TOOLBOX - ABA - American Bankers Association · PDF fileABOUT THE ABA Bank Robbery Deterrence Toolbox The ABA is proud to offer this toolbox — free to ABA members — to assist bankers

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ABA Bank Robbery Deterrence

T O O L B O X

June 2003 Dear Colleagues:

When it comes to fighting crime, bankers are already carrying a hefty load. We’re improving our fraud-fighting capabilities, cracking down on money launderers and now even helping in the search for terrorists. Now we learn that an old nemesis - bank robberies - appears to be making a comeback.

Over the years, ABA has put together informational resources to help bankers educate their employees and customers about coping with robberies. In our dealings with the national media, ABA has long stressed that during a robbery, a bank’s number one priority is the safety of its customers and employees. We’ve pointed out that three out of four bank robbers usually wind up in jail within 18 months of their crime. And we’ve sought to use the media to tell Americans about bankers’ already significant robbery deterrence efforts.

This toolbox contains an additional set of resources to help you meet this challenge. It includes information on how to conduct a robbery risk assessment, enhance your robbery deterrence strategies, train employees in what to do during a robbery, fine-tune your pre- and post-robbery procedures and communicate with the public and the media about robberies.

The toolbox was developed under the tutelage of the ABA Bank Robbery Deterrence Task Force, with the capable leadership of Mary Beaty Edgar of Bank of America. The Task Force members were drawn from institutions of all sizes and from all parts of the country. The breadth of knowledge and experience of the task force members was the key to the toolbox’s comprehensiveness.

I would like to extend a special thank you to all the members of the Task Force. Their dedication, hard work and many contributions are what made this excellent member resource possible.

Sincerely, Aubrey B. Patterson, ABA Chairman

ABA Bank Robbery Deterrence

T O O L B O X

American Bankers Association

Bank Robbery Deterrence Task Force Chairperson

Ms. Mary Beaty Edgar Senior Vice President Bank of America Jacksonville, Florida

Members

Mr. Dennis L. Algiere Senior Vice President The Washington Trust Company Westerly, Rhode Island

Betty A. Conkling Director, Fraud Prevention & Investigation JPMorgan Chase Bank New York, New York

Thomas H. Eckert Vice President and Assistant Director Global Corporate Security JPMorgan Chase Bank New York, New York

Thomas W. Ellison Chairman and President Commercial Bank of Texas, NA Nacogdoches, Texas

Susan K. Flynn Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer Sarasota Bank Sarasota, Florida

Boris F. Melnikoff Consultant to the President Branch Banking and Trust Atlanta, Georgia

Bryan O'Connell Senior Investigator FleetBoston Financial Corp. Weymouth, Massachusetts

Patrick W. Wallace Worldwide Fraud Investigations FleetBoston Financial Corp. Boston, Massachusetts

William Wipprecht Director of Security Wells Fargo Bank San Francisco, California

ABA Staff

John J. Byrne Senior Counsel and Compliance Manager

John Hall Associate Director, Public Relations

Wm. Douglas Johnson Senior Policy Analyst

A B O U T T H E

ABA Bank Robbery Deterrence Toolbox

The ABA is proud to offer this toolbox — free to ABA members — to assist bankers inevaluating their current bank robbery deterrence efforts.

Financial institutions have had physical security programs in place for years, and havealways recognized, first and foremost, the need to maintain the safety of their customersand employees during a robbery attempt. Our industry has also always recognized thevalue in maintaining an active and ongoing partnership with law enforcement and othermembers of the community to deter bank robberies.

Robbery deterrence efforts on the part of financial institutionshave always been a balancing act between ensuring that thecustomer has an inviting environment in which to bank andputting in place the measures necessary to limit an institution’svulnerability to robberies. Our goal, with Tool 1: AssessingBank Robbery Risk, is to provide your institution with amethodology to evaluate your robbery risk. Tool 2: RobberyDeterrence then provides you with a review of the variousdeterrence options that are available. Combined, these toolsare designed to help you match your relative risk with theappropriate deterrence measures.

Using the finest deterrence measures available, unfortunately, does not prevent you from being robbed. Tool 3: Employee Training and Education, provides a series ofprocedures to consider before, during, and after a robbery occurs. The tool contains arobbery response kit that can be amended to suit your financial institution and community. It includes a checklist of things to do following a robbery, as well as adescription form that captures the characteristics of the robber and the robbery.

Tool 4: Communicating About Robberies, recognizes that such protection measuresdo not end when the robbery is over, and that there is a role for your employee assistance program to ensure that your employees recover from any trauma they mighthave experienced during or after the event. This tool also provides you with post-robbery procedures to discuss the robbery with your community, as well as to stress the importance of having an excellent pre-robbery relationship with law enforcement.

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Assessing Robbery Risk


T O O L

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ABA Bank Robbery Deterrence Toolbox Tool 1

© 2003 AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, Washington, D.C. 1-1

Physical Security Checklist and Inventory Any assessment of robbery risk begins with an evaluation and inventory of the measures you are already taking as a financial institution. The following checklist and inventory provides your institution with some factors to consider when evaluating your security measures. This document can be modified to suit your institution’s particular needs. For institutions with multiple branches, your institution can utilize the risk assessment provided within this toolbox to develop a suggested survey frequency. For instance, you may want to make it institution policy to evaluate new branches within 30 days after opening. Consider setting up an evaluation schedule wherein branches that have been categorized as low risk according to the survey might need to be reevaluated every two years, medium risk sites are evaluated every 18 months, and branches categorized as high risk are evaluated every year. 1. Windows Yes No N/A

Are all windows secured in a manner that prevents staff from opening them from within the facility?

Are all windows properly latched and tamper proof/resistant? Is the risk of intrusion low enough at this site that screens and/or bars are not needed on the windows?

For all windows capable of opening, note the location of any with alarm contacts in the comments section below. Comments:

2. Hatches and Vents Yes No N/A

Are exterior hatches and vents secured to prevent unauthorized external entry? Note the type of lock in the comments section (padlock, etc).

Is the risk of intrusion low enough at this site that no external hatch requires alarm protection (i.e. door contact)?

Describe location of all key locks and alarm contacts that exist currently in the comments section. Comments:

Tool 1 ABA Bank Robbery Deterrence Toolbox

1-2 © 2003 AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, Washington, D.C.

3. Doors Yes No N/A

Are all outside doors equipped with adequate locks to prevent unauthorized access after-hours?

Do all outside doors with external hinges have a security pin or screw? Is the risk of intrusion low enough at this site that no latch guards are required to prevent tampering?

Are alarm contacts used on external doors, as necessary? Describe areas of missing protection for inclusion in final recommendation.

