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timed out:statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
1 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
Table of ConTenTs
exeCuTive summary 3Glossary 41. inTroduCTion, main findinGs and reCommendaTions 72. The naTure of sTaTuTes of limiTaTions 14 2.1 Therationale 15
2.2 Therelevanceforcriminal,civil,administrativeanddisciplinaryproceedings 15
2.3 Thelengthofstatutesoflimitations 17
2.4 Thestartingpointofthelimitationperiod 17
2.5 Aspectsofcriminalproceedingscovered 18
2.6 Groundsforsuspension,interruptionandextension 19
2.7 Theabsolutelimitationperiod 21
2.8 Comparativelengthsofstatutesoflimitationsfordifferentproceedings 21
2.8.1 Thelengthforcriminalproceedings 21
2.8.2 Thelengthforcivil,administrativeanddisciplinaryproceedings 28
2.9 Otherprocedurallimitsinteractingwithstatutesoflimitations 29
2.10 Recommendationsfrominternationalinstitutions 30
2.11 Recentandcurrentreformefforts 31
3. weaknesses and Good praCTiCe 32 3.1Mostsignificantweaknessesidentifiedintheresearch 33
3.1.1 Limitationperiodsarenotlongenoughtoensureeffectiveprosecutionofcorruption 33
3.1.2 Inclusionofappellateinstancesinthedurationofstatutesoflimitationscanleadtoimpunity 33
3.1.3 Absenceofimmunityasagroundforsuspensionorinterruption 34
3.1.4 Absenceofrequestsformutuallegalassistanceasagroundforsuspensionorinterruption 34
3.2Examplesofgoodpractice 35
3.2.1 Flexibilityregardingthestartofstatutesoflimitations 35
3.2.2 Verylongorabsenceofabsolutestatutesoflimitations 35
3.2.3 Prioritisingcasesclosetostatutesoflimitationsexpiry 36
3.2.4 Suspensionorinterruptionofstatutesoflimitationswhenadefendantcommitsanothercrime 36
3.2.5 Availabilityofdataandstatistics 36
4. eleven CounTry profiles in brief 37 Austria,Bulgaria,CzechRepublic,Greece,Hungary,Ireland,Italy,Lithuania,Portugal,RomaniaandSlovakia
annex NumberofclosedinvestigationsandcourtproceedingsduetoStatutesofLimitations 44endnoTes 46
transparency international (ti) is the global civil society organisation leading the fight against corruption. through more than 90 chapters worldwide and an international secretariat in Berlin, germany, ti raises awareness of the damaging effects of corruption and works with partners in government, business and civil society to develop and implement effective measures to tackle it.
www.transparency.org
Author:AnjaOsterhausProofreadingandediting:StephanieDebereDesign:Lemke-MahdaviKommunikationsdesignCoverphoto:©istockphoto/NickSchlax
Acknowledgements:Theauthorwishestoexpressherappreciationtothemanyindividualswhocontributedtothepreparationofthisreport.ThisincludestheexpertsfromTInationalchapters,listedbelow,whocoordinatedtheresearchandwrotethenationalreports.ParticularthanksareduetoMarieChêneandGillianDellfromtheTI-Secretariatfortheirinvaluableadvice,andtoHelenTurekforhersupport,particularlyinthefinalstagesofthepreparationofthisreport.ThanksarealsoduetoJulioBacioTerracinoandSkirmantasBikelisforsharingtheirexpertiseandknowledge.
ExpertsfromTInationalchapters(projectpartners):SimonEllmauer(Austria),RalicaIlkova(Bulgaria),EliskaCisarovaandZuzanaNavratilova(CzechRepublic),IoannaAnastassopoulouandArtemisiaPapadaki(Greece),ÁdámFöldes(Hungary),JohnDevittandAndrewSheridan(Ireland),GiorgioFraschini(Italy),SkirmantasBikelisandNeringaMickeviciute(Lithuania),DavidMarcãoandLuísMacedoPintodeSousa(Portugal),VictorAlistar,AngelaCiureaandIuliaCospanaru(Romania),PavelNechala(Slovakia).
Otherexpertsandauthorsofoverviewstudies:YannBaden,ChristophBurchard,JulioBacioTerracino,SimonaHabic,MiklósLigeti,JoachimMeese,AssoPrii,EliasStephanou,JaanusTehver,XavierVandenBosch,AndrewSheridan
WithsupportfromthePreventionofandFightagainstCrimeProgrammeoftheEuropeanUnion EuropeanCommission-Directorate-GeneralHomeAffairs. Thispublicationreflectstheviewsonlyoftheauthor,andtheEuropeanCommissioncannotbeheldresponsibleforany usewhichmaybemadeoftheinformationcontainedtherein.
©TransparencyInternational.Allrightsreserved.
Everyefforthasbeenmadetoverifytheaccuracyoftheinformationcontainedinthisreport.AllinformationwasbelievedtobecorrectasofNovember2010.Nevertheless,TransparencyInternationalcannotacceptresponsibilityfortheconsequencesofitsuseforotherpurposesorinothercontexts.
ISBN:978-3-935711-62-3Printedon100%recycledpaper
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transparency international 2 3 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
exeCuTive summary
Thisreportassessestheimpactofstatutesoflimita-tions(SoL)ontheprosecutionofcorruptionoffencesacrosstheEuropeanUnion(EU).Itisbasedon27studieswhichexaminedthenatureofSoLindifferentnationallegalcontextsinordertoidentifyweaknessesandgoodpractices.
Theresearchfoundthatimpunityforcorruption-relatedoffencesisamatterofsignificantconcernacrosstheEU.Thekeyproblemsidentifiedwerethelackofdetectionofcorruptioncasesandthelackofhumanresourcesandexpertiseoflawenforcementbodiesandjudicialstaff.InthemajorityofEuropeancountries,lengthyproceedings,sometimescombinedwithahighlevelofbureaucracyandexcessiverequirementsofproof,constituteseriousobstaclestoanti-corruptionlawenforcement.Insuchacontext,statutesoflimita-tionsareoftentooshorttoallowtheprosecutionofcrimes,particularlyiftherearenotsufficientoptionstoexpandthelimitationperiodincaseofdelays.
InsomeEuropeancountries,particularaspectsoftheSoLregimeconstituteseriousproblems:inGreece,ItalyandPortugal,proceedingscaneffectivelybeclosedevenifanoffenderhasbeenfoundguiltyinthefirstinstance.Inaddition,theGreeksystemprovidesanextremelyfavourableSoLregimeforcertainpersons,mainlypoliticians.InFrance,statutesoflimitationsformostcorruption-relatedoffencesaretooshorttoensureeffectiveprosecutionandinSpain,theyareveryshortforsomecorruptionoffencesbutcanbeconsideredadequateforothers.
InthemajorityofEuropeanjurisdictions,theSoLregimehassomeweaknessesorloopholes.Internationalcooperationoncriminalmattersorimmunityprovisionswhichcancausesignificantdelaysareoftennotconsideredasreasonstoprolongproceedings.Eventhoughthishasnotledtothedismissalofasignificantnumberofproceedingssofar,itisamatterofconcern,particularlyincomplexcaseswhichmayhaveacross-borderdimensionrequiringinternationalcooperation.
Onlyin10ofthe27EUmemberstatescoulddataregardingthenumberofproceedingsclosedduetoSoLbecollected.Whiletheavailablestatisticsshowaratherlowpercentageofclosedproceedingsinmostcases,therearetwonotableexceptions.InItaly,since2005onein10trialswasdismissedduringtheprosecutionphase,aswereuptofourpercentofcriminalproceedingsinSlovakia.
SeveralEuropeanjurisdictionsprovidegoodpracticeandmostrecentreformeffortshaveledtoanimprovementofSoLregimeswithregardtoprosecutingcorruption-relatedcrimes.Inseveralcases,SoLperiodswerelengthenedsignificantlyorthegroundsforsuspensionorinterruptionwereextended.Incontrast,recentreformsinItalyhavefurthershortenedthelimitationperiods.
Themainrecommendationsfromtheresearcharethatnationalpolicymakersshouldcarefullyreviewtheircountry’sSoLregimeinordertocloseanyloopholesfortheprosecutionofcorruptionoffences.Giventhatparticularlycomplexcorruptioncasesareoftendifficulttodetectandprosecute,limitationperiodsforseriouscorruptionoffencesshouldbe10yearsorlonger.ThecalculationofSoLshouldreflectthespecificitiesofcorruptioncases.TheSoLregimeshouldprovidefordelaysifaproceedingisputonholdbecauseapartyinvolvedisprotectedbyimmunity,andfordelaysduetointernationalcooperation.SoLshouldnotallowforproceedingstobeclosedafterthefirstinstancejudgement.Otherwise,thereisariskthatasentenceagainstanallegedoffendercannotbeenforcedbecausethecaseprescribedduringtheappellateinstances.DataoncriminalcasesclosedduetoSoLshouldbecollectedandmadeavailableinordertoidentifytheimpactofSoLontheadministrationofjustice.Thespecificreasonsfortheclosuresshouldalsoberecordedinordertoidentifyandaddressweaknessesinthesystem.
Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
transparency international 4 5 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
Absolute limitAtion periodTheabsolutelimitationperiodisthemaximumperiodwithinwhichactioncanbebroughtagainstanallegedoffender.Regardlessofanygroundsforinterruption,suspensionorextension,theabsolutelimitationperiodcannotbeextendedunderanycircumstances.
Abuse of functionsTheabuseoffunctionsorpositionisreferredtoastheperformanceof(orfailuretoperform)anact,whichisinviolationofthelaw,byapublicofficialinthedischargeofhisorherfunctions.Theperformanceof(orfailuretoperform)suchanactiscarriedoutbythepublicofficialforthepurposeofobtaininganundueadvantageforhim-orherselforforanotherpersonorentity.
AdministrAtive proceedingAnadministrativeproceedingisanon-judicialdeterminationoffaultorguiltandmayincludepenaltiesofvariousforms.Administrativeproceedingsareoftencarriedoutbygovern-mentsorotherpublicentities.
AggrAvAted offenceAcrimeortortthatbecomesworseormoreseriousduetocertaincircumstancesthatoccurorarepresentduringthecommissionofthecrimeortort,forexample,possessionofadeadlyweaponorrecklessdisregardforotherpeople’ssafety.Theperpetratorofanaggravatedoffenceisusuallysubjecttomoreseverepenaltiesthanforunaggravatedformsoftheoffence.
Alleged offenderApersonwhohasbeenaccusedofacrimeoranotheroffence,buthasnotyetbeenprovenguilty.
AppellAte instAnceAppellateinstanceisthestageinlegalproceedingswhentheunsuccessfulpartyinalawsuitresortstoasuperiorcourtempoweredtoreviewandchangeafinaldecisionmadebyalowercourtonthegroundthatthedecisionwasbaseduponanerroneousapplicationoflaw.
AppellAte jurisdictionAppellatejurisdictionisthepowerofasuperiorcourttoreviewandchangeafinaldecisionmadebylowercourts,onthegroundthatthedecisionwasbaseduponanerroneousapplicationoflaw.Dependingonthetypeofcaseandthedecisionbelow,appellatereviewprimarilyconsistsof:anentirelynewhearing;ahearingwheretheappellatecourtgivesdeferencetofactualfindingsofthelowercourt;orreviewofparticularlegalrulingsmadebythelowercourt.
briberyTheoffering,promising,giving,acceptingorsolicitingofanadvantageasaninducementforanactionwhichisillegal,unethicalorabreachoftrust.Inducementscantaketheformofgifts,loans,fees,rewardsorotheradvantages(taxes,services,donations,etc.).Theactofofferingabribeiscommonlyreferredtoasactivebriberyandtheactofacceptingthebribeaspassivebribery.
burden of proofBurdenofproofisadutyplaceduponacivilorcriminaldefendanttoproveordisproveadisputedfact.Burdenofproofcandefinethisduty,oritcandefinewhichpartybearsthisburden.Incriminalcases,theburdenofproofisplacedontheprosecution,whomustdemonstratethatthedefend-antisguiltybeforeajurymayconvicthimorher.Butinsomejurisdictions,thedefendanthastheburdenofestablishingtheexistenceofcertainfactsthatgiverisetoadefence,suchastheinsanityplea.Incivilcases,theplaintiffisnormallychargedwiththeburdenofproof,butthedefendantcanberequiredtoestablishcertaindefences.
civil lAwAbodyoflawderivedandevolveddirectlyfromRomanLaw.Theprimaryfeatureofcivillawisthatlawsarestruckinwriting.Theyarecodified,andnotdetermined,asinthecommonlaw,bytheopinionsofjudges.
civil proceedingsIncivilproceedings,civilactionsarebroughtbyentities,personsorthestatetoobtainremedyfordamagesufferedasaresultofadefendant’sactions.
common lAwAbodyoflawbasedoncourtdecisions,thedoctrinesimplicitinthosedecisions,andoncustomsandusagesratherthanoncodifiedwrittenlaws.CommonlawformsthebasisofthelegalsysteminEnglandandmanyotherEnglish-speakingcountries.MostformerBritishcolonieshavealegalsystembasedoncommonlaw.
