Military Review FORTt-riNE YEARS OF MIL!'iARY..' SERVii$B/,

VOLUME XLIII

NUMBER 12

DECEMBER 1963

Diluted Professionalism Mq; Wq/fer F. 'Ulmer, Jr., USA 3

Lesson in Leadership . Lt Gen Clovis E. Byers, USA, Ref 12

Social Sciences and the Military .,. • . Col A. A. Jordan, Jr., USA U Col W. A. Schiess, USA

16

Neutralism . . . . • . . . . . . Lt Col A;thur S. Hyman, USA 23

Indonesia . . • . . Ma; Edgar O'Ballance, British Territorial Army 30

Where Is Red China Headed? . • Col Fernand Schneider, French Army 38

Civic Action in Laos:

The Royal Lao Program . .Brig Gen O. Sananikone, Royal Lao Army 44

The Military Program. . • . Ma; Charles W. Stockell, USA 55

Keeping Limited War Limited . • Ma; Alton R. Wheelock, USA 64

Normandy Revisited. . . . . Ma; Gen H. Essame, British Army, Ret 70

To Beat the Guerrillas Albert L. Fisher 81

Seizing the Initiative Maj L. G. Clark, Australian Army 87

Military Notes 97

Military Books 107

The Military Review, a publication of the UNITED STATES ARMY, provides , a forum for the expression of military thought with emphasis on doctrine concerning

the division and higher levels of command.

The VIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORS' and not neces­sarily those of the US Army or the Command and General Staff College.

/ .

Editor in Chief Col [(enneth E. Lay

Assistant Editor Lt Col Albert N. Garland

Layout Editor 2d Lt Robert K. Lindgren

Spanish-American Editor Lt cJl Juan R. Melendez

Asst Spanish·American Editor Maj Jose E. Tizol

Brazilian Editor Lt Col Joiio H. Faeo

Associate Editor Col Daniel E. Halpin Army War College

Executive Officer Maj James N. Hale

Production Officer Maj Norman C. Murray

Staff Artist Charles A. Moore

MILITARY REVIEW-Published monthly by U. S. Ann)' Command and General Staff College. Fort Leav· enworth. Ka'nsas, in English. Spanish. and Portuguese. Use of funds for printing of this publication bas been approved by Headquarters, Department of the Army. 3 July 1962.

Second..class postagp paid at Fort Lea'ienworth. Kansas. Sub.scription rates: $3.50 (US currency) a year irt the United States, United. States mHitBry post offices. and those countries which are members of the Pan-American Postal Union (including Spain); $4.50 a year in all other countrieS. Address subscrip. tion mail to the Book Department, U. S. Ann)' Command and General Staff' College, Fort L~avenworth, Kansas -66027. •

The Martin ComJla1lY

DILUTED PROFESSIONALI8M Major Walter F. Ulmer. Jr., United States Army

The views expressed in this arti­cle are the author's and are not nec­essarily those of the Department of the Army. Department' of Defense, or the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College.-Editor.

M ORE than the members of any other profession;:!1 group, military of­ficers are exposed to a great variety of experience. Versatility and adapta­bility have been hallmarks of the pro­fessional soldier.

The traditional training of line offi­cers has consisted of a partially con­trolled sequence of varied short-term assignments interrupted by periods of formal schooling. Discontinuity seems to bJ;! an essential ingredient in a the­oretically proper career. The shibbo­leth is "broad background."

And yet, isn't the "broad back­ground" approach unsuited to the tech-

December 1963

PROFESSIONALISM

nological and political realities of the times? Can we continue to afford the luxury of training many officers for positions they will probably never oc· cupy? Can we operate effectively with an essentially transient group of prac­titioners who rarely attain expertise in any field?

There is today no lessening of the need for soldierly virtues. Personal in­tegrity, an awareness of the funda­mentals of the battlefield, the ability to lead and inspire men, and devotion to duty remain cornerstones, of mili­tary officership. But the essential ele· ments of modern professional compe­tence include far more than good char­acter and noble ·intent.

Greater Knowledge Among the credentials of a profes­

sional is the ability to perform his required task wi~h skill and under· standing. Attainment of the requisite skill and understanding demands in­tensive study and controlled experi­ence. It demands, in a word, speciali­zation. If military specialists are not produced within the profession, the "profession" can .expect to be sup­planted by other industrious, ambi­tious, intelligent, well·rounded ama­teurs.

The tasks that must be accomplished by any professional group are derived from two sources: the body of knowl-

Major WalteJ; F. Ulmer, Jr., is with Headquarters, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. His assignments include duty in Korea and Japan with the 56th Amphibious Tank and Trac· tor Battalion and the 6th Tank Battal­ion. From 1958 to 1962 Major Ulmer was an instructor at the United Sta~es Military Academy, and in June 1963 he completed the Regular Course of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College.

edge indispensable to the functioning of the profession, and the operational environment of the profession.

The technological and scientific rev­olution of our era has enlarged the body of knowledge pertinent to the conduct of military operations. Com­plex weapon systems and their sup­porting logistical structures have cre­ated recognizable problem areas in military operations. Proper fiscal man­agement of the resources required to support the current forces is itself a sizable task. But the nuclear and space-age subject matter does not re­place traditional military subjects; it is superimposed on the already con­siderable breadth and depth of mili­tary art and science.

In addition to the growing complex­ity of tactics, logistics, and manage­ment, today's professional sol die r practices in a sensitive and demand· ing political environment. The cir· cumstances of the cold war that pre­scribe the involvement of the military in a variety of governmental opera· tions are well known. Worldwide com. mitments impose requirements for in­stant readiness-requirements which demand that operational needs take appropriate priority.

Lower Standards So it has come to pass that military

activities have become increasingly more diversified as well as more com· plex. A likely result of an expanded professioh is a steady and insidious lowering of professional standards. This must be avoided. We must counter the tendency toward a diluted professionalism.

While the Army reacted promptly to technological advances by produc· ing new machines and updating or­ganizations and doctrine, there has

. been little or }.o deliberate reaction to

Military Review 4

th~ new demands placed on the officer corps. In fact,' preoccupation with equipment and organization has been conducive to a neglect of many aspects of personnel management. Generalist Theory

Our two major management prob­lems-insufficient retention of high potential personnel, and a growing

qualified officers to higher echelons continues, the operating units become short both in numbers and quality of officers. At the top echelons, vigorous, ambitious officers, seeing the troop units perform with difficulty, attempt to rescue the situation by imposing restrictions and controls on the ac­tions of the troop unit commanders.

Army New8 Features

Military activities have become increasingly more diversified as well as more complex

centralization of authority-are in­timately related to the generalist de­velopment theory and its attending broad assignment policies.

Because of the wide latitude in duty assignments, many of the most com­petent officers are selected for duty on high-level staffs. For a variety of rea­sons, the operating units---eommanded for relatively short tours by relatively junior officers-do not consistently re­ceive a fair share of the outstanding officers.

As the gravitation of the highly

De.cember t963

This situation often results in frus­tration and eventual disappointment in the operating units. Capable junior leaders become discouraged. The over­worked draftee, conscious of the over­controlled and hesitant performance of his unit, too often returns to his com­munity with a poor picture of the mil­itary service.

Secretary of Defense Robert S. Mc­Namara commented on the problems of overcentralization in testimony be­fore the House Armed Services Sub­committee. The Secretary stated:

5

PROfESSIONALISM

While 1 believe that unified plan­ning, programming and decision-mak­ing are indispensable to the effective management of the defense effort, 1 am equally convinced that the actual operation of the program should be managed, to the maximum extent pos­sible, on a decentralized basis.

faith and fear Certainly inherent in any responsi­

ble manager's decision to allow truly decentralized operations is a faith in the skill and judgment of subordinate leaders. In this day and age, military skill comes to: fruition only after in­tensive study and experience. Only when professional expertise is ensured can the necessary decentralization be expected.

Our modern American Army has assiduously avoided extensive special­ization within the officer corps. This is particularly true in the combat arms; it does except the few identified spe­cialists in medicine, law, intelligence, engineering, and special occupational skills.

There is a traditional fear that the specialist will lack the background of varied experience -assumed necessary for successful performance in the higher staff and command' positions. The officer who has attained recog­nized proficiency in one area of study is often regarded with suspicion-his horizon surely must be limited. his judgment deformed.

It is doubtful, however, if the suc­cessful officer of the past, even when the complexities of the service de­manded far less training than at pres­ent, followed the well-balanced career patterns that now are held in such high regard. Nor does there seem to be any indication that any recent American senior commander has been hampered in his exercise of command

by a special depth of understanding of one particular phase of military operations.

Our lack of respons'e to the chal· lenge of a wider, more demanding sub. ject matter is in distinct contrast to the specialization that evolved within the legal and medical professions. This specialization was necessitated by the proliferation of new data and the de­velopment of more complicated pro· cedures.

Limited Attempts We have made limited attempts to

increase proficiency within the exist· ing career pattern structure. Service school curricula have been revised; civilian graduate training 'programs have been increased; the need for more specialization in logistics, intel­ligence, and research and development has created career fields in these areas; and the desire for increased mobility has caused a near-career spe­cialization program in aviation to emerge.

Yet the principal functional areas of contemporary military operations have been fundamentally unmodified by deliberate revision. Furthermore, the expanded diversity of contempo. rary duties has engendered an uncon­trolled variety of assignments.

An indiscriminate variety in assign­ments tends to minimize the profi· ciency that can be developed only through pertinent experience. For ex· ample. an infantry major might serve on a troop unit staff, in a Military As­sistance Advisory Group, in a research and development project, in the United States Continental Army Command, United States European Command, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Department of the Army, or United Nations command headquar­ters. He might attend graduate school

Military Review 6

in journalism, serve as a post infor· mation officer, be assigned to a logis· tics command in the communications zone, or work with the Atomic Energy Commission. Often the assignments are intermingled and without discern­ible sequence.

Measurement The officer evaluation system does

not place a high premium on skill. Effi­ciency ratings reflect, in great meas-

US Army

We must give primary attention to the unique and basic military skills

ure, aptitude and versatility. These traits, while essential, are not com· plete qualifications of a professional. Oddly enough, the Army today has no requirement that a specific profes­sional skill-demonstrated by exami· nation or job performance-be mas· tered before promotion to a higher grade. Thus the title "Captain of Ar· tillery" carries with it no measured professional qualifications.

December 1963

During peace, and in the many short episodes of a cold war, the basic sol· dierly skill levels are difficult, if not impossible, to measure accurately. However, facility in many peripheral functions performed by officers is readily measured. The comptroller, en· gineer, and honor guard commander demonstrate talents that can be eval· uated in peacetime as well as in war. Because of the relative ease of noting proficiency in nonbattle skills, per· formance in these are a s is easily standardized.

In the long run, we are more apt to overlook a lack of know-how in the unique military functions. The meas­urement of true proficiency in com· mand and staff positions with operat· ing forces is an arduous and demand· ing task. A 'lack of experience and training in these hard·core military skills tends to perpetuate itself. This same general scheme of events can be observed frequently in unit training where the measurable activities (ve· hide appearance and starched fa· tigues) are emphasized, and some of the more important functions (the ability to coordinate fire and maneu· ver) are neglected.

Proficiency Other facets of the present-day po·

Iitical and educational climate can be interpreted (or misinterpreted) as de· emphasizing the need to maintain pro· ficiency in military subjects. Certain­ly, when the President urges the grad­uating cadets of the Military Academy to develop a facility in political science and negotiations, and calls attention to their probable future roles in political­military affairs, he presumes, also, the development of their skills in basic military operations. A reminder of the inextricable involvement of military activities with political affairs is not

PROFESSIONALISM

a mandate to abandon e:rpertise in the use of military forces.

We have seemingly, of late, pro­duced officers who have so effectively integrated the economic-political-mili­tary streams of interest that they are hard pressed to deliver a military opin­ion. The capacity to speak as a mili­tary specialist, when required, must remain a fundamental capability of the professional soldier.

Future Development What must be done to ensure the

requisite future professional develop­ment in the Army? I believe there are four problem areas that must be con­sidered:

• We must give primary attention to the unique and basic military skills. The essence of the military profession must not become so intermingled with associated peripheral matter as to be­come indistinguishable as a valid area for professional study. This must be done not as a retrenchment, but as a timely revitalization of professional standards.

• We must realize the magnitude and complexity of the true military subject matter in relation to an indi­vidual's capacity to master all or part of it in one lifetime. Manpower re­soUrces must then be fitted to the tasks to be done. The needs of the service must take priority over notions that officers must be generalists first and specialIsts if time and circumstances permit.

• Recognizing the need for exper­tise in a broad and complex profes­sion, we must create specialties within the profession for all the officers. Offi­cer assignments must be restricted s\> as to ensure an adequate professional development as well as a broad general outlook.

• There must be a means of readily' identifying officer skills as well as offi· cer aptitudes. Too, proficien~y gained in a specialty must be periodically as­sessed and recorded.

Subdivisions The plan to effect these changes

must ,commence with a definition of the areas of specialization•. The follow­ing military functional areas seem to be logical subdivisions;

Tactical Operations This area includes the fundamental

military skills of directing personnel, employing weapons, and managing re­sources in the execution of tactical op­erations. Officers would enter the tac­tical operations specialist career field after seven to 10 years' service. The principal source of this group would be the combat arms.

Assignments would prepare the offi­cer for command and staff duties with field army, corps, division, and smaller units, and might include tours with any of the combat arms'.

Duties other than with operating units appropriate to this specialty area would include -Reserve Officers' Training Cor p s (ROTC) , service school faculty, combat developments, joint or combined staff duty at field army or below, and Military Assist­ance Advisory Group.

Research and Development and Logistics This area includes the provision of

weapons, equipment, and logistic sup­port for the operating forces. This career field would include individual specialties appropriate to the title, and would include the members of the tech­nical and administrative sel"vices.

A tour of two years with a combat arm would precede specialization in this field. Graduate schooling would be appropriate in these specialty areas.

Military Review

Strategic Planning and Resources Utilization

This field includes the translation of national objectives into military 'requirements; coordination with other governmental and internatiqnal agen­cies; selection and allocation of re­sources; direction of strategic opera­tions; and' development of long-range plans.

Officers would enter this field after a minimum of eight to 10 years' duty in any of the arms or services. Gradu­ate schooling iiI physical or social sci­ences would be appropriate for most duties.

Assignments would train officers for duty at field army and higher staff, and for joint and combined staff duty. Other duties within this specialty area would include service school faculty, legislative liaison, Military Assistance Program, civil defense, international boards and agencies, and intragovern­mental committees. Note that the tac­tical operations and stt'ategic planning and resources utilization (SPRU) fields have overlapping assignment areas in several cases.

Other Factors Transfer among the specialty areas

would be authorized with the approval of the gaining and losing fields. Orien­tation tours outside the specialty area would be authorized, and identified as such.

Promotions would be allocated to each specialty area. The prime requi­site for advancement would be that of demonstrated capability in a selected career field.

While the tactical operations spe­cialist practiced his art, he would be content that a fair amount of talent was concentrating in the strategy and resources area. And, conversely, when an officer transferred his priority of

December 1963

interest from the integration of fires at brigade level to political geography, he would do so with the comforting knowledge that other competent and interested practitioners were concen­trating on the tactical end of the spec­trum.

This plan assists in assuring recog­nized competence in the operating forces, enhancing the building of a climate of mutual trust that enables true initiative to flourish. Eventually, as skills become highly developed through properly managed career pat­terns, large administrative and super­visory staffs should wither away. The administrative burden now justified by fear of improper operations in the field should greatly diminish.

Each career field would provide enough diversity of assignment to af­ford challenging and varied duties, yet the fields are sufficiently narrow to permit the compilation of substantial experience and knowledge. General of­ficers would be selected from any of the specialty areas, and, when pro­moted, would serve in any duties ap­propriate to individual capability.

Medical officers, chaplains, and law­yers would not be included in these specialty areas.

Military Schooling The military schooling system would

need some revision to support this broad plan.

The first change would be in the career courses of the combat arms. An identical program of instruction would be implemented at the infantry, ar­mor, and artillery schools to provide an integrated combat arms back­ground to future tactical operations specialists.

Detailed subject matter relative to one branch, omitted from the common

9

l'R,0FESSIONALlSM

combat arms programs of instruction, but essential for branch skills, would be provided by the greater on-the-job training available through the special­ization system.

Combat arms officers who would be­come SPRU specialists would have an advantage of greater insight into all ,the combat arms prior to specializa­tion.

The career courses would not have to serve as prime sources of experi­ence. They could concentrate on up­dating and standardizing doctrine and techniques, as opposed to ensuring a common denominator of basic skills. The skills would be gained through timely, programed experience in the specialty are", under the tutelage of officers who had a long-term interest in the people and the units within their chosen field.

The second change in schooling would appear at the U. S. Army Com­mand and General Staff College. Prior to attending this school, most officers would have been assigned in one of the three specialist areas. The College pe­riod of instruction' would consist of two phases. One phase would be a com­mon program for an students. For this general and broadening instruction the students would intermingle and, hopefully, exchange concepts and opinions.

The other phase of the course would be specialized information presented to segregated classes of the three special­ties. In these classes, current doctrine and intensive analysis pertaining to the students' prime areas of interest would be presented. The students should have a common interest in these subjects and a motivation derived from a future need-to-know.

The orientation courses-airborne, aviation, and ranger schools-would

not require change from current pro· grams. The ROTC, United States M11. itary Academy, and Officer Candidate School programs would not necessarily be changed.

Personnel Management One beneficial byproduct of the cre­

ation of specialty areas would be im­proved personnel management. The of­fice of personnel operations would have only three major assignment group­ings for all officers with more than eight to 10 years' service. Officers would not be available for the myriad of duties for which they are now eligi­ble, and the reduction in assignment options should permit longer range planning. Elimination of the need to sample all types of ,duty would permit longer tours, and reduce permanent change of station moves and the at­tending cost and family discomfort.

Extended association with the same group of specialists should ensure, in some measure, the esprit and commu­nity of effort that branch of service once provided before the branch im­material tour became commonplace.

This specialization would not create a General Staff Corps, nor would it establish an elite group either at high staff or tactical levels. Rather, it would delineate functions and permit train­ing and experience to be focused on manageable segments of military af­fairs.

An additional feature of this plan would be an administrative procedure for assessing officer skill resources at any given time. Officer military occu­pational specialties (MOS's) would be expanded in meaning and significance, to include digits indicating experience and training. As an officer completes schools and on-th~-job experience, his MOS would be changed to reflect his attainments.

Military Review 10 I

I The limitations of human judgment

lind statistics would remain. There would be some basis, however, for rapidly appraising total officer pro­fessional qualifications, ana experi­ence; no such method is currently available.

The essence of the problem has been identified as a'lack of adaptation of offic~r assignment policies to the needs of the times. The reasonable desire for broad background has led to such di­vergency of assignments as to jeopar­dize proficiencY in any number of crit­ical skill areas. On-the-job proficiency, now more difficult to attain than in the past, is absolutely essential in conduct­ing the daily cold war military tasks.

In order to ensure continued pro­fessionalism. the Army must adopt

controlled specialization for all offi­cers. The total problem must be sub­divided into manageable parts. The combat arms officer, now so broadly oriented, must become the prime tar­get of specialist training.

This approach to professional devel­opment does not depreciate traditional military values. Parochialism, or lim­ited comprehension, of the broad im­pact of military operations is not con­doned. A true skill is required in some functional area of operations.

• The military must concentrate its talent. above all, on its special prob­lems. It must not attempt to be all things to all men. The Nation deserves nothing less than the highest possible professional competence from its offi­cer corps.

There is no substitute for staying witb some fragment of knowledge un­til you have obtahied mastery of it. No substitute for making such an effort

of your own. It seems a truism of this that one needs to know deeply in

order to experience the full joy of liberal learning.

Dr. N,athan M. Pusey President, Harvard University

December 1963 11

Acme Photo

ALESSON IN LEADERSHIP Lieutenant General Clovis E. Byers. United States Armu. Retired .

THE most Chal1e~ging combat sit­uation facing the commander is that in which an enemy has been consistently successful. In such a situation. the tide of battle may be changed only in one of two ways-by overwhelming rein­forcements or by leadership of a new and dynamic quality.

In late 1942 General Douglas Mac­Arthur faced precisely this situation. Since 'fTuly the Japanese had been ad­vancirl.@: across New Guinea from Gona to Buna,. Although checked by the com­

bined effort of the Australians and Americans, the threat had not been eliminated. nor would it be until the enemy had been thrown out of Buna. principal supply port on the north coast. But now the US forces that were to accomplish this task had been weak­ened by hunger, fatigue, disease, and unit disorganization until their condi­tion had become deplorable. MacAr­thur, of course, had no reinforcements to throw in. Leadership was his only hope.

Military RevIew 12

"Don't Come Bac,k Alive" On 30 November 1942, Lieutenant

General Robert L. Eichelberger, Com­manding 1st Corps, US Army, re­ported as ordered to General MacAr­thur's Port Moresby quarters. After a terse briefing, General MacArthur said, "Time is of the essence for the Japanese may iand reinforcements any night." He stopped his rapid pacing of the floor, pointed his finger in Ei­chelberger's face, and exploded, "Co out there, Bob, and take Buna or don't come back alive."

General Eichelberger soon deter­mined the true state of affairs on the other side of the Owen Stanley Range. A breakdown in the service of supply largely explained the pitiable condition of the troops. Methodically but expe­ditiously the new commander learned where the trouble lay, instituted cor­rective measures, and soon had supply rolling in.

His next problem was more diffi­cult. Ground units had been sent to the Buna area in air echelons; for a va­riety of reasons, the air movement had become greatly confused with many units landing remote from their intended destinations. Organizational integrity scarcely existed.

Reprinted by permission of the ~opyright holder, the Marine Corps Association, publishers of the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, pro­fessional journal for Marine of­ficers. Copyright © 1962 by the Marine Corps Association. Origi­nally published in November 1962 under the title "Assault and Cap­ture of Buna," part of the John A. Lejeune Forum on "Combat Leadership."

General Byers is vice president of General Telephone & Electron­ics Corp., Washington, D. C.

December 1963

The front consisted of an irregular string of troop islands having no tac­tical integrity above company level; adjacent companies were from differ­ent battalions; and adjacent battalions were from different regiments. To cap the situation, the inexperience of the troops and their condition meant that units hesitated to patrol the strange jungle. The result was that no one was sure who was on his right or left. A Japanese diary later captured offered this illuminating picture of initial US action: • The enemy has received almost no training . .. their movements are very slow. At this rate they cannot make a night attack.

The enemy has been repulsed by our keen-eyed snipers. In the jungle it seems they fire at any sound, due tQ illusion. From sundown until about 1Q p.m. they fire light machine guns and throw hand grenades recklessly.

Forward Units Visited In an effort to determine the exact

condition of his troops and to remeQY outstanding deficiencies, General Ei­chelberger visited the most forward of his units. Believing in leadership by personal example, he invariably ex­posed himself to the lurking enemy. When trying to learn why desirable positions a few yards to the front were left unoccupied, time and again he would move to the indicated spot, cause men to come- forward, and assist them in locating their new gun positions. On one occasion during the early days, an aide moving behind the general was seriously 'wounded, but this did not stop his explorations.

The general's attitude, of course, did not escape notice of the troops. With supply moving, spirits rose, and with the front slowly gaining cohesion, di­rect patrolling began. For the first

13

US A.rmy

An infantry patrol pushes through the jungle

LEADERSHIP

time, commanders began to get a true picture of the nature of their front. Now attack plans could be developed with some hope of success.

General Eichelberger soon wit­nessed the positive results of his ef­

-""

learned that the colonel was forward. At the battalion command post, we learned the same. The trip was now becoming lonesome. Finally spotting a single American soldier in a foxhole in the kunai grass, We asked where

fort, albeit indirectly. On the left of the Buna front, an understrength US regiment was attached to the Austral­ian forces. Eichelberger was now asked by the Australian general com­manding to relieve the American com­mander because of his slow advance. Replying that he never relieved anyone until he personally saw the justifica­tion, he suggested, instead, that they both gO forward to see how the Amer­ican colonel was conducting the opera­tion.

At regimental headquarters, the party, .of which I was a member,

the Japanese were. The soldier uncon­cernedly pointed across a trail to a mound of earth about 100 feet to his front. "Over there in that bunker."

"Do you know where your regi­mental commander is?"

The soldier pointed to another mound of earth about 10 yards to his right. "In that bunker."

No undue haste was evident, but common agreement promptly caused all to join the colonel in his bunker. There we found that, through a tre­mendous effort, the colonel was on the verge of launching a coordinated at-

Military Review

tack-indeed, a very skillful one that soon ,resulted > in the US regiment breaking through to the coast.

On the return trip, the Australian general suddenly turned to his Amer­ican opposite: "Bob, I'll be forever thankful for this lesson you've taught me. You have saved me from doing one of the greatesf injustices a man ever could do."

By this time, a drive similar to the colonel's was permeating the entire battleline. And now the smug tone of the Japanese underwent dramatic change:

The nature of th~ enemy is superior and they excel in firing techniques. ... Hqs is a pitiful sight due to their artillery fire . ... Enemy scouts appear everywTiere and attack, shooting auto­matic rifles. . .. .

And finally: With the dawn the enemy started

shooting all over. All I can do is shed tears of resentment. Now we are wait­ing only for death. The news that re­

inforcements had come turned out to be a rumor. All day we stay in the bunkers. Weare filled with vexation.' Comrades, are you going to stand by and watch 'us die? Even the invincible 'Imperial Army is at a loss. Can't any­thing be done? Please God.

General Eichelberger had arrived on the Buna front 1 December 1942. On 2 January 1943, his dynamic, tireless, and imaginative leadership had as­serted itself, and the message so crit­ically needed by General MacArthur ",as delivered: "Buna has fallen."

The farthest advance the Japanese had made had been turned back. There were many days of difficult fighting through the next 18 months of island popping, and countless deeds of out­standing leadership and extreme brav­ery. But in Buna there was that initial defeat of a heretofore victorious army' that marked the turn of a tide. This, in my mind, constitutes the most in­spiring example of leadership I have ever witnessed.

War is as much a conflict of wills and of spirit as of means. Hence, in my judgment, the decisive element in warfare is not the weapon and the equipment but the man who uses the hardware.

General Earle G. Wheeler

December 1963 15

SOCIAL SCIENCES

AND THE

MILITARY PROFESSION

Colonel Amos A. Jordan, Jr., UnUed States Army

Lieutenant Colonel William A. Schiess, United States Army

THE social sciences offer the mili­tary man a way to enlarge his mental capacities and broaden his horizons. They open up fresh avenues of commu­nication with. his counterparts in civil life and provide him, first, with fresh insights and principles with which he can develop new ways of discharging traditional functions and, second, with the kinds of knowledge and analytical skills needed to meet the new responsi­bilities being thrust upon him.

Military leaders are often required to exercise command and control of complex, and destructive forces which

must be kept at a state of instantane­ous readiness during indefinite periods of tension and infrequent interludes of relaxation. Other military leaders must develop individuals and units which can' operate effectively with min­imum resources and under the primi­tive conditions of guerrilla warfare. In either case, these forces must be controlled by centralized arrangements capable of decentralized execution and be manned by highly skilled and intel­ligent individuals.

This combination of requirements necessitates the development of mili· tary leaders with a keen insight into the motivation of men and the dynam­ics of small group leadership. Under today's circumstances, neither the tra· ditional methods of leadership nor the familiar dependence of the soldier on his comrades ,to the left and right may, in themselves, suffice.

What guidance can the behavioral scientists offer to today's model of a

This article was digested from the original, published in the AIR FORCE COLLEGE JOURNAL (Can­ada) 1962. All Rights Reserved by the AIR FORCE COLLEGE JOUR­NAL. The ideas expressed in the JOURNAL are those 0/ the writers and do not necessarily reflect 0/­ficial policy. When writing this, Colonel Jordan was Professor 0/ Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York. Colonel SchIess was with the Offiice 0/ the Chief 0/ Information, Department of the Army~ in Washington.

