Three Myths About Codes of Engineering Ethics

Three Myths about Codes of Engineering Ethics



Michael Davis

8 IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, Fall 2001

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Amyth is a story or belief truerto fear or wish than to fact.1

My subject is three mythscommon in engineeringethics: a) that the first codesof engineering ethics put loy-

alty to client or employer ahead ofthe public interest; b) that engi-neering codes of ethics should bemere (moral) guides rather than(legalistic) rules; and c) that codesof engineering ethics are too vagueto provide much guidance.

Perhaps all that these mythshave in common is being too com-mon in discussions of engineeringethics; but I think they have morein common than that. They seem tobe mutually enforcing. For exam-ple, one way to argue that codes ofethics should be mere guides is topoint out how far off the mark theyonce were or how vague theyremain. The three myths also seemto share a common source, a mis-understanding of the role of inter-pretation in the use of codes —as Ishall show here.

What I shall not show is that themyths are common. For each, Imerely give one example of aprominent writer in engineeringethics who treated it as (more orless) obviously true. Because read-

ers should have no difficulty con-firming that the myths are common(and because space forbids me tooffer much evidence here), I amleaving confirmation to them.

FIRST CODESThe first myth concerns what

codes of engineering ethics wereoriginally. One might suppose thatthe original codes cited would beBritish (since engineering’s first pro-fessional societies seem to have beenBritish) [1]. But, in every example ofthe myth I have come across, thecode cited is American. Here, forexample, is Carl Mitcham’s recentappeal to the myth:

“the early ethics codes inprofessional engineering —such as those formulated in1912 by the American Insti-tute of Electrical Engineers... and in 1914 by the Amer-ican Society of Civil Engi-neers (ASCE) — defined theprimary duty of the engineerto be of service as a “faithfulagent or trustee” of anemploying company” [2].

What is missing from the earlycodes, according to Mitcham, isany idea that engineers have aresponsibility for the public health,safety, and welfare, much less thattheir responsibility to the public is“primary” (that is, paramount).

The basis of the myth is easy toidentify. We need only look at thecodes cited. The ASCE code con-sists of a sentence fragment (a pre-amble of sorts) —”It shall be con-sidered unprofessional andinconsistent with honorable anddignified bearing for any memberof the American Society of CivilEngineers” — and six numberedphrases (each beginning with aninfinitive) to complete the sentence.The first of these phrases forbidsengineers “To act for his clients inprofessional matters otherwise thanas a faithful agent or trustee, or toaccept any remuneration other than

his stated charges for services ren-dered his client” [3]. The veryphrase Mitcham puts in quotes —“faithful agent or trustee”—appears in this provision.

There are, however, two signifi-cant differences between whatMitcham claims and what we actu-ally find in the code. The first is thatthe ASCE code says nothing about“employing companies,” only“clients.” The code seems designedfor consulting engineers, not forcivil engineers generally. That dif-ference need not concern us here(though it does suggest that thecode might have a purpose less gen-eral than Mitcham supposes). Theother difference does concern us.

The ASCE code does notexplicitly give priority to acting asa faithful agent or trustee; it mere-ly lists first the rule imposing thatduty. Since every code must listsome rule first even if all are equal,Mitcham should not simplyassume that whatever happens tocome first must be “primary.”Mitcham’s belief that the ASCEput the interests of client (oremployer) ahead of everything elsedepends on an unstated principleof interpretation — something like“first in order means first in impor-tance.” Mitcham offers no argu-ment for such a principle of inter-pretation. I see no reason toassume it.

But (it will be said) the codesays nothing about a duty to thepublic; surely, that is significant.Yes, but the question now is whatthe significance is. Like the order ofduties, silence about any particularduty is open to more than one inter-pretation. There is nothing in thesilence of the ASCE’s code torequire us to conclude that the pub-lic interest is subsidiary to the inter-ests of client (or employer). Indeed,there are at least two arguments forthe opposite interpretation.

