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TRANSCRIPT OF A PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY THE
PRIME MINISTER OF SINGAPORE, MR. LEE KUAN YEW, AT
BROADCASTING HOUSE, SINGAPORE, AT 1200 HOURS
ON MONDAY 9TH AUGUST, 1965.
Question: Mr. Prime Minister, after these momentous pronouncements,
what most of us of the foreign press would be interested to
learn would be your attitude towards Indonesia, particularly
in the context of Indonesian confrontation, and how you view
to conduct relations with Indonesia in the future as an
independent, sovereign nation.
Mr. Lee: I would like to phrase it most carefully because this is a
delicate matter. But I think I can express my attitude in this
way: We want to be friends with Indonesia. We have always
wanted to be friends with Indonesia. We would like to settle
any difficulties and differences with Indonesia. But we must
survive. We have a right to survive. And, to survive, we must
be sure that we cannot be just overrun. You know, invaded
by armies or knocked out by rockets, if they have rockets --
which they have, ground-to-air. I'm not sure whether they
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have ground-to-ground missiles. And, what I think is also
important is we want, in spite of all that has happened --
which I think were largely ideological differences between us
and the former Central Government, between us and the
Alliance Government -- we want to-operate with them, on the
most fair and equal basis. The emphasis is co-operate. We
need them to survive. Our water supply comes from Johore.
Our trade, 20-odd per cent -- over 20 per cent; I think about
24 per cent -- with Malaya, and about 4 to 5 per cent with
Sabah and Sarawak. And we cannot foolishly get into a
position where we are confronted, or being confronted, by
both sides. In other words, any settlement must be such as
will not endanger our survival, mainly capacity to resist
invasion and to call on friends, to have friends in readiness to
help us if we are invaded. In other words, we must have the
capacity to prevent a successful invasion. Bases not to be
paid for by us - you know, it comes to about $400 million a
year, and Singapore's annual budget is only about $120
million. And, secondly, we cannot jeopardise the security of
the Federation, because that jeopardises our security. The
water will be endangered. So we would like, within the limits
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of our position, we would like to be able to bring about a
settlement, both between Indonesia and ourselves, and
between Indonesia and Malaysia. I mean, I think a settlement
is only possible on that basis. A settlement between
Indonesia and ourselves without taking into consideration the
security and the future of Malaysia, particularly Johore -- I
mean, to put it selfishly, South Malaya -- I think is a very
short-sighted approach. But, because this is a -- if I may say
so, you've bounced off the first and probably the most
delicate of all questions -- I would not like anybody to
interpret this as what one would call a carefully-worded
policy statement. This is an attitude which stems from a
realistic apraisal of our survival needs. Have I answered you?
Questioner: Thank you very much.
Mr. Lee: Does that meet your point?
Questioner: Well, I understand that it's rather early to frame a rather
considered policy statement on it, but I was wondering
whether you were thinking of any particular approaches to
Indonesia in terms of some kind of....
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Mr. Lee: Well, well. I would say that first of all Indonesia would have
to recognise us as an independent, sovereign nation. I mean,
if they consider us a neo-colonialist nation, then how do we
begin to get off the ground at all, isn't it? Indonesia must first
recognise that Singapore, as proclaimed by myself on behalf
of the people and Government of Singapore today is an
independent, sovereign nation with a will and a capacity of its
own. A strong will, if I may be little immodest about the
pride and the stamina of the citizens of Singapore in a
capacity which is rather limited. But, nevertheless, within
that capacity, and with help of all friends, Commonwealth
friends who would help our survival,. we intend to survive.
And, once they have recognised us, and that we have a will
and a capacity of our own, a separate mind of our own and
not just puppets or pantomimes of, what-do-they-call,
"lackeys of the imperialists" and so on, then I think we can
discuss problems. And there are problems which can be
resolved.
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Question: Mr. Prime Minister, what is the attitude of the Singapore
Government to the payroll and the turnover taxes which have
been imposed by you?
