Transpo Digests 1.1

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Transportation Law | Atty. Golangco | 2015-2016 | 2J

NEGROS NAVIGATION v. CA

G.R. No. 110398, November 7, 1997

Related doctrines from the full text:

Civil Law; Negligence; Court finds that Capt. Santisteban and the crew of the M/V Don Juan failed to

take steps to prevent the collision or at least delay the sinking of the ship and supervise the abandoningof the ship. — In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to exercise the extraordinary diligencerequired of it in the carriage of passengers, both the trial court and the appellate court relied on the findings ofthis Court in Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court , which case was brought for the death of other

passengers. In that case it was found that although the proximate cause of the mishap was the negligence of thecrew of the M/T Tacloban City, the crew of the Don Juan was equally negligent as it found that the latter‘smaster, Capt. Rogelio Santisteban, was playing mahjong at the time of collision, and the officer on watch,Senior Third Mate Rogelio De Vera, admitted that he failed to call the attention of Santisteban to the imminentdanger facing them. This Court found that Capt. Santisteban and the crew of the M/V Don Juan failed to takesteps to prevent the collision or at least delay the sinking of the ship and supervise the abandoning of the ship.

Same; Same; Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by the Court’s policy of maintaining stability in jurisprudence in accordance with the legal maxim ―stare decisis et non quieta movere.‖ — Adherence to

the Mecenas case is dictated by this Court‘s policy of maintaining stability in jurisprudence in accordance withthe legal maxim ― stare decisis et non quieta movere‖ (Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has beensettled.) Where, as in this case, the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by partiessimilarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a

bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.

Same; Same; A shipowner may be held liable for injuries to passengers notwithstanding the exclusively

real and hypothecary nature of maritime law if fault can be attributed to the shipowner. — The next issueis whether petitioner is liable to pay damages notwithstanding the total loss of its ship. The issue is not one offirst impression. The rule is wellentrenched in our jurisprudence that a shipowner may be held liable forinjuries to passengers notwithstanding the exclusively real and hypothecary nature of maritime law if fault can

be attributed to the shipowner.

CRESCENT PETROLEUM v. M/V LOK MAHESHWARIG.R. No. 155014 November 11, 2005

FACTS: Respondent M/V "Lok Maheshwari" (Vessel) is an oceangoing vessel of Indian registry that is owned byrespondent Shipping Corporation of India (SCI), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Indiaand principally owned by the Government of India. It was time-chartered by respondent SCI to Halla MerchantMarine Co. Ltd. (Halla), a South Korean company. Halla, in turn, sub-chartered the Vessel through a timecharter to Transmar Shipping, Inc. (Transmar). Transmar further sub-chartered the Vessel to Portserv Limited(Portserv). Both Transmar and Portserv are corporations organized and existing under the laws of Canada.

On or about November 1, 1995, Portserv requested petitioner Crescent Petroleum, Ltd. (Crescent), acorporation organized and existing under the laws of Canada that is engaged in the business of selling

petroleum and oil products for the use and operation of oceangoing vessels, to deliver marine fuel oils (bunkerfuels) to the Vessel. Petitioner Crescent granted and confirmed the request through an advice via facsimiledated November 2, 1995. As security for the payment of the bunker fuels and related services, petitionerCrescent received two (2) checks in the amounts of US$100,000.00 and US$200,000.00. Thus, petitionerCrescent contracted with its supplier, Marine Petrobulk Limited (Marine Petrobulk), another Canadiancorporation, for the physical delivery of the bunker fuels to the Vessel.




On or about November 4, 1995, Marine Petrobulk delivered the bunker fuels amounting to US$103,544inclusive of barging and demurrage charges to the Vessel at the port of Pioneer Grain, Vancouver, Canada.The Chief Engineer Officer of the Vessel duly acknowledged and received the delivery receipt. MarinePetrobulk issued an invoice to petitioner Crescent for the US$101,400.00 worth of the bunker fuels. PetitionerCrescent issued a check for the same amount in favor of Marine Petrobulk, which check was duly encashed.

Having paid Marine Petrobulk, petitioner Crescent issued a revised invoice dated November 21, 1995 to"Portserv Limited, and/or the Master, and/or Owners, and/or Operators, and/or Charterers of M/V ‗LokMaheshwari‘" in the amount of US$103,544.00 with instruction to remit the amount on or before December 1,1995. The period lapsed and several demands were made but no payment was received. Also, the checksissued to petitioner Crescent as security for the payment of the bunker fuels were dishonored for insufficiencyof funds. As a consequence, petitioner Crescent incurred additional expenses of US$8,572.61 for interest,tracking fees, and legal fees.

