ForewordThis volume pictures the difficulties of small unit commanders

and soldiers in executing missions assigned by higher headquarters.Such missions are based at best on educated guesses as to the enemysituation and probable reaction. Success, failure, confusion, out-standing behavior, as pictured here, illustrate battle as it did, andoften can, take place. The viewpoint of the participants at the timeis hard to re-create in spite of what is known of the circumstancesthat surrounded the engagement. What now seems to be obviouswas then obscure. The participants were continually faced with ques-tions which can be reduced in number only by thorough training:What do I do next? Where shall I fire? Who is now in charge?Shall I fire? Will firing expose my position? Shall I wait fororders? To us who comfortably read accounts of the engagementthe answers may seem evident. We must remember that confusion,like fog, envelops the whole battlefield, including the enemy. Initia-tive, any clear-cut aggressive action, tends to dispel it.

In battle the terrain is the board on which the game is played.The chessmen are the small units of infantry, of armor, and thevarious supporting weapons each with different capabilities, all de-signed for the co-ordinated action which makes for victory. No onepiece is capable of carrying the entire burden. Each must help theother. Above all, the human mind must comprehend which, forthe instant, has the leading role. There is no time out in battle.Teams must be prepared to function in spite of shortages in bothpersonnel and equipment. They must be practiced and drilled ingetting and retaining the order necessary to overcome the confusionforever present on the battlefield. This is the outstanding lesson ofthese pages. If heeded they will have most beneficial effect on ourArmy.

We, the victors in this war, can ill afford not to examine ourtraining methods continually. Do we drill as we would fight? Dowe instill in the soldier discipline and a knowledge of how to get orderout of battle confusion? If not, victory will cost too much.

ORLANDO WARDWashington, D. C. Maj. Gen., U. S. A.15 November 1951 Chief of Military History

The Authors

Charles B. MacDonald, compiler of this volume and author oftwo of the studies, commanded a rifle company in the 2d InfantryDivision in World War II and is the author of Company Commander.*He is now on the staff of this office writing a volume on the U. S.Army in Europe. Sidney T. Mathews, author of the third study,was a member of the Historical Section, Fifth Army, during the war,wrote the study entitled "Santa Maria Infante" published in SmallUnit Actions* of the series AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION,and is a Ph.D. in History of the Johns Hopkins University. He isnow on the staff of this office, writing a volume on the U. S. Armyin Italy.

Washington, D. C. KENT ROBERTS GREENFIELD15 November 1951 General Editor

* Washington, 1947.

vi

Preface

In World War II historians in uniform followed the U. S. Army'scombat forces in almost all theaters of operations, their primary dutyto interview battle participants in order to enrich and complete therecord of the war. Added to the organizational records of the Armyunits, the combat interviews obtained by these historians producedan unprecedented amount of source material. Rich in detail ofsmall units in action, it provided an opportunity to show what actu-ally happened in battle.

The volumes of UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR IIdealing with the war in the Pacific are rich in such detail. In thosedealing with the war in the European and Mediterranean theaters,the scale of treatment is such that the history can rarely follow theaction of small units. One of the objects of this volume is to achievea microscopic view of battle in those theaters by focusing on the bat-talions, companies, platoons, and squads that fought in the front lines.

The AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION* series has alreadypresented fourteen volumes which are primarily small unit actions,but these are concerned almost exclusively with infantry in battle.Another object of this volume is to present actions in which the roleof other arms and services can also be presented, providing a betterpicture of the interrelation of small parts on the battlefield in asgreat a variety of tactical situations as possible.

The choice of actions to be included was limited by the kind ofsource material available for the specific purposes of the volume.Although interviews and unit records are present in abundance, onlyin a few instances can the small unit level be sustained through anentire operation or to a natural conclusion.

In many respects the actions chosen are representative of scoresof battles in their respective theaters, for all three are made up offailures as well as successes. Out of a combination of actions suchas these, large-scale victories or defeats are compounded. Squads,platoons, companies, battalions, and even regiments and divisions,

* Published by the Historical Division, War Department Special Staff.

vii

experience local reverses as well as successes to decide the over-allcourse of war.

Each of the three studies presents an operation that constitutesbut one of many in which the units and individuals described tookpart. Their performance in other engagements may have been morebrilliant. It should be kept in mind that one action seldom is thebasis for a military reputation. Further, a number of factors thatoften vitally influence a battle action—some of them unrecognizedeven by the participants—inevitably remain a mystery. The avail-ability of materials and the type of objectives dictated the choice ofactions to be recorded, not the individuals or the units. Theirassistance in producing information and criticizing the manuscriptis indicative of a loyal desire that others profit from their experiences.

While the authors are aware of the vital contributions supply andadministrative units perform in the long-range scale of victory, theirstory lies in the administrative and logistical histories and in thevolumes of the technical services of the series, UNITED STATESARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Likewise, the story of commanddecision in higher headquarters lies in the campaign volumes. Oneof the actions, "River Crossing at Arnaville," has already beendescribed at a higher level in Hugh M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign; *the two others, "Break-through at Monte Altuzzo" and "Objective:Schmidt," will appear in higher-level accounts, minus the detail ofthese presentations, in subsequent volumes of UNITED STATESARMY IN WORLD WAR II.

Both "Objective: Schmidt" and "River Crossing at Arnaville"were written primarily from combat interviews and unit records pre-pared by persons other than their author. "Break-through at MonteAltuzzo" was written by the historian who obtained the interviewsand who made a number of trips to retrace the battle on the groundwith surviving participants. Responsibility for editing the Altuzzostudy to meet the requirements of this volume, for planning thevolume, and for selection of studies to be included was mine.

In preparing this volume, Dr. Mathews and I were assisted im-measurably by the expert professional guidance of the members ofthe Office of the Chief of Military History. We wish particularly torecognize the contributions of Mr. Joseph R. Friedman, for his highlyprofessional services as editor of the volume; of Mr. Wsevolod Aglai-

* Published by the Historical Division, Special Staff, U. S. Army.

viii

moff, for his maps and for his counsel, based not only on his knowl-edge of military cartography and European terrain but also on hisexperience in battle; of Miss Margaret E. Tackley, for her exhaustiveresearch in selection of photographs; of 1st Lt. George L. Frenkeland Mr. Britt Bailey, for considerable assistance with Germanmaterials; of Mrs. Pauline Dodd, for her invaluable work as copyeditor; and of the following, both in and out of the Office of the Chiefof Military History, who did so much to make this volume the co-operative enterprise that it is: Miss Norma E. Faust, Dr. AlfredGoldberg, Lt. Col. John C. Hatlem, Mr. David Jaffé, Mrs. LoisRiley, Mr. Royce L. Thompson, Mr. Ralph H. Vogel, Lt. Col.Charles A. Warner, and Miss Lucy E. Weidman. Additionalcredits to the officers and men who produced the source materialsare to be found in the footnotes and bibliographical notes.

Washington, D. C. CHARLES B. MACDONALD15 November 1951

ix

Contents

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLEChapter Page

I. THE GASOLINE DROUGHT AND THE DORNOTCROSSING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

T h e Advance Begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Commitment of the 5th Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7The Terrain and the Forts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Crossing a t Dornot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13T h e Assault Begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7The German Reaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Advance to Fort St . Blaise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Support of the Dornot Bridgehead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Holding the Dornot Site, 9-10 September . . . . . . . . . . . . 291st and 3d Battalions, 11th Infantry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34Withdrawal at Dornot, 10-11 September . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

II. THE CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE (10-11 SEPTEMBER) . 40Battalion Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2T h e Assault Crossing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4The 2d Battalion Crossing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50Counterattack From Arry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51The 3d Battalion Attacks Arry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54The 11th Infantry Enters the Arnaville Fight . . . . . . . . . . . 55Counterattacks Against the 10th Infantry, 11 September . . . . . . . 59Supporting the Bridgehead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

III. SMOKE AND BRIDGING OPERATIONS (9-14 SEPTEMBER) 63Smoke Operations Begin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65Bridging the Moselle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70Initial Planning and Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72Armor Crosses at the Ford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74Bridging Efforts Continued . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5German Counterattacks, 12 September . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76Plans To Expand the Bridgehead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80Reinforcements for the Bridgehead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81Supporting the Bridgehead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83Bridgebuilding Continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4

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Chapter Page

IV. BUILD-UP AND EXPANSION (13-15 SEPTEMBER) . . . . 87Impasse on 14 September . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88Attack in the Fog, 15 September . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90Objective—Hill 3 9 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3The Bridgehead I s Secure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

ORDER O F BATTLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZOI. DEVELOPING THE GOTHIC LINE (10-13 SEPTEMBER) . 103

The Terrain and the Enemy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104The 363d Infantry Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107Attack Preparations, 338th Infantry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109Confidence in the 338th . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112Preparations of Company A, 338th . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113Enemy Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 7Advance to Hills 624 and 782 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121Fire Fight in the Bowl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123Supporting Fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 5Company A at Hill 782 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128Confused Reports From the 363d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130T h e Enemy Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 1

II. PEABODY PEAK (14 SEPTEMBER) . . . . . . . . . . . 133Communication Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 5Company A Attacks the Outpost Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136Company B Moves Out . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140Another Prominent Ridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143Fire Fight at the Barbed Wire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148Ledford's Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 92d and 3d Platoons Move Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151First Counterattack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 61st Platoon Moves Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157Machine Guns and Mortars Move Forward . . . . . . . . . . . 160Second Counterattack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 2Third Counterattack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 3Company B's True Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163Supporting Fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 4Plight of the Forward Platoons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165Sergeant Lang Goes Down the Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166Fourth Counterattack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 7Help From Artillery and Mortars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169T h e Day's Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 1The Enemy Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

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Chapter Page

III. SHELLFIRE AND A FALSE MESSAGE (15 SEPTEMBER) . 176Preparations f o r Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176Gresham and Corey Move Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181Fire at Knobs 1 and 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183Flanking Attempt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 6Misplaced Shellfire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 8Long-Range Fire and Counterattack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191Supporting Platoons on Hill 782 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 4The Day's Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197The Enemy Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

IV. ADVANCE TO THE CREST (16 SEPTEMBER) . . . . . . 202General Gerow's Plans for the 338th . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203The 2d Battalion Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2051st Battalion Prepares To Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205Last-Minute Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 7Capture of the Outpost Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211Fire Fight at Knob 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214American Shellfire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 51st Squad at Knob 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216Advance to the Crest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217Defensive Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 92d Platoon Follows to Hill 926 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2191s t Platoon's Advance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221Advance up the Western Ridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221Bypassed Pockets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 2The Enemy Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