Military Review 16

modern major general? These special­ists in individual and group behavior, of social interaction, sometimes seem to be "talking about things which everybody knows in language which nobody understands." Yet study of their writings on how individuals or groups react and adapt to continual stress and change can be invaluable to a profession as characterized by stress and change as is the military.

The Trait Approach The psychologists' investigations in­

to personality can help us identify'de­sirable readership traits. The "trait" or personality approach to leadership, which recognizes the central impor­tance of the leader's ability to galva­nize others, seeks to identify those qualities which make men follow him. Of course, any examination of leader­ship characteristics will be inconclu­sive, for there are so many traits that may apply and so few consistent trait patterns.

Despite its inconclusiveness, this ap­proa-ch has found certain characteris­tics that are generally correlated with leadership. These core traits provide us with a list for self-improvement or for guiding and counseling others in developing their leadership capabili­ties. While these traits, such as an in­terest in people, or decisiveness, are not easily developed, they can be cul­tivated and nourished. In short, lead­ers can be made as well.as born. Motivation Factors j To supplement the trait approach to le~dership, psychologists can assist us to understand motivation. What causes some men to do their job willingly and efficiently while others respond in a negative and mediocre manner? What influence do rewards and punishment play in motivation? How should these be applied? How do intrinsic and ex-

December 1963

trinsic factors influence the individ­ual? The very nature of these ques­tions indicates that motivation is a focal point in understanding behavior.

Motives are not all as simple as wanting food or trying to avoid fa­tigue duty. They vary in frequency, in intensity, and in direction or valence. They can be directed towara short­range goals Of distant ones. They can be physiological or strongly social.

In seeking to motivate others, the leader must recognize the difference between intrinsic motivation (satis­fying by the very nature of the task) and extrinsic motivation (providing a means to another goal). The former is, of course, more lasting while the latter is more immediate and evanes­cent.

Attitudes It is not uncommon to find men, both

in and out of the military profession, who will-under certain conditions­undergo arduous tasks for considera­tions other than material reward. Learning how to create and mai'ntain such conditions over extended periods and in the face of situations which vary from indifference to hostility is the challenge.

Motivation does not occur in a void; it is linked with attitudes, which are the comparatively stable feelings, or tendencies, which predispose individu­als to act in certain way·s. The service­man approaches his military career, either voluntarily or involuntarily, with certain attitudes that have evolved through his educational'devel­opment, home influence, and spiritual guidance. It is upon these positive at­titudes that the leader builds. He de­velops the soldier both as an individ­ual and as a member of a team ori­ented toward unit goals.

More specifically, attitudes influence

11

SOCIAL SCIENCES

the wayan individual sees or "per­ceives" things, the way he interprets events. A person "sees" what he wishes to see and "hears" what he wants to hear, In the development of an indi­vidual's perception of a situation, there is a good deal of omitting, sup­p,lementing, and structuring. It is the leader's task to understand the pat­terns of his followers' perceptions and to try to reinforce those which produce high regard for the leader and group and which encourage mission-oriented behavior.

Influence of Personality All of the foregoing factors are as­

pects of the complete personality. Per­sonality is the sum of the dynamic characteristics within the individual which determines his reactions to en­vironment. It is' a product of heredity, environment, and maturation level and is an integrated whole, not just a list­ing of traits.

The leader's personality inevitably differs from that of the follower. This has been the subject of much res'"arch. It is generally concluded that follow­ers are less concerned about prestige, dominance, and power and that they possess lower levels of aspirations. Caution in generalizing is indicated, however, by the fact that sociometric studies show that good leaders must he good followers, at least in demo­cratic societies. Leadership "and follow­ership should not be considered as two extremes of the same continuum. In­difference, rather than followership, is the opposite of leadership.

Since the leader operates in a social setting, we should be aware of the in­teractions between the leader and the members of his unit or organization. All individuals in a unit have certain social needs which they try to satisfy, such as, status, security, and dignity.

Most of these needs are satisfied by social interactions. To complicate the problem, the leader, too, has personal motives which may not coincide with his institutional role as leader. If, in

US Af"mlJ

The leader must be capable of motivat­ing f:lis men to actions which may be far

removed from their persona] desires

pursuing his own personal needs, the leader fails to satisfy the subordi­nate's needs, someone else will; if the formal leader does not function effec­tively, an informal head will emerge to weaken or destroy the formal lead­er's influence.

As the institutional head of his unit, the leader must not only possess the technical knowledge to accomplish the mission (which is paramount); he must also be capable of motivating his men to actions which may be far re­moved from their personal desires. Only by knowing and by understand­ing his men, and by increasing the satisfactions which they derive from

Military Review 18

the group, can the leader inspire them to accomplishments under the gamut of conditions which currently typify military service.

Group Psychology Perhaps the one contribution of the

sociologist most directly applicable to the military leader's tasks is that branch known' as social psychology, an~ specifically the portiQn Qf it deal­ing with small grQUps. An organiza­tion can be viewed merely as a cQlIec­tion of individuals with a common aim. In reality, hQwever, a close-knit group can better be viewed as we do the in­dividual, as an organism with attitudes and behavior patterns all its own. Within the main group, subgroups emerge, consisting of individuals with common interests and experiences, and informal Qrganizations develop and flourish within the formal organiza­tion.

The purposes and attitudes which group members share lead to the de­velopment of group norms and "shared frames of reference." These serve as a common basis for understanding and simplify the establishment of rules and standards. They provide the basis for group solidarity, ease of communica­tion, and unit identification. Addition­ally, group norms are behavior stand­ards. Members of a unit have very dif­ferent personalities, yet understand one another while working together, for they interpret one another's be­havior through common ri'orms. These norms are, in turn, accepted and in­ternalized by members of the group.

Membership within a group pro­vides satisfaction for some of man's most basic needs. Fulfilling these needs may be so important to the person in­volved that he will be willing to forego physical well-being-even to risk his life-for their attainment. These so-

December 1963

cial needs may be subdivided into three categories: affiliative, status, and' se­curity needs.

The individual who wishes to affili­ate With a group must generally accept the group standards of behavior. The more one adheres to them, the more he is likely to identify himself with the group, since the group reference has become his reference. This manifests itself in his behavior, by which he seeks to approach identity with what he considers normal for the group. This phenomenon can be used in the military services in developing esprit de corps.

The more the individUllI adheres to group rules and ideals, the more com­plete his acceptance as a fellow mem­ber. Departure from the norm of be­havior by a member will normally re­sult in pressure by others to align the deviate with the group norm. The more valued the member, the greater will be such pressure. The type and intensity of pressure applied will vary from sit­uation to situation, but in all instances will be designed to restore behavior to the group norm.

"Belongingness" contributes direct­ly to group cohesiveness and achieve­ment. A leader's understanding of the factors contributing to it will help him to foster this feeling among subordi­nates. In military organizations, the chain of command should foster unit identification in its subordinates. Nor­mally, identification will occur first and be the strongest at the lowest unit level. The soldier "identifies" with his squad or crew before he develops bat­talion or squadron spirit.

Within an organization, the individ­ual sees himself in relation to the other members. His status needs may be sat­isfied through dominance Qver Qthers

19

SOCIAL SCIENCES

or through socially approved behavior such as the accomplishment of some function valued by the group. The point is that every man desires recog­nition. Because the attainment of sta­

, tus depends on responses of others, the individual achieves status by the rec­ognition he receives, explicitly or im­plicitly, in the group to which he be­longs.

Finally, security needs are fulfilled within the group by the adherence to group norms and group acceptance. Membership in a group, therefore, not only provides satisfaction to its ini­tiates, but also bolsters the insecure among them.

Human Relations , "Human relations" practices have a

place in the conduct of the military leader with respect to his unit. They are successful when each member of the group sees the accomplishment of a mission as contributing to the ful­fillment of his own personal needs. These practices in a military situation vary with the mission, size, and com­position of the unit. If applied discrim­inately, not routinely, they foster unit esprit; if incorrectly applied, they un­dermine unit integrity.

Most important, human relations cannot be so. oriented toward the fol­lower that unit proficiency and mission accomplishment are impaired. A com­mander can, for example, conduct sound human relations practices and still exercise supervision and punish­ment authority. Human relations is a means to an end to the military pro­fessional, not an end in itself.

In addition to indicating the influ­ences of leadership traits and group dynamics, psychologists and sociolo­gists can help illumine situational fac­tors external to the individual and the group ,which must be considered in

appraising leadership problems, Situ­ational variables arise with different units, different theaters of operations, and different missions. Military lead­ership requires flexibility in technique, for methods applicable in one situa­tion may not work in another.

Experience can, therefore, never dictate-but only guide-future ac­tion. This statement has particular pertinence in an era in which revolu­tionary developments in the tools and techniques of warfare have produced a disjunction in the military art. In today's milieu, rational action to define in advance the probable environment and to determine ways of minimizing or circumventing the constraints in­herent in it is essential. In the past, security matters have characteristic­ally been handled pragmatically; how­ever, the pace of modern war, cold or hot, no longer permits military lead­ers to accumulate decades or even years of experience in dealing with problems before having to decide how to deal with them.

Active Sharing In the brief space allotted, it is im­

possible to trace the relevant ideas of all the social sciences in even the sket­chy detail given in the foregoing to psychology and sociology. Economics, political science, and anthropology all have concepts and methods which the military man could profitably employ in some circumstances, particularly in discharging his new or extended cold war missions. Foremost· among these is 'his responsibility to share actively in the development of national policy. With the boundaries between war and peace so blurred and the distinctions between foreign policy and military policy so fuzzy, the military is no longer regarded as passive onlookers

Military Review 20

unt'il other instruments have failed and war is the, only recourse.

Economic and Political Context Even in fields where yesterday's mil­

itary man would not have dared tres­.pass, such as economics, today's officer is being asked for advice. Although the aavice of the professional econ­omist will also'presumably be available on questions such as aid, gold flow, and foreign procurement, the intertwining of military and economic considera­tions means that the military man must understand the issues involved and be able to discuss them with the economist.

The military commander and the economist, alike, are concerned with the efficient use of scarce resources. Economists have developed several tools whieh the military can borrow­for example, marginal analysis, which is the procedure of allocating re­sources so that the employment of the last item, man or dollar, devoted to a particular use is optimized-that is, the item would not yield a higher re­turn if it were applied to any other use. Similarly, "production possibil­ity" and uindifference" curves can be used systematically to explore the best hlend of resources for a given purpose.

Indeed, a whole "systems analysis" method for optimizing strategic as well as budgetary decisions has been developed by economists and others in recent years. While many military problems are not easily quantified, and hence cannot be handled rigorously by these methods, even they can often be better dealt with by a systematic cost and gains approach.

If the professional officer is to offer sound cold war advice, he must develop an awareness of the political context in which military decisions are made. The political "feedback" from military

December 1963

activities can become critical for a country such as the United States which has over half a million men, ac­companied by a million dependents, stationed in nearly 50 countries.

International Scene In this context, military men will

find it helpful to consult the political scientists' studies on the nature of power and how it is wielded, particu­larly on the international scene. An awareness of the pervasiveness of the competition for influence, and an ap­preciation of the shifting role played by military power therein, will help him to understand anti cope with the political environment-whether that of a national community, within an alliance, or between hostile nations.

The rise of the newly independent and less developed countries of Africa and Asia and the tensions attendant upon their nation-building efforts are a further subject of concern to both social scientists and military profes­sionals. Political scientists and sociol­ogists have developed a specills of sys­tems analysis for analyzing these so­cieties which the military might well borrow.

This type of analysis focuses on the functions which any society must per­form and then explores the methods, styles, and institutions for their per­formance in the country under inves­tigation. If Khrushchev's promise of "wars of national liberation" in the new states indicates the pattern of the future, our profession must quickly learn about these areas which the Com­munists are determined to "liberate."

Anthropologists can probably teach us more about the less developed na­tions than any of the other social sci­entists. Their concept of "culture," which they generally define as the

21

SOCIAL SCIENCES

shared values and beliefs underlying a community's institutions and cus­toms, can throw light for the military on such questions as what taboos to observe, how to elicit cooperation, 01'

under what conditions a society is will­ing to fight for independence rather than to acqu iesce in domination. Al­though they have specialized in com. paratively primitive cultures, the an­thropologists' findings can also help us understand our own societies by the contrasts and generalizations which they afford.

No officer, regardless how brilliant, can hope to master all of the material in the social sciences which is relevant to his profession. Certainly, there is insufficient time in the formal educa­tional process for the military man fully to explore these fields. Yet the nature of the crisis in Which we find ourselves, and the consequent burgeon. ing of our responsibilities, requires us at least to be aware of the kinds of assistance-in information, concepts, and analytical tools-which the social scientist can offer.

. . . our future lies in the leadership and counsel that Army officers pro­vide-in unified, joint and combined headquarters, in allied counsels, in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense,

and in other a~encies of the Government.

Secretary of the Army Cyrus R. Vance

Military Review 22

NEUTRALISM Lieutenant Colonel Arthur S. Hyman, Uaited State. Army

NEUTRALISM is a relatively new phenomenon in the history of inter­national relations. For this reason, the words "neutralism." "nonalign­ment," and "neutrality" are often (and incorrectly) used interchangeably. The result has been a rather widespread obscurity about the meaning and im­plications of neutralism in world poli­tics. A brief semantic exercise may help to reduce this obscurity and set the stage for a m 0 r e accurate analysis.

Neutrality is deeply imbedded in in­ternational law. It is a legal status of states which demands certain rights from the belligerents in time of war and accepts certain obligations toward these belligerents. It is a status which comes into existence only after a war has begun.

December 1963

Nonalignment is a policy of political passivity. It connotes a policy of re­maining free of bloc conflicts, nothing more. A nonaligned state remains clear of military alliances with a!lY bloc or great power. It also assetts tliat aU foreign policy issues will be judged on their merits.

The advocates of neutralism have, in consensus with those espousing non­alignment, a strong desire not to take sides in any bloc conflict. In contrast to nonalignment, the policy of neutral­ism goes much further-it involves a policy of positive action toward bloc conflicts. A neutralist state assumes an obligation to help reduce tensions be­tween blocs with a view toward the maintenance of peace or bringing about peace. From this, it'may be con­cluded that a major foreign policy ob­

23

NEUTRALISM

jective of a state espousing neutralism is the reduction of tensions which could lead to war.

Cornerstone Neutrality, for over 100 years be­

fore World War II, was a cornerstone of United States foreign policy. We 'isolated ourselves-protected by geog­.raphy and the British Navy-and di­.rected our efforts toward domestic af­fairs. Americans felt that the best way to avoid war, especially in Europe, was to remain neutral toward all bel­ligerents, claiming and maintaining certain legal rights and duties.

In the vastly altered world arena of today, the neutralist sees that the best way of remaining out of war is by preventing war. Thus it seems that the policy of neutrality has been trans­formed by circumstances into a more positive policy of neutralism-an al­tered means to the same goal.

From t his analysis, neutralism would appear to have emerged through necessity as a modern policy version of the classic status of neutrality. Non­alignment, on the other hand, would appear to have developed as an inter­mediate stage at some point in time between neutrality and' neutralism. While this article focuses on south and southeast Asia, it must be understood that many factors are common in other areas of the world.

Lieutenant Colonel Arthur S. Hy­mall is with the Special Warfare Di­rectorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. Department of the Army. He served in the Pacific during World War lJ and was wtth the 40th Infantry Division during the Korean Conflict. He is a graduate of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. the Armed Forces Staff College. and the U. S. Army War College~

Factors I· A ooref,1 n'M;"';" .'f I"" ;~",- :

relationship between the mternatlOnal . environment and internal conditions of the newly independent countries during the early postwar period is es. l, sential to the understanding of the policy of nonalignment and, subse· quently, neutralism. It was the inter· relationship between the two that made the early emergence of a policy ! of nonalignment a natural transforma· ~

tion. The aftermath of World War II t

brought with it the rapid erosion of ~ the colonial power of Western nations in Asia. In India the transition to in· dependence was measured and rela· tively harmonious; in Indonesia and Indochina, violent and bloody. In every instance, independence was predicta­ble, inevitable, and desirable. Never· theless, regardless of the various con­ditions of colonial rule, the passage of imperialism left the new countries in a condition of physical weakness and emotional exhaustion.

In addition, they were, without ex­ception, seriously weak economically and, in varying degrees. in the quality of their human resources-resources needed to administer modern coun· tries. conduct foreign affairs, develop democratic institutions, initiate and manage economic development, and educate their backward people. Com­p ely ab ed by these serious prob· lem at h me, it was little wondel' that the rs of the new states viewed the outside world with a lack of under· standing and deep foreboding.

In large part, neutralism in this re­gion was the child of colonialism and nationalist revolution, and bequeathed to south and southeast Asia a legacy of pervasive anti-Western sentiment. A deep and basic distrust of the West·

Military Review 24

etn Powers e1<isted. Despite many achievements, tile colonial e1<perience left deep scars and a residue of Asian hatred for Europeans-white men in general-and the Capitalist system which supposedly made imperialism inevitable.

In manY,respects, the hostile image of the outside .world was directly in­fluenced by the past evils of colonial exploitation, with its resulting indig­nities. There were, of course, such other factors as nationalism, a predi­lection for some form of socialism, and problems based on archaic social sys­tems overwhelmed by rising expecta­tions.

Grand Example Initially, the United States repre­

sented hope and a grand e1<ample of a one-time colony to the nationalists of Asia. The writings of Thomas Jef­ferson and Abraham Lincoln were basic reading for the eli t e who dreamed of independence and freedom of mankind. U Nu, Prime Minister of Burma, said, when viewing the Liber­ty Bell in Philadelphia:

The ideas and ideals, the ringing words and slogans of the American Revolution, have a tremendous emo­tional importance to all men who struggle for liberty. . . . Abraham Lincoln is one of the American lead­ers from whom we ... draw our in­spiration.

Fr.om 1945 onward, however, the United States became increasingly identified with the colonial practices of her European NATO allies. Al­though the United States had pressed for the independence of India and Bur­ma-and after several years of failing to assist, she finally provided the cru­cial pressure on the Dutch. in 1949 for the liberation of Indonesia-her poli­cies on other colonial issues, in Asia

December 1963

as well as Africa, had been at best ambiguous and inconsistent. The Asians bee a m e increasingly disen­chanted with the United States for her apparent failure to adhere rigidly to her traditional policy of anticolonial­ism.

Soviet Bloc Nor did the Asian leaders view the

possibility of an alignment with the Soviet bloc with enthusiasm. Although the economic achievements of the So­viet Union had been impressive, her widely proclaimed anticolonial stand admired, and the heroic bravery of the Soviet soldiers in World War II leg­endary, there existed a dislike for So­viet regimentation and dictatorship. The Asian leaders also seemed to fear the extensive connection between local Communist Parties and Moscow.

This fear of subversive communism was substantiated when, under the di­rection of Moscow, local Communists abandoned their cooperation with the indigenous nationalist leaders. Three Communist conferences WElre held in Calcutta during February and March 1948. It was widely believed in the West that the decision was taken, then, to I a u n c h Communist uprisings throughout Asia. Prime Minister U Nu told of his country's predicament when he said:

Our troubles started almost as soon as we achieved independence in Jan­uary, 1948..•• One month after inde­pendence, these leaders [Burmese com­munists] attended a Southeast Asian communist conference in Calcutta where insurrection was plotted.

One year later, Mao Tse-tung in­creased the concern of the neutralists when he said:

It is impossible to sit on the fence; there is no third road, ... We also op­pose illusions about a third road. Not

25

.-NEUTRALISM

only in China but throughout the world, without exception, one inclines either toward imperialism or toward socialism. Neutrallty is merely a cam­ouflage; a third road does not exist.

These early lessons in Communist intentions did not go unobserved throughol!t Asia. Fear of the power­

, 1946. Prime Minister Jawahlrlal Neh.l ru declared in September of that year I that India would: ,

.... keep away from power politici of groups, aligned against one an­other, which had led in the past to ' world wars and which may again lead' to disasters on an ever vaster scale.

All the basic premises of the policy

':' Comm,""' "~"~r' to­

...- ~"

~ .

Red China has proved to be an imperialistic and ruthless neighbor

fluence on indigenous Communist Par­ties, in addition to strong nationalistic feelings and distrust of Western na­tions, kept the neutralists from mov­ing toward any alignments. In fact, the early", postwar events seemed to have reinforced the convictions of these Asian leaders as to the correctness of their nonalignment policies. Evolution

The first recorded official declara­tion of a policy of nonalignment came with the independence of India in

-such as anticolonialism, nonalign­ment with power blocs, and faith in the protection of the United Nations -were elaborated by him in a speech a few days later. This Indian policy of nonalignment served as a model for other new states emerging from colo­nial domination.

With the advent of political inde­pendence, nationalism was manifested by the urge for modernization and rapid social improvements. But the success of social and economic develop-

Military Review ( 26

ment within the backward countries of Asia depended upon peaceful con­ditions-internally and internation­ally. The fear of another world war which might destroy their national in­dependence. if not their very existeMe, prompted these states to seek peace, often at any cost. They began to argue strongly fo~ total disarmament and peaceful settlements of disputes.

The support which they gave the United Nations was largely based on the belief that the world body was the only hope and workable organization for peaceful settlement of interna­tional disputes. They also found in the United Nations an instrumentality in which they were able to realize equal­ity with other nations and a means of maximizing their influence in world affairs.

Fundamental Differences One might conclude that the neu­

tralist states followed identical poli­cies on all international issues. This is far from the truth. There were im­portant and fundamental differences in the nation'al and regional factors which influenced domestic policy in the countries and caused significant vari­ances in foreign policy. Internal con­ditions-the presence of strong right or leftwing political parties, social structure, economic conditions, geo­graphical location, and security re­quirements-were but some of these elements. The s e differences were graphically demonstrated to the world first at the Bandung Conference of 1955 and later at the Neutral Nations Summit Conference held in Belgrade in 1961.

Although major differences in out­look on many issues existed among the leading neutralist states, especially

- those of a regional nature, the Bel­grade Conference demonstrated most

December 1963

forcefully to the· world that these un­committed states had some strongly shared interests and had become an active and significant force with which both the East and West blocs had to reckon. Twenty-five neutralist coun­tries produced at Belgrade, for the first time, a comprehensive and com­plete statement of shared opinions on internl!tional questions. As a group they were united by at least three major preoccupations:

• Anxiety to avoid involvement in the East-West dispute.

•• Economic development. • Safeguarding their independence

and fighting colonialism. The clear and comprehensive state­

ment of objectives and goals which re­sulted from the Belgrade Conference demonstrated how far neutralism had evolved as a positive world force since Nehru rather hesitantly observed in 1947 that "India's foreign policy will be rather vague." It seems reasonable to conclude, however, that only the strongest of external pressures, as have been generated in the cold war these past 17 years, could have forced so diverse a group of states to for-mu­late jointly international goals.

Cold War Pressures The initial reactions of both the

Sino-Soviet bloc and the Western na­tions toward those Asian countries espousing a policy of nonalignment were a mixture of puzzlement, dismay, and often enmity. Neutralism was fre­quently looked upon by Western ob­servers as:

· .. simply the reflection of some perverse, shortsighted or selfish code of Asian values which failed to dis­tinguish between communism and democratic traditions of.the West. or still worse which favored the Marxist philosophy.

21

NEUTRALISM

The Soviet Union contemptuously referred to the neutralist leaders as "lackeys," "stooges," and "tools of the imperialists," and, as previously men­tioned, in 1948 launched local Commu­nist insurrections throughout Asia. Mao Tse-tung had made clear the po­s,ition of the Chinese Communists with respect to a "third road." Secretary of State John Foster Dulles expressed the views of many Western leaders when he &aid in 1956 that neutrality was ,tan obsolete conception and, ex­cept under very exceptional circum­stances, was an immoral and short­sighted conception." On 4 July 1956 Vice President Richard M. Nixon, speaking in Manila, said that:

. . . a condition for commanding American sympathy was that foreign nations must make a moral distinction between the communist world and the free world.

A Hard Fact With the passage of time and in­

creased threat of nuclear weapons, the cold war struggle appears to have be­come a "no-war-no-peace" reality. The United States, the Soviet Union, and,

. to a lesser extent, Red China seem to have become more and more reconciled to neutralism as a hard fact of inter­national life. .

Since the death of Stalin, the So­viet Union has increased appreciably her efforts to swing the uncommitted states toward her side by repeated strong stands against colonialism in any form and offers of economic aid and military assistance.

Peking, likewise, radically changed its approach tow a r d neighboring Asian countries. At the Bandung Con­ference, Chinese Foreign Minister Chou' En-Iai exerted all his diplomatic skills to promote the new Red Chinese foreign policylne.

,28

Although a gradual change in atti­tude by both blocs toward the neutral. ists became apparent, the increasing importance of neutralism itself repre· sented the most compelling inducement mechanism for the change.

Gradually, the neutralist states developed skill in using the instrumen­tality of the United Nations for polit· ical maneuvering, and thereby in­creased its value to them. The develop. ment of a balance between the United States and the Soviet Union in both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons imposed rigid restraints upon the abil­ity of each to act, and, consequently, further increased the capacity of the neutralists to resist alignment.

Reevaluation The increasing significance of neu­

tralism as a world force, coupled with a discernible change in Sino-Soviet strategy, forced the United States to reevaluate her foreign policy. In retro­spect, it appears that earlier US for· eign policy vis-a-vis the neutralist countries of Asia lacked both under­standing and flexibility.

A better insight into US foreign pol­icy, as it was applied in the western Pacific, requires that we look briefly at the policies of the Truman and Ei­senhower administrations. By the end of 1949, a clear-cut pattern of US pol­icy had become evident, with the first priority on strengthening Western Eu­rope's security.

To meet the demands of this gigan­tic task, it was felt that United States commitments in Asia had to be re­duced. This decision resulted, in part, from the triumph of the Chinese Com­munists, and the belief that if a global war occurred, it would be ignited in Europe, not in Asia. In the early part of 1950, the United States was at a point of charting a new course in her

Military Reyiew

Far Eastern policy-a course aimed at avoiding military involvement.

As a result of the Korean War, how­ever, and under the guidance of the next Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, US foreign policy in Asia was re­versed. This policy, until then, seemed to be based upon one premise: com­munism could be contained in Asia only by the establishment of an un­broken chain of alliances.

Suspicion lind distrust. of US mo­tives and policies in Asia was sharply increased when Dulles warned the Chi­nese Communists of the grave conse­quences which might arise if they in­tervened in Indochina. It was in this connection that he gave voice to a con­templated change in America's over-aU strategy. Speaking before the Council of Foreign Relations in New York in January 1954, Dulles declared, in ef­fect, that a new emphasis would be placed by the United States on the "de­terrent of massive retaliatory power" that would be employed "instantly, by means and at times of our own choos­ing" to counterbalance the weaknesses of the containment policy-a corner­stone of US foreign policy under Pres­ident Truman.

Damage Done Although Dulles quickly qualified

his remarks, the damage had been done. US attempts to force the neu­tralist countries to choose sides in the cold war and her threat to use nuclear weapons to contain communism cre­ated deep anxiety and distrust among the neutralist leaders, who either did not share our apprehensions or feared to provoke their Communist neighbors, Then, too, the neutralists realistically saw that their policy of neutralism could not protect them in the event of a nuclear war.

As the United States entered the

December 1963

present decade, some of the past pol­icy errors seemed apparent to our lead­ers. The right and propriety of neu­tralism was no longer questioned in the highest policy-making levels, de­spite an occasional cry of outrage at evidence of such "unneutral" neutral­ism as that displayed at the Belgrade Conference. Recently, in answer to an urgent plea from Mr. Nehru, the United States promptly delivered arms to India for the purpose of defense against the outright Red Chinese ag­gression directed from Peking.

What the future of this force of neutralism will be is anybody's guess. Recent events on the Chinese-Indian border may have forced the Asian neu­tralists to reevaluate their foreign pol­icies. It seems reasonable to conclude, however, that they have becoroe aware of the value and importance of neu­tralism as a force in world affairs.

