Tilly - 1975 - Revolutions and Collective Violence

8/13/2019 Tilly - 1975 - Revolutions and Collective Violence

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REVOLUTIONS AND COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

Charles TillyUniversity of MichiganMay 1973

CRSO Working Paper {I83 Copies available through:Center for Research on SocialOrganizationUniversity of Michigan330 Packard StreetAnn Arbor Michigan 48104


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REVOLUTIONS ND COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

Charles Ti l lyUniversity of Michiganay 1973

FINAL DRAFT

to appear i n Fred I . Gree nstein andNelson W Polsby, Handbook of PoliticalSc ie nc e Reading, Mass. : Addison-Wesley)


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The TaskSuppose we were loo king forward t o ye t ,another, uncer ta i? yea r

i n t h e p o l i t i c a l l i f e o f o u r co un tr y- -w hich ev er c o un tr y i t is--and,w e wante d to re duc e our unc e r t a i n ty . For t h a t yea r and th a t c oun t ry ,how could we go about est i mat ing th e pro ba bi l i ty of two con dit ion s:a t h a t a re vo lu ti on would occ ur ; b) t h a t more than some minimumprop or t i o n ( sa y t e n pe rc e n t ) o f t he c ou n t ry ' s popu la t i on would t a ked i r e c t p a r t i n c o l l e c t i v e v io le n ce ?

The se a r e more o r l e s s me te o ro log i c a l que s t i ons: what w i l l t h ep o l i t i c a l w ea th er b e l i k e ? S ho uld I ge t ready fo r a s torm? We mighta l s o compl ica te the problem by tur nin g the two in to en gineer ing ques-t i o n s . Suppose we want to produce a re vo l u t ion , o r more t ha n aminimum involve me nt i n c o l l e c t i ve v io l e nc e , o r bo th , wi t h in t h a tcou ntr y- yea r. What would i t t a ke ?

The tu rbu le n t tw e n t i e th c e n tu ry ha s brough t p l e n ty o f a t t e n t io nt o be a r on bo th t he me te o ro log i c a l a nd the e ng ine e r ing ve r s ions ofthe se que s t i ons . Yet t he re l i a b i l i t y of ou r a nswers t o them ha s no t

GENERAL NOTE: The Canada Coun cil and th e Na ti on al S ci en ce Foun datio ns u pp o rt ed t h e r e se a rc h i n t o p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t i n Europe which l i e sbehind t h i s paper , and the I n s t i t u t e f o r Advanced S tudy gave me th et im e t o w r i t e i t t s e v e r a l p o i n t s i n t h e p a pe r I have drawn free lyon a n unpub li she d pape r , The Hi s to r i c a l S tudy o f Po l i t i c a l Conf l i c t , Ipres ented to the confe rence on new t r en ds i n h i s t or y sponsored byDaed alus and th e Ford Foundat ion, Rome, J un e 1970. David Bayley,Henry Bienen, Harry Ecks tein , Da nie l Headrick and Edward S ho rt er havea l l g i v e n me v a lu a b l e c r i t i c i s m of e a r l i e r d r a f t s ; I must confess,however, that I have be en unwi l l i ng a nd /o r una b le t o make a l l t hechanges t h a t any one of them proposed .


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improved notably over those offered by Aristotle at the very dawnof systematic thinking about revolution and political violence.(With no particular embarrassment, indeed, a respectable politicalscience journal once published an article treating the Quantifica-tion of Aristotle s Theory of Revolution; see Kort 1952.*) I don tmean to belittle Aristotle. He was a master political analyst.His formulations have lasted twenty-four centuries. Some formula-tions in this essay will be thoroughly Aristotelian. Still, onemight have thought in twenty-four centuries men could have improvedon his politics, as they have on his physics. No doubt Aristotlewould have been baffled by the enormous, powerful national stateswhich populate today s political world; his theories tend to losetheir shape when stretched over twentieth-century politics. Butthe same thing happens when current theories of revolution are

exported to the city-states with which Aristotle was familiar.In this strict sense ofpredictability, the systematic formulationsof political scientists improve little on the haphazard formula-tions of common sense. And the formulations of common senseimprove little on casting dice or reading omens.

am talking about systematic knowledge; the acid test iswhether it helps us anticipate what will turn up in some as-yet

*Citations in this form refer to the list of references at the endof the essay.


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unexplored corner of experience with less error than other ways ofthought. That sort of knowledge overlaps with several other kindswhich have a lot to do with revolution and collettive violence.Political philosophy, in examining the principles according towhich men attempt to organize their public life, and comparing themwith the alternative principles men might employ, has much to sayabout conflict. Statements of political programs and credos usuallyinclude strong ideas concerning the justification--or lack of it--for violence and revolution. Theoreticians and practitioners havecreated a vast tactical literature: how to make revolutions, howto foil them, principles of guerilla, principles of counterin-surgency. Systematic knowledge obviously sets constraints on allthese other ways of knowing, but it does not exhaust or replacethem. Systematic knowledge concerns us here.

It is possible that the pursuit of systematic knowledge aboutcollective violence and revolution destines the pursuer to failureand irrelevance in all but the longest of long runs. A schemewhich will predict elections with no more than percent errorembodies quite an intellectual achievement, but it does littlegood to anyone in a political system in which most electionshang on a margin of less than 5 percent. With every reason tobelieve that revolutions and collective violence are at least ascomplicated and contingent as elections, we have to beware ofthe quick fix and resign ourselves to the prospect of . repeated


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blunders . Any c a re fu l examination of th e con sta ntl y accumulatingw r i t i n g s on r ev o lu t i o n and co l l e c t i v e v io l en ce w l l convince thereader tha t the b lundering has been going on fo r a lon g time, andshows no si gn s of c ea sin g. Nor do I hope f o r a n i n s t a n t t h a t t h i ses say w l l end t he t re nd, or even avoid i tAva ila ble Ideas : General

Lik e th e old-time doc tors who grave ly sn if fe d th e chamberpo ts o f th e i r pa t i en t s , we cou ld seek t o d iagnose the i l l s of pol i -

t i c a l s c i en ce by c lo s e examina ti on o f t h e l a r g e v a r i e t y of av a i l ab l ethe or ies of r evo lu t ion and co l l ec t i ve v io lence . Tha t unp leasan tt a s k w l l not occupy us much he re , a s i t has been done thoroughlyand w e ll elsew here (s ee Bienen 1968, Converse 1968, Stone 1966,Gurr 1969, Albe roni 1968: ch.1, Ec ks te in 1965, Fink 1968). Thi sreview w l l o nl y c a t a l o g o r c r i t i c i z e e s t a b li s h e d t h e o r i e s wherethey w l l c l a r i f y t h e a rg um en t. I t w l l f o ll o w t h e r i s k i e r c o u r seo f co n cen t r a t i n g o n a s i n g l e app ro ach t o p o l i t i c a l co n f l i c t w hichi s promising, which ta kes i n t o account a good de a l of previou sthin kin g and research , but which i s al so f a r from accepted or proved.

The ta sk i t s e l f needs def in in g . Whether we a r e t ry in g t oa n t i c i p a t e o r t o m an ip ul at e t h e p o l i t i c a l we at he r, i t i s q u i t e e a s yto confuse two d i f f e r en t p rocedures. The f i r s t i s t h e ex p l an a ti o nof a p ar t i cu la r c on f l ic t o r c la s s of co nf l i c t s by moving backwardf r o m th e e f f ec t t o t he complex of cause s which l i e s behind i t :Why t h e Whiskey R eb e ll io n? Why the recu r ren t mi l i t a ry coups ofLatin America? The question i s re tr os pe ct iv e, moving from outcome


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t o 'or igi n. The second procedure s the assessment of the probable'.. . . . consequences of a given s e t of circum stances: What ef fe ct does

. . . . . .r a p i d i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n h a ve . on t h e n a t u r e o r f r eq ue nc y of p r o t e s t ?

. .. .. . . .. . . -. . What s o r t s of power s t ru gg le s tend to fo l low lo sse s i n war? What.. ., ... . .. .. . .. . - s th i s ' yea r ' s l ik e l i hoo d of a r e be l l io n i n South Af r i ca , under. .. . . . ,. . , ' suppos i t ions A, B o r C .about h er r e l a t i o n s w i th t h e r e s t o f . h e . . . '.. .

, . . . .. . . : . . .. ,? . .. , . . . . I . -. . w o rl d? ~ h e s e u e s t i o n s ha ve a p r o s p e c t i v e c h a r a c t e r , m ov in g. fr om . . . ... . .. . . ., . . . .

or ig in t o outcome--or , more l ik e l y , t o a s e t of ou tcomes vary ingi n p r o b a b i l i t y .

. . . -' . ' \ . . .. .. . 2 . .

.. . The prospe ct i ve procedure and t he r e t ro sp ec t i ve one converge. . .. : - .< . . < . .. .. i :: under some s p ec ia l dond i t ions: 1 ) i f a pa r t i c u l a r outcome fo l lows '.. . ... .. . . . .

:. : . un ique ly and wi th h igh p rob ab i l i t y from a p a r t i cu la r an teceden t . ,3 . . . ..:. .. - . .-.,. - . circumstance, and 2 i f t h e on ly q u e s t io n t h a t m a t t er s s t h e l i k e -. , . . .. . .. . . . .. . .* . . . : l ihood of t h a t one outcome, o r 3) i f a l l t h e r e le va n t v ar i a bl e s 'a re . . . .

I . . . .. .5, :, . .

: . .. : . . known. I n . p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s , t h e s e c o n d i ti o n s a r e ( t o pu t t . . .. . .. . .. .- > t .. . . .. g e n t l y ) r a r e . Yet i n t h e a n a l y s i s o f r e v o l u t i o n , t h e s t a n d a r d p ro - . . .. . . .

' - ' cedure s t o draw p ros pec t ive conc lus ions from re t ro s pe c t i ve an a lys es ,going from t h e f a c t of r e v o l u t io n i n p a r t i c u l a r t o t h e c o nd i t io n s

. under which r evo lu t ions occur i n gene ra l .Al though co l l e c t iv e v io lence occu r s every day , r evo l u t ion s a r e

> ' . ' . r a r e e ve nt s They d o n ' t l e nd t he ms el ve s t o t h e s o r t s of s t a t i s t i c a l. . p r oc e du r es wh ic h h e l p u s make s e n s e ' o f b i r t h s , o r t r a f f i c p a t t e r n s

o r s h i f t s i n e ve ry da y s pe ec h. The i r occu r rence a lmost c e r t a in lydepends on . th e convergence of d i f fe re n t condi t ions , r a t h e r t h a n on e .