V. COUNTERATTACKS (17 SEPTEMBER) . . . . . . . . . 226Assault on the Right Bunker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227Assault on the Left Bunker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229Return to the Bunker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229Search for Spoil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232Action on the Western Peak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232Action at Hill 926 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234Enemy Pockets and the 3d Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234Company K Attacks Knob 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236The 3d Battalion Mops Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238Break-Through on the Flanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

ORDER OF BATTLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 4

xiii

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDTChapter Page

I . ATTACK ON VOSSENACK (2 NOVEMBER) . . . . . . . 251The 112th Makes the Main Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257T h e 2 d Battalion Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 9Company G on the Left . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259Company F on the Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262Company E Mops U p . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6 0Artillery in the Vossenack Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268The 1st Battalion Attacks at H Plus 3 Hours . . . . . . . . . . 268109th and 110th Infantry Regiments Attack . . . . . . . . . . . 271A i r Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 2T h e Enemy Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 4Summary for 2 November and Night of 2-3 November . . . . . . . 274

II. THE MAIN EFFORT CONTINUES (3 NOVEMBER) ... 276The Spearhead Advance of Company K . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277Company L Also Advances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281Company I Follows in Reserve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282Company M Moves to Schmidt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2823 d Battalion Medics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 2T h e Greene Hornets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 3The 1st Battalion Follows the 3d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2831 s t Battalion Medics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 5Artillery Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 5Vossenack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 5The Engineers and the Kall Trail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286The Night in Schmidt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290109th and 110th Infantry Summaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291A i r Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9 2T h e Enemy Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9 2Summary for 3 November and Night of 3-4 November . . . . . . . 293

III. ACTION AT SCHMIDT (4 NOVEMBER) . . . . . . . . . 295Tanks Try To Cross the Kall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295Action a t Schmidt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9 7Struggle With the Main Supply Route . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303The Battle for Kommerscheidt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305The Kall Struggle Continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309T h e Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1 2Command and the Kall Trail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313893d Tank Destroyer Battalion Joins the Action . . . . . . . . . 314A i r Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1 5109th and 110th Infantry Summaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315T h e Enemy Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1 7Summary for 4 November and Night of 4-5 November . . . . . . . 319

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Chapter Page

IV. MORE ACTION AT KOMMERSCHEIDT (5 NOVEMBER) . 321Tank Destroyers Try for Kommerscheidt . . . . . . . . . . . . 323Another Enemy Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323Events Along the Kall Trail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324T h e Tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 4Action Again in Kommerscheidt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325Company B, 112th, Moves Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326The Tank Destroyers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320Command in Kommerscheidt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327T h e Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 7The Greene Hornets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328Tank Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 8Infantry Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 9Tank Destroyer Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330T h e Medics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 1Formation of Task Force R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332T h e Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 3The Situation in Vossenack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334Armor in Vossenack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336Artillery Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 8109th and 110th Infantry Summaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339A i r Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 9The Enemy Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341Summary for 5 November and Night of 5-6 November . . . . . . . 342

V. ACTION AT VOSSENACK (6 NOVEMBER) . . . . . . . 344Armor in Vossenack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345Engineers in Vossenack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348The Situation in Kommerscheidt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348Task Force R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349Tank Demonstration in Kommerscheidt . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350The Planned Attack on Schmidt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352A New Defense Attempted in Vossenack . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352Was There a German Attack? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354The Armor Builds Up a Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355The Engineers Act as Riflemen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357The Command Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362The Night in Vossenack: Armor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363The Night in Vossenack: Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363Medics and Engineers Along the Kall . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366Supplies Cross the Kall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368Artillery and Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369109th and 110th Infantry Summaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371The Enemy Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371Summary for 6 November and Night of 6-7 November . . . . . . . 372

Chapter Page

VI. ACTION AGAIN AT KOMMERSCHEIDT (7 NOVEMBER) . 374A New Commander for the 112th . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 378Along the Kall Trail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379Company A , 1340th Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379Colonel Peterson's Return Trip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380Attack To Retake Vossenack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381Task Force Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386The Tank Destroyers Try To Cross the Kall . . . . . . . . . . . 388Armor in Vossenack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 9A i r Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 9The Enemy Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391Summary for 7 November and Night of 7-8 November . . . . . . . 392

VII. WITHDRAWAL ACROSS THE KALL (8 NOVEMBER) . . 393The Day at the Kommerscheidt Woods Line . . . . . . . . . . . 394Along the Kall Trail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396Vossenack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 7Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 8Medical Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 112th and 110th Infantry Summaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404Artillery and Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404The Enemy Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405Summary for 8 November and Night of 8-9 November . . . . . . . 406

VIII. CONCLUSION (9-20 NOVEMBER) . . . . . . . . . . . . 407Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 9Summary of Closing Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413The Enemy Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414Relief of the 28th Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414

ORDER OF BATTLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 0

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 3

BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3 1

xvi

MapsNo. Page

1. Dornot Bridgehead, 8 September 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

2. Crossing at Arnaville, 10 September 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . 45

3. Arnaville Bridgehead, 11 September 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . 58

4. Smoke Generator Operations, 10-15 September 1944 . . . . . . 64

5. Bridging the Moselle, 11-14 September 1944 . . . . . . . . . . 716. German Counterattack, 12 September 1944 . . . . . . . . . . 78

7. Expanding the Bridgehead, Attack of 15 September 1944 . . . . 91

8. Advance Toward Mt. Altuzzo, Company A, 338th Infantry, 13September 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 6

9. Artillery and Air Support Area, 13-17 September 1944 . . . . . 126

10. 338th Infantry Plan of Attack, 14 September 1944 . . . . . . . 133

11. 1st Battalion Attack, 14 September 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . 13712. "Peabody Peak," Company B on Western Ridge, 14 September 1944 15213. Advance to Knob 2 and First German Counterattack, Morning,

15 September 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

14. Knob 2, Situation Before Second German Counterattack, Afternoon,1 5 September . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 2

15. Plan of Attack, 16-17 September 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . 20516. Capture of Mt. Altuzzo, 16-17 September 1944 . . . . . . . . 21217. Assault on the Bunkers, Morning, 17 September 1944 . . . . . . 226

18. Situation on Mt. Altuzzo, Morning, 17 September . . . . . . . 23119. Company K Attack, Afternoon, 17 September 1944 . . . . . . . 23720. 28th Division Front, Evening, 2 November 1944 . . . . . . . . 270

21. Drive on Schmidt, 3 November 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2782 2 . T h e Kall Trail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 723. 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry, Night 3/4 November . . . . . . . 290

24. Tanks on the Kall Trail, 4 November 1944 . . . . . . . . . . 296

25. The Switchback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31226. Intervention of German Reserves, 4 November 1944 . . . . . . 316

27. Situation at Dawn, 6 November 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34028. Company C, 1340th Engrs, at the Kall Bridge, Night 6/7 November

1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 729. 28th Division Front, Dawn, 7 November 1944 . . . . . . . . . 37030. 28th Division Front, Dawn, 8 November 1944 . . . . . . . . . 390

31. 28th Division Front, Dawn, 9 November 1944 . . . . . . . . . 40232. Along the Kall Trail, 9 November 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . 40833. Plan for Closing Action, 10 November 1944 . . . . . . . . . . 412

xvii

Maps I-XI are in accompanying map envelope

I. XX Corps, Situation, Noon, 6 September 1944II. Reaching the Moselle South of Metz, 6-7 September 1944

III. Allied Front in Italy, 12 September 1944IV. Situation in Mt. Altuzzo Area, 0600, 13 September 1944V. The Aachen Front, 1 November 1944

VI. 28th Division Objectives, 2 November 1944VII. Attack on Vossenack—Jump-Off, 2 November 1944

VIII. Attack on Vossenack—Completion, 2 November 1944IX. German Counterattack on Schmidt, 4 November 1944X. Defense of Kommerscheidt, 4 November 1944

XI. Fight for Vossenack, 6-7 November 1944

IllustrationsPage

Dornot Bridgehead Site on the Moselle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Congestion i n Dornot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5Approaching the Moselle Under Enemy Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . 18River Crossing Near Dornot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9Infantryman a t Footbridge Over Railroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33Arry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3Objectives of the 2d Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48Truck-Mounted Smoke Generator in Operation . . . . . . . . . . 66Arnaville Crossing Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8Double Treadway Span Across the Moselle Canal . . . . . . . . . . 73Treadway Bridge a t River Site 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82Heavy Ponton Bridge Across Moselle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85T h e Battleground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 4Infantrymen i n Full Field Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 8Relaxed Foot Soldier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114Monte Altuzzo Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 8Infantry Approach Over Open Field. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120Howitzer and Tanks Moving Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12781-mm. Mortars i n Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 4Jagged Crest o f Western Ridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 4Camouflaged L o g Bunker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 5German Trench and Observation Post . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161Peabody Peak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 2Command Post a t Paretaio Farmhouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177Taking a Break . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 2Camouflaged Tank Destroyers (M-18) Moving Up . . . . . . . . . . 199Painting of Monte Altuzzo Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202

xviii

Page

Enemy Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 9Artillery-Shelled Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 8German Matériel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 5Break-Through . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 1T h e Schwammenauel D a m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 6Vossenack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6 0Objective: Pillboxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 3Huertgen Forest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 0Kall Trail Supply Route . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298, 299German Prisoners of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302Tank Destroyers M-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 2Immobilized Armor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 1Corduroy Road . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 8Remains of Church at Vossenack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383Supporting Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 5Cargo Carrier M-29 (Weasel) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405Evacuation o f Wounded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410

All illustrations are from the files of the Department of Defense. The photo-graph on p. 202 is from the Department of the Army, Collection of CombatPaintings, World War II.

xix

RIVER CROSSING ATARNAVILLE

the story of the 10th and

11th Infantry Regiments,

5th Infantry Division, and

Combat Command B, 7th

Armored Division, in cross-

ings of the Moselle River at

Dornot and Arnaville,

France.

by CHARLES B. MACDONALD

CHAPTER I

The Gasoline Drought and theDornot Crossing

To the American soldier in Europe in1944 the historic Lorraine city of Metzwas to become known, after the complexseries of forts and other prepared posi-tions on its outskirts, as "Fortress Metz."The first test in the long combat lessonwhich was to give the city its name camein early September with crossings of theMoselle River south of Metz.1

By 1 September the main force of theThird United States Army's XX Corps,after a spectacular August drive acrossFrance, had run out of gasoline at Ver-dun. Reconnaissance units were sent asfar east as the Moselle River, last majorwater barrier before Metz.2 The opti-mistic reports they brought back of apanic-stricken enemy only deepened thefrustration of the paralyzed units waitingfor gasoline. Actually, during theseearly days of September such optimismwas unfounded; even on 1 September,the Germans had units going into position

to defend Metz,3 and by 4 Septemberenemy resistance against American recon-naissance units perceptibly stiffened.