Glossary
continuous offenceAcontinuousoffenceisallegedwhereadefendantissaidtohavecommittedacontinuousseriesofcloselylinkedoffenc-es.Forexample,ifanactofbriberyisrepeated.
criminAl proceedingsCriminalproceedingsareactionsbroughtbythestateagainstanindividualoralegalentitysuchasabusiness.
defendAntApersonorlegalentityagainstwhomanactionorclaimisbroughtinacourtoflaw.
disciplinAry proceedingsDisciplinaryproceedingsincludesanctionstakenagainstapublicorprivatesectoremployee,whicharebasedoncontractsorotherlegalobligationsthatariseoutoftheworker’sindividualpositionoremployment,ratherthanthegeneralobligationscreatedbycriminaloradministrativelaw.
embezzlementWhenapersonholdingofficeinagovernmentinstitution,organisationorprivatecompanydishonestlyandillegallyappropriates,usesortrafficsthefundsandgoodstheyhavebeenentrustedwithforpersonalenrichmentorotheractivities.
extensionWithregardstostatutesoflimitation,extensionprolongsthelimitationperiodforaspecificlengthoftime.Groundsforextensionvaryfromonejurisdictiontoanother,butcanincludetherequirementofspecialtime-consuminginvestiga-tivemeasures.
felonyAgravecrime,suchasmurder,rape,orburglary.Afelonyispunishablebyamorestringentsentencethanthatgivenforamisdemeanor.
first instAnceThebeginningorthefirsthearingoflegalproceedings.Thefirstinstancetakesplaceinalowercourt.
grAnd corruptionActscommittedatahighlevelofgovernmentthatdistortpoliciesorthecentralfunctioningofthestate,enablingleaderstobenefitattheexpenseofthepublicgoodGrandcorruptionisusually(butnotalways)synonymouswithpoliticalcorruption.
illicit enrichmentThecorruptactofillicitenrichmentmaybedefinedasasignificantincreaseintheassetsofapublicofficialthathecannotreasonablyexplaininrelationtohislawfulincome.
immunityForthepurposesofthisreport,immunityreferstotheexemptionfromlegalprosecutionforpoliticallyexposedpersons.Insomecountriespoliticiansaregrantedpoliticalimmunityforactionstheycarryoutinperformanceoftheirdutiesinordertopreventpoliticallymotivatedlegalattacks.
impunityTheexemptionfromlegalpunishment.
indictmentAwrittenstatementchargingapartywiththecommissionofacrimeorotheroffence.
instAnceAnactionorstageinalegalproceedingorprocess.
interruptionWithregardstostatutesoflimitation,wheninterruptionoccurs,anewlimitationperiod,usuallyidenticaltothepreviousone,beginstorun.Groundsforinterruptionvaryfromonejurisdictiontoanother,butoftenincludedevelop-mentsinproceedings,suchasthecommencementorthefilingofthecasetocourt.
investigAtionTheprocessofuncoveringthefactsandcircumstancessurroundinganoffence.Whenstatutesoflimitationapplytotheinvestigationperiod,theinvestigationmustbecompletedandthechargesmustbebroughtwithintheperiodoflimitation.
misdemeAnourAminoroffenceortransgressionofthelaw,lessheinousthanafelony.
money lAunderingTheprocessofconcealingtheorigin,ownershipordestina-tionofillegallyordishonestlyobtainedmoneybyhidingitwithinlegitimateeconomicactivities.
transparency international 6 7 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
mutuAl legAl AssistAnceMutualLegalAssistance(MLA)istheformalprocessthroughwhichcountriesrequestandprovideassistanceinobtainingevidencelocatedinonecountrytoaidcriminalinvestigationsorproceedingsinanothercountry.
obstruction of justiceTheobstructionofjusticemaybedefinedastheuseofphysicalforce,threatsorintimidationorthepromise,offeringorgivingofanundueadvantage,toinducefalsetestimonyortointerfereinthegivingoftestimonyortheproductionofevidenceinaproceedinginrelationtothecommissionofacrimeorotheroffence.
offenderApersonwhohasbeenfoundguiltyofacrimeoranotheroffence.
permAnent offenceAnillegalactivitythatoccursoveraperiodoftimewithoutcessation,forexample,theoperationofahumantraffickingnetwork.
prosecutionTheinstitutionandconductoflegalproceedingsagainstaperson.Whenstatutesoflimitationapplytotheperiodofprosecution,theprosecutionmustbefinalisedandajudge-mentreachedwithintheperiodoflimitation.
relAtive limitAtion periodTherelativelimitationperiodisthemaximumperiodwithinwhichacriminalorcivilactioncanbebroughtagainstanallegedoffender,butwhichcanbeprolongedduetospecificgroundsforsuspension,interruptionorextension.
repose of societySocietybeinginastateofpeaceandtranquillity.Statutesoflimitationaredesignedtocontributetothereposeofsociety.Theprosecutionandpunishmentofoldcrimesrecallsillfeelingandpreventssocialhealingofanoldconflictanditsnegativeconsequences.
stAtutes of limitAtionsStatutesoflimitationsarestatutoryrulesthatsetthemaxi-mumperiodwithinwhichacriminalorcivilactioncanbebroughtagainstanallegedoffender.Statutesoflimitations,alsocalledlimitationperiods,promotefairnessandtheefficiencyofinvestigativeandjudicialproceedings.
stAtutes of reposeStatutesofreposeisthetermusedfortheabsolutelimitationperiodincivilproceedings.
subpoenAAcourtorderrequiringapersontoappearincourttogivetestimony.Itisapunishableoffencenottoappearwhenasubpoenaisdecreed.
suspensionWithregardstostatutesoflimitation,suspensionfunctionslikeabreakorpause.Oncethesuspensionhaslapsed,thelimitationperiodcontinuesrunning.Groundsforsuspensionvaryfromonejurisdictiontoanother,butoftenincludeimmunityorillnessofthedefendant.
to prejudice one’s right to A fAir triAlTohaveadetrimentaleffectonone’srighttoafairtrial.
tortAcivilwrong,otherthanabreachofcontract,whichthelawwillredressbyanawardofdamages.Acivilsuitcanbebroughtagainsttheperpetratorofatort.
trAding in influenceThepromise,offeringorgivingtoaperson,orthesolicitationoracceptancebyaperson,directlyorindirectly,ofanundueadvantageinorderthatthepersonabusehisrealorsup-posedinfluencewithaviewtoobtaininganundueadvantagefortheoriginalinstigatoroftheactorforanyotherperson.Tradingininfluenceisalsocommonlydividedintoitsactiveform(givinganadvantageinexchangeforinfluence)anditspassiveform(requestingoracceptinganadvantageinexchangeforinfluence).
whistleblowingWhistleblowingisthedisclosureofinformationaboutaperceivedwrongdoinginanorganisation,ortheriskthereof,toindividualsorentitiesbelievedtobeabletoeffectaction.Earlydisclosureofwrongdoingortheriskofwrongdoingcanprotecthumanrights,helptosavelivesandsafeguardtheruleoflaw.Whistleblowingisincreasinglyrecognisedasananti-corruptiontool.
Glossary
introduction, main findings and recommendations1.
transparency international 8 9 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
inTroduCTion
Statutesoflimitations(SoL)arestatutoryrulesthatsetthemaximumperiodwithinwhichacriminalorcivilactioncanbebroughtagainstanallegedoffender.SoL,alsocalledlimitationperiods,promotefairnessandefficiencyininvestigativeandjudicialproceedingsandcontributetothereposeofsociety.
However,limitationperiodscanalsoconstituteobsta-clesintheprosecutionofoffencesbecause,inpractice,theytypicallyincludetheprosecutionphaseofpro-ceedings,i.e.evenifchargesarebroughtagainstanallegedoffender,theproceedingcanendduetothelimitationperiod.Particularlyinthecaseofcorruption-relatedoffences,whichoftencometolightafteralongpassageoftime,standardSoLprovisionscanleadtoimpunityiftheyareoverlyshortordonotprovideforsufficientflexibilitytoallowprosecution.Anadditionalconcernrelatestocross-bordercorruptioncases,asinternationallegalcooperationcandelayproceedingssignificantly.
Allrelevantinternationalbodieshavehighlightedthatadequatestatutesoflimitationsarecriticaltotheeffectiveprosecutionofcorruption,andhavedevelopedinstrumentsthatstipulaterelatedprovisions.1TheOECDWorkingGrouponBribery(WGB)andtheCouncilofEurope’sGroupofStatesagainstCorruption(GRECO)includedtheassessmentofSoLintheirreviewmechanismsregardingtheimplementationoftherelatedconventions.2
However,sofarthereisnodetailedinternationalstandardregardingcorruption-relatedstatutesoflimitations,andinternationalinstitutionshavenotalwaysprovidedclearandconsistentguidancetotheirmem-berstates.TheOECDWGBhasstressedthatthelackofcross-cuttingresearchonthisissueimpedesanappropriateassessmentofwhetherstatutesoflimita-tionsareadequatefortheinvestigationandprosecutionoftheoffenceofforeignbribery.3
TanGenTopoli a show-case for the relevance of statutes of limitations to anti-corruption law enforcement
Tangentopoli (literally ‘the city of bribes’), also known as ‘Clean Hands’, was a series of judicial investigations involving politicians and public officials in the Milan area. This scandal which exploded in 1992 uncovered the spread of bribery and illicit funding to parties involving ministries, members of parliament and businessmen.
After the preliminary hearings, 635 people (almost 20 per cent of the total) were acquitted. Of these, 314 acquittals (49 per cent) were because the expiry of SoL meant the case could not be pros-ecuted. After the trial, 40 per cent of cases were dismissed, with 57 per cent of those due to the expiry of SoL – not least because the courts were unable to manage this volume of proceedings.
Additional data shows that of the 4,520 people recorded in the General Register of Crimes’ Notices of the Court of Milan, 586 (13 per cent) were acquitted because of SoL.4
Another relevant issue emerging from this study is that the majority of cases which expired due to SoL did not even reach the trial phase because the first phase of the proceeding, the investigations, could not be completed in time.
ThisreportreducesthisgapbyprovidinganoverviewofSoLinrelationtocorruptionandcorruption-relatedoffencesacrosstheEuropeanUnion(EU).ItexplorestherelevanceofSoLforthefightagainstcorruption,analysesproblemsintheenforcementofanti-corruptionlawandidentifiesgoodpracticeacrosstheEU.
CoveraGe of The reporT
Thereportbuildsonnationalresearchfromall27EUmemberstates.Thenationaldatacollectionwascarriedoutattwolevels.In11countries(Austria,Bulgaria,CzechRepublic,Greece,Hungary,Ireland,Italy,Lithuania,Portugal,RomaniaandSlovakia),in-depthstudiesoftheissuewereconductedbyrespectiveTransparencyInternational(TI)nationalchapters.Intheother16EUmemberstates,5anoverviewassessmentwascarriedout.Thefindingswerediscussedatameetingofinternationalexperts,withrepresentativesfromtheOECDWGBandtheUnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(UNODC).
Theresearchcoveredallcorruptionandcorruption-relatedoffencesasdefinedintheUnitedNationsConventionagainstCorruption(UNCAC),i.e.bribery,embezzlement,tradingininfluence,abuseoffunctions,illicitenrichment,obstructionofjustice,andmoney-laundering.Itcoveredthecommissionoftheseoffenc-es,butalsotheparticipation,attemptandconspiracytocommitcorruption-relatedoffences.Moneylaunder-ingwasincludedbecauseofitsintrinsiclinktocorrup-tion:inorderforcorruptoffenderstoenjoythebenefitsoftheirillicitactivities,theymusthidetheoriginoftheirfundsandeventuallyconvertthemintolegalfunds.TheresearchassessedtherelevanceofSoLforanti-corruptionlawenforcementinthedifferentbodiesoflaw(criminal,civil,administrativeanddisciplinaryproceedings)aswellasinthedifferentstagesintheinvestigationandprosecutionofoffences.
However,thecomparabilityofdataacrosscountriesislimitedbecausenotallEUjurisdictionshavetrans-latedtheseoffencesintotheirnationallaw.Corruptionoffencesmayalsoberegulatedindifferentwaysinindividualcountries,withrelatedimplicationsforthedurationofSoL.
impuniTy beCause of The passaGe of Time
In September 2003, a Lithuanian judge dismissed a criminal case where defendants had been charged for the embezzlement of US $2.6 million. In 2007 the Judicial Commission of Ethics and Discipline refused to impose disciplinary liability on the judge with reference to the fact that the three-year period of disciplinary SoL had expired.6
meThodoloGy of The researCh
ThisreportispartofaEuropeanCommissionco-fundedproject.Themethodologiesforbothapproaches–thein-depthandtheoverviewstudies–werejointlydevelopedbytheprojectpartners,i.e.theTISecretariatandthe11TInationalchaptersinAustria,Bulgaria,CzechRepublic,Greece,Hungary,Ireland,Italy,Lithuania,Portugal,RomaniaandSlovakia.Informationwasgatheredthroughadeskreview,questionnairesandinterviewswithlocalexperts.Thedeskreviewincludedtheexaminationofrelevantlegalprovisionsandacademicpapers,assessmentsandreportsbyinternationalbodiessuchastheOECDWGBandGRECOandthecollectionandanalysisofstatisticsaboutthelengthofSoLperiods,aswellasthepercentageofproceedingsclosedduetoSoL.Thisinformationwascomplementedwithinsightsprovidedbyprosecutors,judges,academics,officialsfrominteriorministriesandlocalanti-corruptionagencies,andcivilsocietyrepresentatives.Thenationalstudies,methodologiesandarelatedbackgroundpapercanbeaccessedattheTIwebsitewww.transparency.org.The11in-depthstudiescanalsobefoundonthewebsitesofeachcountry’sTInationalchapter.
inTroduCTion, main findinGs and reCommendaTions1.
transparency international 10 11 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
swedish invesTiGaTion inTo alleGedly CorrupT exporT deals dropped due To sTaTuTes of limiTaTions
In June 2009, the Swedish prosecutor Christer van der Kwast closed three investigations into SAAB’s involvement in allegedly corrupt export deals with the Czech Republic, Hungary and South Africa. He stated that there was evidence which clearly indicated that the case was “very serious, both in terms of the systematic approach and the amount. It involves hundreds of millions of Swedish crowns in hidden payments in several countries, and there is strong reason to believe that bribery also has occurred.” The inquiries examined evidence from the middle of the 1990s to the beginning of this millennium. However, the period of limitation did not allow for the prosecution of incidences that occurred before July 2004. Mark Pieth, chairman of the OECD anti-bribery working group, expressed concerns about the halt of the investi-gation. “It raises the question whether Swedenis really committed to the OECD convention,” he said in an interview.7
main findinGs
AcrosstheEuropeanUnion,impunityforcorruptionandcorruption-relatedoffencesisamatterofsignificantconcern.TheroleplayedbySoLinthiscontextdifferswidelyfromcountrytocountryandiscloselylinkedtotheoverallefficiencyofenforcementagenciesandthejudiciary.
generAl findings About the reAsons for corruption-relAted impunity• Thelackofdetectionofcorruptionwasidentifiedas
akeyproblemacrosstheEU.Corruptbehaviourisusuallyofbenefittothepartiesinvolvedandinmostcasesthereisnoimmediatevictimwhocanbringcharges.Theclandestinenatureofcorruptbehav-iourmeansthatitmaynevercometolightunlessreportedbyathirdperson.Therefore,theimpor-tanceofwhistleblowing8andtheneedforeffectiveprotectionofwhistleblowerswaspointedoutas
amajorissuethatneedstobeaddressedinmostEuropeancountries.
• Thelackofhumanresourcesandexpertiseoflaw-enforcement-bodiesandjudicialstaffwereidentifiedasfurthermajorobstaclestotheeffectiveinvestigationandprosecutionofcorruptioncasesacrosstheEU.Incidencesofcorruptionareoftendifficulttodiscover,investigateandprosecute.
Inmostcountries,qualifiedinvestigativemanpowertopursuecorruptioncasesandeconomiccrimeingeneralislacking.
• InmostEuropeancountriesitislengthyproceed-ings,sometimescombinedwithhighlevelsofbureaucracyandexcessiverequirementsofproof,whichconstituteseriousobstaclestoanti-corruptionlawenforcement.Insuchacontext,SoLareoftentooshorttoprosecutecrimes,particularlyiftherearenotsufficientoptionstoexpandthelimitationperiodifnecessary.
• InmanyEuropeancountries,thereisalsoalack oftrustinlawenforcementwhichresultsinunwill-
ingnesstoreportwrongdoing,reinforcingthelack ofdetectionofcorruptioncases.
specific findings About the stAtutes of limitAtions regime in eu member stAtes• Insomecountries,particularaspectsoftheSoL
regimeconstituteseriousproblems:inGreece,ItalyandPortugal,proceedingscaneffectivelyrunout
oftimeevenifanoffenderhasbeenfoundguiltyinthefirstinstance.Inaddition,inGreece,thereis
anextremelyfavouralbeSoLregimevis-a-visparliamentariansandmembersofthegovernment.
