Nixons Trident

7/30/2019 Nixons Trident

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John Darrll Shrwood

Nixons TridentNaval Power in Southeast Asia, 1968197

N AVA L H IS T OR Y & H eR IT A ge cOmmA N D | T he U.S . N av y a Nd T he v ie T N a m W


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Front Cover: Detail from Wheels DownHook Down by John Steel. Acrylic on illustration board. Navy Art Col lection.


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Nixonsrident

The U. S. Navy aNd The vieTNam War

Edward J. Marolda and Sandra J. Doyle, Series Editors

2 0 0 9

Naval Power in Southeast Asia, 19681972

John Darrell Sherwood


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Secretary of the Navys Advisory Subcommittee on Naval History

Dr.JohnB.Hattendor(Chair)

Dr.CharlesC.ChadbournIII

LieutenantGeneralGeorgeRonaldChristmas,USMC(Ret.)

RearAdmiralWilliamJ.Holland,USN(Ret.)

Ms.ChristineG.HughesCaptainWilliamSpencerJohnsonIV,USN(Ret.)

Dr.J.P.London

TeHonorableRobinB.PirieJr.

Mr.FredH.Rainbow

AdmiralJ.PaulReason,USN(Ret.)

Dr.JamesR.Reckner

Dr.CliordL.Stanley

Dr.WilliamL.Stearman

CaptainChanningM.Zucker,USN(Ret.)

Published by

NavalHistory&HeritageCommand

805KidderBreeseStreetSE

WashingtonNavyYard,DC20374-5060

www.history.navy.mil

BookdesignbyDeanGardeiandGwynnFuchs

U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL EDITION NOTICE

Use of ISBN

TisistheOcialU.S.Governmenteditionothispublicationandishereinidentiedtocertiy

itsauthenticity.Useo978-0-945274-58-2isorU.S.GovernmentPrintingOceEditionsonly.

TeSuperintendentoDocumentsotheU.S.GovernmentPrintingOcerequeststhatany

reprintededitionclearlybelabeledasacopyotheauthenticworkwithanewISBN.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Sherwood,JohnDarrell,1966

Nixonstrident:navalpowerinSoutheastAsia,19681972/JohnDarrellSherwood.

p.cm.(TeU.S.NavyandtheVietnamWar)

ISBN978-0-945274-58-2(alk.paper)

1.VietnamWar,19611975Aerialoperations,American.2.VietnamWar,19611975

Navaloperations,American.3.UnitedStates.NavyHistoryVietnamWar,19611975.4.Nixon,

RichardM.(RichardMilhous),19131994.I.itle.

DS558.8.S5432008

959.7043450973dc22 2008004087

TepaperusedinthispublicationmeetstherequirementsorpermanenceestablishedbytheAmericanNational

StandardorInormationSciencesPermanenceoPaperorPrintedLibraryMaterials(ANSIZ39.48-1984).

ForsalebytheSuperintendentoDocuments,U.S.GovernmentPrintingOce

Internet:Bookstore.gpo.gov;Phone:tollree866-512-1800;DCarea202-512-1800;Fax:202-512-2104

Mail:StopIDCC,Washington,DC20402-0001


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CoNTeNTS

Introduction 1

AirOperationsinLaos 5

ProtectiveReaction 23

BluntingtheEasterOensive 35

MiningHaiphongHarbor 45

TeWarAgainsttheMiGs 53

Linebacker 61

Conclusion 75

Sidebars

Intruder 10

AdmiralTomasHinmanMoorer 28

FromTanhHoatoSarajevo 62

WalleyeV-GuidedBomb 64

NavalBombardment:IntotheLionsDen 68

TeAuthor 78

Acknowledgments 78

SuggestedReading 79


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SoutheastAsia.

ChrisR

obinson


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Johnson.Itwas,asArmyhistorianS.L.A.Marshall

laterexplained,apotentialmajorvictoryturned

intoadisastrousdeeatthroughmistakenestimates,

lossonerve,andatidalwaveodeeatism.Ater

et,JohnsonlookedorawayoutoVietnamthat

didnotinvolveurthermajorcombatoperations

againstNorthVietnam.

AnnouncinginMarch

thathewouldnotrunin

theupcomingelection,

Johnsoncalledorpeace

talkswithHanoitoend

thewar.Healsohalted

navalandairattackson

NorthVietnam,except

intheareajustnorth

otheDemilitarized

Zone(DMZ),theborder

areabetweenNorth

andSouthVietnam.On

31October1968,he

orderedacessationo

allbombingoperations

againstNorthVietnam.RichardM.Nixon,

electedtothepresidency

thatsameNovember,

alsowantedtoend

Americaninvolvement

inVietnam.Buthe

didnotwanttobe

therstAmerican

presidenttoloseawar.Onceelected,hesoughtto

achievethisgoalopeacewithhonorthroughVietnamizationaprogramdesignedtowithdraw

U.S.groundorcesromSouthVietnamandturn

overthecountrysdeensetotheVietnamese.

Americanairandnavalpowerwouldcoverthis

withdrawalbyprovidingtheARVNwithair

andnavalgunresupport.Americanairpower

wouldalsolimittheowoCommunistsupplies

On31January1968,theNorth

VietnameseArmy(NVA)andViet

Cong(VC)guerrillaslaunchedaspec-

tacularoensiveinSouthVietnam.

Fiveothecountryssixmajorcities,36oits44

provincialcapitals,and64oits245districtcapitals

wereattackedthatday.

Asappersquadeven

penetratedthegrounds

otheU.S.Embassy

inSaigon.Temedia

broadcastimageso

combatattheembassy

andinotherkeycities,

causingtremendous

psychologicalshockor

theAmericanviewing

public.Ultimately,

U.S.andArmyothe

RepublicoVietnam

(ARVN)troopskilled

orcapturedmosto

theenemycombatants

inSaigoninthenextewdays.Alliedtroops

quelledmostothe

ghtingintheresto

thecountrybyMarch,

killingover58,000NVA

andVCtroopsinthe

process.TeARVN

suered4,954dead,and

theAmericans,3,895.ItwouldtakeNorthVietnam

ouryearstorebuildaorcecapableomountingasimilaroensive,andtheVietCongneverrecovered.

Despitesueringovervetimesasmanymilitary

casualtiesastheallies,NorthVietnamwonthe

etOensiveinastrategicsense.Teshockand

intensityothesurpriseattackcreatedatragicsense

odeeatismormanymembersotheAmerican

publicandespeciallyorPresidentLyndonB.

iNTrodUCTioN

PresidentRichardM.Nixon,16June1972.

NHCLFile


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2

tothesouththroughLaosinacampaigncalled

CommandoHunt.DuringCommandoHuntandtheinterdictioneortsthatprecededit,U.S.AirForce

andNavyaircratdroppednearlythreemillion

tonsobombsonthissmall,landlockedcountry.

Inthehistoryowarare,onlyGermanyandJapan

inWorldWarIIhadbeenthetargetomorebomb

tonnage.

AlthoughoensivebombingagainstNorth

Vietnamociallystoppedbetween1968and1972,

theUnitedStatesconductednumerousprotec-

tivereactionstrikesagainstNorthVietnameseairdeenseswhenthesedeensesreduponor

otherwisethreatenedU.S.aircratconductingaerial

reconnaissanceorpassingoverNorthVietnam

intransittoLaos.Over1,000protectivereaction

strikeswerelaunchedin1970alone.Duringone

suchoperationinDecember1971,200AirForce

andNavyplanesstrucktargetsasarnorthasthe

20thparallel(just75

milesromHanoi)inthe

biggestbombingraido

thatperiodProudDeep

Alpha.

Temostintenseyear

otheairwarwas1972.

Duringthatyear,North

Vietnamlaunchedamajor

attackthatemployed

massesoregularground

troops,tanks,andartillery

againstSouthVietnam.

Intheso-calledEaster

Oensive,theenemy

hopedtocrushtheSouth

Vietnamesearmedorces

andbringthewartoa

sudden,violentconclu-

sion.Onlyasmallnumber

oAirForceghterplanes,

ahanduloArmyand

Marineadvisors,andthe

NavycarriersintheGul

oonkinwereonhandto

aidtheSouthVietnamese

instemmingtheCommunistonslaught.Intheend,

navalairpowerprovedvitalinstoppingtheoensivebecauseotheNavysabilitytoconcentratecarriers

oVietnam.Inamatteroaewshortweeks,the

NavyscarrierpresenceintheGuloonkinjumped

romtwotosixattops.Navyaircratewthe

majorityostrikesduringthecriticalearlydaysothe

oensive.Navysuraceshipsalsooeredbeleaguered

SouthVietnamesegroundorcesneartheDMZ

criticalgunresupportagainstNorthVietnamese

armoredcolumnsmovingdownthecoast.

Oncetheinvasionwaseectivelyhalted,navalaircratandwarshipscarriedthewartoNorth

Vietnam.DuringOperationPocketMoney(May

1972January1973),navalaviatorsminedHaiphong

harborandothermajorportsinNorthVietnam.

InLinebackerI(AprilOctober1972),Navyplanes

andwarshipsresumedcombatagainstNorth

Vietnamandstruckmanyormerlyo-limittargets

A-7 Line MaintenancebyrellaKoczwara,1976.Oilonmasonite.ConsideredoneotheNavysworkhorsesotheVietnamWar,thelightattackA-7aircratplayedakeyroleinbothLinebackeroperationsandtheminingoHaiphongharbor.Armamentconsistedoone20-mmmultibarreledcannonandupto15,000poundsobombs,rockets,ormissiles.

NavyArtcollection


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orthersttimeinthewar.Navalaviatorsought

theirmostintenseair-to-airduelswithenemy

MiGsduring1972,andwarshipsbravederce

enemyretoattacktargetsosignicancealongthe

NorthVietnamesecoastline,includingtargetsin

Haiphong.Inall,enemyrehit16U.S.Navyships

during1972thedeadliestyearothewarorthe

Navysgunresupportorce.

Tenallarge-scaleair/suraceoperationo

thewarwasLinebackerIINixonsamousB-52

bomberassaultagainstHanoiandHaiphongin

December1972.Tisoperationultimatelycon-

vincedtheNorthVietnamesetoagreetoapeace

settlement.Asinnearlyeveryearlieraircampaign

othewar,navalaviatorstooktotheskiesduring

LinebackerII,bombingtargetsinHanoiand

HaiphongaswellaspavingthewayorAirForce

B-52sbyattackingsurace-to-airmissile(SAM)sites

andotherairdeensepositionsinNorthVietnam.

NavalaircratalsoreseededNorthVietnamese

harborswithminesduringLinebackerIIand

destroyedenemypatrolboats.Finally,navalgunre

supportshipsstruckavarietyoimportanttargets

alongtheheavilydeendedNorthVietnamcoastline.

Tisnavalpowerprovedcriticalduringtheend

gameotheVietnamWarandcontributedmightily

towardstheachievementothePresidentsgoalo

peacewithhonor.

AB-52takesoromGuam.


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HoChiMinhrail.

ChrisRobinson


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hecourseotheVietnamWarchanged

dramaticallyortheU.S.Navybetween

31Marchand31October1968.During

thatperiod,PresidentJohnsondrasti-

callyscaledbackandthenhaltedallair,naval,and

artillerybombardmentoNorthVietnam.His31

Octoberorderhaltedoensiveoperationsnotonly

againstNorthVietnamproperbutagainsttargets

withintheDMZalongthe17thparallelbetween

NorthandSouthVietnamandwaters12nautical

milesromthecoast.

TeJointChiesoSta(JCS)immediately

directedthatallnavalgunresupportshipsinthe

Guloonkinbewithdrawnsouthothe17th

parallel.Tesuraceactionorceincludedthree

cruisersand22destroyers.SinceOctober1966,

theseshipshadattemptedtostemtheowomuni-

tionsandsuppliestoSouthVietnambybombarding

roadsandbridgesashoreanddestroyingwaterborne

logisticscrataspartoOperationSeaDragon.

