Trident' Renewal Vote: Separating Fact From Fiction

8/15/2019 'Trident' Renewal Vote: Separating Fact From Fiction

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‘Trident’ renewal vote:

separating fact from fictionInterim report from Labour’s Backbench Defence Commi ee

June 2016

MPs will soon vote to conrm the government’s con nued commitment to the maintenance of an independent nuclear deterrent. While the result of that vote on “Trident” itself is not in doubt, the Labour party’s con nued commitment to the policy is under review. As part of the party’s debate on defence, the Parliamentary Labour Party Defence commi ee, chaired by John Woodcock MP and Baroness Chris ne Crawley, has run briengs with leading experts on the arguments for and against renewal of the deterrent.

This interim report explains what ‘Trident’ renewal means in prac ce, summarises the key arguments advanced in the commi ee’s evidence sessions, and blows apart common myths about the UK’s independent nuclear deterrent. The commi ee will produce a nal report before the Commons vote.

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Contents

Executive summary

Section A: Nuclear practice and theory

Chapter 1: What does a renewal of “Trident” mean?

Section B: Nuclear deterrence in the modern world

Chapter 2: Nuclear deterrence- Deterrence theory- Threats to na onal security- Keeping the peace and geopoli cal posi oning- Mul lateralism versus Unilateralism- Public Opinion

Chapter 3: Continuous at sea deterrence (CASD)- Vulnerability of submarines- Other op ons to CASD- Cost- Jobs

Section C: Summary

Conclusion10 common myths and the response

Section D: Q&A

Section E: Briefings

A First Sea Lord’s viewLord Boyce brings real life perspec ve to the u lity and challenges of a deterrent.

Lessons from the pastLord Peter Hennessy and James Jinks elaborate on the historical context for nuclearweapons and submarines.

Deterrence theoryMalcolm Chalmers discusses the concept of deterrence and how this applies to the UK’snuclear deterrent

Russia ‐Threat or reality check?David Clarke and Andrew Monaghan discuss if the Russian threat is real and can be keptin check with possession of a nuclear deterrent.

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Non‐prolifera onDame Margaret Becke considers the last Labour government’s record on nuclearnon‐prolifera on.

Defence Secretaries’ debate

Former Defence Secretaries Lord Robertson and Lord Browne hold opposing views.

Leading voices againstCND’s Kate Hudson and Lord (Nick) Harvey who led the Trident alterna ve review setout their stalls.

Industrial landscapeThe contribu on of the nuclear deterrent to the UK’s economic and skills base.

Trade UnionsSkills, jobs and the supply chain

HM Government’s viewDefence procurement Minister Philip Dunne MP, Vice Admiral Lister and Ian Forber fromthe MOD speak up.

Thanks and acknowledgements

Special thanks to the wide range of experts who have contributed to this report:

Tim Hare, Lord Boyce, David Clark, Andrew Monaghan, Margaret Becke MP, Lord

Browne, Lord Robertson, Lord Hennessy, James Jinks, Steve Carlier, Helen Kenne , BAE Systems, Malcolm Chalmers, Philip Dunne MP, Admiral Lister, Ian Forber, Sir Nick Harvey, Kate Hudson, Ian Waddell, Dave Hulse, Azza Samms.

Thanks also to UNITE the Union, the GMB and the Confedera on of Engineering and Shipbuilding Unions (CSEU) for their assistance.

Finally thanks to Prema Gurunathan who acted as the secretariat for the report and contributed a huge amount of experience and her considerable exper se and to Emma Booth and Tom Railton for their assistance and support.

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Executive summary

This evidence‐led report aims to inform the Labour Party debate about the renewal of the UK nuclear deterrent. Based on evidence from the leading experts in the eld, from

both sides of the debate, the report examines arguments about both the necessity of a nuclear deterrent and the different methods of delivering it.

Sec on A gives a short explana on of the context of the upcoming vote and the decision that faces Labour MPs before Sec on B examines the issues in more detail. Within Sec on B, Chapter 2 looks at the case for retaining a nuclear deterrent and Chapter 3 explores different op ons for doing so.

Chapter 2 concludes that:

● The global security environment is both unstable and unpredictable, with non‐state actors but also aggressive state actors including those in possession of or seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.

● There is no legal barrier that prohibits renewal of the deterrent nor is it true that the deterrent is not en rely opera onally independent.

● In this context an nuclear deterrent provides the ul mate guarantee of security.● Britain’s role in global security decisions would be weakened by disarmament.● Unilateral disarmament has li le prospect of contribu ng to wider global

nuclear disarmament efforts.

Chapter 3 concludes that:

● Con nuous‐at‐sea deterrence, delivered by a eet of four ballis c missile submarines, remains the most cost effec ve and secure deterrent available.

● New developments in an ‐submarine warfare such as drones and cyber will not signicantly compromise the vulnerability of submarines or reduce their superiority of other systems.

● Various proposed compromise op ons such as fewer submarines or keeping the missiles separate reduce the credibility of the deterrent without delivering substan al cost savings.

● Es mates of cost from an ‐nuclear campaigners are specula ve and misleading.● The renewal programme makes a substan al contribu on to UK advanced

manufacturing and supports thousands of highly skilled jobs. Claims that jobs could be retained through diversica on are not credible or supported by evidence.

The report therefore concludes that there has been no substan al change in the circumstances surrounding the deterrent since the 2015 Labour elec on manifesto and its annual conference later that year reaffirmed the party’s commitment to replace the UK Vanguard submarine eet. Renewal by comple ng the current programme to build four successor submarines to maintain con nuous at‐sea deterrence con nues to offer the maximum security and value for money. Other op ons either compromise UK security or add to cost. Many alterna ves do both. The recommenda on of this report is that Labour maintains it exis ng policy of suppor ng renewal in the upcoming vote.

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Section A: Nuclear practice and theory

Chapter 1: What does a renewal of “Trident” mean?

1.1. Since the 1980s the UK’s independent nuclear deterrent has been delivered by four Vanguard‐class submarines. With these now coming to the end of their lives, a new

genera on of submarines known as successor need to be constructed. There has been much confusion about what has been dubbed the ‘Trident Main Gate’ vote and what exactly parliamentarians may be called upon to vote for. While ministers have not yet revealed the the exact mo on to be put before the House of Commons, in prac ce the decision MPs face is whether or not to commit to the construc on of the successor boats. The ‘renewal of Trident’ is therefore less to do with the actual Trident missiles and more about the principle of a maintaining an independent nuclear deterrent system.

1.2. In light of the lengthy procurement process required for complex weapons systems, Parliament voted in 2007 to “maintain the strategic nuclear deterrent beyond the life of

the exis ng system.” The government had, the year before, published a white paper outlining its inten on to build a new class of submarines. The coali on government in the 2010 SDSR decided to delay the Main Gate un l 2016. Ini al Gate was passed in 2011, releasing funds for a ve year assessment phase.

1.3. The SDSR 2015 indicated that the Successor Programme would no longer be subject to the tradi onal ‘Main Gate’ process, but states that the MOD “will hold a debate in Parliament on the principle of Con nuous At Sea Deterrence and our plans for Successor”.

1.4. Both the Labour Party and the Conserva ve Party have commi ed to maintaining a con nuous‐at‐sea deterrent.

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1.5. The tone of the debate around this issue implies that it is not already decided, but this is far from the truth. With a Conserva ve majority absolutely commi ed to the successor programme, and a variety of other MPs guaranteed to vote for renewal, there is a cast‐iron majority in the House of Commons. What is up for debate is the exact posi on that the Labour Party will take on this issue. This debate should be informed by the undeniable fact of the certainty of renewal.

1.6. The Labour debate on the nuclear deterrent seems to have followed a counter‐cyclical approach to global policy, with the party suppor ng disarmament at the height of the Cold War and je soning this just as the Cold War ended when these were

perhaps the most benign circumstances for a debate about disarmament. Today Britain is facing new global threats, obviously with the rise of interna onal terrorism, but also from an increasingly belligerent Russia with a provoca ve nuclear posture, yet the party has chosen this moment to return to the debate about disarmament.

1 HC Deb 16 July 2013 and HC Deb 17 July 2013

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1.7. It was the famous post‐war Labour government that rst acquired Britain’s nuclear deterrent and since then Labour has adopted a mul lateralist stance on disarmament, believing that whilst other countries possess nuclear weapons then Britain should not disarm unilaterally. Despite this, Labour in government made steps down the nuclear ladder, such as the elimina on of tac cal nuclear weapons, reduc ons in warheads and

Margaret Becke ’s commitment to ‘global zero’.