• InFrance,statutesoflimitationsformostcorruption-relatedoffencesarethreeyears.Eventhough
therearemechanismsforsuspensionofthelimita-tionperiod,suchashortlimitationperiodcannotguaranteeeffectiveprosecution.InSpain,statutesoflimitationsareveryshortforsomecorruptionoffences,e.g.activebribery,whiletheycanbeconsideredadequateforothers,suchasmoneylaundering.
• InthemajorityofEuropeanjurisdictions,theSoLregimehassomeweaknessesorloopholes,suchastheabsenceofimmunityorofarequestformutuallegalassistanceasagroundforsuspensionofthelimitationperiod.Whileinmostofthesejurisdictionstheresearchdidnotdetectcorruptioncasesacquittedduetotheseweaknesses,itcannotbeguaranteedthattheywillnotcauseimpunity
ofallegedoffendersinthefutureandtheyshouldthereforebeadjusted.
• Atthesametime,severaljurisdictionsprovidegoodpracticesuchastheapplicationofSoLexclusivelyfortheinvestigationphaseofproceedings,ormechanismstotakethespecificitiesofcorruptioncasesintoaccount.
• Overall,theresearchshowedthatSoLhaveparticu-larlyimportantimplicationsforpoliticalandgrandcorruption,casesinvolvinghigh-levelpoliticiansandcomplexcaseswhichmayhaveacross-borderdimensionrequiringinternationalcooperation.
• InmanyEuropeancountries,recentreformeffortshaveledtoanimprovementofSoLregimesforprosecutingcorruption-relatedcrimes.Inseveralcases,SoLperiodswerelengthenedsignificantlyorthegroundsforsuspensionorinterruptionwereextended.Incontrast,recentreformsinItalyhavefurthershortenedthelimitationperiods.
lAck of dAtA About proceedings closed due to stAtutes of limitAtionsAsmentionedabove,thenationalresearchforthisprojectincludedthecollectionandanalysisofstatisticsaboutthepercentageofproceedingsclosedduetoSoL.However,thisdatawasonlyavailablein10ofthe27countriesstudied.Evenwherestatisticscouldbecollected,theydonotshowcasesthathadnotevenstartedbecausetheywerereportedlate,andofficerscouldalreadypredictthatinvestigationorprosecutionwouldnotbecompletedwithinthesettimeperiod.9
ItwaspointedoutbyseveralresearchersthattherealnumberofcasesendingindirectlyduetoSoLislikelytobesignificantlyhigherthanstatisticscanshow.Thisrendersthefindingsinconclusive.
Theavailabledatashowsthat,inmostcases,lessthanonepercentofinvestigationsandproceedingsareclosedduetoSoL,althoughtherearesomeexceptionswhichshowsignificantlyhighernumbers.InBulgariaandHungary,25oreven32percentofcriminalinvestigationswereclosedinsomeyears.However,thereisnoinformationastowhetherthiswasduetoSoLorforotherreasons,suchasalackofevidence.
OfparticularconcernarejurisdictionswithahighnumberofcriminalcourtproceedingsclosedduetoSoL.ThefiguresareexceptionallyhighforItaly:since2005,10to13percentofallcriminalcourtproceedingshavebeenclosedduetoSoL,meaningthatonein10trialsendedwithimpunityfortheallegedoffender.InSlovakia,uptofourpercentofcriminalcourtproceedingshavebeenclosedinthepastyears.
inTroduCTion, main findinGs and reCommendaTions1.
transparency international 12 13 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
reCommendaTions
Itwaspointedoutbymanyresearchersandlocalexpertsthatinefficienciesinlawenforcementandthejudiciaryarekeyconcernsfortheeffectiveprosecutionofcorruption,andneedtobeaddressed.
GeneralconclusionscanbedrawnregardingSoLregimesspecifically,eventhoughtheyneedtobeassessedcarefullyinthecontextofeachjurisdiction.Theseconclusionsleadtothefollowingrecommenda-tionstonationalpolicymakers:
1. the grAvity of corruption crimes needs to be AdequAtely reflected in domestic lAwSoLperiodsaregenerallycalculatedinrelationtothegravityoftheoffence.Forlimitationperiodstobesufficientlylong,itiscriticalthatcorruption-relatedoffencesbeadequatelyweighed.If,asinFrance,mostcorruptionoffencesareclassifiedasmisdemeanoursandnotasfelonies,theresultingSoLislikelytobetooshort(threeyears,inthiscase).
whaT The GraviTy of The Crime means for The lenGTh of sTaTuTes of limiTaTions
In the Portuguese Freeport Case, involving the waiver of environmental restrictions, the question of whether the case has prescribed depends on how the Prosecutor’s Office qualifies the type of crime. If it is qualified as ‘bribery with breach of duties’, a 10-year SoL period applies. If it is ‘bribery without breach of duties’, it is only five years. In the latter case, the criminal procedure itself should be dismissed.
2. limitAtion periods for serious corruption offences should be 10 yeArs or longerTheemergingguidancefromrelevantinternationalbodiesforaminimumSoLperiodforcorruptionoffencesisfiveyearsormore.However,particularlyincomplexcorruptioncasesandinthecontextofslow,inefficientjudicialproceedings,fiveyearsmaynotbeenoughtoensuretheeffectiveadministrationofjustice.ASoLperiodofatleast10yearswouldreducetheriskofcomplexcorruptioncasesprescribing.Inthecontextofinefficientandlengthyproceedings,aswellasininternationalcorruptioncases,evenalimitationperiodof10yearsmightnotprovidesufficienttime,unlesscomplementedbyflexiblegroundsforsuspensionorinterruptionofproceedings.
3. the cAlculAtion of stAtutes of limitAtions should reflect the specificities of corruption cAsesAs‘covert’offences,manycasesofcorruptiondonotcometolightformanyyears,forexample,untilaregimechangeoccursorwhenanofficialorcompanyemployeeleaveshisorherpost.Therefore,inthecaseofcontinuousoffences,SoLshouldbeginrunningfromthemomentthelastoffencetookplaceandinthecaseofapermanentoffence,theyshouldbecalculatedfromthedateonwhichtheillegalactivityceased.
4. the regime should ensure extensions for cross-border cAsesGiventheincreasinglytransnationalcharacterofcorruptpractices,theSoLregimeneedstoadequatelyreflectpotentialdelayscreatedbyinternationalcooperation,suchasrequestsformutuallegalassistance(MLA),whichcantakemanymonthsorevenyearstobegranted.InthecaseofanMLArequest,theSoLregimeshouldprovideforadditionaltime,forexample,throughthesuspensionofthelimitationperiod,inordertoensuretheeffectiveprosecutionofinternationalcorrup-tioncases.
5. no impunity for politiciAns And members of the government Incorruptioncasesinvolvingpoliticiansorgovernmentmemberswhoareprotectedbyimmunities,eitherasallegedoffendersoraspartiesinvolvedintheproceed-ings,SoLshouldprovideforsuspensionorinterruptionaslongasthepost-holderisinoffice.Thiswillenablethecasetobetakenupwhentheofficialorpoliticianleaveshisorherpost.
6. no stAtutes of limitAtions After A decision of first instAnceASoLregimeshouldnotallowforproceedingstoprescribeafterthefirstinstance.Otherwise,thereisariskthatanallegedoffenderisfoundguiltyinthefirstinstance,butasentencecannotbeenforcedbecausethecaseprescribedduringtheappellateinstances.Inordertoensuretheadequateprosecutionofcorrup-tionoffencesitisevenquestionablewhetherthereshouldbeanylimitationperiodafterformalchargeshavebeenpresentedtothecourtforhearing.
7. systemAtic collection of stAtistics About relevAnce of stAtutes of limitAtions for impunityDataoncriminalcasesclosedduetoSoLshouldbecollectedandmadeavailableinordertoidentifytheimpactofSoLontheadministrationofjustice,bothingeneralandspecificallyforcorruptionandcorruption-relatedoffences.Specificreasonsfortheclosureofcasesshouldalsoberecordedinordertoidentifyandaddressweaknessesinthesystem.
The usefulness of daTa for GuidinG poliCy reforms
In Portugal, between 2004 and 2008, only 0.5 per cent of corruption-related cases were dismissed because of SoL. However, the very few cases that end in impunity are usually the ones involving the greatest sums of money and known political actors. Therefore, the related provisions need to be adapted because they leave loopholes for grand corruption to end in impunity. This conclusionis drawn from detailed data analysis by Portuguese research institutes.10
inTroduCTion, main findinGs and reCommendaTions1.
transparency international 14 15 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
the nature ofstatutes of limitations2.
limiTinG Time delayswiThouT sTaTuTes of limiTaTions – The Case of ireland
In Ireland, rather than imposing limitation periods on the prosecution of crimes as in civil law jurisdictions, the common law doctrine of delay prevails. Under this, the defence may make submissions asserting that the defendant’s right to a fair trial is prejudiced by the effects of the passage of time. The charges will be dismissed if his or her right to a fair trial is found to be prejudiced by the culpable delay of the prosecution. Where delay is pleaded, the case is considered on its individual merits within the parameters set by the jurisprudence on delay.
2.2 The relevanCe for Criminal, Civil, adminisTraTive and disCiplinary proCeedinGs
Inthecontextofthisresearch,SoLforthefourdifferentbodiesoflawwereassessedinthe11in-depthstudies.Fortheother16EUMemberStates,theresearchwaslimitedtocriminalandcivilproceedings.Amongtheresearchersandtheexpertsinterviewedtheviewwaswidespreadthatcriminalproceedingsarebyfarthemostrelevantbodyoflawfortheassessmentofthelinkbetweenlimitationperiodsandimpunityforcorruption-relatedoffences.Thereforethisreportfocusesoncriminalproceedings.
criminAl proceedingsCriminalproceedingsareactionsbroughtbythestateagainstanindividual.Corruptioncasesareoftentreatedundercriminallaw,becausetheyareusuallyoffencesforwhichpenalsanctionsapply.Large-scalecorruptioncasesareoftencomplexandcombineamultitudeofoffences,whichcanalsobeofacivil,administrativeordisciplinarynature.
2.1 The raTionale
Thevastmajorityofjurisdictionsprovideforlimitationperiods.Themainrationalefortheconceptis:
• Topromotelegalcertainty,fairnessandaccuracyofcriminalproceedingsbyprotectingindividualsfromhavingtodefendthemselvesagainstchargeswhenthebasicfactsmayhavebecomeobscuredbythepassageoftime.
• Toimproveefficiencybyencouragingprosecutionauthoritiestodivertscarcelaw-enforcementre-sourcesfromoffenceswhichwerecommittedalongtimeagowithlowprobabilityofsuccessfulprosecu-tiontothepursuitofmorerecentoffences.SoLperiodsarealsointendedtoimproveefficiencybyencouragingthepromptinvestigationandprosecu-tionofcriminalactivity,consistentwitharticle6(1)oftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms,whichprovidesthat‘everyoneisentitledtoafairandpublichearingwithinareasonabletime’.
• Tocontributetothereposeofsocietywhichconsti-tutestheultimategoalofcriminallaw.Theprosecu-tionandpunishmentofcrimescommittedlongagostirsupillfeelingandpreventssocialhealingofoldconflictsandtheirnegativeconsequences.Duetothepassageoftime,thepurposeofpunishmentaswellastheneedforrestitutionmaybecomeirrel-evant.
Exceptfortwocountries(IrelandandtheUnitedKingdom),allEUmemberstatesprovideforlimitationperiodsforcriminaloffences.11Themostseriouscrimesarenotsubjecttoanylimitationperiod.Theseincludewarcrimes,crimesagainsthumanity,genocide,actsofterrorismandsimilaroffences.Insomejurisdictions,intentionalhomicideisexcludedaswell.InAustria,therearenoSoLforoffencesrequiringlifeimprison-mentorsentencesof10to20years,whileinItaly,alloffencesleadingtolifesentencesareexcludedfromSoL.
transparency international 16 17 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
civil proceedingsIncivilproceedings,actionsarebroughtbyentities,personsorthestatetoobtainremedyfordamagesufferedasaresultofadefendant’sactions.CivilSoLlimitthetimeinwhichaplaintiffcanbringalawsuitagainstanotherperson.Inthecontextofthefightagainstcorruption,civilproceedingsarerelevantbecausecivilremediesenablepersonswhohavesuffereddamageresultingfromactsofcorruptiontoreceivefaircompensation.Incountriesthatdonotrecognisecriminalliabilityforlegalentities,suchascompanies,civilremediesenablevictimstotakelegalactionagainstthem.
AdministrAtive proceedingsAnadministrativeproceedingisanon-judicialdeter-minationoffaultorguiltandmayincludepenaltiesofvarioustypes.Therelatedlimitationperiodsareofthemostvariedformsandcomeunderdifferentregulations.Ingeneral,theSoLperiodsinadministra-tiveproceedingsareveryshortandmayconstituteanobstacletotheeffectivefightagainstcorruption,especiallyincountrieswherelegalpersonscanonlybesanctionedthroughciviloradministrativeproceedings.Theymayalsoconstituteobstaclesfortheprosecutionofviolationsofpartyfundingregulations.
disciplinAry proceedingsDisciplinaryproceedingsincludesanctionstakenagainstapublic-orprivate-sectoremployee,whicharebasedoncontractsorotherlegalobligationsthatariseoutoftheworker’sindividualpositionoremploy-ment,ratherthanthegeneralobligationscreatedbycriminaloradministrativelaw.Thesecanincludetermsorconditionsofemploymentcontracts,publicservicestandardsorcodesofpracticeandtherulesappliedtoprofessionalgroupssuchasdoctorsandlawyers.Inthecontextofcombatingcorruption,disciplinaryproceedingsarerelevantbecauseofthepossibilityofimposingdisciplinarysanctions,suchasprohibitiontopractiseaprofession,whichcouldnotbeimposedbycriminallaw.
fiGure 1: the different types of statutes of limitations periods and their main elements12
sol on prosecution****
statutes of limitations period
sol on investigations***
in criminal proceedings
in civil procedings
in administrative procedings
in disciplinary procedings
sol on execution of the sencence
sol on investigation and/or prosecution
sol* statutes of repose**
* period begins on the day of discovery of the offence or damage** period begins on the day of offence or damage*** period begins on the day of offence and runs until the end of investigation or the beginnig of prosecution**** period begins on the day of offence and runs until the end of the trial or end of prosecution or day of sentence
2.3 The lenGTh of sTaTuTesof limiTaTions
AcrosstheEU,thelengthofSoLincriminalproceed-ingsvarieswidely.Generally,itiscalculatedinrelationtothegravityofthecrime,i.e.anoffencewithahighersentence,suchas10years’imprisonment,willhavealongerSoLthananoffencewhichisconsideredlessseriousandfacesamaximumsentenceofthreeorfiveyears.Yetthedetailedcalculationisverydifferentfromcountrytocountry.Insomecountries,forexampleHungary13andItaly,thelimitationperiodisequaltothemaximumdetentionpenaltyfortheoffence.Inothers,suchasAustria,Greece,Portugal,Romania,SlovakiaandSlovenia,theperiodisrelatedtothemaximumpenaltybutnotnecessarilyequaltoit.Forexample,inRomania,thelimitationperiodforprosecutionisfiveyearsplusthelengthofthepenaltytobeexecuted.