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t o a n a t i o n a l s t a t e , w i t h t h e prob le m of w h et he r I t a l i a n s o c i e t yex i s t e d b e fo re 1 8 60 , o r C anadian so c ie ty e x i s t s to d ay , l e f t con-ve ni en tl y vague) p re ca ri ou sl y in te gr at ed by commitment to common.va lu es (convenien tly descr ibed as those o f t he dominant e l i t e s )responding to every s tr uc tu ra l change by a temporary dis - int egra -t i o n which l ead s to new e f fo r t s a t i n t eg r . a t io n .

The adopt ion of t h i s world v iew lea ds a lmost wi thout e f fo r tt o th e sharp sepa ra t i on of "orderly" and "d isorder ly" responses t os t r uc tu ra l change, and hence to the a rgument th a t the l ike l ihoo dof o rde r ly responses t o change s a fu n c t io n o f a ) t h e s t r e n g th ofcommitment of a l l members of the s oc ie ty t o t s common values,b) th e gradualne ss and evenness of th e change. Those who adopt t h i sv is io n of th e way th e world works w i l l f i n d t natura l to assumet h a t m o b i l i t y s more d i s ru p t iv e f o r in d i v id u a l and so c ie ty th animmobi l ity , th a t c r ime s performed by pe ople who a r e "poorly in te -g ra te d" i n t o r ou t i ne s o c i a l l i f e , t h a t a r i s i n g s u i c i d e r a t e , ar i s i n g i l l e gi t i m ac y r a t e and a r i s i n g d i vo r ce r a t e a r e r e l i a b l es i gn s o f so c i a l d i s i n t eg ra t i on , and tha t movements of p ro te s t d rawt h e i r c l i e n t e l e from marginal members of s oc ie ty but--for tunately --tend t o become more modera te , reasona ble and r e a l i s t i c , a s we l l a st o shed t h e i r w i ld es t members, i n th e co u r se o f p o l i t i c a l ex p e r ien ce .A l l of t hes e can, of course, .be made tr ue by def in i t io n. Leavingt h a t t r a p as id e, however, every one of them remains unproved and ,a t be st , dubious (see Cornel ius 1970, Nelson 1969 and 1970, Bienen1968, Gurr 1969: ch. 4 Kantor 1965).


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Dozens of observers of our i t i mes , lu l l ed by the re t r oa c t iv epa ci f i ca t i on of th e pas t and then shaken by the v io lence of t hep r e s e n t , h ave s up po se d t h a t a f i x e d , i n s t i n c t i v e d r i v e t o a gg r e s s io nun der l ie s the read in es s of men to at ta ck each ot he r . Remove the re-s t r a i n t s o r f l a s h t h e s i g n a l s , g oe s t h e argu men t, a nd t h e f a t e f u lurge w l l r i s e . One popular account re ly i ng heav i ly on an imal s tud-i e s o bs e rv es

We a l r ead y know th a t i f o u r p o p ula t io ns g o on in c r ea s in ga t t h e i r p r e s en t t e r r i f y i n g r a t e , u n c o nt r o ll a b l e a gg re s-s i v e n e s s w l l become dramatical ly increased. This hasbeen proved c onclus ive ly wi th l abo ra to ry exper iments .Gross overcrowding w l l p ro du ce so c ia l s t r e s se s and t en-s i o n s t h a t w l l sha t te r our communi ty o rgan iza t ions longb e fo re i t s t a r v e s ' u s t o d e at h . t w l l w o r k d i r e c t l ya g a i n s t im prove ment s i n t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n t r o l a ndw l l savagely he igh ten th e l ik e l ih ood of emot ional ex-plosion (Morris 1967: 145).

f we adopted t h i s reason ing i n de ta i l , we would have t o expectt h a t A merican c i t i e s , e x p e c i a l l y au to mo bi le c i t i e s l i k e Da l l a s a ndLos Angeles, would be among the le a s t aggressive i n th e world , f o rt he y a r e s e t t l e d a t f a r l ow er d e n s i t i e s t h a n t h e i r E uro pea n o r A s ia ncounte rpar ts , and have been ge t t in g le s s dense fo r decades . Theyre n o t s o p e ac e fu l a s a l l t h a t . I f we t ake the argument a s simply

id en t i fy in g o n e o f th e f ac to r s beh in d v io len ce , on th e o t h e r h and ,i t s cap ac i ty t o accou n t fo r t h e l a r g e , g en ui ne v a r i a t i o n s i n v i o l e n c efrom t h e t o t ime , p l ac e to p l ace , g ro up to g ro up d wind les . We h av e a s yetno good means o f d is t i ngu is h i ng th e e f fe c t s o f c rowding f rom t ha tof a g r e a t many o t h e r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of c i t i e s . For t h e p r e s e n t ,then , a t temp ts t o app ly t o human aggregates t he a l le ged les sons ofan imal-aggress ion s t ud ie s lead us i n to a dead end.


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more powerful version of the argument has ''aggression re-sulting mainly from the amount of frustration endured by men, tem-pered by existing constraints on the release of that aggression.wonderful variety of conditions win nomination as frustrations

capable of producing aggression--not only high densities, but alsosexual repression, sexual freedom, wealth, poverty. If these anal-yses of aggressive impulses were correct, aggression would rise andfall regularly with the alteration of the signals, the frustrationand/or the restraints. So far as I can tell, they do not. Buteven if such theories of impulse were valid, the necessity of estab-lishing exactly which conditions were frustrating, or restraining,or stimulating, would involve us again in analyzing the social rela-tions which actually turn to violent encounters.

Our nineteenth-century sociology also favors a particular inter-pretation of political conflict, especially revolution. Revolutionsand other major conflicts arise, in this view, because structuralchange builds up unresolved tensions which burst into disorderwhen and where restraints are weak. Those tensions build up in sev-eral ways: through expectations which rise faster than achievementand thus produce frustration; through the disorientation sufferedby those who cut traditional social ties; through the inherentpsychic costs of mobility, complexity, variety and impersonality;through the difficulty of performing contradictory roles. The ten-sions build up in individuals, but eventually achieve collectiveexpression.


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Embedded in this foundation for the study of political con-.flict are a whole series of related fallacies:

1. that rebellion is an individual act intimately dependenton a certain attitude--a rebellious attitude--toward someor all authorities;2. that the likelihood of mass rebellion is a linear func-tion of the sum of individual hostilities to the regime,which is in turn a linear function of the sum of depriva-tions experienced by the individuals;3 that there is a close correspondence between the sumof individual intentions of participants in revolution-ary actions and the changes produced by those actions;4. that revolution is simply the extreme position on ascale running from fleeting individual protests to durableanger on the part of the entire population, which impliesthat the extent of discontent and the likelihood of atransfer of power are closely related to one another;5 that revolution and revolutionary propensity are con-ditions of a society or a social system rather thanof a particular government or a particular population.

This variety of reasoning permits theorists like Chalmers Johnson,James Davies, Ted Gurr and Neil Smelser to erect schemes in whichsome inefficiency in the system expands the fund of discontent,which in turn leads to assaults on those who hold power, Thesesocial scientists concentrate their theorizingand their research on individual attitudes or on the condition of

I

the social system as a whole. They neglect the struggles amongclasses and power blocs which constitute the bulk of politicalconflict


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which deep, long-run structural changes resulted from the transferof power. The danger is then not only that the number of cases youare working with will be too tiny to permit effective comparison(A distinguished student of political change, commenting on a student'sproposal to undertake the study of revolutions, asked, Which of thefour are you studying? ) but also that you will be making the wrongcomparisons. If, for example, attempts to make revolutions differedfundamentally from all other sorts of political conflicts, but suc-cessful and unsuccessful attempts differed only through the inter-vention of chance, then a lifelong study of successful revolutionsalone would probably yield nothing but shaky hypotheses about thecauses of revolution. That is not an argument for abandoning theanalysis of the so-called Great Revolutions, but for trying to linktheir study with that of the larger set of events to which theybelong. Then we can preserve the distinctness of the Great Revolu-tions by treating revolutionary character--the extent to which theparticular series of events at hand produced class realignments,transformations of government, further structural change, etc.--asa variable.

Social scientists have, I must admit, been giving--and eventrying 'to follow--this brand of advice for some time, without re-sounding success. We have, for example passed through numeroustwists and turns in simply trying to decide what phenomenon isunder examination: rebellion, violence, collective violence,


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'I i n t e r n a l w ar , c o n f l i c t , i n s t a b i l i t y , p r o t e s t , d is or de r.Each of t he se i s p l a u s i b l e . Each c a r r i e s wi th t a somewhat dif-fe re n t agenda and im pl ic i t theory . The f a i lu re of any of them tos t i c k an d t h e e a s e w i t h w hic h w r i t e r s o n r e v o l u t i o n and p o l i t i c a lc on f l ic t swi tch from one to a nother bespeak both confusion and d is-cord about t he nat ure of th e problem a t hand.

There a r e excep t ibns t o the gener a l f eeb leness of soc ia l -s c i e n t i f i c work o n t h e s u b j e c t ; on ly th e r epea ted app l i ca t i on of t heweight of qu an t i ta t i ve ev idence assembled by psych ologis ts ands o c i o l o g i s t s i s g e t t i n g a c r o ss t h e f a c t t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i nth e American ghe tt o r eb el l i on s of th e 1960s tended t o be young menwel l - in teg ra ted i n the i r lo ca l communit ie s, wel l- conv inced tha t theywere ba t t l i ng in ju st ic e , and wel l - suppor ted by many of t he i r k insmenand nei ghb ors . Again, th e gene ra l models developed by LewisRichar dson and Kenneth Boulding o f f e r good de al of an a l yt ic powert o th os e who w i l l use them. But they have had l i t t l e in f luence ont h e way s t u d e n t s of p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t a c t u a l l y d o t h e i r work.

In sh o r t , t h e promise i s t h e r e i n p r i nc i p l e. I n p r a c ti c e ,i t h as b een l i t t l e r ea l iz e d.Chalmers Johnson on Revolutionary Change

gl anc e a t Chalmers Johnson 's Revolu tiona ry Change and Ted

Gur r ' s Why Men Rebel w i l l give a c l ea re r id ea what the rnodel-buildershave--and do n' t have--to o f f e r . The books by Johnson and Gurrresemble each o ther i n br ing ing to b ear on a s i ng le model a wholebroad t ra d i t io n of thought . Johnson's Revolu t ionary Change bra idstog et her many f i b e r s of socia l-sys tem the ori zi ng, which assumes a


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fuqctioning system and then follows a sequence of the sort challenge/,dysfunction/inadequate control/revolution. Gurr s, on the other hand,follows a much more psychological reasoning which finds the causeof rebellion in a widening discrepancy between what men expect oflife and what they get from it. Between the two of them, they employalmost all the well-defined ideas concerning the origins of violentconflict which are in common use among American social scientists.