1.8. In January 2015 the then Shadow Defence Secretary, Vernon Coaker, set out the Labour Party’s posi on:

“Labour is clear. Let me say this unequivocally: our position, in an increasingly uncertain and unstable world, is that is right for the UK to maintain a credible, minimum independent nuclear deterrent based on a continuous at-sea posture. It is right to want to deliver that deterrent in the most capable and cost-effective way, and in a way that best contributes to global security. It is right, therefore, to want to examine all the UK’s military capabilities, including nuclear, and to state that we would require a clear body

of evidence for us to change our view that continuous at-sea deterrence provides the most credible and cost-efficient form of deterrent.”

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1.9. Labour’s 2015 manifesto commitment on the nuclear deterrent is the following: “Labour remains commi ed to a minimum, credible, independent nuclear capability, delivered through a Con nuous At‐Sea Deterrent. We will ac vely work to increase momentum on mul lateral disarmament efforts and nego a ons, and look at further reduc ons in global stockpiles and the number of weapons.”

1.10. The party’s posi on remains the same as this manifesto commitment, which every Labour MP stood on, and can only be changed by a vote at party conference. The 2015 party conference in Brighton approved the ‘Britain in the World’ document reaffirming our commitment to the nuclear deterrent and chose not to debate the issue specically.

2 HC Deb 20 January 2015

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Section B: Nuclear deterrence in the modern world

Chapter 2: Nuclear deterrence

Deterrence theory

2.1. The UK defence doctrine states:

“Deterrence and coercion strategies aim to counter threats to the UK’s security by communicating to potential adversaries the consequences of their anticipated action or inaction. While the threat of a military response can influence our adversaries’ calculation of risk during confrontation, they must be convinced that the full potential costs (the military, economic and diplomatic reaction) of their actions will outweigh any

possible benefits.”3

2.2. The government, in the 2015 SDSR, placed deterrence at the heart of the UK’s na onal security policy. The government’s most important duty is to defend the UK and Overseas Territories and protect its people and sovereignty. The 2015 SDSR states that

defence and protec on starts with deterrence.

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2.3. Deterrence theory has always been prominent in war and conict. It arises from basic and permanent facts about human behaviour, how people will cogni vely act to take into account the probable consequences of what they do.

2.4. The Cold War and the nuclear revolu on renewed interest in the idea of deterrence and thus in recent years ‘deterrence’ has become synonymous with the strategic nuclear deterrence. During the Cold War deterrence worked because there was poli cal will for NATO to act together as one, a strong and capable military capacity and a clear message of communica on that NATO were willing and able to act.

2.5. This is the purpose of deterrence, to deter aggressors, and in the age of nuclear weapons, this way to deter aggressors is with a nuclear posture.

2.6. As Kenneth Waltz states: ‘nuclear weapons dissuade states from going to war more surely than conven onal weapons do.’

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2.7. NATO deputy secretary General Alexander Vershbow at the Berlin Security Conference in 2015 argued, “Deterrence paved the way for détente and introduced predictability into a s ll‐compe ve rela onship.”

2.8. So why a nuclear deterrent and not just any deterrent? Chapter 3 will give more detail on the importance of CASD but since Clement A lee’s government acquired a nuclear deterrent, it has helped keep the peace and prevented the kind of wars between

major powers that ravaged the world in the rst half of the last century.

3 UK Defence Doctrine, JDP 0.01 (5 th edi on), November 20144 2015 SDSR5 Waltz, K. ‘Nuclear Myths and Poli cal Reali es’, The American Poli cal Science Review, Vol. 84

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2.16. More importantly, in 1993, Russia dropped its ‘no rst use’ policy. This means that Russia would not hesitate to use its nuclear weapons simply based on what they perceived as a threat from another country. This has been claried further by Alexei Pushkov, head of Duma’s security commi ee who has commented that Russia would deploy nuclear weapons as conven onal weapons, to regional and local wars, not just

na onal ones.2.17. In summer 2014 President Pu n said: “Russia’s partners… should understand it's best not to mess with us… I want to remind you that Russia is one of the leading nuclear powers.” The following spring, Russia threatened to target Denmark with nuclear weapons if it par cipated in NATO’s missile defence system.

2.18. With rising tensions between Russia and Turkey, a NATO state, we must also be prepared for a possible nuclear stand‐off between the NATO states and Russia.

2.19. A recent RAND Corpora on report has shown just how quickly and effec vely Russia could invade the Bal c States. The recent Russian aggression in the Ukraine and

the history Russia has with the Bal c States has renewed poten al instability and a Russian threat. The RAND report showed that in a series of wargames conducted between 2014 and 2015 which focused on a Russian invasion of the Bal c States, the longest it would take Russian forces to reach the outskirts of Tallinn and Riga is 60 hours. Such a rapid defeat would leave NATO with a limited number of op ons.

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2.20. Furthermore reports of enhanced frequency of Russian military aircra exercises have piqued an interest in what Russia is planning or preparing for. This is especially true for Sweden which in 2014 was alarmed by reports that a Russian submarine was lurking in the shallow waters of the Stockholm archipelago.

2.21. Defence Minister Peter Hultgvist stated that: "What we can see is that there are

more exercises, more military ac vi es in the Bal c Sea".2.22. In 2013 when Russian aircra carried out a simulated a ack on Stockholm, the Swedish air force failed to scramble and had to rely on NATO for help.

11 RAND Corpora on report 2015: h p://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html

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2.23. Many academics and poli cians have since changed their mind about whether they should support a nuclear deterrent purely on the basis of Russian aggression. David Clark, former special adviser to Robin Cook and Chair of the Russia Founda on, used to be staunchly against our nuclear deterrent but has since been convinced of the argument for renewal, sta ng that:

“Russia under Vladimir Putin has evolved into precisely the sort of aggressive, risk-taking adversary the ‘second centre’ doctrine was intended to deter. In relative terms, the Soviet Union was a fairly cautious foreign policy actor. It was willing to use force to maintain control over its satellite states, but avoided direct conflict with the west and refrained from crude nuclear blackmail, especially after the Cuban missile crisis. President Putin has no similar inhibitions. He is prepared to dismantle the post-cold war security order, re-arrange borders by force and threaten nuclear use in order to impose what he regards as Russia’s legitimate sphere of influence on the countries around him.” 12

2.24. The fact is, no‐one predicted what happened in Ukraine and in reality Pu n had no ra onale behind the annexa on of Crimea. We cannot comfortably predict how Russia will act and why it is on such a mission of modernisa on of its nuclear capability. Ukraine was persuaded to give up its nuclear weapons a er guarantees of its territorial integrity, guarantees that were not honoured. In prac ce it is impossible to imagine Russia invading Ukraine if they had retained their nuclear arsenal.

2.25. Russia isn’t the only threat that the UK faces today: we must also turn our heads towards rogue states such as North Korea. The regime there has said on several occasions that it would not hesitate to launch nuclear weapons pre‐emp vely if it believes that its survival was under threat.

2.26. Much like Russia, North Korea is a ruthless and reckless state that has no qualms with pushing the nuclear bu on. Over recent years it has been conduc ng nuclear weapons tests with the most recent one only being a few months ago in February. Media reports in early April 2016 suggested that North Korea was preparing for a h nuclear test.

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2.27. North Korea announced in May 2015 that it had successfully ight‐tested a submarine launched ballis c missile. If true, it would mean that North Korea’s nuclear capability is modernising at a very quick pace which poten ally puts the whole region at risk.

2.28. Furthermore, allega ons of collabora ons between North Korea and Syria have

also intrigued the interna onal community. The belief that the two countries were working together on a secret Syrian nuclear programme is believed to have led to Israel bombing a suspected nuclear reactor on Syrian territory in September 2007. At the moment Syria is unstable and its future is uncertain.

12 Clark, David. “The Le ’s Nuclear Choice”.h p://www.fabians.org.uk/wp‐content/uploads/2015/12/Outward‐to‐the‐World‐Dec‐15‐web.pdf13 “South Korea believes North likely to conduct more nuclear tests before May”, www.Globalsecurity.org, 17 April 2016

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2.37. Admiral Lord Boyce argued that whilst disarming would not cost Britain our P5 status, it would diminish our role in NATO and on the world stage.

2.38. Militarily the UK plays a signicant role in NATO. It is one of the largest contributors of conven onal military forces to NATO opera ons and is one of the few na ons able to command a major military opera on, as well as being only one of three countries to have a nuclear deterrent within NATO.

