987 and 1994, the government focused on forty-five small and mostly unprofitable businesses in the service sector, rigid conditions were set for these sales that allowed the regime to escape the political costs associated with privatisation (Murphy, 2013: 46). The privatisation programme appeared to be slowing down in 1994, but under pressure from the World Bank and IMF Tunisia expanded its scope to include more profitable state-owned enterprises and reform of the stock market (Murphy, 1999: 141-144). From the late 1990s onward, the programme accelerated and strategic sectors of the economy, such as telecommunications, transport, and banking opened up to the market. As of January 2010, 219 enterprises had entered the privatisation programme and had raised $4.45 2 Cable, Embassy Tunis to Secretary of State, ‘Corruption in Tunisia Part II: The Anatomy of

Exploitation’, June 29 2006, 06TUNIS1630. Available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06TUNIS1630_a.html [Accessed March 2 2015]

3 Personal Interview with Amine Ghali, Program Director, The Kawabiki Transition Centre, Tunis, January 8, 2015.

billion for the government over twenty years. However, Murphy (2013: 46) makes the interesting point that ‘[T]he income from sales was not as high as might have been expected, but the firms sold in the latest spree seemed reassuringly secure and profitable after privatization’. When we take into account, the main beneficiaries of Tunisia’s privatisation programme, we can understand why the receipts generated by this process were not as high as anticipated. This was because state assets were sold outright to members of The Family and their close friends, usually without a genuinely competitive bidding process. That those close to Ben Ali were beneficiaries of Tunisia’s privatisation process was a reflection of the regime’s desire to keep control of the economy, despite liberalising it (Hibou, 2006; 2011). Although nominally privatised, private individuals who had the ability to pull or influence the strings of the state itself controlled the economy to a large extent. An observer of this process noted that The Family came to view the Tunisian economy as their private domain, which could not be shared with others stating ‘They share the economy with each other but agree not to share it with anybody outside The Family’.4 The Family came to dominate the privatisation process in a number of ways. Members of the Family partnered with international investors to buy block shares in state companies while in other cases members of the Family facilitated purchases and concessions for international partners in return for either cash or a stake in the business (Murphy, 2013: 46). One of Ben Ali’s sons-in-law, Marouane Mabrouk, acquired a stake in Tunisia’s Banque de Sud before its privatisation and subsequently sold it at a substantial profit. Mabrouk also purchased another company, La Société Le Moteur, at a discounted price. This purchase allowed him to control all Mercedes and Fiat distribution within the country.5 Other purchases included La Céramique and the National Society for Raising Chickens by another son-in-law, Slim Zarrouk and the transfer of significant parts of Tunisair to brother-in-law Belhassen Trabelsi. Belhassen Trabelsi also bought the state-owned company that held the licences for the distribution of Ford, Rover, Jaguar and Hyundai vehicles, and grew a tourism empire through purchasing privatised hotels (Murphy, 2013: 47). Privatised land also interested the Family. The Family bought cheap agricultural land from the state at a discounted price and then obtained permits to alter the usage to real estate and dramatically inflate its value. Belhassen Trabelsi even leased land back to the state at advantageous rates (Beau and Graciet, 2009: 76). The Family’s co-optation of the privatisation process was such that they came to dominate whole economic geographies. The Trabelsi family dominated the economy of the Greater Tunis area, while Ben Ali’s family interests were spread further south along the coastal plains. The capital for these purchases came from hijacking the management of parts of the banking sector and subverting funds from state agencies. Belhassen Trabelsi placed allies on the board of the Banque de Tunisie, which allowed the Family to take out a range of non-performing loans.6 The Family also raided a number of state agencies

4 Personal Interview with Anis Samali, Project Chief Mourakiboun, Tunisian Election Monitoring

NGO, Tunis, January 7, 2015. 5 Cable, Embassy Tunis to Secretary of State, ‘Corruption in Tunisia: What’s Yours is Mine’, June 23

2008, 08TUNIS679. Available at: https://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08TUNIS679.html [Accessed March 2 2015.