For solid doors or doors with blind spots, are cameras and a door monitor in place or is a global “peep hole” installed?

Comments: 4. Cameras (Check all that apply) Yes Black & White Video System Color Video System Mixed: b/w and color Digital Recorder VCR Recorder 35mm Hard-Film System 70mm Hard-Film System Comments: 5. Camera Coverage Areas Number

Entrance Doors Exit-Only Doors Teller Work Stations Cash Work Rooms Teller Cash Dispenser Chests Teller Lines New Accounts Desks Drive-Up ATM Transaction ATM Chest Door Night Depository and Room Blind Areas at Remote Structures Exterior Other (describe locations in Comments Section) Comments:



6. Adequacy of Camera Coverage Yes No N/A

Are all cameras free from obstructions to their field of view? For instance, is there furniture, marketing, plants, etc. that block a camera's view of the intended subject area?

Is the current surveillance coverage adequate? If not, note missing coverage in comments section.

Is there a routine for testing individual camera coverage? During a robbery do all cameras accelerate coverage, or does one camera lock into the area of alarm trigger?

Comments: 7. Alarm Activators Yes No N/A

Is an alarm activator present at every location with access to cash (teller work stations, cash desks, etc.)? Are there an adequate number of alarm activators on desks in the facility? Are an adequate number of wireless pendants available for staff and in use (3 minimum)? Is there a silent “panic” alarm or telephone in the main vault? Is there a routine for testing individual units? Comments: 8. Perimeter Alarms Yes

Exterior Door Contacts Motion or Sound Detectors Glass Break Sensors Ceiling Sensors Other Comments (Describe locations and number of each):



Robbery Risk Assessment Questionnaire This questionnaire is designed to assist you in documenting the varying degrees of robbery risk that exist within your branch network. Each location, by its very nature, has a different risk profile. Developing an orderly approach to differentiating between your branches, in conjunction with inventorying your existing physical security measures, will allow you to determine if the level of security you have in place across your branch network matches your varying risks.

In addition to surveying your own locations, security officers should visit other financial institutions in the area as well and discuss local crime concerns with the appropriate local law enforcement agency. The following questions can be modified to meet your particular financial institution’s needs. 1. What is the total amount of monetary assets stored at this location?

Low 1 Moderate 2 High 3

Score

2. Where is the financial institution office located?

Office Complex or Campus 1 Multistory Building 2 Strip Mall 3 Standalone Building 4 Grocery Store 5

Score

3. Is the financial institution located in: Restricted access area (specialty) 1 Industrial District 2 Business/Commercial District 3 Rural Area 4

Score

4. Is the location within ½ mile of a major thoroughfare/interstate highway?

Yes 2 No 1

Score 5. Is the location within line-of-site of a governmental site, i.e., (police department, fire station): Yes 1 No 2

Score



6. Does this location have two (2) or more public entrances: Yes 2 No 1

Score 7. What is the visibility into the branch from the exterior, i.e., mirrored windows, number of windows and similar: Fair 1 Poor 3

Score 8. What is the comparative distance from the access point to the branch to the teller stations? < 15 feet 2 > 15 feet 0

Score 9. What is the comparative distance from the access point to the branch and a platform associate (FSR, commercial banker, etc.)? < 15 feet 2 > 15 feet 0

Score 10. How many psychological or physical barriers exist between the access point to the branch and the teller stations? 2 or more 1 < 2 2 None 3

Score 11. Is there a clearly marked transition zone between the public and private areas of the branch, i.e., clearly defined borders? Yes 1 No 3

Score

12. How many robberies has this location had in the past 12 months? None 0 One 5 Two 15 Three 30 More than Three 60

Score

13. How many robberies has this location had in the past 36 months? None 0 One 5 Two 10 Three 20 More than Three 30

Score



14. Have there been more than four (4) reported incidents, (ATM robbery, assault, vandalism, night depository robbery) during the past 36 months at this location? Yes 15 No 0

Score

15. Has an injury occurred at this location as a result of a crime? Yes 5 No 0

Score

16. Is there obvious gang activity within 1000 feet of the facility?

Yes 5 No 0

Score

17. Is there obvious illegal narcotics activity within 1000 feet of the facility? Yes 5 No 0

Score

18. Is there obvious vandalism and graffiti within 1000 feet of the facility? Yes 5 No 0

Score Total Score



Development of Risk Categories Based on the total score each of your branch locations received, it is now possible to rank them based upon their risk profiles. The following distribution is used purely as an example, but demonstrates a means for your institution to categorize your locations based upon their risk then develop security equipment requirements and guidelines, based upon that risk.

Theoretical Risk Categories and Equipment Requirements Risk Category 1: Less than 25 Equipment Requirements (for example):

• Alarm System • Video Surveillance • Bait Money • ATM Camera

Risk Category 2: Between 25 and 75 Equipment Requirements (for example):

• Category 1 Measures • Dye Packs • Interior Door (Exit) Cameras • Vault Camera

Risk Category 3: Greater than 75 Equipment Requirements (for example):

• Category 1 and 2 Measures • Interior Cameras • Bullet Resistant Partitioning • Guard Consideration • Controlled Access • Fencing • Limited Service





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Robbery Deterrence


T O O L

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Deterring Robberies Introduction Individuals are primarily deterred from robbing a financial institution by the fear of failure, the fear of apprehension, or both. Deterrent factors can be successfully implemented against the vast majority of potential robbers. Some robbers, however, are not to be deterred for any reason and this section is not geared toward those. The best reaction to those situations is found in other sections of this toolkit on training, coordination with law enforcement, and post robbery procedures.

Our ability to present deterrent factors is extensive. We can reach the potential robber in a variety of ways – through the building or amplification of their existing knowledge and information, or by creating/giving them new knowledge and information. Past or existing knowledge would be the publicized accounts of failed robberies, capture, prosecution and incarceration of a perpetrator. New knowledge or information would be that which we give them as they approach, or enter, our branches. Consider the path the potential robber takes as he approaches a branch – first making observations outside of the branch and then the information he or she receives as they enter and are inside a branch, all of which we control. This material is therefore presented from the approach a potential robber might encounter the information or stimulus. Using this method, we can progressively present the many potential deterrents demonstrating the cumulative effect they can have. A. DETERRENCE TOOLS FOR OUTSIDE THE BRANCH Police: Coordination, Patrols, Visual Deterrents

Utilize the local law enforcement community through communication, cooperation and coordination to provide key deterrent factors, as noted below. Consider police patrols, both walking and vehicular as part of your deterrence

program. Coordinate a weekly walk-in with the local force. It will not only create a visible presence, but also foster better communication, and cooperation. Vehicular patrols in the immediate proximity to a branch can be requested,

supplemented with parking of off duty or, “out of service” cruisers in the vicinity of a branch. Notable security experts recommend the use of police officers as guards, following

the doctrine that the best deterrent is the law enforcement officer. Supporting this consideration is the observation that while more costly, the deterrent

effect is commensurate with that cost, and potential liability may be reduced due to the level of training, skill and experience the police officer will have.