Mr. Lee: By me?
Question: By the Singapore Government, I mean.
Mr. Lee No, no, no, no. Come, really! You know we fought the .... I
mean, this is quite a serious moment, and I think this is a bit
unfair to sort of -- you know -- bounce one off me like that.
You know the payroll and the turnover taxes were imposed
by the then Central Government of Malaysia in December, in
the last Budget. And we opposed it strenuously. It is the
intention of the Singapore Government to revoke the turnover
tax forthwith. And, the payroll tax I think will be revoked as
payroll tax, but we may retain some form of tax based --not
tax, really contribution based on salary by the employer and
the employee for an unemployment insurance scheme. I may
also add that there are a few other things which may have to
be put right which we disagreed with before and we still
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disagree with now. I will be quite frank. I think that we
ought to trade with every country in the world that is prepared
to leave us alone to be ourselves. Not to subvert us, mind
you. I mean, we don't want to be anti-Communist. Nor have
we any intention to allow Colmmunists to bring us down. I
mean, this is a democratic state. In other words, it is non-
Communist and follows democratic procedures. And, that
having been said, like Britain we can trade with the world
including Russia and China.
Question: And Indonesia?
Mr.Lee: And Indonesia. Surely, if they want to trade with us. And
therefore, I in pursuance of this policy, I think we will
allow the Bank of China to continue. But, on the old terms.
You know, not people being sent into Singapore ostensibly
on banking business but probably for other, extra-mural
pursuits which may end up with a great deal of unhappiness.
But, using their Singapore staff, of Singapore citizens, who
are known not to be security risks: no objection to trade. We
welcome trade with everybody.
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Question: Does it follow, Mr. Prime Minister, that you will permit the
Russians, for instance, and the Chinese to have Consulates
here, or trade set-ups?
Mr.Lee Well, I wish to give that more consideration. Let me put my
position -- again, this is not a formulation of policy. I will put
my position briefly as follows: if the Russians want to set up
a rubber-buying mission, which was what they wanted to do
before and that was refused by the Internal Security Council
which consisted of Britain, the old Malaya, and Singapore --
Britain because you know I think Britain was selling rubber
herself from London if they couldn't buy rubber here;
Malaya because she honestly believed that Russians would
subvert the whole place -- I don't really believe that if the man
is a genuinely trade man, and not an intelligence man, one or
two Russians coming to inspect rubber can't do much damage
because as you know this is primarily an Asian city, and any
un-Asian face can easily to detected and surveillance of any
untoward activcities is very simple. But of course where
surveuillance will be difficult because the thing can be lost ...
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for instance, if tomorrow we re-established with Indonesia
and suddenly two hundred Indonesians wanted to come. You
know, they nearly had a hundred before. A hundred-odd of
Consular staff. And, each man had about six or seven
members of the family, the cook, the driver, and the whole
retinue. That meant 7 or 800 people going around the place.
Now, we must be quite sure that they -- that we can safeguard
our security. Now if we get that sort of a position where a
man can be lost in an Asian scene because he is an Asian,
well it complicates matters and naturally security
considerations are vital for our survival.