Inmanycountries,adistinctionismadebetweenshorterSoLperiodsforbasicformsofoffence,andlongeronesfortheaggravatedformoftheseoffences.InSlovakia,forexample,theoffenceofacceptingabribecanhaveSoLoffive,10or20years,dependingonwhethertheoffenceisaggravatedornot.
InothercountriesthelengthofSoLiscalculatedrelatedtothecategoryofcrimes.InBelgiumtherearethreecategoriesofcrime:seriouscrime,crimeandmisde-meanour.Eachofthesecategorieshassub-categoriesandSoLarecalculatedaccordingly.
Regardingspeciallimitationperiodsforcorruptionoffences,onlyPortugalhasrecentlyapprovedsuchmeasures,whichwillcomeintoforcein2011.TheRomaniananti-corruptionlawdefinesspecialpenaltiesforcorruptionoffences,whichindirectlyleadtospeciallimitationperiods.
2.4 The sTarTinG poinT of The limiTaTion period
SoLforcivillawoffencesareusuallycalculatedfromthedaytheoffencewasdiscovered.Inmanycountries,suchasAustria,CzechRepublicandSlovakia,amongothers,theycountonlyfromthedaythedamageisknowntotheinjuredparty.Onlyexceptionally,forexampleinMalta,docivilproceedingsrunfromthedaythattheactgivingrisetothedamagesoccurs,andnotfromthemomentthedamagewasdiscovered.
Incriminallaw,however,thelimitationperiodusuallybeginstorunonthedayonwhichthecrimewascommitted.Forcorruptioncases,thisisasignificantproblembecausemanycorruptionoffencesdonotcometolightformanyyears,forexample,untilaregimechangeoccursorwhenanofficialleaveshisorherpost.
However,manyEuropeanjurisdictionshaveimple-mentedmechanismsthataccountforthespecificitiesofcorruptionandcorruption-relatedoffencesinSoL–seetable7page35.
exTendinG sol ThrouGh The idenTifiCaTion of The mosT serious offenCe
Prosecutors and judges can seek to qualify, where possible, corruption offences as offences which are considered more serious under national law. For example, judges in France have qualified bribery offences as the misuse of corporate assets or receiving of misused corporate assets in order to make it possible to sanction acts which otherwise would not have been punishable (should SoL expire), or which would have been difficult and taken longer to prove.14
The naTure of sTaTuTes of limiTaTions2.
transparency international 18 19 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
2.5 aspeCTs of Criminal proCeedinGs Covered
Limitationperiodsmayconcernthephaseofinvestiga-tionandprosecutionofanoffenceaswellasthephaseoftheexecutionofthesentence.Thevariousregimescanbecombinedindifferentways.
ThecalculationofSoLforinvestigationindicatesthetimelimitforfinalisingtheinvestigationandinitiatingprosecution(i.e.theinvestigationmustbecompletedandthechargesmustbebroughtwithintheperiodofSoL)whilethecalculationofSoLforprosecutionindicatesthetimelimitforfinalisingprosecutionandreachingajudgment.
Limitationfortheexecutionofsentenceappliesifasentenceisnotcarriedoutorissuspended.ThesetypesofSoLperiodsaremeanttodealwithveryspecificsituations,where,forexample,asentenceisnotexecutedduetonegligence.However,suchsituationsrarelyoccurinpracticeandSoLperiodsforexecutionofthesentencearealmostneverenforced.Theyhavethereforenotbeenassessedindetailintheframeworkofthisproject.
Table 1: overview of Aspects of criminAl proceedings covered18
CountrieswithSoLforinvestigation
CountrieswithSoLforprosecution
CountrieswithSoLforexecutionofsentence
Austria19EstoniaFinlandFranceGreeceHungaryLatviaLuxembourgMaltatheNetherlandsPolandRomaniaSloveniaSpainSweden
BelgiumBulgariaCzechRepublicDenmarkEstoniaFinlandFranceGermanyGreeceHungaryItalyLithuaniaLuxembourgMaltatheNetherlandsRomaniaPortugalSlovakiaSloveniaSpain
AustriaBelgiumBulgariaEstoniaGreeceHungaryItalyLatviaLuxembourgtheNetherlandsPolandPortugalRomaniaSlovakiaSlovenia
franCe: jurisprudence determines late start of statutes of limitations
French SoL are particularly short and have been considered a serious obstacle for the prosecution of corruption offences.15 However, related leads to a significant delay of the starting point of SoL, which can help to overcome the problem of impu-nity. The Cour de Cassation, France’s highest appellate jurisdiction, has ruled that the offence of bribery, committed from the moment the agreement between the briber and the bribed person is concluded, is renewed on each occasion that the agreement is acted upon.16 As a consequence, the triggering of SoL is moved forward from the day the bribery agreement was concluded to the day of the final payment or the last day of receipt of the advantage that was promised.17
2.6 Grounds for suspension, inTerrupTion and exTension
Inmostjurisdictions,SoLcanbesuspended,extendedorinterruptedforspecificreasons.Suspensionfunc-tionslikeabreakorapause,andoncethesuspensionhaslapsed,thetimecontinuesrunning.ExtensionprolongstheSoLforaspecificperiod.whileinterruptionmeansthataftertheinterruption,anewlimitationperiod,usuallyidenticaltothepreviousone,beginstorun.Intheenforcementofanti-corruptionlawoneofthekeyconcernsiswhetherthegroundsforsuspen-sion,extensionandinterruptionareextensiveenoughtoallowforproperenforcementofthelaw.
Accordingtosomescholars,ajurisdictionshouldeitherprovideforlongSoLandremoveanygroundsforsuspension,extensionorinterruption,orforshorterSoLwithanextensivenumberofgroundsforsuspension,extensionandinterruption.20Thereality,however,showsamixtureofdifferentregimesbothwithinandacrossEuropeanjurisdictions.
The naTure of sTaTuTes of limiTaTions2.
transparency international 20 21 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
Table 2:overview of frequent grounds for suspension in eu jurisdictions
Groundforsuspension Countries21
Theallegedoffenderevadedtheadministrationofjustice
Estonia,Italy,Lithuania,Portugal,Slovakia,Slovenia
Theallegedoffendercommittedanothercrimeofthesamenature
Austria
Theallegedoffenderisaminororissick
CzechRepublic,Hungary,Lithuania,Luxembourg,Romania,Slovenia
Stepsintheproceedings,suchasthebeginningofproceedings
Austria,Greece
Legalobstaclestotheinitiationorcontinuationofprosecution
Austria,Belgium,Bulgaria,Greece,Italy,Luxembourg,Portugal,Romania,Slovakia,Slovenia
AnMLArequest,internationallegalassistance
Hungary,Lithuania
Immunityandotherstatutorybarrierstoinvestigationorprosecution
Austria,Belgium,CzechRepublic,Hungary,Portugal,Slovakia,Slovenia
Referralofthecasetoanothercourtortoadditionalinvestigation
Italy,Belgium,Lithuania,Portugal
grounds for interruptionInterruptionfunctionsasa‘reset’oftime:aftereachinterruptionanewlimitationperiod,usuallyidenticaltothepreviousone,beginstorun.AcrosstheEU,thereisawidevarietyofdifferentregimes.WhiletheCzechRepublicandItalyprovideformanydifferentprovisions,AustriaandGreecedonotusetheconceptatallforcriminalproceedings.
Table 3: overview of frequent grounds for interruption in eu jurisdictions
Groundforinterruption Countries22
Theallegedoffendercommittedanothercrime
CzechRepublic,Latvia,Lithuania,Romania,Slovakia,Slovenia
Beginningofcriminalprosecution Belgium,Bulgaria,CzechRepublic,Estonia,Hungary,Luxembourg,Portugal,Slovakia
InternationalorEuropeanarrestwarrant
CzechRepublic,Hungary
Designationofthedefendantasaformalsuspect
Hungary,Portugal
Notificationofanyproceduralacttotheallegedoffender,suchassubpoena,arresting,summoning,confrontation,etc.
Belgium,CzechRepublic,Estonia,Hungary,Italy,Romania,Slovakia
2.7 The absoluTe limiTaTion period
TwelveEuropeanmemberstatesprovideforanabso-luteSoLperiodperiod(seegraph),i.e.regardlessofprovisionsfortheinterruptionand/orsuspensionofthestatute,thereisanoveralllimittothelengthoftheperiod.InBulgariaandRomania,forexample,theabsoluteperiodcannotexceedhalftherelativeSoLperiod.Theothercountriesdonothaveanabsolutetimelimitfortheprosecutionofcriminaloffences,i.e.theoreticallythelimitationperiodcanbeinterruptedorsuspendedindefinitelyifneeded.
Atthesametime,thenewSoLregimeinSlovenia,whichenteredintoforcein2008,exclusivelyforeseesabsolute,notrelative,SoLperiods.AlmostallgroundsforsuspensionwereabolishedinfavourofaregimewithlongabsoluteSoL,i.e.aminimumofsixyears,butupto20yearsforseriousoffences.23
2.8 CompariTive lenGThs of sTaTuTes of limiTaTions for differenT proCeedinGs
2.8.1 the length of sol for criminAl proceedingsAcrosstheEU,statutesoflimitationsforcriminalproceedingsvarywidely.Thetablesonthefollowingpagesshowthelimitationperiodsforcriminalproceed-ingsinallEUmemberstatesexceptforCyprus,IrelandandtheUnitedKingdomwherenoSoLexist.24
The naTure of sTaTuTes of limiTaTions2.
transparency international 22 23 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
Table 4: period of limiTaTion (years) unTil end of invesTiGaTion or iniTiaTion of proseCuTion
aCTive bribery of offiCial
frAncehungAryspAin
AustriA*estoniAfinlAnd*greece*mAltApolAndromAniAsweden*
lAtviAluxembourgsloveniA
netherlAnds*
1210
5 3
year
s
20
15
passive bribery
frAnce AustriAestoniAfinlAndgreece*hungArymAltApolAndsweden*
lAtviAluxembourgromAniA
netherlAnds
1210
5 3
year
s
spAin sloveniA10
bribery of foreiGn publiC offiCials
frAncehungAryspAin
AustriAfinlAndgreece*mAltApolAnd
netherlAnds* romAniA
86
5 3
year
s
luxembourg
defalCaTion / embezzlemenT
AustriA frAnce estoniAfinlAndgreece*
lAtviAluxembourgmAltAromAniAsloveniA
10
5 3
1year
s
TradinG in influenCe
frAnce AustriA*estoniAfinlAnd*greece*hungArylAtviAmAltApolAnd
romAniA luxembourgsloveniAspAin
108
53
year
s
abuse of publiC funCTions
hungAry AustriAfinlAndgreece*lAtviAluxembourgpolAnd
sloveniA romAniA
10
65
3ye
ars
15
12
money launderinG
sweden* frAnce AustriAestoniAfinlAndhungArylAtviAluxembourg
romAniAsloveniAspAin
10
532
year
s
netherlAnds greece*mAltA
10obsTruCTion of jusTiCe
luxembourg AustriAfrAnce
romAniA finlAndspAin
54,5 3
1year
s
lAtviAsloveniA
InAustria,dejuretheSoLperiodrunsuntiltheendofprosecution,butdefactotheformalaccusationandsometimesevenotherinvestigativemeasuressuspendtheSoLperioduntilthelegallybindingendoftheproceedings.
*minimum,extragivenifaggravatingcircumstance(cp.detailedclauses)
The naTure of sTaTuTes of limiTaTions2.
transparency international 24 25 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
The naTure of sTaTuTes of limiTaTions2.
* minimum,extragivenifaggravating circumstance(cp.detailedclauses)** Therelativeperiodoflimitation isfiveyearsplusthelengthofthe sentence.Forthegraphic comparisonofdata,thefigures forRomaniaarecalculatedforthe lowestpenalty.
Table 5: period of limiTaTion (years) unTil end of proseCuTion or senTenCe relaTive period of limiTaTion (Can be exTended ThrouGh suspension or inTerrupTion)
20bribery of foreiGn publiC offiCials
czech republic*frAncegreece*hungAry*spAin
belgium*denmArk*estoniAfinlAnd*germAnymAltApolAnd
itAlynether-lAnds*romAniA**
bulgAriAportugAl
10
6 5
3
year
s
luxembourgslovAkiA*
20
15
1210
6 5,5
aCTive bribery of offiCial
czech republic*frAncegreece*hungAry*spAin
belgium*denmArk*estoniAfinlAnd*germAnymAltApolAndslovAkiA*
romAniA** itAly
year
s
5 3
bulgAriA netherlAnds* portugAl luxembourg
20
15
1210
8
passive bribery
frAncegreece*
belgium*czech republic*estoniAfinlAnd*germAnyhungAry*mAltApolAndslovAkiA*
romAniA**
year
s
5 3
bulgAriAdenmArk*
itAlynetherlAnds*
portugAlspAin
luxembourg
20
15
10
6
defalCaTion / embezzlemenT
czechrepublic*frAncegreece*slovAkiA*spAin
belgium*denmArk*estoniAfinlAnd*germAny
bulgAriAitAlymAltA
53
year
s
portugAl luxembourgromAniA**
20
10
76
TradinG in influenCe
frAncegreece*
belgium*bulgAriAdenmArk*estoniAfinlAnd*hungArymAltApolAnd
romAniA**
53
year
s
portugAlspAin
luxembourgslovAkiA*
itAly
15
108
6
abuse of publiC funCTions
greece*hungAry*
belgium*czech republic*denmArk*finlAnd*luxembourgpolAndslovAkiA*
romAniA**
53
year
s
bulgAriA portugAlitAly
15
1210
8
money launderinG
frAnce belgium*czech republic*estoniAfinlAnd*germAnyhungAry*luxembourg
bulgAriAslovAkiA*spAin
53
year
s
itAlynetherlAnds*
mAltAportugAl
romAniA**
108
obsTruCTion of jusTiCe
luxembourg frAnce belgium*czech republic*finlAnd*germAnyportugAlspAin
romAniA**
65
32
year
s
itAly* denmArk*slovAkiA*
transparency international 26 27 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
* minimum,extragivenifaggravating circumstance(cp.detailedclauses)
2422,5
15
10
aCTive bribery of offiCial
itAlyromAniA
greece*lithuAniA
estoniAgermAnylAtviAsloveniA
bulgAriAsweden*
year
s
87,5
portugAl netherlAnds
2422,5
20
15
12
passive bribery
greece* estoniAgermAnylAtviA
lithuAniA bulgAriAitAlyromAniAsweden*
year
s
108
sloveniA portugAl netherlAnds
15
1210
bribery of foreiGn publiC offiCials
itAly greece* estoniAgermAny
lithuAniAnetherlAndsromAniA
year
s
87,5
bulgAriAportugAl22,5
15
12,5
defalCaTion / embezzlemenT
greece*lithuAniA
estoniAgermAnylAtviAsloveniA
itAly bulgAriAromAniAsweden*
year
s
108
portugAl
15
1210
TradinG in influenCe
bulgAriAitAly
greece*lithuAniA
estoniAsloveniA
romAniA
8
portugAl
7,5
year
s
5
lAtviA
22,5
15
8
abuse of publiC funCTions
sloveniA itAly greece*lithuAniA
bulgAriAromAniA
7,5
portugAl
6
year
s
5
lAtviA
2422,5
20
money launderinG
estoniAgermAnysloveniA
bulgAriAitAlylithuAniAromAniA
greece* portugAl
15
netherlAnds
10
year
s
5
lAtviAsweden*
10obsTruCTion of jusTiCe
portugAl lithuAniA germAnyitAly*lAtviAsloveniA
87,5
year
s
4,5
romAniA
The naTure of sTaTuTes of limiTaTions2.