6 Ibid.

for capital, including the Fonds de solidarité nationale (FSN – National Solidarity Fund). The FSN (known as Caisse 2626 form the postcode which people were encouraged to send donations) was created in 1992 to safeguard the gains of economic liberalisation and guard the population against its side effects (Tsourapas, 2013: 28). It aimed to eliminate poverty in economically problematic areas and this would be achieved through donations both from citizens and private business, which were typically coerced (King, 2009: 179). The FSN became known as Ben Ali’s ‘black cash box’ and Tunisians joked that the fund was nicknamed the 2627, as solidarity funds were used to finance the activities of Ben Ali and the Family (Hibou, 2011: 194). The Personalist Cadre (2): MOI Privileges and ImpunityThe nature of the material resources provided to the MOI is difficult to assess owing to the paucity of information available about the institution in the public domain. However, the available evidence utilised in this paper suggests that the ministry was well rewarded for its loyalty to Ben Ali. The forces available to the MOI numbered between 40,000 and 80,000 personnel (Hanlon, 2012: 6) and despite the lack of data regarding official expenditure the paper can detail the benefits provided to the ministry. The MOI did not participate in the privatisation bonanza that characterised The Family, instead the MOI realised its material interests through rent-seeking. Police officers received an average monthly salary of $230 in 2010; below the average monthly wage of a bus driver and only half that of a lower-level bank employee (Hlaoui, 2010). Despite this, a career in the police was sight after because it offered abundant opportunities to earn supplementary income though bribes and other corrupt practices. These practices took various forms and ranged from petty theft to large-scale corruption within the different sectors of the MOI. In the traffic police one could extract bribes from unlicensed street vendors or offer traffic offenders the opportunity to pay individual officers directly in lieu of a more costly fine (Lutterbuck, 2015: 825). Because of these opportunities for graft, a career in the traffic police was one of more sought after appointments amongst those seeking to join the MOI as it all but guaranteed a supplementary wage. The upper echelons of the MOI also displayed an equal capacity for large-scale corruption. Leading members of the Tunisian construction sector established direct links with high-level officials in the Ministry who, in return for bribes, ensured that their business interests were not subject to state interference (Lutterbuck, 2015: 825). Furthermore, these state officials also used their influence to harass their benefactor’s competitors. Because of this, several senior officials in the ministry were alleged to have amassed considerable fortunes by virtue of their influential connections with business magnates.7 These benefits bound the MOI to Ben Ali because the president linked his survival with the material privileges they received. As one activist put ‘[H]e linked his own existence with them and their interests, effectively making his existence their main interest’.8 This corruption not only established ties of loyalty and ‘indebtedness’ 7 See, ‘Quand les parasites font un état dans une dictature policière corrompue’. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/notes/badr-haroun/ne-lisez-pas-cet-article-ça-fait-mal-au-coeur-quand-les-parasites-font-un-état-d/168739229847902/ [Accessed 25 April 2016]. 8 Personal Interview with Achraf Aouadi, Chair and Founder of I Watch, Tunisian Transparency and

Anti-Corruption NGO, Tunis, January 7, 2015.

towards Ben Ali but also created possibilities of punishment in the event of disloyal behaviour (Lutterbuck, 2015: 824). In her analysis of Tunisia Hibou (2011: 152) argues that the regime’s tolerance and corruption was part of a deliberate strategy that allowed the regime to manipulate and instrumentalise members of the MOI. This took the form of positive incentives such as bribes or preferential treatment as well as negative inducements in that Ben Ali could potentially punish corrupt officials for disloyalty because they had broken the law after all. Thus, membership of the MOI, whilst encouraging corruption and nepotism, made one more vulnerable to presidential whims. The Military Cadre: Fending for ItselfThe material resources made available to the military speak to the institution’s isolation within the ruling coalition. Compared to its neighbours in North Africa, the Tunisian military was under-resourced and it did not possess the extensive private sector interests or social privileges of its Algerian and Egyptian counterparts (Gaub, 2014: 26-27). According to the IISS (2012: 351-352) the Tunisian military consisted of a 27,000 strong army, of which 20,000 were conscripts; a navy of 4,800; and an air forces of 4,000. Numerically, the military paled in comparison to the MOI, which had between 40,000 and 80,000 personnel. The budgetary resources for the military were also low in comparison to the rest of the region and Tunisia ranked 109th in the world in terms of the percent of GDP devoted to defence (Brooks, 2013: 210). While the monetary resources devoted to the military increased, there was a decline in military expenditure as both a percentage of GDP and overall government expenditure, as Table 1 makes clear. As a result of declining government expenditure, much of the military’s French and American equipment was out-dated, if not already obsolete (Brooks, 2013: 210). INSERT TABLE 1 HERE The Distribution of Material Patronage and the Tunisian Uprising: Shaping Elite Actions? The distribution of material patronage clearly favoured the interests of the personalist cadre as it became evident Ben Ali did not balance the interests of those in the ruling coalition. The vast wealth accrued by The Family though their co-optation of the privatisation process allowed its members to directly affect the affairs of the country. Ben Ali’s wife Leila Trabelsi commanded the RCD’s technocrats based in the presidential palace to treat her as a de facto President while Belhassen Trabelsi and presidential son-in-law Sakhr el-Materi both acquired leadership positions in the party, which granted both significant opportunities for rent-seeking (see Beau and Graciet, 2009). The MOI was also well looked after in exchange for protecting Ben Ali the ministry received increased funding and permission to engage in corrupt business deals. Furthermore, Ben Ali also rewarded the MOI substantial honours and political decorations to underscore the institution’s importance (Bou Nassif, 2015: 73). The assent of the personalist cadre mirrored Ben Ali’s capture of symbols of public power and gradual monopolisation of power that sought to place the presidency above the ruling coalition (Willis, 2012: 133).