Branch Site Selection, Layout and Design

Choosing a site in a locale where the crime rates are better than other sites should help reduce the risk of robbery. Formulating a risk assessment of current and proposed branch sites by gathering

crime rate data, as well as opinions from local law enforcement personnel. Investing in a geographic/socio-economic analysis of the locale can help with

evaluation of sites. Designing a branch with the entrance in the front and full visibility including

unobstructed glass panels and low shrubbery helps discourage robbers. Teller stations should be positioned far from entrance doors, possibly in the rear of

the branch, forcing robbers to parade through the platform exposing their visual identity to many institution employees.

Guards: Armed & Unarmed, Location, Appearance, Cost

There are several factors to consider regarding the placement of armed or unarmed guards outside financial institutions, as noted below. There are several regions in the United States where armed guards are considered

necessary and have been in use for many years. It is usually in response to the violent nature and volume of robberies in those regions. This approach is effective against a vast majority of potential robbers. The greater number of guns present in a particular area simply increases the

probability of a gunfight occurring. In such cases, the possibility of serious injury and death becomes a reality. Unarmed guards provide another level of deterrence, and may be more available, or

versatile as a greeter while controlling costs. The presence of unarmed guards will more likely lead to a de-escalation of violence. Finally, the responsibility and liability issues significantly increase with the presence

of armed guards. Some private contract guard companies simply will not provide armed guards. Guards outside a branch should have a dual effect on robbery deterrence. A robber

will be hesitant to pass the guard to commit the robbery, with worry not only about his or her escape, but also that an escape route will be observed and reported by that guard. The guard’s appearance balances deterrence with customer comfort and safety. While standard uniforms are most common and customer friendly, they may not

have the deterrent effect of guards in a military fatigue style uniform. Several institutions use the military uniform as the standard. However, those banks are frequently in areas with elevated robbery rates. The annual cost of guards may be a primary concern for some institutions. Costs can be controlled through the implementation of a reduced and random

schedule to defray costs associated with full-time guards while also serving as a deterrent by their randomness. Additionally, contract guards may be less costly than police or law enforcement details.



Signs: Attire, Reward & Cooperation Programs, Enforcement

Signs at the door requesting the removal of identity-obscuring attire such as hats, hoods and sunglasses are increasing in popularity and use. A potential robber never wants to bring any additional attention to them by being the only person in a branch with a hat, hood, or sunglasses. Some institutions also do not allow backpacks or musical instrument cases inside the

location. Other signage in use notifies patrons and potential robbers that the institution

participates in reward programs in conjunction with law enforcement. Regular customers may become more observant while in the branch and those in the institution with knowledge of criminal activity may take advantage of the tip-line to earn a reward. Sign design, and location will determine effectiveness of this tool. (Please refer to

samples provided with this material.) While enforcement of such a policy can remain soft, simply the approach of a

greeter, branch employee, or guard to address the issue should serve as a deterrent. If only one person is deterred then this low cost measure is considered effective. Finally, if a robber complies by removing disguising or covering articles, but follows

through on their robbery, identification is greatly enhanced by the quality of photos. This can also be effective in witness identification that can be used to make a case.

B. DETERRENCE TOOLS FOR INSIDE THE BRANCH Police: Employees, Roles

The use of off-duty officers as part-time employees may have several benefits. These officers can recognize key robbery indicators, such as suspicious activity or behavior preceding a robbery regarding particular individuals. Additionally, such officers can provide immediate crime scene control for evidence

preservation in the post robbery environment.

Guards: Positioning, Roles

Guards inside serve as a significant deterrent to potential robbers, while adding other useful elements of safety and security. Positioning internal guards is key. Placing them near the primary door, or lobby area

so a potential robber must see and pass them can ensure their visibility. The guard inside can be used as a slightly more customer friendly presence through

welcoming and/or enforcing branch policies regarding attire (e.g., hats or sunglasses). The location of these guards also affords them the opportunity to make observations

should a robbery occur. Most considerations regarding the use of armed vs. unarmed guards also apply when

guards are positioned inside rather than outside.



Greeters: Employees, Policy Enforcement

Greeters also have a deterrent effect in that potential robbers do not want to have any interaction with someone who might be able to identify them. There are several ways to implement a greeter program, as noted below. Internally posted guards, as previously noted, have a significant deterrent effect,

while also having the ability to enforce branch policies regarding attire. Employees may serve as greeters, and certainly would be more customer friendly.

Employees can be assigned on a rotating basis instead of giving the responsibility solely to a platform representative. Employees encourage compliance with bank attire policies.

Video Monitors: Type, Usage

Teller line monitors are positioned inside to display the customers standing in line, or approaching tellers, or platform personnel. The customer is reminded that they are on camera and a clear image of him or her is being obtained. Teller line monitors should be wired to recorders whenever possible. Although there

might be some cost savings with a closed loop, conversely if the camera is wired to a recorder there is an additional image of the potential robber. Initial tests of these monitors suggest that when placed in sites consistently robbed,

there is some reduction in robbery activity.

Barriers: Accessibility, Full & Partial, Fixed & Movable

When considering various types of barriers, fully assess legal compliance with the Americans the Disabilities Act, accessibility, as well as the appearance they present to customers. Full bandit barriers are expensive and effective. Their emplacement creates not only

greater security for personnel but also provides a sense of safety for them. When barriers are in place there is adherence to robbery procedures, such as early

alarm activation. Ensure you determine whether your institution requires bullet resistant materials and

evaluate whether the counter is resistant if you are adding bullet resistant barriers from the counter up. Evaluate the areas both above and below the teller counter when considering bullet

resistant barriers to ensure maximization of safety and security. Partial barriers are a cost-effective approach to providing some additional security

and deterrence where none might have previously existed. Fixed barriers are most common, and cost effective. To help with customer acceptance ensure that acoustics are sufficient for smooth

communications by thorough testing. Movable barriers can be steel walls that rise in a teller area to segregate and protect

employees. Those devices have had some success in other countries. Some security professionals in the states have been somewhat concerned about the

safety of those units that propel upwards quickly from the counter. These types of devices also represent costly, high-end solutions.