On May 2, 1996, while the Vessel was docked at the port of Cebu City, petitioner Crescent instituted beforethe RTC of Cebu City an action "for a sum of money with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of

preliminary attachment" against respondents Vessel and SCI, Portserv and/or Transmar.

On May 3, 1996, the trial court issued a writ of attachment against the Vessel with bond at P2,710,000.00.Petitioner Crescent withdrew its prayer for a temporary restraining order and posted the required bond.

On May 18, 1996, summonses were served to respondents Vessel and SCI, and Portserv and/or Transmarthrough the Master of the Vessel. On May 28, 1996, respondents Vessel and SCI, through Pioneer Insuranceand Surety Corporation (Pioneer), filed an urgent ex- parte motion to approve Pioneer‘s letter of undertaking, toconsider it as counter-bond and to discharge the attachment. On May 29, 1996, the trial court granted themotion; thus, the letter of undertaking was approved as counter-bond to discharge the attachment.

ISSUE: Whether the Philippine court has or will exercise jurisdiction and entitled to maritime lien under our laws onforeign vessel docked on Philippine port and supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign port?

RULING: In a suit to establish and enforce a maritime lien for supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign port, whethersuch lien exists, or whether the court has or will exercise jurisdiction, depends on the law of the country wherethe supplies were furnished, which must be pleaded and proved.

The Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis trilogy of cases, which replaced such single-factor methodologies as the lawof the place of supply. The multiple-contact test to determine, in the absence of a specific Congressionaldirective as to the statute‘s reach, which jurisdiction‘s law should be ap plied. The following factors wereconsidered: (1) place of the wrongful act; (2) law of the flag; (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4)allegiance of the defendant shipowner; (5) place of contract; (6) inaccessibility of foreign forum; and (7) law ofthe forum. This is applicable not only to personal injury claims arising under the Jones Act but to all mattersarising under maritime law in general.

The Court cannot sustain petitioner Crescent‘s insistence on the application of P.D. No. 1521 or the ShipMortgage Decree of 1978 and hold that a maritime lien exists. Out of the seven basic factors listed in the caseof Lauritzen, Philippine law only falls under one – the law of the forum. All other elements are foreign – Canada is the place of the wrongful act, of the allegiance or domicile of the injured and the place of contract;India is the law of the flag and the allegiance of the defendant shipowner. Applying P.D. No. 1521,a maritimelien exists would not promote the public policy behind the enactment of the law to develop the domesticshipping industry. Opening up our courts to foreign suppliers by granting them a maritime lien under our lawseven if they are not entitled to a maritime lien under their laws will encourage forum shopping. In light of the




interests of the various foreign elements involved, it is clear that Canada has the most significant interest inthis dispute. The injured party is a Canadian corporation, the sub-charterer which placed the orders for thesupplies is also Canadian, the entity which physically delivered the bunker fuels is in Canada, the place ofcontracting and negotiation is in Canada, and the supplies were delivered in Canada.

PNB v. CA337 SCRA 381 (Aug. 8, 2000)

FACTS:To finance the acquisition of 7 shipping vessels, the Philippine International Shipping Corporation (PISC)applied for and was granted by National Investment Development Corporation (NIDC) guarantyaccomodations. As security for these guaranty accomodations, PISC executed chattel mortgages on the vesselsto be acquired by it. Meanwhile, PISC entered into a contract with Hong Kong United Dockyards, Ltd. for therepair and conversion of one of the vessels, M/V Asean Liberty. The Central Bank of the Phils. authorizedPISC to open with China Banking Corporation (CBC) a standby letter of credit for US$545,000 in favor ofCitibank, N.A. to cover the repair and partial conversion of the vessel M/V Asean Liberty. PISC executed anApplication and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit for US$545,000 with CBC in favor of Citibank.

