TIme to Recall Patton

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It gives idea of why & how to reduce losses in the battle by negating same to your enemy

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  • Time to remember Patton (The News Tuesday, September 22, 2015 :: Shahzad Chaudhry):

    The writer is a retired air-vice marshal, former ambassador and a security and political analyst. War is not meant to be you dying for your country it is by making the other bastard die for his. So said George S Patton, the audacious US general who led his forces at breakneck speed and entered Germany in that final blow to the Third Reich. He was a fiery character with a language that is unrepeatable in decent company. He was never popular with his peers, nor with his officers, but his men loved him. Patton and his men gave the Allies their victory. As Pakistan reels from another Fazlullah carnage, a host of issues open up. What did we learn from the APS attack? What did we do in the interregnum before the act was repeated to the tee at Badaber? I know what had, and has, gotten hold of the military mind but this nation of ours has only reinforced the deviance in dutiful compliance. There arent any better sedatives than repeated sagas of valour, retold in popularised fables. We spent our entire first week of September lauding what was immaterial, and in the past. There was a time, when it almost became revolting to see faces being paraded from one channel to the other, singing praises of what had been. And even there only telling half-truths. Most of our stories of unparalleled courage are in defence. In offence we have either been stemmed, or simply blundered. We exude offence as a trait but hardly think it to its fullest as a system. So is our natural rhythm. General Raheel Shareef did well to finally strike at the North Waziristan hub of the TTP, but surely as he sees his bust being paraded on the election posters and in other adornments along roads, there must have been a moment when he may have said to himself, What do they intend to make of me? Legacy is a kosher concern but only if you have it in your rear-view mirror; to have it upfront can be a terrible distraction. And our history is full of courtiers who never missed an opportunity to raise the king to the heavens in deceptive overstatements. Beware, general. You still have a task at hand. You are esteemed by the people not for who you are, but for what you are doing. You know what was, and thankfully still is, good about Operation Zarb-e-Azb? It is not that the spate of terrorism is forever eliminated; or that an APS-like attack will not be repeated again Badaber tells us that; it is that the space on many fronts that had been squeezed away from this nation has begun to be recovered. I talk of not the physical space alone, which is important in itself, but the notional space that helps nations and states interact with others. There began an element of seriousness when Pakistan was spoken of; the Indians got bothered with Pakistan not only doing things right within, but without too as it moved to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table. Pakistan, having lost its relevance within the neighbourhood, had found eminence again. It went about using the space fast, diplomatically. Space is like additional capacity that you can use to your advantage. But we get carried away far too easily, swept by our own formulations of victory and valour. That is when the breaking-the-back syndrome takes over. War, as generals ought to know, is only a measure of relative gains. Relative gains with some finesse can be converted to perceptions that become yet another trigger for another push; and in this sinusoidal convulsion, along the timeline, objectives are reached. Operation Zarb-e-Azb has given us relative gains which turned to perceptive gains that created the space for politics and diplomacy to establish its foothold. There never is and there never will be the felling of the last terrorist in this war. It will remain a war of perceptions suitably interposed