I think the Communists know very well -- Dr. Goh is the
Minister for Defence and Security, which is a very important
position, and his attitude to subversion from any quarter,
whether by pamphletering or bombs and grenades and a brust
of machine-gun or a bullet, is simply that it will not be
allowed. But trade; by all means. In other words, I mean
look: let us suppose the Indonesians want to set up a
Consulate. I think one or two members we can exchange, to
start with. It's quite safe. We must make quite sure, of
course. As you know, the Philippines Government refused to
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accept General Djatikusumo after what they knew of his
record in Singapore and in Kuala Lumpur. And we must be
sure of them. And I think really the best solution to all this --
I mean, if they are really sincere, they want trade, for instance
China wants to trade with us, I mean we let the Bank of
China go on. And they say they want to purchase rubber
through Singapore, then there is a well known Chinese rubber
merchant, Dato Lee Kong Chian, who had just been to China
and they know him, they appoint him the agent and say "you
please buy for me rubber, whatever it is." One, or two, I
say by all means. But if you suddenly have a large platoon
turning up, then the cost of the whole business of security
becomes formidable. You know, we've already promised --
well, these discussions were not with me but Dr. Goh held
discussions with Dr. Ismail and Tun Razak -- and we've
promised that we will carry a fair share of the defence of
the whole of the Malaysian area. And to do that, we've got to
raise about one brigade. I'm not a military man. Dr. Goh
was a former soldier. During the last war he was in the
Volunteers, and so on, so he knows all about this. And this is
going to cost us money, probably another two or three
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battalions. And that costs money. I mean, one battalion,
running-costs, ten-million dollars per annum. Three
battalions, thirty-million dollars. To establish Garrison
Headquarters and so on, is another ten to fifteen million
dollars for each battalion. Similarly, with security, to keep
one chap under reasonable observation, to see that he's not up
to mischief, you may have to employ about ten fellows. You
know, he disappears from A to B, from B to C. I'll give you
an example of how Lim Chin Siong used to do it when we
were in the Government. He knows he's followed. He comes
to a traffic stop in a taxi. Car stops. He gets off the taxi,
pays him, hops across the road, gets into the bus. The chap
in the taxi is left behind. So chaps are chasing all around, you
see, who did he meet and what for? And, for one chap, one
key man, you may have as much as 20 people involved.
Well, that's a lot of money, and I think Singapore.....you
know us, an economical government because we've got to
build a lot of things: schools, hospitals, homes, roads. So
we've got to be very careful that we don't increase our
security and defence costs more than is necessary. But trade,
I say, to the limit.
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Question: Mr. Prime Minister, how do you see the future of Singapore's
economy? As I understood it, as long as she was in Malaysia
there was tendency to move away from commerce towards
industry, from the free-port status towards industry,
exploitation of the Common Market. Now, presumably....
Mr.Lee: Could you speak louder? I can't hear.
Question: Sorry. I was asking whether the transference...
Mr.Lee: I wonder if you could come forward a little bit?
Question: I'll try and use this microphone. Can you hear me better?
Mr.Lee: Yes.
Question: I was asking, Sir, whether the question of Singapore
transferring her economy from an entrepot free-port economy
to one of a more industrial form of State to rely upon the
common market which Malaysia was supposed to represent,
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whether this tendency in Singapore would now be halted. Or,
how you would see the economy developing so that as a
sovereign State Singapore could be economically viable?
Mr.Lee: Well, I thought that -- you know, this one I have put it down
in writing because I felt this was going to be a very important
subject which a lot of investors, merchants, and workers will
be interested in. So, I put it down in writing. "The years
ahead will require that our two governments work" -- our two
governments, Malaysia and Singapore -- "work in the closest
co-operation, not just in the defence and security, but also in
commerce and industry". And I was greatly relieved when
the Tengku told me in my second discussion with him
yesterday morning that he appreciated this point. And, he
assured me that economic co-operation between our two
countries was most necesary if either of us is to survive the
pressures from common enemies. I think I'm paraphrasing
the Tengku. I think I'm quite safe in that way, but I think he
understood what was worrying me, and I think worrying a lot
of merchants, investors, industrialists, and so on, that there
must be a quid pro quo. I'll give you an example. This is
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what Dr. Goh had in mind when he asked this question to be
clearly put. Dunlop tyres from Petaling Jaya come to
Singapore free. Free entry, we're selling. Bridgestone tyres