Able to do little during this period butcommit ambitious future plans to paperand make a sterile record of the optimisticmessages radioed in by the cavalry recon-naissance units, the XX Corps waitedand hoped that gasoline soon wouldarrive. By the afternoon of 3 Septemberenough gasoline was on hand to promisean easing of the situation, and late in theevening of 5 September the XX Corpscommander, Maj. Gen. Walton H.Walker, returned from Third Army head-quarters with the long-awaited word toresume the offensive.

Early the next morning, GeneralWalker ordered that Field Order 10,4

the most ambitious and far-reaching ofvarious plans considered during the wait-ing period, be put into effect that after-noon, 6 September, at 1400.5 It directedseizure of crossings on the Sarre River,some thirty miles east of the Moselle, and,

1 For the story of the Metz battle, events precedingand following, and a higher-level account of thisoperation, see Hugh M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign(Washington, 1950). This volume, a part of theseries, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLDWAR II, has been used extensively in the prepara-tion of this study.

2 Contrary to a belief prevalent among troops ofXX Corps, no American reconnaissance units wereable at this time to penetrate any portion of Metzeast of the Moselle.

3 MS # B-042 (Krause). Generalleutnant Wal-ther Krause commanded Division Number 462, chargedspecifically with the defense of Metz. This division,an organizational makeshift, had assumed tacticalcontrol over all units in the area.

4 XX Corps G-3 Jnl and File, Sep 44.5 All clock time given is that officially designated by

the Allies; British Double Summer Time was usedprior to 17 September.

4 THREE BATTLES

upon army order, continuation of theadvance to Mainz on the Rhine. (Map1)* The 7th Armored Division, undercommand of Maj. Gen. Lindsay McD.Silvester, was ordered to cross the Mosellein advance of the infantry, apparently inthe hope that the armor might still finda bridge intact. If Metz itself did notfall "like a ripe plum," the armor was tobypass it and strike straight for the SarreRiver and its bridges. The two citiesthat formed the anchor positions for theGerman line of resistance in front of XXCorps—Metz and its northern neighbor,Thionville—were labeled intermediateobjectives and assigned to the 5th and90th Infantry Divisions, respectively.

Detailed orders for both the armor andthe infantry awaited seizure of a Mosellebridgehead and more intelligence on theenemy and the terrain. XX Corps knewthat the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division"Goetz von Berlichingen"6 had troops in thezone of advance and believed that ele-ments of two panzer divisions might alsobe encountered. The corps G-2 alsobelieved that two other panzer grenadierdivisions, the 3d and 15th, might possiblybe committed. The Metz fortificationsthemselves provided a big question mark.Since Roman times, when Metz becamea hub for roads in that sector, the city hadbeen heavily fortified. The present sys-tem was built by the Germans betweenthe Franco-Prussian War and World WarI and was known to have undergone somechanges by French engineers in 1939.What changes the Germans had madesince capturing the forts in 1940 was notknown. In general, the XX Corps staff

believed the fortified system outmoded,and both the Third Army and XX Corpstended to assume that the Germans wouldat most fight a delaying action at theMoselle and that the main enemy standwould be made east of the Sarre Riverbehind the Siegfried Line. Apparentlyon this assumption, virtually no informa-tion on the Metz fortifications was trans-mitted to lower units, not even to regi-ments.7

Actually, Hitler and his military ad-visers had no intention of permitting awithdrawal from the Metz-Thionvillearea; not even so much as retreat behindthe Moselle was contemplated, becausethe Metz fortifications extended west aswell as east of the river. On 4 Septem-ber, OB WEST, the German supremecommand in the west, estimated thattroops available for defense of the sectorwere equivalent to four and one-halfdivisions.8 The defense of Metz itselfwas charged to a miscellany of OfficerCandidate School and NoncommissionedOfficer School troops from the city's mili-tary schools, fortress troops, and phys-ically unfit, all brigaded together underDivision Number 462. Although this "di-vision" was an organizational makeshiftcommanded by the faculty and adminis-trative personnel of the Metz militaryschools, most of the student troops hadbeen picked for further training as officersand noncommissioned officers after hav-ing demonstrated superior abilities in the

* All maps numbered in Roman are placed ininverse order inside the back cover.

6 Hereafter referred to as 17th SS Panzer GrenadierDivision.

7 XX Corps G-2 Jnl and File, Sep 44; TUSA G-2Periodic Rpt, 3 and 8 Sep 44; Interv with Brig GenJohn B. Thompson (Ret) (formerly comdr, CCB, 7thArmd Div), 6 Apr 50; Interv with Maj W. W. Morse(formerly S-2, 11th Inf), 19 Apr 50. Unless other-wise indicated, all interviews were conducted by theauthor in Washington, D. C.

8 Sit Rpt, 4 Sep 44, found in Heeresgruppe B, Ia,Lagebeurteilungen (Army Group B, G-3, Estimates ofthe Situation), 1944.

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 5

field and were among the elite of theGerman Army. Most of these officersand men had used the Metz vicinity forschool maneuvers and knew the terrainthoroughly.

West of the river, units of the 17th SSPanzer Grenadier Division had been actingas a covering force. Although on 2 Sep-tember the 17th SS had begun to moveto reserve south of Metz for refitting andthe 462d had taken over the western secur-ity mission, many 17th SS troops were stillin the line when the XX Corps attackwas launched. The two armored divi-sions which American intelligence hadpredicted might be encountered wereactually no longer in the Metz sector.9

The American estimate that the Metzforts were outmoded was basically cor-rect, even though the inherent strength ofindividual fortifications might be ob-scured by such a generality. While theFrench had concentrated primarily onthe Maginot Line, farther to the east, theGermans after 1940 had given priority tofortifying the Channel coast. Many ofthe forts even lacked usable guns, ammu-nition, and fire control apparatus, al-though those forts subsequently encoun-tered by the southern units of XX Corps

were in most cases manned and ade-quately armed. Over-all considerationmight label the fortified system as ofWorld War I vintage, but it would bedifficult to convince the individual Amer-ican soldier who faced the forts in subse-quent days that "Fortress Metz" couldhave conceivably been made more for-midable than it actually was.

The Moselle River itself was a difficultmilitary obstacle. In the area just southof Metz the river averaged approximatelya hundred yards in width and six to eightfeet in depth with a rate of flow con-siderably greater than that of other riversin this part of France. The banks of theriver south of Metz were flat and oftenmarshy. Before emerging nearer to Metzinto a broad flood plain sometimes reach-ing a width of four to five miles, the rivertraversed a deep, relatively narrow valleyflanked on east and west by steep, com-manding hills. With the advent of therainy season, the river could be expectedto become torrential.

The Advance Begins

As the gasoline drought graduallyended, XX Corps began to assemble itsforces east of Verdun. The main effortto reach the Moselle and thence the Sarrewas to begin at 1400 on 6 September withtwo parallel columns of the 7th ArmoredDivision pushing eastward to take ad-vantage of any Moselle crossing site thatmight be found. First a strong combatreconnaissance force from the 7th Ar-mored, under Lt. Col. Vincent L. Boylan,set out at 0300 on the morning of the 6thto reinforce the cavalry units in advanceof the main armored columns. Encoun-tering little resistance initially, the forcemet stiffening opposition as the morning

9 MSS # B-042 (Krause) and # B-732 (Major KurtHold, formerly Asst G-3, First Army). Division Number462 consisted of two infantry training and replacementbattalions, one machine gun training and replace-ment company, one artillery training and replacementbattalion, one engineer training and replacementbattalion, and the units subordinated to the divisionfor the defense of Metz: the Metz Officer CandidateSchool, formed into a regiment; the NCO school ofWehrkreis XII, formed into a regiment; the SS SignalSchool Metz, formed into a battalion of four compan-ies; Security Regiment 1010; one artillery replacementbattery; several light Flak batteries and one heavyFlak battalion of the Metz antiaircraft defense; anda Luftwaffe signal battalion. MSS # B-042 (Krause)and # B-222 (General der Panzertruppen Otto vonKnobelsdorff, formerly CG, First Army).

6 THREE BATTLES

wore on. About noon it struck a strongoutpost line along the Fleville-Abbeville-Mars-la-Tour road. Meanwhile, thecavalry units had reached points alongthe river both south and north of Metzand, although beaten back, had deter-mined definitely that no bridges remained.

Starting out at 1400, the 7th ArmoredDivision moved on an axis along the mainVerdun-Metz highway, deploying Com-bat Command A in two parallel columnson the left, Combat Command B in thesame manner on the right, and CombatCommand R in the rear of CCB. Atfirst resistance was negligible; as the ad-vance continued CCA became embroiledin a stiff fight near Ste. Marie-aux-Chêneswhich continued through the night andprevented CCA from reaching the Mo-selle until the next morning.

Meanwhile, to the south, CCB, underthe command of Brig. Gen. John B.Thompson, had also been advancing ina two-column formation. On the northwas Force I, led by Lt. Col. James G.Dubuisson.10 Originally the main com-ponent of this force was to have been the23d Armored Infantry Battalion (lessCompany B) and was to have been underthe command of Lt. Col. Leslie Allison,the armored infantry commander; butshortage of gasoline had necessitated thatthe armored infantry and Company B(less one platoon), 33d Armored EngineerBattalion, remain behind, to catch upwith the column whenever gasoline be-came available. The force under Colo-nel Dubuisson ran into its first serious

opposition between Rezonville and Gra-velotte in late afternoon and was hereovertaken by its infantry and engineers.The CCB commander, General Thomp-son, was with this northern column andset up his command post just south ofRezonville.

On the south was Force II, led by Lt.Col. Robert C. Erlenbusch.11 It passedthrough elements of the combat recon-naissance force at Buxières, east of Cham-bley, and in late afternoon approachedthe village of Gorze, which blocked en-trance to a narrow defile leading to theMoselle at Novéant. (Map II) HereForce II was stopped by mines and anti-tank fire; but Company B, 23d ArmoredInfantry Battalion, was directed to bypassthe town in an effort to reach the riverand make a crossing before daylight.Although the company did succeed inreaching a canal which closely paralleledthe river, as day broke on 7 Septemberthe Germans at Novéant and Arnaville,just south of Novéant, discovered theAmericans in between them and satu-rated the area with fire, causing heavycasualties. The infantry finally werewithdrawn under cover of fire from tanksand mortars.

Nevertheless, elements of CCB didsucceed in reaching the Moselle duringthe night. In the left column (Force I),where the 23d Armored Infantry Battal-ion (-) had joined the fire fight west ofGravelotte, the newly arrived unit wasordered to push alone to the river. Uti-lizing a road through the Bois des Ognonsand the Bois des Chevaux in order to

10 Force I consisted of the following: Co A, 31stTk Bn (M); 434th Armd FA Bn (less Btry C); 2dPlat, Co B, 814th TD Bn (SP); CCB Hq, atchd trps,and tns. Force I was later joined by the 23d ArmdInf Bn (less Co B) and Co B (less one plat), 33dArmd Engr Bn. See CCB, 7th Armd Div, AAR,Sep 44.