Aterthebombinghalt,theJCSauthorizedonly

twotypesowarshipstooperatenorthothe20th

parallel:searchandrescue(SAR)destroyers(to

rescuedownedaviators)andpositiveidenticationradaradvisoryzone(PIRAZ)ships.Teoriginal

unctionothePIRAZsystemwastomaintain

constantsurveillanceotheairspaceoverthe

easternregionsoNorthVietnamandtrackall

hostileandriendlyaircratinthisspace.By1967,

theSeventhFleetsaskForce77operatedthree

PIRAZshipsRedCrown,situated25milesrom

themouthotheRedRiver;Harbormaster,located

southoRedCrown;andathirdshiptothenorth

otheRedRiverdeltaandbeganusingtheseshipstodirectNavyandAirForceghtersagainst

NorthVietnameseMiGs.WiththenewSPS-48

radars,PIRAZshipscouldcovernotonlytheGul

oonkinbutmuchotheoverlandareasoNorth

VietnamandcouldvectorU.S.ghtersromallser-

vicestohostileaircratpracticallyromthemoment

oaMiGstakeo.Teseships,inshort,provided

theU.S.NavyandAirForcewithsignicantsitu-

ationalawarenesswithrespecttoenemyaircrat

movement,andwouldbeathornintheenemysside

ortheremainderothewar.

TeNavy,however,wouldbeorbiddenrom

strikingtargetsinNorthVietnamormosto

the19681972period.Instead,itwouldocus

thebulkoitsaviationassetsoninterdictingthe

owotroopsandsuppliesthroughLaostoSouth

Vietnamacampaigndesignedtoacilitateaneven-

tualAmericanwithdrawalromSouthVietnam.

AshistorianJamesH.Willbanksexplainedthe

situation,Johnsonsbombinghaltmadeitclearthat

therewasnolightattheendothetunnel,andthat

itwastimetoendthewarinSouthVietnamone

wayortheother.

Asaninterdictionzone,Laoshadbeeninthe

Navyscrosshairssinceearly1964whenNavyRF-8

aerialreconnaissanceplanesbeganyingoverthe

countryinOperationYankeeeam.Laoshadbeen

usedasasupplyrouteortheNorthVietnamese

since1959whenworkersstartedconstructing

aseriesotrailsthroughthecountrytoprovide

logisticalsupportorthewarintheSouth.Tetransportationsystem,whichAmericansdubbed

theHoChiMinhrail,beganasaseriesolinked

trailsorporters,packanimals,andbicycleriders.

Duringitsrstyearooperation,2,000personnel

andover31tonsomilitaryequipmenthadmade

the100-miletripdownthetrail.

Beginningin1964,theNorthVietnamesetrans-

ormedtheHoChiMinhrailromasystemo

ootandbikepathsintoanetworkoroadscapable

ohandlingmotorizedvehicles.Asaconsequence,throughputquadrupledbetween1963and1964,

andby1966,thetrailconsistedo820milesoair-

weatherroads.woyearslaterin1968,upto10,000

trucksweremovingdownthesystematanyone

time.Almostallmovementwasbyaseriesoshort

shuttlesratherthanlong-distancehauling.Drivers

maneuveredtheirtrucksoverthesameroutesnight

air operaTioNS iN LaoS


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6

aternight,becomingintimatelyamiliarwiththe

terrain.TeyotendrovetheSoviet-manuactured

GAZ-63,asmallour-wheeldrivetruckwitha

70-horsepowerengineandamaximumspeedo

just41milesperhour.ooperate,maintain,and

deendtheowotraconthetrail,NorthVietnam

ultimatelystationedover100,000truckdrivers,

bikeriders,porters,engineers,laborers,antiaircrat

gunners,andmedicaltechniciansinLaos.

Terstconcertedairinterdictioncampaign

againstthetrailbeganinDecember1964.Ina

jointNavyAirForceoperationnamedBarrelRoll,

Americanaircratewoverlikelyinltrationroutes

andattackedCommunistsupplyvehiclesorother

targetsoopportunity.ByMarch1965,SeventhFleet

aircrathadcarriedouthalothe43BarrelRollmis-

sions.Tatsamemonth,thesouthernLaotianpan-

handlewasseparatedromtheBarrelRolloperational

areainnortheasternLaosanddesignatedSteeliger.

TeSteeligerinterdictionzonewasaruggedarea

dominatedbyjunglesandsteepmountains,ranging

rom1,800tomorethan5,000eetinheight.Because

vehiclescouldaccessthisregiononlyromVietnam

viaalimitednumberopasses(BanKarai,inlower

NorthVietnam;MuGia,inthenorthernpanhandle

oNorthVietnam;andBanRaving,justeastand

slightlynorthotheDMZ),plannersbelievedthese

areasrepresentedthebestplacestoocusinterdiction

eorts,andbymid-1965NavyandAirForcepilots

wereyingover1,000Steeligersortiesamonth

againsttargetsintheseso-calledchokepoints.

DespiteAmericasincreasingcommitmenttoair

interdictioninLaos,theNorthVietnamesecontinued

transportingsuppliesthroughthatcountry,oten

inltratingover4,500menand300tonsosupplies

amonthtoorcesghtinginSouthVietnam.We

werehitrequentlybyAmericanairplanes,recalled

TanMinhSon,aNorthVietnamesedriver.I

tenoutoahundredtrucksarrivedsaely,thatwas

agreatvictory.oputevenmorepressureonthe

NorthVietnameselogisticssystem,theUnitedStates

launchedanewcampaigncalledigerHoundin

1965.Itwasdesignedtoconcentratemoreairpower

onasectionotheHoChiMinhrailcontiguous

withSouthVietnam.ByMay,igerHoundstrikes

haddestroyedanestimated3,000buildings,1,400

BicyclescapturedontheHoChiMinhrail.Cyclistsregularlyhauled300-poundloads.Vietnam

Archive,TexasTechUniversit

y


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trucks,numerousbridges,andmorethan200

antiaircratsites.Still,suppliescontinuedto

owsouth.TeAirForceintroducednew

technologiessuchasgunships(rsttheAC-47

andlatertheAC-130)capableoloiteringor

longperiodsotimeoverareasandunleashing

massiveamountsorepowerontargets.

ButasU.S.interdictiontechnology

improvedsotoodidtheNorthVietnamese

transportationeort.Roadconstruction

mushroomedrom80kilometersduring

the196667dryseasontomorethan306

kilometersbyAugust1968.Conscripted

Laotianlaborersdidmostotheconstruction,

usinghandimplementsandworkingatnight

toavoidbombattacks.Whereverpossible,

theVietnameseconstructedroadsunder

treecanopies,makinggooduseonatural

camouage.

Teyalsoplantedbushesandconstructed

trellisworksobamboosaplingstocover

exposedportionsoroads.Finally,inaclimate

plaguedbymonsoonweatherromMayto

October,theselaborersbecamemastersin

solvingdrainageproblemsviacorduroying,gravel-

ingshortsections,installingculverts,andcreating

drainageditches.

ocountertheseandothermeasures,theU.S.developedasystemosensorscalledIgloo

White.Teideaoriginatedromacollectiono

classiedreportsauthoredbyadistinguished

grouposcientistsknownastheJasonDeense

AdvisoryPanel.TeJasonstudypointedoutthat

theAmericanbombingcampaignagainstNorth

VietnamromMarch1965toNovember1968,

knownasRollingTunder,washavingnorealeect

deterringNorthVietnamssupportothewarin

theSouthandadvisedthatairassetsinsteadbeocusedmoreonmilitaryinterdiction.Inparticular,

theJasonsrecommendedtheconstructionoa$1

billionbarrierconsistingobarbedwireences,

mineelds,resupportbases,andsensorsalong

theDMZandalesserbarrierominesandsensors

onlyalongtheborderbetweenSouthVietnamand

Laos.PresidentJohnsontookanimmediateliking

totheidea.InterdictionoeredhimandDeense

SecretaryRobertMcNamaraalimitedandcareully

controlledoperationdesignedtochangethepolicy

oNorthVietnamratherthandestroythatcountrys

inrastructure(thattheprogrammightlaywasteto

LaosdidnotdeterMcNamaraandhisplanners).

Workonthebarriersystembeganinthesummer

o1967.TejobocreatingtheDMZbarrierellto

theU.S.Marines.ManyMarineleadersresentedhavingtodevotescarcecombatresourcestobuild-

ingwhatsomeconsideredamodernMaginotLine

thattheenemycouldbypass.Enemyattacksagainst

Marinepositions,thesiegeoKheSanh(oneothe

linesstrongpoints),andultimatelytheetOensive

o1968continuallydisruptedtheconstruction

projectandeventuallycausedittogrindtoahalt.

HiddenStorageAreaontheHoChiMinhrail.Tisundergroundstorageareawassowellcamouagedthatitwasnotounduntilaroad-wideningbulldozerslicedintothebank.Notetheruinedbicyclewheelinrontotheopening;Hanoiusedeveryavailablemeansotransport,rombicyclestotrucks.


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8

TeLaotianoperation,however,enduredbecause

thesensorscouldbelaidbyaircrataloneanddid

notrequirealargecommitmentogroundorces.

NavyOP2Epatrolplanes,Navyhelicopters,

andAirForcehelicopters(laterF-4s)droppedover

20,000sensorsalongpartsotheHoChiMinh

railnetwork.Mostsensorswereeitheracoustic

orseismic.Teacousticsensors,derivedromtheNavysantisubmarinesonarbuoy,coulddetect

vehiclesoundsandhumanvoices.Seismicsensors

detectedgroundvibrationsromvehicles.Allthe

sensorscameincylindricalhousingsandcontained

low-poweredradiosortransmittingtheinorma-

tionviarelayplanestotheInltrationSurveillance

Center(askForceAlpha)atNakhonPhanomAir

BaseinnorthernTailandanintelligenceusion

centermannedbyabout400AirForcepersonnel.

Teaveragesensorlastedabout45daysandcostapproximately$619,withmoreexpensivemodels

costingasmuchas$2,997.

AirForceEC-121sandlaterQU-22Bsew

tracks24hoursadayabovetheHoChiMinhrail,

pickingupsignalsromthesensorsandrelayingthe

inormationtothesurveillancecenterinTailand.

woIBM360-65computerscollectedandstored

thesensordataorusebythetargetanalysts.Tese

analystsqueriedthedatabaseconstantly,andwhen

worthwhiletargetswereound,theycontactedan

airbornebattleeldcommandandcontrolcenter,

amodiedC-130.TisplaneinturndirectedAir

ForceorNavyplanesguidedbyon-siteorwardair

controller(FAC)aircrattothetargets.ByMay1970,

seventy-twosensorstringsmonitoredtheroadsandtrailsoLaos.WewiredtheHoChiMinhraillike

adrugstorepinballmachine,andweplugitinevery

night,explainedoneAirForceocerassigned

toaskForceAlpha.Beore,theenemyhadtwo

thingsgoingorhim.Tesunwentdownevery

night,andhehadtreestohideunder.Nowhehas

nothing.Whenthesystemworkedcorrectly,strike

aircratmightbeonthesceneveminutesater

beingdetectedbythesensors.

TerstmajortestothesensorsystemoccurrednotinLaosbutatKheSanh,SouthVietnam.During

theenemys1968siegeotheMarinebase,theAir

Forcedroppedsensorstomonitortroopmovements

aroundtheareaandusedtheNakhonPhanom

surveillancecentertoanalyzethedata.Tesystem

workedbetterthanexpected.Forinstance,onthe

nighto34February,sensorsindicatedthepresence

OP-2ENeptune.BetweenFebruary1967andJuly1968,theNavydeployedtheseaircrattoTailandtolaysensorsalongtheHoChiMinhrail.