made in Jurong can't go to the Federation because I think
there's a quota restriction. Can't go. You can't get beyond a
certain number. Now, in actual purchasing power -- this is
not population; I mean, in population they are about 8
million in round figures, we are about two million; we are
one-quarter -- but in purchasing power, number of tyres,
television sets, motor-cars, and so on, we are 40 per cent,
they are 60 per cent. You know, it's about half. So I think
that if Dr. Goh feels very strongly about this when he was
Minister for Finance and he failed to get any change in
attitude, if Dunlop tyres want to come to Singapore, then
there must be a quid pro quo. Bridgestone tyres must go to
the Federation. We don't want to rush these things. I mean,
it'll take time as you can see from the Agreement. There's a
clause, we put it all down in writing; this is the Gazette
Notification made today -- Extraordinary: "The Parties
thereto" -- Article 6 -- "will on and after Singapore Day" --
which means today, or this morning one second after
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midnight -- "co-operate in economic affairs for their mutual
benefit and interests, and for this purpose may set up joint
committees, committees or councils, as may from time to time
be agreed upon". I mean, they are the bigger unit. Let us not
pretend. That was the reason why we wanted to go into
Malaysia and we thought that the thing must be worked
together. But we are 40 per cent of the purchasing power of
Malaysia. I mean, 60 per cent is there. Every worker here
has got I would say roughly between double to treble the
buying capacity of the average -- you know, because there's a
large rural area, and this is a highly industrialised and
commercialised urban area -- our purchasing power is about
two to three times per person that of (average, I mean);
between a Singapore worker and a Kuala Lumpur worker,
there may not be all that much difference, although there is a
difference. I mean, we pay our unskilled workers $4.55 a
day. And, people are washing bottles in Petaling Jaya for
$1.50 a day. So you can see that the purchasing power is
three times. So I think there must be these joint committees
and just councils, and the thing must be worked out together.
And security really depends ... I mean, stability or security of
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Singapore depends upon economic development. And
economic development depends upon co-operation.
Question: Would you go so far as to say that perhaps with the situation
perhaps clarified by this move today the move towards better
interchanges might be speeded up, that things may go little
faster rather than slower?
Mr.Lee: Can I again paraphrase the Tengku -- I think it was yesterday
morning when he said this. He said this to me when I left.
He said, "when you are no longer -- or tomorrow" -- this was
yesterday, and he was talking about today -- "when you are
no longer in Malaysia and we are no longer quarrelling either
in Parliament or in the constituencies, we'll be friends again,
and we'll need each other, and we'll co-operate". And it is my
earnest desire that this should be so. And, most important of
all, that the Tengku's colleagues in charge of these
departments and all the officers right down the line will
slowly get to understand the Tengku's mind. I mean, it may
take some time and I don't think we're going to have a sudden
change tomorrow. It will take six months, nine months,
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before a thaw sets in. But, there is a nice balance between
security and stability. And, there is an inexorable nexus
between security and commerce and industry: economic
development, jobs, and so on, and if there is no stability..may
I put it in another way? I made a note. I think this was
important. Yes. "If perchance this were not to happen" -- in
other words, economic co-operation, defence co-operation
were not to happen. I beg your pardon. If for instance there
is defence co-operation but economic co-operation does not
keep pace with defence co-operation -- "then, whatever
Government Singapore has, whether it is Socialist or
otherwise, whether non-Communist or anti-Communist that
Government must seek a living for its people by trading with
the devil to survive". Even with the devil if he is to survive
he has to trade. These are the facts of life. That's what I feel
about it. I may be wrong. You might get an anti-Communist
Government here that's prepared to see workers unemployed,
disaffected, and just keep them down, discontent down, by
repression. But you know the PAP .... We can't do that
because we don't believe that it's the final kind of
Government in Singapore surviving other than by the gun
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which of course is a very expensive business. If Singapore
could have been governed by the gun indefinitely without
breaking whoever tries to do it, you know, either financially
or militarily, I think it would have been tried -- either by the
British before, instead of granting independence and merger,
and Malaysia, or I think by us or by the former Central
Government. I think everybody understands that. And, we
can help Malaysia's development on a fair basis. We don't
want all the industries. It's not good for us have all the
industries because the impetus to come to Singapore.....