11 Force II consisted of the following: 31st Tk Bn(M) (less Cos A and D); Co B, 23d Armd Inf Bn; 1stPlat, Co B, 33d Armd Engr Bn; Btry C, 434th ArmdFA Bn; 3d Plat, Co B, 814th TD Bn. See CCB, 7thArmd Div, AAR, Sep 44.

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 7

avoid the narrow Gravelotte-Ars-sur-Moselle defile, which was covered byenemy defenses, the battalion fought itsway under the protection of darkness toreach at 0400 the little village of Dornot,some 300 yards from the river. At day-light the Germans on both sides of theriver opened up with small arms andmortar fire, and the guns of Fort Driant,on the heights southwest of Ars-sur-Moselle, west of the river, poured indeadly shellfire. To ease its situation,the battalion cleared a little cluster ofhouses known as le Chêne, on the riverjust north of Dornot, from which the firewas particularly heavy. This successwas exploited by sending in Company B,23d Armored Infantry Battalion, fromForce II and the remainder of Force I,including Company A, 31st Tank Battal-ion (Medium), to assist the armored in-fantry battalion. And none too soon,for the enemy began to launch numerouscounterattacks, the most severe of whichoriginated at Ars-sur-Moselle.

What the American armor had donewas to break through, at a weakly heldpoint and in darkness, the defense lineof a German "bridgehead" enclosingthose Metz forts situated west of theMoselle, a line that the Germans weredetermined to hold. The German linein this area ran generally from Novéantto Gorze and north to Rezonville. TheAmerican success in breaking throughthese defenses had been surprisingly swift,necessitating formation of a second linerunning generally from Ancy-sur-Moselle,north of le Chine, to Gravelotte. Theviolent German reaction was apparentlybased in part, at least, on fear that thissecond line would be turned before itcould be adequately manned.12

While holding against these enemycounterattacks, the 23d Armored Infan-try Battalion utilized its three availableassault boats in the afternoon of 7 Sep-tember in an attempt to put a patrolacross the Moselle. Direct machine gunfire from the east bank destroyed two ofthe boats and killed most of the men,driving the patrol back.

In the meantime, to the north, CCAhad succeeded during the morning of 7September in reaching the Moselle northof Metz and was taking up positions inthe vicinity of Talange in anticipation ofa later crossing of the river. Here CCAremained, under constant enemy shelling,until 15 September, when relieved byelements of the 90th Infantry Division.

At Dornot, in order to ease pressure onCCB and eliminate General Thompson'sconcern about his north flank, CCR wascommitted to clear the heights north ofthe Gravelotte-Ars-sur-Moselle defile,open the defile, and take Ars-sur-Moselle,the source of the counterattacks againstDornot. The reserve command hadscarcely gained enemy contact when itwas halted; corps had decided that CCRremain in corps reserve and be passedthrough by the 5th Infantry Division.13

Commitment of the 5th Division

On 6 September the 5th Infantry Di-vision had been ordered to "pin onto"

12 MS # B-042 (Krause) and accompanying sketch.

13 As found in 7th Armored Division and CCBrecords, this period of 7th Armored Division opera-tions is confusing. More valuable are letters fromsurvivors to the Historical Division and interviews bythe author. See XX Corps, and CCB, CCA, CCR,7th Armd Div, AAR's and Unit Jnls, Sep 44; Intervwith Thompson. See also Ltrs to Hist Div from thefollowing: Gen Walker, 8 Oct 47; Gen Thompson,17 Feb 47, and 1, 6, 7, and 22 Mar 50; Lt Col C. E.Leydecker (formerly CofS, 7th Armd Div), 29 Jul47; and Col Erlenbusch, 9 Apr 48.

8 THREE BATTLES

the tail of the 7th Armored Division andbe prepared to fight for a bridgeheadacross the Moselle in the event that thearmored attack should fail. Attached tothe division were the 818th Tank De-stroyer Battalion (Self-Propelled), the735th Tank Battalion (Medium), the449th Antiaircraft Artillery AutomaticWeapons Battalion, Troop C of the 3dCavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, andthe 84th Chemical (Smoke Generator)Company. (The chemical company didnot arrive in the area until several dayslater.) In support was the 1103d Engi-neer Combat Group. On the left flankof the 5th Division was the 90th InfantryDivision driving northeast toward Thion-ville; on the right, also driving towardthe Moselle River, was the 80th InfantryDivision of XII Corps.

The 5th Infantry Division had receivedits battlefield indoctrination in the Nor-mandy hedgerows beginning in July 1944,and after the St. Lô breakout had par-ticipated in the spectacular Third Armydrive across France. By the time of itsarrival in the Metz vicinity, the 5th hadalready established a reputation for rivercrossings: the Maine, Essonne, Loing,Seine, Yonne, Marne, and Meuse. The7th Armored, its companion in the im-pending Moselle crossing, had also re-ceived its battle indoctrination in theclosing days of the Normandy battles andhad also participated in XX Corps' driveacross France.

In conformance with the orders tofollow the 7th Armored Division, the 5thDivision commander, Maj. Gen. S.LeRoy Irwin, directed that the 2d Infan-try follow CCA on the north, the 11thInfantry follow CCB on the south, andthe 10th Infantry remain in divisionreserve. General Irwin was concerned

as to whether his division was to establishits own bridgehead on the corps' right orto pass through the elements of the 7thArmored already engaged, but his twoleading combat teams had already jumpedoff and made enemy contact on 7 Sep-tember before he was able to get a definitedecision from XX Corps.

Accompanied by its combat team ele-ments, the 2d Infantry was to attackMetz directly from the west while the11th Infantry was to secure high groundwest of the Moselle south of Metz and beprepared to establish a bridgehead. At0830 on 7 September the 2d Infantrylaunched its frontal attack and threehours later came up against a well-organ-ized German defense line between Aman-villers and Verneville. Losses wereheavy, and here the 2d Infantry waschecked in the first of a series of fruitlessassaults against the western outworks ofthe Metz position, assaults which con-tinued until 15 September when theregiment was relieved by elements of the90th Division.

In the south column the 11th Regi-mental Combat Team consisted of itsnormal combat team elements: the 11thInfantry; the 19th Field Artillery Battal-ion (105-mm. Howitzer); Company C,818th Tank Destroyer Battalion; Com-pany C, 735th Tank Battalion; CollectingCompany C, 5th Medical Battalion; andCompany C, 7th Engineer Combat Bat-talion. A reconnaissance platoon wasattached from the 818th Tank DestroyerBattalion. Serving as the nucleus of theadvance guard was the 3d Battalion, 11thInfantry. The combat team, under Col.Charles W. Yuill, 11th Infantry com-mander, was to move by trucks at 0800,7 September, to the vicinity of Buxièresand to proceed from there on foot.

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 9

After detrucking, advance elements ofthe 11th Combat Team were meetingslight resistance from German infantrywho had not been cleared in the armoredadvance when word finally reachedGeneral Irwin about noon on 7 Septem-ber that the 5th Division was to passthrough the armor and establish a bridge-head. By this time the 11th Infantrywas deployed and advancing with twobattalions forward in widely separatedcolumns, fighting to reach the Moselle.The regimental commander, ColonelYuill, had directed his 3d Battalion onthe left to reach the river in the vicinityof Dornot, north of Novéant, and his 1stBattalion to capture Arnaville, south ofNovéant. His intention was to cross theMoselle with his 2d Battalion either atNovéant or just north of Arnaville inorder to avoid suspected enemy fortifica-tions north of Dornot. As night ap-proached, the 11th Infantry toiled slowlytoward the high ground overlooking theriver.

During the afternoon of 7 September,the attempt by the 23d Armored InfantryBattalion to put a patrol across the riverat Dornot had given rise to a belief thatthe armored battalion had already gaineda toehold across the Moselle. About1800, XX Corps told General Irwin tocross the Moselle on the following morn-ing and use the 23d Armored InfantryBattalion to augment his own infantry.The crossing was to be made at Dornot.

By midnight, 7 September, the 1st and3d Battalions, 11th Infantry, had reachedtheir objectives on the high ground be-tween Arnaville and Dornot. Althoughthe order to cross at Dornot had beenprotested by Colonel Yuill, the 2d Bat-talion, 11th Infantry, had been preparingfor the assault since nightfall. The 1st

Battalion, 11th Infantry, under Maj.Homer C. Ledbetter, was being virtuallyignored by the enemy at Arnaville, anindication that the latter offered a morelikely crossing spot than did Dornot,where enemy reaction continued to beviolent. This was apparently overruledby higher headquarters in view of theconcentration of infantry and armor inthe vicinity of Dornot. But on theground there was little co-ordination be-tween this infantry and armor. The 3dBattalion, 11th Infantry, first 5th Divisionunit to reach the Moselle, was as sur-prised upon its arrival at Dornot to findCCB as CCB was to see 5th Divisiontroops. Neither had any idea of theother's presence or impending arrival.

Nevertheless, the order to cross atDornot was sustained, and Colonel Yuilltold his 2d Battalion to make the crossingbefore daylight, 8 September. Not longbefore, the 2d Battalion had detruckedat Buxieres; during late afternoon itsCompany E had been committed to cleanout enemy road blocks in Gorze. Nowthe battalion was moving slowly on foottoward Dornot. Its troops, if they at-tacked before daylight, would have todo so without daylight reconnaissanceand with maps of no larger scale than1:100,000.14

14 The 5th Div story has been reconstructed fromthe following: 2d Lt F. M. Ludden, Combat Interv38, Sep 44, including a valuable preliminary narra-tive, Moselle River Crossing at Arnaville, 8 Sep 44-24Sep 44 (hereafter cited as Moselle River Crossing).(All combat interviews on the Moselle crossings areby the 3d Information and Historical Service andwere conducted in September 44.) See XX Corps,5th Inf Div, 1103d Engr (C) Gp, 10th Inf and 11thInf, AAR's and Unit Jnls, Sep 44; Pass in Review—theFifth Infantry Division in ETO (Atlanta, 1946) (here-after cited as Fifth Infantry Division); History of theEleventh United States Infantry Regiment (Baton Rouge,1947) (hereafter cited as Eleventh Infantry); History ofTenth Infantry Regiment United Slates Army (Harrisburg,

DORNOT BRIDGEHEAD SITE ON THE MOSELLE. Road in foregroundparallel to railroad track leads to Ars-sur-Moselle on left and to Novéant on right. Assault

forces of the 5th Infantry Division crossed the Moselle River from top point of lagoon in centerforeground.