N H C L F i l e


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oover2,000troopsnearMarinehilloutpostsoutside

othebase.Usingthisinormation,artilleryand

airpowerpoundedthearea,thwartinganintended

attackontheMarines.Overall,sensorshelpeddirect

theemploymentoover100,000tonsomunitions

atKheSanhandkillanestimated1,288North

Vietnamesetroops.TesuccessotheKheSanh

sensornetworkpromptedplannerstodevelopamore

comprehensivesystemosensorsinLaosandmakeit

thecenterpieceotheairwaraterPresidentJohnson

orderedanendtothebombingoNorthVietnamin

November1968.

Teresultingcampaign,CommandoHunt,

lastedthroughApril1972.Itwasthelongestair

interdictioncampaigninthehistoryowarare.Te

mostintensiveportionsothemultiyearcampaign

ellduringtheNovemberAprildryseasonbecause

itwasthenthattheNorthVietnamesemovedthe

mosttrucksalongthenarrowdirtroadsotheHo

ChiMinhrail.Lessercampaignsweremounted

duringtheMayOctoberwetseason.

Terstphaseotheprogram,CommandoHunt

I,ociallybeganduringtheNovember1968April

1969dryseasonandsoughttoclosemajorchoke-

pointssuchastheroadsleadingtotheMuGiaor

BanKaraipasses.InthersttendaysoDecember

1968,therewereover2,000trucksmovingtowards

theMuGiaPass.Tetruckswouldstop1,200metersromtheborderandenterLaosatnight.

NavyandAirForceaircratattemptedtoimpede

thisowotracbyeitherattackingthetrucks

directlyatertheyenteredLaosorblockingtheroad

withdebriscausedbybombblasts.

Sincemosttrucksmovedatnight,theNavys

sophisticatednight,all-weatherA-6attackplanewas

vitaltothecampaign.TeSeventhAirForce,which

hadresponsibilityorallCommandoHunttarget-

ing,authorizedtheNavysA-6stoparticipateinanoperationcalledCommandoNailon13December

1968.SeventhAirForcepresentedtheNavysSeventh

Fleetcarrierorce,askForce77,withalistotargets

approvedbytheU.S.EmbassyinLaos.F-77then

selectedspecictargetsoritsCommandoNail

missionsandorderedA-6stotakeradarscopepho-

tographyothetargets.TeA-6sthenconducteda

daylightraidonthetargets(usuallystretchesoroads)

toveriytheaccuracyothemeasurementstakenby

photographyandconrmthattheycouldachieve

bombhitswithin1,000metersoatarget.Onlyater

thesestepsweretakencouldA-6sbeginlaunching

CommandoNailstrikesinthetargetareasatnightor

inbadweather.Tesystem,however,wasnotwithout

itsaws.Terigoroustargetconrmationprocess

delayedtheexecutionomissions,whichcausedthe

SeventhAirForcetoassignlessdesirabletargets

toF-77.Multipleraidsonthesamelocationsalso

alertedtheNorthVietnamesetotheprogram,giving

themplentyotimetocomeupwithalternateroutes

andbypasses.

Amoreexibleapproachtonighttargeting

involvedtheuseotheA-6sairbornemovingtarget

indicator(AMI).TeAMIradarcoulddetect

targetsmovingatspeedsgreaterthanvemiles

perhourandintheoryrepresentedtheperecttool

ornightarmedreconnaissancemissions.Strict

rulesoengagement,however,preventedtheNavy

romtakingulladvantageothesystem.A-6s

rstneededtoconrmvisuallytheexistenceo

thetargetbydroppingaresbeorethey,orthe

accompanyingpouncerA-7CorsairIIorF-4

PhantomIIplanes,couldattackthetrucks.Tese

ares,ocourse,alertedNorthVietnamesetrucks

tothepresenceotheA-6sandcausedthemtostopimmediately.Oncestopped,atruckcouldnolonger

bedetectedbyAMI,renderingthewholesystem

useless.

Athirdnightandall-weathertargetingsystem

wasCombatSkyspot.Usingground-basedradars,

SkyspotcontrollersvectoredAirForceandNavy

attackplanestotheirtargetsandtoldthepilots

exactlywhenandwheretodroptheirordnance.

Smoke,haze,dust,darkness,andoliage,however,

otenobscuredthetargetzones,makingbombdamageassessmentdicult.ByJune1969,more

than10percentotheNavysoverallstrikeeort

againstLaosconsistedoCombatSkyspotsorties.

Interservicecoordinationimprovedovertime

astheNavybeganequippingitsSkyspotaircrat

withAirForceAPN-154beacons,makingiteasier

orAirForcegroundcontrollerstotracktheNavy

continued on page 12


16/88

IN THE STEPHEN COONTS NOVELFlight of the Intruder,

pilot Jake Graton apologizes or the A-6s ungainly

appearance when he rst shows it to his new girlriend,

Callie: Not exactly beautiul, with that blunt nose,he remarks. Flies great though. Other naval aviators

were less complimentary, calling it a tadpole or a

fying drumstick. In part, because o its distinct lack

o visual appeal, the A-6 is one o the least acclaimed

aircrat o the Vietnam War. Yet, this pioneering plane

proved its worth or the Navy many times over, not only

in Vietnam but in Desert Storm two decades later. With

its tremendous bombload, its ability to operate at night

and in poor weather, and its capacity to loiter or long

periods o time over targets, this aircrat excelled in

aerial interdiction, mine-laying operations, and many

other strike missions.The requirements or the A-6 grew out o the Navy

and Marine Corps experiences during the 1950s.

During the Korean War, slower propeller-driven attack

aircrat, such as the AD-1 Skyraider, were much more

eective in the close air support and battleeld air

interdiction role than aster jet ghters because they

had more endurance and could carry bigger payloads.

Though the Skyraider would continue fying in

Vietnam, the Navy recognized it needed a new attack

plane that could fy as ast as a jet, loiter over targets

or a long time, carry lots o ordnance, and operate in

all weather and at night.Most o the major U.S. military aircrat builders

competed or the contract, but the Navy chose

Grumman. The companys model had a 53-oot

wingspan and a 54-oot, 9-inch length. A ully loaded

A-6 could carry as much ordnance as a World War

IIera B-17 bomber. However, with its wings olded,

the planes wingspan could be cut in hal or relatively

easy storage on a carrier.

A second unique design trait o the A-6 was its side-

by-side seating conguration or the pilot and bombar-

dier navigator (BN). Unlike the F-4, where the navigator

sat behind the pilot, the A-6s side-by-side seatingarrangement made the BN more o a team equal as

opposed to the guy in the backseat. And this equality

was vital, or the pilot depended on the navigator not

only to accurately deliver ordnance but also to help him

control the aircrat.

Another unique eature was DIANE (Digital

Integrated Attack and Navigation Equipment). The

system included ground-mapping radar, track radar,

an analog computer, and an inertial navigation

system. The A-6 could attack preselected locations

or targets o opportunity without the crew having to

look outside the cockpit. The BN managed DIANEand, without talking, could relay steering instructions

to the pilot through a Visual Display Terminal (VDT).

As Charlie Carr, a Marine A-6 BN, said, DIANE really

put the BN into the game. Not surprisingly, the A-6

emerged as one o the Navys most popular aircrat

or naval fight ocers. Roger Lerseth even created a

special cover or his notebook in Naval Flight Ocer

School that read: Think A-6!!!

The power plant o the A-6 consisted o two Pratt

and Whitney J-52 turbojet engines. While the plane

could not exceed the speed o sound, its engines

produced 9,300 pounds o thrust, enough to fy theplane at speeds o 648 miles per hour (0.851 Mach).

The J52-P0408, introduced in 1972, increased the

thrust to 11,200 pounds with no signicant change in

engine size, shape, or weight.

Grumman delivered the rst production A-6s to the

Navy in February 1963. The rst A-6s to see action in

Vietnam belonged to Attack Squadron (VA) 75. During

its 1965 tour, the squadron dropped 25 percent o Air

Wing 7s ordnance, despite the act that the wing had

greater numbers o A-4s and F-4s.

A crowning achievement or the A-6 occurred on

18 April 1966. On that night, a fight o two A-6Asrom VA-85 executed a surprise attack on the Uong Bi

thermal power plant located approximately 12 miles

northeast o the seaport o Haiphong. Making radar

system deliveries, the Intruder placed 26,000 pounds

o ordnance on target. So many bombs landed on

the target that Hanoi Radio claimed that B-52s were

responsible.

Like many new aviation technologies, the A-6

suered rom a variety o maintenance ailments early

on in its combat history. Heat, humidity, salt air, and

the shock o catapult assisted launches and tailhook

arrested landings all took a toll on the sophisticatedavionics package o the A-6A, leading to requent

downings o aircrat. Almost without exception,

an A-6 would make one fight and have to go to the

hanger or maintenance, recalled Kent L. Lee, the

skipper oEnterprise (CVAN 65) in 1967.

Naval leaders questioned whether the A-6s should

be employed en-masse in large daytime air attacks,

the so-called Alpha strikes, or be used in ones and10

Intruder


17/88

twos at night or in bad weather against high value,

heavily deended targets. Ultimately, those arguing

or the piecemeal approach won out. We preer goo

(night and bad weather conditions) became one o the

slogans o the A-6 community.Following the 1968 bombing halt against North

Vietnam, the emphasis o A-6 operations shited to

Laos, where the aircrat proved itsel as an interdic-

tion workhorse or night and bad weather missions in

search o enemy vehicles. The fiers called it trolling

or trucks and oten boasted o getting saddle sores

like old cavalrymen rom fying such long missions.

A-6s proved particularly eective during the 1972

battle o An Loc. With their ability to loiter at length

over the target area and their sizable bombloads,

the A-6 became a avorite o Air Force orward air

controllers over the battleeld. Ater hearing that aninbound fight o A-6s rom VA-75 was carrying 42

Mk-82 500-pound bombs (14 per aircrat), one FAC

exclaimed, Jesus Christ, Im in heaven. Ive got my

own B-52 raid!

The precision delivery capability o the A-6 was also

vital during the mining o Haiphong harbor in 1972.

The Navy intended to sweep the mines ater the war,

so accurate delivery was o paramount importance.

NARAK-54021

A Constellation A-6 Intruder drops a load o Snakeye bombs on targets in North Vietnam. The retarder tail o these

bombs allowed low-level, high-precision attack while avoiding bomb-ragment damage to delivery aircrat.

C

The our Mk-52 mines carried by each A-6 in the

operation added 8,000 pounds o extra weight, but

they still delivered their ordnance with great precision.

In Linebacker II, A-6s attacked enemy surace-to-air

missile (SAM) sites, paving the way or the massive AirForce B-52 raids.

A-6s few 35,443 combat sorties during the

Vietnam War and suered 51 lossesa relatively

high loss/sortie ratio when compared to other Navy

aircrat. Overall, 1.4 Intruders were lost or every

1,000 sorties fown compared to 1.0 or A-4s, 0.7

or F-4s, and 0.6 or A-7s. Maintenance problems

were partly to blame. As one fier explained, Nothing

can touch the Intruder when all the black boxes are

working, but in Vietnam it was a rare day indeed

when an A-6 few with all systems unctioning per-

ectly. Another actor was the diculty o its mission.Intruders few some o the Navys most dangerous

missions, oten against SAM sites and other heavily

deended targets.

During the First Gul War, the A-6 continued to

serve as one o the Navys workhorse strike aircrat,

fying over 4,071 sorties and scoring a number o suc-

cesses, including sinking several Iraqi minelayers and

patrol boats. The Navy retired its last A-6 in 1997.

Two Constellation

A-6 Intruders.