CBC then issued its Irrevocable Standby Letter of Credit for US$545,000 in favor of Citibank for the accountof PISC. PISC executed a promissory note for US$545,000 in favor of Citibank pursuant to the LoanAgreement between PISC and Citibank. Upon failure of PISC to fulfill its obligations, Citibank sent CBC aletter drawing on the Letter of Credit. CBC then instructed its correspondent Irving Trust Co. to pay toCitibank the amount of US$242,225. Subsequently, for failure of PISC to settle its obligations under theguaranty accommodations, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) conducted an auction sale of the mortgagedvessels. NIDC emerged as the highest bidder in these auctions. PISC, claiming that the foreclosure sale of itsmortgaged vessels was illegal and irregular, instituted a civil case for the annulment of the foreclosure andauction sale. CBC filed a complaint in intervention for recovery upon a maritime lien against the proceeds ofthe sale of the foreclosed vessels.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CBC‘s claim as evidenced by its Irrevocable Letter of Credit is in the nature of a maritime lienunder the provisions of P.D. No. 1521; and if so, whether or not said maritime lien is preferred over themortgage lien of PNB/NIDC on the foreclosed vessel M/V Asean Liberty

HELD:Under the provisions of P.D. No. 1521, any person furnishing repairs, supplies, or other necessities to a vesselon credit will have a maritime lien. Such maritime lien, if it arose prior to the recording of a preferredmortgage lien, shall have priority over the said mortgage lien. In this case, it was Hongkong UnitedDockyards, Ltd. which originally possessed a maritime lien over the vessel M/V Asean Liberty by virtue of itsrepair of the said vessel on credit. CBC, however, stands as guarantor of the loan extended by Citibank toPISC. It was Citibank which advanced the money to PISC. It was only upon the failure of PISC to fulfill itsobligations under its promissory note to Citibank that CBC was called upon by Citibank to exercise its dutiesunder the Standby Letter of Credit. The applicable law, which is the Shipping Mortgage Decree of 1978, was

patterned closely after the U.S. Ship Mortgage Act of 1920. Being of foreign origin, the provisions of the ShipMortgage Decree of 1978 may thus be construed with the aid of foreign jurisprudence. Under American

jurisprudence, ―furnishing money to a master in good faith to obtain repairs or supplies or to remove liens, inorder to forward the voyage of the vessel, raises a lien just as though the things for which money was obtainedto pay for had been furnished by the lender‖. This is in accord with Art5. 1302 of the Civil Code which

provides that there is legal subrogation ―when a third person, not interested in the fulfillment of the obligation, pays with the express or tacit approval of the debtor‖. In this case, the amount for the repair of vessel M/VAsean Liberty was advanced by Citibank and was used for the purpose of paying off the original maritimelienor, Hongkong United Dockyards, Ltd. As a person not interested in the fulfillment of the obligation




between PISC and Hongkong United Dockyards, Ltd., Citibank was subrogated to the rights of HongkongUnited Dockyards, Ltd. as maritime lienor over the vessel. CBC, as guarantor, was itself subrogated to all therights of Citibank as against PISC, the latter‘s debtor. Art. 2067 of the civil Code provides that ―the guarantorwho pays is subrogated by virtue thereof to all the rights which the creditor had against the debtor‖.

When CBC honored its contract of guaranty with Citibank on March 30, 1983, it also acquired by subrogation

the maritime lien over the vessel which attached to it on March 12, 1979 in favor of Hongkong UnitedDrydocks, Ltd. The maritime lien of CBC thus arose prior to the recording of PNB/NIDC‘s mortgage onSeptember 25, 1979. As such, the said maritime lien has priority over the said mortgage lien.

YU CON v. IPIL Araullo (1916)

FACTS

Respondent, Yu Con, chartered the banca ―Maria‖ – owned by petitioner Narciso Lauron withGilcerio Ipil as its master and Juto Solamo as it supercargo – to transport certain merchandise and moneyfrom the port of Cebu to Catmon.

Yu Con loaded the merchandise and delivered the money, placed in a trunk, to Ipil and Solamo.

Allegedly because there was no more room for Yu Con‘s trunk, Ipil and Solamo transferred the money totheir own trunk in the stateroom.

Before the ship could sail, the trunk and the money placed therein disappeared.

ISSUES/HELD

Are the petitioners liable for the loss? – YES.

RATIONALE

It is therefore beyond all doubt that the loss of the money occurred through the manifest fault and

negligence of Ipil and Solamo.o

They failed to take the necessary precautions in order that the stateroom containing the trunk in which

they kept the money should be properly guarded by members of the crew and they also did notexpressly station some person inside the stateroom for the guarding and safe-keeping of the trunk.

o All of these circumstances, together with that of its having been impossible to know who took the trunk andthe money, make the conduct of Ipil, Solamo, and the other crew members eminently supicious and preventour holding that the disappearance or loss of the money was due to a fortuitous event, to force majeure.