12 THREE BATTLES

The Terrain and the Forts

Dornot, the village that was to be thebase for the projected assault crossing ofthe Moselle, was picturesquely situatedon the sharply sloping sides of steep west-bank hills. Its main road led into thetown from the west and down a narrowmain street to a junction with a north-south highway running generally parallelto the river. Beyond the crest of thewest-bank hills, the Dornot road and allof the town itself were under direct ob-servation from dominant east-bank hillswhich began to rise a few hundred yardsbeyond the river. Atop two of the peaksof the first range of east-bank hills oppo-site Dornot perched Fort St. Blaise andFort Sommy, known as the VerdunGroup, embedded and camouflaged soas to be nearly invisible from the westbank. Although the forts were shownon the small-scale maps with which theassault troops were forced to work, hardlyanything was known of their size orcomplexity.

In this section of the Moselle Valley abroad flood plain that stretched southfrom Metz began to narrow, but east ofthe river there was still a stretch of ap-proximately 400 yards of flatland almostdevoid of cover before the ascent to thehills began. Along it ran the broadMetz-Pont-à-Mousson highway, passingthrough Jouy-aux-Arches, a village one

mile to the north whose name derivedfrom ancient Roman aqueducts still inexistence, and Corny, a village one mileto the south of the projected crossing site.The flat stretch of flood land on the westbank was smaller, only about 200 yardswide between the west-bank highwayand the river. Here some cover wasprovided by a railroad embankmentwhich ran generally parallel to the high-way and the river. Slightly to the north-east of Dornot, between the railroad andthe river, were a small lagoon and acrossfrom it on the east bank a small irregular-shaped patch of woods on flat groundbetween the river and the Metz highway.On the west bank, approximately one-half mile north of Dornot stood the clusterof houses known as le Chine, which hadbeen cleared the day before by the 23dArmored Infantry Battalion. Just northof le Chine lay the village of Ancy-sur-Moselle. Approximately one and one-half miles south of Dornot on the westbank and southwest of Corny was thelarger village of Novéant.

Besides the two forts of St. Blaise andSommy, the elaborate west-bank fortifi-cation, Fort Driant, with a connectingsouthern reinforcement, the Moselle Bat-tery, provided the strongest oppositionto a crossing of the Moselle in this sector.Built by the Germans between the warsof 1870 and 1914, Fort Driant had beendesigned primarily to defend the south-western approaches to Metz, but it wassited so that its batteries dominated theMoselle Valley as well. Emplaced onthe highest west-bank terrain feature inthe vicinity, Fort Driant had alreadyillustrated the effect of its batteries to theattacking American troops. Just northof Fort Driant across the Ars-sur-Moselle-Gravelotte defile stood another fortifica-

1946) (hereafter cited as Tenth Infantry); Third UnitedStates Army After Action Report—1 Aug 44-9 May45 (hereafter cited as TUSA AAR). See also Intervswith the following: Irwin, 28 Mar and 10 Apr 50;Yuill, 17 Apr 50; Maj Cornelius W. Coghill, Jr.(formerly S-3, 11th Inf), 19 Apr 50; Lt Col Kelley B.Lemmon, Jr., 12 Jul 50; Lemmon and Yuill, 13 Jul50; Thompson; Morse. Ltr, Lt Col William H.Birdsong (formerly CO, 3d Bn, 11th Inf) to HistDiv, 27 Mar 50.

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 13

tion, Fort Marival, whose guns could fireon the Dornot area. Farther to thenorth and almost due east of Gravelottewas the formidable Fort Jeanne d'Arc,from which fire might also reach theDornot vicinity.

Accordingly, the urgency of exploitingGerman disorganization and reachingthe Sarre River in effect impelled theAmericans to attempt a crossing of theMoselle against great odds. ColonelYuill and his men were aware that FortsSt. Blaise and Sommy existed, but knewlittle of their capabilities. They werecompletely in the dark about the veryexistence of Forts Driant, Marival, andJeanne d'Arc, for these German de-fenses did not even appear on the small-scale maps in the hands of the 11th In-fantry. The regiment assumed that thefire that had actually come from the bat-teries of Fort Driant was the work ofroving German guns. In addition, anycrossing of the Moselle in the Dornot areaat this particular time might possibly besubjected to enemy ground action on thenear bank, for on the night of 7 Septem-ber the situation around Novéant to thesouth and Ancy-sur-Moselle to the northwas still fluid.15

Crossing at Dornot

As morning approached on 8 Septem-ber, troops of the 5th Infantry and 7thArmored Divisions were deployed as fol-lows: To the north, outside the Dornotsector, CCA was digging in alongside the

Moselle near Talange, northwest of Metz,and the 2d Infantry was facing a strongdefense between Amanvillers and Verne-ville, abreast and west of Metz. The10th Infantry was in 5th Division reserveand CCR in corps reserve. To thesouth, Force II (less Company B, 23dArmored Infantry Battalion) of CCB wasin an assembly area north of Onville, andtwo companies of the 1st Battalion, 11thInfantry, were astride the high groundnorth and south of Arnaville. In thevicinity of le Chine and Dornot wasForce I of CCB: the 23d Armored Infan-try Battalion (including Company B);Company A, 31st Tank Battalion; andCompany B, 33d Armored EngineerBattalion. (Force I's 2d Platoon, 814thTank Destroyer Battalion, had previouslybeen committed and virtually annihilatedeast of Rezonville, and the 434th Ar-mored Field Artillery Battalion, whilesupporting Force I, was in firing posi-tions just northwest of Rezonville.)Astride the high ground west and southof Dornot, ready to assist the crossing byfire, was the 3d Battalion, 11th Infantry,and in Dornot itself, the 2d Battalion,11th Infantry. In the rear of Dornotwas the remainder of the 11th CombatTeam: the 11th Infantry (less its threerifle battalions); the 19th Field ArtilleryBattalion; Company C, 818th Tank De-stroyer Battalion; Company C, 735thTank Battalion; Company C, 5th Med-ical Battalion; Company C, 7th EngineerCombat Battalion; and an attachedreconnaissance platoon of the 818th TankDestroyer Battalion.

The mixture of CCB and 11th Infantryunits had produced a maze of perplexityin the command picture. Both CCBand the 11th Infantry had orders to crossthe Moselle at Dornot. General Irwin,

15 This terrain study is based on the following:Moselle River Crossing; Fifth Infantry Division; TenthInfantry; Eleventh Infantry; Intervs with Coghill, Morse,Yuill, and Thompson; author's visit to area, Jun 49.For other discussion of terrain, see Cole, The LorraineCampaign, pp. 25-29, 126-29.

14 THREE BATTLES

5th Division commander, had been givenverbal orders by XX Corps placing himin command of all troops in the Dornotarea; but this information had notreached General Thompson, CCB com-mander, and he thought he was in com-mand.

The commander of the 2d Battalion,11th Infantry, Lt. Col. Kelley B. Lem-mon, Jr., whose unit was to make the 5thDivision assault crossing, had understoodthat CCB, 7th Armored Division, wouldcross the river approximately 1,000 yardsnorth of Dornot. He had been orderedto make a crossing during darkness andwas in Dornot preparing to execute thismission when he found the units of the7th Armored in the area. Talking withColonel Allison, commander of the 23dArmored Infantry Battalion, he discov-ered that the armored infantry was toforce a crossing at daylight, also atDornot.

The men of Colonel Lemmon's 2dBattalion, 11th Infantry, were alreadyhaving difficulty getting into Dornot, forvehicles of CCB had clogged the narrowroad into the town. Further compli-cating the situation, rain began to fall,making the road even more treacherousin the darkness. Fire from Germansstill on the west bank harassed trafficfrom the flanks, and when attempts weremade to pull the armored vehicles outof the area the two-way movement onlyresulted in traffic jams at Gorze andDornot.

It was still dark when rumor spreadthat a staff officer from XX Corps hadappeared and ordered the armored in-fantry to cross in advance of the 2dBattalion. Although this staff officerwas never identified and his interventiondenied by XX Corps, the idea, at least,

was prevalent and added to the con-fusion.16

Faced with the confusion on the groundand the probability that his men couldnot be ready for a crossing during dark-ness, Colonel Lemmon finally establishedcommunications with his regimental com-mander, Colonel Yuill. Shortly afterdaylight, 8 September, Colonel Yuill toldhis 2d Battalion commander that heshould proceed with his crossing plansand that the 23d Armored Infantry Bat-talion was attached for the crossing. Thebasis for such a statement was probablythe verbal order given General Irwinearlier by XX Corps, that the 5th Divi-sion was to force a crossing and use the23d Armored Infantry Battalion to aug-ment its own infantry. But a short whilelater General Thompson, CCB com-mander, used the communications of the2d Battalion, 11th Infantry,17 to tele-phone Colonel Yuill. Informing him ofhis mission to cross the Moselle, GeneralThompson requested permission to use abattalion of the 11th Infantry to assisthis own 23d Armored Infantry, becausehis battalion had been seriously depletedin the battles to hold at Dornot and leChine. Since the general's mission wasthe same, since co-ordination was ap-parently the only solution to a confusedsituation, and since General Thompson

16 Moselle River Crossing; Ltrs, Gen Thompson toHist Div; Intervs, Thompson, Morse, Coghill, Yuill,Lemmon, and Lemmon-Yuill; Ltr, Gen Walker toHist Div, 6 Jan 49. Colonel Lemmon says that thisstaff officer definitely appeared at his command postin Dornot and gave such an order to him and toColonel Allison, 23d Armored Infantry Battalion.In General Walker's letter, he says that he ordered aninvestigation later to determine the identity of thisofficer, but the investigation proved inconclusive.

17 General Thompson says 3d Battalion, but Colo-nel Lemmon and Colonel Yuill, recalling the incidentin detail, say 2d Battalion.

CONGESTION IN DORNOT before fast crossing of Moselle. The entire town wasunder observation from dominating east-bank hills visible in top background.