18/88

12

planes.Teradiocommunicationslinkbetween

thecarriertaskgroupsandSeventhAirForcealso

becamemoreeectiveovertime,allowingormore

coordinationwithrespecttoordnanceloadsand

missionchanges.

TeNavyaircratoperatedprimarilyunder

directionoAirForceFACsandenteredand

departedLaosviaaspecialNavyightcorridor

establishedjustbelowtheDMZinSouthVietnam.Inthebeginning,aircrewswerenotassignedtargets

priortolaunchandinsteadcheckedinwithanAir

ForceairbornecontrolplaneinLaostobegiven

targetsoopportunity.Overtime,coordination

procedureswereworkedoutbetweenF-77and

theSeventhAirForce,andaschedulingsystem

developedthatacilitatedtheexchangeodataon

targets,routes,andweapons.Ater1November

1968,F-77normallyassignedtwoorthreeattack

carriers(CVAs)toYankeeStationinsupportotheinterdictioncampaign.DuringCommandoHuntI,

Navyaircratewapproximately24percentoall

strikesortiesorthecampaign,whichtranslatedto

morethan3,282strikesortiespermonth.

CommandoHuntII,whichbeganinMay1969and

coincidedwiththeonsetothewetseason,soughtto

hamperNorthVietnameseeortstorepairbombed

andwashedoutroads.Forthersttime,ghter-

bombersconductedarmedreconnaissanceattacksin

designatedree-rezonesareasdeterminedtobe

uninhabitedbycivilians.Navyaircratcontinuedto

seedriversandlandrouteswith500-poundMk-36

and1,000-poundMk-40mines.Dependingonthe

ringmechanismsemployed,theseairdropped

bottomminescouldbesettorespondtomagnetic

inuences,seismicvibrations,orboth.

Inadditiontominingoperations,Navyplanesew

89AMIsortiesinJune1969,buttheprogramwas

discontinuedinJulyasaresultoanalmostcomplete

lackoidentiablemovingtargetsontheLaotianroad

system.DuringCommandoHuntII,Navyplanesew

approximately2,000attacksortiesamonthintoLaos,

whichrepresented32percentoallU.S.sorties.

AsthedryseasoninLaoscommencedinlate

1969,plannersbegantoscaledownCommando

Huntoperations.TeNovember1969April1970

CommandoHuntIIIcampaignemphasizeddaytime

strikesagainstroadsandnightattacksagainst

antiaircratsites.NavyA-6aircratparticipatedina

subordinateoperationoCommandoHuntIIIcalled

CommandoBolt.Anarrayooursensorstrings,

eachwiththreetosixsensorsspaced660eetapart,

deployedalongheavilyusedroads,monitoredtrac.

Astruckstraveledalongtheroads,thesurveillance

centerestimatedthespeedandsizeotheconvoyandusedacomputertodeterminewhenthetrucks

wouldpassbythenextsensorstring.Testrike

controllerthenradioedthisinormationtoA-6s,

andaNavybombardiernavigatoredtheinorma-

tionintotheA-6scomputer,whichinturntoldhim

thecourse,altitude,andspeednecessarytolaythe

planesbombsrightontheconvoy.Teeectiveness

oCommandoBoltremainsunclearduetodicul-

tiesinobtaininggood,post-strikeintelligenceor

nightoperations.TroughoutCommandoHunt,thebestinterdic-

tionweaponwastheAirForceAC-130gunship,

aconvertedcargoplanearmedwith7.62-mm

miniguns,20-mmVulcanGatling-styleguns,

40-mmBoorsautomaticguns,andonthePAVE

AEGISmodel,a105-mmhowitzer.Tesensorarray

andmassiverepowerotheplanesimplydwared

AnaerialviewoaheavilybombedportionotheHoChiMinhrailinLaos,16January1970.

USN1144308


19/88

thoseothetypicalAirForceorNavytacticaljet.

DuringCommandoHuntIII,orinstance,AC-130s

demolished822outothe2,562vehiclesdestroyed

duringthecampaign,or32percentalmostthe

samenumberovehiclesdestroyedbyallNavyA-4s,

A-6s,andA-7combined.

DuringCommandoHuntIII,B-52sdeposited

380,000bombsontheLaotianlandscape,causing

tremendouslandslides,alteringthecourseorivers,

atteningmountains,andtransormingrugged

junglesintomoonscapes.Chemicaldeoliants

strippedhugeswathsorainorestbare.Yetdespite

thisdestructionandtechnologicalwizardry,the

numberoenemyantiaircratsitesactuallyincreased

duringthecampaignrom445sitesinNovember

1969to607inApril1970.AirForceChieoSta

MichaelRyanlamentedthathowevergreatthetoll

invehiclesonthetrail,trucksparkedondocksatHaiphongorsomeotherNorthVietnameseport

presentedaneasiertargetthanthoseskittering

underneathajunglecanopy.AdmiralUlysses

S.GrantSharp,CommanderinChie,Pacic

(CINCPAC),duringtheearliercampaigninLaos,

expressedsimilarconcerns:Althoughitcouldmost

certainlyslowdownNorthVietnameseinltration

intotheSouthbymakingtheirlinesocommunica-

tionlonger,itcouldnotstoptheowaltogether.

Tereweretoomanyotherlinesocommunicationavailable.Sharpinsteadrecommendedintensive

miningoHaiphongandotherminorportsalong

thecoastoNorthVietnamanideathatpolitical

authoritiesrejecteduntil1972.

RecognizingthattheLaotiancampaignwasa

loser,theNavybegantoslowlyscaledownits

commitmentstherein1970.Duringthecourseothe

campaign,theaveragenumberoCVAsontheline

atYankeeStationdroppedrom3.0to2.7andnally

2.0.TeNavyalsobegantoassignitsoldest,least

capableshipstotheeorttosaveitsmoremodern

shipsorotherColdWarcommitments.

TestoryotheShangri-La(CVS38)typied

theNavysdesiretodeployitsolderplatormsto

SoutheastAsiaater1968.Originallycommissioned

in1944,Shangri-Lareceivedtwomajoroverhauls

duringthecourseotheColdWarbutby1970su-

eredrommanyailmentsandidiosyncrasies.While

trainingoJacksonvilleoraVietnamdeploymentin

January1970,theshipsueredarethatkilledone

Sailorandinjuredtwo.InVietnam,oneoitspropel-

lershatsstoppedunctioning,compellingittoleave

thelineornearlyamonthorepairs.Fivedaysater

itsreturntoVietnam,on29July,itsueredasteering

casualtywith14oitsaircratairborne.Teaircrat

hadtodiverttoDanangtoland,andtheshipceased

launchingstrikesoranotherdaywhilerepairswere

made.Shangri-Lasmanytroubleshelpedreducethe

numberoNavystrikesortiesinLaosinJune1970to

just1,286.

AlmostassoonasShangri-La arrivedonstation

inMarch1970,demandorNavystrikeassetsbegan

toincrease.Duringthenighto31March1April,

SouthVietnamwitnessedsomeotheheaviest

ghtinginsixmonths.Communistorcesshelled

morethan150targets,includingthreeprovincial

capitals,andoverrantwoARVNoutposts.Athird

Shangri-La (CVS38),commissionedin1944,wasoneotheNavysoldestcarriersin1970.

Mk-36DestructorMine.Tesemagnetic-inuenceminesdetonatedwhentrucksdrovenearthem.

NHCLFile


20/88

14

carrier,America(CVA66),joined

Shangri-La andBon Homme

Richard(CVA31)inAprilto

augmentthecarrierpresenceinthe

Guloonkin,andtheninMay,a

ourth,Oriskany(CVA34),arrived

onstation.

On1May1970,U.S.andSouth

Vietnameseorceslaunchedathree-

prongedattackintoCambodian

borderregionsnorthwestoSaigon

thattheCommunistshadbeenusing

assanctuariesormanyyears.By4

May,thealliedoensivehadkilled

orcapturedover3,000NVAandVC

troops.Moresignicantly,itgained

much-neededtimeortheallies,

accordingtohistorianJamesH.

Willbanks.Communistorceswere

unabletolaunchsignicantattacks

romCambodiaintoSouthVietnam

ortwoyears.SeventhAirForce

ghter-bombersandB-52sprovided

mostothetacticalairsupportorthe

CambodianincursionwhileNavy

assetsbasedintheonkinGulocusedonLaos.

LieutenantJamesMcBride,anA-4piloton

Shangri-La,ewhisrstcombatmissionduringthistenseperiod.Temissionwasaour-planestrike

intheLaotianpanhandle,aruggedareadominated

byjunglesandsteepmountains.Hisightusedthe

NavycorridorjustbelowtheDMZtoenterLaos.

Bythetimetheightcrossedthebeach,theywere

spreadoutinacombatormationwiththeaircrat

200eetawayromeachother,scanningtheskiesor

hostileMiGs.OnceoverLaos,theleadplane,own

byLieutenantRayLodge,madecontactwithanAir

ForceFAC.TeFACinormedtheightthattherewasa

suspectedtruckstorageareabelowhimandthat

hewouldmarkitwithaWillyPetewhitephos-

phorusrocket.Whenitreactswithoxygen,white

phosphorusproduceslargeamountsosmokeand

toxicgarlic-smellingumes.AirForceFACplanes

usedwhitephosphorusthroughoutthewartomark

targetsduringdaylighthours.Becausevisibilitywas

goodonthe11th,Rayspottedthesmokeimmedi-

atelyandthenledtheightalongaridgeline,comingintowardsthetargetromthenorth.Lodgepickled

hisbombsorst.McBridethenmadearun,40

degreesromhisightpathsoasnottopresenta

goodtargetoranyantiaircratgunnerbelow.

Irolledtheplaneoveronitsletwing90degrees,

pointedthenosetoa45degreeangleodive,and

aimedthegreencircleothebombingsightslightly

downrombelowwhereRaysbombshadhit.With

a45-degreediveangleset,450knotsoairspeed

building,andmyaltimeterunwindinglikecrazy,myscanwentrapidlybetweenthebombsightandight

instruments.Atapproximatelythedesired7,000

eetoaltitude,Ipressedthebombreleasebutton

onthecontrolstickandeltmyloadodestruction

comeotheaircrat.Instantaneously,Ipulledback

onthesticktogetthedesired4gsoorcedeortto

climbquicklyoutodanger.WhenIlookedovermy

AnA-4SkyhawklaunchesromthedeckoShangri-La.

N H C L F i l e


21/88

shoulderatthetarget,Icouldseewherethebombs

hadhitandexploded.Myheadwentquicklyback

intothecockpittocheckmyinstrumentsandthen

outsideagaintoscanorRaysaircrat.

Assquadronpolicydictated,Raydroppedallohisordnanceontherstpassinordertominimize

hisexposureoverhostileterrain.

OncetheA-4shadmadetheirruns,theFAC

orbitedthetargetandinspectedtheresults.Much

tothepleasureotheNavypilots,hereportedseeing

secondaryres,agoodindicationthattheteamhad

hitsometrucks.Iteltgoodcomingbacktothe

Shang,Jimwroteinhisdiarythatevening.We

reachedourtarget,scoredgoodhits,andoundour

waybacktotheshipwithplentyotimetospare.Teentiremissionromstarttonishlastedonly

1.6hours.

BytheendoCommandoHuntIV(May

September1970),U.S.tacticalairactivityhad

diminishedtoanaverageo417sortiesperday.Poor

weatherandalackotargetscontributedtothis

decline,butthemainreasonoritwerecutbacks

orderedbytheJointChiesoSta.Frommid1970

tomid1971,theJCSauthorizedonly14,000ghter/

attacksortiespermonthinSoutheastAsia:10,000,

AirForce;2,700,Navy;and1,300,Marine.