Access Control Devices

There is currently much growth in their acceptance and use. Moderate and high-risk areas have been the primary recipients of these types of

devices. Operationally, they effectively allow only one person to pass through the vestibule at

a time. Often equipped with metal detectors they can lock down an individual automatically

or manually as the need arises. While costly upon installment, they are obvious to all and serve as a significant

deterrent. In comparison, the one-time cost may equal that of the annual cost of one guard. Obviously, when considering this type of device, its impact on customer flow rate

into and out of the branch must be assessed.

C. ADDITIONAL TOOLS – (For Response) Alarms: Location, Testing, Integration

Switch placement should include platform positions, customer service desks and employee lounges; lounge doors should have a peephole and an alarm activation signal light. Testing programs should be 1) routine (quarterly, if not more frequent), 2)

documented in a log and, 3) involve all necessary parties – bank personnel, law enforcement, security contractors or guards. Holdup alarm activation procedures and policies must be reviewed at least

semiannually and more frequently while personnel are considered new. Video integration can be accomplished with some new systems, which will allow

transmission of the video images to your security console.

Cameras

Video cameras should be checked on an annual basis for: 1) focus, 2) field of view, 3) cleanliness, 4) glare, or 5) obscurations - such as plants, or notices. Images produced by either videotape or digital video recorder (DVR) should also be

evaluated on a semiannual basis.



Video Tape: Use, Maintenance

All tapes should be clearly and consistently labeled. Videotapes should be replaced annually to ensure quality images, and should not be

used more than four times to maintain maximum image quality. Tape retention averages from three to six months in general, and tapes provided for

investigations should be immediately replaced in order to prevent over use of the remaining tapes. Maintenance programs should be comprehensive and include periodic VCR

recording head replacement. These programs should include a periodic quality spot-check, as well as time

synchronization to the strictest standards possible. Immediately remove the record protect tab after a robbery to ensure preservation of

the images.

Digital Video Recorders (DVRs)

There are both benefits and disadvantages with the use of DVRs. Images can be sent immediately via Internet e-mail to law enforcement agencies. Images can also be retrieved remotely by investigators at a centralized location. Branch personnel are fully removed from laborious tape change and storage duties. Speed, remote access and clarity of images are greatly improved over analog systems. DVR systems are costly to install. Some problems may exist in regard to evidentiary protocols, which have not been

clearly defined by top law enforcement officials. Images may be electronically altered thus corrupting an original image rendering it

useless as evidence. There may be case law developing which will allow DVR images to be transferred to

CD to be used by prosecutors. Dye Packs

The use of dye packs and their potential versus actual effectiveness is often debated. Seek advice from institutions that do use them as well as those that do not. Some municipalities do not allow gas to be used, only dye and smoke, check for local

regulations and ordinances before implementation. Styles and configurations of dye packs continue to evolve and vendors will happily

present a full spectrum of options. New “flex-packs” are quite authentic; however, savvy robbers often intimidate tellers

by demanding no “exploding money”.



Locator Devices

There are electronic tracking systems on the market that use radio transmitters to help locate robbers. These devices typically use a radio triangulation system to pinpoint the suspect’s position. These systems always require infrastructure using radio towers as well as cooperation

from responding police, as the tracking devices must be installed in their vehicles. These can be very effective in apprehending robbers, however, the set-up requires

cooperation among financial institutions and some financial investment. Bait / Decoy Money

Used by many institutions to assist in prosecuting bank robbers as providing significant evidence that the currency was stolen from the victim institution. This requires some maintenance including an updated record of the serial numbers and a regular change of currency straps. Some institutions have opted for decoy money, which is not recorded and thus

requires less maintenance. This security measure is intended more for loss reduction than for prosecution.

Intranet Sites

Internal Web sites can be set up to provide tremendous amounts of information very rapidly and inexpensively to your branch managers, once the Web site is established. Branch security procedures, employee awareness, bank robber wanted posters,

security alerts, and security personnel contact lists can be easily managed through Web page programs.

Reward Programs & Internet Sites

Various clearing-house associations and trade associations offer reward programs. Many operate in conjunction with local or regional Web sites. Others prepare and distribute wanted posters to branches and are funded by the victim banks as a percentage of the individual losses they each experienced. Many “crime stopper” organizations are willing to place bank robbers on their

wanted poster campaigns. In these cases, the distribution is widespread and the rewards are much smaller, making them an effective yet inexpensive aid in apprehension. Many state banking departments, state bankers associations and trade associations

have excellent Web sites that offer a variety of information dealing with topics from ATM crime to elderly abuse to bank robbery prevention.








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Employee Training and Education


T O O L

3



Before, During and After the Robbery Before a Robbery Before a robbery occurs, training can provide employees with the ability to think through their reactions, mentally prepare them for a robbery, and practice their response. Training should be provided on a regular basis, to ensure that the proper reactions are in place and clearly understood. The following are topics that should be addressed in training programs offered to all staff working in a branch:

Branch security equipment, including alarms and camera systems, should be tested to ensure that all activation and warning devices are in good working order. Testing should include transmitting an alarm to the monitoring station to ensure that communications are functional as well.

Cash maintained in teller drawers should be kept to the lowest amount required

to effectively conduct business. Excess cash should be transferred to the vault or another storage area as frequently as needed to maintain low cash levels. Transfers of cash should not be on a fixed schedule.

Provide training on the operation of alarm devices. Every employee in the

branch should know how to operate every alarm device throughout the branch. Although tellers might normally be working behind a teller line, they may find themselves at a desk in the customer service area. They should know the location of every alarm activation device, and how to properly activate the alarm.

Provide training on the monitoring process used for security alarms. Branch

staff should know that the alarm does not create an audible signal within the branch, and know where the alarm is monitored. If the monitoring site calls the branch to confirm a robbery, branch staff should be trained on how to respond to the call.

Provide training on the operation of notification or warning signals. Employees

in non-public areas of the branch should have some process to determine that the public areas of the branch are safe to enter. A warning light, for example, near the door of a break room should be interlinked with alarm activation devices. Branch staff should be taught to check the warning light, and be provided a way to determine if a robbery is in progress when the warning light is illuminated.

Prepare bait money, recording all serial numbers.

Designate, in advance, a specific, consistent location for all bait money to ensure

that tellers can always find the bait money, and ensure that it is not paid out to customers.



During a Robbery During a robbery, the following points should be covered with all staff working in the branch:

Stay calm. Robberies are usually over very quickly.

Comply with demands of the robber(s) and to take no actions that would place themselves or others in danger.

Give the least amount of cash possible. Include the bait money previously

prepared.

Observe the robber(s) as closely as possible, noting their clothes, any jewelry, any scars or tattoos, approximate height and weight, and other identifying characteristics.

If a note is used, handle it as little as possible, and set it aside as soon as it is read.