Prioritising the personalist cadre saw the single-party and military cadres question their position in the ruling coalition. The RCD remained nominally important to Ben Ali but, outside of the palace-based technocrats, party notables could not influence decisionmaking, as any attempt to do would result in political marginalisation (Penner Angrist, 1999: 98-99). Furthermore, the unintended consequences of economic liberalisation saw party notables unable to access patronage and distribute it to their supporters. Indicative of the RCD’s anger at Ben Ali was a declaration critical of the regime, which claiming to represent party’s silent majority criticised the increased personalisation of the regime (Geisser and Gobe, 2005/6). A former RCD leader remarked that ‘RCD cadres no longer existed. We were treated at best like peons, at worst like lepers’ (ICG, 2011: 9-10). However, the disaffected notables chose not to walk away reasoning that it was better to stay in the ruling coalition than exit it (Penner Angrist, 2007: 187). Indeed, party notables became accustomed to competing with one another for Ben Ali’s favour recognising that breaking away from the regime would have resulted in a diminished status. Ben Ali also held the military cadre in low esteem. Initially, given a prominent position in the ruling coalition the military was undone by the Barakat Essahel case, in which the MOI falsely accused the military of planning to overthrow Ben Ali (Lutterbuck, 2015: 816). Although most of the accused were released or declared innocent the affair soured relations between Ben Ali and the military. The latter became politically isolated and found its access to material patronage depleted. This situation saw the officer corps become increasingly unhappy with Ben Ali. Such was the state affairs one officer bluntly stated: ‘The regime did not like us’ (Hanlon, 2012: 4). However, isolation benefitted the military’s interests as it developed an institutional character independent of the political machinations of the ruling coalition (Brooks, 2013: 214-215). In tracing the political effects of patronage distribution we can note that the foundations of the Ben Ali regime ‘eroded considerably’ (Penner Angrist, 2013: 554) because the personalist cadre’s interests were privileged over the remainder of those in the ruling coalition. There were ramifications to these actions. As the regime eroded from within it became increasingly vulnerable to sustained popular protests because a possibility existed that segments of the ruling coalition would withdraw their support for Ben Ali if they were to occur, either by standing against him or not standing with him. When the Tunisian uprising began on December 17th 2010 the ruling coalition’s members reacted in a manner broadly consistent with the expectations outlined earlier. The advent of the protests saw the RCD disintegrate. Despite its loss of prestige within the ruling coalition, the party still supported Ben Ali. Nonetheless, the scale of the popular mobilisation confronting the regime saw many in the party reconsider their position in the ruling coalition. Party reformists saw the uprising as an opportunity to begin a process of political reform and sought to engage with the protest movement but, according to one observer, the personalist cadre stymied these efforts.9 Nor could the RCD leadership mobilise local cells for counter-demonstrations, which progressively abandoned the regime during the uprisings according to the ICG (2011: 9) who noted: ‘When orders were given to mid-level

9 Personal Interview with Youssef Cherif, Political Analyst, The Cherif Consultancy Company, Tunis,

January 7, 2015.