PilotsotenoundinterdictioninLaostobeboring,butasroutineassomeothesemissions

became,dangerwasalwayspresent.During

CommandoHuntIII,enemygunnersscoredmore

than310hitsonU.S.aircratanddowned60.Many

moreaircratwerelostinaccidents.DuringtheBon

Homme Richards 1970cruise,Lieutenant(jg)Lloyd

G.Howie,FighterSquadron(VF)53syoungestpilot,

andCommanderDeanE.Kaiser,VF-53sseniorpilot

andskipper,diedinaccidents.

TesharpdeclineinU.S.airactivityduringtheJuly1970June1971periodspurredtheNorth

Vietnameseintoamassiveroadconstructioneort.

Bypasseswerebuiltaroundareashithardduring

CommandoHuntIII.TeVietnamesealsobuilt

newroads,bridges,andtransshipmentpointsin

NorthVietnamproper.OnetruckparkinHaiphong

heldover1,200vehicleswhileeightothersinthe

TeSkyhawk,orScooter,asitspilotsotencalledit,wasdesignedintheearly1950sbytheDouglasAircratCompanywiththreegoalsinmind:ithadtoyover500mph,carrya2,000-poundbombloadtoanytargetwithina460mileradius,andcostlessthan$1millionapiece.

N H C L F i l e


22/88

16

HanoiHaiphongareaheld5,000more.Battalion-

sizeconvoyso40to60truckswouldmoverom

theseareasdownthesystemoroadsinLaos.Area

bossesdirectedtheseconvoysthroughnumerous

bypassesandsubsegments,switchingroutesat

thelastpossiblemoment.Fromanairplane,allan

observercouldseeothiscomplexsystemwere

mainroads,notthemany,smallbypassroads

leadingintothejungleandbacktothemainroad.Withthisnewroadnetworkinplace,Seventh

AirForceplannersconcludedthattheNorth

Vietnamesewouldlaunchamajorresupply

eortortheirorcesintheRepublicoVietnam

duringthenextdryseason,thussettingthe

stageorCommandoHuntV.Tiscampaign

ocusedonsimilartypesotargetsasinearlier

campaignstrucks,roads,transshipmentpoints,

supplydumps,andrepairacilities.Teplan

allocated70percentothe14,000authorized

tacticalairsortiesorthatmonthtotheSteeliger

area.Tismassiveinvestmentoairpowercaused

enemytracintheSteeligerareatocometoa

virtualstandsti llduringtheday.Atnight,AC-130

andAC-119gunshipscameouttohammerthe

convoysonthemove,claimingover12,000vehiclesdestroyed60percentothe20,000vehicles

bombedduringthecampaign.

SeventhAirForceplannersclaimedthat

CommandoHuntVorcesprevented89percent

omaterialenteringLaosromarrivinginSouth

Vietnamandreducedtheenemysthroughputo

suppliestoaboutonethirdothepreviousdry

AnaerialphotographoantiaircratpositionsalongtheHoChiMinhrail.Tegunsaremarkedbyarrows(withinacircle)inthelowerrighthandsideotheimage.

N H C L F i l e

Hanoi-Haiphong


23/88

season.Duringthecampaign,F-77

pilotsotenewover200strikesortiesa

dayintoLaosandSouthVietnam.Ona

typicalday,thesepilotsmightmake30

roadcuts,causearoadslide,anddestroy

twotrucksplusanantiaircratgunsite.

Butstatisticsaloneailtotellthe

wholestoryothecampaign.Itwasnot

uncommonorpilotsandtheirsuperiors

toinateenemylosses.Itwasverydi-

cult,recalledGeneralWilliamMomyer,

theSeventhAirForcecommander,to

reachagoodbasisorassessmento

damagetotheenemytruckinventory,

especiallywhenclaimswereexceeding

thetotaltruckinventorybyaactoro

twoattimes.estsconductedinthe

UnitedStatesshowedthattruckshitby

munitionswererarelytotallydestroyed

unlesstheyburned.

ProblemsencounteredbytheSouth

VietnameseorcesintheLamSom719

operationoFebruaryMarch1971

underscoredtheshortcomingsothe

airinterdictioncampaigninLaos.Te

LamSom719operationwasdesigned

tocaptureechepone,theprimary

CommunisttransshipmenthubintheLaotianpanhandle.Itwasadirect

reactiontoamassiveNorthVietnamese

buildupinLaosthatoccurredinlate1970and

early1971atertheenemylostlogisticsbase

areasinCambodia.Duringthisperiod,theNorth

Vietnamesemovedtwentyairdeensebattalionsinto

Laosandovertwohundredlargercaliberguns(37-,

57-,85-,and100-mm).Over22,000combattroops

providedsecurityorthetrail,whichwasunneling

over6,000troopsamonthintoSouthVietnam.Alarmedthatthisbuildupposedadirectthreat

toQuangriProvinceinSouthVietnam,President

NixonandhisadvisorscameupwiththeLaos

invasionideaasameansocuttingtheenemys

logisticsjugular.SouthVietnamesetroopsinvaded

Laoson8February1971,buildingresupportbases

alongtheirinvasioncorridortoprovidesecurity

orthesustainedoensive.Althoughogandlow

overcastalongtheinvasionroutemadeitdicult

orAmericanairpowertosupporttheARVN

attack,theSouthVietnamesemadedecentprogress

upuntil11February,whenornoapparentreason

theystoppedattacking.Tispauseallowedthe

NVAtobringinreinorcements,includingheavy

122-and130-mmartilleryandtanks.AmericanadvisorsurgedtheSouthVietnamesecommander,

GeneralHoangXuanLam,tocommitmoretroops

andattempttodrawtheNorthVietnameseintoa

majorbattle;neveragain,theyargued,wouldSouth

Vietnamhavesomuchairpoweratitsdisposal.

Lam,earingexcessivecasualties,optedinstead

oratokenhelicopterassaultagainstchepone,

Bombsbeingbroughtuptotheightdeckjustbeoreastrike.AlliedaircratdroppednearlythreemilliontonsobombsonLaosrom1962to1973,maki

thatcountrythethirdmostbombedcountryinthehistoryowarare.


24/88

18

ollowedbyageneralARVNwithdrawalromLaos.

Intheend,onlyhalotheoriginalinvadingorceo

15,000madeitoutoLaosduringachaoticretreat.

Overall,U.S.tacticalaircratandB-52sewover

10,000sortiesinsupportoARVNduringLamSom

719,withtheNavyproviding130strikesortiesaday

duringthetwo-monthlongcampaign.

TeinterservicerivalrybetweentheAirForce

andNavyoversortiecountsotenovershadowedthesuperbcooperationbetweenAirForceandNavyat

thewarriorlevel.AirForcepilotsdependedonRed

CrownorsituationalawarenessaboutMiGsover

NorthVietnam,andNavypilots,inturn,depended

ontheAirForceseliteSARorceswhentheywere

shotdowndeepinenemyterritory.Testoryo

LieutenantBartonSheldonCreedtypiesthecom-

radeshipbetweenthetwoservices.On13March

1971,antiaircratreintheSteeligersection

oLaosdownedaRanger(CVA61)A-7ownbyCreedoVA-113.TeaircratcaughtreandCreed

ejected,breakinganarmandalegintheprocess.An

AirForceFACimmediatelyestablishedcommunica-

tionswiththepilot.Despitestrongevidenceo

enemytroopsinthearea,anearbyrescuehelicopter

decidedtorescueCreed.Tehelicopterhovered

overtheinjuredpilotandloweredaparajumper

(PJ)within30eetothegroundwhen

smallarmsrestartedhittingtheheli-

copter,injuringsomeothecrewand

orcingtheaircrattopullup.Creeds

lasttransmittalwas,Pickmeup,pick

meupnow!Teyarehere!

SARorceslaidreonthearea,

hopingtokilltheenemytroopsnear

Creed.Fourminuteslater,anotherheli-

copterwentinwhileasecondcovered

theoperation.Groundrestruckboth

aircrat,seriouslywoundingoneo

thecopilots.Neitherhelicoptermade

itbacktobase,butbothcrewswere

rescued.TeAirForcemadeathird

rescueattempt1520minuteslater,but

couldnotlocateCreed.Teytriedagain

aterdark,evensendingaPJdownina

junglepenetratortosearchorCreed

onoot,butheoundnosignothepilot.Tenext

morningtheoriginalFACwentbackandlookedagain.

TeFACoundCreedsparachutespreadoutonthe

groundabout500metersromtheoriginalejection

site.SincenoAmericanpilottryingtoevadecapture

wouldadvertisehispresenceinthismanner,theFAC

assumedthattheparachutewasadecoyandbroke

othesearch.DeenseDepartmentinvestigators

learnedaterthewarthatCreedprobablydiedromhisejectioninjuriessoonatertherstrescueattempt.

Overall,groundrestruckthreeAirForcehelicopters

duringtheoperationandwoundedeightcrewmen.

LamSom719onlytemporarilydislodgedthe

enemyslogisticsowsouth.AtertheARVNwith-

drawal,sensorsactuallydetectedmoresouthbound

traconthetrailthanbeorethecampaign.Despite

mountingevidencethatinterdictionwasailing,

plannersinWashingtoncontinuedtotakecomort

romstatisticalmeasuresosuccess.LateintheCommandoHuntVcampaign,PresidentNixon

metwithhistopmilitaryadvisorsinSanClemente,

Caliornia,todiscusstheissue.Tegroup,whose

membershipincludedrepresentativesromthe

services,theStateandDeensedepartments,the

NationalSecurityCouncil,andCIA,concludedthat

CommandoHuntwasindeedsuccessullystemming

AnA-7ECorsairIIlandingontheightdeckoRanger(CVA61),January1968.TeA-7provedahighlysuccessulattackaircratduringthenalyearsotheVietnamWar.ItcouldyuptoMach.94andeaturedasophis-

ticatedbombingcomputerandall-weathernavigationsystem.

NHCLFile


25/88

theowosuppliestoSouthVietnamand,inso

doing,helpingtoprotectVietnamizationandthe

ongoingwithdrawaloU.S.orcesromSouth

Vietnam.Tegrouprecommendedthattheeort

continue.Temajorobjectiveomanyothesepoli-

cymakerswastoendtheAmericaninvolvementin

Vietnambeorethenextpresidentialelectioncycle.

TeythereoretendedtoaccentuatepositivenewssuchasthenumberotrucksdestroyedinLaos.

Telastdryseasoninterdictioneortinsouthern

LaoswasCommandoHuntVII,aslightlysmaller

campaignthanCommandoHuntVintermso

sortiesownbutmoresophisticatedthananyo

itspredecessorsintermsotacticsandtechnology.

DuringPhaseI,B-52sandtacticalghtersdropped

14,000500-poundbombsand17,100750-pound

bombsprimarilyontheMuGiaandBanKarai

passes.Tisbombingdidlittletoaecttheowo

tracintoLaos.Atersomanyyearsobombing,

thesepassesnolongercontainedanyvegetation.

Bypassescouldeasilybeconstructedinthetreeless

environment,andcratersinroadscouldbequickly

lledwithsoilromothercraters.Lackovegetationalsomeantthattheseroadsdriedmorequicklyater

arainthanthosecoveredintropicalora.

PhaseIIinvolvedthecreationothreeblock-

ingbelts:oneeachnearchepone,BanBak,and

Chavane.Asintheoriginalsensorseedingeort,

U.S.Navyaircratprovidedmuchotheordnance

usedintheinterdictioneort.NavyA-7sseeded

OV-10Broncos.OV-10orwardaircontrollersewlowandslowoverthejungleinLaos,searchingortargets.Whentheyound

anenemyconvoy,theymarkeditwithsmokerocketsandcalledinNavyorAirForcestrikeplanestobombthetrucks.

NHCLFile


26/88

20

thebeltswithMk-36magnetic-

inuenceminesthatdetonated

whentrucksdrovenearthem.