Before writing his general analysis of the revolutionary pro-cess, Chalmers Johnson wrote a valuable and well-informed study ofthe Chinese Revolution, emphasizing the importance of anti-Japanesenationalism as a source of support for the Communists. Whateverweaknesses his theorizing may display, then, do not come from ig-norance of the world outside of North America. They come rather,

/it seems to me, from heavy reliance on the systemic metaphor andfrom confusion of state with social system.

Johnson identifies three clusters of causes of revolution:First, there are the pressures created by a disequilibratedsocial system--a society which is changing and which isin need of further change if it is to continue to exist.Of all the characteristics of the disequilibrated system,the one that contributed most directly to a revolutionis.power deflation--the fact that during a period of changethe integration of a system depends increasingly upon themaintenance and deployment of force by the occupants ofthe formal authority statuses.The second cluster of necessary causes revolves around thequality of the purposeful change being undertaken whilea system is disequilibrated. This quality depends uponthe abilities of the legitimate leaders. If they areunable to develop policies which will maintain the confi-dence of non-deviant actors in the system and its capacityto move toward resynchronization, a loss of authority


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w i l l ensue. Such a lo s s means t h a t th e use of f or ce byt he e l i t e s no longe r considered leg i t im ate , a l thought does not ne ces sa r i ly mean th a t a r ev o lu t i on w i l l occur

a t once. So long a s the l ead e r s can s t l l use the armys u c c e s s f ul l y t o c o e rc e s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n , t h e s ys te mw i l l cont inue t o pe rs is t . However, t he power de f l a t io nw i l l approach maximum pr op or ti on s, producing a pol ices t a t e ( e .g . South Af r i ca today ) .The f i n a l , o r s u f f i c i e n t , c a u s e of a r e v o l u t i o n s someing red ien t , u sua l ly con t r ibu ted by fo r tu ne , which dep r ivest h e e l i t e of i t s chief weapon fo r enfor c ing so ci a l be-ha vi or (e.g. an army mutiny), o r which le ad s a group ofr evo lu t iona r i e s to be l i eve th a t they have the means t od e p ri v e t h e e l i t e of t s weapons of coerc ion . I n t h i ss tudy , such f i n a l , o r immed ia te , causes o f r evo lu t iona r e r e f e r r e d t o a s a c c e l e r at o r s . They a r e t h e p r e s s u r e s ,o f t e n e a s i l y s u s t a i n ed i n f u n c t i o n a l s o c i e t i e s , w hichwhen they impinge on a so ci et y exp erien cing power d ef la -t i on and a l o s s of au tho r i ty immed ia tely ca ta lyze t i n t oin s u r r e c t i on . They a r e a l so the f a c t o r s which de termine,when an ins ur r ec t i on does occur , whether or no t th e rev-o l u t i o n a r i e s w i l l succeed i n e s t ab l i sh in g and occupyingnew st at us es of a ut ho ri ty (Johnson 1966: 90-91).. .. .. . ( . . , . .. . . . ... _) . . . . . . . :. . Johnson then a t te mpts t o - l i n k the se very gen era l phenomena t o. . . . . . ... . . . , . .. . . ., ... .

. 1 s. .. . ... . in d iv idu al behavior th rough the sequence: r a p i d change,-+

. .. . . . .;,:. , . . .. . .. . ....: . . - .. . . ' . . . . . .. . . systemic disequil ibr ium- > over t ax ing of ex is t i ng means of . . , . . ..' . . - .. . .. . . .. ., .: ., ? ' , . . .. . . . . . . . .. ._ . . . . . home osta tic and purp osiv e resp onse t o change--->individual. ,.; . . . . . . . . 3 .. . . . . . . . . .: : . . . . ... . _ .. . . , .. :.. disorientation---) panic anxiety shame guilt depression e t c . .. ,.: . . . . . ... . .. .. ..- . : :-) form atio n of movements of p ro t e s t . T rue to h i s p redecesso rs , , , : :.. . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . , .. ' he proposes the s u i c i de r a t e a s a p rime index o f d i sequ i l ib r ium.

Johnson peppers h i s work wi th br ig h t ide as and good cr i t iq ue sof prev ious anal yses of revolu t ion . i s scheme, however, has l i t t l e

. .v a l u e f o r t h e s y s te m a ti c a n a l y s i s of p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t . Onemajor reason s that the scheme s r e t r o s p e c t i v e ; t h e r e a p pe a rs t o. .'. . be no way t o know whether home osta tic and purposive res pon se s '


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to change were adequ ate except by observing whether a rev ol uti ona c t u a l l y o c cu r re d . Whether the que stio ns we a r e askin g a r e meteoro-l o g i c a l o r e n gi ne er in g i n s t y l e , t h a t s a d isa ppo in t i ng outcome.Again, the trea tment of a government a s an emanation of a so ci alsy st em , o r i c e v e r s a , l e a d s t o p r op o sa l s f o r t h e d e t e c t i o n o fd i s e q u i l i b r i u m w hich a r e b o t h l o g i c a l l y and p r a c t i c a l l y h o p e l es s .

Ideally,' .' a s Johnson says , th is index would port ray th e magni-tude of d issync hroniza t ion between the s t r uc tu re of va l ues and th es o c i a l d i v i s i o n of l a b o r , t he re by i n d i c a t i n g t h e p o t e n t i a l i t y f o rter min ati on of a system due to t s f a i l ur e t o f u l f i l l t s f u n c t i o n a lprer equ is i t es (p. 120) .

The concre te p ropos a l s fo r p re d ic to r s which fo l low from t h i sg e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e , a c c or d in g t o J oh ns on , a r e : r i s i n g s u i c i d e r a tes ,h ei gh te ne d i d e o l o g i c a l a c t i v i t y , r i s i n g m i l i t a r y p a r t i c i p a t i o nr a t i o and i n c r e a s e s i n r a t e s of c r im e, e s p e c i a l l y p o l i t i c a l c r im e.These i tems have th e advantage of be ing measurable , a t l e a s t c rud ely ;w the re fo r e can inv es t iga te whethe r they pred ic t t o r e vo lu t ion wi thbe tt er than chance accuracy. Even i f they do, however, no te s t ofth e theory has occurred . Acceptance of crime; s u ic ide , ide olo gic a la c t i v i t y and m i l i t a r y p a r t i c i p a t i o n a s i n d i c a t o r s o f t h e ba dn es sof f i t between values and d iv is io n of labor requ ires acceptanceof the very theory which s saupposedly up fo r t e s t .

Fi na ll y, th e argument provide s almost no means whatsoever ofin fe r r in g which people take what pa r t s , when and why. The main


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implicit proposition is that those segments of the population mostdisoriented by structural change will take the most active part inrevolutionary movements:

s the disequilibrium of a social system becomes moreacute, personal tensions are generated in all statuses.These tensions may be controlled by some people throughinternal psychological defense mechanisms, and the aliena-tive sentiments of others may be dissipated throughdeviant behavior (e.g. fantasies, crime, mental disease,and psychosomatic illnesses). However, with the passageof time, these mechanisms tend to lose their efficacy,and persons subject to highly diverse status protestswill begin to combine with each other and with deviantsgenerally to form a deviant subcultural group or move-ment (p. 81).

Again, we are dealing with a proposition which runs a great risk ofbecoming true by definition; all it takes is to give a high weightas deviant to those sorts of behavior which happen to be associatedwith the adoption of a revolutionary position. Leaving aside thattendentious way of setting up the problem, however, we simply haveno reliable evidence of a general tendency for revolutionaries,protestors, rioters or participants in mass movements to comedisproportionately from the marginal, criminal and/or disorgan-ized parts of the population. In short, Johnson's scheme assumesthat nineteenth-century folk sociology is correct.>

Even within the framework of classic sociology, Johnson takesa step which is open to serious challenge: he essentially equatesstate and society. The equation shows up most clearly in theidentification of the societal elite with those who run the state,but it recurs in general statements throughout:


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The t ru e na rk of soc i e ty , the r e fo re , w i l l b e i n s t i t u t i o n scharged wi th the ex e rc i se o f phys ica l fo rce bo th to in -su r e the pe rpe tua t ion of the d iv i s io n of l abo r and tor e g u l a t e t h e us e of v i o le n c e i n c o n f l i c t s o f . p o l i t i c a 1i n t e r e s t . The most t y p i c a l form o f su ch i n s t i t u t i o n s st he s t a t e . (p. 18)The most impor tan t func t ion of the val ue system i n as o c i e t y s t o a u t ho r i z e , o r l e g i t i m a t i z e , t h e u se o fforce. (p. 26)Desp i t e numerous e f fo r t s over th e pas t cen tu ry t o b r i ngabo ut some form of world government, e it h er throughp u rp o si v e o r g a n i z a t i on a l on g p o l i t i c a l l i n e s o r t hr ou ght h e i n d i r e c t l i n k i n g of n a t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n ta sk -o r i e n t e d a s s o c i a t i o n s ( p o s t a l un io ns , h e a l t h o r g a n i z a ti o n s ,bodies fo r es t ab l i sh in g common s tan dard s , and so fo r t h) ,th e na t ion a l s t a t e has remained the l a r ge s t form of se l f -conta ine d so ci a l system. (p . 169)

The consequence of t h i s pa r t ic u l ar equat ion s t o b r u s h a s i d e t h ep rob lemat ic cha rac te r of the s t a t e ' s ve ry ex i s t ence and of t spa r t ic u l ar boundar i es a t many moments of reb el l ion , war, rev olu t io nand c o un t er - re v ol u ti o n. S t a t e s a r e o r g a n i z a t i o n s w hich r i s e , f a l l ,exp erie nce changes of management, and even cea se t o e x i s t . Only anext reme v iew o f tha t mys te rious en t i ty ca l l ed a soc ie ty g ran t s tthos e same pr op er t i es . Only a muddled view equates the exp erienceof the one en t i ty wi th the experi ence o f the o the r .Ted Gurr on hy Men Rebel

Ted Gurr shows more aware ness t h a t t he se problems re problems.i s side-comments and sub-hypotheses amount to an exte ns ive at tem pt

t o t ake the o rga n iza t ion a l cha ra c t e r i s t i c s of governmen ts in to accoun t .Yet h i s ba si c theory does not permit him t o de al with th e phenomenaof p o l i t i c a l co n f l i c t much be t t e r than Johnson .