Table 6: period of limiTaTion (years) unTil end of proseCuTion or senTenCe absoluTe period of limiTaTion (no furTher exTension possible under any CirCumsTanCes)
transparency international 28 29 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
2.8.2 the length of stAtutes of limitAtions for civil, disciplinAry And AdministrAtive proceedingsSoLincivil,administrativeanddisciplinaryproceedingsalsovarywidelybetweenjurisdictions.
Forcivilproceedings,inmostcases,therearedifferentlimitationperiodsfordifferentactions,andinsomecases,suchasSpain,theperiodsevenvarybetweendifferentregionsinthecountry.CorporateorcertaincommercialdisputescanalsohavetheirownSoL.
Inthemajorityofcountries,SoLforcivilproceedingsvarybetweenthreeandfiveyearsformostoffences.InSpain,thelimitationperiodforcivilproceedingsagainstthepublicadministrationandfortortsisoneyearaftertheactoriginatingtheclaimtookplace.Thisisexcep-tionallyshort.
CountriessuchasAustria,Estonia,Finland,Greece,SlovakiaandSlovenia,haveanabsoluteperiod,alsocalledstatutesofrepose,whichcanvarybetween10and30years.
SoLforadministrativeanddisciplinaryproceedingsvarybetweenthreemonthsandsixyears.Eventhoughlittleevidencewasfound,someresearcherspointedoutthattheshorterperiodmightconstituteanobstaclefordisciplinaryliability.InAustria,forexample,theconnectionwiththecriminalproceedingscodecouldbeparticularlyrelevant.Thisprovisionstatesthatthepolice,prosecutororcourthavethedutytoinformthecompetentbodyifacriminalproceedingagainstapublicservantisinitiatedorterminated.ThisdutyofinformationmightlaunchtheshorterdisciplinarySoLperiodandmightthereforeleavelesstimefordiscipli-naryproceedings.ThiseffectisfurtherheightenedbythefactthattheshortSoLperiodisnotprolongedtotheleveloftheSoLperiodforcriminalproceedingsifthepublicservant’sbreachofdutiesconstitutesacriminaloffence.25
InLatviaandLithuania,GRECOfoundthatcurrentadministrativeSolmaybetooshorttoensuretheeffectivecontrolofpoliticalpartyfinancing.InLatvia,underthegeneraladministrativeprovisions,theSoLareforoneyearaftertheoffencewascommitted.Giventhedeadlinesforthesubmissionofannualfinancialreportsbypoliticalpartiesandthedelayssometimesobservedinthesubmissionofthesereports,theseperiodsaresomewhatshortinthecontextofcontrollingpoliticalfinancing.GRECOthereforerecommendsinbothcasesthattherelatedSoLbeextended.26
2.9 oTher proCedural limiTs inTeraCTinG wiTh sTaTuTes of limiTaTions
InadditiontoSoL,inmanyjurisdictionsthereareotherprovisionsthatmaylimitthelengthofcriminalproceed-ings.Therationalefortheseprovisionsisthatthereshouldbenounreasonabledelayincriminalproceed-ingsinanyofthestages.Timelimitsareposed,forexample,forpre-trialinvestigationsandthegatheringofevidence.
IntheCzechRepublic,thepoliceneedtoestablishwithintwotosixmonthswhethertheoffencewascommitted.However,thistimelimitcanbeextended.Thereisalsoatimelimitforissuinganorderforatrialtobeheld,forthepreliminaryhearingandfortheindict-ment.Furthermulti-levelapprovalsareneededbythepolicebeforecarryingoutproceduralactsandthereareexaggeratedrequirementsfromthePublicAttorney’sofficeconcerningtheformalnotificationofpoliceacts.
InGreece,pre-trialdetentioncannotexceedasix-monthperiod,unlessinlightofexceptionalgrounds,withpriorapprovalbytheJudicialCouncil.InLithuania,theaccusedcanfileacomplaintiftheinvestigationisnotcompletedwithinsixmonthsofthefirstenquiry.InPortugal,criminalinvestigationsmustbecompletedwithinsixmonths(andcanbeextendedto12monthsincertaincases).Slovakiahasnospecificlimits,buttheallegedoffendermayappealtotheConstitutionalCourtifheorsheconsiderstheproceedingunreasonablydelayed.
Therelevanceofprocedurallimitsisparticularlyobviousincountrieswithoutlimitationperiods,suchasIreland,whereofficialstatisticsondecisionstoprosecuteclearlyshowthatthehighevidentialburdenofproofinIrishcriminallawisthemostsignificantfactorindecisionstoendprosecutions.
The Case of irelandhigh evidential burden as an impediment to anti-corruption law enforcement Thestatisticsrevealthataround30percentofcasesinIrelandwerenotpursuedinrecentyears,thevastmajorityoftheseduetoinsufficientevidence.
Graph 1: direction given by the director of public prosecutions on files received
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
No prosecutionProsecution on indictment
Summary disposalFiles still under consideration
Graph 2: mAin reAsons for not prosecuting A cAse
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Other Undue DelayTime Limit Expired
Sympathetic Grounds Public InterestJuvenile Diversion Programme
Insufficient Evidence
The naTure of sTaTuTes of limiTaTions2.
transparency international 30 31 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
2.10 reCommendaTions from inTernaTional insTiTuTions
TheimportanceofSoLinthefightagainstcorruptionisrecognisedinmanyrelevantinternationallegalinstru-ments.TheUnitedNationsConventionagainstCorrup-tion(UNCAC)providesthat‘[e]ach State Party shall, where appropriate, establish under its domestic law a long statute of limitations period in which to commence proceedings for any offence established in accordance with this Convention and establish a longer statute of limitations period or provide for the suspension of the statute of limitations where the alleged offender has evaded the administration of justice’(Article29).Regardinglegalpersons,UNCACstipulatesinArticle26,paragraph4:‘Each State Party shall, in particular, ensure that legal persons held liable in accordance with this article are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions’.
Further,theOrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD)ConventiononCombatingBriberyofForeignPublicOfficialsinInternationalBusinessTransactionsprovidesthat‘any statute of limitations applicable to the offence of bribery of a foreign public official shall allow an adequate period of time for the investigation and prosecution of the offence’(Article6).
EventhoughtheCouncilofEurope(CoE)CriminalLawConventiononCorruptiondoesnotstipulateanystandardregardingSoL,GRECOhasbeenassessingtheissueinitsThirdEvaluationRound.27
TheEUConventionagainstcorruptionhasnorelevantlegalprovision.28
Intermsofcriminalcases,theOECDWGBandGRECOhaveprovidedfurtherguidanceoninterpreta-tionoftheterms‘adequate’and‘long’inrelationtoSoLperiods,thoughonceagaintheyprovideonlygeneralrecommendationsratherthanminimumstandardsorbestpractice.
TheOECDWGB,whichassessesexclusivelytheadequacyoftheframeworkforforeignbriberyoffences,hasindicatedthattheSoLperiodshouldbecalculatedinaccordancewithacountry’sgeneralconditionsofenforcementofnationalcriminallawandinlightofrelevantproceduralrules,suchasgroundsforsuspen-sionorinterruption.Specifically,theWGBrecommend-edthatinFrance,SpainandHungary,aperiodofthreeyearsforcertaincorruptioncasesmightbetooshort,andinthecaseofHungary,fiveyearswouldbead-equate.InthecontextofitsThirdEvaluationRound,GRECOconsideredthatthethree-yearSoLperiodsforbriberyinFranceweretooshort.InLatvia,aperiodoftwoyearsfortheoffenceoftradingininfluencewasalsoregardedbyGRECOasinadequate.
Insummary,OECDWGBandGRECOhaveoftenconsideredfiveyearsasanadequatetimeforSoLwhileassertingthattheseperiodsneedtobetailoredtothejusticesystemsandrealitiesofeachcountry.Thusincertaincircumstances,theOECDWGBhasalsocriticisedafive-year(orhigher)thresholdasbeinginadequate,forexampleinBelgium,Bulgaria,GreeceandItaly,wherecriminalproceedingstendtofacelengthydelays.TheOECDWGBandGRECOalsohighlightedthatSoLshouldbeflexibleintermsofgroundsforsuspension,extensionandinterruption.
Aspreviouslymentioned,theUNCACmonitoringmechanismhasonlybeenadoptedrecentlyandassuchithasnotyetproducedanyinterpretationonSoL.
Bycontrast,thebasisforSoLstandardsforcivilproceedingsistheCoECivilLawConvention,wherethestandardsforthelengthofSoLarespecific.ThisConventionstipulatesthatproceedingsfortherecoveryofdamagesresultingfromacorruptionoffencemustbesubjecttoalimitationperiodofnotlessthanthreeyearsfromthedaythepersonwhohassuffereddamagebecameaware(orshouldreasonablyhave
beenaware)thatdamagehadoccurredorthatanactofcorruptionhadtakenplace.Inaddition,thecivillawrequirementthattheidentityoftheresponsiblepersonbeknownisapplicableinsuchcases.29Moreover,incivilproceedingsmostcountriesalsoprescribealongerperiodbeyondwhichproceedingsmaynotbecom-menced(statuteofrepose),regardlessoftheplaintiff’sdateofknowledge.TheCoECivilLawConventionprovidesthattheabsolutebaroncommencingpro-ceedingsshouldnotcomeintoeffectbeforetheexpiryof10yearsafterthecorruptact.30
2.11 reCenT and CurrenT reform efforTs
SomeEuropeanjurisdictionshaverecentlyundertakensignificantreformsinthisareaorareintheprocessofrelatedreforms,sometimesinspiredbyguidancefrominternationalinstitutions.InLatvia,forexample,sub-stantialamendmentswereelaboratedin2009inlinewithGRECO’srecommendations.AmendmentswereadoptedintheCriminalLawregardingprovisionsonprivateandpublicsectorbribery.Criminalliabilityfortradingwithinfluencewasextendedfromtwotothreeyearsforacceptinganoffer,andfiveyearsforofferingmaterialvalues.Asaresult,SoLperiodsforcasesoftradinginfluencebecamelonger(andarenowfiveyears).InPortugal,recentchangeshavegreatlyextend-edSoLformanycorruption-relatedoffences.InLithua-nia,newlegislationhasjustbeenadoptedwhichextendsSoLforalloffences,andthereisadeclaredpoliticalwilltoextendSoLformisconductinoffice.
Romaniahasadoptedanewpenalcode,butitisnotyetimplemented.Whilethenewcriminalcodeprovidesforshorterpenalties,leadingtoshorterSoL,Romaniahasananti-corruptionlaw,31whichestablishesspecialpenaltiesforcorruption-relatedoffencesandprovidesforadditionaltoolsfortheinvestigation,prosecutionandtrialofcorruptioncaseswithinthelimitationperiod.Forthesereasons,thenewregulationisseenasapositivedevelopmentbylocalstakeholders.
InGreece,reformsintendedtocombatdelaysintheadministrationofjusticewereadoptedinSeptember2010.TheSupervisoroftheprosecutor’sofficeap-pointedsixprosecutorstobeexclusivelyresponsiblefortheinvestigationandmanagementoffilesconnect-edwithcorruptionandcorruption-relatedoffences.Casesconsideredasextremelyimportantwillbeallocatedtotwoprosecutorsandwillbecloselyfol-lowedbythesupervisingprosecutor.
Giventhatthesereformswerepassedrecently,theireffectscannotyetbeassessed.However,itisimpor-tanttonotethattheywereundertakeninthespiritofreducingloopholesduetoshortorinadequateSoLprovisions,ortoimprovethelegislativeframeworkinotherways.
ContrarytothegeneraltrendofprovidinglongerSoL,recentreformsinItalyhaveledtotheirshortening.Areformin2005reducedSoLformostoffencesbyhalf.In2010,anewbillwaspresented,whichisstillunderdebate.Thisproposalprovidesforthedismissalofproceedingsinrelationtodeterminedphasesintheprocess.Forseriouscrimessanctionedbymorethan10years’imprisonment,SoLwouldendafterfouryearsforthefirstdegree,aftertwoyearsfortheseconddegreeandafteroneandahalfyearsforthethirddegree.Whilebothrecentreformeffortshavebeenexplainedbyanintentiontoreducethelengthoftrials,thusprovidingforareasonabledurationincompliancewithart.6oftheEuropeanConventionofHumanRights,thestatisticsraiseseriousconcernsabouttheireffects:since2005,between10and13percentofallcriminalcourtproceedingshavebeenendedduetoSoL,meaningthatmorethanonein10trialsendedwithimpunityfortheallegedoffender.32ThisnumberisparticularlyhighandraisesseriousconcernsabouttheefficacyoftheItalianjusticesystem.
The naTure of sTaTuTes of limiTaTions2.
transparency international 32 33 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
3.1 mosT siGnifiCanT weaknesses idenTified in The researCh
Whetherstatutesoflimitationsaresufficientlylongandadequatefortheeffectiveprosecutionofcorruptionandcorruption-relatedoffencesdependsonaseriesofissues.Thereisacloselinkwiththeoverallefficiencyofthejudiciary,whichclearlyhasastrongimpactonthetimeneededtoinvestigateandprosecuteanoffence.Thelackofhumanresourcesandexpertiseofjudicialstafftoinvestigateandprosecutecorruptioncaseswereidentifiedasmajorobstaclestoenforcinganti-corruptionlawacrosstheEU.
Overall,thefollowingweaknesseswereidentified:
3.1.1 limitAtion periods Are not long enough to ensure effective prosecution of corruptionInsomeEuropeancountries,SoLperiodsaretooshorttoensuretheeffectiveprosecutionofcorruptionandcorruption-relatedoffences.InFrance,therelativeSoLperiodfortheprosecutionofmostcorruptionoffencesisthreeyears.Formostcountries,SoLdifferbetweenvariousoffences.InSpain,theSoLperiodislimitedtothreeyearsinseveralcriminalproceedings.Forcivilproceedingssuchastortsorproceedingsagainstthepublicadministration,thelimitationperiodisoneyearaftertheactoriginatingtheclaimtookplace.Thisisextremelyshortandcanseriouslyimpairtheabilityofvictimsofcorruptiontobringchargesagainstthoseresponsible.
InGreece,itisparticularlystrikingthatSoLperiodsforministersareshorterthanforregularcitizens.Therelevantlaw,whichisalsoapplicabletotheiraccom-plices,limitsthestatuteoflimitationsfor‘punishableactions’–bothfeloniesandmisdemeanours–tofiveyears(theabsoluteperiodbeing10)commencingonthedaytheoffencewascommitted.Ineffect,duetoimmunityprovisions,nocriminalactioncanbebroughtagainstministersunlessanduntilparliamentgivesitsconsent.33Duetothisprovision,thecrimemaynotbeprosecutedatall.