F-4s,inturn,depositedwide-area

antipersonnelminestoprotect

theMk-36s.Temineeldsclosed

someblockingpointsorasmany

as41days,butothersproved

useless.TeNorthVietnamese

couldclearbeltsoantipersonnel

minesbyusingrocksattached

tostrings,andMk-36scouldbe

deusedbyhand.

Forbothphases,enemyair

deenseswereamuchmore

potentthreatthaninearliercam-

paigns.TeNorthVietnamese

redtheirrstsurace-to-air

missileinLaoson4March

1971romasite2.5mileswest

otheBanKaraiPass.On23

April,aSAMsitenearthesame

passclaimeditsrstU.S.plane

overLaos,anAirForceO-2.

DuringCommandoHuntVII(1

November197129March1972),

theNorthVietnamesebrought

eightSAMbattalionsintoSteeligerandincreasedtheir

antiaircratbatteriesrom345

to545guns.Teseimprovedair

deenseseectivelyputanendto

attacksbyslowermovingplanes

suchastheB-52,AC-119,and

AC-130intheSteeligerarea

oLaos.BeginninginDecember

1971,evenast-movingjetghters

neededmandatoryprotectionbyspecialhunter-killerSAMteams

calledIronHandights.Onthese

missions,A-4sorA-7sequipped

withShrikemissileshunted

SAMsitesbysearchingortheir

radaremissions.Whenaradar

signalwaspickedup,theShrike

ANorthVietnameseSA-2surace-to-airmissilesite.TeSA-2hadamaximumrangeoabout31miles,amaximumoperatingaltitudeo80,000eet,andspeedoMach3.5.Itusuallycarriedahighexplosivewarheado287pounds.Duringthecourseothewar,theNavydevelopedvariousmethodsordeeatingSAMs,includingdeensivemaneuvering,electroniccountermeasures,andhunter-killerteamsarmedwithantiradiationmissiles.

USAF94841

HoChiMinhrailpulverizedbybombs.

NHCLFile


27/88

wouldhomeinonthebeamtodestroytheradar.

TeseplanesalsocarriedMk-82500-poundbombs

oraquickvisualbackupdeliveryintheeventaSAM

litowasspotted.TeNavyotenchoseitsnest

pilotsortheIronHandmissionbecauseitrequired

tremendoussituationalawarenesstoythesemis-

sionseectively.IronHandpilotshadtobeintimately

amiliarnotonlywiththeirownsophisticated

weaponssystemsbutwithallintelligencerelatedto

SAMsitesintheirareaooperationsandtheight

tracksothestrikeaircrat.

Inadditiontoimprovingtheirairdeenses,the

NorthVietnamesealsobeganintereringwiththe

sensorstrings.Teyeventuallydiscoveredthat

aircratdroppingsensorsdovedierentlyrom

thoseonbombingmissions.Withthisinormation,

theybeganplottingandneutralizingvariousstrings.

Teyalsolearnedtothwartairborneelectricity

sensorssuchasBlackCrowbyshieldingignition

systemswithaluminumoilandcoveringengines

withmatsobananaandbambooleavestoblockhot

spotsrominraredsensors.

TethirdphaseoCommandoHuntVIInever

ullygototheground.On31March1972,the

NVAlaunchedamassivespringoensiveintoSouth

VietnamamovethatcausedtheSeventhAirForce

toabruptlyterminateCommandoHuntanddivert

allavailableairassetstothwartingthisoensive.Inpurenumericalterms,CommandoHuntVII,

likemostoitspredecessors,appearedtobeastun-

ningsuccess.TeSeventhAirForceclaimed4,727

trucksdestroyednotnearlyasmanyasthe11,009

claimedtohavebeendestroyedinCommandoHunt

V,butstillenoughtopreventanestimated84percent

othe30,947tonsosuppliesenteringLaosrom

reachingtheCommunistorcesinSouthVietnam.

However,evenwithamere5,024tonsosupplies,

alongwithsuppliesstockpiledduringtheearlierCommandoHuntcampaigns,theNorthVietnamese

werestillabletolaunchtheEasterOensive,acam-

paignthatnearlydeeatedtheRepublicoVietnam.

TroughouttheCommandoHuntcampaign,the

NorthVietnamesethwartedthemostsophisticated

Americantechnology.Teybuiltnewroadsto

bypasschokepointsandblockingpoints,employed

sapperstodiuseminesaswellassensors,and

protectedstrategicallyimportantmountainpasses

withantiaircratgunsandsurace-to-airmissiles.

Onceoverthemountains,theNorthVietnamese

movedsuppliesalonga12,000-milemazeoroads

andtrailsbarelyunderstoodbyAmericanintel-

ligenceocers.Blockingbeltsonlyservedtoslow

downtrac,notstopit,becausesomanybypasses

existedinthejunglesandorestsotheLaotian

panhandle.BytheendoCommandoHuntVII,

theVietnamesecouldalsomovesuppliesatnight

withnearimpunitybecauseenemyairdeenses

haddriventheAmericangunshipsandB-52srom

mostvitalareasotheSteeligernetwork.Between

1966and1971,U.S.intelligenceanalystsestimated

that630,000enemytroops,100,000tonsoood,

400,000weapons,and50,000tonsoammunition

madeitswayromNorthVietnamtoSouthVietnam

viatheHoChiMinhrail.

Whileultimateresponsibilityorthestrategic

ailureoCommandoHuntrestedwiththe

policymakersinWashington,whobelievedthat

aninterdictioncampaigninLaoscouldseriously

degradetheCommunistabilitytowagewarinSouth

Vietnam,boththeNavyandtheAirForcedeservea

certaindegreeoblameorsomeothecampaigns

tacticalshortcomings.Navyaircratewover

10,000sortiesorCommandoHuntVIIaloneandmanymoresortiesduringearliercampaigns.During

the1970Cambodianincursion,Navyaircratbore

muchothesortieburdenortheSteeligerregion.

Navyminingandacoustictechnologywaswidely

employedinCommandoHunt,andNavyaircrat

deployedalotothetechnology.Despitethisre-

powerandtechnology,thecampaignailedtoreduce

theowoCommunistsuppliesenoughtopreventa

majorNVAoensivein1972.

Initially,AdmiralSharpandotherNavyocersopposedinterdictioninLaosinavoroamore

concentratedminingeortdesignedtocloseallo

NorthVietnamsmajorports.Onceminingwas

rejected,however,theNavyagreedtodoitssharein

Laosandcontributelargenumbersosortiestowhat

hadbecomeAmericaslargestbombingcampaign

betweentheallo1968andthespring1972.


28/88

U.S.bombingzonesinNorthVietnam.StrictrulesoengagementstipulatedthatNavyaircratcouldonlybombtargetsinRoutePackages2through4and6Bormuchothewar.

ChrisRobinson


29/88

heNovember1968bombinghaltended

theRollingTundercampaignagainst

NorthVietnam,butitdidnotcompletely

haltallalliedairactivitythere.In1969

alone,theSeventhAirForceandaskForce77

conductedover5,000reconnaissancemissionsover

NorthVietnam,withtheNavyying40percento

them.Initially,Navyreconnaissanceplanesewthese

Bluereemissionsunescorted.On7November

1968,however,theNorthVietnameseredonan

RA-3BSkywarriorovercentralNorthVietnam,

promptingtheNavytobeginescortingtheseights

witharmedghters.Bytheendothemonth,29

Navyreconnaissanceaircrathaddrawnhostile

reoverNorthVietnamandantiaircratrenear

VinhdownedanRA-5CVigilanteon25November.

Duringthissameperiod,theAirForcelostan

RF-4andanF-4.Inretaliationortheselosses,U.S.

aircratbombedtheresponsibleantiaircratsites.

Inkeepingwiththespiritohispeaceoensive,

PresidentJohnsondidnotusetheattacksasa

justicationorresumingthebombingcampaign

againstNorthVietnam,buthedidauthorize

Americanplanestoretaliateishotatbyantiair-

cratsitesinNorthVietnam.InDecember,thelast

monthotheJohnsonpresidency,Hancock(CVA

19)A-4smadetwoseparateShrikeattacksonNorth

VietnameseSAMsites.Intherstinstance,which

occurredonthe14th,anA-4EIronHandpilotred

aShrikeatasiteaterhavingourSAMsredat

himandhiswingman.Inthesecondincident,two

A-4EsonaBluereeescortightredtwoShrikes

proTeCTive reaCTioN

AcamouagedRA-5CromReconnaissanceAttackSquadron13taxisonKitty Hawk(CVA63)whileoperatingintheSouthChinaSea,13April1966.Originallydevelopedinthelate1950sasaMach2carrier-basedattackplanecapableocarryingnuclearorconventionalordnancetotargetsupto3,000milesaway,theRA-5wasusedmainlyorphotographicreconnais-sanceotargetsinNorthVietnamandLaos.

N H C L F i l e


30/88

24

aterbeingilluminated

byaNorthVietnamese

SAMsiteradar.

Januaryusheredin

anewyearandanew

presidentwhowanted

totakeamoreaggres-

sivestancetowards

NorthVietnam.

Moderatememberso

theCabinet,however,

earingcriticismrom

thedomesticantiwar

movement,persuaded

Nixonnottolaunchan

immediatebombing

campaignagainst

NorthVietnam.

Instead,hesettledorasecretB-52bombingcam-

paignagainstCommunistsanctuariesthatbegan

inCambodiainMarch1969.Aewweeksintothe

campaign,theNew York imes exposedit,giving

theantiwarmovementsubstantialammunitionwith

whichtoattackthenewadministration.

NixonsSecretaryoDeense,MelvinR.Laird,

traveledtoSouthVietnaminMarch1969toperson-

allyassessthesituationthere.Lairdhadopposedthe

CambodianbombingsandurgedthePresidenttostayocusedonVietnamization.AormerRepublican

senatorromWisconsin,Lairdrecognizedthat

domesticsupportorthewarintheU.S.waswaning

andthatalong-termU.S.groundcommitment

tothewarwasnotpoliticallyeasible.Duringthe

visit,aNew York imesreporteraskedhimwhya

hundredAmericanMarineshadoccupiedsomehills

inLaosoraweek.Withoutconrmingordenying

theepisode,LairdsaidthatU.S.militarycommand-

ershadthepowertolaunchprotectivereactionmissionsinordertosaeguardtheirtroops.Shortly

thereater,thiscatchphrasewouldalsobeappliedto

airstrikesagainstantiaircratsitesinNorthVietnam.

Aspromulgatedon25November1968,therules

oengagement(ROE)allowedtheNavyandAir

Forcetosendescortedreconnaissanceightsas

arnorthasthe19thparallel,andiredupon,the

escortswereauthorizedtodestroytheseweapons,

installationsandimmediatesupportingacilities.

Americanpilots,however,becamemoreaggressive

overtime,occasionallyattackingsitesthatillumi-

natedthemwithradarseveninoshotswerered.

AterbeingpaintedbyaFansongradarnearVinh

on21April,twoA-4FsromBon Homme Richard

redtwoShrikemissilesatthesuspectedsite.Bythe

summero1969,asmanyasourAirForceghters

wouldorbitoversuspectedSAMsites,readyto

attackatamomentsnoticeiareconnaissanceight

wasthreatenedorattacked.

Duringonesuchmission,theNorthVietnamese

redtwoSAMsatapairoF-105WildWeasels(the

AirForceequivalentoanIronHand)neartheMu

GiaPasson28January1970.TeWeaselsdropped

12Mk-82bombsonthesite,whichwasonthe

NorthVietnamesesideothepass.OneWeaselthen

straedanothersitenearbybutwashitbyground

re,orcingthepilotandhiselectronicwarare

ocertoeject.TeAirForcethenattemptedto

rescuethecrewwithanHH-53JollyGreenGiant

helicopter.TeVietnamesereactedbylaunching

aMiG-21,pilotedbyVuNgocDinhothe921st

FighterRegiment.Dinh,whowouldendthewar

withsixconrmedkills,crossedovertheborderin

LaosandredasingleAtollheat-seekingmissileat

thehelicopter,killingitscrewosix.TeF-105crew(AirForceCaptainsRichardJ.MallonandRobertJ.

