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Tomaž Turk:The Market Dynamics of Digital Content
Digital content
• The user view of digital technology
• Information markets• The role of libraries• Price for access to digital content• Spam economics • Copyright - the price of creativity
ESPOSITO, Joseph J.: The Processed Book. First Monday, 8 (2003), 3 (URL: http://www.firstmonday.dk)KENNEY, Anne R.: Digital to Microfilm Conversion: A Demonstration Project 1994-1996 (URL: http://www.library.cornell.edu/preservation/com/comfin.html, 7.1.2004)KINGMA, Bruce R.: The Economics of Information: A Guide to Economic and Cost-benefit Analysis for Information Professionals, Libraries Unlimited, Englewood, 2001.PHILLIPS, Fred Y.: Market-Oriented Technology Management. Berlin: Springer, 2001.SCHIFF, Frederick: Business Models of News Websites: A Survey of Empirical Trends and Expert Opinion. First Monday, 8 (2003), 6 (URL: http://www.firstmonday.dk)
New technologies, digital content
• Higher productivity at low costs• Variable cost of digital content are
relatively low (in comparisson to fixed costs)• Marginal cost of one copy (access to digital
content) are relatively low for access provider and for user
• Digital content is a public good (its consumption is not constrained to one user or one usage)
Classic or digital? The user view
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3,50
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number of accesses
tota
l co
sts
web publication
a classic journal
Classic vs. digital media access costs from a user perspective.
The user respects his/her fixed costs as well.
The price for a digital content - a fee
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0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3
number of accesses
pri
ce o
f ac
cess
demand
marginal cost of one access (for provider)
A
BThe price sets at marginal costs, but only on a perfect market. What about low marginal costs of information goods?A fee for access should cover the total costs.
A - a deadweight loss - the price is too high; an additional copy provides 0,20 Euros of marginal benefit, which is more than its marginal costs.
Access fee
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8000 8500 9000 9500 10000 10500 11000 11500 12000 12500
number of accesses
tota
l co
sts marginal cost for clients
A
Equilibrium at 10,000 accesses.
How to charge for access?
Access fee
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number of accesses
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sts
marginal cost for clients
A
marginal cost for clients
If the charging system is expensive
and inefficient, there is a
deadweight loss on the market.
The cost of charging.
Access fee
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number of accesses
tota
l co
sts
marginal cost for customers
A
Fortunatelly, new technologies enable higher
productivity and efficient charging
mechanisms.
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number of books (Millions)
pri
ce
demand
supply
Market for books and journals The market for books and
journals represents the supply from publishers and the demand from individuals and libraries. Libraries are providing arround 5 % of quantity demanded, but they value books and journals at a higher level (since they represent the demand for all of their patrons).
The sketch shows the equilibrium point, where the optimal level of books and journals is provided and demanded in a given society.
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number of books (Thousands)
pri
ce
demand
Demand for books by libraryAn individual library's demand curve is a sum of demand curves of its patrons.
For example, if the price for a book would be 40 Euros, the quantity demanded from this library would be 30,000 pieces.
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number of books
pri
ce
demand
Demand for books by librarySince the market price for a book is 30 Euros, the library is interested in higher number of titles.
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60
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number of books
pri
ce
demand
supply
Q
Market for books and journals
Can library effectively estimate the value of books and journals for its patrons?
If the estimate is too low, then the library biases the signals sent to the market, which results in a deadweight loss.
The role of librariesHow the transaction and opportunity costs influence the decisions? The example with traditional media:
Benefit
Opportunity cost of using the library's subscription
Transaction cost of an individual
subscription
Maximum individual
subscription price
Peter 100,00 € 60,00 € 5,00 € 55,00 €Jane 100,00 € 20,00 € 5,00 € 15,00 €Irene 100,00 € 20,00 € 5,00 € 15,00 €Charles 100,00 € 20,00 € 5,00 € 15,00 €
100,00 €
Each patron has some
benefit from a journal...
...but using the library
represents additional costs (e.g.
travel)
If a customer buys its own copy of a journal, he has
additional expenses (space
on the shelf, paying the bill...)
This is the space for the publisher, he
can charge that price to an individual,
without the danger of loosing a customer.
The role of librariesHow the transaction and opportunity costs influence the decisions? The example with traditional media:
Benefit
Opportunity cost of using the library's subscription
Transaction cost of an individual
subscription
Maximum individual
subscription price
Maximum subscription
price via library
Peter 100,00 € 60,00 € 5,00 € 55,00 € 40,00 €Jane 100,00 € 20,00 € 5,00 € 15,00 € 80,00 €Irene 100,00 € 20,00 € 5,00 € 15,00 € 80,00 €Charles 100,00 € 20,00 € 5,00 € 15,00 € 80,00 €
100,00 € 280,00 €
Each patron has some
benefit from a journal...