Shortabsoluteperiodsareparticularlyproblematic:Italyhasanabsolutelimitationsperiodofseven-and-a-halfyearsformostcorruption-relatedoffences.34InFinland,thelimitationperiodcanonlybeextendedforamaximumofoneyear.Thisextensionperiodistooshorttoensuretheconclusionofmanycases.
3.1.2 inclusion of AppellAte instAnces in the durAtion of stAtutes of limitAtions cAn leAd to impunityMostcountriesprovidethattheperiodsoflimitationsrununtildeliveryofthejudgementatthefirstinstance.ThelengthofproceedingsintheappellateinstanceisnotlimitedbySoL.Insomecountries(forexample,Germany,Greece,Italy,PortugalandSlovakia),periodsoflimitationsrununtilthejudgementcomesintoforce,i.e.theperiodoflimitationscoverstheproceedingsintheappellateinstance.
InGreeceandItaly,thisprovisionhasrepeatedlyledtothedismissalofcasesafterthefirstinstancejudge-ment.InGreece,wheremanyoffenceshaveanabso-lutelimitationperiodofeightyears,thereisagreatriskofproceedingsendingduetoacquittalwhenpendingforjudgmentbeforetheAppellateCourtorevenbeforetheSupremeCourt.Moreover,owingtoaprovisioninthePenalCode,theProsecutorhastheauthoritytostoppenalprosecutionanddismisspendingcasesifthelimitationperiodisabouttoexpire.
Germany,PortugalandSlovakiasolvethisproblembyothermeans.InGermany,thejudgementinthefirstinstancesuspendstheperiodoflimitationsuntilitbecomesfinal.35Portugaladoptsasimilarmecha-nism.36InSlovakia,anyfurtherstepintheproceedings,suchastheappealafterthefirstinstance,interruptsSoLsothatanotherfullperiodcommences.GiventhatthereisnoabsoluteSoLperiodinSlovakiaandGer-many,defacto,aproceedingneverprescribesafterthefirstinstance.
weaknessesand good practice3.
transparency international 34 35 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
3.1.3 Absence of immunity As A ground for suspension or interruptionInmanyEuropeancountries,parliamentariansandgovernmentmembersareprotectedbyimmunityprovisionsagainstallegationsthatmightbepoliticallymotivated.Fortheeffectiveprosecutionofcorruptionandcorruption-relatedoffencesinvolvingtheseper-sons,itiscriticalthatimmunityconstituteagroundforsuspensionorinterruptionoftheSoLperiod.However,thisisnotalwaysthecase.
countries where immunity does not provide A ground for suspension or interruption of sol
Bulgaria,Denmark,Estonia,Finland,Greece37,Italy,Lithuania,Malta,theNetherlands,Romania,Spain
InAustria,thereisagroundforsuspensioninthecaseofimmunity,butitonlyappliestotheimmunedeputyhimself,andnottoallotherinvolvedpersons.AccordingtoarecentinterpretationofadecreefromtheMinistryofJustice,thisalsoappliesifanimmunedeputyisoneofmanyparticipants,forexampleawitness.Insuchacase,theproceedingmaybedelayed,buttheSoLperiodissuspendedonlyfortheparliamentarian,notforallotherparticipants.Giventhatdeputiescanneverbepursuedbylawenforcementauthoritiesforcriminaloffencesrelatedtotheirparlia-mentarywork(professionalimmunity)andcanonlybepursuedfornon-professionalcriminaloffencesifaspecialcommitteeoftheparliamentgivessanctiontotheprosecutionmeasures(extra-professionalimmu-nity),thisprovisioncaneasilyleadtothedismissalofcaseswheredeputiesareinvolvedbecausethelimita-tionperiodforotherpartiesrunsoutoftime.
3.1.4 Absence of requests for mutuAl legAl AssistAnce As A ground for suspension or interruptionMutuallegalassistance(MLA)andextraditionrequestsmaytakealongtimetobegranted–severalmonthsorevenyears–whichmayconstituteabarriertotheeffectiveprosecutionofcorruptionoffencesbeforetheexpiryofthelimitationperperiod.ThereareseveralEuropeancountrieswhichdonotestablishMLAandextraditionrequestsasgroundsforsuspensionorinterruptionofSoL.Someofthem,suchasAustria,donotprovideforMLAasaspecificgroundforsuspen-sion,butaccordingtoexpertsinthesecountries,thisislargelycompensatedforbyotherprovisionswhichcanextendSoL.
countries where An mlA request does not provide A ground for suspension of sol
Austria38,Belgium,Bulgaria,Denmark,Estonia,Greece,Italy,theNetherlands,Portugal,Romania,Spain,Slovakia,Slovenia39
Insomecountries,thereareadditionalproblemsincasesofinternationalcooperation.BelgiumandDenmark,forexample,willnotprovideassistanceiftheirownSoLperiodhasexpired,eventhoughtheunderlyingconductisstillactionableintherequestingstate.GiventhatSoLarelimitedtofiveyearsinDen-mark,thiscanseriouslyimpairtheprosecutionofcorruption-relatedoffencesinothercountrieswhereinvestigationmaytakemorethanfiveyears.
3.2 examples of Good praCTiCe
RatherthanthelengthofSoLinisolation,itistheinterplaybetweentheirlength,thegroundsforsuspen-sionorinterruptionandtheoverallefficiencyofthejudiciarywhichdefineswhetheraparticularSoLregimecaneffectivelyprosecutecorruptionandcorruption-relatedoffences.Nevertheless,somegoodpracticecanbedrawnfromtheresearch.
3.2.1 flexibility regArding the stArt of stAtutes of limitAtionsIncriminallaw,thelimitationperiodusuallybeginstorunonthedayonwhichthecrimewascommitted.However,manyEuropeanjurisdictionshaveimplement-edmechanismsthataccountforthelatediscoveryofcorruptioncases.
3.2.2 very long or Absence of Absolute stAtutes of limitAtions Insomejurisdictions,therearenoabsoluteSoLperiodsinCriminalLaw.WherethisapproachiscombinedwithacomprehensivesystemofgroundsforsuspensionandinterruptionandadequaterelativeSoLperiods,thereisaverylowriskofcasesbeingclosedduetoSoL.
InAustria,forexample,therearenoabsolutelimitationperiodsandtherelativeSoLperiodsaredefactoonlyrelevantbetweenthedayacrimewascommittedandthefirstinvestigativemeasures.Whilethisminimisestheriskthattheprosecutionofcorruptionbedismissedbecauseofthepassageoftime,italsominimisestheeffectivenessofthesystemforthepromotionofafairtrialwithinareasonablelengthoftime,asprovidedbyarticle6(1)oftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms.
Table 7:mechAnisms thAt Account for time delAys due to lAte discovery of corruption And corruption-relAted offences – some exAmples from eu member stAtes
Startofcalculation Countries(examples)
Continuousoffence:calculatingtheperiodonwhichthelastoffencetookplace
Austria,Belgium,Bulgaria,CzechRepublic,Estonia,France,Greece(forsomecrimes),Hungary,Portugal,Slovakia,SloveniaandRomania,
Permanentoffence:calculatingSoLfromthedateonwhichtheillegalactivityceased
Austria,Bulgaria,CzechRepublic,Estonia,Greece(forsomecrimes),Italy,Portugal,Romania,Slovakia,Slovenia
Attemptedcrimes,calculatingSoLfromthedayofthelastexecutionact
Austria,Bulgaria,CzechRepublic,Hungary,Italy,Portugal
CalculatingSoLfromthedaywhenconsequencesarise
Austria40,Bulgaria41,CzechRepublic,Lithuania
SpecificSoLforspecificeconomicsectorsorparticularoffences
Greece,Romania
weaknesses and Good praCTiCe3.
transparency international 36 37 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
3.2.3 prioritising cAses close to stAtutes of limitAtions expiryAlmostnocasesprescribeinPortugal,owingpartlytothefactthatcaseswhichposeahighriskofdismissalaregivenahigherpriorityininternaldistributionandinvestigationwithintheProsecutor’sOfficeandtheJudicialPolice,ensuringthattheState’sjus puniendi42isaccomplishedbeforethelegallimitationsterminatethecriminalproceeding.Duetothisprovision,thenumberofcriminalproceduresdismissedduetoSoLhasreducedsignificantly:theaveragepercentageofproceduresdismisseddroppedfrom6.8between1990and2000to0.5intheperiodfrom2000to2007.However,atthesametimetheproceedingsinCourthavenotbeengivensuchpriorityandthenumberofcasesterminatedinCourtduetoSolhasbeenrisingoverthelastfewyears(2007to2009).
AsimilarprovisionexistsinGreece,buthasyettoyieldsignificantresults.
3.2.4 suspension or interruption of stAtutes of limitAtions when A defendAnt commits Another crimeInAustria,SoLperiodsaresuspendedifanallegedoffendercommitsanotheroffenceofthesamenatureduringtheSoLperiodoftheoriginalcrime.Inseveralothercountries,SoLisinterruptedinthiscase.ThismeansthattheaccusedmustrespectthelawforthewholeSoLperiodinorderforthecasetobeabletoprescribe.Consequently,itisseenasappropriatethattheaccusedcannotbeprosecutedafterareasonableperiodoflaw-abidingbehaviour.InAustria,thisgroundforsuspensioncontributestofewerprescribedcases.Italsomeansthatthefewcaseswhichdoprescribeareseenasacceptablebecauseofthelaw-abidingbehav-iouroftheoffenderforthewholeperiodoflimitation.
3.2.5 AvAilAbility of dAtA And stAtisticsInsomecountries,suchasHungary,Ireland,LatviaandPortugal,detailedstatisticsareavailable.Theseareparticularlyvaluableiftheyprovideinformationnotonlyaboutthenumberofproceedingsthatprescribe,butalsoaboutthereasonsforthedismissal,asinthecaseofPortugal.InIreland,statisticsaboutwhycaseswerenotprosecutedcanbeeasilyaccessedonthewebsiteoftheDirectorofPublicProsecution.Availabilityofandeasyaccesstodataisofgreathelpinidentifyingandaddressingweaknesses.
eleven country profilesin brief4.
weaknesses and Good praCTiCe3.
transparency international 38 39 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
Aspreviouslymentioned,thenationaldatacollectionwascarriedoutattwolevels.In11countries,theissuewasstudiedindepthbytheirrespectiveTInationalchapters.Intheother16EUmemberstates,43anoverviewassessmentwascarriedout.
Thischapterbrieflysummarisesthemaincharacteris-ticsoftheSoLregimeineachofthe11countriesstudiedindepth.Thedetailedreportsandtheoverviewoffindingsforallstudiescanbefoundatwww.transparency.org
ausTria
Overall,theAustrianSoLregimeworkswell.TheabsenceofabsoluteSoLperiodsincriminalproceed-ingsiscombinedwithacomprehensivesystemofgroundsforsuspension.Infact,theSoLperiodsareonlyrelevantbetweenthedayacrimewascommittedandtheformalaccusation,orevenearlierinvestigativemeasurescausingsuspension.Ifanoffendercommitsanothercrimeofthesamenatureduringthelimitationperiod,theearlieroffencecannotprescribebeforetheSoLperiodoftheoffencecommittedlaterhasexpired.Incivilproceedings,theinjuredpartycanclaimfordamagesresultingfromcriminaloffenceswithin30yearsfromthedaythedamageoccurred,evenifthedamageandthewrongdoerareknownfromthebeginning.ThisprovisionavoidsSoLobstaclesincorruption-relatedcivilproceedings.
ThemainweaknessesintheAustrianSoLregimerelatetothelawenforcementagencies,whicharenotwell-equippedfortheinvestigationandprosecutionofeconomiccrimes.Accordingtosomeexperts,thelackofbusinessexpertiseisaccompaniedbyagenerallackofhumanresourcesandbythepoortrainingofprosecutors.TheestablishmentofaSpecialisedAnti-CorruptionProsecutionOfficein2008aimedtoaddressthisproblem.Recently,theMinisterofJusticepresentedadraftlawwhichforeseestheupgradeofthisagencytoanationalprosecutionoffice.Underthisdraftlaw,thescopeofthisofficewouldnotonlyincludecorruptioncrimes,butalsoseriouseconomiccrimes.Theofficewouldalsoreceiveafive-foldincreaseinresources,whichmightimprovethesituation.
Inaddition,thereareloopholesregardingthegroundsforsuspensionincaseswhereparliamentarydeputieswithimmunityfromprosecutionareinvolvedinpro-ceedings.Accordingtothecriminalcode,deputiescanneverbepursuedbylawenforcementauthoritiesforcriminaloffencesrelatedtotheirparliamentarywork(professionalimmunity)andcanonlybepursuedfornon-professionalcriminaloffencesifaspecialparlia-mentarycommitteesanctionstheprosecutionmeas-ures(extra-professionalimmunity).Thisprovisioncouldalsodelayinvestigationsandproceedingswherea
deputywithimmunityisonlyoneofmanypersonsinvolvedor,accordingtoarecentMinistryofJusticeinterpretation,evenonlyawitness.Giventhatthegroundforsuspensionappliesonlytothedeputyhim-orherself,theSoLperiodforotherparticipantscontinuesrunningeveniftheproceedingisonholdinordertowaitforsanctionbytheparliamentarycommittee.ThisisdefinitelyaloopholeintheAustriansystemofthegroundsforsuspension,whichareotherwiseverycomprehensive.Giventhatmanyparliamentariansalsoholdotherpublicfunctions,forexample,asmayors,thisprovisioncanposeobstaclestotheprosecutionofasignificantnumberofcases.
bulGaria
Overall,SoLinBulgariaarepostulatedinawaywhichsimultaneouslyaimstodisciplinetheauthoritiesentrustedwithfunctionsrelatedtoinvestigationandprosecution,andtoprovideanopportunitytodeterminetheresponsibilityoftheoffenderwithinaprolongedtimeperiod.AparticularityoftheBulgarianpenalcodeisthattheSoLappliesfromthedatewhentheoffencetookplaceuntiltheexecutionoftherespectivejudicialdecision,whiletherearealsoprovi-sionalgroundsforsuspensionorinterruption.UnlikeSoLforcriminalprosecution,SoLconcerningtheothertypesofresponsibility–administrative,disciplinaryandcivil–arecomparativelyshort:uptofiveyearsstartingfromthedatetheoffencetookplace.
InBulgaria,statisticsforthenumberofpreliminaryandjudicialproceedingsterminatedduetoSoLhavebeencollectedsince2005.Itisindicativethatintheperiod2005-9between50and80percentofproceedingssuspendedduringthepreliminaryphaseweresuspend-edduetoSoL,whilethepercentageofjudicialpro-ceedingssuspendedduetoSoLislessthanone.Themainconclusionfromthisisthatthereasonforthesuspensionofproceedingsisthelatestartandthelengthofcriminalproceedings.Inthiscontext,inordertodisciplinetheauthoritiesundertakingthepreliminaryproceedingstocompletethemontime,aninitiativehasexistedsince2005fortheperiodicalrenewalofsus-pendedproceedings.