First, the language in question,“act in professional matters...as afaithful agent or trustee,” stillappears in most codes of engineer-

IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, Fall 2001 9

The author is with the Center forthe Study of Ethics in the Profes-sions, Illinois Institute of Technolo-gy, 3241 S. Federal St., HUB 204,Chicago, IL 60615. Versions of thisarticle were presented at: theHumanities Colloquium, IllinoisInstitute of Technology, Dec. 7,2000; The Department of Technolo-gy, Culture, and Communication,University of Virginia, Feb. 15,2001; and the Association for Prac-tical and Professional Ethics Ann.Mtg., Cincinnati, OH, Mar. 2, 2001.

1This is, of course, the ordinary sense of“myth.” The social sciences, especiallyanthropology, use the term in a somewhatbroader sense, one ignoring the question oftruth even though the “myths” reported(Athena springing from Zeus’ head, forexample) are generally not true.

ing ethics, but always as part of aprovision we now identify as con-cerned with conflict of interest.Why not interpret the 1914 lan-guage as also concerned with con-flict of interest? After all, the restof the first phrase quoted earlier(the part forbidding remunerationother than for stated charges ren-dered the client) is concerned witha subject closely related to conflictof interest (bribes and kickbacks).

Since no one today supposes thatavoiding conflict of interest isinconsistent with serving the pub-lic interest, why read such aninconsistency into the ASCE’s1914 code?

Second, it is easy to imagine aplausible explanation of whysilence about a duty to the publicin an ASCE code means just theopposite of what Mitcham claimsit means. A civil engineer might, in1914, have explained that there isno need to put a duty to the publicinto a code of ethics designed forcivil engineers. That duty is part ofthe very meaning of “civil engi-neering.” Since Thredgold firstoffered his famous definition in1828, civil engineers have general-ly agreed that they practice “the artof directing the great sources ofpower in Nature for the use andconvenience of man.” In Thred-

gold’s definition, “man” is equiva-lent to “public.” To do anything notfor the use or convenience of thepublic would be to do somethingother than civil engineering. Theduty to the public is so integral towhat a civil engineer does that it“goes without saying” that civilengineers have such a duty. Hence(the argument concludes), it is amistake to move from silenceabout such a duty to the duty’s

absence. I do not claim that these

two arguments prove that thecivil engineers of 1914 recog-nized a duty to the public.Indeed, I admit that such aduty would have been contro-versial (and that generallywhat people think “should gowithout saying” is preciselywhat a code should say). All Iclaim is that the provisionMitcham cites is, at best,weak evidence for the con-clusion he draws from it, andthat the interesting questionis why he seems to supposeotherwise.

Mitcham does, it is true,cite Layton’s Revolt of the

Engineers (and nothing else) onbehalf of his conclusion. But thatclassic history of American engi-neers early in the twentieth centu-ry has exactly one sentence on theASCE’s code: “First, the society in1914 adopted a code of ethics [as aconcession to the dissidents]” [4].There is nothing in Layton abouthow the code was interpreted.2

The ASCE’s code is an exampleof one enduring type of profes-

sional code, the short; the AIEE’s,an example of another, the long.3

We must read past one unnum-bered paragraph (a sort of pream-ble) to reach the twenty-two num-bered paragraphs (numbered from1 to 22) constituting the body ofthe code. These are divided intofive sections:

A. General Principles;B. The Engineer’s Relations to

Client or Employer;C. Ownership of Engineering

Records and Data; D. The Engineer’s Relations to the

Public; and E. The Engineer’s Relations to the

Engineering Fraternity.

We must pass the two num-bered paragraphs under “GeneralPrinciples” to reach a sentence(B.3) that seems to confirmMitcham’s claim:

“The engineer shouldconsider the protection of aclient’s or employer’s inter-ests his first professionalobligation, and thereforeshould avoid every act con-trary to this duty” [7].

Here “first” seems a mere syn-onym for Mitcham’s “primary.”But is it? Again, we must be care-ful to distinguish what Mitchamassumes from what is actually onthe page. The AIEE code declaresprotecting the client’s or employ-er’s interest the first “professional”obligation. That at least allows forother obligations, non-professionalones, that might take precedence.What might these be?