  • with political eminence that should further the good space, and squeeze the bad away from the terrorists. As soon as the tables turned for us, we flipped. Getting the first meeting going in Murree was when bugles were sounded far too early. The celebrations began, we touched our zenith and lost our focus. It took a minor spokesman at the NDS in Kabul to burst our tenuous balloon. Lavishing praise is a tricky business. Contriving fables is even more dangerous, while pursuing legacies can instil unnecessary caution. The period from now till November, 2016 is the trickiest when all these emotions will be in play. Already the debate has begun dangerously at that, and without regard to the enormity of another lurking APS or Badaber on whether the chief will get an extension? This can damage Operation Zarb-e-Azb perennially. To help there is this most damaging debate that has begun in the media of a civil-military imbalance and why and how to counter General Raheels growing popularity. We are known masters at raising people to the heavens and then quietly slipping the ladder away from under them. Playing games with people in such trying circumstances as those we face us is always at the cost of playing with the nation. Maybe we should first help this nation win the war against terror. Plenty went wrong at Badaber. We should have the courage to admit it. Losing people is a loss; losing extraordinary people is an irrecoverable loss. We cant cover that up with devising eulogies. Why and how did the terrorists make to the Camps Guard Room? I will not take issue with the defence tactics employed at Badaber since the attack was pre-informed in vivid detail, yet there is so much that needs to be internally debated on the detail of defending vulnerable points. My point of concern has always been the larger conception of it. APS and Badaber, and countless more in and around Peshawar, were attacks on Peshawar, which is both an area as well as a point and thus must include, in defence, all attributes of an area and point defence. I dont see that in place. Instead vulnerable places within Peshawar are treated typically as separate points without a larger strategic defence framework for the city. If one exists, it isnt functioning. On a larger scale, the war is now spread to four tiers. The first perimeter lies in Fata and the other border regions with Afghanistan where the Pakistani military is fighting the insurgency; the intermediate tier is based on intelligence-based operations conducted with reasonable success through the length and breadth of the country. The wars third tier is the defensive battle we are forced to fight every now and then as in Badaber. This is where a serious rehash is needed to make it foolproof. Till every such attempt is beaten back, then only the futility of it will begin to seep into its perpetrators. This is also where Patton must be invoked and eulogies replaced with sound tactics and unmatched firepower. The final tier lies in Afghanistan, a country that has practically spun out of control, again. Pakistans renegades sit there and plan such operations. This has to be stopped. The deal involves taking the issue to the Afghan government and in the absence of any cooperation, on account of either lack of capacity or unwillingness, taking them out through a limited operation. How such an operation is enacted is a matter of detail but political space for it needs to be created in earnest. The two states have a rough road ahead in their relationship; that much is clear. Dealing with it sanely will remain a priority. But a firmer hand at the wheel is who will deliver. Email: [email protected]

    Martyrdom and command (The News:: Monday, September 28, 2015 : Talat Hussain) The writer is former executive editor of The News and a senior journalist with Geo TV.

  • Facebook posts often make for ordinary reading, but this one is a gem vivid, immediate and straight as a barrel. It deals with two subjects martyrdom and command that have rarely been raised for rational understanding. They are either considered restricted or are assumed as closed for debate. And not to miss another significant point, the post has come from someone who knows whatever there is to know about leading men, and designing plans that potentially involved deployment of resources and mustering institutional prowess at a mass scale. These are not the musings of an idle mind. These are observations born of experience, expertise, and, whats more, a passion for excellence. First, the text: . Or suppose I had been hit by that mortar that burst with an awful shriek so near to me, and turned into a Catherine wheel of body-parts and (even worse) body-ingredients? Once again, I was moved above all not by the thought that my death would count, but that it would not count in the least. Unknown I have seen the wanton destruction strewn all about us, have been witness to the flowing blood of our brave sons, have been there, done that and for too long, not to say what I must. It appears to me that we have begun to glorify Shahadat far more as a protective manoeuvre for the living rather than as recognition of our martyrs; and in our eagerness have now presented our young men a narrative, that Shahadat must be pursued at all costs. This will cause unnecessary deaths as our youngsters set out to die rather live for their beliefs. My salutation to the brave mothers and the strong fathers who survive the Shahadat of their sons and daughters and I am sure that this nation will not let this sacrifice go in vein, but I also condole with you for your loss; for a loss it is no matter what one may say. My greatest respect and admiration to our Shaheeds, their valour and their courage as they walked into the valley of death, but I would rather have them here by my side today where they are immensely missed, as we stumble down the path of conflict, confusion, and chaos. But it is only fair that I say, I have also seen this sanctimonious dramatising of matters before as I am seeing them today. In order to show that things went as planned, that there was no omission and that the overall concept has proven successful, we tend to trip over one another congratulating each other and patting backs, as if we had intended for our young to die. This is not correct; the many who sacrificed their lives have done so for a great cause and the effect will be felt all over, but was it also because of incompetence and indifference; could we have done it in a better way, securing our objectives as well as the lives of our young? After all, in my mind, a military success is related to co-relation of losses and the damage done to the enemy, not the damage done to oneself. So I would like to urgently beseech everyone, to get a hold of themselves, not let emotions runaway with reality, lest our courageous young men are sacrificed at the altar of those fanciful commanders whose enthusiasm exceeds their stupidity and who are willing to shed blood even to the last drop of their very own on account of their lack of capacity. They will never be open to any criticism, as if criticising them would somehow take something away from our Shaheeds. Believe me I have seen this type and its the most dangerous kind of all who must be put to pasture. Forgive me if I have trespassed or hurt any feelings but lets learn to call a spade a spade if we want to win this thing. But for those who are listening and can hear me, in the name of all that is honest and honourable, in our love for our Shaheeds and their glory, I beg with the utmost sincerity in my heart, please hold some investigation and establish where we went wrong or could have done better. Accountability saves lives. I myself have always said that there should be no enquiry in the field and what happens is an outcome of a judgment call