ThemainweaknessintheimplementationoftheSoLisdue,ononehand,tothedifferencesininterpretationandimplementationoftherulesbyofficialsinvariousfieldsofthejudicialsystem,andontheother,theexistingopportunitiesfordelayingproceedingsinsuchawaythattheSoLexpiresbeforethefinaljudicialstate-ment.ThemostrecentchangesintheBulgarianPenalCode,whichsignificantlyreducedthechancesoftheblockingofproceedings,especiallyonthepartofthedefendant,alreadyshowgoodresults.
Insum,SoLisnotamongthekeyobstaclestodeter-miningtheresponsibilityofoffenders.Whathinderstheuncoveringandinvestigationofcorruption-relatedcrimesisthemutualinterestoftheparticipantsinthecorruptactandtheopportunityforallparticipantstobearresponsibilityfortheirdeeds,aswellasthedistrustofmembersoftheinvestigatingauthoritiesandthelackofeffectivewitnessprotection.Improvementswouldbemadeifguaranteesforalawfulandefficientjudiciarywereestablishedalongwithwitnessprotectionforthoseinvolvedincorruptioncases.
CzeCh republiC
Thelimitationperiodforcorruption-relatedcriminaloffencesincriminalproceedingsisnotperceivedasacriticalissueintheCzechRepublic.ExtensivegroundsforsuspensionandinterruptionareprovidedandtherearenoabsoluteSoLlimitingtheriskthatcasespre-scribe.ThereisalackofstatisticsavailableonSoLasagroundofterminationofcriminalproceedings.YettheexpertsinterviewedidentifiedotherreasonsfortheobstructionofcriminalproceedingsevenbeforeSoLexpire,whichcancontributetotheimpunityofcorruptconduct.Acriticalissueistherequirementtoproveintentbeforeproceedingscanbestarted.Therangeofoffencesthatarenegligent(notintentional)shouldbewidenedandthepoliceshouldbemadeabletodocu-mentcorruption-relatedcriminalactivitywithoutfirstinitiatingcriminalproceedings.
eleven CounTry profiles in brief4.
transparency international 40 41 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
AnotherweaknessoftheCzechSoLregimewasintroducedonlyrecently.ThenewcriminalcoderemovedthesuspensionofSoLincaseswheretheallegedoffenderisabroad.Thisprovisionshouldberestored.IncompliancewithinternationalandEuropeanobligations,criminalliabilityforcorporateentitiesshouldbeintroduced,inparticularforbribery,proceedsfromillegalactivities,etc.IntheCivilCode,thesub-jectivelimitationperiodforliabilityfordamageshouldbeextended.
CapacityissuesarealsoaseriousproblemintheprosecutionofcorruptionintheCzechRepublic.Thereisaneedtoincreasethedetectivecapacity(e.g.specificoperatingtechniques)ofthebodiesresponsibleforcriminalproceedings.Inaddition,complexeconomiccrimesorcrimesagainstpropertyaresometimesqualifiederroneouslyasother,lessseriousoffences,resultinginshorterSoL.
GreeCe
InGreece,themainproblemisthecomplicatedregula-toryframeworkwhichhampersthespeedyadministra-tionofjustice.Theco-ordinationofenforcementbodies,thetrainingofpersonneloreventheestablishmentofaspecialprosecutionauthorityforcorruption-relatedoffencescouldhelptoovercomethisproblem.
ThemainweaknessoftheSoLregimerelatestothefactthatSoLformembersofparliamentandcabinetmembersareshorterthanSoLforothercitizens,andthatitisextremelydifficulttoliftimmunityinGreece.Thisunequaltreatmentisaquestionofpoliticalwillandshouldbeaddressedasamatterofurgency.Further,despitethelackofstatistics,itmustbeassumedthatcasesprescribeduetothefactthatappellateinstancesareincludedinthedurationofSoL,whichare,insomecases,alsotooshorttoensuresufficienttimeforprosecution.
However,therearealsosomeinnovativeprovisionsinGreece,suchastheprioritisationofcasesandthespeedytrialofcorruption-relatedcases,aswellasthenon-suspensionofdisciplinaryproceedingswhilecriminalonesarepending.However,thelatterisnotalwaysimplementedanditisquitecommonfordiscipli-naryproceedingstobehalteduntiltheissuanceofafinalcriminalcourtdecision.Moreover,inordertoanswertheincreasingneedforstatisticaldatainthisrespect,corruptioncaseshavebeenrecordedbytheProsecutor’sOfficesinceSeptember2009.
Inordertodecreasethebacklogofcasesandmovetowardsfacilitatingthespeedyadministrationofjustice,aseriesofmeasurescouldbeintroduced,forexample,creatingspecialisedchamberswithintheexistingcourts,de-penalisingminorinfringementsordividingandtransferringthejurisdictionofcentralcourts(suchastheAthensCourtofFirstInstance)toregionalcourts.
Inordertoimprovethedetectionofcorruptioncases,whistleblowersshouldenjoyahigherlevelofprotection.Thesesafeguards,aswellasraisingawarenessamongthepublicandeducatingyoungpeople,shouldformadditionalcomponentsofastrategytocombatimpunity.
hunGary
InHungary,SoLprovisionsarenotthemostrelevantfactorsthatleadtoimpunity.EventhoughtheOECDWGBandGRECOfoundthatthethree-yearlimitforcertainbriberyoffences(includingforeignbribery)istooshort,theresearchcarriedoutintheframeworkofthisprojecthasnotidentifiedsignificantproblemsinthisrespect.Otherfactors,notablythelackofdetectionofcorruption-relatedcrime,aremoresignificant.Thislackofdetectionisdetermined,ontheonehand,bystruc-turesofdependenceandbypersonalinterests,andontheother,aswellasbythelackofacultureofintegrityandconfidencethatauthoritieswilleffectivelyinvesti-gateandprosecutesuchcrimes.
TherearedetailedstatisticsavailableonSoLandothergroundsofterminationofcriminalprocedures,enablingtheProsecutorGeneral’sofficetocarryoutqualitycontrolovertheworkoftheinvestigativeauthorities.Thedatashowsthatbetween2005and2009therehavebeennumerouscasesthatwereclosedduetoSoLduringtheinvestigationphase,totallingbetween0.7-andto11percentforcorruptioncases,andevenupto25percentin2007forothercriminalcases.Duringtheprosecutionphase,between0.5and2.2percentprescribed.
Toimprovethesituation,thereisaneedforbetterco-operationbetweenHungary’scontrollingandinvestigativeauthoritiesinHungary,aswellasamonginvestigativeauthoritiesatatransnationallevel.Ascorruption-relatedcrimesareveryoftenconnectedtoeconomiccrimes,steppingupeffortsininvestigationandprosecutionofthelatteronesmayhelpfightcorruption.Aswithothertypesofcrimes,betterpersonnelandtechnicalresourcescouldhelptheworkofeconomiccrimeandanti-corruptionunitsinthepoliceandtheprosecutionservices.Theinvestigativeindependenceofthepoliceandtheprosecutor’sofficeshouldbestrengthenedinordertoprovideneutral,non-politicalandnon-arbitrarydecision-makingaboutovertheapplicationofcriminallawandpolicytorealcases.
ireland
DespitethefactthattherearenolimitationperiodsforcriminalproceedingsinIreland,thereisalowincidenceoftheprosecutionofcorruption-relatedoffences.AcriticalissueforthisisthatthereareverystringentstandardsofevidencerequiredbytheIrishcourts.Further,theDirectorofPublicProsecutions(DPP)recentlyaddressedthesubjectdirectly,citingthecomplexityofcorruptionandwhite-collarcrimeasaseriousimpedimenttoitssuccessfulprosecution.Therearealsopracticalproblemswhenaprosecutorisfacedbyajuryof12randomlyselectedcitizens.
Theseeminglyintractableproblemofthestate’sinabilitytoprosecutecorruptionoffenceshasledoverthepast20yearstotheestablishmentofTribunalsofInquirysimply,astheirnamesuggests,toinquireintomattersofcorruption.Theveryfoundingprincipleofthetribunalsofinquiryisthattheyarenotconcernedwiththeadministrationofjustice.Aconsequenceofthisisthatevidencegivenbyapersoncompelledtoappearatatribunalcannotsubsequentlybeusedagainstthatpersonincriminalproceedings.Afurtherandnaturalconsequenceofthisispublicoutrageatthespectacleofthecorruptbehaviourofnumerousindividualsbeingshownpubliclyatthetribunals(andathugepublicexpense),withanegligiblenumberofthosepersonsfacinganycriminalsanction.
TheIrishstateshouldrecognisetheself-confessedinabilityoftheDPPtoprosecutecomplexcorruptionandwhite-collarcrimesuccessfully.Thesolutiontothisseriousproblemrequiresbothanincreaseinthecapacityoftheinvestigativeauthoritiesandlegislativechangeincludingtheprovisionofwhistleblowerprotectionforthosewhoreportfraud,taxevasionandcrimesundercompanylaw.
Itwillalso,astheDPPrecognised,requireachangeintheprevailingcultureinalargesectionofsociety,includingmanyofthoseinapositionofauthority,whoatpresentdonotappeartoregardwhite-collarcrimeasequivalentto‘ordinary’crime.
iTaly
LengthyproceedingsandSoLarehighlycontroversialissuesinItaly.Theanalysisfoundthatthecurrentregimeshowsseriousweaknesses.Withonein10criminalproceedingsbeingdismissedduetoSoL(nodataisavailablespecificallyforcorruption-relatedcases),thecurrentSoLregimeconstitutesasignificantreasonforimpunity.
eleven CounTry profiles in brief4.
transparency international 42 43 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
ItisthecombinationoflengthyproceedingswithshortabsoluteSoLforoffencessuchasthefalsificationofbalancesheets,theabuseoffunctionsandtradingininfluence,aswellasthelackofpoliticalwilltocloseloopholes,whichhampertheprosecutionofcorruptioncases.Thefactthatproceedingscanprescribeafterthefirstinstance,evenifanoffenderhasalreadybeenfoundguilty,isparticularlystriking.
Problemsariseduetothehiddennatureofcorruption:whentheoffenceisdiscovered,aconsiderableperiodoftimehasoftenelapsedandtheremainingtimeisoftennotsufficienttocompletetheproceeding.Thecalculationofthemomentofcommencementshouldthereforebechanged,forexample,byre-introducingtheconceptofacontinuouscrime.Thegroundsforinterruptionsshouldalsoberevisited,aswellasthesuppressionofadifferentiateddisciplinebasedonthesubjectiveconditionofhabitualcriminals.
Undertheseterms,itbecomesparticularlyimportanttochampiontheearlydetectionofcrimesinordertoallowprosecutorsalongeravailableperiodoftimetocarryoutproceedings.Theintroductionofwhistleblowingregulationsandtheassignmentofresponsibilityforforeignbriberycasestospecialisedandadequatelyresourcedstaffcouldaddresstheseproblems.
liThuania
LithuaniareformeditscriminalSoLregimeinJune2010.ThereformsdiminishtheriskthatSoLmighthampertheenforcementofanti-corruptionlaws.However,itistooearlytoassesstheirimpactinprac-tice.
Analysisofthepre-reformsituationshowedthattheSoLregimeusedtoconstituteanobstaclefortheinvestigationandprosecutionofcriminaloffences,mainlybecausethetimedelaysweretooshortandtherewasadegreeofinflexibilityinthewaytheywerecalculated.
ThenewregimecombinesdifferentmechanismstocalculateSoL.Itextendsthetimeperiodstoeightor12years,dependingontheoffence,decreasingtheunreasonablyhighrelevanceofSoLfortheenforcementofcriminallaw.SoLinadministrativeandcivilproceed-ingsarenotparticularlyrelevantinLithuania.
WhilethemechanismofcalculationofdisciplinarySoLisquiteflexible,thesix-monthabsoluteperiodofSoLisrathershort.However,initsactionprogramme,thegovernmentofLithuaniahascommittedtoextendingperiodsofdisciplinarySoL.Arelatedbillhasalreadybeenproposedandiscurrentlybeingdebatedinparliament.TheauthorsoftheamendmentproposetoextendtheabsoluteperiodofdisciplinarySoLtouptooneyear,anduptothreeyearsinthecaseofaseriousbreachofduties.
porTuGal
InPortugal,theSoLregimeworkswelloverall,withadecreasingnumberofcasesbeingdismissedduetoSoL.Since2004,thenumberhasfallenfrom2.4percenttolessthanonepercentofallcorruption-relatedcases.Themainconcernrelatestolengthycriminalproceedings,whichcancauseSoLtoexpireduringthecourtphase.Againstthisbackground,thePortugueseParliamenthasrecentlyenactedalawwhichextendsregularSoLperiodsformostcorruption-relatedcrimesto15years.Nevertheless,thefewcaseswhicharedismissedtendtobelarge-scaleandshouldthereforenotbeunderestimated.
AremainingweaknessofthePortugueseregimeisthattheSoLperiodincludesallstagesoftheproceedings,includingtheappellateinstances.Further,neitheranMLArequestnordelayscausedbyinstitutionalco-oper-ation(beitwithpublicorprivateentities,suchasbanks)orappealstotheConstitutionalCourtconstitutegroundsforinterruptionorsuspension.
Toaddressthelengthycriminalproceedingswhichareasignificantconcernintheenforcementofanti-corrup-tionlegislation,itisrecommendedthatthenumberofcriminalinvestigatorsbeincreased,thenumberofproceedingseachinvestigatordealswithatoncebereducedandacentralised,easilyaccessiblesystemofinformationandco-operationbetweenentitiesbeprovided.Inaddition,thedetectionofcorruptioncasesshouldbeimproved,forexample,byprovidingbetterprotectionforwhistleblowersandbyraisingpublicawarenessinordertoensuretheearlierdiscoveryofcrime.
Aspecialisedanti-corruptionunitwithintheProsecu-tor’sOfficeandspecialisedcriminalcourtsforcorrup-tion-relatedcrimesshouldalsobeestablished.
romania
TheRomaniananti-corruptionlawprovidesforspecificpenaltiesforcorruption-relatedoffencesand,asaconsequence,forspecialSoLfortheseoffences.Moreover,specialisedanti-corruptionbodieshavebeenputinplaceinordertoreduceimpunityforcorruptionoffences.
TheexpertsinterviewedfeltthatthelimitationperiodsregardingSoL,areadequateforcorruptionoffences.Insteaditisthecriminalproceduralsystemwhichraisesissuesinthefightagainstcorruption,bycreatingopportunitiestoblockanddelayproceedings.TheRomaniancriminalproceduralsystemisdeeplyunstableandeventhoughthelimitationperiodsseemtobesufficient,theproceduresstipulatedbylawcreatediversepossibilitiesforoffenderstoavoidprosecution.Thesolutionthereforeliesnotnecessarilyintheaug-mentationofthelimitationperiods,butintheimprove-mentoftheproceduralsystem.