I n h i s book Why Men Rebel, Gurr see ks t o pro vid e a g en er ale x p l an a t i on o f p o l i t i c a l vi o l e nc e . P o l i t i c a l v i o le n c e i n c l u d e s


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a l l c o l l e c t i v e a t t a c k s o n m aj or p o l i t i c a l a ct or s- -e sp ec ia ll y a g e n t so f the s t a t e - -wi th in a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l ~ c o m m u n i t y . I n s t e a d ofel ab ora tin g a theory of how p o l i t i c a l communities ope rat e, however,_he conc entra t es on exper iences which happen to ind iv i dual s and then

>< . ' itumula te in to mass a c t i o n .

The key i de as have been around a long time. Ind iv idua l s angerwhen they sense a l a rg e gap between what they g e t and what t heydeserv e. That can happen through a d e c l i n e i n what t h e y g e t , o r ar i s e i n what they f e e l they deserve . Given th e chance , angry peoplere be l. When many peo ple go through t h a t same exp eri enc e of in cr ea s-i n g R e l a t i v e D e p r i v a t i on p l u s wi de ni ng o p p o r t u ni t y f o r r e b e l l i o n a tthe same t ime , p o l i t i c a l v io lenc e genera l i zes . S imi la r ideas haveof te n emerged i n the an al ys i s of American ghet to reb el l io ns , o fLa ti n American pa la ce coups, and of t he French Revol ution . Gurrhas ex pl ic at ed t he l og ic of such ana lyse s , and developed means ofmeasuring a number of th e va ri ab le s involved. Compared with theargument of ~o h ns on sRevol utiona ry Change, th e- Gu rr scheme has th eadvantage of avoid ing both t he assumption of a se l f - r eg ula t i ngsoc ie t y and the equat i on of government w i th so ci a l sys tem.

Seen a s a re t r os pec t i ve a na lys is , Gurr s a rgument hangs to-ge the r ve ry we l l . I t i s , i n d e e d , . v i r t u a l l y t r u e by d e f i n i t i o n .P o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e r e q ui r e s some s ha re d d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , g r a n te d .Shared d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n r e q ui r e s i n d i v i d u a l d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , t r u e .Ind iv id ua l d i s s a t i s f a c t io n r e s u l t s f rom an unfavorab le compari sonbetween th ing s a s they ar e and th ings a s they ought t o be, no


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doub t. What, Fhen, have we excl uded ? The two extr emes : 1 ) pu re lyi n s t r u m e nt a l a c c o u n t s of r e b e l l i o n , i n w hich v i o l e n c e i s s imply themost e f f i c i e n t means av a i l a b l e f o r acco mp li sh in g some co l l e c t iv e end ,2 t r ea t men t s o f r eb e l l io n s a s emana tion s o f i n s t i n c t , mad ness , r an -dom impulse o r oc cu l t fo rce . Gurr ' s theory s ta nds w e l l wi th i n wes t-e r n p o l i t i c a l ph ilo sop hy a s i t r e j e c t s t h e i d e as t h a t t h e most e f f i c i e n tmeans may b e h u r t fu l t o many and th a t t h e i r r a t io n a l p l ay s a s ig n i f i -c a n t p a r t i n l a r g e p o l i t i c a l movements. But t h e s e a l i n g o f f o f t h o s etwo extremes s t i l l le av es a g re at de al of room between them.

A p ro s p ec t iv e v e r s io n of th e a rg umen t, on th e oth er hand, be-comes more de te rm in at e and more dub iou s. Now th e argument say s t h a td ep r iv a t i o n p rod u ces ang e r wh i l e l a ck of d ep r iv a t io n p r ev en t s i tt h a t u nd er s p e c i f i e d c o n d i t i o n s i n d i v i d u a l a n g er c o a l e s c e s , w i t h h i g hr e g u l a r i t y , i n t o c o l l e c t i v e d i s c o n t en t ; t h a t u nd er f u r t h e r s p e c i f i e dc o n d i t i o n s c o l l e c t i v e d i s c o n t e n t h a s a h i g h p r o b a b i l i t y o f p r od uc in gv i o l e n t a c t i o n . I t i s not enough t o show th at th es e th in gs happensometimes, A t the very l e a s t , they must happen more o f te n than chance .would pred ic t .

Gurr h imsel f goes a t t he prob lem through the . an a l ys is of 1 ,100 .. ,.. . . .. .

s t r i f e e v e n ts w hich o c cu rr e d i n 1 1 4 s t a t e s o r c o l o n i e s fro m 1 96 1.... . . .. . . .. . . . 1 _ . . ~ ., . .:.. . .. .. .: t h ro u gh 196 5; The an a l y s i s p ro du ces some s t r i k i n g s t a t i s t i c a l r e - ; . , . .

, - 3 . , . . .. , .. . ., ., . ' ;; . ,.-, . . . . .. . , . . s u l t s ( i n c l ud i n g m u l t i p l e ' c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s on t h e o r de r of . , ,.

'. : . ., . . . , .. , . . . .. . :. ..80 which' Gurr takes to con r m t h e i n ue n c e of . t h e v a r i a b l e s h e .

I+

. .

. . . ..:. . . c a l l s Pe rs is t i ng Depr iva t ion , Short-Term Depr iva t ion , Regime Legi t -.I . . . . .. ..., . . . .. . . imacy a nd, e s p e c i a l l y , S o c i a l and S t r u c t u r a l F a c i l i t a t i o n .. . .


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T h i s l a s t v a r i a b l e , S o ci a l and S t r u c t u r a l F a ci l it a t io n , i l l u s -t r a t e s some of t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n i n t e r p r e t i n g Gu r r' s r e s u l t s .Af ter c ons ider able exper imenta t ion , Gurr combined th ree d i f fe re n tindexes

1) a measure of geographic i na cc es s i b i l i ty which gaveh igh s co res to coun t r i e s wi th rough t e r r a i n s andp oo r t r a n s p o r t n e t s ;2 a measure of th e ex te nt t o which t h e Communist pa rt ywas b o t h a c t i v e and i l l e g a l ;3) a measu re of fo r e ig n s upport fo r domest ic in i t i a to r sof s t r i f e .

A l l of t h e s e a r e p l au s i b ly r e l a t e d t o t h e l e v e l o f c o n f l i c t - -t h eCommunist P ar ty and fo re ig n suppo rt ite ms s o much so th a t one mustwonder w het he r ~ u r r as measured th e same th in g twic e. (The same.wor ry abou t con tamina t ion dogs the in te rp re ta t i on of the f ind ing th a t

l eg i t ima te r eg imes have lower l e ve l s o f s t r i f e . ) The cons ide rab leexplanatory s t r en gt h of th ese va r ia b le s , however , p rovides no ev idencewhat soever fo r the ce n t r a l r e l a t i ve -dep r iva t ion a rgumen t.

The two measures of dep r iv at io n a r e more c ru ci a l t o th e theoryand more c l e a r l y i ndependent of th e phenomena Gurr s seeking to ex-p l a i n , b u t t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l s o r a i s e s s e r i o u s prob lem s. F i r s t ,t h e q u a l i t y of d a t a s low. Second, th e 114 p o l i t i e s form a cross -se ct io n a t th e same point of t ime; th a t means one must judge t hee f f e c ts of long-run changes i n dep r iva t io n , fo r example , th rough th ecomparison of regimes which vary i n economic di sc ri mi na tio n, poli-t i c a l d i s c r im ina t ion , po ten t i a l s epa ra t i s m, dependence on p r i va tefo re ign ca p i t a l , r e l ig io us c leavage , and educa t iona l oppor tun i ty


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( f o r t hos e a r e t he e s s e n t i a l c r i t e r i a of long -run de p r i va t i on ) a t agive n moment. Third, th e ba si c va ri ab le s went through so much sel ec-t i o n and re-measurement i n th e course of Gu rr s r ese arc h (th e twodep riv at i on measures, fo r example, combining i n a pa rt ic u la r way th e1 3 s t u r d i e s t s u r v iv o r s of t h e 8 sepa ra te measures of dep r iva t ion wi thwhich Gurr began) t h a t th e da ta may well have become a glo ve shapedwe l l t o one hand, and to no o the r.* The c r u c i a l t e s t s w i l l come whenGu rr s model i s checked ag ain st good data f or appro priately-lag gedtim se r ie s, with independently-measured v ar ia bl es covering new t imepe r iods and new se t s of p o l i t i ca l un i t s .

The fur the r re sea rch i s de f i ni te ly worth under taking. For onethin g, Gurr has reduced to a manageable model t h e es se nt ia ls o f ashape l e ss bu t pe rvas ive s e t o f i deas encounte red i n b ranch a f t e r b ranchof p o l i t i c a l a na l y si s . For anothe r, he has worked o ut a n ingeniousse r i e s o f p rocedures fo r measuring the ma jor va r i ab l e s wi th in t hemodel. For once we have a genuine oppo rtuni ty t o confron t theoryw i t h da t a .

I f t he ar gume nts of t h i s e ss ay a r e c o r r e c t , t ha t c on f r on t a t i onw i l l f e t c h a smashing blow t o the very social-psy cholog ical theoryGurr espouses . To make su re tha t so c r uc ia l a con tes t proceeds t o af a i r and f u l l c on cl us io n w i l l req uir e some reworking of th e theory .For example , Gurr s de f i ni t io ns e l im in a t e one major ca tegory of col -l e c t i v e v io l ence : co l l e c t i ve v io l ence ca r r i ed ou t by agent s of t h e

*with my own da t a on co l l ec t i v e vio l ence and in du s t r i a l con f l i c ti n Western Europe, a judi c iou s se lec t io n of cases , var iab le lags andmodels makes i t easy t o produce mul t iple c or re l a t i on s above 80


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s t a t e . A c t u a l ly , a good d e a l of a c t i o n of t h i s v a r i e t y s l i p s i n t oGur r ' s ana lys i s d i s gu i s ed as the work o f "d i s s iden t s . " For (contraryt o th e image of Dis s ide nts l ash ing out a t Regimes) the gre a t bu lk ofthe k i l l i n g and wounding i n the cou r se o f modern c o l l ec t iv e v io lences done by t roops , po l i ce and o the r s pec ia l i zed r ep res s i ve fo rces

More impor tan t, the r eg ime normal ly has th e g rea te r d i s c r e t ion i n th i sregard . Many demons tra t ions , fo r in s ta nc e , pass peacef u l ly . But afew br in g de ath , mainly when some re pr es en ta ti ve of th e governmentdecide s the demons tra tors have gone too f a r . Nothing i n Gurr ' s schemepermi t s us t o in fe r when r ep res s ive v io len ce w l l occur, and t o whom.