Other factors which, in the past, contributed to the emergence of neu­tralism still remain-the cold war con­tinues unabated, economic and social conditions are still critical, Red China has proved to be an imperialistic and ruthless neighbor, and democratic in­stitutions, at best, operate precariously in many neutralist countries. In this environment, regardless of both the outcome of the Chinese-Indian border dispute and the Sino-Soviet split, the political status of neutralism should continue to offer many tempting in­ducements to the weaker states.

It is conceivable, moreover, that the neutralist countries offer the best hope for ultimately bridging the gap be­tween the East and the West. Their middle position enables them to pro­vide an acceptable channel of commu­nications in a world where the loss of' diplomatic contact could mean a ca­tastrophe.

29

INDONESIA Major Edgar O'Ballance, Territorial Army, Great Britain

I NDONESIA is one of the world's most prominent neutrals. Her strate­gic position 011' southeast Asia causes her to be courted by both the West­ern and the Eastern blocs.

Sometimes a neutral, sitting on the fence, has influence and prestige out of proportion to her size and potential. Is this the case with Indonesia?

With a population of 97 million people, the Republic of Indonesia, comprising an area of about 1.9 mil­lion square kilometers, is made up., of some 3,000 islands spread 'over a large expanse of ocean, 011' the southeast

J

corner of the Asian Continent. The larger and better known of the islands -at least to Western readers-are Sumatra, Java, Borneo, the Celebes, and the Moluccas. Java contains more than half of the total population and the Republic's capital, Djakarta (Ja­karta). The capital, formerly known as Batavia, has a population of over three million people.

For centuries these islands were ruled by the Netherlands. At the turn of the 20th century, nationalism made its appearance. The first Na­tionalist Party was formed in 1911;

Military Review 30

in its wake, others of a similar char­acter sprang tip over the ensuing years.

An Indonesian Communist Party was formed in 1920, but it was crushed six years later after a series of disturbances. During the period be­tween the two World Wars, National­ist and Socialist political parties were tolerated but not encouraged by the Dutch.

During World War II the islands were occupied by the Japanese who allowed an Indonesian nationalist gov­ernment to exist under their control. In this government, two local leaders came to the fore-Dr. Achmed Su­karno and Dr. Mohammad Hatta. When tl)e Japanese surrendered in 1945, Sukarno proclaimed his coun­try's independence, but the British military forces which had moved in yielded control to 'the Dutch the fol­lowing year.

Upon returning to Indonesia, the Dutch were faced with this de facto rival nationalist government which wanted independence. Negotiations broke down in 1947, and there fol­lowed a two-year, guerrilla-type strug­gle.

The Dutch showed they could take and hold the cities, but could not master the countryside. In 1948 Su­karno was captured, but other nation-

Major Edgar O'Ballance is a Terri­torial officer with the 5th Battalion of the Sherwood Foresters in Derby­shire, England. His assignments have included duty as a staff officer, regi­mental duty, and commander of a bat­talion in Burma against the Japanese during World War II. A frequent con­tributor to the MILITARY REVIEW, Ma-

o jor O'Ballance has written extensively on Asian affairs.

December 1963

alist leaders continued the struggle. At last, weary of the fight and of ad­verse world opinion, the Dutch decided to withdraw. The transfer of power over all theformer Dutch East Indies, except Dutch New Guinea, took place late in 1949; in 1950 Sukarno, as President, proclaimed the Republic of Indonesia.

Early Days The Indonesian Rep ubI i c was

founded on the five principles of be­lief in God, nationalism, humanitar­iapism, social justice, and democracy; the separate provinces were granted broad regional autonomy. Elections were held and President Sukarno gov­erned through a series of· coalition cabinets that were formed on a Mos­lem-nationalist basis. The Communist Party, which was legal, was not rep­resented.

Revolt torn and chaotic, the Repub­lic ambled uneasily along until 1957 when President Sukarno, tired of squabbling politicians and factions, introduced his "gUided democracy"­allowing the Communists to take part in the government. He decided, after this trial period, that the Western­type democracy was not suitable for the diverse peoples of Indonesia.

Since about 1955 President Sukarno has globetrotted many countries, both of the Eastern and the Western blocs, refusing to b e com e enmeshed in treaty obligations with either-al­tbough he has accepted loans, arms, and other aid at various times from both camps.

Armed Forces Formally established in October

1945, the Indonesian armed forces have their roots in a J apanese-spon­sored paramilitary youth movement which was introduced during the pe­

31

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riod of Japanese occupation. This or­ganization developed into a national army which faced the Dutch when they returned in 1946. When inde­pendence became an accomplished fact in 1949, the national forces had in­creased to over 600,OOO--<>nly a small proportion were under President Su­karno's direct control. The bulk con­sisted of guerrilla and partisan groups spread throughout the islands-some of which were of doubtful loyalty and had dubious aims.'

The immediate and most urgent need was to produce an efficient, uni­fied. disciplined, smaller army to keep internal order and prevent fragmenta­tion. For example. military action had to be' taken against the Amboinese. who had been Dutch mercenaries for generations and who were reluctant to accept the authority of the new Republican Government. There was neither the cash nor available equip­ment to maintain a large standing force.

Strength was slowly reduced to 300.000. and then to 200.000. Today, in keeping with the events of the last few years, the armed forces number about 400,000 personnel.

Army In character, the army is mainly in­

fantry, consisting of about 130 in­fantry battalions distributed in some 16 regional brigade groups on a loose territorial basis. There are a limited number of specialist units, such as field engineers, artillery, antiaircraft. armor, signal, and transportation. By and large, though, the Indonesian Army is still in the rifle and machine­gun stage of development. *

There is a large detachment of paratroops, said to be about 30,000

• Indonesia. "Armed Forces," Militaf1l Review, October 1963. p 107.

December 1963

strong. The remainder of the i~fantry is fairly well grounded in basic infan­try work, with the accent being on defensive measures and guerrilla war­fare. It is boasted that 75 percent of the men have combat experience" in that sphere. The standard of training tends to vary from island to island, the most efficient being located on Java where the built of the armed forces are. and where smart detach­ments of all arms are always available to show the flag.

Ample volunteers have been avail­able, and it has not been necessary to implement conscription which has been introduced recently. Soldiers tend to stay on in the army if they can be­cause of the attractive conditions as compared with civilian ones, and the turnover of men has been slow.

Navy The Indonesian Navy was estab­

lished in 1949. the departing Dutch providing a few small craft to form the nucleus. Since then other ships have been accumulated from various sources.

Today, the Indonesian Navy, with a manpower strength of about 40,000, operates 250 ships. The fleet includes one 19,OOO-ton heavy cruiser, two frig­ates mounting ship-to-ship g u ide d missiles, about 20 submarines. seven modern destroyers. an antisubmarine helicopter squadron. approximately 60 motor torpedo boats, and 12 patrol craft.

It has a sizable marine detachment which has recently received a number of Soviet-type amphibious vehicles. The navy also has an air arm equipped with Gannet antisubmarine aircraft, and Albatross and Catalina flying boats. More Soviet helicopters are expected, as well as some Soviet mis­siles.

33

.. INDONESIA

Air Force With 23,000 men, the Indonesian

Air Force has some 100 Soviet MiG­15, 17, and 19 fighters, plus 18 long­range, t win - jet MiG-21's. In the' bomber category..are 20 Il-28 turbo­jet aircraft and 10 pure jet TU-16's.

President Aehmed Sukarno

The air force possesses a respectable transport capability with 'its US C­47's and C-180's and numerous Soviet troop carrier aircraft. In addition, the Indonesians are said to possess around 100 Soviet SA-2 Guideline' surface­to-air missiles, effective up to about 60,000 feet.

The over-all d e due t ion must be that as the armed forces are slowly becoming modernized, it will be some time before they could be capable of successful sustained action against an armed force of any first, or even second-rate power. They are, how­ever, adequate to keep internal order

34

and quell island revolts. Conversely, the guerrilla potential of Indonesia in terrain, armed forces, and the peo­ple is great.

Internal Problems Like any young country, Indonesia

has her share of internal problems­building up a sound economy, estab. lishing industrialization, raising the standard of living, and wiping out i1. literacy. There are, however, three potential issues that may affect her international standing and influence. These are:

• Fragmentation. • Communist r i val r y with the

army. • The survival of President Suo

karno. Fragmentation

There is an inherent rivalry pc­tween the various ethnic groups­there are 12 different ethnic groups and about 114 different languages. ,In some cases, regional autonomy does not seem to be enough.

In 1952 an abortive revolt was led by General Abdul Haris Nasution, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, against the central govern· ment. Until that moment the army was considered to be completely loyal to President Sukarno. but this showed that it was becoming politically con­scious and more independent. General Nasution was reconciled with Presi· dent Sukarno, and three years later was restored to his former position as chief of staff. Today, he is both Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and Minister of Security.

The "Revolt of the Colonels" oc· curred in 1957 when s eve r a I local army commanders proclaimed a series of coups. This movement spread until the central government controlled only Java and parts of Sumatra. The reb·

Military Review

els in Sumatra began negotiating with foreign sour~es for imports and exports. A state of siege had to be declared, and the situation was finally restored by the ever popular, President Sukarno, skillfully using his tremen­dous prestige.

The "Revolt of the Outer Islands" broke out the following year, and the central government had to use force to cope with it. Although order was restored by the army, it was admitted, in December 1958, that there were still over 10,000 armed rebels at large.

These events show that desir~ for local independence are real, and that any weakness of the central govern­ment may be exploited. Realizing this, the army has always favored strong central control. Danger of fragmenta­tion exists, and, should it occur, the power and influence of Indonesia would wane accordingly.

Army versus Communism The next problem, yet to be solved,

is the army versus communism dispute which may one day project the coun­try into a bitter civil war which could attract foreign Communist interven­tion.

In 1948 the Communists tried to pull off a coup but were crushed, and some of the leaders were executed. Even though the Communists polled some six million votes at the general elections after independence, Presi­dent Sukarno, for some time, would not have them in his coalition cabi­nets.

Today, the Indonesian Communist Party claims to have over two million members and is the third strongest in the world, The large, growing Com­munist Party is counterbalanced by the army which is strongly pro-Mos­lem and anti-Communist. So far, the Communists have been unable to gain

December 1963

a foothold in the armed forces, and the army has prevented the Commu­nists from exploiting into the coun­tryside.

When granted emergency powers during the revolt of 1958, General Nasution banned the right of public assembly and curtailed free speech. Both of these'measures hit the Com­munists hard. Since 1958 the' Presi­dent has tended to favor the armed forces, to the Communists' detriment. Although temporarily checked, the Indonesian Communist Party is still it p9werful organization with great Potentialities, and the army fully real­izes the danger. The Moslem and Na­tionalist political parties do not yet fully share this view, but all dislike the Communist program.

The army has taken a leaf from the Communist handbook and is actively participating in the battle for the minds of the peasants. Short courses of instruction are held for both offi­cers and men in subjects such as agri­culture, social services, public health, and anti-Communist propaganda. Sol­diers are sent out into the villages to teach the peasants to read, and they supply suitable anti-Communist prop­aganda to read. Occasionally, they help in the fields and assist on minor projects such as irrigating, sinking wells, building houses, and construct­ing roads. They are prepared to offer advice and guidance as well as prac­tical help. It is in this way that the army has been able, in the countryside. to keep the Communists at bay.

The armed forces and the Commu­nists are uneasy bedfellows, and both realize that the real struggle for power is yet to come. If and when it does come, the danger lies not only in the Republic being torn by civil war,

35

INDONESIA

but by huge clandestine injections of external Communist infiltration and aid.

The President As long' as President Sukarno re­

mains the active leader, it is reason­able to assume that the existing status will continue. The President is a gifted coordinator who has, over the years, successfully persuaded political groups and factions and the army to work together under his leadership. He has attained a sort of magical in­fluence o~er the people of Indonesia, and his personal popularity has ena­bled him to stay well above party squabbles. He has an uncanny political sense, and he knows when to rid~ with a loose rein and when to put on the brake.

It may seem odd in a so-called de­mocracy that one man-a coordinator rather than a direct administrator­should be the one and, seemingly, only keystone. but, to a large extent, this is so. What will happen if he diSilP­pears from the scene?

President Sukarno's stature in In­donesia is such-or appears to be so to an outsider-that no obvious re­placement stands' hovering in the background (although Dr. Hatta is occasionally mentioned) 'who could hold the Republic together.

The removal or' President Sukarno might unleash latent forces. The Com­mUllists, if they are running true to form, are feverishly preparing for that day. This could mean civil war and fragmentation.

Foreign Relations Neutrals have few trustworthy, re­

liable friends, and smiles and pleas­antries frequently hide international insincerity. There have been numer­ous changes in emphasis and align­ment s,ince Indonesia played host to

the famous Bandung Conference in 1955.

The US attitude has been one of cautiousness and, accordingly, has giyen only limited arms and aid to Indonesia. Today, US aid has been restricted, although the United States fully realizes the strategic importance of Indonesia and the disadvantages that would ensue if the RepUblic turned Communist. ,.

The Soviet Union, until recently, did little to help, partly, perhaps, because the country was so far distant from Moscow, or because President Sukarno refused to be drawn into any com­mitments, or, perhaps, because, in the period when the Soviets and Red China were firm friends, it was felt that Indonesia fell more naturally into the Red Chinese sphere of influence. Only since serious ideological differ· ences between the two Communist giants have arisen has the Soviet Union decided to increase her mili· tary aid to Indonesia.

Indonesia's relations wit h Red China have been cool. Although Presi­dent Sukarno has publicly admired Mao Tse-tung's methods and results, this has not prevented him from tak· ing over many Red Chinese interests in Indonesia and deporting numbers of the 3.5 million Chinese domiciled there.

With Great Britain, President Suo karno has several differences of opin­ion, but so far he has been careful to act correctly. He is displeased with the recently created Federation of Malaysia.

Australia also regards Indonesia with suspicion, and the germ of a future dispute over the possession of parts of the island of New Guinea seems to be breeding.

Military Review 36

With his next door n,eighbor, the philippines, President Sukarno has another possible dispute in embryo-­this one is in reference to claims to parts of the island of Borneo.

Communist infiltration in southeast Asia never ceases. Today, it is corrod­ing South Vietnam and Laos; tomor­row, it may have spread farther afield, perhaps to Thailand, Malaysia, or even Indonesia. Ranged against this creep­ing, persistent advance of a ruthless ideology is only the loose SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza­tion) framework.

Indonesia's strategic position is of vital importance to SEATO. As long as Indonesia remains neutral and can control her Communist Party, there is not much to worry about. This premise seems to depend, to some large ,extent, upon the survival of the Presi­dent, who has continuously refused to become involved in any military al­liances.

If the status quo is interrupted, it would seem that an active struggle in­volving open hostilities between the armed forces and the Communists may begin, which could mean that Indone­sia might become another Vietnam.

Should the Communists emerge triumphant from such a struggle, then a distinctly unfriendly power would be set square astride the routes to, and between, the SEATO countries. This happenstance would not only cause many practical difficulties, it

would probably make SEATO un­workable.

On the other hand, should the armed forces gain control, it could mean that Indonesia would have a totali­tarian regime. While military dicta­torships do not commend themselves to Western democracies, it would at least be strongly anti-Communist. Even if it were not able to enter SEATO, which isn't completely im­possible, it might qualify for Western aid to build up a strong front against communism.

No one can say with certainty what the eventual outcome will be of the latest Indonesian reactions to the es­tablishment of the Federation of Malaysia, particularly those toward the British. The burning of the Brit­ish Embassy may be interpreted either as a premeditated event-to show displeasure at Britain's support of the new Federation---{)r as an event caused when a mob got out of hand. It is difficult to believe that President Sukarno wants a war with either Great Britain or Australia at this time.

Certainly, the prompt replies of Great Britain, the United States,. and Australia to the events of late Sep­tember 1963 must have given Presi­dent SUkarno food for thought. And the stand taken by those three coun­tries might well determine Indonesia's future course in international affairs for months to come.

t 37December 1963

WHERE

IS

RED CHINA

HEADED?

Colonel Fernand Schneider. French Army

RED China, in full process of evolvement, with her personal form of communism, her astonishing industrial development, and her tragic agricul­tural stagnation, poses-under the pressure of lier demographic growth -a distressing problem for the West­ern World.

Without question, this country is at a turning point in its history. But its destiny, far from being shaped in iso­lation, will be inescapably determined under the conditions of contacts with other nations-such as the USSR, Ja­pan, and India-which are themselves undergoing revolutionary transforma­tions.

Under these conditions, it is difficult to form .any clear picture of the Com­

munist Chinese situation in the near future, particularly when related to the realities, aspirations, and prob· lems of the Soviet Union.

To begin with, it is well to state that the so-called Marxist common denomi­nator between Red China and the USSR does not constitute a determin· ing and exclusive phenomenon. From the ideological standpoints, there ex-

This article was transla ted and digested from the original, pub­lished in the REVUE MILITAIRE GENERALE (France) February 1963, under the title, "Qu va la Chine?" Translation by Mr. La­Vergne Dale, Leavenworth. Kan­sas.

Military Review 38

ists no identity between the Soviet and the Chinese forms of communism, sim­ply because the two countries are not

. at the same stage of Marxist evolu­tion.

The Soviet Union has, in a way, di­gested her revolution which, in accord­ance with a law which is repeatedly verified in the history of human socie­ties, has reached °a stage of consider­able bourgeois impregnation. New structures have been created, and the beneficiaries of the present state of affairs are anxious to retain the privi­leges deriving therefrom, evincing a spirjt of conservatism worthy of the Western Capitalists.

Younger Generation With the progressive disappearance

of the "October pioneers," some of the younger generation, brought up in the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, but more openminded to things of a spir­itual nature and to matters pertaining to the West, deal with life in a less revolutionary manner. Their more lib­eral attitude will certainly facilitate, In the long run, a Soviet reintegration into a Europe constituting a part of the Free World.

Even now Khrushchev himself pro­poses to his compatriots, as a future ideal, the attainment-even the sur­passing-of the American standard of living. Certain failures in the Soviet economy have brought about an un­fortunate increase in the price of con­sumer goods which will considerably delay this accomplishment; however, it is nonetheless true that the Soviet social objective is now a bourgeois ideal.

It is not the same in Red China. TM recent experiment (and failure) of the communes surpasses anything that has been attempted in the USSR. The ex-

Dlcember 1963

periment is only that of the Chinese masters of the moment and not an ex­pression of the will of the people.

The Communist Chinese leaders are at variance with the Soviet Commu­ni'St leaders who, personally, are more desirous of retaining their privileges than of pursuing the Marxist revolu­tion. And then there is the difference between the yellow people of Commu­nist China and the white race of the Soviet Union.

This breach between the two coun­tries-noted at the time of the last Communist congress-is, however, only' one of the aspects of a latent So­viet-Chinese conflict. Such a clash will break out one day because of the demo­graphic expansion of Red China which will have a population of one billion in 20 years. Then, by the simple opera­tion of the laws of physics, a violent explosion on the part of Communist Eurasia will be inevitable on the fron­tiers of an overpopulated and famished country in the presence of the danger­ous void of Siberian Russia. In the year 2,000, the USSR will have only 380 million Soviets with which to op­pose a billion or a billion and a half Chinese.

In addition, there will be the out­ward thrust of the populations of all those Soviet border "colonies"-to em­ploy the expression of Lenin-in which feelings and resentments born of ra­cial or religious differences continue to survive.

Immense Clash From these doctrinal oppositions

and from this antinomy between peo­ples could come an immense and bloody clash between the white and the yellow races at the frontiers of Europe. Even now, even outside of Eurasia, sharp Soviet-Chinese competition is taking shape in the underdeveloped countries

39

liED CHINA

(If Africa and South America. Peking is seeking' to develop its influence there. It is encountering local opposi­tion, notably on the part of the "Af­rican and Malagasy Union," which is on the way to developing into a re­markable community. a synthesis of our Western civilization and a happily

Military Power If Red China does turn against the

Soviet Union, what military means does she possess to wage war? As Sta. lin might have said, "How many divI­sions does Red China have?"

The history of Communist China is that of her armed forces. Her rise is

,)f;'> , ';". ~ ;.: !

.~

US ATtIIl/

The history of Communist China is that of her armed forces

rediscovered and recognized "Negri­tude."

Moreover, certain African states have established contact with Nation­alist China-the Cameroun and the Congo, for example.

Under these circumstances, Peking's grip-in spite of the "Afro-Asiatic solidarity" proclaimed by th~ envoys of Mao Tse-tung-does not seem to be taking form in a massive way in Af­rica. The same could be said of the majority of the countries of South America.

that of her partisans, in the beginning, progressively yielding place <!juring the course of constant evolution to a reg· ular army. The latter, still in the ges­tation phase, gave proof of its capa­bilities in Korea where it held its own against the forces of the United Na· tions.

Since that time, and with Soviet aid, Red China has constantly improved the organization ,of her war machine. At the present time, the Red Chinese ground forces number approximately two and a half million men grouped

MililaryReview 411

in 35 armies, each of two or three di­visions of from 10,000 to 17,000 men.

Infantry divisions predominate, but several armored and one or two air­borne divisions supposedly exist. The artillery is grouped in divisions as in the Soviet Army. In time of war, sev­eral of the present "armies" would doubtless be grouped together to form field armies.

The navy, with 50,000 men, consti­tutes a minor element. It possesses one light cruiser, four destroyers, 15frig­ates. 25 submarines, 50 patrol boats, 25 minesweepers, and 60 submarine chasers.

Unless it were expanded into a larger fleet, the navy could perform only coastal missIons. Nevertheless, by pushing a program of naval construc­tion, Red China would be able, it is believed, to create a good fleet of sub­marines.

The air force of Red China com­prises several thousand aircraft, par­ticularly MiG-15, MiG-17, and MiG-19 jet fighter planes, as well as [/-28 jet fighter bombers. This is essentially tactical support aviation.

Nuclear Power Red China does not yet possess any

nue/ear power. Her nuclear industry is. however, already in process of de­velopment, and the construction of Red Chinese nuclear weapons is antici­pated.

It does not appear that provision has as yet been made for any delivery vehicles for the future nuclear weap­ons. It is certain that the USSR has no interest in endowing her rival of tomorrow with powerful nuclear weap­ons. Communist China will, therefore, be anxiolls to manufacture her nuclear equipment herself in order that her military power may soon measure up to her political ambitions.

Comparison Does all this mean that Red China's

present potential would be negligible in comparison with that of the USSR?

The discussions of military experts in recent months have sufficiently re­habilitated the importance of conven­tional forces. China possesses an ad­vantage in numbers and would be able, with her divisions, to man the 7,200­kilometer frontier which separates her from the USSR.

The terrain on which the Soviets and ·Chinese would meet has been the object of a recent study. The author of the study sees three possible fronts, from east to west, on the boundaries between the USSR and China.

• On the east, the Manchurian sec­tor, 2,300 kilometers wide and of easy traversability, would lend itself to a tank war.

• In the center, the Mongolian sec­tor stretches for a distance of 2,500 kilometers over particularly inhospita­ble regions, in which the only possibil­ities would be operations in desert ter­rain with weak forces.

• At the western end of the theater, a mountainous region which stretches for 2,400 kilometers lends itself only to mountain warfare, where the So­viets coming from the north would be confronted with the Tibetan Plateau with its altitude of 4,000 meters.

Even by taking advantage of the third of the terrain suitable for the engagement of mechanized forces, a large-scale Soviet offensive against the Red Chinese would require the em­ployment of so great a quantity of means that the effort would consume a major portion of the Soviet military potential, especially since it would be necessary to face guerrilla action in the mountain regions and uprisings on the frontiers of the Soviet Union her-

December 1963 41

"RED CHINA

self. If one added the logistical effort necessary to support such an opera­tion, it becomes apparent that such an undertaking would not be possible ex­'cept with the aid of the Western bloc.

Of course, Red China would en­counter the same difficulties in mount­ing an offensive against the Soviet Union. For her, likewise, only the Manchurian front would lend itself to an offensive. Nevertheless; in invad­ing eastern Siberia, she would be op­erating close to her supply bases while the Sovi;ts would have long and espe­cially vulnerable communication lines. In addition, uprisings, originating on the Soviet frontiers, would imperil both the latter country and the regime.

The Chinese could throw the main body of their forces into Manchuria,' in the direction of the Stanovoi Range, and turn them afterward toward Lake Baikal, pushing forward over the Chi­ta-Irkutsk-Novosibirsk line. A suffi­cient number of divisions could be as­signed to the protection of the west flank of the main offensive.

Moreover, Red Chinese aircraft and missiles could cause great damage in the Soviet rear areas, particularly against the vulnerable communication routes.

Nuclear Weapons If we consider major nuclear means,

assuming that the conventional forces would be equipped with tactical nu­clear weapons, it does not seem that the latter will bring any fundamental modification to the relationship of the forces facing one another, even though the nuclear potential of the Peking ar­mies is inferi\lr to that of the Soviets.

In reality, the USSR, assumed to be at variance with the West, will not dare to wage the great nuclear battle. In drawing on her terror arsenal, she would place herself in an inferior po­

sition with respect to the Western Powers. Alternatively,' she will make concessions to Communist China, un­less, foreseeing the coming Chinese tidal wave, she will have preferred the "lesser evil" and have changed camps, Then the great confrontation between "the West as far as the Urals" and Communist China would be possible.

Remedy There need be no conflict, however,

if a solution-economic rather than military-ean be found fOr the billion Chinese of tomorrow. It could be found in an accelerated industrialization of China through Western Or Soviet means or by the combined efforts of both. At the same time, the Chinese agricultural problem-the attempted

'solution of which ended in such bitter failure at the time of the so-called Great Leap Forward-should be at­tacked from an entirely different an­gle, better adapted to the rural necessi· ties and more in conformity with the traditions and the mentality of the Chinese peasant.

It would be necessary, likewise, to reduce the problems caused by Siberia, with its 26 million inhabitants and ~

population density of only three per­sons per square kilometer, alongside a territory of much the same area in which 670 million persons are packed to a density of 70 per square kilometer.

Red China, as all underdeveloped countries, must be economically sus­tained in order to survive. It is logical that the rulers of Red China, in order to find a way of escape for their fam· ished surplus population, should con· sider the acquisition through invasion or by means of negotiations, of areas on the frontiers of the USSR. Entire regions inhabited by non-Soviets could be incited to join with Red China.

The problem of Red China is, above

Military Review 42

all, an economic and a human prob­ of certain facts from which the pos­lem. A solution qy force is theoreti­ sibilities, the impossibilities, and the cally possible at some future time. threats of the moment result. The

It is well to remember that China present situation between Communist and her destiny have always consti­ China and the USSR has been well de­tuted a mystery to inquiring minds of fined by Chancellor Adenauer in a re­the Occident. If the predictions of a mark which, all things considered, is Marx and of a Lenin concerning world reassuring: evolution have generally been belied I believe that this opposition be­by history, the greater is the reason tween Soviet Russia and China con­for caution concerning the evolutions stitutes a factor of peace for the world. proclaimed by "scientific" doctrinar­ A war by Soviet Russia against the ians for the countries of Asia. Too West would, in any case, so weaken many unknowns exist in China to per­ Russia that communist China would mit sure previsions. be .a still more dangerous neighbor

Nevertheless, it is well to take note for her.

. . . the picture of the two stalwart giants-the Soviet Union and Com;

munist China-marching shoulder to shoulder to conquer all that lay before them also has been fading fast. Not that both of them are not still Commu­

nist, but they no longer present that picture of shoulder-to-shoulder unity in

carrying out their objectives. Their quarrels have broken into the open and are indeed deep.

U. Alexis Johnson Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

December 1963 43

LAOS

'Case Study In Civic Action

The Royal Lao Program

Brigadier General Oudone Sananikone, Royal Lao Army

Providing military resources to satisfy civilian community needs­civic action--is as old as warfare itself. The United States Army has engaged in many civic action pro­grams. Some have met with suc­cess; others have failed. From all, however, valuable lessons can be learned.