2.39. A decision to unilaterally disarm could also prompt the US to raise, again, the long‐running issue of the perceived imbalance of contribu ons to NATO between North America and European allies. This argument has been made by Bernard Jenkin:

“Our continuous at sea deterrence is an important contribution to NATO. It is a pay-back to the United States for being the ultimate guarantor of European security. We should not imagine for a minute that if we started downgrading our deterrent, the United States would remain as interested as it is now in maintaining security in Europe, with all the benefit for this country.”

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2.40. Lord Boyce argued that if we were to disarm on the basis that we do not believe in the nuclear doctrine, then it is hard to see how the UK could stay in NATO as it is a nuclear alliance. As the 2010 NATO Strategic Concepts states:

“The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.”

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2.41. NATO’s Deterrence and Defence Posture Review reaffirmed this in 2012:

“Nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO’s overall capabilities for deterrence and defence alongside conventional and missile defence forces. The review has shown that the Alliance’s nuclear force posture currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defence posture.”

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2.42. Even if we were to unilaterally disarm and remain in NATO, every NATO state is nuclear capable and allows the deployment and ring of nuclear weapons from its territory. This is part of the 1949 alliance. Although the United States, France and the UK are the only members of NATO with an independent nuclear capability, the US sta ons nuclear weapons in ve European countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey.

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15 HC Debate 17 July 201316 NATO Strategic Concept, 201017 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, NATO, 20 May 201218 Norris, Robert. S and Hans. M Kristensen, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 2011”, Bulle n of the Atomic Scien sts, January 2011

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2.43. Some have argued that due to the United States and France having nuclear weapons, we can rely on their nuclear umbrella. This posi on is difficult to square with a moral objec on to nuclear weapons. Secondly, as men oned above, we would s ll have facili es to assist with US nuclear launches and it effec vely outsources our foreign and defence policy to the Americans which could ul mately mean we could be dependent

on a US republican president for our security. Finally, as argued by Malcolm Chalmers of RUSI, should the US not full its NATO obliga ons, which could be possible with its Pacic priority, an aggressor s ll has to consider the UK and our ability to strike. Having three nuclear powers in NATO and thus three centres of decision making, in nuclear theory, is a greater deterrent and enhances security not just in the UK but in the region and across the world.

2.44. NATO is and has always been commi ed to arms control, disarmament, and non‐prolifera on. NATO states that that nuclear weapons commi ed to NATO have

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been reduced by more than 95% since the height of the Cold War. However as long as nuclear weapons exist, it is impera ve that NATO remains a nuclear alliance and that the

UK supports its neighbours in security and peace by remaining a nuclear state.

2.45. Finally a popular myth about our nuclear weapons should be countered. It is o en claimed that our nuclear weapons are not independent, either because they rely on US technology or because of NATO. Mul ple experts conrmed in their evidence that this is false. Although we collaborate with our US allies on some technological ma ers, our deterrent is completely opera onally independent and the sugges on that it is not en rely in UK control is simply untrue.

Multilateralism versus unilateralism

2.46. The Nuclear Non‐prolifera on Treaty (NPT) is the primary interna onal framework governing the possession of nuclear weapons and the prolifera on of nuclear materials. Under its terms the ve designated nuclear weapons states, including the United Kingdom, undertake to share peaceful nuclear technology. In exchange the non‐nuclear states undertake never to a empt to acquire nuclear weapons. The treaty came into force in 1970 and was indenitely extended in 1995. It is important to note that three nuclear weapons states ‐ India, Pakistan and Israel ‐ are not signatories to the treaty, and that North Korea withdrew in 2003.

2.47. For the purposes of this discussion the sec on of the NPT which is of interest concerns the du es placed on nuclear weapons states. There is a common misconcep on, propagated by opponents of the UK’s nuclear deterrent, that the NPT effec vely obliges nuclear weapons states to disarm unilaterally. The CND website declares “ The UK does not have any right to possess nuclear weapons under the treaty; instead it is legally bound to disarm.” This claim does not survive actual scru ny of the

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terms of the NPT.

19 NATO Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Forces, December 201520 h p://www.cnduk.org/campaigns/global‐aboli on/non‐prolifera on‐treaty

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2.48. The key ar cle under dispute is Ar cle VI which is worth quo ng in full:

“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under

strict and effective international control.”2.49. It is abundantly evident that the scenario envisioned under the terms of the NPT is a nego ated mul lateral treaty, not a duty to unilaterally disarm. There is also explicitly no expecta on in the NPT that disarmament should occur within a specic me‐frame.

2.50. This leads us to a wider discussion of the merits of unilateral and mul lateral approaches to nuclear disarmament. The Labour Party has historically been commi ed to a mul lateral approach compa ble with the terms of the NPT. This process is difficult due to the unwillingness of many nuclear states to enter into nego a ons or to contemplate disarmament. It was noted above that at least three states in possession of nuclear weapons are not signatories to the NPT, with the poten al for the addi on of North Korea to that list. The Labour posi on has been that whilst the United Kingdom should pursue mul lateral nego a ons in good faith, our own capacity should be maintained whilst other states show li le inclina on for disarmament.

2.51. This is in contrast to the approach of organisa ons such as the CND who believe that the United Kingdom should adopt a unilateral stance, giving up our own weapons without reciprocal agreements from other states. Kate Hudson, the chair of CND, maintains that she also believes in mul lateralism because she desires the total elimina on of nuclear weapons, but this is to blur an important dis nc on. But it is simply not possible to be both a mul lateralist and a unilateralist, it is a contradic on in terms. Of course unilateralists can claim the example of the UK disarming may cause others to follow suit, but this remains a hope rather than a policy.

2.52. If it is a hope, it is also a remote hope. Margaret Becke argued that there is absolutely no evidence that a unilateral move to disarm would evoke a reciprocal response from any other nuclear power. The UK has made a number of unilateral moves down the nuclear ladder in recent decades, such as consolida ng to one pla orm and elimina ng tac cal nuclear weapons. None of these gestures of good faith have resulted in similar moves by other states. It would take heroic op mism to believe that anything would change should the UK disarm unilaterally.

2.53. What progress has been made on disarmament in recent decades has largely been a result of bilateral or mul lateral arrangements between states, most notably the signicant reduc on in warhead stockpiles nego ated between the USA and Russia. Any future path for total nuclear disarmament is likely to follow a similar course. A unilateral decision by the UK would simply remove a willing par cipant from these talks and may, perversely, impede global efforts.

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2.54. Progress on mul lateral disarmament has stalled, and it is important not to exaggerate the degree to which movement is likely on this front in the near future, but the work undertaken by Margaret Becke and the last Labour government stands as a reminder that progress is possible if the poli cal will exists. She argues that the priority now should be work on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which remains “unnished

business”.

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Public opinion

2.55. In her evidence, Kate Hudson of the CND claimed that public opinion is in favour scrapping the nuclear deterrent. It is difficult to support this claim with evidence. The most recent YouGov poll from February 2016 shows that 46% of the popula on are in

favour of renewing our nuclear deterrent and 28% are against, only a quarter of the public. Looking at the history of such polling it appears public support for unilateralism 21

has hovered at around this level since the 1980s, although it is possible to get different results by framing the ques on in a different way. 22

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? The renewal of the Trident nuclear submarine is estimated to cost up to £100bn over its lifetime and is an essential part of our national defence that should be renewed.

Weighted sample of 1217.

21 YouGov Survey, February 201622 Trident in Uk politics and public opinion BASICh p://www.basicint.org/sites/default/les/tridentpoli cspublicopinion_basicjul2013.pdf

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Summary

The concept of deterrence

● Deters poten al adversaries by showing the possible consequences of theirac ons.

● Human behaviour shows that people will weigh up the pros and cons of asitua on before ac ng. Our nuclear deterrent adds into this weighing upequa on.

● The fact is, the only me nuclear weapons have ever been used is when onlyone side had them .

Threats to our national security

● Russia under Pu n’s presidency has become increasingly aggressive and recklessas shown by the invasion and annexa on of Crimea, Ukraine.

● NATO deterrence is effec ve at protec ng NATO states from Russian aggression.● Russia is currently modernising its nuclear weapons having currently spent £403

million.● Tensions between Turkey, a NATO state, and Russia could lead to a NATO‐Russia

nuclear standoff.● North Korea, a rogue state, has recently increased its nuclear weapon tes ng as

well as the allega ons of Syria working with North Korea on a secret nuclearprogramme.

Keeping the peace and geopolitical positioning

● Dropping our nuclear deterrent could diminish UK global inuence, especially inregards to mul lateral talks.

● As NATO is a nuclear alliance, it would seem contradictory to remain a part of

NATO if we were to disarm for moral reasons, especially as the US could s lldeploy nuclear weapons from UK territory.