You know, last year, the change in the identity cards, the
difference, was a nett gain to Singapore of 10,000 persons.
10,000 persons, most of whom are in the age group 20 to 30.
Which is about 25 per cent of our populations of that age
group born 20 to 30 years ago.
Question: And are you going to allow immigration to continue, Mr.
Prime Minister?
Mr.Lee: I would say yes. I would say we carry on as usual. Look,
why upset things. We've gone on so well so long. We can
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prosper. Rubber goes out to Singapore, workers come. Well,
they don't get certain benefits, mind you. I mean, social
welfare benefits. But, within limits, I mean. They want to
come, it doesn't matter. Mind you, I'll put it in another way.
Whilst we are not all together happy about having a nett gain
of ten thousand. I mean, it's a large figure. In that ten
thousand, there are I should imagine -- there must be about
100 to 150 able, trained technocrats, engineers, doctors,
lawyers, dentists, teachers, who made a contribution to us,
able men who for various reasons seek an outlet in
Singapore, because it's a bigger city and people drift to cities.
I say, we lose nothing. And I hope this will go on in a
reasonable way. But we can't have a flood. Supposing
tomorrow we had 100,000 workers coming down from
Johore. We'll have to ask Dr. Toh, who is in charge of
immigration now he's come back, I mean Dr. Toh will have to
see Dr. Ismail about this because what will happen? We'll
have shanty towns going up, all will increase because these
chaps for months or years will have adjustment here and there.
In other words, the important thing now to survive for them
and for us is to face reality and be reasonable to each other.
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Question: Could you outline for us the train of events that led to this
morning's proclamation?
Mr.Lee: Yes, I'm speaking partly from memory and partly from some
notes which I've made which I thought would come. It's
bound to crop up. I made it in a hurry. I said, when I first
met the Tengku at 12.30 on Saturday morning, I was still not
convinced that in spite of everything Dr. Goh had told me
because he had been for a few days in discussion with
Malaysian ministers, that was, I did not believe that there was
no other way. I believed then that I could still convince that
Tengku that there were a number of other ways of reducing
communal tensions in Malaysia, such as a looser Federation.
You know, even at the time it hard to believe that there was
no other was no other way. But, after my talk with the
Tengku -- and with the Tengku alone, mind you, the other
members, some other ministers who were there, they were in
another room. I thought it's better we let our hair down and
speak frankly to each other, because their ministers had been
talking to Dr. Goh for a few days; now I was meeting the
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Tengku for the first time -- after what he told me when we
were alone, I realised there was no other way than what he
thought was the solution, that we had to leave Malaysia. And,
I knew from what he said, and he has an intuition about these
matters, that we would all be in for big communal trouble if
Singapore or if I and my colleagues insisted in going on with
Malaysia as it is. And, I'll be quite frank -- any other kind of
Malaysia than a Malaysian Malaysia is unacceptable. You
can't get people to accept it. Well, perhaps now with
Singapore out, there could be a Malaysia because the process
would be much slower, will be much more gradual. The
impetus of a highly urbanised and a politically sophisticated
city and 2 million people in it maybe set a pace which was
too -- well, which they thought was too fierce, but too rapid.
I didn't think so myself, but -- because this......unless a stand
was taken about all these outpourings every day in the Jawi
newspapers, I mean, everything would be lost. But I mean,
that's all over and done with. We don't want to raise the
matter. 'Utusan' can come on and sell in Singapore. I don't
mind so long as we don't have any trouble. Let it go on.