The code gives a double answerto that question. First, the pream-ble warns: “While the followingprinciples express, generally, theengineer’s relations to client,employer, the public, and the engi-


The myths seem to share acommon source, amisunderstanding of therole of interpretation in theuse of codes.

2Layton does have a bit more about AIEEcode [4, pp. 70 and 84-85]. But for any-thing like an adequate description of thecontext in which the AIEE code was writ-ten, one must turn to [5] or [6]. What wecan learn from either of these books is thatthe consulting engineers seemed to want amore demanding code of ethics than did theemployed engineers, that the code wentthrough several revisions (weakening someprovisions), and that everyone was reason-ably happy with the result. Clearly, manyhard questions must have been left forinterpretation.

3Ironically, today the ASCE has a longcode; the IEEE (the AIEE’s successor), ashort code.

neering fraternity, it is not pre-sumed that they define all the engi-neer’s duties and obligations.” It is,then, always open to the engineerto argue that he has an obligationin addition to those in the code,one which (though perhaps not“professional”) takes precedence.

Second, if we look just aboveB.3, we find two numbered para-graphs (A.1 and A.2 of the Gener-al Principles) that seem to set lim-its to any merely professionalobligation. A.1 says: “In all of hisrelations the engineer should beguided by the highest principles ofhonor.”Apparently, honor takesprecedence over any merely pro-fessional obligation. ParagraphA.2 makes clear how important alimit honor is:

“It is the duty of theengineer to satisfy himselfto the best of his ability thatthe enterprises with whichhe becomes identified areof legitimate character. Ifafter becoming associatedwith an enterprise he findsit to be of questionablecharacter, he should severhis connection with it assoon as practicable.”

At the start of their relationship,the engineer has an affirmativeduty to “satisfy” himself that theclient (or employer) is “of legiti-mate character.” If not satisfied ofthat, the engineer cannot enter therelationship. If, at any time there-after, a (reasonable) question aboutthe legitimate character of theclient arises, the engineer mustsever the relationship “as soon aspracticable.” What “legitimate”means is left open, but A.1instructs the engineer to be guidedin all his relations by “the highestprinciples of honor.” That soundspretty demanding, demandingenough to require something morethan mere legality, perhapsdemanding enough to include evena duty to protect the public health,

safety, and welfare.The “first professional obliga-

tion” of an engineer (loyalty) is,then, “first” only if certain condi-tions are met. But does “first” mean“primary” (that is, taking prece-dence over all other professionalobligations) once those conditionsare met? B.3 has a second sentence:“If any other considerations, suchas professional obligations orrestrictions, interfere with his meet-ing the legitimate expectations of aclient or employer, the engineershould inform him of the situation.”If “first” meant primary, this secondsentence would make no sense.How could another professionalobligation interfere with an obliga-tion taking precedence over all oth-ers? The only way to save B.3 fromincoherence, it seems to me, is tounderstand “first” as (somethinglike) “central” rather than “prima-ry.” The engineer should organizehis work around serving the clientor employer. He should regard any-thing interfering with so organizinghis work as a serious matter, seriousenough in some cases to force dis-solution of the relationship (that is,when there is evidence that a clientor employer is not entirely legiti-mate), but in other cases (such asconflict with another professionalobligation) still serious enough torequire notice to the client oremployer that there are some thingsthe engineer cannot do. Taken as awhole, the AIEE code makes senseonly if “protecting the client’s oremployer’s interests” is not theengineer’s “primary [that is, para-mount] duty”.

Lawyers will find what I havebeen doing familiar. It is whatthey call “interpreting” or “con-struing.” Part of interpreting anyprovision of a statute, contract, orother legal document is puttingthe provision in context. The con-text includes everything from thesurrounding language to the histo-ry of the provision, from relevantcase law to interpretations givenanalogous language in other pro-

visions. No lawyer would inter-pret a provision without a goodsense of such context.