...but using the library
represents additional costs (e.g.
travel)
If a customer buys its own copy of a journal, he has
additional expenses (space
on the shelf, paying the bill...)
On the other hand, he can charge the library for the subscription.
The value of a title for each customer is the difference between the received benefit
and library's opportunity costs.
The role of librariesSame example with digital journal:
Benefit
Opportunity cost of using the library's subscription
Transaction cost of an individual
subscription
Maximum individual
subscription price
Maximum subscription
price via library
Peter 100,00 € 1,00 € 1,00 € 0,00 € 99,00 €Jane 100,00 € 1,00 € 1,00 € 0,00 € 99,00 €Irene 100,00 € 1,00 € 1,00 € 0,00 € 99,00 €Charles 100,00 € 1,00 € 1,00 € 0,00 € 99,00 €
0,00 € 396,00 €
In the long run, the price will drop since the costs for publishers are lower.
Libraries "gather" and provide access to different bundles of information. Their transaction costs for patrons are lower than that for a group of publishers.
Spam as a negative externality
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number of unwanted e-mail messages
cost
s, b
enef
its
per
pie
ce
sender's marginal cost
The cost of spamming includes originator's cost...
Spam as a negative externality
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number of unwanted e-mail messages
cost
s, b
enef
its
per
pie
ce
marginal social cost
sender's marginal cost
...and marginal cost for receivers.
Spam as a negative externality
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number of unwanted e-mail messages
cos
ts, b
enef
its p
er
piec
e
marginal benefit
marginal social cost
sender's marginal cost
A spammer counts on some benefit for
his marketing efforts - he plans to send 40,000 copies.
Spam as a negative externality
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number of unwanted e-mail messages
cos
ts, b
enef
its p
er
piec
e
marginal benefit
marginal social cost
sender's marginal cost
...but there are too many copies of message for this activity to be at the optimum for the society.
...but there are too many copies of
message for this activity to be at the
optimum for the society.
Spam as a negative externality
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number of unwanted e-mail messages
cost
s, b
enef
its
per
pie
ce
marginal benefit
marginal social benefit
marginal social cost
sender's marginal cost
We forgot the benefits for the
society (the information reaches
the customer).
How to provide "a user friendly spam"?
Information literacy
0
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30
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60
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
number of e-educated people
mar
gina
l ben
efit,
mar
gina
l cos
t
marginal cost, supply
marginal benefit, demand
Personal value of a course for
atendees gives 3,000 atendees
with given marginal costs for
providing a course.
Information literacy
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
number of e-educated people
mar
gin
al b
enef
its,
mar
gin
al c
ost
marginal cost, supply
marginal social benefit
marginal benefit, demand
Other activities in the society can have benefits
as well, thus we have positive network
externalities. They are not recognised on the
market!
The government can assess this with the
subsidy.
Creativity market
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0 number of copies
price
marginal cost
demand
A
B
C
Q
F
P
Avtor maksimizira svoj donos z (monopolno) ceno
P, cena na ravni mejnih stroškov bi bila prenizka, da
bi financirala njegovo dejavnost.
Author maximizes his revenue through the higher price P. The price at his marginal cost would be critical for total costs recovery.
Copyrights induce the monopoly situations on the market.
Creativity market
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0 number of copies
price
marginal cost
demand
A
B
C
Q
F
P
This results in a deadweight loss.
A possible solution: market segmentation
Supply side
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0 number of works
mar
gin
al b
enef
it,
mar
gin
al c
ost
H
G
Q''
marginal cost
marginal social benefit
It can happen that author's creativity is at the social equilibrium
regarding marginal social benefit and his marginal
costs, but this doesn't cover his total costs.
Supply side
0,00
0 number of works
mar
gin
al b
enef
it,
mar
gin
al c
ost
H
G
E
Q''Q
marginal cost
marginal social benefit
R'
...so he reduces his output and responds with
higher prices.
Supply side
0,00
0 number of works
mar
gin
al b
enef
it,
mar
gin
al c
ost
H
G
E
Q' Q''Q
marginal cost
marginal social benefit
R
R' The society can recognize this and
increases the copyright law enforcement (the lenght of the patent,
breadth - similarity,...)...
Creativity market
0,00
0 number of copies
price
marginal cost
demand
A
B
C
QQ'
C'
B'
F
P
P'
...but at a higher price.