● Three centres of decision making, in nuclear theory, is a greater deterrent whichenhances security and keeps the peace, not just in the UK but in the region andacross the world.

● Despite myths, the nuclear deterrent remains totally opera onally independent.

Multilateralism versus unilateralism

● The Labour party has historically been commi ed to a mul lateral approach todisarmament.

● There is absolutely no evidence that a unilateral move to disarm wouldencourage others to disarm.

● By renewing the submarines we are not in breach of NPT.

Public Opinion

● 46% of the Bri sh popula on would rather we renewed our nuclear deterrentthan the 28% who say we should get rid of it.

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Chapter 3: Continuous at sea deterrence (CASD)

Vulnerability of submarines

3.1. Having established the case for the UK to maintain a nuclear deterrent, the argument turns to what form this deterrent should take. Currently the strategic

deterrent operates through con nuous at sea deterrence (CASD) and is delivered by four Vanguard class ballis c missile submarines (SSBNs). CASD refers to both a posture and a pla orm. The posture is ‘con nuous’, meaning that at least one submarine is at sea at any one me and its payload is ready to be deployed. The ‘at sea’ refers to the pla orm, the SSBNs.

3.2. Different postures and pla orms are available and some states have mul ple pla orms. For example it is possible to have a nuclear deterrent comprised of ballis c missiles based in silos, cruise missiles red from aircra or cruise missiles red from submarines. It is also theore cally possible to keep the warheads and the missiles separate to the pla orm or to keep all submarines docked unless they are required to go to sea.

3.3. The UK has decided to pursue a CASD strategy because it offers the minimum credible deterrent delivered in the most cost‐effec ve way. Originally the UK operated with an airborne deterrent and for a short me operated two systems concurrently before consolida ng to and SSBN system in the 1970s.

3.4. The decision to keep one submarine at sea at any one me removes any ambiguity from the UK’s nuclear posture and eliminates the risk of escala ng a crisis by being seen to prepare for a nuclear strike. As it stands all poten al adversaries are aware that the UK has the capacity to respond to a rst‐strike, even if the country is devastated by the

ini al a ack.3.5. In the event of such a strike each submarine commander has a le er from the prime minister of the day detailing what ac on to take. All UK prime ministers to date have been careful to ensure that the contents of this le er are ambiguous as any signal that might undermine the deterrent would increase the chances of a nuclear strike against the UK.

3.6. Submarine historians Lord Hennessy and James Jinks argued that ballis c missile submarines are widely acknowledged as the superior pla orm for a strategic nuclear deterrent. They offer a mobility and range not possible with silos and a level of invulnerability far superior to that offered by aircra or ba leships. It is this invulnerability that forms the main basis of their appeal as it is possible to have only one SSBN deployed and yet retain condence in the ability to respond to a nuclear a ack by delivering unacceptable loss to any aggressor. The invulnerability stems from the difficulty of loca ng SSBNs once they are deployed. The limita ons of undersea detec on technology mean that it is possible even for large submarines to be impossible to detect for months on end, hiding in the vast expanse of ocean and using the proper es of the ocean itself to throw off any a empt at detec on.

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3.7. It has been argued that developments in an ‐submarine warfare are now threatening this invulnerability and may make SSBNs obsolete as a delivery pla orm for a nuclear deterrent.

3.8. There are two main conten ons. The rst is that a new genera on of underwater

unmanned vehicles (UUVs) commonly referred to as ‘drones’ will have the same effect on undersea warfare as they have above water, detec ng submarines and making them vulnerable to a ack. The second is that advances in cyber warfare introduce new vulnerabili es and compromise the reliability of an SSBN‐based deterrent.

3.9. The argument that a new genera on of UUVs will make the ocean ‘transparent’ and radically change the undersea environment has become fashionable in recent years and has been used in the context of this debate by the Bri sh American Security Informa on Council (BASIC), an organisa on that campaigns against the strategic deterrent.

3.10. It is undeniable that UUV technology is advancing and that in the future UUVs will be able to operate for longer, cover greater distances and even carry out missions previously given to manned submarines. What is conten ous is the idea that they will transform undersea warfare and nullify the advantages that SSBNs enjoy over other pla orms.

3.11. There are two fundamental facts that give undersea pla orms an advantage. The rst is that the ocean is vast and submarines are difficult to locate. As Lord Boyce puts it, “big ocean, small submarine”: it makes looking for a needle in a haystack seem simple. Secondly the impenetrability of the ocean means that the range of detec on technology (sonar) is limited to a few hundred metres. Of course this technology may improve with me, but it is unlikely to do so drama cally due to the physical proper es of the ocean.

3.12. The argument that ‘swarms’ of UUVs will mean that there is no place le for submarines to hide in the ocean is difficult to sustain. Achieving even par al coverage of the ocean would require vast numbers of UUVs working in a coordinated fashion at an expense that is difficult to imagine. UUVs will con nue to be constrained by the physical proper es of the ocean and the prac cal limita ons that come with their size, range and the difficulty of transmi ng informa on. A reliance on surface pla orms would mean that these pla orms would themselves be vulnerable to a ack.

3.13. James Jinks argued that proponents of this argument also frequently fail to take into account that advances in detec on technology are mirrored by similar advances in

the stealth of submarines themselves. Expert Bryan Clark notes that “The same improvements that are making submarine detec on easier may also enable a new genera on of sophis cated counter‐detec on technologies and tac cs”. He points to

23

developments of sonar jamming technology and the poten al to mirror the ‘noise‐cancelling’ technology used in headphones for an underwater environment.

23 Clark‐ ‘The emerging era in undersea warfare’ p12

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3.14. UUVs will undoubtedly transform some aspects of undersea warfare such as mine‐hun ng, but Lord Boyce argued that they are unlikely to prove a substan al threat the vulnerability of SSBNs in the coming decades and certainly do not represent a decisive argument against inves ng in Successor. It should be noted that the other nuclear states, such as the United States and Russia, that are supposedly at the

vanguard of advances in UUV technology are themselves con nuing to invest in new submarines. They clearly do not feel that the oceans are about to cease to be the safest place to hide a nuclear deterrent.

3.15. The other development posited as a poten al future threat to the viability of a submarine‐based nuclear deterrent is the risk of cyber a ack. This is an argument that has been made by BASIC and by former Labour defence secretary Lord Browne in his evidence. The risk is that if the submarines were compromised as a result of a sophis cated cyber a ack then it would make our deterrent ineffec ve as a weapon of last resort, essen ally nullifying its main purpose.

3.16. In the last decades cyber has been a new fron er of warfare and is playing an increasingly important role in military strategy. Mainly this has involved cyber a acks on civilian infrastructure, such as in Estonia in 2007, but there is of course the risk that cyber a acks will be focused on military targets.

3.17. Lord Hennessy and James Jinks argued that our submarine eet remains more secure from cyber a ack than is o en suggested. The network on which submarines operate is ‘air‐gapped’ meaning that it is not connected to the internet, which insulates the system against outside penetra on. It is also incredibly difficult to penetrate the hull of submarines when they are at sea, not least because they are incredibly difficult to nd. None of this should breed complacency, and the MOD are inves ng heavily in cyber

defence with £700m spent recently upgrading their communica on security

, but it 24

should provide a degree of reassurance that it would be extremely difficult to mount an effec ve cyber a ack against a submarine‐based nuclear deterrent.

3.18. It is clear that the advance of new technologies, including cyber and drones, is changing the undersea warfare environment. These are threats that the UK should be aware of and there should be adequate provision made to protect against future advances in these areas. But these developments are not the ‘game‐changers’ that they are o en presented as. Submarine historians Lord Peter Hennessy and James Jinks note that “all the na ons in the business are upgrading and ac ng on a common convic on that beneath the ocean is by the most secure place to conceal your weapons of last

resort”. The MOD officials who gave evidence to the commi ee made it clear that 25

there was a constant process of assessing threats and upgrading submarines to meet new challenges. The threats are real, but they are neither a decisive argument against retaining a nuclear deterrent nor a compelling reason to move away from a submarines as the pla orm on which that deterrent is based.

24 h p://www. .com/cms/s/0/73 ae2c‐f81c‐11e5‐96db‐fc683b5e52db.html#axzz49YgUXWe3 25 The Silent Deep p636

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Other options to CASD

3.19. It has been suggested that rather than con nuing with con nuous at sea deterrence the UK should adopt a different posture or delivery system.