Ipil and Solamo were depositaries of the sum in question and, having failed to exercise the diligencerequired by the nature of the obligation of safe-keeping assumed by them and by the circumstances of thetime and the place, it is evident that they are liable for its loss or misplacement and must restore it.

With respect to Lauron, he is also liable in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Commerce in force because, as the proprietor and owner of the vessel who executed a contract of carriage with Yu Con, thereoccurred the loss, theft, or robbery of the P450 that belonged to Yu Con through the negligence of Ipil andSolamo and which theft does not appear to have been committed by a person not belonging to the craft.

The old Code of Commerce absolved the shipowner from liability for the negligence of the captain

and its crew but, in the light of the principles of modern law, this doctrine on the non-liability of the

shipowner for the unlawful acts, crimes or quasi crimes, committed by the captain and the crew can

no longer be maintained in its absolute and categorical terms.o In maritime commerce, the shippers and passengers in making contracts with the captain do so through the

confidence they have in the shipowner who appointed him; they presume that the owner made a mostcareful investigation before appointing him, and, above all, they themselves are unable to make such aninvestigation, and even though they should do so, they could not obtain complete security, inasmuch as theshipowner can, whenever he sees fit, appoint another captain instead.

Thus, it is only proper that the shipowner should be made liable.




WING KEE COMPRADORING v. BARK ―MONONGAHELA‖ G.R. No. L-19540, January 29, 1923

FACTS

Wing Kee Compradoring Company furnished various supplies to Bark Monongahela. Most of the bills forthese goods are made out against the ―Admiral Line, S.S. Monongahela.‖ All are countersigned by themaster and the first steward

Wing Kee Compradoring Company was looking to the Admiral Line for payment

from the documents where the requisitions are made out, it can be deduced that the Admiral Line was theoperating agent for the Monongahela and was responsible as such until the agency was terminatedo Ex. The forms have the heading ―The Admiral Line.‖ Then follows Manila, the date, and the name,

―Wing Kee Compradoring Co.‖ Next is the order ―Please deliver to S.S. Monongahela now lying atBay, the following goods and send bills to Admiral Line.‖

Later, the following appeared in Manila Bulletin: ―Notice- Bark Monongahela- The undersigned herebygive notice that they are not responsible in any manner for any indebtedness incurred by BarkMonongahela, its Master and/or Crew- The Admiral Line.‖

ISSUE: WoN The Admiral Line is liable to Wing Kee Compradoring as the agent of by Bark Monongahela? YES

RATIO:

Under Art. 586 of the Code of Commerce, ―The owner of a vessel and the agent shall be civilly liable

for the acts of the captain and for the obligations contracted by the latter to repair, equip, andprovision the vessel…‖ ―By agent is understood the person intrusted with the provisioning of a vessel orwho represents her in the port in which she happens to be.‖

It has also been held in common law that when the agents buy in their own names, but really for theaccount of their principal, the seller has an option to look to either for payment, unless (1) he trusted theagent exclusively; or (2) by the usage and understanding of the business, the agent is only held; or (3) thespecial circumstances show that only the agent was intended to be bound and the seller knew it or waschargeable with knowledge of it.

In this case, it must be noted that Wing Kee Compradoring has not followed out its allegation that it has aclaim against the Bark Monongahela. It has also not exerted effort to bring the owner of the bark into thecase and hasn‘t pushed the case against the captain. What Wing Kee Compradoring wants is for theAdmiral Line, as Bark Monongahela‘s agent, to pay the claim.

The argument that the agency has ceased and so action can‘t be brought against the Admiral Line is far -fetched. It‘s as if saying that every agent for a vessel could avoid responsibility pursuant to Art. 586 bygiving up its agency when threatened with suit to enforce the obligations of third parties. Moreover, the

bills were presented when Admiral Line was still agent.Thus, Admiral Line, as agent of Bark Monongahela is liable to Wing Kee Compradoring, during the periodwhen it was still its agent.