Try to keep the demand note.

Activate the alarm and camera system as soon as it is safe to do so.

Once the robber(s) has left the branch, notify other employees that a robbery has occurred.

As quickly as possible after the robber(s) have left the branch, lock all doors to

the branch.

If possible, note the direction of escape for the robber(s), including a description of any vehicle used to escape. Do not pursue the robber(s).



After a Robbery After a robbery occurs, the following steps should be followed to ensure that no one in the branch has been injured, and to preserve evidence for law enforcement:

Call law enforcement (usually 911 for local law enforcement) and the FBI. Be prepared to tell them that a robbery has just occurred, the address of the branch, and any identification you can provide on the robber(s), vehicle(s) used and direction of escape.

Contact the alarm monitoring station to confirm that the alarm was received, and

determine if law enforcement has been dispatched to the branch.

Ensure that no one in the branch needs medical attention. If any one is injured, call for medical assistance.

If possible, post a notice at the main entrance to the branch, to notify customers

that the branch is temporarily closed, and to give the location of the nearest open branch.

Ensure that you have fulfilled all requirements under your insurance policy.

Station someone near the main entrance to wait for the police. Let no one into

the branch except law enforcement.

Give each witness (employees or customers) a description form to help them recollect what they saw, or give each witness a piece of paper to makes notes about what they observed.

If customers insist on leaving, get their names and phone numbers to share with

law enforcement if needed.

Protect any areas that the robber(s) touched or stood in an effort to preserve any fingerprints or any footprints they might have left.

Remove all employee nameplates to ensure their anonymity.



What Not to Do The following are steps which branch employees should be taught not to take:

Do not attempt to chase or detain the robber(s) in any way.

Do not attempt to determine the amount of cash taken in the robbery until law enforcement begins their investigation.

Do not discuss the robbery, or compare notes regarding the robber(s). Each

witness to the robbery should be prepared to give an independent description of what they saw to law enforcement.

Do not provide information to the media. In particular, do not provide the

name(s) of any tellers robbed.

Do not discuss the amount of money taken during the robbery.

Do not answer telephones during the robbery unless instructed to do so by the robber(s).

To simplify the robbery response process, a robbery response kit has been included in this toolbox, which can be tailored to your institution and pre-positioned in the branch. Each of the responsibilities listed above should be printed on a separate sheet, and given to branch employees to follow. The robbery kit includes a robbery description form, along with a form to collect the names, addresses and telephone numbers of everyone present in the branch during the robbery. Specialized Training Situations In some instances, the branch may be equipped with specialized robbery prevention devices such as bandit barriers. In these instances, tellers can be instructed to alter their robbery response procedures as follows:

If no weapon is displayed or threatened, duck out of sight of the robber and tell another employee that a robbery attempt is in progress.

If a weapon is displayed or threatened, give a small amount of cash to the

robber, and immediately notify another employee that the institution has been robbed.

If dye packs or tracking devices are used in the branch, tellers should be trained on how the devices work. Dye pack sensors should also be placed at all location exits and tellers should be trained in their operation. These devices should be tested on a regular basis along with other security devices.



If the robbery involves a takeover of the branch, or an unusual amount of violence or threat of violence, branch staff may suffer from trauma because of the experience. Counseling should be offered to anyone adversely affected by the experience to ensure that they receive the support needed to return to work. If a bomb or other explosive device is used during the robbery and is left at the scene, staff should be instructed not to touch or disturb the device in any way. Branch staff should secure all currency, evacuate the branch after the robber(s) has left, and should call law enforcement from a safe location away from the branch. Electronic devices such as cell phones or radios should not be used in the vicinity of the device. If a robbery is attempted at a drive-through window, tellers should be instructed to duck out of sight, and to notify another employee immediately. If a device is sent into the branch through the drawer, do not touch or disturb the device in any way. If possible, send the device back outside the branch, drop out of sight, and notify another employee of the robbery attempt. Preserving Evidence Evidence left at the scene can provide critical clues that can possibly allow law enforcement to link robberies, identify suspects, and prosecute the crime. Evidence includes any notes used in the commission of the robbery, any possible fingerprints at the scene, and footprints left in the branch. It is important that any areas where the robber visited be carefully protected to ensure that evidence is preserved. Chairs, queue line ropes or other physical barriers should be placed around the affected teller area(s). Training Methods Training methods can include videotape programs, staff meetings, reminders and periodic reminders. If the branch staff includes tellers who have been through a robbery, they should be encouraged to discuss their experience with others, including their reaction to the threat. Personal stories from more experienced tellers could provide the needed reassurance that the robbery is typically over quickly, and that life can return to normal. In some jurisdictions, law enforcement will perform a “mock robbery” to allow tellers to experience a “robbery” event without the risk of actual harm. If a mock robbery exercise is conducted, care should be taken to ensure that tellers are notified in advance, and customers are prevented from visiting the branch during the exercise. Even with advance warning, and the knowledge that the “robbers” are actually law enforcement officers, some tellers may be frightened by the experience, and should be therefore offered the opportunity to talk with a counselor if they are disturbed by the experience.



Mistakes to Avoid During a Robbery Many employees will never experience a robbery. But those who do will find that it can be a very traumatic experience. Approximately 80 percent of bank robberies involve a lone robber who holds up a lone teller. The robber may hand the teller a note and may or may not display a weapon. The robber’s goal is to appear simply as a customer conducting a transaction. He doesn't want to be noticed and counts on only one witness – the teller.1 Take-over robberies have been increasing in the last few years and can be extremely dangerous. These robbers, who usually travel in groups, will enter the branch with guns drawn and be very intimidating, creating a volatile situation. The robbers may jump the teller counter and force tellers down to the floor. The Bank Protection Act requires that all employees and officers be trained annually on proper procedures for robberies, larcenies and burglaries. Most financial institutions will train their tellers but fail to recognize the importance of training all employees and officers regarding their responsibilities under the protection act. Unfortunately, this lack of training has resulted in some very dangerous actions taken by employees. Annual security training of employees will meet the requirements of the Bank Protection Act but annually is not sufficient. Bank Security Officers should constantly be reminding tellers of proper procedures they should follow during a robbery throughout the year. This can be accomplished by sending out memos, distributing newspaper stories or security articles about robberies, which is a form of continuing education. 1. Do not treat the holdup note as a joke or a prank. There have been several instances

in which a teller has been handed a holdup note and believes the customer is joking. If the teller does not believe the note is serious, the robber may feel forced to display a weapon, escalating the likelihood of harm.