3.20. As part of the Conserva ve/Liberal Democrat Coali on Agreement in 2011, it was

agreed that possible alterna ves to the successor programme would be examined. The review, dubbed the ‘Trident Alterna ves review’ was expected to examine the possibili es of alterna ve delivery systems, the feasibility of said systems and cost, industrial implica ons and associated risk.

3.21. It examined several different postures and systems that could be poten ally used, but all of these were not as effec ve or safe as CASD delivered by successor. They were:‐

● Aircraft deployed with cruise missiles- Vulnerable to a ack prior to a launch as the loca on could be targeted.- Vulnerable to a ack a er a launch as it can be targeted and shot down.-

Would require costly procurement of a new aircra that had the capability of a nuclear capacity.- Would require costly conversion of the UK’s nuclear warheads.- Overseas basing and overight rights for most opera ons would have to

be secured which poses diploma c problems and raises ques ons about the sovereignty of the UK’s deterrent.

● Ground based capability- Would require a signicant level of infrastructure investment and

disputes over the loca on.- Limita ons on global reach which would require the UK to develop or

procure an Intercon nental Ballis c Missile (ICBM) capability.- Vulnerable to pre‐emp ve targeted a acks.

● Nuclear tipped cruise missiles- Limited range means there are geographic areas that the UK could not

reach.- Forward basing if required, could require third party agreement which

again places a degree of uncertainty over the UK’s sovereign ability to use its nuclear deterrent.

● Free fall nuclear bombs- Moving to an alterna ve to the current Trident missile would create a

technical, nancial and schedule risk to the programme.- The delivery of a warhead into a cruise missile cannot be delivered

without risk for over 20 years.- The UK would also have to procure a small capability to bridge the gap

between the soon to be out of service Vanguard class and the alterna ve cruise missile based system which would be further costs.

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● Reduced nuclear posture or dual-use SSBN- Maintaining a submarine‐based deterrent but with reduced posture

would save very li le money as the current eet needs to be replaced anyway.

- Only very minimal savings would be made from a three boat eet

instead of a four boat eet, as a signicant propor on of costs in any procurements programme are incurred at the beginning of the manufacturing cycle.

- Opera ng a smaller eet would also come at greater strategic risk as a con nuous at sea deterrence could not be guaranteed. There is also the risk of crisis escala on if it was necessary to sail a submarine during a period of interna onal tension.

3.22. In sum, the report concluded that our current CASD system offered the UK the highest level of assurance that can be a ained with a single deterrent system, as well as being the cheapest op on. It stated:

“None of these alternative systems and postures could offer the same degree of resilience as the current posture of continuous at sea deterrence, nor could they guarantee a prompt response in all circumstances.”

3.23. Sir Nick Harvey, the Lib Dem minister who oversaw the review described it as the rst holis c look at the deterrent but stands by his belief that a non‐con nuous posture is preferable. Lord Peter Hennessy made the point that the 2006 review was also comprehensive, with over 400 op ons considered. Lord Boyce believes the Trident Alterna ves Review conclusively ruled out other op ons.

3.24. Recently the Labour frontbench has also alluded to the possibility of the UK having the “Japanese Op on”. Japan is seen as a nuclear “threshold” state, where it has a the poten al to acquire nuclear capability independently but has no deployment method. For the UK this would mean unilaterally disarming but retaining our nuclear ability (which includes retaining civilian nuclear facili es, our stockpile of ssile material and our industrial capacity) to recons tute a nuclear capability within a ma er of months.

3.25. Although this op on is presented as a compromise, in reality it is unilateral disarmament by the back door. Lord Boyce argued that it would be incredibly difficult and costly to maintain the world class facili es that enable the construc on of nuclear weapons and the delivery systems to deploy them, nor is it feasible that it could be done rapidly were the need to arise. He claimed the skills would be lost forever.

3.26. Even if submarines or an alterna ve delivery pla orm were constructed, it could take weeks, even months to a ach warheads to missiles, load them and deploy the submarines, which could be too late. James Jinks made the point that such ac on could risk escala ng a nuclear crisis.

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Jobs

3.40. As with the previous eet of submarines, the successor programme will be built at BAE Systems in Barrow‐In‐Furness, where there are currently over 6000 jobs dependent on the company.

3.41. The MOD has stated that “maintaining and sustaining UK’s nuclear deterrent supports over 30,000 UK jobs and makes a signicant contribu on to the UK economy.”

Approximately 2,200 people across the MOD and the three companies involved are 31

currently working on the Successor programme with 50% of these being engineers and designers.

32

3.42. Professor Keith Hartley in his submission to the BASIC Trident Commission assessed that the Successor programme will support almost 26,000 jobs over its life‐cycle.

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BAE at Barrow‐in‐Furness: 6,045BAE suppliers: 5,017

AWE: 4,500

AWE suppliers: 4,500

Devonport: 1,590

Devonport suppliers: 1,590

Opera ons and support: 2,700

TOTAL 25,942

3.43. There are 293 cons tuencies across the UK that have companies in the BAE supply chain alone and 692 companies in the BAE supply chain in total.

34

31 MOD, successor Submarine Programme Factsheet, January 2016 32 Ministry of Defence, The United Kingdom’s future nuclear deterrent: 2014 update toParliament, 16 December 201433 Professor Keith Hartley, Defence Industrial Issues: Employment, Skills, Technology and RegionalImpacts, Discussion Paper No.2 of the BASIC Trident Commission, 2012Number 7353, 8 March 2016 34 BAE Supply Chain Data 2015

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3.44. Both the Unite and GMB trade unions support the renewal of our submarines, with Len McCluskey, General Secretary of Unite sta ng:

“Building submarines is critical to retain tens of thousands of highly skilled jobs and is fundamental to the survival of Barrow, which is heavily reliant on the industry for

employment.“The skills of the workforce and the contribution they make to this region and our country are exceptional so it is important that there is commitment right across the

political parties to retain our world-leading technological advantage in submarine design and build by delivering the replacement for the Vanguard to Barrow.”

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3.45. Hugh Scullion, General Secretary of the Confedera on of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions also reiterated this point: “if a decision is taken not to replace Trident, highly skilled jobs will disappear and we will never get them back again”.

36

3.46. Jeremy Corbyn and the CND have argued that it would be possible for jobs to be

kept through defence job diversica on.37

3.47. Trade union representa ves argued that this approach must be taken with great cau on, it is not as easy as just stopping thousands of people’s jobs and pu ng them elsewhere. We must also be wary of the fact that these are very highly skilled jobs, and to get rid of them would also lead to a permanent loss of such skills. Submarine builders and maintenance crews cannot simply be instantly and without cost transferred to construc on or house building.

3.48. For defence diversica on to work, there must already be a plan in place for this to happen. Ian Waddell argued that the simple fact is that no such plan currently exists, meaning that vo ng against renewal of the submarines, without a proper plan in place would see 1000s of workers lose their jobs overnight. Many countries that have planned exhaus vely for years to put defence diversica on in place have all failed to do so effec vely. The UK has a poor record in this area and Unite have stressed in their submission to this report that there are no compara ve interna onal examples of diversica on of private sector workers proving effec ve.

3.49. Closing exis ng submarine facili es would have a signicant economic impact on local employment as well as having an induced mul plier effect as redundant workers will reduce their spending in the local economy. There is absolutely no evidence that shows defence diversica on could mi gate the impact of these highly skilled workers leaving the areas dependent on Successor to nd work elsewhere.

35 Barrow’s industrial future is bright, says Union’s general secretary, News and Star, 11 March2013 and reiterated at Labour Party conference 2015.36 Unions warn scrapping Trident will cost 13,000 jobs, Independent, 4 April 201337 Defence Diversica on, August 2015

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Summary

Vulnerability

● The submarine network is ‘air‐gapped’ and not connected to the internet which makes outside cyber penetra on extremely difficult, if not impossible.

● The threat of UUVs is exaggerated, they will not make the ocean transparent or greatly assist in detec ng and tracking submarines in the deep ocean.

● As other technologies progress, so do ours with the MOD inves ng £700 million against cyber threats.

Other options

● The Trident Alterna ve review in 2013 showed that CASD was the most capable and cost effec ve system.

● All other delivery methods would be more expensive and would face problems such as range or vulnerability.

● The cost saving of building three boats rather than four is insignicant and eclipsed by the danger of relaxing a CASD posture.

Cost

● The construc on cost is £31bn with a £10bn con ngency cost.● Cost increases are due to updated informa on and the impact of ina on on

defence equipment. ● The CND gures are distorted and are not a real representa on of how much

the programme will cost compared to similar public procurement projects.