Likewis e , an important po r t io n o f c o l l e c t iv e v io len ce p i t s con-tender s f o r power ag a ins t each o the r , r a th e r than r eb e l s aga ins tregimes. Gur r ' s scheme e l imin a tes s uch co n f l i c t s i n p r in c ip l e , wh i leh i s da ta inc lude them i n p rac t i c e . No ca tego ry i n the scheme, fu r t he r -more, d e a l s w i t h t h e p r o b a b i l i t y , o r t h e e f f e c t , of a g i t a t i o n , o r ga n i -aa t ion , mobi l iza t ion , leade rsh ip , pool ing of resources , developmentof i nt e rn al communications among po t en t ia l reb el s . We have only th eg r o s s d i f f e r e n c e s combined i n S o c i a l an d S t r u c t u r a l F a c i l i t a t i o n .

One might be ab le t o meet the se ob jec t io ns by refocus ing th ef r u s t r a t i o n - a g g r e s s i o n a n a l y s i s o n gr ou ps w i t h i n a s t a t e , and r e l a -ti o n s among them. Gurr makes some va lu ab le , i f fl e e ti n g, sugges-t i on s a s to how one might do tha t : s ep a ra te d i s con ten t s co res fo r ,each major segment of th e pop ula tio n, and so on. To do t h a t workse ri ou sl y, however, would amount t o tak in g up the very so r t s of s tr uc -t u r a l a n a l y s i s t h e c e n t r a l a rgum ent d i s m i ss e s .


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Alternat ive Sources of TheoryA t t h i s moment, b e t t e r guidance fo r those who wish to s o r t ou t

t h e h i s t o r i c a l e x pe ri en c e of p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t i s coming from socials c i e n t i s t s who ha ve e l e c t e d t o work l e s s a bs t r a c t l y , c l o s e t o h i s t o r i -c a l f a c t , w i th g r e a t e r a t t e n t i on t o d i v i s i ons and va r i a t i on s w i t h i nth e cou nt rie s under st ud y, and i n a comparative framework. (This mightseem inevi table; i t i s i n f a c t , e xce p ti ona l ; t he s t r onge s t i n f l ue nce sof s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c pr oc ed ur es on h i s t o r i c a l p r a c ti c e , a s i n t h ecas es of demography, l i n g u i s t i c s and economic theory, normally in-volve complex, ab s t ra c t th eor ies . )

Barrin gton Moore s So cia l Or igin s of Di cta to rsh ip nd Democracy,f o r example, commands th e i nt e r es t and respec t of a wide range ofh i s t o r i a n s . I t s concent ra t i on on the c l a s s d iv i s i ons and a l l i a nc eswhich cre a t e revolut ion ary s i tu a t io ns , and the coa l i t ion s which maketh e revolu t ions themselves, s t ron gly counters the soc iolo gic a l t end-ency to consider rev olu t ion a s the express ion of a c r i t i c a l l e v e l oftens ion, aggress ion o r mal funct ion i n th e system as a whole .

The complex web of th e book s argumen t.han gs on two pegs: 1 ) th eidea t h a t t he c l a s s co a l i t i o ns i nvolved i n t he grea t moderni zing revo-lu t i on s, and hence th e char acte r of tho se rev olu t ion s, have dependedespec i a l l y on the fa t e s of t he a g r a r i a n c l a s s e s i n t he c ou r se of t hecommerc ia l iza tion of ag r i cu l t ur e and the growth of the (s ta te , wi th th el iq ui da t io n of th e peasant ry and the co-opta tion of the a r i s to cr acyand gentry, fo r example, being c ru ci al i n England; 2 t he f u r t he ridea t h a t t he c l a s s co a l i t i o n making the revolu t ion has s t rongly


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i n f luenced t he subsequent po l i t i ca l o rgan i za t i on of t ha t country , wi tha coa l i t i on of bureauc ra t s and l and lords , fo r i ns t ance , t end ing t oproduce fascism. Thus parliam enta ry democracy .becomes th e h is to ri ca l-ly- spe cif ic consequence of t he ear ly emergence of ag ra ri an capi t al is mi n ce r t a i n cou nt r ies , a c i rcumstance perhaps never to be repea tedagain. Moore provid es evidence f o r . h i s twin thes es via extended compar-i son s of t he h i s to r i es of England, France, the United s ta te s , China,Japan and In di a, pl us numerous exc ursi ons t o Germany and Rus sia.

R ev o lu ti on t a k e s on an i n t e r e s t i n g r o l e i n ~ o o r e ' s cheme. Themajor revolut ion- -the Engl ish Ci vi l War, th e French Revolut ion, and s oon- -act s a s a c r uc i a l swi t ch i n t he t r ack along which a pa r t i cu l a rcountry ' moves. Yet rev olu t io n dis so lve s a s a phenomenon ge ne ri s ,f o r t becomes s imp ly t h e maximum moment o f c o n f l i c t s which endu re .l ong be fore and l ong a f t e r t he t r ans fe r o f power i t s e l f ; i ndeed, t heca se of Germany shows th a t t h e fundamental tr a n s f e r s of power whichoccupy th e ceriter. o Moore's a na ly si s can occur without any rev olut iona t a l l i n t h e c o nv e nt io n a l se n s e of t h e word:

The not ion tha t a violent popular revolut ion s somehownecessary i n order to sweep away feudal ob s ta c le s toi n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n s pure nonsense, a s th e course ofGerman and Japanese history.demonstrates. On the o th erhand, th e p o l i t i c a l consequences from dismounting th eo ld . o rde r from above a re dec ide ly d i f f e r en t . s they ,proceeded with con serv at ive modernizat ton, the se semi-parl iamen tary governments t r ie d t o pres erve a s much oft h e o r i g i n a l s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e a s t he y co ul d, f i t t i n gl a rg e sec t i ons i n to t he new bui ld ing whereve r poss ib l e .The r e s u l t s had some resemblance to present-day Victor-ia n houses with modern e le c t r i ca l ki tchens bu t in-su ff ic ie n t bathrooms and leaky pipe s hidden decorouslybehind newly pl as te re d wal ls . U l ti m at el y t h e m k e s h i f t sco lla ps ed . (Moore 1966: 438).

W e f ind ourse lves a t the o pposi te p os i t io n from Chalmers Johnson's


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of product ion--land, lab or , equipment--are renderedre l a t i ve ly immobil e by p r io r l i e n s and e xpe c t a t i ons ;p r o d u ct s a r e s o l d i n t h e m ar ke t t o p ro du ce t h e e x t r amargin of re tu rn s with which t o buy goods one does notproduce on the homestead. I n c o n t r a s t , . t h e f ar mer e n t e r st h e m ar ke t f u l l y , s u b j e c t s h i s l a n d and l a b o r t o o penc o mp e ti ti o n, e x pl or e s a l t e r n a t i v e u se s f o r t h e f a c t o r sof produc t ion i n the se a rch f o r maximum re t ur ns , andf a v o r s th e more pr of i t ab le pro duc t over th e one en-t a i l i n g th e smal le r r i s k . The change-over f rom peasantt o farmer , however, s not merely a change i n psycholog-i c a l o r i e n ta t i o n ; t i n v ol v e s a m ajo r s h i f t i n t h ein s t i t u t i o n a l c on t e x t wi t h in wh ic h men make t h e i rchoices . Perhaps t s pr e c i se ly when the pe a sa n t c a nno longe r r e ly on h i s a c customed in s t i t u t i o n a l c on-t e x t t o r e du c e h i s r i s k s , b u t when a l t e r n a t i v e i n s t i -t u t i o n s a r e e i t h e r to o c h ao t ic o r t oo r e s t r i c t i v e t ogua ra n t e e a v i ab l e commitment t o new ways, t h at th epsyc ho log i c al , e conomic , so c i a l a nd p o l i t i c a l t e ns ionsa l l mount toward peasant r e b e l l io n and involvement i nrevolut ion Wolf 1969: XIV-XV .

From th a t spr ingbo ard , Wolf l ea ps t o a c lo se examina t ion of th ee x p er i e nc e of t h e p ea s a nt r y i n ea ch o f h i s c o u n t r i e s , t o s c r u t i n yof t h e c ond i t i ons under wh ic h ea c h o f t he re vo lu t i on s i n que s t i onbroke ou t , a nd t o c ompara ti ve a n a ly s i s o f t he de t e rmina n ts of t h econs idera bly d i f f e r en t forms of involvement of the se var io us peasantpop ula t io ns i n t h e i r na tcon a l movements.

Some common f ea tu re s emerge: th e cr u c ia l r o l e of th e middlep e a s a n t s, r a t h e r t h an t h e r u r a l p r o l e t a r i a n s o r t h e k u l a k i ; t h ei n f l u e nc e of a l l i a n c e s wi th d i s a f f e c te d i n t e l l e c t u a l s : t h e i n i t i a l -l y de fe n s ive and inward- looking c ha r a c t e r of a l l t he p re se n tr e b e l l i o n s ; th e frequ ent oc curr ence of a deadlock of weak contend ersf o r powe r, u l t im a te ly fa vora b l e t o we l l -o rga n i z e d . c e n t ra 1 g roupsa l l i e d w it h m i l i t a r y power; t h e f i n a l i n a b i l i t y of p e a s an t s t oa cc o mp l is h t h e i r p o l i t i c a l e nd s, however s u c c e s s f u l t h e i r r e b e l l i o n s


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i n t h e s h o r t r u n, i n t h e ab se nc e of s t r o n g a l l i a n c e s w i th d e t er -mined and organized non-peasants.