16 THREE BATTLES

was the senior officer on the ground.Colonel Yuill approved and designatedColonel Lemmon's 2d Battalion. Thiswas a major step toward co-ordination,but there was nothing to indicate thatGeneral Irwin was aware of the negotia-tions, and there was no real co-ordinationamong supporting elements of the twodivisions. Colonel Yuill, although hav-ing granted General Thompson's request,did not consider that his 2d Battalion wasin any sense attached to CCB, only thatGeneral Thompson was in over-all com-mand.18

After his telephone conversation withColonel Yuill, General Thompson madecontact with the 7th Armored Divisionartillery officer. Since he had receivedno response to urgent messages of the daybefore to division headquarters requestingassault boats, General Thompson toldhis artillery officer to avoid both divisionand corps headquarters but to secure asmuch artillery as possible for support ofthe crossing. He wanted a preparatorybarrage of smoke and high explosive onthe east-bank hills beyond Dornot forforty-five minutes prior to the assault.The 2d Battalion, 11th Infantry, mean-while was making its own preparationsfor artillery support from its own divi-sion.19

Although it would seem that two di-vergent efforts to cross the Moselle werebeing made at the same spot, real co-ordination finally came on battalion leveland all preparations eventually workedtoward one end. According to ColonelLemmon, both he and the 23d ArmoredInfantry commander, Colonel Allison,

recognized that the 2d Battalion, 11thInfantry, was the major unit and wasgiving the orders. The 2d Battalion'soriginal plans had been made with theidea that elements of CCB would crossone thousand yards north of Dornot andtake Jouy-aux-Arches, the latter town tobe on the north flank of the 11th Infantrybridgehead. Now the two infantry bat-talion commanders decided that bothunits would cross near the small lagoonon the west bank, across from the irregu-lar-shaped patch of woods on the eastbank. The 23d Armored Infantry wasto swing north, capture Luzerailles Farm,approximately halfway between Fort St.Blaise and Jouy-aux-Arches, and estab-lish a defense in the southern edge ofJouy-aux-Arches, both positions to pro-tect the north flank of the bridgehead.The 2d Battalion, 11th Infantry, was toadvance immediately on Fort St. Blaise.The 3d Battalion, 11th Infantry, whichwould cross later, was to capture FortSommy and protect the south flank ofthe bridgehead.20

Because supporting artillery was notcompletely in firing position, GeneralThompson and Colonel Yuill, apparentlyat about the same time and with approvalof the 5th Division commander, decidedto postpone the attack. Another factorin delay was the lack of assault boats.Only those few brought to Dornot bythe 11th Infantry's attached platoon ofCompany C, 7th Engineer Combat Bat-talion, were present until about 0800when some twenty additional boatsarrived. The arrival of these boats wasthe result of a lengthy trip during thenight through rear areas by GeneralThompson himself, after his repeated

18 Intervs with Thompson, Lemmon, Yuill, Lem-mon-Yuill; Ltr, Col Birdsong to Hist Div.

19 Intervs with Thompson and Lemmon. 20 Intervs with Lemmon and Lemmon-Yuill.

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 17

requests for boats the day before hadbrought no results.21

Plans for the crossing proceeded, someapparently made by General Thompson,others by the two battalion commanders,and some by Colonel Yuill, 11th Infantrycommander. The main fact was thatthe 2d Battalion, 11th Infantry, wouldfurnish the bulk of the troops, for in thebattles at le Chine and Dornot the 23dArmored Infantry had been reduced toabout half its normal strength and wasdepleted even further when Company Awas ordered to hold the left flank of thenear bank at le Chene. The 3d Bat-talion, 11th Infantry, from its positionsatop the high ground south of Dornot,was to assist the crossing with machinegun and mortar fire, while its CompanyL sent a platoon to investigate Novéantand place outposts in the town as south-flank protection for the crossing. ThisCompany L platoon subsequently foundNovéant unoccupied but withdrew in theafternoon when plans were made for a3d Battalion crossing. Two companiesof the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry, werestill in position astride the high groundaround Arnaville, with elements of Com-pany B assigned to clear the enemy froma pocket at Ste. Catherine's Farm, be-tween Gorze and Dornot.

With the confusion of men and vehiclesstill existing in the Dornot vicinity, at0930 General Thompson ordered thevehicles of his combat command, includ-ing the 31st Tank Battalion, which wasclose behind Dornot, to move from thearea. Remaining were CCB's armoredinfantry, engineers, and medics. Appar-ently not all vehicles succeeded in clear-

ing the area, for the infantry complainedthat a number of armored cars with theirbright cerise air-identification panelswere left parked in the open along theroad leading from Dornot to the river,drawing enemy artillery fire.22 The con-fusion between 7th Armored and 5thDivision troops was finally dissipated on9 September when CCB was officiallyattached to the 5th Division in exchangefor attachment of the 2d Infantry Regi-mental Combat Team to the 7th Ar-mored Division.

The Assault Begins

Ready to support the crossing on themorning of 8 September were the 19th,21st, 46th, and attached 284th FieldArtillery Battalions of the 5th Divisionand the 434th Armored and attached558th Field Artillery Battalions of the7th Armored Division. The new hourof assault was set for 1045. Under coverof heavy blanket concentrations by theartillery (few point targets could bediscerned) and a smoke screen on FortsSt. Blaise and Sommy, the infantry,assisted by the platoon of Company C,7th Engineers, and elements of CompanyB, 33d Armored Engineers, moved theassault craft to the water's edge. Usingan underpass beneath the railroad track,they moved northeast to a spot betweenthe lagoon and the river across from thesmall irregular-shaped patch of woods onthe east bank. (To the troops in theaction, this woods became known, appar-ently because of a horseshoe-shaped de-fense later set up there, as the "horseshoewoods.") Enemy shelling and machinegun fire began to harass the infantrymen

21 Intervs with Lemmon, Lemmon-Yuill, Yuill,Thompson, Morse, Coghill; Ltrs, Gen Thompson toHist Div.

22 Eleventh Infantry; Intervs with Thompson, Morse,Lemmon-Yuill.

APPROACHING THE MOSELLE UNDER ENEMY FIRE for first river crossingnear Dornot on 8 September 1944.

RIVER CROSSING NEAR DORNOT. Assault boat under way (above) as machinegun (below) covers the crossing. Note casualty in left foreground.

20 THREE BATTLES

from the moment they moved throughthe railroad underpass. At least oneinfantry squad carrying an assault boatreceived a direct hit. It became neces-sary to call for more supporting artilleryfire and to send a patrol from the 23dArmored Infantry Battalion to the northto eliminate enemy small arms fire. Thispatrol finally knocked out the west-bankopposition and captured some twentyprisoners.

Not until about 1115 did Company F,led by its company commander, 1st Lt.Nathan F. Drake, in the lead boat, launchthe assault in five assault craft. Thecrossing was contested by rifle and ma-chine gun fire from the east bank andmortar and artillery fire that woundedseveral Company F and engineer troops.Before loading in assault boats, eachwave of infantry would take cover in ashallow ditch about twenty yards fromthe river, then make a dash through theenemy fire to reach the boats. Next tocross, despite continued enemy fire whichkilled one man and wounded five, wasCompany G. By 1320 all of CompaniesF and G, plus a platoon of heavy machineguns and 81-mm. mortars from CompanyH, were across the river, and Company Ehad begun its crossing. Once beyondthe river, the men fanned out in the woodsfor local security and began to reorganize.The elements of Companies B and C,23d Armored Infantry, whose combinedstrength now totaled only forty-eightmen, including Colonel Allison, the bat-talion commander, and his forward com-mand group, went across intermingledwith the two lead companies of the 2dBattalion, 11th Infantry.23

Valuable fire support in the Dornotcrossing was furnished by the machineguns, mortars, and 57-mm. antitank gunsof the 3d Battalion, 11th Infantry, frompositions on the bluffs south of Dornot.Forward observers attached to the 3dBattalion from the 19th Field ArtilleryBattalion made good use of the command-ing observation to adjust fires in supportof the 2d Battalion, 11th Infantry. Ar-tillery liaison officers from both 5thInfantry and 7th Armored Division artil-lery were with Colonel Lemmon, 2dBattalion commander. The howitzersof Cannon Company, 11th Infantry,were in direct-fire positions on the heightsjust south of Dornot.24

The engineer plan for the crossing hadcalled for the 537th Light Ponton Com-pany (1103d Engineer Combat Group),assisted by one platoon of Company C,160th Engineer Combat Battalion, toconstruct and operate infantry supportrafts. Company C, 150th EngineerCombat Battalion, Company B, 160thEngineers, and elements of the 989thTreadway Bridge Company were to con-struct a treadway bridge in the vicinityof Dornot. But continued enemy ma-chine gun, mortar, and artillery fireforced abandonment of this plan on thefirst day. The corps engineers were heldback by Colonel Yuill, 11th Infantrycommander, who realized that bridge-building under the circumstances wasimpossible. Except for two platoonsthe corps engineers either remained in

23 Moselle River Crossing; Eleventh Infantry; FifthInfantry Division; 11th Inf S-3 Jnl, 8 Sep 44; Ltr, CaptMorris M. Hochberg (commander of the armored

engineers) to Hist Div, 21 Apr 50; Intervs withThompson, Lemmon, Lemmon-Yuill; Ltrs, GenThompson to Hist Div. The 2d Battalion, 11thInfantry, Unit Journal, is of little value since entriesfor this period were later destroyed by enemy artilleryfire. See also AAR's of 23d Armd Inf Bn and CCB,7th Armd Div, and arty units, Sep 44.

24 Ltr, Col Birdsong to Hist Div; Intervs with Yuilland Lemmon.

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 21

their assembly areas or did mine clear-ance on rear-area roads. One of theseplatoons, the 1st Platoon, Company C,150th Engineers, moved to the crossingsite in early afternoon on reconnaissancebut met intense enemy fire. Insteadof preparing for bridge construction, theplatoon was pressed into service assistingthe ferrying of troops and supplies andevacuating wounded. When this pla-toon was relieved after dark by the com-pany's 2d Platoon, the platoon of 7thEngineers and elements of Company B,33d Armored Engineers, were also re-lieved. Ferrying operations thus passedto control of the 2d Platoon, Company C,150th Engineers. During the afternoonone squad of the armored engineers hadcut the railroad tracks in preparation forbuilding a road over the tracks to theriver.25

According to the original plan for theassault crossing the 3d Battalion, 11thInfantry, was to await the initial successof the 2d Battalion's effort and then crossthe river farther to the south. Recon-naissance by the battalion S-3 and anattached engineer officer revealed alikely site in the northern outskirtsof Novéant. Although the battalioncommander issued tentative orders forthe attack, it was delayed to await theoutcome of the 2d Battalion's attemptsto expand the bridgehead opposite Dor-not. Subsequent action at the 2d Bat-talion site caused cancellation of plansfor a second crossing, and at 1705 Com-pany K was ordered to cross at Dornot,to be followed as soon as possible by theremainder of the 3d Battalion. Approxi-

mately one and one-half platoons ofCompany K had reached the east bankby 1745, despite being held up by heavyenemy mortar fire and confusion withthe rear elements of Company E, whichwas receiving machine gun fire from itsleft front and still blocked the crossingsite. The remainder of Company Kmanaged to cross at intervals during earlyevening, but the confined situation in thebridgehead forced cancellation, for themoment at least, of plans to send overthe rest of the 3d Battalion.26

Not all the second company had crossedwhen shortly after noon General Thomp-son, CCB commander, received a mes-sage to report to 7th Armored Divisionheadquarters. Here he was relieved ofcommand of CCB and subsequently re-duced in rank. One of the reasonsgiven for his relief was that CCB hadestablished a bridgehead across theMoselle on 7 September and then hadwithdrawn it contrary to the orders ofthe XX Corps commander. This wasnot a fact, for no bridgehead had beenestablished on 7 September: this was onlythe small patrol which had crossed inthree boats and had been almost annihi-lated. General Thompson was laterexonerated and restored to the rank ofbrigadier general.27

The departure of the CCB commander,the only officer above the rank of lieu-tenant colonel present thus far in thevicinity of the crossing site, placed full

25 1103d Engr (C) Gp and 150th Engr (C) BnAAR's, Sep 44; Interv with Yuill; Ltr, 1st Lt KingsleyE. Owen (formerly Ex Off, Co B, 33d Armd EngrBn) to Hist Div, 21 Apr 50.