Mitcham argued as if each pro-vision of a code stands alone, itsmeaning obvious without even aclose reading — as if, that is, inter-pretation were trivial. I have else-where explained what is wrongwith this way of interpreting codes[8]. That a philosopher likeMitcham, learned in many subjects,including codes of engineeringethics, could interpret a code in thisway suggests serious intellectualtrouble not likely to be his alone.

GUIDESIt is, I think, because they

assume that codes do not requireinterpretation that many who teachengineering ethics want to rejectcodes. Consider, for example, HeinzLuegenbiehl’s classic judgment:

“codes of engineeringethics, in their present form,should not be utilized as aset of ethical rules...theattempt to provide such a setof rules is not justifiable ...codes of ethics [should] bereplaced by a set of “guidesfor ethical engineering deci-sion making” [9].

What, according to Luegen-biehl, is wrong with ethical rules?Ethical rules set a standard that is“hard and fast” [9, p. 146]. Theyare (he says) inconsistent withengineers acting as “autonomousmoral agents” [9, p. 146]. Whatengineers need are “guides”because guides

“indicate what novel sit-uations engineers in a par-ticular field of practicemight encounter and there-by forewarn and alert themto these situations; theyshould also point to thekinds of factors typicallyconsidered relevant to suchsituations” [9, p. 147].


There are, in fact, two ways toread Luegenbiehl’s description ofguides. Read one way, guides pro-vide almost no guidance. Read theother way, Luegenbiehl is address-ing the problem of interpretationMitcham missed. Let me explain.

One way to read Luegenbiehl’sdescription of guides is as twolists: first, a list of factors suggest-ing a moral problem; second, a listof factors engineers “typically”use to resolve problems of that sort(whether they should use them ornot). Neither list is exhaustive; nei-ther tells an engineer what to do, oreven how much weight to give anyconsideration. There are no “hardand fast rules”, indeed no rules atall. The guides provide almost noguidance. All they do is remindengineers to look for some things,leaving each engineer free to dowhatever she thinks best, “to use[her] own justified moral founda-tion...to evaluate a particular situa-tion from the moral point of view”[9, p. 147]. Each engineer standsalone, on her own “moral founda-tion.” The profession has nothingto say about what she should (orshould not) do.

The other way to read Luegen-biehl’s description of guides is asmore than lists of things to thinkabout. The guides “forewarn,” thatis, include judgments of what theprofession thinks engineers (gener-ally) should (or should not) do. Theguides also add background infor-mation to help the engineer inter-pret the warning. For example, theguide for conflict of interest would:

“first define conflict ofinterest and then wouldenumerate possible exam-ples of conflicts of interest.... The “guides” would fur-ther contain a discussion of:the legal status of conflictsof interest; the likely conse-quences they could have;the implications of pro-posed courses of action forthe individual, the profes-

sion, and society; the dis-tinction between actual andpotential conflicts [and soon]” [9. pp. 147-148].

On this second reading, a guideis more like an engineering ethicstextbook. It has a point of viewevident not only in the warnings itissues (the equivalent of a code’sprohibitions and requirements) butalso in the background it providesfor the interpretation of thosewarnings. On this reading, Lue-genbiehl is aware, as Mitcham wasnot, that context is important forinterpretation. But, even on thisreading, Luegenbiehl seems naiveabout interpreting codes. He thinkscodes lay down hard and fast rules(requiring no interpretation). Heoffers his guides as an alternativeto those hard and fast rules. In fact,he could instead have pointed outthat no rule is “hard and fast,” thatall need interpretation, and thatinterpretation requires taking intoaccount a great deal: definitions ofrelevant terms, examples of appli-cation, and so on.

On this second reading, Lue-genbiehl has confused the functionof codes (to guide conduct) withone method of guiding conduct(“hard and fast” rules). Codes con-sist of rules, and rules are sup-posed to guide conduct. They are“binding” (in some sense). Theyare, however, not therefore “hardand fast,” that is, clear and inflexi-ble. They need not turn those whoobey them into unthinkingautomatons. They are, more orless, part of what Luegenbiehl (onthis second reading) calls “guides”(that is, the part that forewarns).