Panek)werecapturedbutneverreturnedaterthe

warandarenowpresumeddead.

TeHH-53shootdowninuriatedtheallies,but

therewaslittletheycoulddotoavengethekilling

giventheROEatthetime.MiGswouldoccasionally

ydownthesouthernpanhandleoNorthVietnam

toVinh,butavoidedanycontactwithAmerican

ghters.Inanattempttodisrupttheseights,Vice

AdmiralFredBardshar,CarrierDivision5com-mander,orderedaseriesolow-levelbarriercombat

airpatrols(BARCAPs).On27March,oneothese

patrolsalmostbaggedaloneMiGromthe921st

Regiment,buttheenemypilotspottedthetwoF-4Js

romConstellation(CVA64)andgotawaybeore

theycouldlineupashot.Tenextmorning,radar

controllersinHorne(DLG30)acquiredtwoMiGs

MelvinR.Laird,SecretaryoDeenserom1969to1973,wasakeypolicymakerduringthelatteryearsotheVietnamWar.

NHCLFile


31/88

headingtowardsVinhandimmediately

inormedConstellation,whichlaunched

twoF-4swithinveminutesothe

warning.

Oneotheplanes,crewedbyLieutenant

JerryBeauilierandhisradarinterceptocer

(RIO)Lieutenant(jg)SteveBarkley,expe-

riencedaradarailuresoonaterlaunch,

butHornesuccessullyvectoredthemto

twoMiGsairbornenearTanhHoa.We

gainedavisualataboutourmiles,recalled

Barkley,ajuniorRIOonhisrstWESPAC

cruise.Tewholethingendedinjusttwo

turns.TeMiGssplitatergainingsighto

theF-4sclosingattheirveoclocklow,and

oneredanAtollattheleadF-4,crewedby

CommanderPaulSpeerandhisRIOLieutenant(jg)

JohnCarter,butthemissilemissedbyawidemargin.

Beauilier,agraduateotherstopGunclass,then

splitagain,andthelowMiGreversed.Badmove,

explainedBarkley.TeyredtheirrstAIM-9Dat

lessthanonemilewithabouttendegreesothe

MiGstail.Fivesecondslaterareballeruptedin

thevicinityotheMiGstail.Beauilierthenreda

secondSidewinder.TelastviewwehadotheMiG

wasthatitwasinamesgoingdown,explained

Barkley.Beauilier,whoregrettedringthesecond

missile,laterconessedthattheMiGwasonreatertherstshot,butIwantedhimsobadlythatIshot

himagain.Terewasnowayhewasgoingtogetaway

romme.Followingtheshootdown,themoodon

boardConstellationwaseuphoric.Tiswastherst

Navy/USAF/USMCMiGkillsincethe1968bombing

halt.TeNavysnextkillwouldnotcomeuntil19

January1972.

AMiG-21.BuiltbytheMikoyan-GurevichdesignbureauintheSovietUnion,theMiG-21wasthemostadvancedghtereldedbytheNorthVietnamese.Pilotsotheseplanespreerredhit-and-run,slashingattackstodogghts.Teyreliedontheirsupersonicspeedandtheskillotheirground-controlinterceptoperatorstodirectthemquicklytoatargetandthenhelpthemescaperomtheirpursuers.

AnF-4JlandsonConstellation(CVA64),29July1974.TeF-4wasoriginallydesignedasaeetdeenseghterbutwasutilizedextensivelyinVietnamasabomberaswell.ItcouldachievespeedsinexcessoMach2andcarryupto18,650poundsoordnance,includingair-to-airmissilesandlaser-guidedbombs.Itspowerulpulse-dopplerradarwasasupremetechnologicalbreakthroughatthetime.Itcouldidentiytargetswellbeyondvisualrangeanddirectradar-guidedSparrowmissilesatMiGsupto12milesaway.

N H C L F i l e


32/88

26

Renewedinterestinprotectivereactioncame

duringthespringo1970astheNixonadministra-

tionbeganplanningortheCambodianincursion.

PresidentNixonknewthattheinvasionwouldcause

anuproaronCapitalHillandthoughtitmightbe

prudenttogothewholewayandresumebombing

NorthVietnamaswell.HenryKissinger,hisnationalsecurityadvisor,dissuadedhim,arguingthatthey

hadaullplatealready.Instead,theadministration

optedoralimitedattackagainstlogisticstargetsin

thepanhandleoNorthVietnamjustnorthothe

DMZandthenearthemainpassesintoLaos.

Teour-dayattacktookplaceduringthesame

periodastheinitialthrustsintoCambodia:14

May.SeventhAirForceplanesstrucktargetsalong

mainsupplyroadsleadingintoLaoson12May.

F-77aircratjoinedtheeorton34May,striking

supplytargetsinNorthVietnaminthevicinityo

theMuGiaandBanKaraipasses.Inall,708Air

ForceandNavysortieswereownandtwoAir

Forceplaneswerelostintheeort(anF-4andRF-4).

AdmiralJohnS.McCainJr.,CINCPACatthetime,

believedthatthestrikeswerethemostsuccessulto

dateagainsttheNorthVietnameselogisticssystem.

Teenemyhadbeencaughtbysurprise

atatimeogreatconusionoccasioned

bytheCambodianinvasion,andinthe

middleoalastditchattempttopush

suppliessouthbeoretherainyseason.

Teattacksdestroyedbetween10,000

and50,000tonsosuppliesconcentrated

alongthecorridorsleadingintoLaos.

Teselosses,alongwiththeattackson

theCambodianbaseareas,hadasigni-

cantimpactonNorthVietnamsability

toconductoperationsinSouthVietnam.

AlthoughtheCambodianincursion

andtheshootingoourstudentsby

NationalGuardsmenatKentState

Universityon4Mayovershadowedthe

airoensiveinthepanhandleoNorth

Vietnam,thepresseventuallycaught

windotheattacksanddemanded

answers.TeadministrationusedLairds

catchphrase,protectivereaction,to

justiytheattacks,eventhoughLairdwasinthe

proverbialdoghouseatthetimeorspeakingout

againsttheCambodiaattacks.

Byall1970,U.S.reconnaissanceightsbegan

compilingevidenceoanotherlogisticsandair

deensebuildupinsouthernNorthVietnam.Photos

romtheseightsindicatedashitoantiaircratartillery(AAA)concentrationsromthecoastal

areasoNorthVietnamtotheroadsandpasses

leadingintoLaos.Tisintelligencealsorevealedthat

theNorthVietnamesehaddeployed12SAMbattal-

ionssouthothe20thparallel.odestroythesenew

deenses,AdmiralTomasH.Moorer,Chairmano

theJointChiesoSta,requestedauthorityrom

theSecretaryoDeenseoraprotectivereaction

strikebelowthe20thparallel.Lairdrejectedthe

proposal,claimingthatsucharaidmightdamageNixonspeaceeorts.

On13November,theNorthVietnamesedowned

anAirForceRF-4CneartheMuGiaPass.Tenext

day,AdmiralMcCainrequestedanimmediate

protectivereactionstrikeagainstairdeensetargets

inNorthVietnamsouthothe20thparallel.Tis

requestarrivedatthesametimethatMoorerwas

AdmiralJohnS.McCainJr.arrivesontheightdeckoKitty Hawkandis

metbyViceAdmiralFredericA.Bardshar,CommanderaskForce77,5January1970.McCainservedasCommanderinChie,Pacicrom1968to1972.

NHCLFile


33/88

planningathree-daystrikeagainstsimilartargetsto

coincidewiththeSonayraid(anattempttorescue

alliedprisonersowarheldataprison23mileswest

oHanoi).FromtheCambodianexperienceearlier

thatyear,Nixonhadlearnedthathecoulddiuse

criticismbystagingmultiplepoliticallyunpopular

operationsatthesametime.Eveninailure,noted

AirForcehistorianWayneTompson,theSonay

raidcaughttheimaginationomanysucientlyto

bluntbarbsaimedatbombinginthepanhandle.

MoorerdelegatedplanningortheraidtoMcCain,

whodevisedatwo-daybombingoperationagainst

airdeensetargetsinNorthVietnamsoutho18

degrees,15minutesnorth.Testrikesoccurredon

21November.Onehourbeoretheattackbegan,the

UnitedStateslaunchedoneothemostdaringraids

initsmilitaryhistoryagainstSonayprison.Te

attackbeganwithadiversionaryeintbyA-6sying

inlowormationtowardsHaiphongtosimulatea

B-52raid.AirForceRF-4sdroppedaresoverHanoi,

andNavyandAirForcetacticalaircratsuppressed

enemyairdeenseswithShrikemissiles.According

tohistorianEarlilord,thesediversionarymoves

terriedtheNorthVietnameseradarcontrollers.

Oneevenannouncedthatanatomicbombhadbeen

droppedonHanoi.

Followingthisairdiversion,aU.S.ArmyRanger

teamledbyColonelArthurBullSimonsmistakenlylandedataNorthVietnamesesapperschoollocated

aquartermileromtheprison.Fityrangersengaged

theenemyinareghtbeorerealizingthatthey

wereattackingthewrongacility.Leavingscoreso

Vietnamesedead,buttakingnocasualtiesthem-

selves,theRangersremountedtheirhelicoptersand

arrivedatSonayjustsixminuteslater.Inthemean-

time,anotherHH-53helicopterhadcrash-landed

intheprison.Rangersrombothaircratsearched

thecamporPOWsbutoundnone.wenty-threeminuteslatertheywerebackintheairheadedto

Tailand.TeonlyAmericancasualtywasanAir

Forceightmechanicwhobrokehisanklewhenthe

HH-53hewasridingmadeanevasivemaneuverto

avoidanAtollmissileredbyaMiG.TeVietnamese

alsodownedanF-105WildWeasel,butitscrewwas

successullyrescued.Whiletheraidailedtorescue

anyPOWs,itdidcauseconsiderabledamagetoNorth

Vietnamesedeensesanddemonstratedtheprowess

oAmericasspecialwararecommunity.Italso

compelledtheauthoritiestomoveallprisonersto

ahanduloprisonsintheHanoiarea,givingthese

menmorecontactwithellowAmericansandboost-

ingmorale.

Tepressreportedtheraidasarenewedbombing

campaignagainstNorthVietnamandnotasarescue.

Weareconductinglimitedprotectionreactionair

strikesagainstmissileandantiaircratacilitiesin

NorthVietnamsouthothe19thparallel,Secretary

oDeenseLairdannouncedon21Novemberatrue

statementthatobscuredthemoresignicantactions

takingplaceoutsideoHanoi.TeFreedomBait

protectivereactionstrikestowhichhewasreerring

lastedonlysixhoursandcausedminimaldamage.A

totalo210Americanaircratparticipatedinthese

strikes,includingnavalairpowerromHancockand

Ranger,butpoorweathercausedbyatyphooncom-

pelledtheNavyandAirForcetorelyheavilyonradar

andLORAN(long-rangeradionavigation)bombing

duringtheraid,reducingtheaccuracyotheirbomb

deliveries.

Nevertheless,FreedomBait,alongwithSonay,

didrevealAmericasresolvetostrikeNorthVietnam

inecessary.Moreover,theexpectedhueandcry

romCongressoverFreedomBaitnevermaterial-ized,leadingAdmiralMoorertoconcludethat

therewaslittlepoliticalrisktoexpandingbombing

authoritiesintosouthernNorthVietnam.Iseeno

politicalrisksintheseauthorities,hesaid,which

arenotoutweighedbythecontinuingthreattoour

currentinterdictionandreconnaissanceoperations.