YU BIAO SONTUA v. OSSORIORomualdez (1922)

FACTS

On March 12, 1920, 2K cases of petroleum and 8,473 cases of gasoline were loaded in the motor boat Alfonso

o The loading was done without the permission from the customs authoritieso The cases were loaded by means of straps supporting 10-12 cases at a timeo The cases were placed in the hold of the ship, which is 14ft from the boiler of the main engine and

4ft from the boiler of the smaller engine




On March 13, the smaller engine was in operation preparatory to the departure

Subsequently, a fire broke out with an explosion on board Alfonso followed by a violent expulsion ofgasoline and petroleum

Due to the magnitude of the fire and the inflammability of the materials and the proximity of the steamerY. Sontua, the fire spread to the said steamer

Sontua brought this action to recover from Ossorio, the owner of Alfonso, alleging that the damages were

due to the negligence of the agents and employees of Ossorio Ossorio contended that the damages were caused by a fortuitous event and are not imputable to his or any

of his agents‘/employees‘/mandataries‘ negligence CFI ruled in favor of Sontua and held that:

o The explosion was due to the negligence of the persons in charge of Alfonso o Ossorio is liable for the negligence of his agents and employees

ISSUES/HELD

WoN the explosion was due to the negligence of the persons in charge of Alfonso? – YES.

WoN Ossorio, the owner of the motorboat, was liable for the negligence of his agents and employees? – YES.

RATIONALE

Issue #1

Expert testimony introduced by Sontua shows the explosion and fire, which caused the damages, areimputable to the negligence of the persons having charge of Alfonso at that time. It was shown that:o Due to the manner by which the cases were loaded, the cases would receive bumps resulting in

damage to the cans and consequent leakage (use of straps)o The gases formed by the volatilization are apt to accumulate in a compartment without sufficient

ventilation (hold of a ship)o This accumulation will cause the gases to ignite upon comin gin contact with a spark or upon

temperature being sufficiently raised (smaller engine was in operation)

Issue #2 The rule is that where the vessel is one of freight, a public concern or public utility, it owner or agent

is liable for the tortuous acts of his agents

The Code of Commerce further provides that the general liability of a vessel owner extends to losses byfire arising from other than a natural or other excepted cause, whether occurring on the ship, orcommunicated from other vessel, or from the shore. This means that losses by fire are not within the

exceptions (act of God or peril of the sea except by local custom) UNLESS proximately caused by

one of the exceptions Re: allegation that obligations under Art. 612 of the Code of Commerce are inherent in the master, the SC

said that although such duties are inherent to the master, it does not

FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY v. CAG.R. No. 130068. October 1, 1998 // G.R. No. 130150. October 1, 1998

Related doctrines from the full text:

Admiralty; Maritime Law; Ships and Shipping; Torts; In American jurisprudence, there is a

presumption of fault against a moving vessel that strikes a stationary object such as a dock or

navigational aid. — We start our discussion of the successive issues bearing in mind the evidentiary rule inAmerican jurisprudence that there is a presumption of fault against a moving vessel that strikes a stationaryobject such as a dock or navigational aid. In admiralty, this presumption does more than merely require theship to go forward and produce some evidence on the presumptive matter. The moving vessel must show thatit was without fault or that the collision was occasioned by the fault of the stationary object or was the result of




inevitable accident. It has been held that such vessel must exhaust every reasonable possibility which thecircumstances admit and show that in each, they did all that reasonable care required. In the absence ofsufficient proof in rebuttal, the presumption of fault attaches to a moving vessel which collides with a fixedobject and makes a prima facie case of fault against the vessel. Logic and experience support this presumption.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Pilots; Words and Phrases; ―Pilot,‖ Defined. — A pilot, in maritime law, is a

person duly qualified, and licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or in certain waters. In a broadsense, the term ―pilot‖ includes both (1) those whose duty it is to guide vessels into or out of ports, or in

particular waters and (2) those entrusted with the navigation of vessels on the high seas. However, the term―pilot‖ is more generally understood as a person taken on board at a particular place for the purpose ofconducting a ship through a river, road or channel, or from a port.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Under English and American authorities, generally speaking, the pilot

supersedes the master for the time being in the command and navigation of the ship, and his ordersmust be obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation. — Under English and American authorities,generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the command and navigation of theship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation. He becomes the master prohac vice and should give all directions as to speed, course, stopping and reversing, anchoring, towing and thelike. And when a licensed pilot is employed in a place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his duty to insist on

having effective control of the vessel, or to decline to act as pilot. Under certain systems of foreign law, the pilot does not take entire charge of the vessel, but is deemed merely the adviser of the master, who retainscommand and control of the navigation even in localities where pilotage is compulsory.