One recent program which has been given scant recognition is de­scribed in the two articles which fol­low. Initially, the program in Laos met with limited successes. It even­tually failed 'ohen the political sit­uation no longer afforded a favor. able climate for civic action.

The patterns of civic action de­scribed by General Sananikone and

Major Stockell-beginnings, organi­zation, and withdrawal--are worthy of study by all students of counter· insurgency operations.-Editor.

C lVle action is a very popular top ic of discussion today, particularly iI connection with underdeveloped coun tries and those faced with a threat 01 Communist insurgency.

What constitutes civic action? Hov does one go about establishing a civic action program? What are the special problems with which one must cope?

Answers to these questions are not easy to come by. They will vary great­ly from nation to nation and will be largely dependent upon the existing political, economic, and sociaii struc·

Military Review 44

ture. There is one point that should be clearly understood. While the pri­mary motivating factor in getting a civic action program is, in many cases, the threat of communism, we must not overlook that such a program in an underdeveloped country is a necessity regardless of the Communist threat. The only difference is the degree of urgency.

Special Conditions It is interesting to note that while

civic action is widespread in Asia, it is not necessarily known as civic ac­tion. but rather by a variety of other titles-community development, vil­lage self-help, and aid. The Royal Lao Civic Action Program developed and executed between 1957 and 1959, is particularly worthy of study in view of the special conditions and peculiari­ties which existed in Laos at that time.

Laos, a landlocked nation of some 233,110 square kilometers, is composed of rugged, forested mountains and plateaus which are between 152 and 1,219 meters in height. The Mekong River Valley forms the main artery of life throughout the country and the majority of the estimated three million Lao live along this great river valley. The area is characterized by poor com­munication facilities, and movement, except up and down the Mekong, is extremely difficult and tedious. Village life is predominant; farming is the principal economic endeavor.

Politically, the country is divided into 12 provinces which are subdivided

Brigadier General Oudone Sanani­kone. Royal Lao Army. was Commis­sioner General of Civic Action, Royal Lao Government, from 1957 to 1959. He is a graduate of the 1962-68 Reg­ular Course of the U. S. Army Com­mand and General Staff Callege.

", ....

December 1963

into muongs (districts), tassengs (subdistricts), and bans (villages). During the period 1957-59, the polit­ical power revolved around the Lao Houam Lao Party-supporters of the National Government-and the Neo Lao Hak Sat-the front organization for the Communist Party-and their military arm, the Pathet Lao. Both the Royal Lao Government and the Communists were making a major ef­fort to broaden their baselamong the rural population, and the principal tools for both were civic action and propaganda. The Pathet Laa had I.' a the I.' an extensive organizatian throughout Laos at that time, but it was strongest in the two northern provinces of phong Saly and Sam Neua-both of which had been under Pathet Lao domination for several years following the .end of the Indo­china War in 1954. In other provinces their political party-Neo Lao Hak Sat-had varying degrees of popular support. '

Objectives The Royal Lao Government, through

its civic action effort, hoped to achieve three major objectives:

• Strengthen the local political ap­paratus by training political cadres and indoctrinating the people with an awareness of the Lao nation and its broad national plans.

• Generate, a spirit of' self-help in the villages which, in turn, would re­sult in an over-all improvement in liv­ing standards. It was hoped this ob­jective might have the most far-reach­ing effects.

• Institute a major anti-Commu­nist effort, the motivating objective.

The vehicle for civic acfion was the mobile training team.

Naturally, the objectives of the mo­bile training teams were· more spe­

45

· ROYAL LAO PROGRAM

cHic in nature. One was to show the flag, and thus counter one of the rna· jor Pathet Lao propaganda themes which revolved around the idea that the Royal Lao Government~as not in­terested in the rural areas and that its officials and influence never touched the lives of the villagers.

Communication Channels . Learning the problems of the vil­

lages and of the rural population as­Sisted in filling one of the major voids in the g~vernment's knowledge. Prior to this time, adequate channels of com­munication did not exist between the government and the rural areas, which comprised the larger part of the na­tion. The key l\lng-range objective, de­signed to play a major part in the eradication of Communist influence and the development of the nation, was to train local village leaders. The nai ban (local mayor) and the tasseng (subdistrict chief) were not necessar­ily the real leaders of the community.

The first aim of the mobile teams was to explain the government's ob­jectives and policies to the people. This was vital if the Pathet Lao propaganda campaign was to. be countered. And, since the area in which the most last­ing results could be achieved was that of assisting the people in agriculture, health, sanitation, irrigation, trans­portation, and local engineering proj­ects, the key was the ability of the team leader to convince the people that the project of improvement was going to be of value to them. Other­wise, there would be no lasting value from the efforts of either the teams or the villagers.; the whole civic ac­tion program might well be wasted and only serve to bolster Communist propaganda.

The organization of the Royal Lao Civic Action Program began at the

national level with a National Com. mittee of Civic Action composed of the directors of the various ministries that had an interest in or contributed to civic action. The president of the com· mittee was the Prime Minister, but the actual operator was the Commis. sioner General of Civic Action.

The committee was primarily one of information and coordination, as, in actual practice, the Commissioner General had broad powers delegated to him by the Prime Minister and he was able to make policy decisions in most areas. For example, the Commis· sioner General established priorities in men, money, and material and se· lected the geographic locations of the various teams. On the prov'incial level the same committee for civic action existed and it, too, had the primary mission of coordination. The team leader could make and implement de· cisions in the field. This was necessary for two reasons: the difficulty of com­munications and the diverse situations in the country. Lack of Trained Leaders

It is well known that most under· developed areas are critically short of trained leaders, and Laos was no ex· ception. This problem was solved by a nationwide recruiting program which, in effect, was centered primar· ily on the civil servants. Aside from a few teachers, most of the people supervising the program had to come fro m governmental agencies. Of course, this reduced efficiency in other areas because of the loss of trained personnel and, even worse, those peo. pie who had exhibited the most neces· sary ingredient-leadership talent.

Such a program was boulld to meet opposition by the various department heads. But sufficient pressure was be­hind it to overcome the bottleneck,

Military Review 46

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December 1963 47

-ROYAL LAO PROGRAM

and the best of the young civil serv­ants were made available to the civic action program. The Commissioner General was given full authority to select the people whom he needed and he handpicked most of them.

A minimum age of 25 years was re­quired for volunteers. In addition to

.professional qualifications, an ability to communicate was desired. This was extremely important. In many cases, the entire program in a given area would depend on the team leader or member. being able to influence the local population against Pathet Lao propagandists, who were among the cleverest and most capable in the n;1­tion. -

AnDther important prerequisite was that volunteers should possess good­personal habits and not have any im­pediments in either speech or looks that would be a handicap in dealing with the local people. A formal edu­catiDn was not considered necessary, but most of those selected had a col­lege background and all had the equiv­alent of high school training. It was also desirable that each trainee should have previous training or experience in one of several technical specialties, such as public administration, health, engineering, or agriculture. Volun­teers needed to be trained in theory, as well as in practical experience, and be able to pass this experience on to the local villager. In fact, practical experience and a demonstrated abil­ity to teach others had the first pri­ority.

Finally, the applicants had to be in excellent health and good physieal con­dition. They would be operating in re­mote areas away from medical help, and the ability to traverse rugged terrain would be a great necessity for the civic action teams.

In the fall of 1957, fourteen teams of 10 men each were selected, and they began a two-phase training program,

First Phase Operations The first phase consisted of six

weeks-a 'total of about 400 hours of formal instruction. Classes were held six days a week and in evening ses. sions. A broad curriculum was cov· ered:

• History of Laos. • Political dynamics of Laos. • Detailed examination of the Lao

Constitution. • Election regulations. • Royal Lao governmental struc·

ture. • Policies of the governmenL • Administration within the king·

dom with emphasis on local adminis· tration.

• International organization-t he ~outheast Asia Treaty Organization, United Nations, and Warsaw Potct.

• Organization, objectives, and techniques of international commu­nism.

• Evaluation of the Communists in southeast Asia.

• Principles of intelligence. • Organization, objectives, and local

appeal of the Pathet Lao. , • Background of key Pathet Lao leaders.

Instruction was given by officials of the National Government and other experts available in the nation.

The second phase consisted of one additional week, and it was during this period that the 10-man teams were prepared for action in five main areas: public health and sanitation, education, public works, agriculture, and public relations. Two experts from each field were incorporated into each team.'

Military Review 48

One of the major problems in as­signing the specialists was that of en­suring that at least one or more mem­bers of the team was from the area to which the team was assigned. The reasons for this are quite obvious. The team leaders were selected primarily by the Commissioner General upon recommendation pf the other commit­tee memhers and government agencies.

The team members were given 60 hours of fprmal instruction in their area of specialization, with primary emphasis devoted to solving the prac­tical problems they would soon face in the field. There was also some instruc­tion given by the Royal Lao Army which covered in detail the army's role and the assistance that the team members could expect from local army officials. For example, the civic action teams were dependent on army com­munication facilities. The army was by far the largest and most cohesive national organization within the coun­try, and it played a major role in the civic action effort at a later date.

After the completion of the second phase of training, the team leaders were sent to Saigon to attend a spe­cial two-week leaders' course given by the government of South Vietnam. The other members of the teams went to their assigned areas of operation and used the two weeks to organize the first phase of the actual operation.

Details It might be useful to outline some

of the administrative details of the program. The Royal Lao civic action organization was not established as a permanent government agency. Vol­unteers were recruited for one year, and then were expected to retu rn to their former positions. As it turned out, the civic action plan was extended for a second year.

December 1963

The pay was excellent in order to attract suitable people. Team mem­bers were given the status of Royal Lao Army officers and provided uni­forms. They were not allowed to bring their families with them on their as­signment, nor were any special family benefits provided. Team members, nat~ urally, were entitled to hospitalization when needed. ,

It would be appropriate to point out here that speed in getting these peo­ple into the field to counter the grow­ing Pathet Lao threat influenced many decisions "at this time. There are sev­eral areas in which major changes would be desirable if this type of program were being started anew.

Local Support Everyone knew that if this program

were going to work, it would be neces­sary to assist th"e teams in securing the support of local governmental of­ficials. Subdistrict and village head­men are unpaid officials and are nor­mally volunteers. To gain the support of these officials, two types of train­ing programs were started. First, all the governors and chaomuongs (dis­trict officials) were brought to Vien­tiane for a six-week training course similar to that given the team mem­bers. Of course, it was of a broader nature and the hours of instruction during the day were reduced.

Shortly thereafter, all the village headmen (nai bans) and tasseng chiefs were brought into the district headquarters for one week of train­ing. The government paid them a sal­ary during this period. This training was the key to the whole project. The team leaders taught this course and the entire thrust of the instruction was to gain the confidence of these officials-assuring them that civic ac­tion had something to offer them and

49

ROYAL LAO PROGRAM

their .people. Since longrun success was dependent upon these unpaid of­ficials, great stress was placed on the fact that the civic action teams were not going to undercut the local offi­cials. In fact, they were there to as-

the villagers felt they' needed to makE their tives better. H the team madE this decision, there would be no popu. lar support and the project would die, creating a profitable propaganda item for the Communists. The job was made

ReJl1~bltc of V /dlltlT

One of the key objectives of any civic action program is to generate a spirit of self help in the villages

sist them and build up their influence by strengthening the people's feetings for the local officials, the National Government, and the United Kingdom of Laos.

During the latter period, the other team members were becoming ac­quainted with the local villages and target areas-we called it the visiting period. The primary mission of the team during this period was to ex­plain the civic action concept to the local people. This in itself was diffi­cult, as the opposition-the Pathet Lao in this case-was making a major ef­fort to distort r-he program and to create an unfavorable reception. It was equally important to learn what

easier when the tasseng and nai ba1 were sold on the civic action concept

It was found that many times th real keyman in the village was no the headman, but rather some othe person. This might be a leading mer chant, farmer, or, in many cases, th, local temple head or monk. The visit ing period was used to identify theg, key people and to win them over tl the civic action concept. If long-tern results are to be achieved. there is nl need to start any projects until thi: has been accomptished.

Of course, there 'are certain pivota areas where you are forced to act with out the support of these officials be cause of success by the opposition

Military Reviel 50

But in these areas the objectives will be a bit different-more of a holding action, as compared to any expecta­tion of permanent success with only civic action effort. These areas require effort by more than one civic action team. This also may be an appropri­ate area for military civic action teams, as well as. for armed force.

Service The Commissioner General's office,

in an effort to assist the teams as much as possible, instituted an infor­mation gathering service prior to the dispatch of the teams to the fillld. The service gathered all available informa­tion on the selected areas, including the current status and the needs of the area in terms of health, education, welfare, transportation, and economic conditions. Great stress was also placed upon the gathering of bio­graphic information on local leaders, both progovernment and Pathet Lao.

Most of this information came from the Ministry of Interior and the local army company that was normally sta­tioned in each muong. The informa­tion provided was fairly good, but was normally old and incomplete. Each team stopped at the provincial capital and spent one day in briefings on the local situation. The teams did not stop at the tasseng or muong level as they bad met those leaders during the week's briefing conducted by the team leaders.

Permanent Representative Each team leader watched for a man

to assume the job of permanent civic action representative in the village. Realizing that the Royal Lao Govern­ment did not have the men or the means to establish permanent teams in each village, it was hoped that the impetus of the movement could be

-maintained by selecting such men and

December 1963

by return visits of the original civic. action team. This was a paid position and, in essence, was the hope for long­term projects. After the pel'Ii:lanent representative was selected, he spent some time accompanying the various team members and assisting them while he gained as much experience as possible.

During the first week of the visit­ing period the team had to determine the effective strength of the local Com­munist organization, not the least of the reasons being their own personal safety. The' civic action teams de­scr'ibed here were not armed.

Second Phase Operations After the visiting period was over,

the team gathered information, ana­lyzed the situation, and planned the most probable course of self-help that the people of a village could be en­couraged to take. If the project was to have any lasting value, it had to come from the villagers and rellect their appraisal of need. Making a de­cision was easy in the outlying dis­tricts, hut the villages near district headquarters and towns had been ex­posed to repeated campaign promises by the local politicians and political parties. Such promises sometimes fos­tered the attitude that the government should do all the development for the villagers. As a result, it was most dif­ficult to generate any concept of self­help.

The selected projects took many forms-improvement of the local pa­goda, work on the village school, con­struction of a dispensary, road devel­opment, minor irrigation projects, or the establishment of a community haH­type facility. The team members found that although they might have their own ideas as to what a village needed, they either had to go along

51

ROYAL LAO PROGRAM

with the desires of the people or do a super selling· job to convince the people that the other item was really the most desirable. Since one of the major problems was lack of time and the need for impact-type items, the team normally went along with the villagers' desires. . One point that was stressed to the

, people was that there wouid be no forced assembly of the village-a com­mon Pathet Lao tactic and one that was a great irritant to the local peo­ple. Rather, the same thing might be accomplished by holding a boun (vil­lage celebration or fair) . Further, work on the village project was en­couraged on Lao Sunday so that all members of the village could partici­pate. To obtain maximum impact, a formal dedication ceremony was held and a number of local people were asked to do most of the speaking. Plaques were donated and installed to serve as reminders to the people of the source of the new village impr,?ve­

, ment.

Return Visit After the initial projects were com­

pleted, the team moved to another vil­lage in the same general area leaving the local civic action man· in charge. It was planned that the team would stay in one area for a month, but, in general practice, they remained be­tween one and two months in one locality.

When the team moved on, one of the members tried to return every month to maintain contact with the village and to encourage a continua­tion of the self-help attitude. In most cases, additional supplies for the dis­pensary were provided, and limited replacement of tools was made. These return visits ranged from one week to a month.

Problem Areas Numerous problems were encoun.

tered with various phases of the pro. gram-problems which pointed up weaknesses in the over-all scheme of things. At the same time, we discov. ered many good points in the program whleh may be worthy of considera. tion in other countries and with other civic action programs.

Assignment of Teams It is necessary to have at least one

member of the team from the same general area, but it is not a Wise move to send a team of local people back to their own villages or to adjace~t

areas where they are well known. They may not be respected and may have difficulty in exerting any real influ· ence. There is also the problem of be· ing forced to associate with relatives and constantly facing a problem of undue influence. This is particularly true 'if the team members are young.

However, it is of major importance to the success of the team mission to include at least one minority member if the team is to work with minor· ity groups. This must be done even at the expense of accepting a less qualified team member, as his knowl· edge and information concerning these groups will more than compensate for reduced technical skill.

Selection of Team Members The fact that the Commissioner

General personally interviewed each member allowed him to handpick the people whom he wanted. Inasmuch as it was a fairly small program, this approach was practicable. Addition· ally, those people who were not willing to work hard or to serve in any loca­tion in Laos were weeded out early in the training stage.

But since the program was not of a permanent nature, the government

Military Reviett 52

had difficulty in attracting first-class personnel. This resulted in forced "vol­unteering" in some cases. The prob­lem area was further complicated be­cause Laos does not have a wide base of highly trained personnel from which to select. This problem, of course, faces any underdeveloped country~ It was found that former monks made pa'rticularly good train­ees and this source should not be over­looked, even though some of them may not have the required educational' background.

Training The people involved in the project

probably would agree that the train­ing course was not long enough. Many volunteers did not have the special skills for which they were recruited; others were well qualified Qn a theo­retical level, but lacked the practical experience necessary to pass informa­tion on to the villagers. This was par­ticularly true of the second recruited group. The answer to this problem could have been a longer on-the-job training program.

The subject matter. given in the training course was adequate. About the only addition that might be sug­gested would be a review of statistics and simple recordkeeping.

The trainees complained that the course was too difficult, but admitted that it was a great help to them and they did not suggest any additions or deletions. About 25 percent of the trainees came from civil service, 33 percent were former military men,.;md the, remainder came from various schools in the country.

If the program were to start again, It would be preferable not to give the trainees officer status or provide them with uniforms. While this had the ad­vantage of providing easy identifica-

December 1963

tion of civic action members, it also closely identified them with the mili" tary and the government-a factor that the Pathet Lao tried to exploit.

As one might well expect, the re­lationsh'ip between the team leader and the local officials was potentially difficult. If the chaomuong and tasseng were doing their jobs and utilizing all available government s~pport, there was no real need for the :civic action team working in their area. There­fore, the team had a real job in launching a crash program and still retaining the active support of the lo~al leaders. I

On the village level, the only way to make progress was to win and keep the respect of the village! leaders and to stress constantly that the civic ac­tion people were in no war competing or attempting to reduce the local of­ficials' influence. In many cases, the religious leaders are the overriding influence in the community. Much of the village life revolves around the local pagoda, and in many areas no move can be expected to be successful without its support.

Feminine Influence The influence that women have in

local matters should not be overlooked. It may 'be very necessary to convince the women as well as the men before a village will support the projects.

Crash civic action programs had a tendency to cause confusion and prob­lems in other ministries of the gov­ernment. Coordination was difficult and caused considerable interdepart­mental interference and bickering. Nearly all of the ministries already had long-term projects in this field, ,and it was difficult,to integrate these long-term projects with I short.term, crash efforts. There was considerable duplication of effort and bad feeling

53

ilOYALlAO PROGRAM

when, in some instances, other agen­cies were reluctant to give their full support.

Milit~ry Civic Action The original idea was that the civic

action plan would last for one year. By late 1958 the military were to take .over the efforts and the Commissioner General of Civic Action was to dis­band his organization. It was felt that by utilizing the military structure of the volu'1teer battalion with its vol­unteer companies that were perma­nently located in each muong, man­power would be more effectively used. This would release the civic action personnel to return to their perma­nent jobs and positions. There would remain a permanent organization that could engage in long-term projects and have the secondary benefit of creating a better relationship between the army and the civilian community.

The army utilized a six-man team under a noncommissioned officer as the basic civic action team, and s;'-p­plied the teams through military chan­nels. This system had many advan­tages, such as a far broader base, more manpower, and an existing organiza­tion that was already oriented toward the area and local population in its home station, The military teams were also better prepared to work in areas of Pathet Lao influence, inasmuch as they were armed and capable of stand­ing up to armed propaganda efforts.

For the majority of the Lao people, their villages are still the hub of life. From necessity and by tradition, the village-large or small-strives to be a self-sufficient unit. However, it is not usually a unit large enough to do much about improving living conditions, nor does it generate much initiative among the people. Yet the closeness and per­

sonal nature of village life tend to give people a comforting feeling o{ stability and security.

The problem of an enlightened cen­tral 'government is to improve liVing conditions and standards without de­stroying the cohesive influence of vil­lage life. Civic action is a reasonable first step because it builds on what is there, but tangible results are not likely to be dramatic.

Promises The Pathet Lao and its political

front tried to sabotage the Royal Lao Civic Action Program. Their propa­ganda line was to promise the moon and insist that it was the responsibil­ity of the government to provide im­provements Without any effort on the part of the recipients. Where civic ac­tion was begun in an area relatively unpoisoned by propaganda or irre­sponsible political promises, the idea of self-help took hold quickly. After all, the Lao tradition is that work is the source of all property. In areas previously dominated by the ,Patlle! Lao there was sometimes a demand for showy improvements at the ex­pense of more modest, long-range ben. efits. Nevertheless, the Royal Lao Civic Action Program was demon­strated to be worthy of continuation.

Regardless of specific projects un­dertaken, the channel of communica­tion between the Royal Lao Govern­ment and its people was broadened in a way that refuted the saying, "The voice of the poor has no carrying power." Many civil servants received training and experience Whie h equipped them for more effective serv­ice to the people. Local leadership was developed or strengthened. Above sll, the National Government became real and important to the people.

Military Review 54

LAOS

Case Study In 'Civic Action

The ~ilitary, Program

Major Charles W. Stockell, United States Army

IN COUNTERINSURGENCY ac­tions and brush-fire wars which occur in the less developed areas of the world, it is well-recognized that civic action programs are of vital impor­tance. In conflicts such as those in Vietnam or in Laos, the key to defeat­ing the insurgents is to persuade the VIllager that it is not in his interest to provide food and support to the mal­contents. Mao Tse-tung, "eM" Gue­vara, and Vo Nguyen Giap emphasized the importance of securing the sup­port of the peasants in order for an insurgent for.ce to have a base of sup­ply, intelligence, and manpower.

We have now come to recognize the truth in this point of view. However, we have not alwa~'s understood the

December 1963

problems which we face in separating the villagers from the guerrillas. The rules, the problems, and the organiza­tion are totally different from those we have successfully coped with in more sophisticated countries where civil affairs support was needed.

In Laos there were three consecutive programs of civic action before the United States withdrew her military advisory forces in 1962. Each program had merit; each was wellrplanned and reasonably well-supported; and each was supervised by outside advisors who were hard working and dedicated. Yet each failed.

Failures are not necessarily bad if we realize the causes of the failures and ensure that these are considered

55

MILITARY PROGRAM

in future attempts to solve similar problems~especiallyproblems as com­plex and important as winning the sup­port of the majority of a country's ru ral inhabitants.

Laos is typical of countries that have had, and will have in the future, armed revolts by Communist-inspired groups. Economically she is poor, al­though she possesses an excellent ag­ricultural potential. She lacks schools and trained administrators. There are few roads-and no rail facilities-either within the country or connecting it with neighboring states. Her com­merce is severely handicapped.

As an underdeveloped country, Laos cannot support armed forces capable of coping with internal trouble. A re­cent press report quoted King Tiao Savang Vatth;ma as saying, "Laos is not really a national community." It is this type of underdeveloped nation -divided physically, racially, and emo­tionally-in which insurgency thrives. The political situation makes Laos a vulnerable target for the Communists. Her strategic location in southeast Asia gives her a particular impor­tance.

The people who inljIabit Laos. like most of ·the races of this part of the world, are a charming group in many ways. Poor, but content, they usually

Major Charles W. Stockel! is as­signed to the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. He served in Laos with the.. Psychological S e"l' vic e s Branch of G3, Military Assistance Ad­visory Group, when the third of the civic action programs was organized. A Foreign Area Specialist in Soviet affairs, Major Stockel! was graduated from the Regular Course of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col­lege in 19.63.

live a quiet, peaceful life. For the most part they are staunch Buddhists. AI. though thl!y have no military tradition, they proved their courage in the Indo­chinese wars when properly led and motivated. Being inherently peaceful, they will often endure, rather than actively resist, coercion. Due to the backwardness and isolation of their country, the Lao viHagers often know nothing of national political problems. They are not Communists, but they will not resist the pro-Communist in· surgents until they have the means to resist or a government that can pro· tect them.

First Program When the extent of the Communist

infiltration into the northern and northwestern provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly was realized several years ago, the first of the civic action pt:Ograms was formed in 1957. Like its successors. it was recognized by the Lao Government as being a good and worthy program.

Set up as a civilian organizatiOn un· del' the name of the National qommit­tee of Civic Action. it drew some of the best young men of the country. Al­though it was organized to establish self-help programs in the villages and to teach anticommunism, it admitte<J!y was also designed to strengthen the political apparatus then in control of the country.

With 300 people in all, the program was able to put 24 teams of 10 men each into the field. All members of the organization were required to attend a general orientation course on civic action. Team members were then put through two-week courses in public health, public works, agriculture, edu· cation, and public information by the appropriate Lao ministry. Each team member became a specialist in one of

Military Review

these fields. They were also given briefings about the leading people liv­ing in the area in which their team would be operating.

After the teams were trained and out in the field, the organization ran into difficulties. It was unwieldy and hard to administer. Money was needed to operate and to pay the salaries of the team members.

There were other problems. Rural people the world over are som~what suspicious of government aid pro­grams until they can actually see the benefits. Many villagers believed that the civic action program was more in­terested in fostering political control than in improving the lot of the people. Most important of all, the teams had to protect themselves or be protected by Royal Lao soldiers when they op­erated'in insurgent areas.

Second Program The civic action program died after

one and a half years of operation, but from it evolved a second civic action undertaking.

This was a military venture with teams composed of soldiers from vol­unteer battalions which were fairly Joc~lized and did not move around the country like the regular armed forces. These teams were to be administered and supported by one civil affairs com­pany composed of 100 regular soldiers in each province, A general officer headed a national civil affairs organi­zation and' also controlled, at the same time, all psychological warfare and troop information activities.

Again the civic action forces went through a period of training, equip­ping, and field testing. The new con­cept seemed to work better despite the limited amount of training which could be given to the civic action team members. These men rarely had more

December 1963

than a year or two of formal school­ing, although they had'been picked for their ability and aptitude.

Some 200 to 300 teams of six men each were eventually trained, to some degree, for civic action work. Each team contained a chief and five men trained in the basic civic action fields. These men would work with Commit­tees of Cooperation made up of villag­ers responsible for each of these func­tions within their village.

A program-in-being slowly got un­derway in the spring of 1960. Funds were provided in the budget for a rapid increase in troop strength dur­ing the next year. A large amount of equipment was provided: tools, radios, loudspeakers, and medical kits.

Lao officers who were in the pro­gram at this time stated that much' of the equipment stockpiled in advance was never issued to troops in the field, since the total goal of 600 teams' was never reached. Some of this equipment was still in the military warehouses as late as the summer of 1961, where most of it had deteriorated to useless­ness in the heat and moisture.

Coup In August 1960 Captain Kong i.e

staged his now famous coup, seizing the capital, Vientiane, and splitting the Royalist forces into two factions. For the next four months, until Kong Le was driven north by the loyalists, civic acti~c~me to a halt.

By De~e~er, when the loyalist forces of General Phoumi Nosavan re­occupied Vientiane, there was no civic action force left. The team members had been taken back into the ranks as riflemen, part of the Lao civic action staff had joined Kong Le's forces, and only a handful of people with any past experience could be located.

A makeshift orgahization was put

57

u

MIlITARY 'PROGRAM

together under the Psychological Di­rectorate and, because of the possible political use'of such an organizabon, it was placed under the control of the Department of National Coordination (DNC)-a euphonious way of saying security forces, FBI, and highway po· .lice all rolled into one. Unfortunately,

which included all civil affairs, pSI" war, and troop information activities.