26 3d Bn, 11th Inf, Unit Jnl, 8 Sep 44; EleventhInfantry.

27 Interv with Thompson. See also in the OCMHfiles a copy of the letter sent to the Chief of Staff byGeneral Thompson, 6 October 1944, explaining thepoints raised in the letter which initiated his relief.General Thompson was advanced to brigadier gen-eral by Special Orders 210, 20 October 1948, underprovisions of Section 203 (a) of the Act of Congress,approved 29 June 1948 (PL 810 80th Cong).

22 THREE BATTLES

responsibility for the river crossing inthe hands of the 11th Infantry. Fromthis time on there was apparently noquestion but that it was an 11th Infantrybridgehead supported by the 23d Ar-mored Infantry Battalion of CCB.28

The German Reaction

From the German viewpoint the cross-ing of the Moselle was almost as confusedas the original American preparations.Defending the east bank at the time ofthe assault were the 282d Infantry Battalion("Battalion Voss"), made up of men withstomach ailments, and the SS SignalSchool Metz (''Battalion Berg"), both underthe command of Division Number 462.Headquarters for Battalion Berg was inJouy-aux-Arches; for Battalion Voss inCorny. The Americans had crossed theriver on the boundary between the twobattalions, a line through the middle ofthe horseshoe woods.

The only other German troops in thevicinity of the crossing site were the 37thSS Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 77th SSPanzer Grenadier Division. This regimenthad arrived east of Metz on 6 Septemberafter a road march of approximately fiftymiles from the vicinity of Saarlautern.On 7 September the regiment's 2d Battal-ion (battle strength: 620 men) had beenordered to Marly, some three miles eastof Jouy-aux-Arches. Attached to the 2dBattalion was a company of armored in-fantry, seven Flak tanks,29 two assaultguns and one 75-mm. self-propelled gun.Having arrived in Marly in midafternoon(7 September), the battalion during the

evening passed to control of DivisionNumber 462.

About 1000, 8 September, the date ofthe American crossing, the bulk of the2d Battalion, 37th SS Panzer Grenadier Regi-ment, moved to Augny, between Marlyand Jouy-aux-Arches. At noon one ofthe company commanders reported thathe had talked with a wounded man whosaid the Americans had crossed the riverbut were equipped with no weaponsheavier than submachine guns. A littlemore than an hour later, when a messagefrom the German corps headquartersindicated that about one company ofAmericans had crossed the river at thehorseshoe woods, the commander of the2d Battalion sent a patrol to Jouy-aux-Arches to determine the truth of thereport. The patrol returned at 1430with a written message from the com-mander of Battalion Berg stating that theenemy had crossed north of Corny, thata large part of Battalion Voss had beenrouted, and that there had also been somepenetration in the sector of Battalion Berg(SS Signal School Metz). Although theenemy could be thrown back if reserveswere brought up, the message stated, theSS Signal School had no reserves available,and "the situation is serious, unless rein-forcements arrive."

Meanwhile, several reports had beenreceived from Battalion Voss that therewas "no change in [the] situation." Be-cause this news contradicted his informa-tion from Battalion Berg, the 2d Battalioncommander sent a noncommissioned offi-cer to Corny to find out what actuallywas taking place. He returned with amessage from the commander of BattalionVoss stating, somewhat inexplicably, thata company of the latter battalion "tookoff." Perhaps this news explained the

28 Intervs with Yuill and Lemmon-Yuill.29 The Flak tank (Flakpanzer) is a hybrid armored

vehicle consisting of a light or medium antiaircraftgun mounted on a tank chassis.

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 23

earlier report that a large part of BattalionVoss had been routed, but it failed toindicate that there had been an Americancrossing. In the face of these contra-dictory messages, the 2d Battalion com-mander planned originally to commitonly two reinforced platoons, one movingsouth from Jouy-aux-Arches and onemoving north from Corny, with the mis-sion of throwing back the enemy—iffound. When continuing reports fromBattalion Berg in Jouy-aux-Arches indi-cated that a bridgehead had been estab-lished and that reinforcements werecrossing the river, he changed his plans.He ordered his 7th Company to move toCorny and attack north and his 5thCompany to Jouy-aux-Arches and attacksouth. The 8th Company, a heavy weap-ons company, was to support the attackswith infantry howitzer and mortar fire.The companies moved out for the attackat 1515.30

Advance to Fort St. Blaise

At the horseshoe woods, while the earlyeffort of the 3d Battalion, 11th Infantry,to reinforce the bridgehead had beentaking place, Companies F and G had, inlate afternoon of 8 September, movedout of the woods in an advance acrossthe Metz highway and up the slopesleading to Fort St. Blaise, more than2,000 yards beyond the river. (Map 7)Company E, still reorganizing in thewoods, was to follow when reorganization

was complete and mop up bypassedresistance. Company K, when otherelements of the 3d Battalion were able tocross, was to capture Fort Sommy. Al-though the 23d Armored Infantry Battal-ion had been ordered to take LuzeraillesFarm and the southern edge of Jouy-aux-Arches, the small number of armoredinfantry to cross apparently negated thisoriginal plan, for no attempt was madeto execute it.

Accompanied by Capt. Ferris Church,the 2d Battalion S-3, the two lead com-panies moved out, Company F forwardand Company G echeloned to the leftrear. Climbing the steep slope past occa-sional patches of trees and through vine-yards and irregularly spaced fruit trees, themen met virtually no enemy oppositionand only a strange silence from the forti-fication at the top of the hill. Therewere no casualties in the advance untilCompany F had reached the outer de-fenses of Fort St. Blaise. There thecompany commander, Lieutenant Drake,leaned over a wounded German to askhim a question. As the lieutenantstraightened and raised his head, one ofthree German riflemen hidden scarcelyten yards away shot him through the fore-head. He died instantly as the menabout him turned their weapons on thethree Germans. Command of the com-pany fell to 1st Lt. Robert L. Robertson.31

Continuing its advance, Company Fslowly and methodically cut its waythrough five separate double-apronbarbed wire obstacles, only to come up

30 For a detailed report of this action from theGerman side, see pages from the war diary of the 2dBn, 37th SS Pz Gren Regt, found in a file of miscel-laneous papers, labeled Allg., 1, 2, 3, 4/SS Pz. Gren.Rgt. 37 (Feldgericht) (hereafter cited as 37th SS Pz.Gren Regt Miscellaneous File). This file contains anodd collection of documents, most of them records ofdisciplinary actions taken by the 1st Bn of the regi-ment. The 282d Inf Bn has been identified through5th Div G-2 sources only.

31 Unless otherwise noted, this section is based onthe following: Moselle River Crossing; Combat Interv38 with Sgt Hugh B. Sikes and Cpl Otto Halverson,3d Plat, Co G, 11th Inf (hereafter cited as CombatInterv 38 with Sikes, Halverson); Eleventh Infantry;Fifth Infantry Division; Intervs with Lemmon andLemmon-Yuill.

24 THREE BATTLES

MAP 7

against an iron portcullis studded withcurved iron hooks that prevented scaling.On the other side of the portcullis a drymoat about thirty feet wide and fifteenfeet deep surrounded the fort. The fortitself was a huge domed structure of threelarge casemates constructed of concreteand covered by grassy earth which pro-vided excellent camouflage and addi-

tional protection. Although the men ofthe 2d Battalion did not know it, Fort St.Blaise was manned at this time by onlya weak security detachment of a replace-ment battalion which withdrew as theAmericans approached.32

32 MS # B-042 (Krause). Colonel Lemmon says,"Undefended or not, our people got fire from the fortand heard Germans inside." See Interv withLemmon-Yuill.

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 25

Not knowing that the fort was unde-fended, Captain Church, after radioconsultation with his battalion headquar-ters, ordered his two companies to pullback about 400 yards to permit the artil-lery to plaster the fort before the finalassault. The companies did pull backbut, when the supporting artillery fired,three rounds fell short,33 wounding severalof the Americans and killing three. TheAmerican artillery fire seemed a cue for aheavy concentration of German mortarand artillery fire, and at the same time(about 1730) German infantry begancounterattacking on both flanks and in-filtrating in the unprotected rear of thetwo companies. Over his radio CaptainChurch ordered Company E to move upquickly to close the gap between it andthe advance elements. But it was toolate. Intense machine gun cross fireswept in from both flanks, and the broadMetz highway and the flatland on eitherside of it had become a deathtrap.

The enemy threatened at any momentto split the battalion. Captain Church'sforward companies were stretched out soprecariously on the open slope of the hillthat he ordered a withdrawal back tothe woods. So effective was the enemyinfiltration in the battalion rear by thistime that the withdrawal was planned as

an attack downhill in a skirmish line.But vineyards and patches of woods andenemy fire prevented control of theskirmish formation, and the two com-panies separated, each coming down thehill in a ragged single column. An oldGerman trick of firing one machine gunhigh with tracer bullets and anotherlower to the ground with regular ammu-nition took its toll. The retreat movedslowly and casualties were heavy. Asdarkness approached and visibility de-creased, unit commanders told their mento make a last dash for the woods; if aman was hit, he was to be left alone tocrawl the rest of the way as best he could.The bulk of the companies were threehours in returning to the horseshoe woods,and some men were still straggling in atdaylight the next morning. The deadand wounded marked the path of with-drawal. Although medics went out dur-ing the night and the next day to carefor the wounded, they were often shotdown at their tasks.