Which way should Luegenbiehlbe read? I’m not sure. The conclu-sion of his paper suggests that thefirst reading is closer to what heactually intended:

“I have attempted toshow that morality shouldnot be legislated in the pro-fession of engineering any

more than it can be in oureveryday lives. Yet this iswhat the engineering codesof ethics, as they arepresently formulated,attempt to do. Given thisand other problems with thecodes, I have thereforeadvocated that for the codesof ethics a set of ‘guides forethical engineering deci-sion making’ should be sub-stituted” [9, p. 152].

Luegenbiehl seems to opposehuman rule-making as such — or,at least, anything that might countas “legislating morality.”

But Luegenbiehl’s explanation ofwhat is wrong with legislatingmorality (that it imposes hard andfast rules) suggests that guidesappeal to him precisely because theyoffer a substitute for “unthinkingobedience” to rules rather than asubstitute for rules as such. Certain-ly, the threat to moral autonomyposed by a code of professionalethics (a set of rules humans havelegislated) is no greater than thatposed by a promise.4 When we entera profession, we add to our moralobligations (much as we do whenwe make a promise). A profession’scode of ethics is generally the centralstatement of those obligations.When we try to follow the code ofour profession, we are, in effect, try-ing to keep a promise. Trying tokeep one’s promises is part of beingan autonomous moral agent, not anactivity opposed to such agency.5

What is opposed to such agency isunthinking obedience to thepromise, ignoring the sorts of con-sideration Luegenbiehl (mistakenly)says codes force us to ignore. Hence,I’m inclined to think that, upon dueconsideration, Luegenbiehl wouldprefer the second (interpretative)


4For an extended defense of this way ofthinking about codes, see [10] or [11].

5For more on the consistency betweenmoral autonomy and following one’s pro-fessional code, see [12] or [11, ch. 10].

reading I gave of “guides.”6 If so,then he should accept the defense ofcodes I make here.

VAGUENESSLuegenbiehl seems to assume

that codes of ethics necessarily laydown hard and fast rules, rules soclear that there is little or no roomfor interpretation. That clarity isprecisely what he objects to. Whatwe must now consider is the oppo-site objection to codes of ethics,that they are too “vague” to pro-vide much guidance. Here, forexample, is what Mike Martinrecently said on that subject:

“Even fully justifiedcodes of mandatory mini-mum responsibilities con-tain numerous areas ofindeterminacy, vagueness,and lack of clear prioritieswhen duties conflict”[13].

Martin, co-author (with RolandSchinzinger) of a popular text inengineering ethics that reprintsfour important codes, is not some-one to criticize codes lightly. Weshould take seriously any criticismhe makes. What exactly is his crit-icism of codes?

Martin seems to have identifiedthree distinct failings of codes, thatis, indeterminacy, vagueness, andlack of clear priorities when dutiesconflict. None of these failings is ararity, he says. Even a fully justi-fied code will include “numerousareas” exhibiting each of these fail-ings. Let us consider these in order,beginning with indeterminacy.

Insofar as codes of ethics areindeterminate, they are open to

more than one interpretation(“determination”). Are codes inde-terminate in this way? Of course.We can reduce the indeterminacyin a provision by interpreting it inthe context of the code as a whole;further reduce indeterminacy byinterpreting the code as a wholewithin the tradition to which itbelongs; and so on. But even if wehad time to bring in all relevantconsiderations, we might still endup with several good interpreta-tions of a provision and no deci-sive reason to choose one over theothers. This is, however, not somuch a weakness of codes as a factabout language as such. We cannotentirely control how our wordswill (or should) be understood. Alllinguistic expression is (some-what) indeterminate, that is, opento more than one way of beingmade more determinate. That isnot necessarily a bad thing. Likeindeterminacy, determinacy has itscosts. Generally, the more determi-nate we wish to be, the more wordswe will have to use, the more wewill have to know about the con-text in which the words will beused, and the more commitmentswe will have to make in advance.Often, being brief is better thandetermining everything in advance(supposing complete determinacypossible). Sometimes, for exam-ple, we know so little about whatmight be at stake in a certain sortof situation that predeterminingexactly what will be done wouldbe unwise. Indeterminacy, even inlarge areas of a code of ethics, maybe better than the alternative.