Specifically,theRomanianSoLregimeshouldextendandbetterdefinethegroundsforinterruptionandsuspensionofSoL.Thereshouldbeaconsistent,unitaryandstablecriminalpolicyforcorruption-relatedoffences,withathoroughimpactanalysisofthechanges,includingconsultationof
relevantstakeholders.DataandstatisticsregardingtheincidenceofSoLshouldbegatheredandanalysed,andevaluationcarriedoutofthe‘blacknumber’ofcorrup-tion-relatedoffencesandthenumberofpotentialcaseswithinthelimitationperiod.Thejudiciaryandlaw-enforcementbodiesshouldbeadequatelyequippedtoinvestigate,prosecuteandtrycorruptioncasesinordertoclosetheproceduralgaps,leadingtothecompletionofthelimitationperiod.
slovakia
InSlovakia,theSoLregimedoesnotconstituteamatterofsignificantconcernfortheprosecutionofcorruption-relatedoffences.Problemsrelaterathertotheinappropriatedefinitionofcriminaloffencesandtothelackofdetectionofcorruptioncases.Detailedstatisticsareavailableregardingthenumberofcasesdiscontinued;however,theydonotshowthegroundsfortermination.
WeaknessesintheSlovakianSoLregimerelatetothefactthattheimmunityofgovernmentmembersdoesnotconstituteagroundforsuspensionofSoL.Infact,theholdingofahighpositionwithinthestateadminis-trationpracticallyprecludestheinvestigationofcriminaloffences.Further,inordertosuspendtheperiodoflimitationbecauseanallegedoffenderisabroad,itneedstobeproventhatheorsheintendedtostayabroad.Thisprovision,onlyintroducedin2006,shouldberevoked.
AnotherproblemistheabsenceofaconnectionbetweentheperiodoflimitationforthecompensationofdamagespursuanttotheCivilCodeandthecompletionofcriminalproceedings.ThelegalregulationallowsforSoLwithregardtothecompensationfordamagestoexpirepriortoavalidcompletionofcriminalproceed-ingsandtheconvictionoftheoffender.
eleven CounTry profiles in brief4.
transparency international 44 45 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
Table 8: number of closed investigations and court proceedings due to statutes of limitations
InvestigationsclosedduetoSoLTotalnumberofclosed
andcompletedinvestigationsPercentageofinvestigationsclosed
duetoSoL(%2of3)
Country YearCorruption-related
offences Criminal Corruption-related Criminal Corruption-related Criminal
belGium 2009 4 1.344 252 712.591 1,6 0,2
2008 2 1.218 232 707.589 0,2 0,2
2007 3 2.104 302 711.458 1,0 0,3
2006 3 1.373 291 738.866 1,0 0,2
2005 1 1.627 265 787.853 0,4 0,2
bulGaria 2009 70.985 375 226.478 n/a 31,3
2008 235.659 1.068 653.777 n/a 36,0
2007 274.122 1.319 743.467 n/a 36,9
2006 11.848 3799 243.337 n/a 4,9
esTonia 2009 2 172 48.359 1,2 n/a
2008 16 310 50.977 5,2 n/a
2007 0 232 50.375 0,0 n/a
finland 2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
hunGary* 2009 2 2.097 276+961 199348+185005 0,7 1,05
2008 10 108.332 285+490 375226+191279 3,5 28,87
2007 6 91.893 254+311 366829+205721 2,4 25,05
2006 5 36.556 258+423 207570+220943 1,9 17,61
2005 46 5.763 414+857 99512+217536 11,1 5,79
iTaly** 2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
laTvia 2009 2 16 12,5
2008 3 16 18,8
2007 0 18 0,0
2006 2 41 4,9
2005 1 27 3,7
liThuania 2009 0 5.672 441 42.263 0,0 13,4
2008 1 2.967 371 37.013 0,3 8,0
2007 1 1.964 398 34.511 0,3 5,7
2006 0 1.200 365 37.260 0,0 3,2
porTuGal*** 2009 466692***
2008 1 125**** 470.780 0,8
2007 1 128 446.428 0,8
2006 0 62 442.993 0,0
2005 4 278 431.171 1,4
2004 6 245 394.365 2,4
slovakia 2009 12 193 945 32.266 1,3 0,6
2008 21 219 869 30.070 2,4 0,7
2007 9 123 899 29.926 1,0 0,4
2006 13 137 922 27.523 1,4 0,5
2005 15 220 2.365 38.513 0,6 0,6
slovenia 2009 2.537 87.465
2008 23 346 2.601 81.917 0,9 0,4
2007 42 430 2.735 88.197 1,5 0,5
2006 25 381 2.686 90.354 0,9 0,4
2005 25 637 2.118 84.379 1,2 0,8
annexCriminalcourtproceedings
closedduetoSoLTotalnumberofclosedcriminalcourt
proceedingsandconvictionsPercentageofproceedings
closedduetoSoL(%4of5)
Country Corruption-related Criminal Corruption-related Criminal Corruption-related Criminal
belGium
bulGaria 13 80 1.584 69.289 0,8 0,1
7 87 1.631 69.389 0,4 0,1
16 82 1.859 65.601 0,9 0,1
9 82 2.111 66.283 0,4 0,1
esTonia 25 7.881 n/a n/a
14.533 n/a n/a
12.706 n/a n/a
finland 0 301 78 731.648 0,0 0,0
0 696 81 684.598 0,0 0,1
2 737 111 628.592 1,8 0,1
3 394 84 583.236 3,6 0,1
1 245 100 601.367 1,0 0,0
hunGary* 3 444 200 87.743 1,5 0,5
2 520 242 88.902 0,8 0,6
3 633 348 93.800 0,9 0,7
10 776 456 102.037 2,2 0,8
8 1.034 502 104.262 1,6 1,0
iTaly** 806.918
153.388 1.509.455 10,2
163.635 1.467.677 11,1
159.533 1.406.082 11,3
189.345 1.502.504 12,6
laTvia n/a 14
n/a 16
n/a 14
n/a 16
n/a 4
liThuania 2 28 353 16.832 0,6 0,2
n/a 15 290 16.082 n/a 0,1
n/a 10 318 16.066 n/a 0,1
n/a n/a 317 16.832 n/a n/a
porTuGal*** 5 1.489 198 120.846 2,5 1,2
10 2.592 219 130.545 4,6 2,0
3 667 187 126.035 1,6 0,5
0 312 130 98.697 0,0 0,3
0 306 118 95.404 0,0 0,3
5 384 112 98.185 4,5 0,4
slovakia 20 589 510 30.953 3,9 1,9
22 578 812 28.681 2,7 2,0
18 572 749 27.067 2,4 2,1
33 517 931 25.764 3,5 2,0
34 494 1.645 27.729 2,1 1,8
slovenia 15.885
14.277
14.484
15.288
14.222
* the first number in the cell is terminations without indictments, the second is the number of indictments
** 2009: only first semester
*** number of total criminal proceedings closed in police entities
**** numbers referring to criminal proceedings for bribery, embezzlement and unlawful economic advantage which have been referenced by the Central Prosecution and Investigation Department
transparency international 46 47 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries
1 SeetheOrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD)Anti-BriberyConvention,article6andtheUnitedNationsConventionagainstCorruption(UNCAC),article29.RecommendationsfromtheCouncilofEurope’sGroupofStatesagainstCorruption(GRECO)ThirdEvaluationRoundhaveraisedtheissueaswell.
2 TheUnitedNationsConventionagainstCorruption(UNCAC)ReviewMechanismhasonlyrecentlybeenestablished,andtherearenooutcomessofar.
3 Seee.g.Corruption-AGlossaryofInternationalStandardsinCriminalLaw,OECD(2008)p.55f.http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/57/41650182.pdf)andMid-termStudyofPhase2Reports,OECDWGB2006http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/39/36872226.pdf
4 Davigo,PiercamilloandMannozzi,Grazia:LacorruzioneinItalia.Percezionesocialeecontrollopenale,Bari,Laterza,2007.MrDavigoisCouncilloroftheSupremeCourtofCassazione,andMsMannozziisUniversityProfessorofCriminalLawatUniversitàdell’InsubriainComo.
5 NamelyBelgium,Cyprus,Denmark,Estonia,Finland,France,Germany,Latvia,Luxembourg,Malta,theNetherlands,Poland,Slovenia,Spain,SwedenandtheUnitedKingdom
6 EBSWpalankųsprendimąpriųmusiteisųja–nebaudžiama(ThejudgewhohasmadeadecisioninfavourofEBSWgoesunpunished)//www.delfi.lt(July122007),http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=13767288
7 http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bribe/2009/07/global-corruption-roundup-ii.html;
http://svt.se/2.58360/1.1597692/utskriftsvanligt_format?printerfriendly=true
8 Whistleblowersdiscloseinformationaboutaperceivedwrongdoinginanorganisation,ortheriskthereof,toindividualsorentitiesbelievedtobeabletoeffectaction.InmostEuropeancountries,whistleblowersarenotsufficientlyprotectedandtheirreportsarenotproperlyfollowedup.Formoreinformationseehttp://www.transparency.org/global_priorities/other_thematic_is-sues/towards_greater_protection_of_whistleblowers
9 InHungary,relatedstatisticsdoexist.TheyshowthattheinvestigativeauthoritiesrejectedacomplaintorreportoncorruptionoffencesduetoSoLinfourcasesin2006,threein2007andtwoin2008.
10 DCIAP-PGRandCIES-ISCTE,AcorrupçãoparticipadaemPortugal2004-2008Resultadosglobaisdeumapesquisaemcurso,FinalReport,2009
11 InCyprus,therearenoSoLforanyoffencepunishablewithmorethanthreemonthsimprisonment;giventhatallcorruption-relatedoffenceshavehighercharges,defactotherearenoSoLforcorruptionoffences.
12 AdaptedfromBacioTerracino,JulioandBikelis,Skirmantas:BackgroundNote-Corruption-relatedStatutesofLimitations,16April2010.
13 InHungary,theperiodisequaltothemaximumsentence,butmaynotbelessthanthreeyears.SeeOECDWorkingGrouponBribery,Hungary:Phase2Report,May2005,para.115
14 OECDWorkingGrouponBribery,France:Phase2Report,January2004
15 OECDWorkingGrouponBribery,Phase2Report,January2004,para.98.
16 Carignonruling,Crim.27October1997,Bull.Crim.No.352.
17 Crim.13December1972,Bull.No.391,andCrim.9November1995,12May1998.
18 DataismissingforIrelandandtheUKbecausetheydonotdisposeofSoLincriminalproceedingsandforCyprusbecausedefactonoSoLapply.
19 DejuretheSoLperiodrunsuntiltheendofprosecution,butdefactotheformalaccusationandsometimesevenotherinvestigativemeasuresbeforetheaccusationsuspendtheSoLperioduntilthelegallybindingendoftheproceedings.
20 BikelisS.,NikartasS.,ÜseleL.StatutesofLimitationsintheSystemofCriminalJustice.InLithuanianLawInstituteofLithuania,2009(unpublished).
21 Thistableprovidesexamplesbasedonthe11overviewstudiesplusinformationfromBelgium,Estonia,LatviaandSlovenia.Inthecourseofthisprojectitwasnotpossibletocompileacomprehensivelistofallcountrieswhereanyoftheseprovisionsapply.
22 Thistableprovidesexamples,basedonthe11in-depthstudiesplusinformationfromBelgium,Estonia,LatviaandSlovenia.
23 ItisinterestingtonotethattherearestillsomecaseswhereSoLcanbesuspendedinSlovenia,namely1.immunityofMembersoftheNationalAssembly,2.iftheaccusedaftercommittingcriminaloffencehasbecomeafflictedwithamentalillnessormental
endnoTes
disturbanceorsomeotherseriousdiseaseand3.,theterminationoftheinvestigationwhentheperpetratorisunreachablebythestateauthorities.
24 FordetailsaboutCyprusrefertoendnote11.25 SeeAustriareportpage14.26 2008:GRECOThirdEvaluationRoundEvaluation
ReportonLatvia,onTransparencyofPartyFunding,para83and2009:GRECOThirdEvaluationRoundEvaluationReportonLithuania,onTransparencyofPartyFunding,para117.
27 GRECOwasestablishedin1999bytheCouncilofEurope(CoE)tomonitorCoEmemberstates’compli-ancewiththeorganisation’santi-corruptionstandardsthroughmutualevaluationandpeerreview.GRECOevaluationreportscontainrecommendationstotheevaluatedcountriesinordertoimprovetheirlevelofcompliancewiththeprovisionsunderconsideration.StatutesoflimitationsarebeingassessedintheThirdEvaluationRound.
28 WhiletherearelegalprovisionsonSoLtheydonotapplytocorruptionoffences.Thisisthecase,forexample,ofRegulation2988of1974onlimitationperiodsinproceedingsrelatingtotransportandcompetitionandRegulation2988of1995ontheprotec-tionoftheEuropeanCommunity’sfinancialinterests.
29 CoECivilLawConvention,Art.7(1).30 Ibid.31 Law78/2000ontheprevention,uncoveringand
punishingofcorruptionoffences.Aproblemliesinthefactthatseveralcorruptionoffences,suchasconflictofinterest,arenotcoveredbythisnewlaw.
32 Italianreport,page10.33 Forthisconsent,theabsolutemajorityisneeded,
followingarequestbyatleast30membersoftheParliament.Suchconsentmustbeobtainednolaterthantheendofthesecondregularsessionoftheparliamentarytermwhichcommencedaftertheoffencewascommitted.
34 Exceptforembezzlement,moneylaundering,passivebriberyandcorruptioninjudicialacts
35 §78b(3)CC36 TheaccusationsuspendstheSoLperiod,butonlyfora
maximumperiodofthreeyears.Fromthemomenttheaccusationisnotified,theSoLperiodisalsointerrupted,providingforanevenlongerSoLperiod.UnlikeGermanyandSlovakia,however,Portugaldoeshaveabsolute
SoLperiods,whichcanexpireduetoslowproceedingsinthefirstinstanceandintheappellatecourts.
37 InGreecetheprosecutionofministersissuspendedforthedurationoftheparliamentarysessionwithinwhichtheoffencewascommitted.Inaddition,thereisaveryshortextinctivedeadlineforprosecutionthatrelatestotheendoftheparliamentarysessions.
38 However,researchersandexpertsfeltthatotherprovisionsmaysomehowcompensatefortheabsenceofanMLArequestasgroundsforsuspensionorinterruption
39 GiventhatrelativeSoLperiodswererecentlyabolished,thereare(almost)nogroundsforsuspensionanymore.Instead,absoluteSoLperiodsareparticularlylong.
40 Iftheresultsoccurafterthepunishablebehaviourceased.
41 Thereareefficientandnon-efficient(formal)crimesintheBulgarianPenalLaw.Inthecaseof“efficientcrimes,Soliscalculatedfromthedaytheconsequencesarise.Therearenocriminalconsequencesprovidedforthenon-efficientcrimes,soSoLbeginsfromthemomentofexecutionofthecrime.
42 JuspuniendiistheState’srighttosanction43 NamelyBelgium,Cyprus,Denmark,Estonia,Finland,
France,Germany,Latvia,Luxembourg,Malta,theNetherlands,Poland,Slovenia,Spain,SwedenandtheUnitedKingdom
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