2. Do not create any surprises for the robber. In some cases, tellers have abandoned

their teller station if they don’t observe a weapon. Others have been advised to pretend to faint. These actions may be successful in thwarting the robber, who may simply run out of the branch. But if the robber is really desperate, the teller’s actions may cause the robber to display a weapon and possibly grab a customer in the lobby. Do exactly what the robber tells you to do.

3. Do not carry excess cash in your cash drawer. Robbers can potentially come back if

they’re given large amounts of cash. Tellers should adhere to their institution’s cash limits for both top drawer and teller station. If a teller accepts a large cash deposit, excess cash should be transferred to the head teller immediately.

4. Do not offer to rob the entire institution for the robber. Only give to the robber the

money demanded. Don’t ask if the robber wants the cash in your second drawer. 1 “Mistakes to Avoid During a Robbery” has been adapted from the work of Mr. Tony Brissette, President, Brissettee Consulting Services.



5. Do not attempt to bring attention to the robbery. Statistically, employees who follow the robber’s instructions are seldom injured in the course of a robbery. Handle the robber as you would a regular customer. The most important role you have in this robbery is to ensure the safety of all employees and customers in the branch. Bringing attention to the robber could compromise the safety of all.

6. Do not argue with the robber or attempt to talk him or her out of the robbery.

Arguing, confronting or attempting to talk the robber out of the crime will increase the likelihood that others will become aware a robbery is in progress and escalate the level of danger.

7. Do not tell customers that you have just been robbed. After one robbery, just as the

robber reached the front door, the teller yelled out “grab him, he just robbed me.” This was an extremely dangerous action that places the safety of employees and customers in danger. What if a customer did attempt to grab the robber and a struggle took place in which a weapon was used and either a customer or employee was injured or killed? On occasion, customers, believing they are acting as good Samaritans, have confronted or chased robbers and increased the likelihood of danger to themselves and others.

8. Do not ever leave the bank after a robbery. In numerous cases after the robber left

the branch, an employee will either exit the branch to see if they can observe the robber’s getaway or – worse – actually pursue the robber in a chase. This type of action not only places the employee in danger but also poses a threat to others. If during such a chase or attempt to observe a robber that someone is injured, the institution will have potential liability in a possible civil action. Let the police pursue the robber. If you are taken hostage, also attempt to find ways to not leave the branch.

9. In a take-over robbery, do not make sudden movements. Do not attempt to activate

hold up alarms, run out of the branch, or attempt to call the police. Take-over robberies are extremely dangerous because the robbers are most likely displaying weapons. If you are on the telephone when a take-over robbery occurs, hang the telephone up and do not answer any in-coming calls unless instructed to by the robbers. Attempting to activate an alarm can also be very dangerous if the robbers observe you during your attempt. Do not try to escape the robbery, as robbers will be closely watching for this activity.

10. Do not ever attempt to engage the robber(s) in a struggle. Although most of us

would never imagine engaging a robber in a physical confrontation, there have been cases in which bank security guards, branch managers and other employees have physically confronted bank robbers. Remember this type of response to a robber increases the level of danger to all employees and customers in the branch.



Robbery Response Kit Having the proper documents handy after a robbery has occurred will greatly ease the process of making sure that you get all of the information necessary to quickly apprehend and convict the robber. This robbery response kit can be amended to suit your financial institution and community. It includes a description form that captures the characteristics of the robber and the robbery, and a form to help you get in contact with any witnesses and employees who were present when the robbery occurred.

Post Robbery Checklist

After a robbery occurs, the following steps should be followed to ensure that no one in the branch has been injured, and to preserve evidence for law enforcement:

Call law enforcement (usually 911 for local law enforcement) and the FBI. Be prepared to tell them that a robbery has just occurred, the address of the branch, and any identification you can provide on the robber(s), vehicle(s) used and direction of escape.

Contact the alarm monitoring station to confirm that the alarm was received, and to

determine if law enforcement has been dispatched to the branch.

Ensure that no one in the branch needs medical attention or should be referred to your employee assistance program. If anyone is injured, call for medical assistance.

If possible, post a notice at the main entrance to the branch, to notify customers that

the branch is temporarily closed, and to give the location of the nearest open branch.

Station someone near the main entrance to wait for the police. Let no one into the branch except law enforcement.

Give each witness (employees or customers) a description form to help them

recollect what they saw, or give each witness a piece of paper to make notes about what they observed.

If customers insist on leaving, get their names and phone numbers to share with law

enforcement, if needed.

Protect any areas that the robber(s) touched visited to preserve any fingerprints or any footprints they might have left.



Robbery Description Form Fill in the blanks immediately after a robbery and before you compare notes with anyone else. Describe or circle only those items you are sure of. Use the blank figure to draw in hard-to-describe details such as patterns of clothing and/or location of scars. Please provide additional copies of this form for each robber. Date of Robbery: Time:

Institution or Company Name:

Branch:

Address:

Phone:

Your Name:

Home Address:

Phone:

Position:

Signature:

Date: Time: Loud Soft Lisp Slow High-Pitched

Refined Rapid Nasal Deep Stutter SPEECH: Other: (describe):

Local Eastern Southern Western Foreign ACCENT: Other (describe):

Semiautomatic Pistol Revolver Knife Rifle

Automatic Rifle Submachine Gun Shotgun Sawed-Off ShotgunWEAPON:

COLOR: Black Shiny Other:

DESCRIBE WEAPON

Did robber use a note? Yes No Did you retain note? Yes No

If you were unable to keep the note – what did it say?

If robber spoke – what did he or she say?

ROBBERY DETAIL

Did the robber have an accomplice you were aware of? Yes No



Don’t Know On Foot Car Other Vehicle ROBBER’S

ESCAPE Type of Vehicle:

Make:

Model:

Color:

Year:

License Number:

Number of Other Passengers in Vehicle:

ESCAPE VEHICLE

Direction Taken:

ADDITIONAL NOTES OR DESCRIPTIONS



HEIGHT: WEIGHT: RACE: APPARENT AGE: SEX: Male Female COMPLEXION: Sallow Light Ruddy Freckled Dark

Blonde Red Brown Gray BlackHAIR COLOR:

Partially Gray Other:

FACIAL HAIR Beard Unshaven Moustache Long Short Medium Bald Wig Straight HAIR STYLE: Medium Curly Partially Bald Bushy Thin

EYEBROWS: High Over Eyes Low Over

Large Wide Set Small Close Together Pouches Deep Set EYES:

Droopy Blue Gray Hazel

EYE COLOR: Brown Black Small Large Long

NOSE: Short Thin Wide Straight Crooked Buck

TEETH: Discolored Some Missing Long Square Receding

CHIN: Prominent

EARS: Small Prominent MASK: Yes No HANDS: Right-handed Left-handed

Please use the blank figure to draw in any hard-to-describe details such as patterns of clothing or location of scars.