Jobs

● There are roughly 26,000‐30,000 jobs involved with the UK’s nuclear deterrent.● 293 cons tuencies across the UK have companies in the BAE supply chain that

contribute towards the UK’s nuclear deterrent.● There is no evidence that defence diversica on could mi gate the impact of

highly‐skilled workers leaving the successor programme to work elsewhere.

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Conclusion

This report has sought to answer two main ques ons surrounding the decision to procure a new genera on of submarines to carry the UK nuclear deterrent. Is a nuclear deterrent s ll relevant in a modern security climate? If so, is con nuous at sea

deterrence, delivered by four ballis c missile submarines, s ll the best method of providing such a deterrent?

In the process of compiling this report we have spoken to a wide range of experts from both sides of the debate and drawn on the extensive body of academic and other material that has been published on this topic. Whilst there is not a consensus on all points, the bulk of the evidence points to two broad conclusions.

Firstly nuclear deterrence remains an important strategic element of UK defence policy and will con nue to do so in the decades ahead. Current global instability and the unpredictable future security landscape, including a belligerent Russia and the rise of rogue states, reinforce the need for the UK and our allies to maintain robust defences. Our deterrent is a key component of NATO defences and helps to anchor the UK is a prominent player in global security decisions. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that unilateral disarmament will have any posi ve impact on global disarmament efforts.

In this context, the debate turns to the best method of delivering a nuclear deterrent. Again the evidence strongly points to one conclusion. A four‐boat ballis c missile eet, providing con nuous at sea deterrence con nues to be the surest guarantee of UK security and provides the most effec ve value for money. Other delivery mechanisms or stances would either compromise the deterrent effect or cost substan ally more to develop. The evidence of previous official reports, that various proposed compromise op ons fail to deliver any signicant benet by way of security or cost‐effec veness, s ll holds true. The cost is high, but not prohibi vely so, and the benet to UK manufacturing and the industrial base is substan al.

In the course of compiling this report it has become evident that much of the recent evidence proposed in opposi on to the renewal programme is either inaccurate or highly misleading. Any ambiguity about the independence of our nuclear weapons and the legality of renewal has been decisively quashed. Figures for cost are frequently wildly exaggerated and based on specula on. Concerns about advances in an ‐submarine warfare are overplayed and stray into the realms of science c on.

Given this prolifera on of inaccurate informa on, and the prominent posi on given to

misleading data in the media, a short list of popular myths and rebu als has been provided. It is hoped that this will assist Labour MPs to come to a conclusion based on a solid eviden al basis rather than one grounded in fantasy.

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10 Common Myths

CostMyth: CND have stated the cost of the successor programme will be £205bnEvidence: The actual cost is £31bn with a £10bn con ngency. This takes into account

defence ina on which is the largest source of addi onal costs.

Japanese option and other compromisesMyth: Submarines with no missiles, three boats or nuclear threshold statusEvidence: Previous official reports that dismiss compromises as ineffec ve and expensive s ll hold true. The ‘Japanese op on’ is not taken seriously by experts.

Public OpinionMyth: Public opinion shows that a majority of the UK are against our nuclear deterrentEvidence: there has been a long standing pa ern of un‐biased polls public support for retaining a nuclear deterrent as long as other countries do the same.

DronesMyth: Drones will be able to nd our submarines making them redundantEvidence: The proper es of the ocean and issues of scale will con nue to limit the effec veness of drones. Drones will not compromise the vulnerability of submarines.

CyberMyth: Our adversaries will be able to hack into our submarinesEvidence: The submarine network is not connected to the internet. The MOD is inves ng in counter‐cyber defences. Cyber is a threat, but not a game‐changer.

IndependenceMyth: Our nuclear deterrent is controlled by the U.S.Evidence: We collaborate with our allies, but our nuclear weapons remain en rely opera onally independent and only the Prime Minister can authorise a launch.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation TreatyMyth: We would breach of our interna onal obliga ons by renewing our submarinesEvidence: The NPT states that as a nuclear state we can maintain our exis ng nuclear capability. Building replacement submarines simply retains exis ng capacity.

Defence Diversification

Myth: Workers on the successor programme could nd new jobs using the same skillsEvidence: Thousands of jobs would be lost overnight and reten on of skills would be next to impossible. There is no evidence of private sector diversica on being effec ve.

UnilateralismMyth: Disarming would lead other countries to follow suitEvidence: No evidence to support this, other unilateral moves have been ineffec ve.

ThreatsMyth: The UK’s nuclear deterrent can’t tackle the threats we face todayEvidence: The world is unstable, nobody can predict the threats we will face in 50 years.

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Section C: Q&A

What is the point of weapons we will never use?

Our deterrent is in use every single minute of every single day. The ra onale behind the

possession of nuclear weapons is not to use them, and to prevent other states ever using them.

What about the moral implications of having nuclear weapons?

None of us like nuclear weapons and we all wish they had never been invented. But in a world in which some states do have them, it is less likely for them to be used if we maintain our weapons whilst working for global reduc on through nego a ons to disarm. This has been successful in recent years at reducing the numbers of warheads substan ally. Disarming unilaterally will hinder not help global disarmament.

How does renewal effect our international treaty obligations?

The Nuclear Non‐Prolifera on Treaty says that the 5 nuclear states, including the UK, are allowed to maintain their exis ng nuclear capacity. Building replacement submarines simply retains the capacity we already have.

What about the cost?

The cost is £31bn with a £10bn con ngency, this has taken into account defence ina on which is the most likely source of cost escala on. It seems like a lot, but these submarines will last the best part of 40 years, in the same period we will spend around £6,600bn on the NHS.

Don’t the Americans control our nuclear weapons anyway?No. Our deterrent is en rely opera onally independent and only the Prime Minister can authorise the launch of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, our Trident missiles do not use GPS and cannot be “used” or “hacked” by other na on states. We use a constella onal naviga on system which uses the stars to determine loca on, which therefore cannot be hacked.

Could we not shelter under America’s nuclear umbrella?

First of all, this posi on is hard to square with a moral objec on to nuclear weapons. Our NATO membership would mean we would have to have facili es to assist with US

nuclear launches anyway. It would outsource our foreign and defence policy to the Americans and would ul mately mean we could be dependent on a US Republican president for our security. There is also the possibility that disarmament would prompt the Americans to reconsider their own contribu on to NATO which already dwarfs that of other states.

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Why do we need four submarines?

Four submarines are required to maintain one constantly on patrol and retaining this posture is essen al to ensure a con nuous deterrent.

What about other options?

The Trident Alterna ve review 2013 showed that no other alterna ve to our current CASD would be more cost‐effec ve or secure. No evidence since then has changed this conclusion.

How will this effect Labour’s chances in Scotland?

There is li le evidence that people in Scotland feel par cularly differently about nuclear weapons than people in England. To beat the SNP we need to hold them to account on their abject failures in educa on health and the economy, not try to out‐SNP them on defence or foreign policy. Jackie Baillie MSP recently took strong stance in favour of the UK’s nuclear deterrent and secured re‐elec on to Holyrood in the May elec on.

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Section D: Briefings

A First Sea Lord’s viewLord Boyce brings real life perspective to the utility and challenges of a deterrent.

This is an overview of a briefing for Labour parliamentarians given by Admiral Lord Boyce, a cross-bencher who has commanded three submarines and is a former First Sea Lord (1998-2001) and Chief of Defence Staff (2001-03). Chaired by the chair of the PLP backbench committee John Woodcock MP, this is the first in what is intended to be a series of briefings on our nuclear deterrent ahead of the main-gate vote expected in the spring. Future sessions will consider the industrial, geopolitical and other aspects of the debate.

What does replacing Trident mean? What is its lifespan and costs?

● We are replacing the current Vanguard submarines, not their missile system. Sea salt ages subs, which will come to end of their life in the late 2020s. Going much further brings a risk of unreliability, par cularly mechanical failure.

● Submarines made in the UK, rockets in the US (avoiding replica on costs). Warheads made and maintained at Aldermaston in the UK. The idea that the missiles have to be rotated every few weeks making the UK effec vely dependent on the US is a myth.

● New Successor submarines may last 30‐40 years, so up to 2070● The government has said replacing the submarines will cost around £30bn, so

the capital cost over 40 years equates to around 3‐4% of the annual defence budget. Cos ng debate gets confused because opposi on groups like CND add

in es mates for ongoing training and maintenance over a 30‐40 year period and everything else they can think of. Figures like £167bn far too crude.

What technological reasons underlie Trident? What alternatives exist?

● Conven onal pre‐emp ve nuclear strikes from an adversary could take out most conven onal weapons but submarines would remain intact, hence their ul mate deterrent status.