Same; Same; Same; Same; It is quite common for states and localities to provide for compulsory

pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted requiring vessels approaching their ports, with certainexceptions, to take on board pilots duly licensed under local law. — It is quite common for states andlocalities to provide for compulsory pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted requiring vessels approachingtheir ports, with certain exceptions, to take on board pilots duly licensed under local law. The purpose of theselaws is to create a body of seamen thoroughly acquainted with the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to enter ordepart, and thus protect life and property from the dangers of navigation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A pilot should have a thorough knowledge of general and local regulations

and physical conditions affecting the vessel in his charge and the waters for which he is licensed, such asa particular harbor or river. — Pursuant thereto, Capt. Gavino was assigned to pilot MV Pavlodar into Berth4 of the Manila International Port. Upon assuming such office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to theuniversally accepted high stan

dards of care and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skilland knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters over which his license extends superior to andmore to be trusted than that of the master. A pilot should have a thorough knowledge of general and localregulations and physical conditions affecting the vessel in his charge and the waters for which he is licensed,such as a particular harbor or river. He is not held to the highest possible degree of skill and care, but musthave and exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded by the circumstances, and usually shown by an expertin his profession. Under extraordinary circumstances, a pilot must exercise extraordinary care.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Negligence; Those who undertake any work calling for special skills are

required not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do but also possess a standard minimum ofspecial knowledge and ability — every man who offers his services to another, and is employed, assumesto exercise in the employment such skills he possesses, with a reasonable degree of diligence. — An actmay be negligent if it is done without the competence that a reasonable person in the position of the actorwould recognize as necessary to prevent it from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to another. Those whoundertake any work calling for special skills are required not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do

but also possess a standard minimum of special knowledge and ability. Every man who offers his services toanother, and is employed, assumes to exercise in the employment such skills he possesses, with a reasonabledegree of diligence. In all these employments where peculiar skill is requisite, if one offers his services he is




understood as holding himself out to the public as possessing the degree of skill commonly possessed byothers in the same employment, and if his pretensions are unfounded he commits a species of fraud on everyman who employs him in reliance on his public profession.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The degree of care required is graduated according to the danger a

person or property attendant upon the activity which the actor pursues or the instrumentality which he

uses — the greater the danger the greater the degree of care required. — There is an obligation on all persons to take the care which, under ordinary circumstances of the case, a reasonable and prudent man wouldtake, and the omission of that care constitutes negligence. Generally, the degree of care required is graduatedaccording to the danger a person or property attendant upon the activity which the actor pursues or theinstrumentality which he uses. The greater the danger the greater the degree of care required. What is ordinaryunder extraordinary of conditions is dictated by those conditions; extraordinary risk demands extraordinarycare. Similarly, the more imminent the danger, the higher the degree of care.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Ship Masters; While it is indubitable that in exercising his functions a

pilot is in sole command of the ship and supersedes the master for the time being in the command and

navigation of a ship and that he becomes master pro hac vice of a vessel piloted by him, there is

overwhelming authority to the effect that the master does not surrender his vessel to the pilot and the

pilot is not the master — the master is not wholly absolved from his duties while a pilot is on board his

vessel, and may advise with or offer suggestions to him. — While it is indubitable that in exercising hisfunctions a pilot is in sole command of the ship and supersedes the master for the time being in the commandand navigation of a ship and that he becomes master pro hac vice of a vessel piloted by him, there isoverwhelming authority to the effect that the master does not surrender his vessel to the pilot and the pilot isnot the master. The master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding the presence of a pilot. There areoccasions when the master may and should interfere and even displace the pilot, as when the pilot is obviouslyincompetent or intoxicated and the circumstances may require the master to displace a compulsory pilot

because of incompetency or physical incapacity. If, however, the master does not observe that a compulsory pilot is incompetent or physically incapacitated, the master is justified in relying on the pilot, but not blindly.The master is not wholly absolved from his duties while a pilot is on board his vessel, and may advise with oroffer suggestions to him. He is still in command of the vessel, except so far as her navigation is concerned, andmust cause the ordinary work of the vessel to be properly carried on and the usual precaution taken. Thus, in

particular, he is bound to see that there is sufficient watch on deck, and that the men are attentive to theirduties, also that engines are stopped, towlines cast off, and the anchors clear and ready to go at the pilot‘sorder.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where a compulsory pilot is in charge of a ship, the master

being required to permit him to navigate it, if the master observes that the pilot is incompetent or