I n the long run , Wolf s s ens e o f the va r i ab les involved w i l lprobab ly co n t r i bu te more t o our under s tanding of po l i t i c a l con-f l i c t than h i s enumera t ion o f th e cons tan t s . He shows ve ry e f -f e c t i v e l y ( i n a l i n e of a rgument s i m i l a r t o M oo re s) t h a t t h e c o a l i -t i o n s f ormed by r e b e l l i o u s p e a sa n t s s t r o n g l y a f f e c t w he th er t h e i rac t i on s go beyond th e immediate red re ss of gr ievances , th a t where

c o m m er c ia l i za t i on ha s p roc ee ded s o f a r a s t o d i s s o l v e t h e t r a d i -t i on al org ani za t ion of th e peasant community reb el l i on does notoccur (cont rary to the mass-socie ty not ion t h a t a tomized and anguishedmen make id e al r eb el s ) , t h a t a c en te r- ou tw ar d p a t t e r n o f r e b e l l i o n ,s i n Ru ssi a, China and Vi et Nam, fa v or s th e expanded power of a

s i ng le pa r ty a s oppos ed t o an army and /o r a na t ion a l bou rgeo i s i e .t pres en t , ex tens ions of s imple bu t powerfu l ana lys es l i k e

W ol f s a r e l i k e l y t o a i d t h e s ys te m at ic s t ud y of p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c tmore than th e bor rowing of more e la bor a te ,an d ab s t ra c t schemes l i k eth os e of Johnson and Gurr. t would he lp to ex p l i ca te and fo rma l izeWolf s a rgumen t, t o f ind qu an t i t a t iv e r ep res e n ta t io ns of the a rgu-ment and q u a n t i t a t i v e ev i de n ce t o t e s t i t out where poss i b le , andt o c o m p ut e ri z e p o r t i o n s o f t h e a n a l y s i s where t h e d a t a a r e r i c henough. The ch oi ce i s not between handwork and apparatus but be-tween s tr on g the ory and weak. The ju nc ti on of th e powerful id ea sof a Wolf o r a Moore wit h the new methods emerging i n h i s t o r i c a lr e s e a r c h w i l l p r o d u c e e x c i t i n g r e s u l t s .


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C o l l e c t i v e H i s t o r yhave i n mind e spe c i a l l y t he i nc re a s ing r i c hne ss of t he work

now be ing done i n c o l l e c t i v e h i s to ry : h i s to ry f rom the bo ttom up.C o l l e c ti v e h i s t o r y i s th e syst ema tic accumulat io n of comparable in-format ion on numerous so c i a l un i t s (most of te n ind iv i dua ls , but some-t i m es f a m i l i e s , f i r m s , c om mu niti es o r o t h e r u n i t s ) i n o r d e r t o d e t e c tsome s t r u c t u r e o r some change which i s n ot r e a d i ly v i s i b l e t o t h epa r t ic ip an ts or th e obse rver s . The sha rpe s t examples come fromdemography, where changes i n th e average age a t marr iage or i n th ed e a t h r a t e h av e n on e of t h e d r a m at i c v i s i b i l i t y of t h e d e a t h o f aking o r t he outbreak of a war , bu t o f t en have more profound e ff , ec t so n t h e l i v i n g c o n d i t i o ns of l a r g e p o p u l at i o n s t h a n t h e d r am a t ice ve n t s do. Hi s to r i c a l demogra phers l i k e E A Wrigley and LouisHenry have been trans form ing ou r knowledge of European so ci et y wi thth ir i n g en i o us e x p l o i t a t i o n o f e ve ry d ay s o u r c e s l i k e p a r i s h r e g i s -t e r s a nd ge ne a log ie s . The log i c of many s t ud i e s of e l i t e s and o fs o c i a l mob i l i t y r e se mble s t h a t o f h i s to r i c a l demography: a sse mblesmall, uni fo rm and os t e n s ib ly t r i v i a l f r agmen t s o f i n fo rma t iona bou t i nd iv idua l s i n to e v ide nc e of ma jo r c ha nges i n s t r uc tu re .E ss en t i a l ly s im i l a r procedures should .make i t poss ib l e t o r e ne wpsyc holo gica l h i s t or y , the h i s t or y of consumption and produc t ion ,i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y and t h e h i s t o r y o f p o l i t i c a l power; s o f a rt he y ha ve been l i t t l e t r i e d .


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I n s t u d i e s of p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t , t he y h ave b ee n t r i e d , w i t hresounding suc ces s. The French and the fran cop hile s have le d.Georges Lefebvre , th e gre at , long- l ived h i s t or ia n of th e Revolut ion ,provided much of th e ins pi ra t i on , i f not much of th e technique. Heforwarded the id ea of mul t ip le , semi autrmommrevolutions converg-ing in to a s i ng le Revolut ion . More impor tant methodological ly , h edemonstrated t h a t th e semi-autonomous re volut ions- -espe cial l y th epeasant revolution--were ac ce ss ibl e to study from th e bottom up.But he d id not sy stema t ize the s tudy of the popula t ions involved.Alber t Soboul d id . Soboul has no doubt been ~ e f e b v r e ' smost in-f l u e n t i a l h e i r i n b ot h r e ga rd s. H i s 1958 the s i s , ans -cu lo t t e sp a r i s i e n s ---n l ' a n 11 shone a s po t l i gh t on fac es previously deepi n shadow--the fac es of the day-to-day a c t i v i s t s of th e Pa r i s i anse c t i o n s . (The sec tio ns were es se nt i ' al ly neighhorhood governments

and p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i at i o n s .) I.t d i d s o ma i nl y t h ro u gh t h e s t r a i g h t -forward but extremely demanding an al ys is of the papers of th esec t io ns themse lves , and the pa ins t aking r eco ns t i tu t ion of th e i rmembership.

t about t h e same time, Richard Cobb was ca rr yi ng ou t a c l o s estudy of t he composi t ion and c ha ra ct er i s t i cs of th e volunteer Revo-lutionary Armies which played such a c r u c i a l r o l e i n t h e e ar l yyea rs of th e Revolution, I&re Tjdnnesson was fol lowin g th e Pa ri si ansan s-c ulo t te s through the Year 111 George Rude was analyzing theac tua l compos i tion of the r evo lu t ionary c rowds of the g r ea t ~ou rn 'e es ,Adeline Daumard, Louis Chevalier and F r a n ~ o i s uret were cl os el ysc ru t i n i z i ng the changing compqsit ion and ' weal th of the P ar is ia n


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popul a t ion f rom th e l a t e e ig h te ent h century to 1848, and R6miGossez was appl yi ng many of th e same microscop ic proce dures t othe Revolu t ion of 1848. These h i s t or ia ns vary gre a t ly i n preconcep-t i on s , - t ec hn iq ue s and su bj ec t mat ter . What br i ngs them toget her ,wit h dozens of t h e i r com patr i ots, a s exponents of a new brand ofh i s t o r y i s the del ibera te accumulat ion of un i form dossiers on numer-o us o r d i n a r y i n d i v i d u a l s i n o r d e r t o p ro du ce s o l i d i n f or m a ti o n o nc o l l e c t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s n o t r e a d i l y v i s i b l e i n t h e e x p er ie nc es ofany one of them. The s o l id in format i on was of te n qu an t i ta t i ve , a l -though th e q ua n t i f i ca t i on invo lved was o rd in a r i ly e l emen tary .

The adop t ion of co l l ec t i ve h i s t o r y d id no t , of cou r se , gua ran teesuccess . t could have been a t e r r i b l e was te o f t ime. Indeed , i tshould have been, i f o ld th eo r ie s abou t th e b l ind spon tane i ty ofth e masses were co r re c t . s i t t u rned ou t , however, co l l ec t i veh i s t o r y y i e l d e d g r e a t r e t u r n s when a p p l i e d t o F re nc h p o l i t i c a l c on-f l i c t s . His tor ian s now unders tand how wide and deep was the po l i t i -c a l mo bi li za ti on of or di na ry Frenchmen i n 1789 and 1848, how coher-en t th e ac t io n of the so -ca l l ed mob, how sha rp the r i f t s wi t h in thec o a l i t i o n which made the Revolu tion had become by 1793. The Mar xistapproach to the s tu dy of French p o l i t i ca l co n f l i c t s ga ined newst re ng th , bo th because Marxis ts were more inc l ined than o t he rs t o takeup t h e d l o s e s t u d y o f t h e l f t t l e p e o pl e tt w hich t h i s s o r t o f c o l l e c t -iv e h i s to ry involved, and because the Marx is t t r ad i t io n providedmore powerful means of ana lyz ing major di vi si on s wit hi n th e popu-l a t i o n t ha n i t s r i v a l s d i d .


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Although much more has been accompl i shed a long th es e l i n e s i nF re nc h h i s t o r y t h a n e l se w he r e, t h e c o sm o po l it an Geor ge ~ u d 6 r o u g htth e p roc e dure s he pe r f e c t e d i n de a l i ng wi th F re nc h crowds bac k a c r os st h e c ha nn el t o B r i t a i n , w h i le s t u d e n t s of t h e P u r i t a n Re v ol u ti o n, o ft h e American R evol ut io n and of modern Germany have been d ev is in g ver -s i o n s of c o l l e c t i v e h i s t o r y which a l s o p ro mi se t o renew t h e i r a r e a so f s t udy . I n some o f t he se e n t e rp r i s e s t he un i t under e xa minat ions no t t h e i nd iv i dua l bu t t he e ve n t, t h e de c l a r a t i on , t h e movement,

o r something e l s e . But t h e l og i c s s t l l th e same: com parable in-for mati on about numerous unitssummed i n t o pa t t er ns and changes whicha re o th er wi se d i f f i c u l t t o d e t ec t .

These de ve lopmen t s i n h i s t o r i c a l r e se a rc h make t p o s s i b l e ,as n ev er b e f or e , t o j o i n t o ge t he r t h e r i c h n e ss of t h e h i s t o r i c a lr e c or d , t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e k i n d s o f h i s t o r i c a l l y - b a s e d t h e o ry e la b -or a t ed by Moore and Wolf, and t he se a rc hin g ana ly t i c procedures ofcontemporary so c i a l sc ien ce . Not th a t we should abandon t h e s tu dyof t he p re s e n t . The po i n t , on t h e c on t ra ry , s t o i n t e g r a t e t h ee x am i na t io n o f t o da y w i t h t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n of y e s t e r d a y .

T ha t i n t e g r a t i o n w i l l b e e a s i e r i f we s t a p t r e a t i n g t h e p a s tas a r e p o s i t o r y o f G r e a t R ev o lu t io n s an d t h e p r e s e n t a s a c o n t a i n e ro f o t h e r k i nd s o f c o n f l i c t s . I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e a tt e mp t t o p l a c e t h eg r e a t s t r u g g l e s f o r power i n t h e co n t e x t o f t h e w ho le r a n g e o f p o l-i t i c a l c o n f l i c t w l l i t s e l f b r i n g o u t many o f t h e c o n t i n u i t i e sbe twe e n pa s t a nd p re se n t .