● Because Trident is a con nuous at‐sea deterrent (CASD), the UK will not be caught out nor is it necessary for the submarines to come into harbour to become opera onal. During a crisis, they are required at hours’ no ce or days at best (three for the Falklands for instance), so a CASD allows a swi reac on. Leaving subs in port “on ice” brings twin problems of meliness when they need to be used; an ac on in itself which may be viewed as an escalatory move during tensions.

● Seldom men oned are the highly‐trained, mo vated and efficient people who man submarines. Incredibly, there has been no break in CASD in 45 years. Disarming risks losing these skills permanently. Should the UK decide later that a deterrent is again necessary it would be impossible to re‐establish it.

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● Despite technological advances in other areas, the oceans remains impermeable and highly likely to remain so – meaning submarines will remain very hard to detect. There is more chance of a man being able to land on Mars within six months than technology being created to make the oceans permeable in the foreseeable future

● Ballis c missiles are more accurate and have a longer range compared to cruise missiles.

● Further, one should consider the me and cost required to establish a new delivery system, by which me Vanguard‐class submarines may have reached end of service. Nor should we forget that a new system is likely to leave the UK in breach of the Non‐Prolifera on Treaty. The BASIC campaign group and the Lib Dems in government both tried to prove that an alterna ve delivery system would work but ended up admi ng it was unrealis c.

● If the UK were to step down the nuclear ladder to the extent of scrapping its warhead but retaining engineering capacity to build them again if needed, any

a empt to begin rebuilding would be at odds with commitments made in the NPT. Besides retaining the skill base to do so completely unrealis c – what would all the people at Aldermaston do in the mean me.

Q&A

Geopolitical rationale behind maintaining Trident?

The UK has already disarmed substan ally – to the bare minimum credible deterrent ‐ but this has not prompted others to follow suit nor has it stopped the likes of Pakistan or Russia from increasing their nuclear footprint. Russia in par cular is seriously improving its nuclear and submarine capability.

Scrapping Trident unilaterally would remove the UK’s chance of playing a role in future mul lateral disarmament nego a ons.

Scrapping Trident would mean more money for the army?

Highly unlikely. HMT wouldn’t allow it to be spent on conven onal arms. Those who claim otherwise are “on another planet”

Cost of decommissioning if you did scrap Trident?

Upfront decommissioning costs of £3‐4bn, so any decision to scrap going to solve budget crisis in next 5 years.

Cyber-attack risks?

Cyber is a threat but subs are autonomous once they leave and have cyber proofed way of receiving messages. If comms are severed, fall back measures exists.

Second centre of decision?

Should the US not full its NATO obliga ons (unlikely but not impossible with its Pacic priority), an aggressor has to consider the UK. In nuclear theology, having a second independent nuclear power chain looming is a great deterrent.

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Impact on role in NATO and UN Security Council if we disarm?

No impact on P5 role – not all countries were nuclear powers when it was founded. If we disarm on the basis we do not believe in the nuclear doctrine, then it is hard to see how the UK could stay in NATO.

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Lessons from the pastLord Peter Hennessy and James Jinks elaborate on the historical context for nuclear weapons and submarines.

This is an overview of a briefing for Labour parliamentarians by Lord Peter Hennessy and James Jinks, authors of “The Silent Deep: The Royal Navy Submarine Service Since 1945”. Lord Hennessy, is one of Britain's best-known historians and Attlee Professor of History at Queen Mary, University of London. James Jinks completed his PhD under Lord Hennessy. Chaired by the chair of the PLP backbench committee John Woodcock MP, this is the sixth in a series of briefings on the Successor programme ahead of the main-gate vote. Past sessions have examined Russian foreign policy and Labour’s record on non-proliferation. Future ones will include the industrial aspects and another with

polling experts.

Overview of comments by Peter Hennessy

● The Labour Party rowed about the bomb from its incep on in 1946, with Stafford Cripps and Hugh Dalton speaking at a Cabinet commi ee mee ng against it, ci ng the need for resources would distract from the post‐war reconstruc on. Ernest Bevin arrived, late from a conversa on with his US counterpart, where he had been slighted, announcing that a bomb with “the bloody Union Jack on top of it” was required.

● Ci ng defence strategist and former MOD Permanent Secretary Michael Quinlan, PH says there are eight themes which arise each me we face the ques on of renewal or upgrade. These are: 1) the ra onale behind it, which range from pres ge to a seat at the top table to the need to inuence US and contribute to collec ve

security 2) challenge – within Government and beyond, the UK has a deep and recurrent tendency to reconsider its decision, unlike the other nuclear weapons states 3) cost 4) a tude of the US 5) France – always lurking as powerful factor. 6) ethics –even before CND, Catholic theologians opposed the bomb 7) ins tu onal pressures e.g. from the Armed Forces, 8) secrecy – although this is much diminished.

● Each me a decision is required, the same arguments are replayed, albeit in a different form. Former Defence Permanent Secretary Kevin Tebbit also noted that the UK was the “most reluctant of all nuclear states”, no one went through the same agony, with the French le in par cular demonstra ng a wholly different psyche to the Bri sh le .

Overview of comments by James Jinks

● JJ focussed on how we came to a submarine based system and its advantages.● An effec ve deterrent system possesses several characteris cs including reliability

and invulnerability.● UK’s nuclear weapons were rst carried on bombers before the development of the

ballis c missile. With the cancella on of the Bri sh Blue Streak and the American Skybolt, the UK purchased the submarine‐based Polaris ballis c missile from the US.

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● In the 1960s, the UK built four nuclear submarines, which remained in service from 1968‐1996. But from the 1970s, a debate started on how best to replace Polaris. Again the rela ve merits of land, air and sea were discussed, alongside the merits of ballis c and cruise missiles.

● JJ comments that during the Cold War, the USSR spent vast sums in order to detect

and track submarines, using everything from supercomputers to lasers but got nowhere. An ‐submarine warfare improvements have been evolu onary not revolu onary, though there will be mes of temporary superiority. In the next 30‐40 years, we can expect satellites and sonar to improve whilst Mari me Patrol Aircra will cover greater distances. Yet, it remains the case of “small submarine, big ocean”.

● Same technology which may make submarine detec on easier, may also make them quieter and lead to a new genera on of counter‐detec on technologies and tac cs that would enhance the ability of a submarine to remain undetected. For example, a submarine or unmanned vehicle may emit a sound to drown out its own noise, a method similar to noise cancelling headphones. The Russians claim their ‘Akula’ II

class submarines can already do this. Next genera on submarines may also deploy decoys to create false targets and conduct acous c jamming similar to that employed by airborne electronic warfare systems against radar.

● In all probability, the ‘Successor’ class submarines will have new jammers and decoys, either unmanned undersea vehicles or on the submarine itself, as well as countermeasures against sonar and other non‐acous c detec on techniques such as magne c detec on.

● US, Russia and China con nue to invest in submarines, with India also doing so now, because they believe the oceans will remain opaque.

● On vulnerability to cyber‐a ack JJ says it is difficult to glean informa on amidst the great secrecy surrounding the systems that control UK nuclear weapons. He is uncertain how anyone could claim the US DoD report claims the UK strategic weapons system and command and control arrangements were liable to cybera ack. The authors, and any hacker, would need detailed knowledge and understanding of the computer systems on board the Royal Navy’s submarines, as well as the command, control systems and procedures that allow the Prime Minister to authorise the release of nuclear weapons. Submarines are designed to operate in isola on. The DoD report recommends ‘focusing some of the capabili es into the submarine force where isola on is already designed into how they operate and ght’, which would seem to imply that its authors regard submarine based systems as rela vely secure.

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Deterrence TheoryMalcolm Chalmers discusses the concept of deterrence and how this applies to the UK’s nuclear deterrent

This is an overview of a briefing for Labour parliamentarians by Malcolm Chalmers,

Deputy Director and also Director of Proliferation and Nuclear Policy programmes at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). Chaired by the chair of the PLP backbench committee John Woodcock MP, this is the eighth in a series of briefings on the Successor

programme ahead of the main-gate vote. Past sessions have examined Russian foreign policy, Labour’s record on non-proliferation and the industrial aspect of Trident. Future ones will include a session examining polling and another with workforce and trade union representatives.

Overview of comments by Malcolm Chalmers (MC)

● Recent defence reviews have expressed the UK’s recommitment to nuclear weapons but also its commitment to disarmament and reduc on in the number of warheads, yet the 2015 SDSR broke this pa ern par ally by signalling no further disarmament. In one less analysed sentence, MC believes that there is a clear signal that the UK’s nuclear posture could be moved up, in view of the broader security environment and as a response to the greater poten al for conict with peer, or near peer states, in par cular the worryingly asser ve posi on of Russia over the last few years. At present the UK has 40 warheads and eight missiles on each boat but the capacity to carry more of each should there be technological changes in an ‐submarine warfare or missile defence.