This seems to be an excellent solu. tion when the job to be done is on a fairly small scale and.in a jungle coun. terinsurgency environment. .

The three functions can complement each other. For example, the job of aIt

Army Nf'W8 FeutUTes.

In the less developed areas of the world. it is now recognized that civic action pro­grams are of vital importance

the chief of DNC had little concept of civil affairs and, as he had several other major functions to perform, not much attention was given to these ac­tivities.

Reorganization . It was decided in July 1961 that the

Psychological Directorate was t90 small, too loose, and too ineffective to do the job. Accordingly, the director­ate was reorganized along the lines of the South. Vietnam counterpart unit

three is persuasion, the main differ· ence being the target audience. In this type of warfare psywar cannot easily be directed toward the enemy soldiers who are few, elusive, and generally well-indoctrinated. Therefore, it is a logical step for 'psywar to take the village population as a second major target and, integrated with the civic action personnel, provide an informa· tion representative on the team. Many of the appeals made to the villagers

Military Review 58

can be directed as well toward friendly, indigenous troops. Thus' there is an integrated psychological information and propaganda effort at a consider­able saving in manpower and equip­ment.

In an, underdeveloped country and in a counterinsurgency conflict, man­power, equipment, and trained opera­tors are at· such 11 premium that it is wise to pool what is available. There is also a saving in the size of staff and administrative headquarters required. And the psychological effort is directed primarily toward the key audience­the villager. The larger the country and the more complex the operation, the greater becomes the need for sep­aration of functions. But in Laos, or any fairly small country, the combined civil affairs-psywar-troop information structure has much to commend it.

The idea of the reorganization of the Psychological Directorate was en­tbusiastically received by General Phoumi Nosavan, the Royalist Minis­ter of Defense, and by other military leaders. A recognition of the need for civic action and a village-level persua­sion program was never lacking on any level in the Lao Army or Government.

In practice, however, the operations were heavily influenced by the ideas of local commanqers who seldom adhered to a standard method approved by the Ministry of Defense.

A US civil affairs mobile training team was brought in to train an initial cadre of officer-instructors for a civil affairs school and team leaders for the first 10 civic action teams. After considerable delay, 16 junior of­ficers were made-available by the Lao Government to receive this training. These men had an average of six grades of education, which is fairly goud by over-all Lao standards.

December 1963

Although the material given these officers was simplified text from our US civil affairs manuals, it still was not basic enough and proved to be too theoretical for this audience. The young officers did not appear to gain a sufficient amount of applicable ex­perience from their schooling. If more senior and better educated officers had been available to receive this instruc­tion, II higher return could have been realized. When a psywarcourse was also begun, some of the same junior officers attended.

Eventually, a practical course for civic action enlisted team personnel was put into operation and a few teams began to appear in the field. Lit­tle practical good ever came from these teams in the short time that remained before the Military Assistance Advis­ory Group (MAAG) phased out of the country.

In retrospect, it is obvious these teams desperately needed enough US advisors qualified to speak Lao to lead them through the first few months of actual field operations. Unfortunately, the MAAG staff was far too small to allow this, and the Lao teams did not have sufficient training or self-confi­dence to know how to operate effec­tively.

Theory The Lao civic action teams were sup­

posed to consist of six men, with a team leader and five enlisted assist­ants carrying out six basic civic action functions: village security and de­fense, public works, village schools, simple agricultural improvements, preventive medicine, and public infor­mation. The approach was to be keyed to the average villager's comprehen­sion and ability to carry out the sim­ple measures and improvements which the team would recommend.

59

MILITARY PROGRAM

The team ,would also help the villag­ers with gifts of seed, tools, school primers, and simple medicines to get the programs started. It was a stand­ard self-help concept with the villager doing most of the work and mainte­nance with a bare minimum of ma­terials and assistance from the team.

After studying the needs of a vil. lage, recommending certain projects, discussing the program with the vil. lage eldfrs, and collectively getting the work underway, the team would move to the next village. Eventually, a team would have several villages working on improvements and the team would visit each one regularly to help, advise, influence, and indoc­trinate. When the villagers were doing well, the team visits would grow more infrequent. This was the theory; the practice was something different. .

Practice One th.ing which nullified any pos­

sibility of organizing an effective pro­gram was the misconception of what civic action was supposed to do. Many Lao commanders believed that this was another means of personally in­fluencing the villagers under their control. This is a mistaken <notion that will often occur in an underdeveloped country.

In the US view, civic action is not a tool for political manipulation. When an attempt i9 made to use it in this way, the villagers may become disil­lusioned if they do not necessarily identify their well-being with any specific program or leader. If, however, they can be convinced that they have the ability to live a free life witllOut government coercion, but with gov· ernment assistance, they are less will­ing to accept communism or any other "ism."

Unfortunately, many Lao cOmmand. ers did not understand or appreciatt the US methods which the Lao teams had been taught. Directives from the top command in Vientiane could not change this situation. The local com. manders cannot be wholly blamed, as the direction and control of these ac­tivities from the national level was weak and confused.

Accomplishment Only in one instance did civic action

really show what could be accom­plished. In the little village of Ken Thao a US Army Special Forces unit took over the administration of an in· telligent, progressive program of civic improvement. The villagers. welcomed it as a forward step. Almost overnight the village flou rished. Dispensaries. wells, public works, and other proj· ects sprang up. Villagers took a new interest and donated their time and effort. It cost but a small amount of the Special Forces team's time. It re­quired some support and assistance from MAAG, the United States Infor· mation Service, and the United States Operations Mission, but it showed reo suIts.

When the Special Forces team moved out, the program dwindled for lack of direction and supervision, thus providing us with another lesson in civic action-things cannot be done too quickly. Once a program is operat­ing, the villagers need some outside stimulus to encourage and support them. Otherwise, they put off the re­quired work and soon slip back into the minimal existence they have known before. It is not that they are unwill­ing to work on self-help projects, only that they need to be reminded occa· sionally. An example can be taken from one of the hospitals bu ilt in Laos by Doctor Thomas Dooley. For montbs

Military Review 60

Doctor Dool~y succe!\sfully operated the hospital. 'The, villagers were in much better health. And then the hos, pital and its stocks of medicines and supplies were turned over to the local administration. Within a short time, the medicine and supplies had disap­peared and the hospital had been aban­doned-all becau~e of a lack of super, vision. AUenation

Often. too, Lao soldiers on patrol alienated the villagers by taking what

spiritual administrator. His influence is great; in Laos the pro-Communists courted the priests for this rea1'l0n.

The village priest and the hea.dman are the two key figures in any success­ful civic action program. If they op­pose a scheme recommended by a civic action team, it is better to drop the idea.

The best ideas are those which can be accomplished by the local people using available resources. The proj­ects should require a minimum of

/.

Republic of Vietnam

The best civic action projects are those which can be accomplished by the local people usi.ng available resources

they wanted and paying little-disre­ maintenance, spare parts, gasoline,"'Or garding the authority of the village technical assistance, and a project headman and the village priest. The should not be suggested or begun un, Buddhist priest in a southeast Asian til all the necessary materials are on village is generally the best educated hand in the country. Nothing dis, man there. As such, he is the teacher courages or discredits a prog;am so of the village school as well as the much as the failure to deliver prom.­

December 1963 61

MIlITARY PROGRAM

ised results rapidly. Too often, due to administrati]{e procedures, shipping time, or lack of funds, the necessary equipment cannot be procured for sev­eral months.

To guard against this, only a' few standard projects should initially be considered and the materials for these

. stocked in advance. ,Results should be visible, if possible. Tangible benefits are highly desirable. Toward the very end of MAAG's service in Laos, a sys­tem had been evolved for approving projects. The MAAG civl! affairs ad­visor and MAAG engineer, together with the Lao civil affairs commander, the tea~hief' and the village head­man, Sl veyed the project jointly and approved 1 n allocation of materials or money.

Military Program A military CIVIC action program

should rely on its own resources and not on material or technical support or assistance from other government agencies. Although these agencies are interested in military proposals and plans, their resources and materials are earmarked for specific projects of their own. They e-annot support a mili­tary ciVIC action plan except as a long­range proposition where funds can be programed ,years in advance.

These civilian agencies cannot be expected to operate in any area where there has been any insurgent activity. Certainly, there are individual mem­bers who will carryon village projects in disputed areas, but they are the exceptions. These are the areas where military civie action must carry the burden itself and with its own per­sonnel, resources, and programs. Mili­tary civic action funds in Laos were always short or nonexistent where seed, bUilding materials, and other ex­pendables were concerned. Small con-

I

62

tingency funds are vital to any ciVic action program, because all needs ~ah. not be specifically programed in ad. vance.

Problem Areas In backward countries, the language

barrier will, of course, hamper at. tempts to organize a civic action pro. gram or to demonstrate its operation Although the educated people may speak some common tongue, the vil· lager and the soldier probably will not. Generally, the latter cannot read or write their own language. It is im· perative that US civil affairs person­nel be trained in the language of the country so that they do not have to depend on the marginal language abil· ity of a local interpreter to express their thoughts.

There will always be a lack of trained people, even in simple skills, and there will be little local apprecia· tion of supply responsibility or ac· countability. Equipment will deterior· ate due to a lack of preventive mainte· nance. Such simple instructions as care and cleaning will have to be reo peated over and over again before they are followed to any degree. If repeated neglect of equipment is evident, fu· ture deliveries should be withheld uu· til the situation improves.

Funds should normally lie held un· del' tight control, and there should be no hesitation to cancel a program if there is evidence of graft, neglect, or lack of support by _the local govern· ment~ This is exceedingly important. Although it is unrealistic to expect speed and efficiency, there must be honesty and a sincere effort on the part of the host government if they expect to receive US aid. Under no circumstances should funds be turned over to the host government to admin·

Military Review

ister without firm and continuous su­pervision and c'ontroI.

Finally, any US civil affairs unit must be able to control and direct its personnel operating in the field in or­der to be able to coordinate and con­trol the over-all program. These field operators should be controlled from a central office. Regional MAAG com­manders are always short of personnel and a civil affairs officer on their staffs will sometimes end up with so many additional duties that he cannot per­form his main task properly, If dis­patched from a central office on a task basis, a civil affairs field advisor can coordinate his activities with the re­giOlral MAAG commander while carry­ing out a part of an integrated na­tional civic action program.

Summary A number of often quoted, and as

often disregarded, principles of civic action should be reiterated.

The more backward the country, the more patience must be displayed. Plan for slow but steady progress. Expect misunderstanding and differences of opinion as to operating methods, su­pervision, and control. Be ready to lead the first groups through their training and field work by the hand. Share the workload with the indige­nous civil affairs officers; don't take on the whole job just because the pace is dragging.

Repeat basic principles over and over. Show by example and demon­stration. Talk is sometimes misinter­preted or forgotten. Correct gently and praise loudly. Let the local officials think any suggestions are their own

ideas, Remember native customs, and blend them into any recommenqations.

Hold the purse strings tightly and don't hesitate to cut off the support if a program is not fairly adminis­tered. The fact that one might disa­gree with the local organization and operation is not grounds for withhold­ing support, but dishonesty or com­plete misdirection are sufficient rea­sons. Don't give away materials and tools without ensuring that the vil­lagers will learn that these things are a gift from the US people. Have your own resources to operate the program. Don't depend on other agencies; too often they will not be able to assist.

Don't talk through an interpreter if it can be avoided. When learning a language, pick the one spoken by the common people, not the more culti­vated European tongues used by the upper class.

Above all, do not expect US doc­trine and methods to be the solution to the civil affairs needs of the af­fected nation. Too often we attempt to institute a complex, sophisticated program for the local people which they do not understand and cannot administer by themselves. The best program is a simple, open, honest one, built with local resources, easy to maintain and administer with un­trained, but well-intentioned officials -a program which exploits indige­nous abilities and Communist weak­nesses.

As the late President Ramon Mag­saysay of the Philippines once said, "If you haven't convinced the village people, you haven't won any guerrilla war."

December 1963 63

"Major Alton R. Wheelock, United States Army

The'views expressed in this arti­cle are the author's and are not nec­essarily those of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College.-Editor.

AT THE turn of-th~ present dec­ade, debate cent~ed on the questidn of limited war. () e of the mOl\t seri­ous facets of t e debate revolved around the problem of escalation.

Opponents to the proposal that US Armed Forces be trained and equipped to fight a limited war used the escala­

tion factor as a potent argument. They said, in effect, that no matter what courses of action this country might adopt to limit war, a limited engagement would blossom rapidly into an all-out nuclear exchange.

In retrospect, the possibility 'if es­calation at that time was relatively remote. Weaponry had not reached the point that would produce a true escalation. An all-out nuclear exchange probably would have been sudden and preemptive in nature, rather than the gradual expansion of a limited en­gagement. In the early days of the

Military Review 64

1960's, there was no continuum of sophisticated weapons that would per­mit a limited engagement to expand, through increasingly devastating nU­clear blows, to an all-out nuclear ex­change at national levels.

Today, however, w~aponry has pro­gressed to the point where true es­calation can develop. The range of missiles has become longer; the mis­siles are more accurate; aNd the yield of the warheads has become more dis­crete: The mobility of missile-launch­ing. platforms has increased a thou­sandfold, particularly with the advent of the Polaris-carrying nuclear sub­marine. A former question as to when missiles and their nuclear warheads cease to be tactical and become stra­tegic is no longer theoretical; it is very real. The hardware now exists that permits a nuclear explosion of any size to be placed at any point from Vietnam to Moscow to Washington.

Today, too, the United States is enhancing her capability to engage in limited war. It is no secret that the US Army has increased its ground for strength, mobility, firepower, and command control. The presumption can ouly be that US foreign policy provides for the willingness to engage, or threaten to engage, in limited war.

Unfortunately, our' knowledge of the problems and constraints of lim-

Major Alton R. Wheelock is with the Army Materiel Com man d in Washington, D. C. He holds a Bache­lor of Science degree from the State University of New Y01'k and a Mas­ters in Business Administration from the H a r v a r d Business School. He served I'll North Africa and Europe during World War II, was with the 8th Army in Korea, and was assigned to the Office of the Chief Signal Offi­cer in Washington.

December "1963

ited war has not increased accord­ingly. We know more about weapons effects than we do about how to keep a limited war limited. What principles can be devised to avoid escalation? What problems do these principles raise? What constraints will exist in limited war that are foreign to our military and political thinking today?

Limited Objective Students of limited war contend

quite correctly that limited war can only have as its purpose a limited ob­jective. To carry this one step fur­ther, the limited objective must be attainable and in consonance with well-defined national objectives. This must be, not only so that it can be distinctly communicated to a hostile govel'nment, but so that it will be be­lieved as w,ell.

In support of this precept, the lim­ited objective must be within the capa­bility of limited 'war forces without committing or a'ppearing to require the commitment of forces necessary to deter 'or to fight a general war. To commit the latter forces--or to ap­pear to require the commitment of these forces-would destroy the cred­itability of the determination to keep the war limited. Thus the commitment of large deterrent forces would serve to trigger the very event they were designed to deter-an all-out nuclear exchange.

The limited objective and the arena of war should be identifiable; they should consist of a "38th Parallel" and a "Yalu." Difficult as such limita­tions might be, they are necessary to ensure that the military commander knows the lim"its within which he has authority to act, and outside of which he has no unilateral authority. It would also assist if the military force werll scaled to the size of the task.

65

LIMITED WAR

All of thjs would. enable us to signal when we achieved our objective, fa­cilitate the communication to the hos­tile government of our intent to pro­ceed no farther than certain limits,

Today, weaponry has progressed to the point wltere true escalation can de\'e]op

and provide planners an opportunity to ensure the consolidation of the gain.

The objective should be subject to change. It might be wise to expand the objective to achieve sOI"le advan­tage which a low-risk situation pre­sents, or the objective might be con­tracted. The latter might occur when further pursuit of the original objec­tive entails newly discovered threats' which outweigh any advantages that might be gained. It might also be pru­dent to .contract the objective to the

li6

existing line of contact for the sake of gain in another geopolitical area. Most painful for the military pro­fessional, the objective mig h t be contracted when military reverses combine with politico-economic con­siderations to dictate a cessation of hostilities at a negotiated line of de­marcation.

Communication of Intent The necessity of communicating to

a hostile government our intent to wage only a limited war has been threaded throughout much of the fore­going. It is easy to demonstrate that the maintenance of communication in its broadest sense Qetween hostile nu­clear powers must be one of the pri­mary principles of limited war. But the requi,rement contains aspects that are hazardous and poses problems that are not easily solved.

Consider, first, the positive aspects. Certainly, we wish to communieate our limited purpose of war and our intent not to threaten the existence of the hostile nuclear power. It may also be useful under certain conditions to publicize our intent with regard to the use or nonuse of nuclear weapons. Should we declare our intent not to tolerate the use of "strategic" weap­ons against a "tactical" target with­out certain specific blows in return? How can we accurately and convinc­ingly convey the point beyond which we would interpret hostile acts as overpowering threats jeopardizing na­tion\ll survival?

There are also the negative aspects. In certain instances, what about ren­dering ou r top decision makers inac­cessible-by such means as vacations, conferences, and political conventions -at the moment when negotiations could not possibly be fruitful to us, or when it is to our advantage, with

Military Review

little risk, not to be "communicative." The underlying' assumption of all

that has been written about commu­nications is that the aggressor with whom we are communicating is the correct one to receive it. But exactly who is the aggressor high command?

Moscow or Peking? Recent events in Laos and Vietnam

appear to raise the que s t ion of whether Moscow or Peking is really calling the plays. Indeed, the same question can be raised about Cuba. Political analysts must always bear in mind that the situation may be con­fused even within the capitals of Pe­kmg and Moscow as the result of shifting powers and the political dia­logue taking place at any instant. One needs to be aware that such an ambig­uous' situation may be deliberately perpetrated.

But the correct assessment must be made as to the identity of the actual aggressor because it bears upon the degree of risk in escalation. The So­viet Union has' a far more sophisti­cated weapons arsenal than Commu­nist China; she also has a far greater industrial commercial base at risk: In comparison with Red China, the So­viet Union has far more "~aluable" population. The combination of recog­nizing the greater risk of escalation from the sophisticated arsenal_be_ cause it is a continuum to national disaster-together with the greater value placed upon its national resource can easily render Soviet leaders more conservative.

At the same time, the identity of the true high command is vital to our understanding of the nature of the limited war in which we might engage.

US Army

Japanese surrender signatories on board USS Missouri, August 1945. During World War II, Japan not only failed to assess correctly the value we placed on our Pacific bases,

she made no move to communicate to us her limited objective.

December 1963 67

LIMITED WAR

Only by identifying the aggressor government can we reasonably be cer­tain of correctly identifying his Iim-, ited objective, the values he might place thereon, its relation to his strat­egy, and the risks he ponders. The So­viets w 0 u I d presumably place less value on a limited objective in south­east Asia than would Red China.

All of this simply demonstrates that the risk of escalation varies accord­ing to .t.\1~ true aggressor, and that many factors bear upon that govern­ment's analysis of the risks and po­,tential gains. The correct assessment of the identity of the high command is vital.

Political Primacy Civilian control is a, basic precept

of the Military Establishment in the United States. Historically, this civil­ian control has been general in nature, and, until Korea, there had been no marked instance where international political consideration outweighed strictly military necessity.

Under the conditions of limited war, however, the interplay between international politics and military op­erations would be intense. The esca­lation factor will depend entirely upon the degree to which political considera­tions limit OF expand the military op­erations. Therefore, political primacy

f over 'limited militar~ operations may ~esumably be a basic principle.

This can be easily demonstrated, but it is not an easy task to design the machinery to accomplish political primacy. How does a government pro­vide the military command structure, the complex military communication and control systems, and the field com­mander's authority to conduct success­ful limited war operations under tight political ,control?

One of three methods might be em. ployed. The first would be to give the military commander a carefully drawn charter delineating unequivocably his limits of authority, and covering every contingency. Because of the numerous contingencies, such a charter would be lengthy and highly complex. Even if such a charter could be drawn, the subtleties of risk assessment would require that the numerous contingen. cies be continually reviewed and up. dated. While appearing adequate on paper, such a charter would fail to provide both sufficient freedom of ac­tion and the ability to assess what military action should or should not be taken in the national interest.

Another method would be to place a Defense-State Department command team in the field. Unfortunately, such a team arrangement requires a degree of mutual respect hitherto not always found. The military commander would tend to believe that the State Depart­ment official does not appreciate mili­tary cause, whereas the State official may be convinced his counterpart cares nothing about escalation. In short, not h i n g would have been achieved over the first course of ac­tion except bitter feeling.

The third method would be to create a Defense-State Department command

, team at Washington. Such a team would report to the President, not only for the authority it would give the team, but also to facilitate the communication with the enemy gov­ernment through the highest office in the country. This command groUp would require a sophisticated commu­nication link with the field military commander. The transmission of data only would not be enough. The com­munication link should include televi­sion to bring into play the personal

Military Review 68

leadership possible only through face­to-face communic~tion.

Regardless of the choice of com­mand structure, the situation will call for an understanding by the military man of the political aspects of limited war, and a respect by the civilian au­thority for the necessity of minimiz­ing casmilties. It js not clear that the senior service schools are achieving this understanding among their stu­dents; it is clear that it is vitally needed.

Summary Today, the United States is gearing

for limited war at the very time that escalation is becoming more and more a possibility. Three principles, prop­erly understood and applied, must be ohserved to keep a limited war lim­ited:

• The limited objective" • Communication of intent.

• Political primacy. All are necessary; all are inter­

dependent. The application of the three princi­

ples requires the devising of an or­ganization to conduct a limited war, obtaining the communication hard­ware to serve that organization, and training of personnel to, handle the organization.

In World War II, Japan intended to wage a war for the limited purpose of expanding her periphery of in­fluence-not to subdue the United States. She not only failed to assess correctly the value'we placed upon our Pacific bases. she made no move to communicate her limited purpose to us.

It is no comfort to the survivors of Hiroshima that the Japanese Goveril­ment understood so little about wag­ing limited war.

y o U R

V I E W S

W A A R N E T

E D

This article is not purported to be the final word on limited war. The question, "Can Nuclear War Be Limited?" deserves further airing both from the pro and the can viewpoints, with 1ull discussion of the technical and military aspects of the problem. We invite prospective- authors to submit their manuscripts on the subject. To get started o'n the right track and assure a degree of prinrity, query us in advance send­ing a synopsis of your contemplated article.

EDITOR

December 1963 69

NORMANDY

REVISITED

Major General H. Essame,

British Army, Retired

I T IS. possible to overstudY a~ect. At any rate my colleague and I r.=a"ed this conclusion in May 1963. For 18 months we had endeavored to teach our students how to write straight an­swers to plain questions on the North­west Europe Campaign of 1944-45, the subject prescribed for the British Pro­motion and Staff College Entrance ex­aminations. There' are, we calculate, about 30 questions concerning which the examiners are likely to display cu­riosity, wrapped up understandably in varying language just to bowl out those eternal optimists who rely on a

good memory rather than the light of reason.

Military students, roughly sp~aking, fall into three classes:

• The minority anxious to show how much better they personally would have done had they been in General Dwight D. Eisenhower's and General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery's shoes.

• The solid phalanx anxious only to get the ordeal over with at any cost and, therefore, prepared to swallow any rulings on the operations likely to be acceptable to higher authority.

• The rearguard of eternal opti·

Military Review 70

mists who hope to acquire enlighten­ment by persistent exposure to lec­tures, the· minimum of reading, and the inspiration of the moment in the examination room,

Overconcentration on one subject produces what is sometimes called "Dons Disease"-the chronic ability to give a final opinion and an attitude of philosophic doubt. We had read everything-or practically everything -on a campaign which by 1963 in its vast bibliography vies almost with the Civil War. The more we read, the more what had once seemed simple became obscure.

We had seen our part of the busi­ness through in 1944, he as the pilot of a light aircraft on the 2d Canadian Army fl'Ont and I as an infantry brig­adier with the British 2d Army. There was no escaping the truth. Either we were biased by personal experience and prejudice, or many of the writers on this campaign visualized it as a gi­gantic exercise on a map conducted in the atmosphere of a war game.

There was no escaping our need­we personally must go back to the ground itself and try and find out, as Leopold von Ranke, the father of mod­~rn historiography, put it: "What hap­pened and why it happened in the way

Major General H. Essame, British Army, Retired, is a member of the Institute of Strategic Studies and a lecturer in military studies under the auspices of the Universities of Ox­ford, Exeter, ,and Southampton. He served in an infantry battalion in World War I, and commanded an in­fantry brigade from Normandy to the Baltic during World War II. He re­tired from the service in 19~9. A fre­quent contributor to the MILITARY REVIEW, his most recent article, "A Redcoat Surgeon's Account of 1776," appeared in April 1962.

December 1963

it did:' So we loaded up a vast collec­tion of British and American books, personal accounts, and wartime maps into a small van and flew to Cher­bourg.

The Plan Normandy was for many years part

of the dominions of the King of Eng­land. The Queen still reigns over what is left of the Dukedom-the Channel Islands-in her capacity as Duchess of Normandy. When an Englishman lands there, he has the feeling that he has not really left home. The mark of the conqueror is still on it as it is on rural England. There are the same type of churches and the same village greens.

Even an aged civilian starting on a project such as ours needs a plan. We had four days at our disposal. The best course, therefore, seemed to be to rec­onnoiter clockwise the area enclosed by the roads from Cherbourg to Caen, Caen to Alen<;on, A len <; 0 n to Avranches, an then back to Cher­bourg. This wo Id involve considering the operations ut of chronological or­der to some e nt, but it would give us the feel of the ground as, a whole.

Now that the armies have gone, we found Normandy once more dreaming in the sun-seemingly almost empty. You can drive for miles without meet­ing anyone. An occasional horse and buggy clops along the road. Time does­n't seem to matter much.

We looked again at the little fields with their high overgrown hedges and stout, almost tankproof banks offering the defending infantry almost every­thing-a position in seemingly end­less depth; complete cover from view; a labyrinth with infinite opportunities for infiltration, stalking tanks, and for -the concealed movement of reserves.

Caen is being rapidly rebuilt on

71

NORMANDY REVISITED

modern lines. Otherwise" the French have rebuilt the villages almost stone fpr stone.

Drop Zones Passing through Montebourg, which

is much as it ever was, we pushed on to the crossroads at Sainte-Mere-Eg­lise, the heart of the 82d Airborne Di­

. vision's drop zone. Turning right, we were soon on the banks of the Merde­ret. A glance brought home why the scattered nature of the drop caused the Germans to magnify the threat. I had never before realized how wide and exposed ,the marshes are on either bank of the river. They are nearly a mile broad down to the junction with the .Douve. At Chef-du-Pont, the American bridge still stands and will probably still stand for another quar­ter of a century.

Then on to the 101st Airborne Divi­sion's area east of the Cherbourg high­way between Sainte Marie du Mont and the famous lock above Carentan. The marshes fringing the Douve seemed even more formidable than those of the Merderet.

The two rivers up to the estuary of the Douve, which in itself is no mean obstacle, form a kind of cockeyed swas­tika straddling the Cotentin Penin­sula. Only on the ground can it be realized how decisive was the part played by the airl)orne divisions on D-day. Without their help the 4th In­fantry Division would have rammed its nose into a cul-de-sac.

Despite the dispersion-and per­haps to some extent because of it­General Eisenhower's decision to over­rule his air commander, Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, and pro­ceed with the drop was a master stroke. Left undisturbed on D-day, the Germans, with their normal quick re­action ,to a changed situation, could

probably have held up the advance on Cherbourg for many more weeks.

The 4th Infantry Division was quick in the uptake, too. Like the Austral. ians in Gallipoli, the:n'landed in the wrong place and cashed in on it.