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An Approach and Some Co ncep tsOf cou r se , s uch an expansion o f the f i e l d of v i s io n p res en t s

t s own problems. I f re vo lu ti on s indee d a mult i-dim ension al phen-omenon, a lo ng which dime nsion s sho uld we expand? For example, onee a sy b u t i n a d e qu a t e f o rm u l at i on t r e a t s r e v o l u t i o n a s a n e x tr em e c a s eof a more ge ne ra l phenomenon ca ll ed viole nce. I f we were t o manu-fa c t ur e a Vio lence Detec tor which would c la ng louder and louder a s tpas sed g rea te r and g r ea t e r deg rees o f damage t o pe r sons o r p roper ty ,however, t would r a i s e a hullab alo o around wars ,hoc key games,barrom brawls o r e ve ry da y l i f e i n p r i s o n s , m e n ta l h o s p i t a l s a nd hous-i n g p r o j e c t s , w h i l e o n ly ch im in g g e n t l y i n t h e v i c i n i t y of a g r e a tmany coups d ' e t a t , demons tr a t ions , gene ra l s t r i k e s and so -ca l l edreb e l l i ons . I f v io lenc e and r evo lu t i on go toge the r to some ex t en t ,t s no t becaus e v io lence s the e s s ence of r evo lu t ion , bu t becaus e

men tu rn t o unl imi ted means of coerc i on i n t h e f l u i d i t y o f a revolu-t i o n a r y s i t u a t i ' o n , as i n a number of o t h e r f l u i d s i t u a t i o n s .

Le t us r e t u r n t o t h e e x a c t r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n v i o l e n c e a n dp o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t l a t e r o n. F or now, t h e i m p or t an t p o i n t s t h a tv io lenc e by i t s e l f does no t de f ine a cont inuum of r evo lut ionnessa t one end of which we f in d the full -f l edg ed Great Revolution. Thesame a p p l i e s t o a l l t h e o t h e r o bv io us p o s s i b i l i t i e s : a ) t r a n s f e r o fpower a s a cont inuum, w i th th e lar ge s t t ra ns fe r (however la rges def ine d) th e most revolu t ionary ; b) soc ia l change a s a

continuum, wit h th e most rap id and/or most far-reac hing th emost r e v o l u t i on a r y ; c ) i l l e g i t i m a c y of p o l i t i c a l


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action, with the most illegitimate the most revolutionary; d) scaleof collective'action, ith large-scale more revolutionary; e) locusof action, with action by underdogs more revolutionary. Each ofthese identifies some significant link between revolutions and otherevents. None of them singly defines the range of phenomena in-eluding revolution.

For the moment, then, let us assume that we are exploring thearea of convergence of all these roads. We can call the entire regionpolitical conflict, and leave its outer limits indefinite. The

more violent, power-transferring, illegitimate etc. etc. the event,the closer we are coming to home. As we work, we can decide whichroads are actually dead ends, and which ones main highways.

A preliminary map of the region should include several impor-tant landmarks: a government, a polity, contenders for power. Forany specified population, let us identify the organizations whichcontrol the principal concentrated means of coercion; such organi-zations are governments. In any particular population there may beseveral governments operating, or none at all. To the extent thatsuch an organization is formally coordinated, centralized, differ-

. . , . . . .. ., . ., . , .. entlated: from other organizations and territorially exclusive it is ' . . . . .

" ' astate but many governments are not states. Let now single , .. . - . . .. .

.. ; out every group within the pobulation which during some specified ... . : * . . I . ... : . ... . , . ' . span of time collectively apply resources to the influence of a par-:., :. . i . . % ... .: . ? .,... i s . . titular governmenti they are contenders for power with respect to. . . . . . . .. . .. . , ; . : . . *. . e : . ,.. . . . . .I . I : . . . . .. . . that gove'rnment. That do'es not mean they are equally ~owerfui r. . . . . . .

, . . . , . . c. .. , . . .. . . . . . .


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e qua l ly suc c e s s fu l . To the e x t e n t t ha t a c on te nde r e xe rc i se s arou t in e l c l a im to re sponse on the pa r t o f a ge n t s o f t he gove rnme nt ,t he c on te nde r i s a member of t he p o l i t y ; t h e p o l i t y c o n si s t s of a l lc on te nde rs rou t ine ly and suc c e s s fu l ly l a y in g c l a ims on th e governmen t.The nonmembers which a r e conten ding f o r power we may c a l l c ha ll en ge rs .Most g roups wi th in any pa r t i c u l a r popu la t i on a r e no t c on te nde rs ,many co nte nd ers a r e not members, .and some members a r e a b l e t o exer-c i s e f a r l a r g e r c on t ro l ove r t he a c t i v i t y of t he gove rnme nt t ha n o th e rmembers. Obviously, a group may contend f o r power i n more th an onepo l i t y ( a nd even be a member of more t ha n one) i f more th an one gov-ernment i s ope ra t i ng wi th i n a popu la t ion . The se a r e s imply ma t t e r so f d e f i n i t i o n .

I l a y o u t t h e s e u n ga i nl y d e f i n i t i o n s (and o t h e r s , a l a s , s t i l lt o come) wi th tremb ling hands. Al be rt Hirschman (1970)--no mean

wi eld er of paradigms himself--has warned e lo que ntl y ag ain st these a rc h fo r parad igms a s a h indra nc e t o unders t and ing re vo lu t io ns andp o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t . S o c i o l o gi s t s and p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s a r e ex-ceedingly vulnerable to the o ld magica l misconcept ion tha t naming aphenomenon has the effect of taming i t Most con cept ual schemes a r e ,a s Hi rschman c l a ims , more t r oub le t ha n the y a r e worth: b l i nde rs ,not te l esc op es. The t e s t s of a schemet .s va lu e come from th e under-s t a nd ing , t he fu r t he r e xp lo ra t i ons , t he new hypo the ses , t he ve r i -f i ab l ' e prop os i t i ons which s pr i ng f rom i t s use . The scheme a t hand i sl i t t l e t e s t e d i n any of t h e s e r e g ar d s .


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Yet t he d e f in i t i o ns make t poss ib l e t o map ou t a s e t of r e l a -t i o n s among cont ende rs , p o l i t i e s and governments. (The mapping i sof co urse , hyp oth e t i ca l , i n the same way th a t one might envis ion as t r a ig h t road be tween London and Pa r i s , only t o d i scov er t he incon-ve n ie n t f a c t of t h e Eng l ish Channe l. ) Every po l i t y , l e t u s s a y ,es ta bl is h es te s t s of membership. The t e s t s may inc lud e proof ofs a n c t i t y , o r w e al t h , o r a ny number o f o t h e r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , b u t t h eya lw a ys i n c l u d e t h e a b i l i t y t o m o b i li z e o r c o e r c e s i g n i f i c a n t numbers

of people . Plembers of a p o l i t y r e pe a t e d ly t e s t e ac h o t he r s qua l i -f i c a t i on s . When a member fa i l s a p a r t i a l t e s t , more se r io us c ha l -l e nge s t o t h e i r membersh ip fo ll ow{ re pe a t e d fa i l u r e l e a d s t o e x-c l u s i o n fr om t h e p o l i t y . New members en te r by pa ssi ng t h e t e s t s ofmembership; o ld members e x i t by fa i l i n g them. Each en tr y and eache x i t c ha ng es t h e c r i t e r i a of membership i n a d i r e c t i o n f a v o r a b l e t ot h e re su l t in g s e t of members, and th e members of th e po l i ty comet o t r e a t t h e p r e va i l i n g c r i t e r i a a s m at te rs of r i g h t , j u s t i c e andp r i n c i p l e .

W i th i n t h e p o l i t y , a cc o rd i ng t o t h i s h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n s t ru c -t i o n , s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t k i nd s of i n t e r a c t i o n s a r e c o n s t a n tl y g oi ngon:

1. members o f t he p o l i t y a r e rou t ine ly a pp ly ing re sourc e st o th e inf lue nce of the government ;2 non-members a r e a l s o a t tempt ing to inf lue nce th e gov-ernment and t o ac qu ir e membership i n th e p o li t y , and mem-be rs (a ct in g most ly through agencies. of th e government)a r e r e s i s t i n g t h o s e a t te m p ts ;


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3 members a re t e s t i n g each o th er through a wide rangeof in t e r a c t i ons which cou ld inc lud e con test ed e l ec t i ons ,parl iamen tary deb ates , ceremonial dis pla ys , gang wars oradvantageous marr iages .

The t es ti n g proce ss by which cont end ers ac qu ir e or l os e membershiptends to i nc rea se the e xte nt of co ll e ct iv e violedc e when th e member-sh i p of t h e p o l i t y s chang ing f as t . Pros pect ive members ord in ar i l yt re a t admission t o the p ol i t y a s due them on general grounds, and ,t h e r e f o r e f i g h t i n t h e name of l a r g e p r i n c i p l e s . Existing memberso n t h e way o u t o r d i n a r i l y t r e a t t h e i r p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n a s g ua r-anteed by pa rt ic ul ar agreements and customs, and the ref ore f ig hti n th e name of the defens e of hol lowed r i gh ts . Ei th er of the seo r i e n t a t i o n s i n c r e a se s t h e w i l l i n g n e s s of t h e i nd i v i d u a l s i n t h egroup t o r i s k damage or i n j u r y , t h us t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n vi o le n ce .(Note, however , th at over th e long run contenders en ter ing and leav-ing t he po li ty tend to rec eiv e more damage and in ju ry t han they in-f l i c t , s inc e the concen t ra t ed and e f f ec t i ve means of coerc ion a r eunder t he co nt ro l of th e members v i a t h e i r in f luen ce over th e gov-ern me nt. We sh a l l r e t u r n t o t h i s p ro ble m l a t e r on.) I f t h i s g en e r all i n e o f r easoning s c o r r e c t , m ost c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e w l l opposemembers of t h e p o l i t y t o non-members, members t o members, and ag en ts ,of th e government to non-members. Vi ole nt co n fl ic t s of ag ent sof government aga in st each ot he r, ag en ts ag ai ns t members andnon-members a g a in s t non-members w l l be cor respondingly rare .Mobilization and Contention for Power

How do cont en de rs f o r power come and go? Here th e id ea ofmobi l i za t ion s he lp fu l (see Deutsch 1953, E tzi on i 1968, Ne tt1 1967).Men ge t t h e i r work done by accumulating and employing a g r e a t


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var ie t y of r e sou rces to in f luence each o the r and t o t r ans fo rm t heworld around them. The res ou rce s in clu de l o y a l t i e s , knowledge,we alth , machines, communication l i n e s and any number of ot he r t hi ng s.We can convenien t ly group them i n t o th ree c a teg or ie s : normat ive ,coerc ive , and u t i l i t a r i a n ( th e terminology comes from Etz ion i 1968,bu t the genera l idea i s commonplace). Normative resources includeth e commitments of men t o i d ea ls , groups and ot he r men; co er ci vereso urce s inc lude means of punishing ot he r men and l im it in g th ea l t e r n a t i v e s open t o t hem; u t i l i t a r i a n r e so ur ce s i n c l ud e a l l t h ere s t , e sp ec ia l ly those th ings men f in d i t reward ing t o acqu ire .