party officials to mobilise their men, the situation was difficult because much of their rank and file were sympathising with the demands of the protestors. As a vehicle for party mobilisation the RCD was gradually unable to offer material advantages to its members, which contributes towards explaining the passivity of local members during the uprising. These actions were initially consistent with the literature’s expectations of the single-party cadre’s behaviour. However, while the distribution of material patronage saw many in the party disapprove of the regime’s behaviour but the available evidence indicates that the strength of the popular protests arrayed against the regime are what finally convinced many in the party to abandon Ben Ali. The military cadre also withdrew from the ruling coalition during the uprising. When the uprising began the military deployed to Tunisia’s interior but did not actively engage in managing protests (Brooks, 2013: 215). Institutionally, the officer corps made clear that it would not use force against those demonstrating because it feared a military split and the potential occurrence of civil war.10 Bou Nassif (2015: 78-81) supports this contention stating that the officer corps was not ‘ready to shed blood’ to save Ben Ali, which supports the point that the military institution would abandon the incumbent if its interests were threatened. However this also raises the point that endogenous factors were not the sole explanation for why the military cadre abandoned the ruling coalition, which is similar to the decisionmaking that shaped the single-party cadre’s actions. The personalist cadre’s reactions are entirely consistent with the hypotheses’ expectation that none this cadre’s members would willingly favour regime change. First, members of The Family actively sought to stymie the RCD’s efforts to enter a dialogue with the protestors and (Ben Choudra, 2011: 59). The MOI actively attempted to repress the protest movement but it soon became overwhelmed as protest spread throughout Tunisia’s interior.11 Furthermore, the MOI’s repressive tactics had the unintended consequence of fuelling further anti-regime sentiment that contributed to it being overwhelmed by the protest movement (ICG, 2011: 3). Analysing elite interest realisation and the distribution of material patronage gives rise to two interest findings. First, the distribution of material patronage certainly shaped interest realisation and contributed to the decisions of the single-party and military cadres to withdraw their support for Ben Ali during the Tunisian uprisings. It also shaped the decision of the personalist cadre to continue supporting Ben Ali. Second, as an explanatory variable the distribution of material patronage cannot solely explain the decisions of the single-party and military cadres to withdraw support for Ben Ali. In analysing the behaviour of both cadres it emerges that the scale of the mobilisation arrayed against Ben Ali partly convinced the two to withdraw their support. What does this tell us? It tells us that material patronage shapes interest realisation but that it’s insufficient to solely explain elite behaviour during popular protests. Rather, it emerges that material patronage is potentially the first step in a large causal chain that sees actors question their position in the ruling coalition.

10 Interview with Anis Samali 11 Interview with Amine Ghali.

Conclusion: Erosion from Within and the Success of Popular Protest? This paper argued that elites withdraw their support for authoritarian incumbents during popular uprisings because their institutional interests are not realised. Taking the distribution of material patronage as the sole explanatory variable I illustrated this argument through an analysis of the 2011 Tunisian uprising. The paper found that the distribution of material patronage shaped how elite actors viewed their preferences regarding regime change but it also found that material patronage was not a solely sufficient variable to explain why elites withdraw support for the incumbent. Instead, material patronage forms one step in a causal chain and must be considered alongside other factors both endogenous and exogenous to elite actors. There are lessons that we can draw from our discussion of Tunisia. First, it emerges that the institutional constraints in which elite actors operate shape their interests and preferences towards regime change. Second, the paper notes that the unintended consequences of authoritarian reconfiguration, in this case economic liberalisation, contributed to the destabilisation of Ben Ali’s ruling coalition. Privileging the interests of the personalist cadre though allowing the The Family to co-opt the privatisation process destabilised the relationship between Ben Ali and the RCD. Furthermore, the privileging of the MOI also damaged the relationship between the military cadre and the remainder of the ruling coalition. Finally, privileging the interests of the personalist cadre over those of the single-party and military cadres ay prove detrimental for authoritarian incumbents over the long-term as it limits base from which incumbent scan draw support. As noted above material patronage does not constitute the sole explanatory factor in explaining elite behaviour, it requires integration into a large casual sequence. However, that should not diminish the fact that the theoretical framework employed in this work allowed us to articulate elite interests and successfully predict elite behaviours. Furthermore the framework, while drawn from comparative studies of authoritarian institutionalism, displays an aptitude for integration with studies of authoritarian upgrading. This indicates the framework’s viability for an ongoing engagement with other tenets of the authoritarian upgrading argument that may allow us to paint a fuller picture of elite behaviour during popular protests. Bibliography Achcar, Gilbert, 2013. The People Want: A Radical exploration of the Arab Uprising, (London: Saqi). Albrecht, Holger, 2015. ‘Does Coup-Proofing Work? Civil-Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes Amid the Arab Uprisings’, Mediterranean Politics, 20:1, 36-54. Arieff, Alexis, 2011. ‘Political Transition in Tunisia: Report’, RS21666, The Congressional Research Service, February 2, (Washington DC: The Congressional Research Service). Beau, Nicolas, and Catherine Graciet, 2009. La Régente de Carthage: Main Basse Sur al Tunisie. The Regent of Carthage: Assault on Tunisia, (Paris: Editions La Découverte). Bellin, Eva, 2012. ‘Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring, Comparative Politics, 44:2, 127-149. Ben Choudra, Lofti, in collaboration with Isabelle Soares Boumalala, 2011. Dans L’ombre de la Reine. In the Shadow of the Queen, (Neuilly-sur-Seine Cedex: Editions Michael Lafon).

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