The Beach We spent the remainder of the day

at Omaha Beach. The memorial tells all that need be said. It has all the dignity and appeal of the Menin Gate at Ypres, the Canadian Memorial on Vimy Ridge, the French on the Che· min des Dames, the Australian at Vii· lers-Brettoneux, and the vast and sam. ber Russian erection so tactlessly lo­cated in the British sector of Berlin. The emotional appeal is immense. What is more, the great plaques tell the story with a simplicity and clarity beyond criticism.

After seeing it, a visit to the mu­seum at Arromanches is an anticlimax. The organizers, whoever· they are, seem to have aspired to COVer a little of everything, including a decidedly arch mannequin of the French Corps Feminin. My own recollections frankly do not include anything of this sort, although apparently one German gen· eral was late on parade on D-day ow­ing to his preoccupation with one as· pect of this subject._

Little Ports We devoted the next day to the

British sector. between the Caen-Ba· yeux road and the beaches. The little ports of Port-en-Bessin and Corseulles were packed with coastal shipping. In the invasion, these ports made a sur­prisingly large and unexpected contri· bution to the tonnage landed-15 per­cent of the total. They handled 15,000 tons in the first week and gave the planners an unexpected bonus. The wreck of the artificial harbor at Arro­manches is still there.

Military Review 72

The task of the 2d British Army on The entire 50th Division was ashore D·day was to capture and link up the by midday. By 1800, with four hours beaches, strike rapidly inland, and, by of daylight left, the reserve brigade the evening of D-day, to link up with was concentrated. Yet it took nearly the 6th Airborne Division east of the five hours to advance toward Bayeux

.\..4:.

·~.'~);i··i~.' .~? '/-~-<~" :':i:t.~;'\~" ,1,,!~ ~"')~.'I.IIt. ~ #~~ ~ ~ ..'f:\1' 1 1•It"),

• ,. ~~;'1 ",?'t'",,-. ,",.. :.~ ',.,: .'to; ...~~; " ~ ...- v"\ ... \I ~'" ,,;{s••_."tf'.~ '._ ~ .... ,,_" :'4r-t ""':~;",'1'~~,- :t':";'v __ :....J- ...

We looked again at the little fields with their high overgrown hedges and stout, almost tankproof banks offering the defending infantry almost everything

Orne and occupy a bridgehead which through easy country against little op­1V0uld include Bayeux and Caen. At position. The remainder of the division midnight on D-day, the 50th British had more in front of it. Nonetheless, Division was three miles north of Bay­ there was no escaping the conclusion eux, the Canadians were four miles -the town of Bayeux should have north of the Caen-Ba~-eux road, and been taken on D·day. the 3d British Division was three miles On the Canadian front it was a dif­north of Caen. ferent matter. They had had a rough

The question on which we had to passage in the actual landing. There reach a firm opinion was this: why was much congestion on the beaches. didn't they finish the job? Much ink Their final objective was Carpiquet and paper has been expended on this airfield, 10 miles inland. At nightfall, theme. Here, we can only summarize between them and the British 3d Di­our own conclusions on the spot at the vision was a three-mile gap with the

. same time of the year in 1963. 21st Panzer Division inside it. In the

Oecember 1963 13

NORMANDY REVISITED

light of the situation as it appeared to the commander at the time, to form what they called a '''fortress'' for the night was a realistic decision. In ret­rospect, it seems that they should have been given a less ambitious objective.

Commitments Near Colleville, about a mile west of

the Orne, there is an excellent view­point of the British 3d Division front and', in particular, of the open avenue ideal for tank maneuver between Caen and the coast at Lion-sur-Mer and Luc-sur-Mer down which General Ed­gar Feuchtinger thrust the 21st Pan­zer Division on the evening of D-day, That afternoon, the commander of the British 3d Pivision knew that the ar­rival of the 12th SS Panzer Division to join the 21st Panzer Division was imminent. He .had three commitments: to secure the beachhead, to keep con­tact with the 6th Airborne Division at the only crossing over the Orne and the Orne Canal at Benouville, and to get Caen. He, therefore, had to get his priorities right and he understandably placed them in that order.

We read the key narratives on the spot. There was congestion on the beaches, the troops were tired, and the operation could not be launched from a firm base. These are good reasons, but we I~ft with a sneaking doubt: a commander prepared to chance his arm that evening might have reached the northern outskirts of Caen.

East of the Orne, the robust com­mander of the 6th Airborne Division and later the Deputy Supreme Com­mander, Europe, had the imagination to take the war correspondent, Chester Wilmot, with him in his glider.

We crossed the Orne at "Pegasus" Bridge by the first house liberated in No-rmandy. The Orne and the Orne Canal are no mean obstacles. There

was Iittl.\l sign of life on the high ground which the 6th Airborne Divi. sion seized soon after midnight on D-day. They had a simpler task and better fortune than the US 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions. The coun­try is more open an.d, furthermore, it is dry.

Nevertheless, the i r achievement was remarkable-bridgeheads cap. tu red and held on both sides of the Orne; to the east three bridges over the Dives cut at Troarn, Bures, and Robeville, and a fourth over a tribu. tary stream near VaraviIle; the cap. ture of a battery at Merville; and the seizure of the ridge which runs down from the village of Le Plein toward Troarn. About 60 percent of the troops dropped were able to join in the early operations.

WeJound a perfect viewpoint on the high ground at Le Plein. Looking northwest, we saw the great sweeping beaches west of the Orne. To the west, all the country between the river mouth and Caen lay at our feet. To the southwest, open fields stretched in the direction of the dominating mass of the steelworks at Colombelles, juS! east of the river on the northeastern outskirts of Caen. The Bois de Baven! in full leaf descended rather rapidly to the marshy banks of the Dives River. The 6th Airborne Division's landing was a decisive blow. If it had failed, the British landing might weI! have faced disaster,

Luck Admittedly, luck was on its side.

Had General Feuchtinger, the com· mander of the 21st Panzer Division, been true to the time-honored German tradition of marching to the sound of. the guns and launched his whole divi· sion, not a paTt of it, soon after the first light, the result would not have

Military Review 74

been in doubt. He had 16,000 men, 120 tanks, 40 assault guns, and twenty­four 88's. From ·the Allied point of view, it is fortunate that he had never studied the operations of Grant and StonewaJl Jackson.

While the airborne bridgehead had much to commend it as a defensive position, as a saJly port for further operations few less promising areas could be found in Normandy. The Ger­mans had many advantages. They could fight on a narrow front with se­cure flanks on the Dives and on the Orne and the built-up area of Caen. There was some cover and exceJlent observation. AJI troops entering the bridgehead must pass over the bottle­necks of "Pegasus" Bridge and the two otger bridges later constructed over the Orne and the Orne Canal. So far as we were concerned, the reasons for the slow progress in this area in June need little further elucidation.

Crisis It was from this unpropitious base

that the much-criticized Operation Goodwood took off in July and precip­itated a crisis in the high command, a crisis which has b!!en overemphasized.

We decided to foJlow the axis of the three armored divisions in this opera­tion right up to the skyline of the Bourgebus Ridge some five miles southeast of Caen and then look back at the ground as the Germans saw it.

From the ridge looking north over the cornfields, we grasped the strength of the German position, organized as it was in considerable depth by Gen­eral Hans Eberback with three infan­try divisions and two armored divi­sions, and another in local reserve. Looking toward Caen and to the west, the observation and the fields of fire were perfect. The stone-built villages embedded strongly in hedges and or-

December 1963

chards gave them an endless succes­sion of readymade defended localities.

Two railway embankments tra­versed our line of advance. The steel­works of Colombelies and" the indus­trial sub u r b s southeast of Caen seemed another Stalingrad. It was not surprising that they cost the Canadi­ans so many casualties. Looking back from Bourgebus, the airborne bridge­head seemed no bigger than a postage stamp-so small was it, in fact, that the bulk of the artillery support had to be provided from the west bank of the Orne.

Why fantastic traffic congestion de­veloped in the Goodwood battle needed no fu rther explanation. We certainly attacked the enemy where he was strongest. The truth of the matter is that we fought each other to a stand­still. Our armor was misemployed. It was a mistake to use it as the main assault arm when its more normal task should have been to exploit a gap made by the infantry.

Strategically, Goodwood may be claimed as a victory in that it kept away the bulk of the German armor from General Omar N. Bradley whose breakout in Cobra was now imminent. Tactically, we had to admit that the boot was on the other leg. It was a "Kernstown" on a larger scale, and it must be admitted that the German re­sistance was of a high order.

Closing Gap At Falaise we took the road to Trun

to study the final stages of the clos­ing of the gap between this little town and Chambois at the crossing of the Dives. Here, heavily wooded slopes run down to the river. We crossed at Chambois to visit the commanding bluff at Coudehard where the Poles held on grimly for three days while General Willi Bittrich's 2d SS Panzer

75

,-NORMANDY REVISITED

Corps held the jaws open for the es­cape of the remnants of the 5th Panzer Ariny and the 7th Army.

We tried to see the picture through German eyes. There are many parallel tracks running through this final gap which undoubtedly helped German commanders to retain some type of control. Nonetheless, the fact that 50,­'000 men got away says much for their courage and tenacity in' a debacle. With their enemy closing in on all sides, their troops exhausted, and when all seemed hopeless, many of the surviving German commanders still kept their heads.

I could not help wondering whether in August 1944 the ghost of William the Conqueror rose from his grave in his favorite city of Caen to see the carnage in the Guffren Forest and on the banks of the Dives. If it did, the scene must have been after his own heart if the grisly scenes in the Bay­eux tapestry, the world's first and greatest cartoon strip now displayed in all its ancient glory in Bayeux, are any indication of his tastes.

British Advance From the personal point of view,

the hours I spent next morning on the battlefield of the Odon' were per­haps the most stimulating. Here, was the area where the British Army at­tempted to break through from the Caen-Bayeux road, immediately west of Caen, across the Odon and the Orne to cut the roads running southward from the city. This offensive drew onto the British all the six Panzer Divi­sions then available, and a nebelwerfer brigade of somewhat'sinister memory. I followed the line of, our five-mile ad­VlInce right through to the dominat­ing ridge which culminates in the bare plateau of Hill 112, one and a half

miles south of the Odon and our high water mark for some weeks. . It was said at the time, on what au­

thority I do not know, that the local population had a proverb: "He who holds Point 112, holds Normandy."ln the event, it proved correct. For over a month we shared it with the Ger. mans, they on one reverse slope and we on the other. Sitting in the sun I tried to. weigh up the problem from the German angle.

The vital high ground on which I sat was the ridge immediately south of the Odon. It was shielded by the deep and densely wooded valley of the river itself which runs into a ravine. Here, is a belt of very close country and villages two miles wide. Between this belt and the Caen-Bayeux road stretched, as in 1944, undulating corn· fields enclosed by high hedges with steep banks and interspersed with age· old, stone-built villages set out in dense overgrown orchards.

Four Belts For the defender, the position had

everything: depth, obstacles in the right place, good lateral communica· tions, and excellent observation. Held in four belts as it was, it must have been easy to patch up. I saw how the German commanders, with no mean skill, had been able to force us to fight what was, in essence, an interminable series of small infantry actions and prevent our armor from breaking out into the open country toward the Fal· aise road. Their trump cards were their skillfully handled battle groups and well-trained infantry; our ace was not the air arm, but the artillery.

Luckily for us they never seemed able to concentrate their artillery fire. To the best of my recollection, the nebelwerfer-despite Lieutenant Colo­nel Joachim Emde's claims for it in

; Military Review 76

the May 1963 issue of the Military Review-was a poor substitute, really effective only against troops in the open. You could hear the rockets com­ing, and by flinging yourself in time on the ground you could dodge the frag­ments which, jn allY case, were very small. Its blast was admittedly ter­rifi~, but if in a slit trench, there was not much to feal'.

We next headed northwest for the commanding bluff at CauMont, so op­portunely captured by the US 5th Corps on 12 June. Little emphasis had

Junction As we approached from the south.

the line on which we remained static for over six weeks, the church at Cau­mont stood out with startling promi­nence on the skyline. Had we searched for a more outstanding landmark, we could not have advertised to the enemy with greater emphasis the point of junction of the British and United States Armies-unless, of course, we had put up a notice.

I spent a happy morning following the line of advance of General Brad-

US Army Photo8

General Eisenhower's third key decision was taken alone-to proceed with the landing despite the equivocal weather reports

been placed on this exploit which, in fact, gave the bridgehead the vital real estate in and around Cerisy Forest without which the buildup would have been most difficult. I remember it as the cause of great relief at the time.

December 1963

ley's breakout in Cobra. Of this, the British sectipn of the spoke of the great wheel was Bluecoat, which went through the intricate country known as La Suisse Normande, the highest and wildest in Normandy. I relived

71

'NORMANDY REVISITED

my own laborious progress to Mount .Pincon and the Noireau. This belt of country is some 25 miles wide. Today,

. it seems almost uninhabited and even more overgrown than it was in 1944. We drove for seven miles and only met one inhabitant-a French peasant woman who might h a v e walked straight out of Millet's "Angelus." . There was only one road heading in the right direction in 1944 on the 2d Army front. With a commander such as Bittrich to exploit the advantages this country offered for delaying ac­tion, it was understandable why we got forward with less speed than the troops on the outer flank. We did have the good fortune to have as our com­mander Sir Brian Horrocks, who made each man feel that what he personally did would affect the outcome. Without him, we would never have advanced as fast as we did.

Mount Pincon, the highest point in Normandy, now has a television mast on its bald top. It dominates the coun­try. To the northeast you can see Caen in the dim distance. To the south an endless succession of wooded ridges extends to the Noireau. In comparison, the line of advance ·of the US 8th, 7th, 19th, and 5th Corps between Vire and Saint-Vi seemed easier going. It was also les~ strongly opposed. Nonethe­less, in 1963 it was still clear that all the assets at the time were by no means with the attack. The rapid American progress still seemed spec­tacular by any standard.

Training In retrospect, it seems fair to say

that, so far as the tlritish were con­cerned, more attention in training be­fore the invasion might well have been given to fighting in close country. Southwest England offered ample op­portunities.

Such recent fighting experience as was available then, however, stressed the lessons learned in fighting in the' desert. Procedures applicable to North Africa failed to produce the answer in Normandy.

Too, we ought to have developed close air cooperation more than we did. By the time the battle was clos­ing down, many of us were growing weary of being bombed by our own aircraft. I can testify that it was not so lethal as many writers without ex­perience at the w ron g end have claimed. There are a vast number of places with the name "Mesnil" in some combination or other dotted all over Normandy. It is unfortunate that the airmen so frequently got the wrong one.

On all counts, it must be conceded that German training in these re­spects was much more practical and imaginative, as was to be expected in view of their infinitely greater battle experience.

News In modern war, the thirst of the sol­

dier for news must be satisfied. The British Army was almost overensured in this respect. For the six weeks be­fore Cobra, we had copies of the more sensational British newspapers deliv­ered daily to the frontline. The press correspondents, probably as a result of their early training, tended to re­gard inter-Allied operations as an in­ternational sporting contest.

During June and July, crude dia­grams showing all the Panzer divi­sions cluttered around' Caen inevita­bly resulted in the British troops ask­ing why their American Allies were taking so long in getting to Saint-Lo. I had to clear. my own mind on this point once and for all, and have a look

Military Review 78

at the actual ground between Carentan and Saint-La.

It proved to be quite as difficult as "that which I knew so well immediately southwest of Caen with the added dis­advantages in parts of being aecidedly wet. General Bradley makes this un­equivocally clear in his book. For for­eign consumption, this seems to be the best account of .the operations here. You are in the presence of a real bat­tlefield commander facing the facts.

His army had similar teething trou­bles to those of the British. Those units with battle ex.perience had to learn new tricks; those without had to adapt themselves to the facts of life on the battlefield against a skillful enemy.

In pea.ce, the officer with the glib tongue, the fluent pen, and some his­trionic ability inevitably becomes prominent. The Hallecks shine; the Grants are unnoticed. General Bradley had to sort all this out in the heat of action. Historically, it seems highly probable that he will come out as well as anyone.

Recollections I left the Normandy battlefield in

1963 with great regret. My recollec­tions were less somber than those of the Somme and Passchendaele. I had the good luck to see something of both World Wars, as it were, from the stalls -in World War las a subaltern, and in the second with the greater freedom of an infantry brigade commander. In Normandy the German troops had to put up with conditions as bad as 'our own in 1916, 1917, and 1918; we did­n't, thanks primarily to our infinitely superior system of higher command . and to our complete dominance in the air.

The original COSSAC (Chief of ~taff to the Supreme Allied Com-

December 1963

mander) plan-a landing on a three­divisional front between the Orne and the Vire, with one airborne division droPP/ld to protect the east flank to be followed by a drive down the Falaise ~oad-would almost inevitably have led to disaster. Lieutenant General Frederick E. Morgan and his planners may well have done the best with what they had been given. Nevertheless, we would have been thrusting our noses into a bag. General Eisenhower's de­cision to e,xtend the front-~nd his moral courage in facing the inevitable worldwide political and strategic re­per~ussions-was, therefore, the key decision of the campaign.

His second great key decision was to overrule the objections of the Com­mander of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, Leigh-Mallory, and to go ahead with the airborne landings. De­spite the scattered drops of the 101st and 82d Airborne Divisions, their in­fluence morally and practically on D-day was decisive. Less. ponderous and hidebound than many of the more normal divisions, they displayed 'the resilience and individual enterprise ob­viously essential to the operation.

His third master stroke was taken alone--to proceed with the landing de­spite the equivocal weather reports. The Battle of Normandy was won be­fore the first soldier set foot in France.

Differences Much journalistic capital has been

made out of the alleged differencJs be­tween the British and the Americans. The fact is that they were surpris­ingly few. That they occurred at all is primarily traceable neither to per­sonalities nor to interservice and in- ., ternational rivalry, but to the defects of the command structure on the air side and the lack of frontline battle experience of the planners themselves.

79

- 'NORMANDY REVISITED

A commander, least of all one with the temperament of General Sir Ber­nard L. Montgomery, should have to deal with one air commander, not thl·ee. Montgomery had to cope with Air Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder, the Deputy Supreme Commander, Leigh-Mallory, the Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, and Air 'Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham of the 2d Tactical Air Force. There was a breach of principle here and friction was inevitable.

In addition, the very bulk of the Morgan p I a n raises doubts as to whether the air commanders ever studied it in depth-or, if they did, really ever comprehended the prob­lems which confronted the land forces once they were ashore.

A visit to Normandy, today, will convince any soldier, sailor, or airman that the varying rates of progress of the armies in the Normandy battle were dictated by the ground itself and the use the Germans made of it. It is doubtful whether any of the planning staff ever visualized the difficulties of fighting in close country against well­commanded and highly trained troops.

For the future, perhaps the deduc­tion is that tactical factors, on which the opihion of the battle-experienced soldier should be final, have an impor­tant bearing on strategy. The wide publicity now given to the opinions of civilian strategists is, therefore, some­what disquieting.

One of the constantly recurring her­esies of history is that wars can be won without fighting battles. In fact, as in Normandy, the inevitable butch­er's bill has to be faced. On 25 Au­gust, of the nine Panzer divisions, Panzer Lehr had been destroyed and the rest were each about 400 strong.

'so

They had started the battle with be­tween 16,000 and 20,000 troops each, Thus at the end they were down to about two and one-half percent. That they were still prepared to fight on commands respect. As the Duke of Wellington said of Waterloo: "They pommelled us: we pommelled them. We pommelled the hardest so we won."

It is an oversimplification to say that the Germans were defeated by superior material might. The country favored the defense and the British and American Armies had to develop the necessary techniques in the heat of battle itself. More battle experi­ence on the planning staff might have anticipated at least some of their dif­ficulties.

The late Field Marshal Lord Archi. bald P. Wavell held that "ultimately Military History is a flesh and blood affair:' He went on to say:

To learn that Napoleon won the campaign 0/ 1796 by manoeuvre on in­terior lines or some such phrase is of little value. If you can discover how a young. unknown man inspired a ragged, mutinous and half starved army alfd made it fight, how he gave it the energy and momentum to fight as it did, how he dominated and con­trolled generals older and more expe­rienced than himself, then you will have learnt something. Napoleon did not gain the position he did so much by study of rules and strategy as by a profound knowledge of human na­ture in war.

Were he still alive, I am sure he wou ld add: "A visit to the actual ground of any campaign, when possi­ble, .is a valuable stimulant to the imagination," and indeed often an essential corrective to conclusions reached as a result of reading aibne.

Military Review

TO BEAT

lHE GUERRILLAS

AT THEIR

OWN GAME Albert L. Fisher

December 1963

TRADITIONAL military tactics employing conventional weapons and large numbers of men who spend most of their time in fixed positions is un­suited for counterguerrilla operations in a South Vietnam-type environment. An analysis of the results of nel!rly nine years of French fighting in Indo­china, from 1945 to 1954, and of the operations of United States forces in South Vietnam during the past few years clearly points in this direction.

81

GUERRILLAS

Both from the military and the psycho­.logical viewpoint, small unit opera­tions using tactics developed specifi­cally for this type of warfare-which includes the political and economic portions of the spectrum, as well as the military-are imperative:

It is both frustrating and embar­rassing when a government force of, perhaps, regimental· size engages a much smaller Viet Cong unit and finds, when the smoke of battle has cleared, , that fewer than a dozen of the enemy have been killed or captured. This is somewhat like using a cannon to shoot a mouse, and then missing. And the Viet Cong gains much in prestige as small groups of its men seemingly thwart the efforts of larger govern­ment forces.

Equally detrimental is the heavy destruction of civilian property-often resulting from employment of large units--causing resentment or even hatred of the government by the people.

I do not discount the legitimate need for conventional weapons, defensive positions, frontal tactics, and mass op­erations. r strongly contend, however, that the emphasis for oper~tions with­in a South Vietnam-type environment ought to be on small, mobile, semi-in­dependent units which can seek out and destroy the enemy wherever he is operating. In other words, operations in this environment ought to be based on small units; conventional tactics should be used primarily in support.

Albert L. Fisher heads the Depart­ment of Geography at the University of Utah. An intelligence officer in the ·United States N a val Reserve, Mr. Fisher has made a study of unconven­tional warfare, including several trips to southeqst Asia.

Shortcomings, Militarily, the basic reason for the

failure of conventional military doc. tr~e in South Vietnam is that it reo qUIres an enemy that can be seen and engaged within a reasonably limited and well-defined geographical area, us. ing tactics which are governed some. what by the rules of war and confined essentially to military action. These conditions do not prevail in this area. The enemy is clearly evident, yet he is almost invisible; he is everywhere, yet nowhere. With rare exceptions, he can be contacted only at the time and place of his choosing.

The enemy's doctrine maintains that the area of combat is everywhere with no stationary front Or rear areas. He teaches that the enemy's rear is his front. He advocates virtually unlimited retreat unless conditions for combat are overWhelmingly in his favor. He is a master at trading space for time,

Mao Tse-tung emphasized this in his doctrine of protracted conflict; the Vietminh used it during their struggle against the French.

The guerrilla's tactics are unconven· tional and defy any rules or regula·

,tions. His conflict is total.

Military Advantages More than a decade of fighting in

Vietnam has demonstrated that small units employing unconventional taco tics can operate effectively within an area that is occupied by large numbers of enemy troops-if the enemy uses conventional tactics. It is probable, though, that the success of the guer· rilla forces would drop off sharply if the occupation troops adopted predom­inately-smail unit and unconventional tactics themselves. And it would ap­pear to be worthwhHe to test the valid· ity of the axiom, "it takes a thief to

Military Review 82

catch a thief," aud substitute guerrilla for thief.

Friendly sma 11 unit operations should not. of course, be confined to the area that is essentially under friendly control. They ought to expand vigor-

outfit capable of beating the guerrillas at their own game.

Enough of these friendly units should be roaming the countryside so that the enemy will lose his mobility and his capability of assembling into

US Army

Friendly small unit operations ought to expand vigorously into the enemy zone of strength

oasly into the enemy zone of strength. Aunit of 50 men-properly motivated, tJained, and led-operating clandes­tinely over an extended period of time Inside an enemy area of strength, could possibly be more effective than several raids 'by airborne units of regimental size, particularly if the airborne sol­diers returned to their barracks im­mediately after the raid.

The friendly force must be capable of living indefinitely away from its home base. It must be a hunter-killer

December 1963

company, battalion, or regimental strength without being detected. Subsidiary Mission

These units must avoid locations, practices, and patterns that would compromise them, leaving roads and well-traveled paths in favor of the jungle, swamps. and rice paddies. Al­though the hunter-killers would fight the enemy whenever warranted, they would have as a subsidiary. mission the requirement to furnish information about their area of operations on 'a

83

GUERRILLAS

daily basis..Only this kind of group can find, fight, al\d destroy the guer­rilla enemy.

In addition, small units should be stationed permanently in villages in the areas of enemy strength. These village-based units should have patrols out around the clock, operating in a random manner.

The objective for both type units is to make the area unsafe for enemy guerrillas. If this could be achieved, it would seriously damage the enemy's confidence and morale, and, perhaps, of even greater importance, it would sub­stantiaIly improve the morale and con­fidence of the friendly forces and the civilians who do not sympathize with the enemy. This program would also destroy the contact between the enemy and the villagers.

When enough small friendly units are roaming the countryside, it will be both difficult and dangerous for the enemy guerrillas to mobilize their forces into battalion and regimental strength for raids and ambushes. They will no longer have the ability to move within a rather large geographical area for a considerable period of time without being detected and inter­cepted. In fact, if properly conducted, this pro,gram should give the friendlY forces considerable ambush capability against the enemy.

Psychological Advantages There are a number of psychological

ad\"antages associated with small unit operations.

For the People The military force must develop a

sympathetic iden,tification with. the people before it can carry out its mis­sion successfully. It must avoid ac­tions that would result in negative public opinion-brusque and arbitrary handling of civilians, looting, and

stealing-particularly during opera. tions in enemy strongholds.

Avoiding actions that would result in negative pub lie opinion is not enough. The military force must also have a well-defined and properly man­aged positive program to win public approval.

It is highly desirable for the troops stationed within a village or hamlet to participate and, where appropriate, to take the initiative in village activi· ties. The troops might form or partici. pate in youth groups, demonstrate ad­vanced agricultural practices, dispense medical care, or offer some schooling to the villagers.

To do this would require servicemen trained in these skills. This type of close, personal identification between the troops and the villagers is possible only on a smaIl unit basis, and is es­sential if the'people are to accept the military as a constructive rather than a parasitic force.

Another facet of the village program is to use troops Who are from the area and have local family and friends. Care should be exercised to prevent the soldier from being intimidated through or because of his family. Gain­ing the support of the people is all· important; the enemy cannot be de· feated without it.

For the Individual Soldier From the viewpoint of the individ·

ual soldier, small units have a distinct advantage because they form a group that lends itself more to a close identi­fication with its members than do large groups.

Undoubtedly, a major part of the reason for the excellent record of the Viet Cong in Vietnam-expressed in terms of a low defection rate, a high fighting spirit, and dedication to cause -is a result of the very close identifi·

Military Review 84

cation that the individual feels with his small guerrilla' unit.

Antiguerrilla forces must have an esprit de corps equal, if not superior, tothat of the guerrillas. This requires something that Can best be accom­

Repu.blic of Vietnam

The proper soldier must be aggressive and courageous under the most difficult

and trying conditions

pUshed on a small unit basis-a feel­mg of belonging, responsibility, and need, Experience in Vietnam demon­strates this to be true, and the conclu­Sions reached by US investigators, as a result of a thorough study into the morale and loyalty of US troops dur­ing the Korean War, testify to the va­lidity of the concept.

Jf friendly forces are to conduct an aggressive and effective campaign, they must consist of highly motivated troops who are dedicated to a cause, Unfortunately, loyalty to a government

December 1963

is often inadequate as a motivating factor; other loyalties must be found with which the individual can form a personal association. They must be something in which he has great pride and in which he will not fail-for ex­ample, a close-knit, proud team.