  • but when I said that it was to protect action borne of initiative not inaction borne of indifference. This has come from Lieutenant-General (r) Tariq Khan, former inspector general of the Frontier Corps, KP and former corps commander Mangla. An officer of high calibre, trenchant wit and supreme decisiveness who turned the FC around from a morbid, runaway force to a supreme fighting machine and cleansed large swaths of Fata lost to terrorists. During my reporting assignments in the area, I met him several times. We didnt always agree. Crucial issues like the chase for Fazlullah of Swat fame or the end-plan for Faqir Muhammad of Bajaur or on the nature and direction of national politics and the ways to fix the country and many others showed us on opposite ends of the spectrum. But even when he would propound ideas that sounded out-of-the-box to civilian sensibilities, his understanding of the subjects in review was deeply impressive. He always seemed to know what he was saying. Most important, he could walk the talk in the battlefield. Now, the context. The immediate context of Gen Tariqs plea is the Badaber attack and the media frenzy spurred by fuzzy official accounts of what transpired in those fateful hours when terror struck and the battle began. Because the rush to praise is so great and the intent to probe so weak, circumstances surrounding the event and the encounter remain totally confusing. This is sad and saddening. It is frustrating for those who know better. The bravery of the martyrs deserves clarity. Their ultimate heroics demand that their actions be described within the framework of how command was flowing at that time and who was leading the charge. The unit that mowed down the attackers without suffering injuries needs to be properly honoured for their bravery. The presence of Captain Asfandyar Bokhari, that luminous youthful face of this soils best, at the scene of the event has to be explained. We need assessments of how our weapons fared when terror was unleashed and the situation of our other Shaheeds, (Shan Ali, Saqib Javaid, Tariq Abbass) acknowledgement of whose sacrifice, unfortunately, remains only in passing. This will only happen when part of the narrative moves from the emotive side of the event towards the factual side of the operation. But this will not happen. Over the years the cost of terror be that our law-enforcement agencies or the people seems to have become an automatic justification for not debating as to whether this cost could have been reduced if we had more dispassionately analysed our own actions in the previous instances. This was done in the Army Public School massacre. The same happened in Parade Lane, Mehran Base, the GHQ attack and a range of other high hits that terrorists were able to make causing preventable casualties, shahadats included. The fear that by asking questions and probing the actions of those in whose custody and command rests precious lives of brave, fearless men, has given birth to the quick-fire bravado brigade whose task is claim total laurels and produce tales of unparalleled success in all circumstances. Inevitably, the names of the martyrs or the scale of the tragedy is used as armour to protect loopholes that allowed the event to take place in the first place. Martyrdom and Command responsibilities are two totally different things. Lives laid in the service of the country are too precious to be pressed into service every time lacklustre careers of favourites are threatened or need polishing. Martyrs are the chosen ones. They have paid their dues. They have indebted us forever. Let them rest in peace. Keep them out of the campaigns of self-promotion and egregious pomposity. Let the living account for their deeds on the merit of their performance. Email: [email protected] Twitter: @TalatHussain12