● Whilst previous defence reviews had focused on how best the UK might operate in places like the Balkans and Iraq, the 2015 SDSR has a greater emphasis on deterrence more generally, over the full spectrum of defence, beyond nuclear weapons, and including diplomacy and economic sanc ons. What unites all of these means of deterrence is that they are about preven on. MC sees deterrence as a signal which uses different instruments to prevent war. If you are talking about countries like Russia and China with range of capabili es, deterrence is preferably to war. In the case of Ukraine, economic sanc ons were an important tool against further Russian interference.

● Nuclear deterrence theory can be as complex as one likes, but at a simple level for the UK, the possession of a nuclear weapon and its demonstra on of its availability (through patrolling) is a deterrence signal.

● Depending on the scenario, it may be that what a country needs is a large scale

strategic deterrence i.e. a one shot deterrence. On the other hand, it may also require sub‐strategic systems that act as a nal warning before the large scale system is used. The UK is the only nuclear weapons state that has a single delivery system; for instance the US and Russia each have three, China has two to three but the UK’s submarine system is capable of a range of strategic and pre‐strategic op ons.

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● MC believes that Russia sees the threat of a small scale nuclear war as a way of deterring western interven on in Ukraine but its threat of all out nuclear war is just not credible. Like North Korea and Pakistan, Russian threats of escala on to nuclear warfare are about deterrence. MC believes that any use of nuclear weapons in this age would be such a massive shi from the norm that poli cal reputa onal

consequences would be enormous and worsen whatever specic geographical crisis (Crimea etc) which acted as a trigger. Whoever did that would have to reckon with consequences; nuclear deterrence rests on possibility that the opposing nuclear weapon state might just retaliate.

Q&A

What can we understand from President Obama’s initial support for multilateral disarmament and subsequently his decision to spend more than USD1 trillion to update the US triad of nuclear weapons?

MC believes that Obama like most US Presidents is commi ed to mul lateral disarmament and got a new START treaty but in the end, the momentum ran into sand due to domes c poli cs and lack of Russian interest. MC doesn’t think the US needs as large an arsenal as it has, not does it need an expensive modernisa on programme but the poli cs of an arsenal smaller than that of the Russian strategic (not tac cal) arsenal would not be acceptable domes cally or interna onally, so it is stuck with broad numerical parity, however meaningless. MC notes that the UK may be the smallest of the ve official nuclear weapon states but what really ma ers is the ability to inict damage.

What is the relationship between NATO countries with no nuclear weapons and the

US? What would happen to the UK should it give up its nuclear weapons?

If the UK gave up its nuclear weapons, it could join lots of NATO countries with no weapons that have signed up to NATO deterrence and play their role in a different manner. For instance Germany, Italy and the Netherlands have aircra and crew who are trained in nuclear missions, trained to drop bombs, but these are American bombs held in European bases under control of US personnel. If the UK were to deploy US nuclear bombs with the RAF, able to be ordered into ac on by the PM, it might go some way to show that it was not rejec ng nuclear deterrence for NATO as a whole, and was prepared to share the poli cal burden of nuclear deterrence just as other non‐nuclear NATO members do. Even if the UK were to take such a step, it would s ll have problems

in explaining to allies why it had chosen this moment in world affairs to give up its own nuclear weapons

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Isn’t the use of nuclear weapons so catastrophic that it is inconceivable they will be used and are hence obsolete?

Deterrence is about changing the behaviour of an adversary and it isn’t always easy to pin down what might lead to a change in their behaviour. MC believes that if Donald

Trump becomes US President, decides that NATO is a waste of money and won’t use nuclear weapons as part of the alliance unless the US is directly threatened, then deterrence will be undermined; President Pu n in turn may be prepared to do things he currently wouldn’t contemplate. For deterrence to work, the aggressor doesn’t have to believe you have to use it, but there’s a chance you might use it.

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Russia -Threat or reality check?David Clarke and Andrew Monaghan discuss if the off-quoted Russian threat is real and can be kept in check with possession of a nuclear deterrent

This is an overview of a briefing for Labour parliamentarians by David Clark (former

special adviser to the late Robin Cook and chair of the Russia Foundation) and Andrew Monaghan (Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House). Chaired by the chair of the PLP backbench committee John Woodcock MP, this is the second in what is intended to be a series of briefings on the Successor programme ahead of the main-gate vote expected in the spring. Future sessions will consider the industrial, diplomatic and other aspects of the debate.

Russian foreign strategy – overview of comments by Andrew Monaghan

● The Russian state is moving onto a war foo ng, which goes beyond its ac ons in Ukraine but also public comments by its leaders and internal policy ac vi es. In their view, their policies are a response to an arc of crisis around Russia’s borders, a compe on for resources and a “21 st century of instability” due to a failure on the interna onal architecture. Russia sees itself opera ng in a world that is less post‐Ukraine more post‐Arab spring.

● A er 25‐30 years of complete neglect, Russia is modernising its military. Such rearmament has changed the European security situa on, though disagreements are nothing new and indeed central to Russia‐NATO rela ons.

● He said to watch for the NATO summit in Warsaw in July, with the possible announcement of permanent basing of NATO forces in cri cal NATO states and bringing former Soviet states like Georgia more into the alliance’s embrace. Russian cri cism will be forthcoming. Nevertheless, AM said that the trigger

point for NATO Ar cle 5 commitments is more likely to involve Turkey (consider for instance the downing of Russian aircra ) than Bal c States.● Watch for further Russian power projec ons – its sending of a naval o lla to a

G20 summit in Australia is the rst me the Russian navy had entered this area in 100 years. There’s a good chance that the Russian carrier will be deployed shortly, possibly before the UK’s.

● Russia views the UK as a so power that has the ability to support colour revolu ons like the ones in Ukraine and Georgia.

Why we need Trident - David Clark [click here for his ar cle for the Fabian Society]

● Labour debate on Trident follows a bizarre cycle of policy, with the party suppor ng disarmament at the height of the Cold War, dropping the policy when it ended and the best chance for disarmament existed and is now looking to move back to unilateralism when the threat has in fact increased. Labour bases its views on Trident in non‐defence terms. For the right, it is about electoral credibility, for the le it is about peace. Both views are valid but unhelpful and more about how we feel. He doesn’t support the status argument, no ng that Germany and Brazil base their arguments for Security Council membership on their economic strength. In turn, disarmament could make war more likely, not less.

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● DC has changed his mind and now supports Trident – the situa on is arguably more threatening and in Pu n, we have an aggressive risk taker who has threatened to use nuclear weapons, most worrying is his use of nuclear blackmail as an ancillary to diplomacy and conven onal military force. In 2014

Pu n reminded the west that Russia was a “leading nuclear power” and not to interfere with it (just as the crisis in Ukraine was deepening); shortly a er it threatened to target Denmark with nuclear weapons if it par cipated in NATO’s missile defence system; whilst at a March 2015 Elbe group mee ng, a group of re red Russian security officials were asked by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to warn US officials privately that Russia would use force, including nuclear weapons, if the west built up its presence in the Bal c states, armed Ukraine or a empted to restore Ukrainian control over Crimea. Alexei Pushkov, head of Duma’s security commi ee has commented that Russia would deploy nuclear weapons as conven onal weapons, to regional and local wars, not just na onal

ones. Around Crimea, Russia has deployed short range nuclear capable missiles. Russian defence spending has increased by more than 5 per cent in the past year but worth considering that 21 per cent of its public spending is classied so we cannot be sure if it is diverted to defence too.

● Trident isn’t only about our ability to deter a nuclear threat from Russia, it also affects our ability to deter a Russian a ack on a NATO country with conven onal forces. Should a non‐nuclear UK wish to provide military assistance to an ally being threatened by Russia, our ci zens would be highly vulnerable to nuclear in mida on. If the UK did not possess a nuclear deterrent, Russia would be far more likely to respond to any UK involvement in a poten al conict by threatening to launch a nuclear strike on Bri sh ci es if it intervened in any way. Russian military doctrine allows for this.

● DC’s Ukrainian friends regret that the country gave up nuclear weapons for a promise by Russia that has since been broken. Ques on remains how they might have maintained the weapons but regardless the view remains that Russian aggression would have been deterred if Ukraine s ll was a nuclear power.

Q&A

Is retaining Trident a binary de

Documents

Trident' Renewal Vote: Separating Fact From Fiction