physically incapable, then it is the duty of the master to refuse to permit the pilot to act, but if no suchreasons are present, then the master is justified in relying upon the pilot, but not blindly. — In sum, wherea compulsory pilot is in charge of a ship, the master being required to permit him to navigate it, if the masterobserves that the pilot is incompetent or physically incapable, then it is the duty of the master to refuse to

permit the pilot to act. But if no such reasons are present, then the master is justified in relying upon the pilot, but not blindly. Under the circumstances of this case, if a situation arose where the master, exercising thatreasonable vigilance which the master of a ship should exercise, observed, or should have observed, that the

pilot was so navigating the vessel that she was going, or was likely to go, into danger, and there was in theexercise of reasonable care and vigilance an opportunity for the master to intervene so as to save the ship fromdanger, the master should have acted accordingly. The master of a vessel must exercise a degree of vigilancecommensurate with the circumstances.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Damages; A pilot is personally liable for damages caused by his

own negligence or default to the owners of the vessel, and to third parties for damages sustained in acollision, such negligence in the performance of duty constitutes a maritime tort. — In general, a pilot is

personally liable for damages caused by his own negligence or default to the owners of the vessel, and to third




parties for damages sustained in a collision. Such negligence of the pilot in the performance of duty constitutesa maritime tort. At common law, a shipowner is not liable for injuries inflicted exclusively by the negligenceof a pilot accepted by a vessel compulsorily. The exemption from liability for such negligence shall apply ifthe pilot is actually in charge and solely in fault. Since, a pilot is responsible only for his own personalnegligence, he cannot be held accountable for damages proximately caused by the default of others, or, if there

be anything which concurred with the fault of the pilot in producing the accident, the vessel master and owners

are liable.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The fact that the law compels the master to take the

pilot does not exonerate the vessel from liability — it cannot be maintained that the circumstance of

having a pilot on board, and acting in conformity to his directions operate as a discharge ofresponsibility of the owners. — Since the colliding vessel is prima facie responsible, the burden of proof isupon the party claiming benefit of the exemption from liability. It must be shown affirmatively that the pilotwas at fault, and that there was no fault on the part of the officers or crew, which might have been conducive tothe damage. The fact that the law compelled the master to take the pilot does not exonerate the vessel fromliability. The parties who suffer are entitled to have their remedy against the vessel that occasioned thedamage, and are not under necessity to look to the pilot from whom redress is not always had forcompensation. The owners of the vessel are responsible to the injured party for the acts of the pilot, and theymust be left to recover the amount as well as they can against him. It cannot be maintained that the

circumstance of having a pilot on board, and acting in conformity to his directions operate as a discharge ofresponsibility of the owners. Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or herowner are liable for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in charge ofthe vessel. Where the pilot of a vessel is not a compulsory one in the sense that the owner or master of thevessel are bound to accept him, but is employed voluntarily, the owners of the vessel are, all the more, liablefor his negligent act.

Same; Same; Same; Damages; Obligations; Joint and Solidary Liability; Where several causes

producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not

have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against

any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that

one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the

same — each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the solecause of the injury. — It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable neednot be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficientcauses other than plaintiff‘s, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combineto produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it

being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which theinjury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the personinjured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from hisnegligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. Where severalcauses producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would nothave happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any orall of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them wasmore culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor‘s negligence

ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Eachwrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whoseliability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. — There is no contribution between

joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where theconcurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently,are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible todetermine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole




injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become jointtortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and control

of a vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages caused to persons or property by reason ofher negligent management or navigation. — Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute,

the vessel or her owners are liable for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners orthose in charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and control of a vessel andthe vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages caused to persons or property by reason of hernegligent management or navigation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Customs Administrative Order No. 1565, which as animplementing rule has the force and effect of law, can validly provide for solidary liability. — Article 1207of the Civil Code provides that there is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or whenthe law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity. Plainly, Customs Administrative Order No. 1565,which as an implementing rule has the force and effect of law, can validly provide for solidary liability. Wenote the Solicitor General‘s comment hereon, to wit: x x x Customs Administrative Order No. 1565 may be amere rule and regulation issued by an administrative agency pursuant to a delegated authority to fix ―thedetails‖ in the execution or enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself. Nonetheless, said administrative

order, which adds to the procedural or enforcing provisions of substantive law, is legally binding and receivesthe same statutory force upon going into effect. In that sense, it has equal, not lower, statutory force and effectas a regular statute passed by the legislature.‖

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Transpo Digests 1.1