We've got to be reasonable. But I would say that the Tengku
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convinced me and he told me that he could not go on
holding the situation much longer and that he could see real
trouble in Malaysia if Singapore continues to be in it. Well, I
met the Tengku again yesterday morning because a number of
my colleagues felt very strongly against this. And, I told the
Tengku so. And everybody knows that a good they feel
passionately about what they consider to be their homeland. I
mean, they came, they settled here, they got jobs, they
became Singapore citizens, they have become Singapore
Ministers. They are basically Malaysians, or Malayans. I
think Dr. Toh who is Chairman of the -- who was Chairman
of the Solidarity Convention would not have signed, and I
told the Tengku so, unless the Tengku convinced him that
there was no other way. And so I think -- I don't know
whether Dr. Toh was to disclose; I think he will have to
disclose this letter eventually, but the Tengku put it very
simply to him that there was no other way, and that there will
be a great deal of trouble if we insisted on going on. And I
would like to add one... You see, this is a moment of ...
everytime we look back on this moment when we signed this
agreement which severed Singapore from Malaysia, it will be
a moment of anguish. For me, it is a moment of anguish
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because all my life.... you see, the whole of my adult life.... I
have believed in Merger and the unity of these two territories.
You know, it's a people, connected by geography, economics,
and ties of kinship..... Would you mind if we stop for a while.
(RECORDING WAS STOPPED FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO REGAIN
HIS COMPOSURE)
Question: Mr. Prime Minister, now that Singapore is a sovereign State,
I take it that your Government will be applying for her
admission to the United Nations, and sending diplomatic
representatives abroad. Could tell us something about that:
Where you are likely to send the representatives?
Prime Minister: Well, we have not given this matter very detailed
consideration: it has happened in the last few days, and Mr.
Rajaratnam is probably in Seremban and other places,...
going around the branches explaining this. I will have to wait
for him to come back and I think the cabinet has got to sit
down and think it out. There are financial limitations for a
country of two million people even though our per capital
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income is high compared to the rest of Asia. But I would say
off-hand, straightaway: I think once we have established our
position... As I told you, I have written to these Prime
Ministers whom I know personally, and I have informed the
Consular Corps to tell their governments -- and off-hand I
would say India, perhaps Pakistan. I am not sure whether we
can afford ..to have two missions for India and Pakistan. I
would say Burma, Rangoon and to cover probably Bangkok
at the same time; the one in India may have to cover Ceylon.
The one in Cambodia -- in Phnom Penh -- to cover Laos. I
hope one in Japan because we are having more and more
trade and industrial exchange. Then of course, our
Commonwealth links: with Britain ... I am not sure whether we
can afford Canberra and New Zealand, but if the Australian
Government is ... I do not know what the cost of a mission in
Canberra is, but I hope perhaps the one in Canberra to cover
Canberra and Wellington, and the one in New York for the
U.N. to cover Canada and perhaps the United States. One of
the most important of the list, of course, is as I mentioned
earlier Cairo and Addis Ababa. Addis Ababa will cover all
the African territories. I do not know what the atitude of the
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communist countries will be. If they are prepared to
acknowledge facts as facts -- that I have got the right to
survive, Singapore has the right to survive, has the right to
call on help from anybody in order that it shall live and not be
eaten up by its neighbours and that it can have bases -- then I
see no reason why we cannot have trade and consular
exchanges with some of the Eastern Eurpoean countries. We
might get some of the Eastern European countries to trade
with us; Russia, China to trade. But mind you, nothing must
be done.... You have seen the Agreement: We will do
nothing and enter into no treaty which in any way jeopardises
our defence arrangements. That is basic and fundamental.
Without that, I do not think, we will last long. If we try to be
clever and play both sides one against the other, if Djakarta is
able to come to terms on an honourable basis -- that we are
not stooges and lackeys of the imperialists -- then Djakarta....
We had a trade mission there before.
Question: Would you include South Africa in this and also have trade
with South Africa?
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Prime Minister: You know the position .. By the time a professedly right-wing
Government in Kuala Lumpur wanting to get acceptance as
an Afro-Asian country makes these postures of banning on
South African goods, closing the South African Consulate few
days before the Algiers Conference, do you think we who feel
very strongly about these things, do you think we can tolerate
it? Let us be frank ....
Question: What would be your attitude, Mr. Prime Minister, to having
the TASS correspondent and the TANJUG correspondent
based here?