“Vagueness” is different. Weoften contrast vague language withclear language, assuming clarity isbetter. Indeed, claiming that phras-ing is vague implies that it can bemade clearer and that the clarity(the added determinacy) is worththe cost. To object to “vague gen-eralities,” for example, is not toobject to generalities as such (wecannot do without them) but toclaim that we can (and should) be

clearer about the generalities inquestion. My own experience withcodes of professional ethics is thatthey are almost never vague (inthis sense). What gets mistaken forvagueness is generally a necessaryindeterminacy arising in somesuch ways as this:

Suppose that I do not like thelanguage of some provision of acode of ethics. While the presentlanguage allows me to interpret theprovision as I like, it also allowsfor interpretations I do not like. “Itis,” I say, “too vague [or ambigu-ous]. Just change a word here, adda few words there, and the provi-sion will be clear.” By “clear”, Imean that others will have to agreethat the provision means what Iwant it to mean. The interpreta-tions I do not like will be ruled out.Those who interpret it differentlyare likely to respond, “Yes, let’sclarify it, but our way, not yours.”In the end, we leave the provisionas it is, hoping for greater consen-sus later. The code’s language is asdeterminate as possible under thecircumstances. It states preciselywhat we can now agree on, eventhough it states less than each of uswants. It is not vague.

That brings us to Martin’s thirdcriticism of codes of ethics, thatthey lack clear priorities (that is,that they suffer from a certain sortof indeterminacy or vagueness).Martin is certainly right that codesof ethics, including codes of engi-neering ethics, seldom say that onerule or consideration takes prece-dence over another.

Martin is also right that anycode of ethics likely to be usefulwill contain rules that may “con-flict”. We must, however, be care-ful what “conflict” means here.“Conflict” does not mean “contra-dict.” Rarely will one provision ofa code of ethics contradict another,even implicitly (as the two sen-tences of B.3 of the AIEE code atfirst seemed to). When peoplespeak of rules “conflicting”, whatthey usually mean is that, in partic-


6One reviewer suggested that the presentcode of ethics of the Association for Com-puting Machinery (ACM) represents thekind of code that Luegenbiehl had in mind.If the reviewer is right, that is evidence forthe second interpretation of Luegenbiehl.The ACM code has a structure so familiarto lawyers (black-letter rule and commen-tary) that American Bar Association’sModel Rules of Professional Conduct,adopted ten years before the ACM’s, isorganized in the same way.

ular situations, one rule may seemto ask what we cannot do if we dowhat another rule seems to ask.Such a conflict presents a problemof interpretation. We resolve theproblem by finding an interpreta-tion allowing us to satisfy bothrules (more or less). Where we canfind no such interpretation, weconclude that the code should beamended. Irresolvable conflictamong rules within a code ofethics is, as far as I can tell, almostas rare as actual contradictions.

Though Martin is right thatthere is a potential for conflictamong rules (in the resolvablesense) and a general lack of prior-ities to resolve those conflicts, heis wrong that this state of thingsnecessarily amounts to a weak-ness. Whether it amounts to aweakness depends on what weassume about how codes shouldwork. Martin seems to assume thatcodes should lay down (what Lue-genbiehl calls) “hard and fastrules,” a decision procedure even acomputer could follow. A decisionprocedure with rules that can con-flict and without clear priorities toresolve those conflicts would cer-tainly be a disaster — if those try-ing to follow the rules were asunthinking as a computer. Butwhy assume that engineers wouldshow no more intelligence wheninterpreting their own code ofethics than would an unthinkingautomaton?