Suit: Gloves: Jacket: Hat: Sweater: Shoes: Slacks: Overcoat: Skirt or Dress: Raincoat: Tie: Windbreaker:

CLOTHING: Circle items and describe:

Belt Buckle: Other Marks and Characteristics: Describe any other personal characteristics such as scars, tattoos, birthmarks, limp, twitch, deformities, amputations, or any jewelry such as a watch, ring, necklace, earring, etc., that the robber wore:



Robbery Witness Contact Form

Name Address Telephone Number



Your Robbery Deterrence and Response Policy Having a robbery deterrence and response policy, as part of your overall policies and procedures, will also provide your institution with a consistent approach to all the steps you wish employees to take before, during, and after a robbery occurs. Many, if not all of the documents in this toolbox, if used by your institution, can be referenced or incorporated into such a policy. You may want to consider portions of the following sample policy as you think through the process of revising your existing robbery deterrence and response documentation. Preventive Measures Employees should be instructed to be aware of all customers in the branch and to make eye contact with them when possible. Persons loitering about should be approached and offered assistance. Unusual behavior or items should be monitored and/or addressed. Under no circumstances should patrons or contractors be allowed into the vault or allowed in areas of the branch not for public use, unless they are known and their purpose is verified. Workmen or delivery persons approaching the doors of the branch before or after hours must provide identification and the reason for entry before being allowed into the building. Actions During a Robbery Every staff member must be familiar with the company’s policy and instructions regarding robbery attempts. Employees should follow the instructions of would-be robbers and not take any action that would antagonize the robber(s), or place the life of any employee or customer in jeopardy. Employees being robbed or employees observing a robbery attempt should activate the alarm and surveillance system if the activation can be accomplished safely. If the robbery involves only one person trying to discreetly control one individual, the individual being robbed should make no effort to signal or gain the attention of any other employees of the branch. Employees should give no more than the amount demanded. They should be trained to ensure that bait money is also given. Employees should attempt to provide a good description of the robber(s). Attention should be paid to the following items:

• clothing • weapons • speech patterns • facial characteristics • the method of operation • other mannerisms or peculiarities that attract attention.



Employees should be trained to observe areas touched or objects handled by the robber(s) so that they can be processed for fingerprints. If a demand note is used, it should be kept for evidence if it is safe to do so. If possible and without taking undue risks, an attempt should be made to obtain a complete description of the method of transportation used by the robber(s). This may include type, model, make and color of the vehicle, the license number and the direction of travel. This should be done by observing from windows. No attempt should be made to exit the branch. Once the robber(s) has left the bank, the bank doors should be locked to prevent the robber(s) from returning and taking hostages. Employees must not make an attempt to follow or detain a robber. Actions After a Robbery Has Occurred The institution’s Manager of Branch Operations and/or management in charge at the time of the robbery is responsible for the following items:

1. Ensure that the branch is immediately closed and restrict access to the area involved until law enforcement personnel have completed the initial stage of their investigation. Only law enforcement and the institution’s administration personnel are to be allowed into the branch until customer service has been restored.

2. Ensure that these Robbery procedures have been followed and a Robber Description

Form is prepared. Provide instructions to all appropriate personnel and customers.

3. Isolate witnesses so that law enforcement staff may interview them. Employees and witnesses should not be allowed to compare information prior to being interviewed.

4. Immediate telephone notification must be given in the following order:

1. Local Police, County Sheriff or Highway Patrol 2. FBI Office (if local authorities have not responded) 3. Corporate Security

5. Descriptive information such as direction of travel, description of the car, etc.,

should be given to the local law enforcement agency so they may provide the information to persons responding to the alarm.

After law enforcement has processed the area for evidence, management must secure the victim’s cash drawer and work area until two persons can conveniently audit them. Information related to the crime scene and bait money involved (dollar amount, denomination and serial numbers) should be given to the investigating law enforcement agency. Still-photo security cameras should be opened in the presence of the FBI or law enforcement officers. If a video camera is used, the bank’s Manager of Branch Operations should maintain custody of the videotape. The Manager of Branch Operations will surrender the film or cassette to the designated law enforcement officer collecting evidence.



Law Enforcement Response and Involvement Law enforcement response may vary with circumstances such as number of personnel available, vehicles in the general area, and existing weather conditions. Generally, at the receipt of an alarm, the law enforcement response is to immediately dispatch officers to strategic areas surrounding the bank. When properly located, the police dispatcher will call the branch to determine if the alarm is false. All local police should have been instructed not to enter the branch, but to assume discreet positions outside until the alarm is confirmed. Under false alarm conditions, a member of management should always meet the law enforcement officers outside the branch. This is usually done when the Police Dispatcher phones and requests the meeting. At this time, confirmation will be made whether a false alarm or an actual robbery has occurred, and only then will police enter the branch. Until a member of the bank management has made this contact, the local police will assume that the robber is still in the bank building and will be primed to apprehend anyone leaving the premises as a potential robber. Do not exit the bank to meet responding officers until the police dispatcher has requested this by phone. Press Releases After a Robbery or Robbery Attempt Photographers, other members of the press or other unauthorized individuals are not to be allowed in the branch during an investigation of a robbery. Under no circumstances are employees to give interviews or release information to the press. All requests for information from the news media must be directed to the employee with public relations responsibilities.








ABA MEMBERS ONLY

Communicating About Robberies


T O O L

4



Communicating with Your Employees

A necessary part of any robbery deterrence program is a policy regarding treatment of employees who have been victimized by the crime. Since every financial institution stresses the importance of protecting the staff over the loss of money, a clear program emphasizing that position is essential. In addition, each institution should have a policy of assisting any customers could have also been victimized. Impact from a Robbery on the Victims

A paper from the National Victim’s Assistance Academy1 outlined a number of common reactions to a robbery by both customers and employees. These reactions need to be recognized and all staff members should possess a working knowledge of the possibilities that a colleague may have them. For example, victims often fear the return of the criminal so notification of the court proceedings is important. The victim may also have trouble concentrating on work; there may be an increased use of sick leave as well as a decline in their customer service. These and other similar factors make counseling very important. Experts also suggest that assisting the employee may lead to that individual being a stronger witness, increasing the possibility of conviction. For the front-line personnel who were victimized, in addition to the reactions mentioned above, employees may feel guilty (even though they followed bank policy) for the monetary loss to the institution. Some employees worry that they may lose their jobs because of the robbery and that by requesting counseling under workers compensation, they may be labeled as problem employees. Whether any of these fears are well founded, they all should be addressed.