Prime Minister: Well, you saw my two questions in Parliament which I put for
today's sitting, but which ......
Question: Would you like to answer them...?
Prime Minister: .. will never be asked now because I am no longer a member
of Parliament ... From the Proclamation, it is finished... As
far as I am concerned, this is their business. I cannot afford
to say anything now. But I will say, on principle, TASS,
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TANJUG by all means. I met the TASS correspondent -- I think
his name was Severi in Bangkok. All right, so he can go
around snooping in Singapore and cause a revolution. The
man looks so obviously....He stands out .. . you do not even
have to have half chap to go and find out what he is doing.
Provided of course, he is not a professional intelligence man
which I do not think he is, what is the harm? TANJUG man:
they had a man who covered for Phnom Penh -- I have
forgotten his name -- he came here once on a short visit in the
old days. And I knew their former Ambassador, Yugoslav
Ambassador to Djakarta, Mr. Bebelov. He is a communist.
But the Russians used to treat them with some distance. The
Chinese and the other Eastern Asian group of Communist
States say that they are traitors, "revisionists". I do not see
him going around stirring up Lee Siew Choh. I do not think
he is going to stir Lee Siew Choh. Lee Siew Choh might get
very angry with him. What is the harm? And perhaps, if they
are here reporting what is happening, we will have a better
image of ourselves in these countries and, as a result of their
Government knowing about these places, they won't think
that I am Mr. Harold Wilson's friend, personal friend and
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Arthur Bottomley's personal friend ... We are all colleagues
in a democratic socialist movement, and I have spoken in
British Labour Party election rallies in the old days when I
was a student. Does that make me a stooge? Wilson is a
stooge of the Americans, I am a friend of Wilson, so I am a
stooge? You come here and see. What do I lose? Nothing.
Well, of course, if they are going to send chaps here and start
newspapers and other things not connected with reporting ...
Just observing, reporting, buying, selling, I say we welcome
everybody. But meddling and influencing the internal course
of events .. I do not mind their influencing their own
countries' attitude to us, but not influencing our people's
affairs.
Question: This may be too hasty, but would you be considering seeking
admission into the Afro-Asian Conference in November ..?
Prime Minister: What else? Are we to be outcasts? Surely we are not. And I
would imagine that all the heads of Government and heads of
State and Governments that I have met in Africa, in Asia will
know that I am not a stooge. If I am a stooge, then you tell
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me I may be offensive to somebody, but ... Let us compare
the attitude of the Singapore Government -- the position, the
policy with that of Nigeria or Uganda or Kenya .. There is, I
would say, rapport between quite a number of these countries
and us; and there is no difference basically in attitudes
between Prince Sihanouk and myself. He wants to survive,
he wants Cambodia to survive, I want my own people to
survive. He has got bigger neighbours; I have got bigger
neighbours. I think we understand each other. But his
neighbours are slightly different from ours. He has got five
million people and a relatively large piece of territory; I have
got now -- I did not want this -- but I have got it now, 214
square miles which we intend to expand as much as we can
by reclamation, the adjacent islands and so on. And there is
no hope of survival if I do not have people who are friends,
who are prepared whatever their reason -- they may be selfish
reasons, that is irrelevant to me so long as I am not playing
stooge to them -- but they ensure my survival, I say I have the
right to have them with me. And I say the British Labour
Government is my friend, openly. As I said this today to the
Deputy, or the Action Deputy -- I do not know whether he is
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acting or what the position is -- Mr. Mills ...I have told him to
tell this to Mr. Bottomley and Mr. Wilson: how sorry I am
that this had to be. I met Mr. Bottomley last when he came
through here -- I cannot remember now... May; and we
discussed, we agreed with each other that however difficult,
there is a better chance of long-term survival --I am thinking
in terms of 20, 30, 40, 50 years, not in terms of the next
election -- if we held together and adjusted. And he was quite
prepared to do his utmost to help in anyway he can; but the
help is limited. We are an independent country now.