SecretaryLairddisagreedanddidnotapprove

Moorerssubsequentrequestorstandingauthority

tolaunchpreemptiveattackswithin19milesothe

DMZortheLaotianborder.LairdwantedtoavoidactionsthatmightendangerthePresidentspeace

initiativesorleadtomoreseriousviolationsothe

1968bombinghaltunderstandings.

During1971,AmericantrooplevelsinSouth

Vietnamdroppedrom335,794to158,119.Asthe

MilitaryAssistanceCommand,Vietnam(MACV)

historyputit,airpowerin1971literallytookupthe

continued on page 30


34/88

Admiral Moorer listens intently to a brieng at the U.S.

Navy River Patrol Force headquarters at Binh Thuy,

South Vietnam, 23 September 1969. Moorer served

as Chie o Naval Operations rom 1967 to 1970 and

Chairman o the Joint Chies o Sta rom 1970 to 1974.

THOMAS MOORER STANDS OUT as one o the ew

senior American military leaders who ought hard

with the political establishment over the conduct

o the Vietnam War. As Chairman o the JointChies o Sta rom July 1970 to July 1974, Moorer

constantly pushed or the authority to strike targets

in the Hanoi area with air power and mine Haiphong

harbor. President Nixon nally agreed to Moorers

proposals in the spring o 1972, and the war ended

eight months later on terms acceptable to the United

States. A hardliner and reactionary to some critics o

the war, Moorer is seen as patriot and a hero by many

veteranssomeone who, in the words o Deense

Secretary James Schlesinger, always put his coun-

trys interest beore anything else.

Born in Mount Willing, Alabama, in 1912, Moorer

graduated rom the U.S. Naval Academy in 1933,

completed aviator training in 1936, and then few a

variety o aircrat, including ghters, bombers, and

patrol planes. He also served on the carriers Langley

(AV 3), Lexington (CV 16), and Enterprise (CVAN 65).

Early in World War II, Japanese ghters attacked

his PBY-5 patrol plane during a reconnaissance

mission in the Southwest Pacic. Although wounded

in the thigh, Moorer landed his aircrat in the water

and got his crew o seven saely into a lie rat. A

Philippine merchant ship soon picked up the group

but was attacked by Japanese aircrat that same day.One o Moorers crew died in that attack, but Moorer

and the other survivors and many o the ships crew

managed to escape rom the vessel in a lieboat and

row to a nearby island. For his gallantry that day, the

Navy awarded Moorer a Purple Heart and a Silver

Star. He later received a Distinguished Flying Cross

or fying supplies into and evacuating wounded rom

Timor Island in October 1942.

Ater the war, Commander Moorer continued to

serve in both aviation and sta assignments and was

promoted to rear admiral in 1957. As a junior fag

ocer, Moorer worked as a strategic planner or theChie o Naval Operations. He commanded Carrier

Division 6 or 17 months in 1959 and 1960. In 1962,

Moorer received his third star and assumed command

o the U.S. Seventh Fleet. Two years later, the Navy

promoted him to ull admiral and appointed him

Commander in Chie, U.S. Pacic Fleet. In that posi-

tion, he commanded U.S. Navy orces in the Pacic

during the August 1964 Gul o Tonkin incident and

subsequent retaliatory strikes against North Vietnam.

Moorer took command o the Atlantic Fleet the ollow-

ing year, thus becoming the only ocer in the Navys

history to lead both feets.Vietnam once again became a major ocus or

Moorer when President Johnson appointed him Chie

o Naval Operations in June 1967. Privately, Moorer

opposed the land war in Vietnam or the simple

reason that we cannot aord to trade a high school

graduate or a North Vietnamese peasant. Once

committed to the endeavor, however, he argued that

the United States should ocus its eorts on the

source o Communist aggression in the region: North

Vietnam. Moorer advocated bombing Hanoi, the

enemys center o gravity, and mining North Vietnams

most important port acility, Haiphong. Moorerrejected the idea o limited war, instead avoring a

decisive application o orce and, with it, the possibil-

ity o compelling North Vietnam to end its aggression

in South Vietnam.

His arguments ell upon dea ears in the White

House, and over time, rustration set in. President

Johnsons bombing halt ollowing the 1968 Communist

Tet Oensive and then his ailure to retaliate against

AdmiralTomasHinmanMoorer

NHCLFile

28


35/88

North Korea ollowing the seizure o the intelligence-

gathering ship Pueblo (AGER 2) greatly concerned

Admiral Moorer, who was araid that America was

losing global credibility. He also worried about theNavys aging ships and inrastructure. In January

1969, he testied to Congress that 58 percent o the

feet was at least 20 years old, while only 1 percent

o Soviet navy ships were the same age. Finally, he

deeply disagreed with Secretary o Deense Robert

McNamaras habit o meddling in the selection and

assignment o fag ocers, which, Moorer argued, was

the purview o the Chie o Naval Operations.

On 2 July 1970, President Nixon appointed Admiral

Moorer as the seventh Chairman o the Joint Chies

o Sta. Moorer perceived Nixon as a kindred spirit,

someone willing to make hard choices and takesignicant risks to extricate America rom Vietnam.

Other members o the administration, however, oten

blocked his eorts to liberalize the rules o engage-

ment and resume the bombing campaign against North

Vietnam. In an attempt to counter these opponents

and gain an upper hand with the new President,

Moorer encouraged Charles Radord, a young yeoman

working or the National Security Council, to make

copies o pertinent White House policy documents or

him. When President Nixon ound out about Radords

spying in December 1971, he sent Attorney General

John Mitchell over to the Pentagon to let Moorer know

that we had the goods on him. Nixon, however,

retained Moorer as chairman because he valued him

as a ellow hardliner and a vital counterweight against

administration doves, especially Secretary o Deense

Melvin Laird.

The Communist Easter Oensive o 1972 nallygave Nixon the justication he needed to relax

bombing restrictions and turn up the heat against

North Vietnam. One o the rst moves he made

was to order the mining o Haiphong harbor, an

idea that Moorer and others in the Navy had been

advocating since the early 1960s. He also initiated

the Linebacker bombing raids against North Vietnam.

Both operations helped convince Hanoi to agree to a

peace settlement acceptable to the United States.

In addition to helping settle the Vietnam confict,

Moorer oversaw the transition o the U.S. armed

services rom a conscript-based military to an all-volunteer orce. He also managed deep cuts in the

deense budget. While he did not always prevail in

Washingtons bureaucratic battles, Moorer managed

the services with great strength and condence

during a deeply divided period in the nations history.

Appointed to a second term as JCS Chairman by

President Nixon, Admiral Moorer retired in July 1974.

He died on 5 February 2004.

Admiral Moorer examines a .50-caliber machine gun

at Binh Thuy, August 1969.

NHCLFile

Admiral Moorer and President Nixon

observe fight operations onSaratoga

(CVA 60), 17 May 1969. The two men

developed a close rapport because o their

similar views on American oreign policy,

especially as it related to North Vietnam.


36/88

30

slackinUSoensivepower.Consequently,CINPAC

andtheJointChiesoStawereevenmorecon-

cernedaboutNorthVietnameseairdeensesnearthe

inltrationroutesintoLaosandSouthVietnam.Te

SecretaryoDeense,however,continuedtostrictly

limittheprotectivereactioneortagainstthese

targets.InJanuary,AdmiralMoorer,inanassessment

tothesecretary,statedthatenemySAMsitesin

NorthVietnamhadorcedtheU.S.todivertsigni-

cantnumbersoghteraircratromtheinterdic-

tioneorttoprotectB-52soperatinginLaosnear

theborderoNorthVietnam.Lairdnallyrelenteda

bitandallowedMoorertoexecuteextensivestrikes

againstSAMsitesinNorthVietnamon20,21,and28

February.Sixty-sevensortiesdestroyedthreemissiles

andavarietyotransportersandlaunchersinan

operationcalledLouisvilleSlugger.

However,hedidnotgiveMoorercarteblanche

authoritytostriketheNorthVietnameseanytime

hepleased.Arguingthatlimited,singlestrikereac-

tionsgavetheenemyadistinctadvantage,Moorer

persistedinpressingorcontinuousauthorities,

butLairdheldhisground,statingthatsuchauthor-

itywouldbeinappropriateoratleastpremature.

Hedidauthorizeanotherlargesingle-strikeeort

againstairdeensesintheNorthVietnamesepan-

handlecalledFractureCrossAlpha.Teoperation

destroyedeightSAMsandavarietyobuildingsand

otherinrastructure.

InadditiontoSAMs,MiGactivityincreasedin

southernNorthVietnamduring1971.InNovember,

reconnaissancerevealedmoreMiGdeploymentsto

severalaireldsinlowerNorthVietnam.Tisthreat

spurredMoorertorequestanattackagainstour

NorthVietnameseairbasesbelowthe20thparallel.

TelossotwoAirForceplanestoSAMsinearly

Decemberlenturgencytohispleasandpersuaded

LairdtoorderProudDeepAlpha,thelargeststrike

CarrierHancock(CVA19)intheGuloonkin,10April1971.

N H C L F i l e

AHancockSailortakesashortbreak

whileawaitingthereturnotheshipsaircrat,April1967.Whileonpatrol,crewmenotenworkedeighthourson,eighthourso,anddeploymentscouldlastsixmonthsorlonger.

N H C L F i l e


37/88

againstNorthVietnamsincethebombinghalt.

Over200AirForceandNavyplanesstrucktargets

ascloseas75milesromHanoi.Poorweatherover

thetargetarea,however,compelledtheNavytorely

onradar-equippedA-6AsystemsbackedbyA-7E

pathnderstodeliverordnance,whiletheAirForce

reliedonLORANbombing.Neithermethodologyproducedgoodresults.Basedonbombdamage

assessmentphotography,theAirForceestimated

thatonly25percentothebombsdroppedhitany-

whereneartheirtargets.TeNavyalsolostseveral

aircrat.InanattackonVinh,enemySAMsdowned

anA-6AromConstellation andanF-4BromCoral

Sea(CVA43).ASARhelorescuedthebombardier

navigatorotheA-6,buttheremainingcrewmen

werekilledorcaptured.

Inadditiontoemployingaviationassets,theNavyoccasionallyusedsuraceshipsagainsttheNorth

VietnameseMiGsandSAMsites.Guidedmissile

destroyersandcruiserspossessedexcellenttracking

radarsandtypicallycarriedtwotypesosurace-

to-airmissileseectiveagainstMiGghters:the

errierandthealos.TeerrierwastheNavysrst

operationalmedium-range,surace-to-airmissile.

Firstdeployedin1956,this27-oot-longmissilehad

arangeo19.8milesandwasguidedbyship-based

radar.Te31-oot-longalosmissilewasalonger

range,radar-guidedmissilethatcouldhittargetsas

aras65milesromaship.On11January,Fox (DLG

33)redtwoerriermissilesataMiG-21heading

northnearVinh,butmissed.Tiswastherstsuchmissileringbyasuracecombatantsince1968,

whenaalosromLong Beach(CGN9)downeda

MiGatarangeo59miles.

HopingtogetNavysuracecombatantsmore

involvedintheairwar,AdmiralMoorerdeviseda

planthatinvolvedusingalos-anderrier-equipped

suraceshipsintheGuloonkintocreateaSAM

environmentinwhichtolureanddestroyhostile

MiGsastheyproceededbelow20degreesnorth.

AtersecuringpermissionromLaird,Moorerexe-cutedhisplanbetween29Januaryand5February.

TeNavyailedtobaganyMiGs,butitdid

intimidateNorthVietnameseradaroperators.On3

February,Chicago (CG11)redaalosatanenemy

groundradarsitenearTanhHoa,andOklahoma

City(CLG5)launchedasimilarattackatasitenear

Vinh.Follow