It is the proud, highly motivated sol­dier who must form the backbone of the antiguerrilla forces. He must be physically and mentally capable of liv­ing for several weeks at a time in the jungle without returning to a perma­nent base. He must be able to destroy the guerrillas and, at the same time, make iriends with the local populace -a large order, indeed. The troops who belong to the small antiguerrilla units will symbolize the government, and they must create the best and most useful symbol possible.

The problem of creating the ideal soldier for the hunter-killer units is the most difficult part of this proposal. His motivation must be so high that he will be aggressive, cou rageous, and loyal under even the most dangerous, difficult, and trying conditions.

In most regions of successful guer­rilla operations, the government can­not initially command the type and degree of loyalty requ ired for success­ful antiguerrilla operations fro m either the general populace or the av­erage soldier. If the population were sufficiently loyal to the government, there probably would not be a guer­rilla problem in the first place.

To instill the proper motivation into the troops will requ ire all of the psy­chological techniques that can be mus­tered. Perhaps the most important of them will be to develop an esprit de corps to the point where the soldier would rather die than let his buddies or his unit down. It can be done only on the basis of small units.

'85

.• .GUERRILLAS

Armed Propaganda This is the tactic of intimidating,

kidnapping, or assassinating carefully selected members of the opposition in a manner that will reap the maximum psychological benefit. It is an activity which, if used at the wrong time and the wrong place for the wrong pur­pose, will probably have serious nega­

. tive results. Extreme caution must be taken not

to create fear or hatred of the govern­ment among the general populace through these operations. Both the as­signments and the tactics of the armed propaganda teams will depend on the operational environment, and their

possible consequences must be thor. oughly evaluated and weighed prior to any action. Conclusions

The type of conflict that prevails it South Vietnam-total, protracted, ani unconventional-cannot be adequate]) combated by traditional or conven. tional means. This was clearly demon strated in Indochina between 1945 am 1954.

Success requires small units thai can find, engage, and destroy the en emy, and at the same time conduci themselves in a way that will persuad! the populace to support the cause 0: the government.

There is no discount price on defpnse. The free world must be-prepared

at all times to face the perils of global nuclear war, limited conventional

conflict. and covert guerrilla activities.

President John F. Kennedy

Military Review 86

SEIZING

THE

INITIATIVE

IN

COUNTER-

If GUERRILLA

OPERATIONS

Major L. G. Clark, Australian Army

GUERRILLAS have always gained much of their military success by ex­tensive use of surprise. They select targets seemingly at random, concen­trate sufficient strength to ensure suc­cess of an attack, and withdraw before the opposite side can react wi.th an adequate force. When on the defen­sive, they always seem to receive early warning of an operation mounted against them, enablin~ them to slip away in small groups.

It is now possible to seize much of the initiative from the guerrilla b~ the employment of improved and newly developed techniques for air support of ground forces. There are various

87

.THE INITIATIVE

methods by which the ground force commander can employ the available air effort to distinct advantage in southeast Asian counterinsurgency op­erations. Parachuting

The paratrooper comes into his own again, particularly in southeast Asia where the huge areas of paddy fields

. offer ideal drop zolles. When a guer­rilla group has been l(,lcated, either in a carefully concealed area or because they have raided a defended post, con­voy, or village, the most readily avail­able force which can be committed to cut off the guerrilla is an airborne unit. One proved system is to provide a paratroop company as an immediate, ready strike force, alerted at an appro­priate airfield with equipment packed, parachutes fitted, aircraft fueled, and aircrews standing by. As soon as the guerrilla group i~ located, the com­pany takes off.

Detailed prior briefings are not re­quired, and it is not essential to have a preselected drop zone. A short brief­ing can be made while in the air. To preserve surprise, the troop-carrying aircraft should make only one pass over the drop zone, the actual selection of which has been made DY the com­mander of the operation flying ahead in a separate, more versatile aircraft.

Having made his selection, the air­borne commander can pass his plan over the radio net to the various air­craft commanders who can brief the paratroops in the air. The drop zone can be marked either by flares, by the commander's aIrcraft actually land-

This article was digested Irom the original, pUblished in the AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL, July 1963, under the title, "Air Sup­port in Anti-insurgency Opera­tions. 1J

ing and lighting smoke pots, or by a pathfinder team landing on the drop zone by helicopter or by parachute.

Whichever method is used, the main body must drop within minutes, other. wise the guerrillas will be alerted and will escape in another direction. Thl identification of the objective or rally. ing point presents a problem to the individual parachutist' \\\ho has been only hastily briefed in the air. HerE again suitable flares, smoke signals, 01

other markings will be required.

Seal Off While one airborne company may b!

sufficient to engage a guerrilla group the latter's escape can only be stoppet if they are completely encircled. Altel the airborne company has dropped b engage the guerrillas, the intentio", of the guerrilla band will soon becom! evident. If they withdraw from th! parachute force, then another airbornl company should jump to cut th~ linl of withdrawal.

To accomplish this, a second para­troop company is readied as soon as the first is alerted, and loaded on the returning aircraft. Preferably, if sui· 'ficient aircraft are available, the sec· ond company becomes airborne soon after the first and orbits until its drop zone is selected.

An experienced guerrilla command, er, knowing such tactics, may well stage diversionary activities to fom a premature jump. The sealing off 01 the guerrillas need not necessarily b( solely an airborne operation, but car be done in conjunction with heliborm and vehicle-mounted troops.

Wind and weather are the main bug· bears of all airborne operations, bu' some risks have to be taken once th! guerrilla band has been' pinpointed Jumps can be made in windspeeds o'

Military Revill 88

up to 40 kilometers per hour, but the greater the wihdspeed, the greater will be the dispersal on the ground. Dragging will produce casualties, al­though the "Capewell release," now being extensively used, allows quick separation from the parachute.

A low cloud base will often deter­mine the jump height. Heights of 183 meters for the US Tl0-type parachute, and as low as 91 meters for the British X-type, have been used. At these heights, however, there is little possi­bility to use the reserve parachute in the event of a malfunction, but the lower the jump height, the shorter the period the parachutist is exposed to ground fire. On the other hand, by fly­ing low, the aircraft are more vulner­able to the same ground fire.

For fast reaction it is better to have all the troops jump in a continuous stick during the first pass over the drop zone. Surprise will be lost if the unit must wait for the second echelon to jump before moving after the guer­rillas. This procedure will result in more dispersion than desired, but practice will develop a system for quick reorganization.

Coordination These airborne operations will, of

course, require a fine degree of coor­dination. The airborne command post system will overcome many of the command problems, while supporting fire can be provided by fighter air­craft. The main difference between these and conventional airborne op­erations is that some troops must be landed as soon as possible so that the enemy is given no opportunity to es­cape. Security must take second place to surprise.

Once committed, the paratroopers . must continue operations until either

the guerrillas have been destroyed or

December 1963

they have. escaped and pursuit is not humanly possible. Accordingly, resup­ply by air is a requirement. All needed supplies should be prepackaged and coded for identification so that sched­uled and on call resupply can be guar-

Should the guerrillas be cornered and forced to fight it' out, heavy drops of mortars, howitzers, and towing vehicles

may be necessary

anteed. Should the guerrillas be cor­nered and forced to fight it out, heavy drops of mortars (both 81-millimeter and 4.2 inch), and 75 and 105-milli­meter howitzers, with their %-ton towing vehicles and their ammunition, may be necessary.

While the mortars are man trans­portable across the paddy fields, the howitzers with towing vehicles might well prove an embarrassment due botb to their very limited cross-country per· formance and to the problem of their security. In guerrilla territory, the howitzers are prime targets for a raid or ambush. At night, though, when air support is not available, their range and firepower may make their use worthwhile.

81

THE INITIATIVE

Once the operation is completed, the extrication of the airborne force may present a problem. In the move back to base through guerrilla-infested ter­ritory, ambushes are always possible, either to the moving troop column or to the relieving vehicle column. The unit must have sufficient supplies, par­ticularly ammunition, to counteract ambushes and to assault opportune targets on the return journey. Heli­copters, of course, could be used for return, but this is not essential. How­ever, the sooner the unit is returned to its base, the sooner it is available for other operations.

Jungle Jumping While parachuting into paddy fields

is comparatively easy, parachuting into the jungle is hazardous. But this may be the only method to approach a guerrilla camp in the jungle and still retain surprise. Foot and vehicle columns will often be detected early by guerrilla outposts, while heliborne operations lapse for want of a landing zone near the objective.

Success has been achieved in para­chuting special groups directly into the jungle canopy. Each parachutist is equipped with a special equipment bag which, after his parachute has deployed, he is able to position under his feet, letting it act as a platform for his descent through the trees. Once his parachute has been firmly caught by the branches, he lowers his equip­ment to the ground and then prepares his abseiling gear for use.

This gear is basically a 61-meter­long canvas web strap secured to the parachute harness. The parachutist wears can vas trousers through the edges of which the canvas web strap slides. Once out of the harness, the parachutist slides down the canvas web strap to the ground, controlling

his descent with his hands. The risk of casualties is greater than normal, but the surprise gained in thick jun­gle is often worth it. Even if the party is not of sufficient strength to attack a large guerrilla base, it can ambush stray parties, direct artillery and air support fire into the guerrilla base, and follow up if the guerrillas with­draw. The problem of casualty evacu­ation, particularly of those injured in the descent, is immense and may often force the abandonment of the mission.

Needless to say, rehearsals of such descents are decidedly not popular!

free Fall Free falling, or sky diving, long an

international sport, has a definite place in southeast Asian counterin­surgency operations. Sur p r i s e is gained by the parachutists exiting from such great heights that the pres­ence of the aircraft would not nor­mally be suspicious to ground troops. Free fallers can also exit from suit­able jet aircraft which are fast enough to avoid conventional ground fire and are not likely to be suspected as troop­carrying aircraft.

In operational free falling, the para­chutist, after exiting, glides in the direction of the drop zones, usually much smaller than normal; activates his parachute at a selected height (610 meters is a safe area); and, by means of a special, highly steerable parachute, lands in the selected drop zone. The jumpers land simultaneously or as close together as possible.

To maintain control of his body during descent, the free-fall parachut­ist is not able to carry much equip­ment. His staying power on the ground, therefore, is limited.

Air-landed operations are possible in some parts of southeast Asia-for example, in the highland plateaus

90

where many open uncultivated areas exist, on the beaches, and on the wider roads. Short takeoff and landing (STOL) aircraft-from the single­engined two-seat 0-lE Bird Dog to the twin-engined CV-2A Caribou­have an advantage over helicopters in that they can land and pick up troops over greater distances, particularly long-range patrols. A pathfinder team may often be necessary to prepare the initial landing zone, but the patrol itself can prepare a landing zone for takeoffs. Secrecy and surprise, quick turnaround, and adequate security while on the ground are essential.

It is in the use of helicopters that spectacular improvements in tech­niques have been made. Heliborne op­erations have two main advantages over paratroop operations:

• They do not require specially trained troops-some familiarization training and a rehearsal prior to an operation will suffice.

• As no special landing surface is needed, troops can be picked up and dropped where required, even using rope descents when the ground is dif­ficult.

The helicopters' greater flexibility often makes their use preferable to airborne operations, although the lat­ter have the advantage of greater range and carrying capacity.

Shock Action As with armor, helicopters are best

employed in shock action, massing as many helicopters and troops as possi­ble for the initial contact with the guerrilla. When a guerrilla concentra­tion has been located, some friendly troops, known as a blocking force, are required to seal off the likely line of enemy withdrawal. A second, sweep­ing or netting force is dropped on the

December 1963

other side of the concentration and clears through the guerrilla area, forc­ing them up against the blocking force for final destruction. Helicopters are ideal for providing these forces, par­ticularly when the terrain would make foot movement slow and vehicle move-

Heliborne operations do not require spe­cially trained troops

ment almost impossible and highly subject to ambush. Surprise is para­mount.

In mounting such an operation, it is essential that reserve helicopters are available in the enplaning area to be used in the event of breakdown or ac­cident-the infantry groups must ar­rive intact. Not all helicopters and troops should be committed to the blocking and netting forces. As the operation develops, the guerrillas may obtain some local success permitting them to escape the cordon, or they may escape through some unknown path or tunnel.

A heliborne reserve force, circling the objective until required, can ob­serve any guerrilla movement away

91

THE INITIATIVE

from the cordon and descend upon them at an appropriate place. Once these troops are committed, a further heliborne reserve must be organized.

When more than one helicopter lift is required, and the first lift, on de­planing, has proceeded to the objec­tive, the same landing zone should not be used for the second lift. Both the deplaning troops and the helicopters are extremely vulnerable when on the ground. They present an ideal target for a stray guerrilla group positioning itself near the original landing zone. To reduce helicopter turnaround time troops for the second lift should hav~ begun moving toward the objective, either by vehicle or STOL aircraft, as soon as the first lift had been alerted.

Refueling When the operation is to be a large

one, or when frequent heliborne moves of the committed troops are required, refueling of the helicopters becomes a problem. The time lost by helicopters returning to their main base for nor­mal refueling could be vital to success. The establishment of a forward re­fueling point reduces this turnaround time. Such a refueling point can be prepositioned, but this will not often be possible and may prejudice sur­prise.

Helicopters can bring in drums of fuel with high-powered pumps and hoses, together with operating person­nel, to a secure forward area. How­ever, the fuel and equipment are heavy and bulky and tie up helicopters which could otherwise be used for troop lifting.

An alternative refueling method is to install in the cargo compartment of a STOL aircraft, such as the Caribou, portable, rubber.ized fuel tanks with associated pumps and hoses. The air­craft with these rubber tanks full of

fuel is able to land on limited surfaces to provide an ideal refueling point, particularly as it can service more than one helicopter simultaneously.

Surprise Landings While the blocking and netting op­

eration requires helicopters to land on comparatively secure landing zones, there are occasions when it is possible for helicopters and their enplaned troops to land directly among the guerrillas, despite the latter's small arms fire capability.

One example is a guerrilla group besieging a fort or outpost in which the defenders seem unable to last much longer. The sudden arrival of a relief force directly into the guerrilla ranks, particularly when accompanied by air support, may well be sufficient to make the guerrillas realize that their siege is broken.

Such an operation does a great deal to maintain the morale of isolated mil­itary units and defended hamlets. The possible arrival by air of a relieving force, soon after an alarm is given, also serves as a clear deterrent to guerrillas to launch siege operations or attacks.

Other opportunities to land among the guerrillas occur when they are on the move or escaping, when they have halted temporarily, or when intelli­gence has indicated a conference is in progress. In each case, when insuf­ficient troops are available to encircle the guerrillas com pIe tel y, shock action among them is necessary to inflict casualties before they can break into small groups and disappear into the surrounding countryside.

Helicopters are invaluable for re­supply along outpost lines, particu­larly those outpost lines situated along a border. Outposts of about company

Military Review 92

strength located in guerrilla infested areas, or along guerrilla supply lines, can prove a serious obstacle to free guerrilla movement. The outposts also help to establish or maintain control over civilians who might otherwise be forced to serve the guerrillas.

Resupply by vehicle convoy or other ground means is so vulnerable to am­bush that the drain on military re­sources to secure the supply line makes the maintenance of the outpost un­economical. Complete logistical sup­port of outposts by helicopter takes the initiative from the guerrilla and frees a number of troops from escort duties.

Night Operations Helicopter operations by night are

possible and desirable. Obviously, sur­prise, security, and speed are greatly enhanced if the helicopters can arrive at the landing zone unseen.

'There are a number of limitations to night flying by helicopters, but weather is the biggest. The pilot must be able to see the horizon to retain stability of his craft and must be able to identify navigational markers and aids along the route..Mountains or similar obstacles along the route make night flying hazardous. The pilot must be well rehearsed by night in such op­erations.

The identification of the landing zone may present a problem. If there are no natural beacons-the lights of a village or reflection from a river­and if the landing zone does not pro­vide an area clear of all obstacles and with gentle approaches, some means of positive identification is necessary. Flares will light up the area, but sur­prise is prejudiced and the eyesight of the crew is affected.

Helicopter landing lights may pro­vide sufficient illumination. Radio di-

December 1963

rectional beacons prepositioned by an infiltrated ground party, or dropped by aircraft at last light, will assist. Alternatively, an all-weather, fixed­wing aircraft could navigate and lead the whole formation to the landing zone, and, if necessary, use its own landing light or drop smoke grenades for identification.

Landing in set paddy fields at night has an additional problem. The water has an excessive glare and a light re­fraction, and both affect a pilot's height judgment. Previous daylight reconnaissance of the landing zone would obviously assist but should be kept to ' a minimum. The presence of reconnaissance aircraft Qver an area will always create suspicion.

Fire Support Protection of, and fire support for,

helicopter operations are essential. For its personal protection, each troop­carrying helicopter should be armed with two swivel-mounted machine­guns, preferably M60's, one at each door. If there is only one door, then one of the machineguns can be mounted on a side window.

Although the two machinegun op­erators reduce the carrying capacity of the helicopter, their guns furnish flexible firepower.

Surprisingly, helicopters are unus­ually difficult to shoot down and de­stroy, the pilot being the most vul­nerable and critical part of the craft. Flying helicopters in pairs is a min­imum requirement for mutual security and for recovery if one is forced down. Subsequent helicopter flights win re­quire a portion of the troops from the first flight to provide landing zone security.

On the trip to and from the landing zone, the helicopters should fly at a height that is out of small arms range

93

THE INITIATIVE

(762 meters) or so low that the craft is over the defended area before the guerrillas can react. Subsequent flights must take a different route.

Supporting Fire Greater fire support for helicopter

operations can be provided by ground support fighter aircraft or by armed

Napalm is not favored because the smoke may affect the helicopter pilot's visibility.

After the troop landing has been accomplished, the fighter aircraft pro­vide fire support on call, remaining in the area until all troops of all lifts have been successfully landed. The

US Army Photos

The much slower but more versatile propeller-driven aircraft can provide more intimate fire support

helicopters. Artillery support has its limitations because the trajectory of the rounds restricts the flexibility of all the aircraft.

The fighter aircraft's primary mis­sion is to destroy strongpoints of guer­rilla antiaircraft fire along the flight route. Generally, a .50-caliber machine­gun will be the guerrilla's largest an­tiaircraft weapon, but larger weapons could be concentrated for a particular task. The fighter aircraft sterilize the landing zone and its approaches by machinegun fire, bombs, and rockets.

second lift often arouses more guer­rilla opposition than the first, as sur­prise has then been lost. For the sec­ond flight, an alternative landing zone and additional air strikes are desir­able.

Opinions differ as to what consti­tutes the best type of aircraft to pro­vide ground support. The most mod­ern fighter aircraft can certainly pro­vide accurate ground support. But their high speed, large turning radius, and restricted visibility of pinpoint camouflaged targets often prevent

94

them from providing the immediate close support helicopters require. The much slower but more versatile pro­peller-driven aircraft can provide more intimate support, often being able to escort helicopters at their own speed.

The armed helicopter can provide the required support in another way. Gas turbine-powered cargo helicopters can provide a fairly stable platform from which rockets or fixed machine­guns can be accurately fired by point­ing the nose of the helicopter at the target. Another version allows flex­ible-mounted groups of machineguns, such as M60's with endless belts in­side the cabin, to be fired by the co­pilot who, by means of power controls, can direct the machineguns at a tar­get as the helicopter flies past it.

Armed ..helicopters can accompany the troop-carrying helicopters and, us­ing their greater engine power and improved flight performances, detach themselves to deal with troublesome enemy strongpoints. Guerrilla ground fire near the landing zone can also be neutralized.

During the landing, the armed heli­copters can remain on call hovering over the landing zone. As the opera­tion continues, they can also provide airborne fire support, particularly while medical evacuation helicopters go into the most forward area to col­lect casualties.

Airborne Command Post Excellent command and control of

all air support operations are, of course, essential. Use of an airborne command post has proved effective. A cargo aircraft, such as a Caribou, is fitted up as a command post for the commander of the operation, who is provided with staff, a variety of com­munication nets, and planning facili­ties.

December 1963

From the air, the commander can actually observe the progress of the operation and make immediate correc­tions if necessary.

Being so close to the stations, his radio communications will usually be good. He can also communicate di­rectly with the leader of the helicopter or paratroop flight, with the com­mander of troops in the air or on the ground, with his forward air con­troller for fighter support, and with his reserve, whether airborne or wait­ing at an advanced base.

Each of the groups involved may also use liaison aircraft of their own for final coordination and for landing zone, drop zone, enemy, and weather information.

Due to the STOL characteristics of the Caribou, the commander can land at a forward strip and transfer to a liaison helicopter for a personal ground visit to the committed troops. His command post can return to air­borne status with command being re­tained by a radio link from the heli­copter to the airborne command post.

Aerial Photography Guerrillas will normally only make

their presence known when they have achieved superiority for a particular mission. Accordingly, every means must be used to seek intelligence. Aerial photography, long an estab­lished technique, should be used ex­tensively as a means of detecting guerrilla camps, guerrilla movement, and guerrilla buildups.

Long-range reconnaissance aircraft and low-flying, short-range, more flex­ible aircraft, with a variety of photo­graphic equipment, must be made available to field commanders at the lowest level. If the photos are readily forthcoming in the shortest possible

95

THE INITIATIVE

time, this becomes an excellent intel­ligence source. However; the areas for photography must be specially se­lected to avoid overtaxing the limited number of photo interpretation units.

Railroads During an insurgency period, one

very successful method for a govern­ment to demonstrate to the people that it is maintaining effective control over their country is to keep its railways running on schedule. Railroad tracks are easy targets for guerrilla activi­ties. It is impossible to guard the whole length continuously, and a sim­ple demolition will derail a train. Once derailed, a train is a vulnerable tar­get for looting.

Low-flying patrols-using aircraft with slow flying speeds for accurate observation and high speeds to escape ground fire when necessary, and carry­ing armament for defensive ground attack-will be capable of detecting prepared demolitions and spiked tracks before a train is due. On the train it­self, radio operators have contact with the .observation aircraft and with the nearest airfield and military bases. Fighter aircraft summoned as soon as a train is ambushed, or the armed ob­servation aircraft itself, will usually be sufficient to hold off the guerrillas until the arrival, often by helicopter, of a relieving infantry force.

Use of cargo-carrying helicopters to move artillery pieces deep into guer­rilla territory in surprise operations allows valuable artillery support, par­ticularly at night or when weather prohibits fighter support. Heavy mor­tars can be carried fully mounted in slings under the helicopter. A 105­millimeter howitzer, disassembled, with crew and ammunition can be car­

ried in the cabins of several helicop­ters. Before the guerrilla can concen­trate to attack the rather vulnerable artillery positions, the same helicop­ters can airlift them to alternative positions or withdraw them to a secure area. Thus no vehicular transport, which is road or trackbound and eas­ily ambushed, is required.

Aircargo The extensive use of air transport

can do much to alleviate the vast man­power and material burden of keeping roads open for resupply acti~ities.

Guarding bridges and intersections, securing ambush positions, clearing activities in suspect areas, and sup­port of vehicle convoys tie up large numbers of troops who could better be employed in more active counterin­surgency operations.

The complete abandonment of a road and the substitution of air trans­port restricts the guerrilla's initiative and may well prove economical in the long run. Aircargo transport will al­ways be at a premium, but its con­centration in certain situations means that a forward base can be supported with the minimum of ground effort.

What does all this prove? Simply that the proper use of air support can provide counterinsurgency forces a degree of initiative and surprise pre­viously denied them. The extensive use of aircraft, although they are costly, can save both ground equip­ment and manpower which previously has been tied up in quantities out· of all proportion to the guerrilla force involved. More important than any­thing else, appropriate air support gives the ground commander an op.por­tunity to meet the guerrilla at times and places least suitable to the guer­rilla.

Military Review 96

UNITED STATES Army Seat Ejection System Slit·Wing Aircraft

A new lightweight seat ejection sys­tem has been developed for use by Army pilots.

Called the LW-2, the automatically operated system is effective at speeds of from zero to 500 miles per hour and at any operational altitude of the air­craft.

When activated, the system cata­pults the pilot and seat through the canopy. When the seat clears the air­craft, a rocket ignites, propelling the pilot high into the air. The seat then separates from the pilot and his para­chute is opened. The e3cape sequence requires three seconds.-News item.

Laser Rangefinder Passes Tests Field testing of a 16-kilogram (35­

pound), battery-powered laser range­finder was brought to a successful con­clusion at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

Tests of the lightweight instrument included a wide variety of terrain and materiel targets at short and long ranges. The frequently publicized laser (MR, Aug 1963, p 96) was reported to exceed design range and accuracy requirements. Simplicity of operation was also confirmed.-News item.

The MILITARY REVIEW and the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College as­sume no responsibility for accuracy of infor­mation contained in the MILITARY NOTES· section of this publication. Items are printed as a service to the readers. No official en­dorsement of the views. opinions, or factual statements is to be implied.-The Editor.

December 1963

An Air Force slit-wing aircraft, featuring a revolutionary air-inhala­tion system called Laminar Flow Con­trol, has made an impressive debut.

The experimental system (MR, Dec 1960, p 62), described as an aeronau­tical milestone, works by inhaling air

Artist's sketch of slit-wing

through hundreds of slits cut length­wise into the top and bottom surfaces of the wings. The paper-thin slits reach from the fuselage to wingtip. The inhaled air is circulated through a series of ducts and discharged through compressors mounted below the wings.

It is predicted that the system will eventually increase an aircraft's range or payload by 50 percent. Additional advantages include the construction of lighter aircraft for larger payloads and greater endurance, allowing air­craft to remain aloft for unusual lengths of time.-News item.

97

MILITARY NOTES

Cargo Unloading Technique The Army has developed and suc­

cessfully tested a technique for quick­ly unloading cargo from moving ships by using helicopters and portable platforms that extend over the sides of ocean cargo vessels.

Elements of the system include a 66-foot-Iong aluminum "wing" (fold­able to 40 feet for storage on the deck), a movable cargo platform or

livery of priority cargo or personnel from any type of ocean transport at any point in the world. Because un­loading operations can be conducted while the ship is moving, the tech­nique offers great potential in both limited and nuclear war situations.

Although initially designed to load and unload helicopter sling loads, di­rect landings on the "ship's wing"

US Army

Ship-to-shore unloading device

dolly capable of holding pal1et loads of 9,000 pounds, and a base unit mounted on the deck which permits the rotation of the "wing." An elec­trohydraulic winch provides the power to move loads to the outboard end from cargo holds in 30 seconds.

The "ship's wing" device will give Army terminal service troops the means of making rapid helicopter de-

have been made by the OH-23 Raven observation helicopter. The platform is now being adapted to allow the larger UH-l Iroquois utility helicop­ter to land and take aboard a squad of troops or evacuate wounded.

A special feature of the device is that it can be mounted on any con­ventional cargo ship by seven steve­dores in a few hours, using regular

Military Review 98

ship's gear. When put into operation, the "wing" is swung outboard with one end over the center of a cargo hatch to permit rapid discharge. Han­dling rates of one 2,000-pound load per minute were achieved in tests conducted by the Army.

The Army's "ship's wings" are scheduled for a series of develop­mental tests to evaluate the full poten­tial of this method of cargo resupply as well as to study the advantages of using the system for priority move­ments of personnel.-Army News Service.

Tests For Broadcasting System An air-transportable broadcasting

system, incorporating the largest mo­bile broadcast transmitter ever devel­oped for the Armed Forces (MR, Dec 1962, p 99), has recently undergone 60 days of intensive testing.

Designed for use by psychological warfare units, the entire system can

be transported by helicopters, cargo planes, or ground vehicles to any zone of operations. Special packing and streamlined loading and unloading procedures are expected to assure fast delivery and assembly.

During the 60-day testing period, the AN/TRC-20 transmitting facili­ties were located at the Yuma Test Station, while the central studio and receiver monitoring facilities were op­erated at Fort Lewis.-DOD release.

Multiple Hand Grenade Launcher A mechanical grenade launcher ca­

pable of tossing 24 grenades at once has been developed. The launcher is a metal box with recesses to hold the grenades. Each recess is slanted for an effective dispersion pattern and contains a coiled steel spring for pro­pelling a grenade. A multihooked rod along the top of each row of grenades can pull out the safety pins before or during ejection.-News item.