1 1996 National Victim Assistance Academy paper, “Federal Crimes: White Collar/Economic Fraud/Bank Robbery”, Chapter 21, Section 9.



Elements of an Employee Assistance Program

There are a number of examples of programs currently being offered at the state and federal level that provide assistance in the form of support groups. Banks have contributed monetary and human resources to these programs. If you have not done so already, look for local or regional groups and offer to participate. The Office of Victim Assistance (OVA) at the Department of Justice has a Website that provides information about these groups. Please go to: http://www.ojp.gov/ovc/help/links.htm The FBI also has many resources dedicated to victim’s assistance. Go to: http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/victimassist/fbiresources/resources.htm How do these support groups work? Most meet monthly and are confidential. The meetings enable victims to share strategies to cope with the crime, to understand the legal remedies and to learn about community resources that may be available. Some of the victims want to know about the prosecution of the criminal and seek notice of the court proceedings. Others simply want to get back into the workplace without trauma. Offering the employee a means to address their fears and get back to the bank will ensure a productive employee but, more importantly, a loyal employee. Therefore, crafting an Employee Assistance Program should include the following:

• Post robbery interview, • Assist the employee with law enforcement follow-up, • Offer appropriate leave of absence, • Direct employee to support groups or other types of counseling, as situation dictates,

and • Provide information on victim assistance programs that include reimbursement for

out-of-pocket expenses. For more information on successful EAPs, please contact the ABA.



Communicating With the Media In communicating with the public about a robbery, it is important that a single person be designated in advance as your institution’s media contact. All other employees should be informed to refrain from speaking to the press and to refer reporters to this designated spokesperson. It is not that you or your institution is trying to restrict information regarding the event. In fact, it is important that the community is informed about the robbery. But it is also important that your institution’s message be accurate and consistent. The best way to have a consistent message is to have a consistent messenger. Do not allow the media to enter the building if the police and FBI have not completed their investigation. Explain to them that evidence from the scene is still being gathered, and refer them to your institution’s designated spokesperson. Do not allow the media to photograph the inside of the branch or any witnesses, and do not disclose the names of tellers or witnesses. Protecting the identity of witnesses is extremely important since they can be at risk. Do not disclose the amount of money taken, or discuss specifics about your security system or procedures. If your local law enforcement or FBI contacts indicate that it is appropriate for you to do so, consider having your media spokesperson release the following information:

The date and time of the robbery, That no one was injured, if that is the case, A brief statement reassuring customers that your institution is safe, The contact information for your official spokesperson, and The contact information for the press officer of your local law enforcement

or FBI office. Your financial institution should not feel obliged to provide details about the robbery itself. Generally, there is no reason for your institution to put out a press release. Local law enforcement, and particularly the FBI, will do so, releasing any details that in their expert opinion will assist them in the apprehension and conviction of the robber. Consider referring reporters to the ABA. The ABA public relations department takes media calls on robberies on a regular basis. This helps broaden the story and allows a trusted-third party to give the industry’s point of view. While ABA spokespeople never discuss specifics with reporters, they do give general information on institution procedures and FBI statistics.



Listed below are some of the media talking points that the ABA uses when discussing robberies. Other talking points on a variety of issues can be found in the “Communications Tools” section of www.aba.com.

Key Points During a robbery, an institution’s number one priority is to protect customers

and employees.

Our best line of defense is a well-trained staff who understand how to handle robberies before, during, and after they occur. Institutions regularly schedule ongoing training for all front-line and branch staff.

Employees are not expected to catch criminals, but they are expected to assist law enforcement in their pursuit. That’s why institutions invest heavily in sophisticated alarm systems, surveillance cameras and other security devices that can’t be disclosed. Some institution’s even use “bandit barriers” (bullet-proof glass that separates the teller from the customer) to prevent robbers from jumping over the counter.

According to the FBI, three out of four bank robbers are caught within 18 months of their crime. This is because of well-trained employees, security devices and cooperation among bankers and law enforcement.

Bank robberies across the nation have been fluctuating during the past 10 years or so, peaking in 1991.

Most bank robberies are drug-related, according to experts. In fact, 49 percent of bank robbers are drug-users, according to the FBI.

Unfortunately, even law enforcement experts cannot explain why the number of bank robberies fluctuates. Some security experts attribute the problem to increased drug usage and/or swings in the economy.

Background Bank robberies peaked in 1991, dropped every year after 1996, yet rose in 2000 and 2001. Institutions continue to search for new ways to fight the problem, but their best strategy is to make sure employees are trained and security systems are in place and working properly. Fortunately, well-trained tellers, alarm systems, cameras, “wanted” posters, special Internet sites, and other security devices have been effective in helping law enforcement officials catch bank robbers.

Ninety-five percent of all robberies are non-violent in nature, such as “note-jobs.” In 2001, injuries occurred in two percent of robberies; hostages were taken in 1.4 percent of cases; and deaths occurred in less than 0.4 percent of cases.



Communicating With Law Enforcement As was discussed in the Introduction to this Toolbox, several municipalities and police departments have expressed concerns about the banking industry’s efforts to deter bank robberies. Make the job of deterring robberies a partnership. Communicating with law enforcement about what you are currently doing to deter robberies, and asking for their assistance and recommendations as to what you could do to improve your deterrence measures, are the best ways to build a productive relationship. Building a productive relationship, where financial institutions and law enforcement view themselves as a partnership, can help prevent the perception that institutions are not doing enough to prevent robberies. You can demonstrate your commitment to bank security in many ways, including the following:

Invite law enforcement officials to visit your branch locations to show them your existing robbery deterrence measures and ask for suggestions as to how they can be improved.

Consider rehearsing a robbery with each branch’s local law enforcement. Such

rehearsals can uncover areas for improvement in existing policies and procedures.

If you have a branch that is particularly robbery prone or demonstrates a higher

level of risk than other branches, consider requesting that local law enforcement increase patrols in that area. Also consider requesting that unused patrol cars be parked at the branch.

Share your forms for reporting and describing a robbery with law enforcement

and ask for suggestions as to how they can be improved. Ask for any standardized forms law enforcement would prefer you to use or incorporate into your own forms, if available.

Consider having Federal or local law enforcement conduct a security seminar for

your institution or for all of the institutions in your community.

Depending upon the volume of robberies in your community, consider the advisability of forming a joint task force and/or a reward program with law enforcement.

If armed personnel are required due to a significant robbery problem, consider

your local law enforcement department as your first choice for finding an off-duty, uniformed officer.



Documents

TOOLBOX - ABA - American Bankers Association · PDF fileABOUT THE ABA Bank Robbery Deterrence Toolbox The ABA is proud to offer this toolbox — free to ABA members — to assist bankers