The answer, of course, is thatthere is no reason. If Martin wasthinking about interpretation at all,he must have assumed that theonly possible sort of interpretationis carrying out a set of clear prior-ities. It’s so simple, so logical, andthere are even a few considerationswe feel safe giving absolute prece-dence. Engineers, after a half cen-tury of debate, eventually agreedthat they could give such prece-dence to the public health, safety,and welfare. But, in general, weavoid such simple interpretativestrategies. The world is too com-

plex. What we want the decision-maker to do when a conflict arisesbetween rules is to interpret themso that the conflict disappears —in a way serving the underlyingpurpose of the code. The code canprovide (what Luegenbiehl calls)“guides,” but we do not want acode that pre-empts altogether thejudgment of the decision-maker.

What objection could Martinhave to writing codes so that theyrequire this more complicatedinterpretation? The answer, I sup-pose, is that, all else equal, a coderequiring such interpretation isharder to use than one that onlyrequires following a set of clearpriorities. But, of course, all else isseldom equal. Clear priorities alsohave costs. Among the costs arerigidity and complexity.

By “rigidity,” I mean the ten-dency to force decision-makers toignore much of what they knowabout a specific situation that thecode’s authors did not know butwould have taken into account hadthey known. The best examples ofrigidity tend to occur in large cen-tralized organizations (“bureaucra-cies”) such as the army. We knowwhat to expect when a sensibleperson in such an organizationresponds to our sensible criticismof what she is about to do: “Therules are clear.”

By “complexity,” I mean inter-related detail. A code with enoughdetail to make every decision moreor less routine would have to be alarge document indeed. It wouldneed a good index to use quicklyand careful editing to avoid theinconsistencies and omissions thatcreep into most large legal codes.Each part would have to includereferences to all other relevantparts, long lists of exceptions, andso on. Though (relatively) routine,decisions using such a code mighttake a long time to make.

Martin has not, I think, thoughtthrough what his criticism of codesimplies about how they should bewritten. Here Martin has some-

thing to learn from Luegenbiehl.He also has something to learnfrom the long debate between par-tisans of short and long codes ofethics. Though even long codes ofethics (a few pages) are short com-pared to most legal codes (hun-dreds or thousands of pages), thepartisans of short codes argue thatlong codes are already too rigidand complex. The partisans of longcodes respond that short codes donot tell members of the professioneverything the profession actuallyagrees should (or should not) bedone. Short codes do not provideas much guidance as they could(and should). Both sides, the parti-sans of short codes and the parti-sans of long codes, may be rightabout the advantages of their ownapproach and the disadvantages ofthe other; but, as often happenswhen designs must be practical,which side has the better argumentmay depend on particular circum-stances, including judgments con-cerning how much the future willresemble the past.

INTREPRETATION ISCENTRAL

One feature all three mythsseem to have in common is a fail-ure to acknowledge how centralinterpretation is to the use of codesof ethics. Why this failure? Theanswer, it seems to me, is that thosewho rely on these myths lack train-ing in a discipline in which inter-pretation of rules is a central activ-ity, as it is in law and certainreligious vocations. They may alsohave a distaste for “legalism”, thesort of careful parsing of rules thatwe associate with lawyers (and thatI have engaged in here). Those whorely on the myths certainly seem tohave missed much of the interest-ing work on interpretation that hasbeen a major focus of philosophyof law over the last half century.7


7See, for example, [14] - or any good texton jurisprudence.

(Continued on p. 22)


managers, users, or those possiblyaffected by a design — be involvedin such decisions?