When a group increases i t s c o l l e c t i v e c o n t r o l o v er anyof the se thre e v a r i e t i e s of resource s , we say the group i s mobi l i -zing; when i t s co l l ec t i ve con t ro l ove r such re sou rces dec reases ,we say i t i s demobi l iz ing . The group i n qu es ti on may ra nge from af am i ly t o a t r i b e t o a s t a t e t o a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l f e d e r a t i o n ofs t a t e s ; t h e i m p or ta n t th i n g i s t h a t the g roup a s a whole acq u i r es o rlo se s co l l ec t iv e con t ro l of r e sou rces . No group can t ake any s o r tof co l l ec t i ve ac t i on wi thout some degree of mobi l iz a t ion ; demobi li -z a t i o n u l t i m a t e l y d e s t r o y s a g ro up s c a p a c i t y f o r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .

Although t h e terminology may be ponderous, th e co re meaningcomes c lo se to a s t andard no t ion o f ac t i ve r evo l u t ion a r i e s . I n one

of h i s most i n f l u e n t i a l s t a t e m e nt s of s t r a t e g y d u r i ng t h e r e s i s t a n c et o Jap an, Mao Tse-Tung wro te a s fol low s:

Idhat does p o l i t i c a l mobi l iz a t ion mean? F i r s t , i t meanste l l in g the a rmy and th e people abou t the p o l i t i c a l a imof th e war. t i s n ec es sa ry f o r e ve ry s o l d i e r and c i v i l i a nt o s e e why t h e war must be fo ught and how i t concerns him.


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Secondly, i t i s no t enough m erely t o ex p l a i n t h ea i m t o them; t h e s t e p s and p o l i c i e s f o r i t s a t t a i n m e n tm us t a l s o b e g i v e n , t h a t i s t h e r e must b e a p o l i t i c a lprogramme Th ir dl y, how sh ou ld we mo bi li ze them?By word of mouth, by le a f l e t s and b ul le t i n s , hy news-papers , books and pamphle t s , th rough p la ys and f i lm s ,t h rough s choo l s , t h rough t he mass organizat ions andth rough ou r cad res . What has been done so f a r i n t h eKuomintang areas i s only a drop i n th e ocean , and more-over i t h a s be en do ne i n a manner i l l - s u i t e d t o t h ep e o p le s t a s t e s a nd i n a s p i r i t un c on ge ni al t o them;t h i s m us t b e d r a s t i c a l l y c ha ng ed. F o u r t h l y , t o m o b i l i z eonce i s n o t e no ug h; p o l i t i c a l m o b i l i z a t i o n f o r t h e Warof Res i s tan ce mus t be cont inuous . Our job i s n ot t or e c i t e o u r p o l i t i c a l programme t o th e peopl e , fo r no-body w i l l l i s t e n t o s uc h r e c i t a t i o n s ; we mu st l i n k t h ep o l i t i c a l m o b i l i z a t i o n f o r t h e war w i t h d e ve lo pm en tsi n t h e war a nd w i t h t h e l i f e of t h e s o l d i e r s and t h epe op le, and make t a co nt in uo us movement (Mao 1965 b:155).

l l t h e c u r r e n t i d e a o f m o b i l i z a t i o n d o e s , t h e n , i s t o b roaden Maofsc e n t r a l n o t i o n t o e x p l i c i t l y i n c l u d e c o n t r o l o v e r o b j e c t s and o rg an -i z a t i o n s as w e l l as commitments of i nd iv id ua ls .

e a r e now p i l i n g d e f i n i t i o n s o n d e f i n i t i o n s . Never the l es sthe se i de as o f m ob i l i z a t i o n make i t e a s i e r t o s e e t h e p r op e r t i e s t h a ta wide range o f g roup a c t i v i t i e s have i n common: accumulat ing as t r i k e f un d, b u i l d i n g a n e t h n i c i d e n t i t y , s t o r i n g weapons, s en di ngmembers o f f t o s c h o o l , w o rk in g o u t a s e c r e t r i t u a l , l a y i n g a c l a i m t oa c e r t a in pa r t o f eve ry member s t ime , bu i l d ing a head quar t e r s , andso on . Some of th es e do not i nc re ase t he t o t a l res ourc es members

o f t h e g r ou p p o s s e s s , b u t s i m pl y t r a n s f e r r e s o u r c e s f ro m i n d i v i d u a lt o g roup . l l of them, on t he o th e r hand , i nc re as e t he r e sou rce s ofw hi ch t h e g ro up a s a whole can d i spose .


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The structure, the environment and the already-accumulatedresources of a group greatly limit the avenues toward mobilizationopen to it at any point in its history. Resources spent properlybring in new resources of a different kind, as when an ethnic leaderuses his group s funds to bribe a politician disposing of jobs forhis people, or a revolutionary committee activates the loyalties itcommands to bring in cash contributions from its following. Whetherthe net effect of such exchanges is additional mobilization dependson the terms of trade between jobs and bribes on the one hand andbetween depletion of reserve loyalties and augmentation of the treas-ury on the other. Again, the environment may be abundant, yieldingresources readily with little effort, or harsfi, full of competitorsand barren of resources. All other things being equal, an abundantenvironment obviously facilitates mobilization.

Finally, the group s organizational structure limits the meansof mobilization. Perhaps the most important dimension in this re-gard is the one which runs from communal to associational organiza-tion. (The basic idea is one of the oldest in sociology; it hasfrequently been abused through the assumption that it describes thebasic path of human evolution, the disguising of the fact that itlumps together several variables which do not always change in thesame direction and the implicit assertion that the,one end is good,the other bad; here I offer it only as a preliminary sorting device.)Communal structures are small, local and relatively undifferentiatedin structure. They recruit largely through inheritance. Among


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f r e q u e n t c o n te n d e rs f o r power a t o n e l e v e l o r a n o t h e r i n t h e w or ldo f t h e l a s t f ew c e n t u r i e s , c o r p o r a t e k i n g ro u ps , p e as a nt v i l l a g e s ,c r a f t b r o t h er h o o d s and r e l i g i o u s c o n g r e g a t i o n s t en d tow ard t h i s e x-treme cype. Assoc i a t i o na l s t r uc tu re s a r e l a rg e , e x t e ns ive and com-p le x . They r e c r u i t l a r g e l y t hr ou g h o pe n t e s t s o f i n t e n t i o n a nd pe r-formance. In t h e m o d e ~ nw or ld , p a r t i e s , f i r m s , t r a d e u ni on s andv o l u n t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s a r e f r e q u e n t c o n t e nd e r s o f t h i s t y pe .

To the e x t e n t t ha t a c on te nde r s communal i n s t ru c t ur e , t su n l i k e l y t o b e a b l e t o e xpand t s manpower repidly, but t s q u i t el i k e l y t o b e a b l e t o g e n er a te s t r o n g l o y a l t i e s o n th e p a r t o f t h emembers t does posse s s . To the e x t e n t t ha t a contender s a s s o c i a -t i o n a l n s t ru c t ur e , th e accumula t ion of i n t en se commitments sl i k e l y t o be v e ry c o s t l y , w h i l e t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of a r an ge of s p e ci a l -i ze d s k i l l s w l l be re l a t i ve ly e a sy . Whether t he posse s s ion o f in -

tense commitments w l l be more o r l e s s a dvan tage ous t ha n the posse s-s i o n o f s p e c i a l i z e d s k i l l s , of c o u r se , d ep en ds e n t i r e l y on t h e n a t u r eo f t h e c o l l e c t i v e t a s k s a t hand a nd t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e s u r ro u n d i ngworld

.The o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of t h e c o n t en d e r s f o r p ower..

.

w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t y a l s o h a s a s t r o n g im pa ct o n t h e t y p i c a lf or ms o f c o l l e c t i v e vi o l en c e w i t h i n t h e' p o l i t y . To be more e xa ct , t_:a f f e c t s t h e k i n d s o f c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s w hich o r d i n a r i l y pr od uc eviol ence . With communal contender s , co l l ec t i ve ac t io n tends to be un- .coordin a ted , loca l ized , raggedly bounded i n time and space , respon-s i v e t o r o u t i n e s o f c o n g re g a ti o n s u c h a s t h o s e of r e l i g i o u s o b se r va n ce ,.


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festivals, planting, marketing and so on. Violence engaging communalcontenders therefore tends to spring from such settings. The free-for-all between gilds and the rural tax rebellion illustrate whatI have in mind.

With associational contenders, the collective action (and hencethe setting of collective violence) tends to be planned, scheduled,bounded, disciplined and large in scale. The violent strike and theturbulent demonstration are typical cases. This does not necessarily

mean that they are more serious or more destructive than the violenceinvolving communal contenders. In fact, peasant revolts are legen-dary for their bloodletting; associational participants in violenceoften have the advantage of being able to call off their forces assoon as they have won, or lost. Nevertheless, collective violenceon a large scale rarely occurs without the significant involvementof associations.

n the western experience on which this analysis is based,there is a tight connection between a contender s organizationalstructure and the locus of its power. The tightness of the connectionmay have led me to misstate the relationship between organizationalstructure and collective action. For the most part, communal groupswield power at a small scale, in local polities. To an importantdegree, associational groups wield power at a large scale, especially innational polities. If the correspondence were perfect, we would haveno problem: localism and communal organization would simply be twofeatures of the same phenomenon. But organizations such as gilds


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and sworn brotherhoods have complex formal s t r uc tu re s , ye t o f t eno p er a t e a t a p u r el y l o c a l s c a l e ; l i k e w i s e , e

Documents

Tilly - 1975 - Revolutions and Collective Violence