Malaysia is an independent country and Britain may help the
Tengku, but the Tengku is independent. He does what he
likes, and we have reached this agreement between ourselves
... It is the wish of the two elected governments ... What else
can be done about it? I am sorry that, against our own
analysis of what is good, this had to happen. I am very sorry
because I could not tell Mr. Bottomley although he has so
much at stake ... with all their heavy expenditure helping us ...
that I was not able to tell him before the event. I sent him off
a cable. But by the time it is decoded ... It was sent before
the event, but by the time it is decoded it is already after the
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event. I also told Mr. Menzies and to Australia and New
Zealand. But again it is coded, and by the time they decode
it, they will have probably heard from their own offices here.
Question: When were the messages sent, Sir?
Prime Minister: Last night or early this morning: I cannot remember. I had
dictated very brief, succinct once because there were about
one to two dozen countries I was cabling to: Heads of state
who personally knew me and whom I personally knew ... And
the process of coding and so on ....
Question: At this stage, can you say what your Government's attitude
will be towards South Vietnam, and the situation in Vietnam?
Prime Minister: South Vietnam? You know this is the most difficult
situation... And I chose my words most carefully when I
went to Bombay and I stand by that. I do not want to
paraphrase it now because if I paraphrase it wrongly, people
may think I have shifted my position. But that was a scripted
piece. I scripted that passage and I think if you like, after this,
we will get the passage and I say we stand by that.
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Question: Mr. Prime Minister, could you at this stage say something
about having a separate currency and a state bank for
Singapore?
Prime Minister: Can I put it this way: we would like to have as little change
as possible in everything: movement of goods, of people,
currency ... Utusan Melayu ... Let it carry on. And I will say
this: in the end, sometimes history takes many devious turns;
just as a river loops and bends around mountains and valleys
before it reaches the sea, so the history of a people takes
many loops and bends before it reaches its destiny. And I say
the nexus between Singapore and Malaya, geographical
privilege to have brought about merger through Malaysia; to
have helped the Tengku bring this about. It was Malaysia
with Singapore in it, prosper and flourish as the states and the
different races in Malaysia drew closer and closer together.
But somebody else will do it. I am quite sure of it. I cannot
do it. Nobody in Singapore at this present moment and for the
next five may be ten years, can ever persuade Singapore to go
back into Malaysia after our experience. But somebody will
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do it one day, perhaps in a different form, under different
circumstances.
I would like finally, if I may, just to speak not to you but
really to the people of Singapore. I have been so busy in the
last few days, I haven't had the time to compose my thoughts
in writing to tell you what it is all about and why what has
happened has happened.
There is nothing to be worried about it. Many things will go
on just as usual. But be firm, be calm.
We are going to have a multi-racial nation in Singapore. We
will set the example. This is not a Malay nation; this is not a
Chinese nation; this is not an Indian nation. Everybody will
have his place: equal; language, culture, religion. And we
will carry on helping the Malays as we promised to do
in competition with UMNO. We will still do it even though
we know now that UNMO cannot compete with us because
they are obviously unable to do anything. They have let down
... well, they are out. But we will still do it.
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And I ask the Malays: don't worry. This was the Government
that believed in multi-racialism and brought Singapore away
from chauvinism into multi-racialism. Pity they turned out
that; we could not achieve multi-racialism and integration in
Malaysia. But we will achieve it in Singapore. We have all
learnt our lessons.
Tomorrow, or perhaps day after tomorrow -- I am not sure
whether I will have the time tomorrow -- I will compose my
thoughts and I will tell you first what happened; why it
happened; why what has happened will not change our
security. The bases will be there, your protection will be
there, co-operation in defence, security will be there and the
water agreement is firm and solid, and guaranteed. And we
will work together.
And finally, let us, really Singaporeans -- I cannot call myself
a Malaysian now -- we unite, regardless of race, language,
religion, culture.
11th August, 1965.