Nuclear Frigate

US Navy

The Navy's first nuclear-powered, guided missile frigate, the USS Bain­bridge. Jane's Fighting Ships (1960-61) lists the new vessel as being of 6,500 tons standard displacement, having a speed of "over 30 knots," and equipped with twin Advanced Terrier missile launchers mounted fore and aft.~News item.

December 1963 99

MILITARY NOTES

Hydrofoil Craft Tested

Courtesy of Ordnance Magazine

FRESH I (Foil Research Supercavitating Hydrofoil)

The. Navy has announced the suc­ 97 kilometers per hour. Experimental cessful trial of a new hydrofoil craft. supercavitating hydrofoils incorporat­Called the FRESH I (Foil Research ing movable control surfaces are ex­Supercavitating Hydrofoil), the craft pected to allow speeds up to 185 kilo­has been operated at speeds of over meters per hour.-News item.

'Skycrane' Contract

The Army has announced the awarding of a 13.5 million-dollar contract for the production of six S-64 Skycrane heavy lift helicopters (MR, Nov 1962, p 99).

The craft is powered by two gas turbine engines and is reported to be capa­ble of lifting approximately 9,072 kilograms (20,000 pounds) .-News item.

Military Review 100

Command Ship Conversion of a small aircraft car- and the extensive electronics equip­

rier to a mobile command post afloat ment required. is planned. The Navy has announced The major portion of the flight deck,

US Navy

From aircraft carrier to command post

that the ship will be utilized by top except that necessary for helicopters, echelon commands and staffs for the will be utilized for specially designed strategic direction of area or world­ communications antennas. Facilities wide operations. In this conversion, a are available for the operation and portion of the hangar deck space will sup p 0 r t of three helicopters.-US be used for the special command spaces Navy release.

Shotgun To Vietnam It was recently revealed that, under were requested by the Vietnamese.

the Military Assistance Program, the The piece has a slight choke to im-United States has provided the Viet- prove its killing range, which has been namese Arm y with an undisclosed described as about 55 meters. It is number of 12-gauge shotguns, spe- further described as a sawed-off pump, cially modified for jungle fighting. A more commonly known as a riot g.un. short time later, additional shotguns -News item.

December 1963 101

MILITARY NOTES

20-Millimeter Fast Gun The Navy has completed initial test­ twin-barreled weapon mounted in a

ing on the HIPEG (High Performance pod. A pod can be attached to an air­External Gun). This new aerial weap~ craft in about three min ute sand on system is reported to give a 10 removed in about one minute. The

Hughe8 Tool Company

Superson~c-designed pod being installed

to 1 advantage over its World War maximum load of 750 rounds can be II counterpart. It consists of three 20- reloaded in about 10 minutes. Any millimeter cannon reportedly capable combination of armor-piercing, incen­of firing 12,600 rounds a minute. Each diary, or other ammunition can be of HIPEG's guns is a self-powered, used in each pod.-News release.

Mobile Flame Thrower A flame thrower, designed in kit

form, for armored v e h i c I e s, is cur­rently undergoing final tests by the Army before it is issued to the troops.

The kit, consisting of a cupola­mounted flame gun, fuel spheres, and pressurizing air containers, is de­signed for flexibility of storage ar­rangement within any armored per­

sonnel carrier. The system is also designed to be transferred from one personnel carrier to another without any s t rue t u r a I modifications. The transfer can be made in the field in a relatively short time.

The weapon is scheduled to be is­sued to the troops by December 1963. -News item.

Military Review 102

High-Speed Camera The US Army's Engineer Research

and Development Laboratory at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, has developed a camera that takes eight million pic­tures a second. Principal use of the high-speed camera is to photograph explosions to enable scientists to study the physical forces set off within ex­plosives as they detonate under vari­ous conditions.

New techniques for utilizing explo­sives are expected with the help of these detailed photographs.-News item.

120-Millimeter Recoilless Rifle The US Army Infantry Board at

Fort Benning, Georgia, has announced the recent evaluation of a new 120­millimeter recoilless rifle. Designated the XM105El, the new weapon re­portedly has a much greater range and tank-killing capability than the 106­millimeter recoilless rifle and is ap­proximately 45 k i log ram s (100 pounds) lighter. Mounted on a tripod, the weapon utilizes a "joystick" for alignment on target and can be used either from the ground or from a 1A,­ton vehicle.-US Army release.

·Sioux Scout' Demonstrated

Bell Helicopter Company

Streamlined version of armed helicopter

A new two-place helicopter has been demonstrated by the manufacturer. Named the S i 0 u x Scout, it has a unique seating arrangement in that the gunner sits in front of the pilot. In addition to improved vision, it also enables the gunner to utilize fully the self-contained turret mounting two M60 machineguns.

December 1963

Short wings contain fuel tanks and are designed to accommodate various armament packages. They also are re­ported to provide increased lift for combat-type maneuvers at high speeds. Dual controls are another feature in the experimental tandem seater. The gunner has armchair-type hand con­trols.-News release.

103

MILITARY NOTES

'AMX30' Tank FRANCE

Soldat und Technik

France's versatile medium tank

Details on the French version of a "European tank" h!tve recently become available. The new medium French­built battle tank weighs about 32.5 tons and is 3.1 meters wide and 2.28 meters high. The prototype is powered by a conventional 730-horsepower en­gine affording a roadspeed of 65 kilo­meters. A multifuel engine is consid­ered for future use. The vehicle can travel approximately 500 kilometers without refueling. It mounts a French 105-millimeter cannon and a coaxial 7.62-millimeter machinegun. A 12.7­millimeter antiaircraft machinegun on the cupola completes the armament.

The vehicle is credited with a ford­ing ability of 2.2 meters which may be increased to four meters by fitting it with a snorkel. Protection against con­tamination is provided the four-man crew. Infrared lights and infrared viewers for the driver, gunner, and commander equip the tank for night operation. Comparative performance tests between the French and the Ger­man "standard" tanks are planned (MR, Jul 1963, p 107) .-News item.

'Crusaders' Purchased The French Navy plans to spend 26,­

475,911 dollars for US-produced F-8E Crusaders. It is planned to equip two carrier-based squadrons with the all­weather fighter. The airplanes will carry the French-designed Matra air­craft rocket as well as the US Side­winders. Other planned changes in­clude a special wing incorporating boundary layer control and modified leading-edge droop for lower landing speeds aboard the short French car­riers Clemenceau and Foch.-News item.

JAPAN Air Defense Rockets Tested

According to a statement released by the Japanese Defense Ministry, five types of air defense rockets have been tested. The rockets were developed from US and Swiss models and im­proved by Japanese specialists. Dur­ing the tests, some of the rockets were launched from aircraft, others from the ground. The weapons are said to be operationaL-News item.

Military Review 104

Hinged Cargo Ship Study of a radically new method of

ship designing is underway in Tokyo. Cargo ships that are vertically hinged in the center are receiving consider­able attention.

A pinpoint ship would be built in two sections, which would then be joined amidships with pin couplings. It is estimated that there would be a 20 percent reduction in the amount of steel required for a 100,000-ton ship, resulting in savings in excess of $800,­000. It is thought that a pin coupling of 50-centimeter (19.68-inch) diame­ter would be adequate for a 130,000­ton ship.-News item.

SWEDEN Swedish Troops Leave The Congo

The Swedish Government has in­formed the Secretary General of the United Nations that the Swedish troop contingent in the Congo will be with­drawn by. December 1963. The troops number 591, including 69 air force per­sonnel.-News item.

INDIA Uneasy Border Truce

Three divisions have 'been added to the Indian Army northern bdrder de­fenses, according to the Indian De­fense Minister. Three other divisions are being raised to help avert the threat of an invasion from Commu­nist China. The Indian Army's weap­ons factory is reportedly producing semiautomatic weapons for use in a possible border war with Red China. It was further reported that more than half of the military assistance prom­ised by the US has been received. Britain, the Soviet Union, Australia, Canada, France, Italy, New Zealand, West Germany, and Yugoslavia are also providing aid.-News item.

December 1963

SWITZERLAND 'MOWAG' Amphibious Rocket Launcher

A Swiss manufacturer has added another armored vehicle to its grow­ing family (MR, Jul 1963, p 105). Caned the MR830, the new vehicle carries a crew of three or four men. It is provided with a small turret mounting t win eight-centimeter (three-inch) rocket launchers. Empty weight is shown as approximately 6,900 kilograms (15,212 pounds) , com­bat weight is listed as approximately 8,800 kilograms (19,400 pounds), and the fording depth is considered to be 110 centimeters ('43 inches).

All vehicles in this family have the same motor, clutch, transmission, dis­tribution system, axles, and steering; therefore, the parts are interchange­able. The vehicles can be equipped with a ventilating system for protection from chemical, biological, and radio­logical contamination; an infrared

MOWAG, Kreuzlingen

MOWAG armored rocket launcher

night-driving device; and an auto­matic fire extinguisher system. The vehicles are credited with these addi­tional characteristics:

• Selective two or four-wheel drive. • Differential locks on both axles,

improving cross-country mobility.

• Improved armorplating. • Emergency operation features on

wheels.-News release.

105

MILITARY NOTES

GREAT BRITAIN Reusable Road

British Army and civil engineers announce the development of a recov­erable aluminum road that can be laid by a truck-equipped with special roll­ers-over soft ground at .4 kilometers in 30 minutes.-News item.

USSR Soviet Counterpart To The ·U·2'

A Swiss journal, Flugwehr und -Technik, states that a one-seat, high­altitude reconnaissance aircraft, N A­TO code name Mandrake, has entered service with the Soviet Air Force. The

Flugwehr und ·Technik

Soviet Mandrake

aircraft has a wingspan of approxi­mately 25 meters and is powered by two jet engines. The estimated takeoff weight is 11 tons. Available data cred­its the craft with a service ceiling of approximately 25,000 meters and an estimated range of about 5,000 kilo­meters.-News item.

Tank For Night Operations A Hungarian source reports that

the Soviet Army has added a new light battle tank to its equipment. The vehicle is said to be equipped with a 76-millimeter cannon and fitted with infrared lighting equipment. It is to be used primarily in night operations. -News item.

Armed Forces Leadership Since 1960, appointments to posi­

tions of high responsibility within the Soviet armed forces have attracted more attention than usual.

During this period a rapid turnover has occurred in the post of Command­er in Chief, Rocket Forces. This posi­tion has held four occupants within three years, while during the same time there were no changes among the chiefs of the conventional forces. This seems to indicate either discord among the rocket forces or Premier Khrushchev's dissatisfaction with the extent of their advancement and or­ganization.

Analysts believe that the rapid rise of Marshal Biryuzov from Chief of Antiaircraft Defense to Chief of the General Staff is highly significant. It may indicate that Biryuzov, a rocket specialist, will be the chief protagonist of Khrushchev's policy of adapting nuclear and rocket forces to the latest "hot" and "cold" war requirements.

Other changes have included the formation in 1960 of a group of "gen­eral inspector" posts-positions with no authority or direct influence over troops. Since 1960 three of the 10 Deputy Ministers of Defense have been removed to "general inspector" posts which are attached to the office of the Chief Inspector of the Ministry of Defense. It should be noted that, with the exception of the Chief In­spector, all members are over 65 years of age.

Some Western observers conclude that the "general inspector" posts are reserved for c e r t a i n high-ranking military officers who are old, in poor health, or who have disagreed with governmental policies concerning the armed forces.-Institute for the Study of the USSR.

Military Review 106

LIMITED WAR IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. By Morton H. Halperio. 191 Pages. John Wiley &Sons, Inc., New York, 1963. $2.95 paper­bound. $4.95 clothbound.

By MAJ JACK G. CALLAWAY, Arty

Timely because of recent events, this compendium deals with limited war-a military encounter in which the United States and the Soviets are on opposing sides and neither applies its total power to destroy the other.

The bulk of this work deals with locally limited war-war without armed attack on the homelands of the two nations. The balance concerns cen­tral war, in which armed attack on the homelands occur although these at­tacks may be limited both qualitatively and quantitatively. The theme is the problem which confronts the policy­makers in applying or resisting force to attain or protect national objectives and interests without running undue risks of exploding a crisis into a total nuclear war.

This study is not a blueprint of the current administration's policies. It is possible after reading it, however, to consider some of the actions and de­cisions of the administration and to r~alize and understand the problems faced by both policymakers and strat­egists. It is absorbing to apply this knowledge to hypothetical future events.

This book is highly recommended for all military personnel because of its relevancy, the absolute profundity of its contents, and its implications.

December 1963

ZACH TAYLOR'S LITTLE ARMY. By Edward J. Nichols. 274 Pages. Doubleday &Co., Inc., G~rden City, N. Y., 1963. $4.95.

By CAPT ROBERT M. WORCESTER,

USAR

The mainstream of American his­tory was tested and turned during 1846-48, the years of the Mexican War. Border conflicts preceded a stiffening of policy under President James Polk, who sent Brevet Briga­dier General Zachary Taylor and his troops to take up positions where they could defend Texas, on or near the Rio Grande, which was claimed by Texas to be the dividing line between Texas and Mexico.

Mexico called that land her own, and when on 4 July 1845, Texas declared in favor of annexation to the United States, Mexico knew it meant war.

The ensuing campaigns tested in battle lieutenants and captains whom we recall today as general officers­Grant, Sherman, Meade, Hooker, Mc­Dowell, Longstreet, and others.

The battles also tested theories. Field artillery met the challenges of the campaigns of Mexico as surely as tanks and machineguns passed their test in World War 1. Another theory was the efficacy of West Point officers. Their leadership and discipline won for them, the recognition they de­served, and their effective direction of raw soldiers proved the worth of well­directed, if untrained, volunteers.

And the Mexican War won the Pres­idency for Zach Taylor.

107

MILITARY BOOKS

ON THE PREVENTION OF WAR. By John Strachey. 334 Pages. st. Martin's Press, Inc., New York, 1962. $5.95. By LT COL WILLIAM N. MARTASIN,

AGe A former British Minister of War

and a keen political analyst examines the "imbalance" in the Soviet-Ameri­can arms race and discusses types and effectiveness of deterrence along with the reasons for failure of disarmament negotiations.

The author spells out the character­istics of nuclear war and evaluates the risk of such a war occurring. His main premise is that "the invention of nu­clear weapons has made general war unacceptable"-especially unaccepta­ble militarily because it will entail "unacceptable casualties."

Although the recent signing of the test ban treaty has overtaken many of Mr. Strachey's arguments and as­sumptions, his analysis of Commu­nist (Soviet and Chinese) nuclear doctrine and intentions is of interest to the military reader.

BEHIND THE BURMA ROAD. The Story of America's Most Successful Guerrilla Force. By William R. Peers and Dean Brelis. 246 Pages. Little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass., 1963. $5.95.

By MAJ THOMAS M. HENRY, In!

This book tells the true story of the Kachin Rangers and various other guerrilla units and of the personnel in the Office of Strategic Services in De­tachment 101 who trained and com­manded the guerrillas in operations that were carried out in Burma in di­rect support of the main Allied effort in World War II. The problems of or­ganizing, controlHng, and supporting unconventional operatIOns deep behind enemy lines are presented in interest­ing detail. This story is particularly

timely in that it parallels certain events taking place in southeast Asia.

Colonel Peers, commanding officer of Detachment 101, acted as the uncon­ventional warfare advisor for General Stilwell. Dean Brelis, now a novelist and journalist, was at one time a lieu­tenant in Detachment 101 and served as an agent in the field.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE UNITED STATES MAR'iNE CORPS. By Fr. Charles Dollen and The Library Staff of the University ,of San Diego. 115 Pages. Scarecrow Press, Inc., New York, 1963. $3.00.

Close to 1,000 titles-emphasizing the years from 1940 to 1960--con­veniently assembled in a small pu b­lication. Of value to the reference li­brarian and the researcher.

THE NAVAL WAR IN THE WEST: The Raiders. The Military History of World War II: Volume 4. By Colonel Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, United States Army, Retired. 67 Pages. Franklin Watts, Inc., New York, 1963. $2.50.

THE NAVAL WAR IN THE WEST: The Wolf Packs. The Military History of World War II: Volume 5. By Colonel Trevor Nevitt Du· puy, United States Army, Retired. 60 Pages. Franklin Watts, Inc., New York, 1963. $2.50.

THE AIR WAR IN THE WEST: September 1939-May 1941. The Military History of World War II: Volume 6. By Colonel Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, United States Army, Retired. 76 Pages.. Franklin Watts, Inc., New York, 1963. $2.50.

THE AIR WAR IN THE WEST: June 1941-April 1945. The Military History of World War II: Volume 7. By Colonel Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, United States Army, Retired. 66 Pages. Franklin Watts, Inc., New York, 1963. $2.50.

Four more in the author's projected 16-volume series-brief, concise, and well illustrated.

Military Review 108

ON WINGS OF HEALING. The Story of the Airborne Medical Services 1940-1960. By Lieutenant Colonell 'Howard N. Cole. With a foreword by Lieutenant General Sir Fred­erick Browning. 227 Pages. William Black­wood & Sons, Ltd., Edinburgh, Scotland, and London, England, 1963. $4.20. By LT COL SAMUEL L. CROOK, SR.,

MSC

Whether large-scale airborne opera­tions can be successful is a controver­sial question. The record of actual air­borne (including air-landed) combat assaults shows few successes in terms of holding the assigned objective or accomplishing the assigned mission. In terms of confusing the enemy by scat­tering small parties all over the land­scape and causing him to divert forces from the main battle, nearly every air­borne assault was successful, although the cost in men and equipment was extremely high.

Allied commanders understood the cost versus effectiveness of airborne operations so well by 1945 that the 18th Airborne Corps was prohibited from dropping during the Rhine cross­ing until ground troops were over the river and were able to guarantee link­up. Even then the British 6th Air­borne Division took 30 percent losses.

To learn why this is so is one good reason for reading On Wings of H eal­ing. Although this book is a history ef the British airborne medical serv­ices from 1940 to 1960, it describes the atmosphere prevailing in an airborne assault and pictures vividly the strengths and vulnerabilities of para­chute operations at the fighting level.

This record of airborne medical ex­perience is valuable to logisticians and the combat arms officer as well as med­ical service officers who want to know what the parachute soldier faces after the drop.

Oecember 1963

THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK. Statistical and Historical Annual of the States of the World for the Year 1963-1964. Edited by S. H. Steinberg, Ph. D. 1,728 Pages. St. Mar­tin's Press, Inc., New York, 1963, $10.00.

The centenary edition of one of the most authoritative and up-to-date ref­erence books of its kind. A veritable gold mine of facts and figures on every country in the world. This edition in­cludes three special features: a pref­ace which surveys the publication's aims and achievements and gives a short history of its development; a brief account placed at the head of each country's entry giving conditions as they were in 1863 and a compari­son with present-day conditions; and an atlas supplement in which a series of eight comparative maps show world population distribution and densities, and political boundaries in 1863 and 1963.

TH'E DOUGHBOYS. The Story of the AEF, 1917-1918. By Laurence Stallings. 404 Pages. Harper & Row, New York, 1963. $7.95.

Here is a highly personalized, well­written account of United States sol­diers in action during World War I, told by an author who was seriously wounded at Belleau Wood and whose photographic history of that war has only recently been reissued.

Narrating the momentous events of 1918 through the experiences of men like Alvin York, Hanson Ely, and Charles W. Whittlesey, the author re­captures vividly the battles at Can­tigny, Chateau-Thierry, Belleau Wood, Vaux, the Marne, Saint-Mihiel, the Schelde, and the Meuse-Argonne. A 32-page section of photographs and 17 excellent maps do much to enhance the narrative.

109

MILITARY BOOKS

THE MODERN UNITED STATES AIR FORCE. By Lieutenant Colonel Carroll V. Glines, United States Air Force. 200 Pages. D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., Princeton, N. J., 1963. $5.95.

A readable and up-to-date story of how the United States Air Force is organized, equipped, t r a i ned, and manned.

MARCH TO SARATOGA. General Burgoyne and the American Campaign, 1117. By Har· rison Bird. 300 Pages. Oxford University Press, New York, 1963. $6.50. By LT COL FIELDING L. GREAVES, AIS

It was a grand strategic plan that General Burgoyne outlined to his su­periors in London in late 1776. It in­cluded three coordinated attacks on Albany: General · Howe northward up the Hudson from New York; Colonel Barry St. Leger eastward through the Mohawk Valley; and Burgoyne, him­self, southward from Canada through the historic invasion route of the val­ley of Lake Champlain, Lake George, and the upper Hudson River. Meeting at Albany, the three British forces would thus shatter the rebellious co­lonial forces, which could then be de­feated at leisure and in detail.

Burgoyne's force, 7,000 strong, started south in June 1777. A bare four months later, the 4,700 survivors surrendered at Saratoga.

Harrison Bird, historian and au­thor of Navies in the Mountains (MR, Jul 1962, p 107), describes the three­part failure of Burgoyne's three-part plan: St. Leger defeated at Oriskany at the head of the Mohawk Valley; the order never sent from London to re­quire a northward move by Howe­who sailed south for Philadelphia in­stead; and the defeats and ultimate surrender of Burgoyne.

In addition to index, maps, illustra­tions, and chronology, the author has also included order of battle informa­tion on the forces of both Burgoyne and Gates, and a fine bibliography.

THE TWO-OCEAN WAR. A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War. By Samuel Eliot Morison. 611 Pages. Little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass., 1963. $15.00. By MAJ FRANCIS H. HELLER, USAR

The 15-volume HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II, rightfully known as "the Mor­ison series," is here summarized in one splendidly written, well-illustrated vol­ume. Six hundred pages still do not make a "short" book, but there are no slack places in the narrative, no pad­ding or flourishes that suggest pos­sible points for the editor's pencil.

In fact, Admiral Morison has stripped much detail from the story he so painstakingly told in the original 15 volumes; thus the broad lines of development and the major actions ap­pear more sharply limned. In addition, he has taken full advantage of the work of others, including the pertinent volumes of the UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series.

This is the Navy's story, and it is told very well indeed. A comparable outcome of the Army's big series would be a goal worth striving for.

RABBIS IN UNIFORM. The Story of the Amer· ican Jewish Mrlitary Chaplain. Edited by Chaplain Louis Barish, United States Army. 347 Pages. Jonathan David, New York, 1962. $5.95.

A history of the Jewish military chaplain in the United States Armed Forces from 1862 to the present.

Military Review 110

AINZIO: The Gamble That Failed. By Martin Blumenson. 212 Pages. J. B. LiPIPincott Ca., Philadelphia, Pa., 1963. $3.95.

The seventh in the GREAT BATTLES OF HISTORY series, a study not of de­tailed tactical operations, but a "big picture" v~lume that gives a rare in­sight into the workings of both the Allied and German ~ilitary field com­mands in Italy in 1944.

The author shows us John P. Lucas, "an old man at fifty-four ... he was tired. Directing the 6th Corps during four months of arduous mountain war­fare in Italy had worn him out"; Mark Clark, "aggressive, hard-working, and impatient ... ambitious and frankly so," who was concerned that the Brit­ish 8th Army would beat his own 5th US Army to Rome; Harold R. L. G. Alexander, "too much the gentleman to make it [the Anzio concept] work ... [he] instructed his 'subordinates by suggestion rather than by direct order"; Albert Kesselring, "a natural optimist and political idealist ... un­willing to listen to what displeased him"; and Eberhard von Mackensen, "fu.ndamentally a technician . . . con­servative ... thorough ... careful, steady, a worrier."

The Allied landings at Anzio and their subsequent failure to jar loose the Italian front was one of the great AlJied disappointments of World War II. "By the merciless logic of war, the operation was a failure," the author says, and it failed because the Anzio operation was impractical, it was a gamble, and neither Lucas nor Clark was gambler enough to have gained Rome, or lost a corps.

Despite the results, Anzio did teach the Allies two important lessons which proved most useful in formulating the final plans for the smash across the

December 1963

English Channel: there had to be more strength in the initial landing, and there had to be quick seizures of key objectives inland.

Almost lost at the end of this vol­ume, and really not a part of the An­zio story, is the author's brief descrip­tion of Clark's decision to turn for Rome, away from Valmontone, after the breakout from the Anzio beach­head.

ABOVE AND BEYOND. The Story of the Con­gressional Medal of Honor. By Joseph L. Schott. 314 Pages. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1963. $5.i5. By COL GEORGE G. CANTLAY, Armor

A bove and Beyond is an informal history of the Medal of Honor. It cov­ers the evolution of the Medal's role from the time of its origin during the Civil War (when it became the Na­tion's only military award for hero­ism) to today when it occupies a re­vered position of respect as the N a­tion's highest award for. valor.

How and why the Medal came to be introduced, how the criteria for its receipt have evolved through the years, why the only woman to be awarded the Medal was given it, how the award of the Medal has been abused in the past, and what has been done to rectify the many abuses are some of the questions which can be answered by reading this exposition of the Medal's history.

While the serious scholar may be somewhat frustrated by the lack of an index and the absence of footnotes cit­ing the sources of information used by the author in his research, the gen­eral reader will probably not miss these refinements. He will find the book lucidly written and informative, and may even agree that some of its passages are fascinating.

111

MILITARY BOOKS

THE BATTLE OF THE ALMA. By Peter Gibbs. 212 Pages. J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, Pa., 1963. $3.95.

By LT COL ROBERT G. MATTE, AIS

This book is another in the excel­lent series on the GREAT BATTLES OF HISTORY edited by Hanson W. Bald­win. Like others which have appeared, it is an authoritative, well-written ac­count.

For the first time in 40 years, the British were embarked on a major campaign on foreign soil. In conjunc­tion with the French and the Turks they were determined finally to settl~ the international crisis arising from the assumed design of the R1,lssian czar to seize the Dardanelles and con­trol of the trade routes to the east. The theater of operations was to be the Crimean Peninsula; the objective, the seizure of the Russian naval base at Sevastopol.

The British Army could scarcely have been less prepared for a major operation. With few exceptions, the officers had no combat experience. The training of the men was ~argely re­stricted to proficiency in d ose order drill. The saddest lack was in logis­tics. The long years of peace had stag­nated the armed forces. The tactics that defeated Napoleon were relied upon to defeat the Russians at the Battle of the Alma.

Fortunately for the British, the Russians were even less sophisticated. While giving due credit to the indi­vidual bravery and collective disci­pline of the British soldier, the Brit­ish-French victory must, in the main, be attributed to the Russians simply making more mistakes.

Although the Battle of the Alma may have had little impact on military doctrine or development, its subse­quent analysis in conjunction with the

whole Crimean debacle brought about a wholesale reorganization of the Brit­ish Army.

The author's detailed knowledge of the organization of the mid-19th cen­tury British Army and the moment­by-moment events of the Alma battle attest to detailed research. The book is altogether a most worthwhile study.

MUNICH. By Keith Eubank. 322 Pages. The University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Okla., 1963. $5.00.

A professor of history at North Texas State University, Dr. Eubank has written a careful yet eminently readable boo k that examines the events preceding, during, and follow­ing the fateful Munich Conference of 1938.

In ·a concluding chapter, the author discusses briefly the impact of the myth of Munich-that is, the associa­tion in the American public mind of "Munich," "appeasement," even um­brellas with ill-considered concessions. He reminds us that this myth is a product of ignorance. Munich, so his study shows, was not simply surrender to bluff; it was the result of a multi­tude of forces: the heritage of rival­ries bequeathed by the Austro-Hun­garian monarchy; the tendencies of revisionist historians to deride the Treaty of Versailles; the apprehen­sions of pacifists and frightened men; and, last but not least, military weak­ness and poor strategic planning.

Dr. Eubank has written a story of the past full of lessons for the present. His concluding assessment of the Mu­nich Agreement is that:

. .. to wage war required sufficient cause, a will to war, and the men and armaments. Because these were lack­ing in 1938, Chamberlain and Dala­dier had no other choice than to sign.

Military Review 112