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[6] M. Akrich, “The description of technicalobjects,” in Shaping Technology/ BuildingSociety: Studies in Sociotechnical Change,W. Bijker and J. Law,Eds. Cambridge, MA:M.I.T. Press, 1992, pp. 205-224.[7] M. Davis,Thinking like an Engineer.Studies in the Ethics of a Profession. NewYork and Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press,1998.[8] H.A. Simon, “The structure of ill-struc-tured problems,” Artificial Intelligence, vol.4, pp.181-201, 1973.[9] N. Cross, Engineering Design Methods.Chichester, UK: Wiley, 1989.[10] P. Galle, “Design rationalization andthe logic of design: a case study,” DesignStudies, vol. 17, pp. 253-275, 1996.[11] D. Pye,The Nature of Design. London,UK: Studio Vista, 1964.[12] H.A. Simon, The Sciences of the Arti-ficial, 3rd ed. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T.,1996. [13] L.J. Ball, J.St.B.T. Evans, and I. Den-nis, “Cognitive processes in engineeringdesign: a longitudinal study,” Ergonomics,

vol. 37, no.11, pp. 1753-1786, 1994.[14] W. Visser, “More or less following aplan during design: opportunistic devia-tions in specification,” Int. J. Man-MachineStudies, vol. 33, pp. 247-278, 1990.[15] I.R. van de Poel, H. Zandvoort, and M.Brumsen “Ethics and engineering courses atdelft university: Contents, educational setupand experiences,” Science and EngineeringEthics, vol. 7, no. 2,pp. 267-282, 2001.[16] World Commission on Environmentand Development, Our Common Future.Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press 1987.[17] T.R. Gradel and B.R. Allenby, Indus-trial Ecology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Pren-tice Hall, 1995.[18] M. Knoppert and R. Porcelijn,DutchEVO, the development of an ultra-light sustainable conceptcar. Delft, TheNetherlands: 1999.[19] R. Schinzinger, “Ethics on the feed-back loop,” Control Engineering Practice,vol. 6, pp. 239-245. 1998.

Myths About Engineering Ethics(continued from p. 14.)

The basics of interpretation arenot hard to learn. I have had notrouble teaching undergraduates tointerpret codes of ethics. Indeed, Ihave had some of these students,those with engineering jobs, pointout the similarity between what wewere doing with codes in class andwhat they had to do at work withspecifications (and municipal,state, and federal regulations).Engineering is, in fact, a profes-sion in which interpreting rules isimportant. Why then not explicitlyteach the interpretation of rules aspart of engineering ethics? Whynot understand codes before find-ing fault with them?

REFERENCES[1] W.J. Reader, Professional Men: TheRise of the Professional Classes in Nine-teenth-Century England . New York: Basic,1966, p. 164.[2] C. Mitcham, “Engineering design researchand social responsibility,” in K. Schrader-Frechette, Ed., Ethics of Scientific Research.Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield: 1994,p. 154.[3] Annals of American Academy of Politi-cal and Social Sciences, vo1. 101, pp. 273-274, 1922.[4] E.T. Layton, Jr., The Revolt of the Engi-neers. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ.Press, 1986, p. 114.[5] A.M. McMahon, The Making of a Profes-sion. New York: IEEE Press, 1984, pp. 112-117.[6] R.R. Kline, Steinmetz: Engineer andSocialist. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ.Press, 1992, pp. 183-189[7] E.L. Heermance, Codes of Ethics: Ahandbook . Burlington, VT: Free Press:

1924, pp. 166-169.[8] M.Davis, “Professional responsibility: Justfollowing the rules?”, Business and Profes-sional Ethics J., vol. 18 . pp. 65-87, Spr. 1999.[9] H.C. Luegenbiehl, “Codes of ethics andthe moral education of engineers,” in Ethi-cal Issues in Engineering Ethics, D.G.Johnson, Ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Pren-tice Hall, 1991, p. 137.[10] M. Davis, “Thinking like an engineer: Theplace of a code of ethics in the practice of a pro-fession,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol.20, pp. 150-167, Spr. 1991.[11] M. Davis, Thinking like an Engineer.New York, NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998,ch. 4.[12] M. Davis, “Professional autonomy: Aframework for empirical research,” BusinessEthics Quart., vol. 6, pp. 441-460, Oct. 1996. [13]M.W. Martin, “Personal ideals in profes-sional ethics,” Professional Ethics, vol. 5, pp.3-27 at 13, Spring-Summer 1996.[14] R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire. Cambridge,MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1986.

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Three Myths About Codes of Engineering Ethics