Earlier in the afternoon of 8 Septem-ber, after the German commander of the2d Battalion, 37th SS Panzer Grenadier Regi-ment, located at Augny, had ordered acounterattack by two of his companies,the 5th Company had reached Jouy-aux-Arches at 1700 and the 7th Company hadreached Corny at 1715. Although the5th Company soon launched its attack tothe south, the 7th Company in Corny wasimmediately pinned down by strongAmerican artillery and machine gun firefrom west of the Moselle and sufferedheavy losses. Because of another mes-sage from. Battalion Berg in Jouy-aux-Arches at 1620, indicating that the towncould not be held unless reinforcementsarrived (the 5th Company had not yetreached Jouy), the commander of the 2d

33 Moselle River Crossing; Combat Interv 38 withSikes, Halverson. Because no mention of shortrounds is made in artillery journals, it seems possiblethat these "short rounds" were from German artilleryat Fort Driant or from one of the other west-bankforts. According to an interview with ColonelLemmon there were more than three rounds. Fromhis observation post in Dornot, he could see a bat-talion volley land among his troops. Checks throughhis 5th Division and 7th Armored Division artilleryliaison officers revealed, he says, that the fire wasfrom a 7th Armored Division ar t i l lery unit and hadbeen called for by the 7th Armored Division artilleryliaison officer in his headquarters. The artilleryliaison officer had the fire lifted immediately.

26 THREE BATTLES

Battalion decided to commit his 6th Com-pany to attack "objective: Jouy-aux-Arches." By 1800 the 6th Company hadreached the town, no doubt finding itstill in German hands. The 5th Companyreported one minute later that it hadreached the horseshoe woods and hadtaken twenty-five prisoners. The 7thCompany was still pinned down at Corny.

But now the 2d Battalion commanderreceived a message indicating that theAmericans had occupied Fort St. Blaise.At approximately the same time, thecommander of Division Number 462 reachedthe 2d Battalion's command post in Augnyand stressed the importance of retakingthe fort. Accordingly, the 6th Companyin Jouy-aux-Arches was committed to"retake" Fort St. Blaise. Under "heav-iest [American] artillery fire," the 6thCompany attacked and occupied the fortat approximately 2200 without makingcontact with the Americans or sufferingany casualties. The Germans believedthat the Americans had had to evacuatethe fort because of their own artilleryfire.

Meanwhile, in Augny, two companiesof the 208th Replacement and Training Bat-talion had arrived and were sent to Jouy-aux-Arches to reinforce Battalion Berg.About 2100, German reserves had beenfurther increased when a Luftwaffe signalbattalion and the 1st Battalion, 37th SSPanzer Grenadier Regiment, had arrived inAugny.34

Upon withdrawal of the two Americanassault companies, the men of the 23dArmored Infantry Battalion and Com-panies E and K, 11th Infantry, began todig in along the perimeter of the horse-shoe woods. As troops of Companies F

and G straggled into the original bridge-head area, 2d Lt. John A. Diersing, com-manding Company E after its originalcommander had been wounded, his 1stsergeant, Claud W. Hembree, and otherofficers and noncommissioned officersdirected the survivors into defensive posi-tions. All that the day's efforts and highcasualties had gained was a minusculebridgehead 200 yards deep and 200 yardswide, encompassing no more than thehorseshoe woods. Only heavy concen-trations from the supporting artillery bat-talions prevented the Germans from re-taking even this small gain and protectedthe Americans as they dug in. The menwere still digging in when the first"counterattack" against the bridgeheaditself began: three enemy tanks drovealong the highway from the north, spray-ing the woods line with bullets and shellfragments. Although protected by "ba-zooka pants," the tanks would not closewith the defenders, their crews contentingthemselves with trying to draw fire todetermine the exact location of the Amer-ican positions. The defenders' line washard hit, particularly the positions ofCompany E at the point of the horseshoe,but the men held their fire. A group ofenemy infantry, estimated at companysize, heavily armed with automaticweapons, and shouting loudly, "Yankskaput!" followed soon after the tanks.This time Company E opened fire, butthe enemy infantry did not close, con-tinuing to follow their tanks until out ofsight to the right.

Almost hourly for the remainder of thenight (8-9 September) the Germanscounterattacked, mainly with rifles andburp guns. As the enemy formed acrossthe highway, the defenders could hearshouted orders, followed by almost fanat-34 37th SS Pz Gren Regt Miscellaneous File.

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 27

ical charges with the enemy bunched andyelling. The American automatic rifleshad a field day, and turned back everyattack with high casualties for the Ger-mans; but the defenders were only par-tially dug in, if at all, and casualtiesamong the Americans were also numer-ous. The woods were filled with criesfor medics. Sergeant Hembree, Com-pany E, realizing that such calls woulddisclose positions, as well as indicate thenumber of casualties, and that all avail-able aid men were working near the riverin an improvised aid station, sent aroundan order that no one was to cry out. Theexhibition of self-discipline that followedwas one of the heartening feats of courageduring the hectic days in the bridgehead.

During the first-night counterattacks,two men of Company K, Pfc. George T.Dickey and Pfc. Frank Lalopa, who hadvolunteered to man an outpost beyondthe main line of resistance, stuck to theirpost despite a warning order to withdraw.Armed only with M-1 rifles, the two menheld off the enemy until finally they weresurrounded and killed. The next morn-ing when other men of Company Kcrawled out to the position, they foundthe bodies of twenty-two Germans, somewithin three yards of the bodies of Dickeyand Lalopa.

Soon after the defense was organized,Captain Church returned to the battalioncommand post on the west bank to reportthe situation.35 Left in command of the

bridgehead forces was the Company Gcommander, Capt. Jack S. Gerrie. Whilethe battalion commander, Colonel Lem-mon, had realized that the situation eastof the river was serious, he was furtherimpressed by Captain Church's reportand requested permission to evacuate hisbattalion. Colonel Yuill in turn askedpermission of division. Although Gen-eral Irwin was aware that the situationin the bridgehead was far from satisfac-tory, XX Corps refused to permit with-drawal until another bridgehead wassecured. A crossing by elements of the80th Division of XII Corps to the southhad been beaten back, and the precariousfoothold opposite Dornot was thus theonly remaining bridgehead across theMoselle. If the Dornot crossing couldbe held while the 10th Infantry madeanother crossing farther south, GeneralIrwin reasoned, there would be a chanceto expand the Dornot bridgehead to linkup with the 10th Infantry. He thereforedenied Colonel Lemmon's request. TheDornot bridgehead was to be held "atall costs."36

Support of the Dornot Bridgehead

After its heavy preassault bombard-ment and until daylight of 9 September,supporting artillery, particularly thedirect-support 19th Field Artillery Bat-talion under command of Lt. Col. CharlesJ. Payne, fired heavily in support of the2d Battalion bridgehead. During thetwenty-four-hour period the 19th FieldArtillery Battalion fired 1,483 rounds.

35 Colonel Lemmon intended going into the bridge-head the first day, but when his advance commandgroup went forward in midafternoon to establish acommand post the men met intense enemy fire.From this time on, Colonel Lemmon felt that hecould exercise better command and co-ordinationfrom the west bank. His CP was in Dornot through-out the battle, although it had to be moved oftenbecause of enemy shelling. Interv with Lemmon.

36 Gen Irwin, Personal Diary, loaned to Hist Divby Gen Irwin (hereafter cited as Irwin Diary), entryof 8 Sep 44; Interv with Yuill. (Quotation fromIrwin Diary.)

28 THREE BATTLES

Most concentrations were on call bySCR-300 from the infantry in the bridge-head, giving support which the infantrydeemed "excellent and plentiful." Thework of the 19th Field Artillery Battal-ion's liaison officer, Capt. Eldon B. Cole-grove, drew particular praise. He re-mained on duty on the west bank relayingrequests for fire the entire time the 2dBattalion held on the east bank. Observ-ers for the 5th Division artillery unitswere either in Dornot or on the bluffsoverlooking the river and thus had goodover-all observation on the bridgeheadarea. One observer from the 7th Ar-mored Division was in the bridgeheaditself.

During the afternoon of 8 September,further forward displacement of support-ing artillery was accomplished. Whilethe attached 284th Field Artillery Bat-talion maintained direct support, the19th Field Artillery Battalion advancedto the vicinity of Ste. Catherine's Farm.One gun of Battery B, 46th Field ArtilleryBattalion, displaced to a position east ofGorze but, when subjected to what wasbelieved to be observed enemy artilleryfire, retired to new positions just west ofGorze. Here it was joined by the re-mainder of the battalion for a displace-ment in effective range of approximately3,000 yards.

While armor had been available in theDornot vicinity in early stages of theoperation, it had been pulled out becauseof unsuitable terrain and lack of cover,and crossing armor into the tiny bridge-head was still impossible. Company C,735th Tank Battalion, a part of the 11thCombat Team, remained uncommitted,but one platoon of Company C, 818thTank Destroyer Battalion, took positionduring the day on the high ground south-

west of Dornot and engaged targets eastof the river.37

Although repeated requests for airsupport had filtered back through higherechelons all day, none was forthcoming.Priority assignment of air to the fight forthe Brittany port of Brest and to "ridingherd" on the Third Army's open southernflank prevented its employment.38

The commander of the 1103d EngineerCombat Group, Lt. Col. George H.Walker, still planned to build a bridgeacross the river opposite Dornot the nightof 8-9 September, but again enemy fireproved too intense. Additional assaultboats were brought up to increase themeans of supply and evacuation ofwounded and to replace boats that hadbeen knocked out or sunk. The 2dPlatoon, Company C, 150th Engineers,continued to operate the assault boatsuntil 1400, 9 September, when relievedby a platoon of Company C, 204th Engi-neer Combat Battalion. Orders hadbeen received late on 8 September de-taching the 150th Engineers and assigningthe battalion to duty with the XII Corpsto the south.39

When crossing the Moselle on 8 Sep-tember, each man of the 2d Battalion andCompany K, 11th Infantry, had takenwith him all the ammunition he couldcarry and the usual canteen of water,but no rations. Beginning at 2200 thatnight, ten men of the 2d Battalion Recon-naissance Platoon carried all types of

37 Moselle River Crossing; 19th FA Bn, 46th FABn, 735th Tk Bn, 818th TD Bn AAR's, Sep 44;Interv with Lemmon.

38 Irwin Diary; 5th Div G-3 Jnl, 8 Sep 44; Cole,The Lorraine Campaign, Ch. III, p. 143, citing NinthAF Opns Jnl, 9 Sep 44; XIX Tactical Air Command,Operations File, 1 Sep-15 Sep 44, inclusive (hereaftercited as XIX TAC Opns File).

39 1103d Engr (C) Gp, 150th Engr (C) Bn, 204thEngr (C) Bn AAR's Sep 44.

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 29

infantry ammunition, three units of Kration per man within the bridgehead,and 250 gallons of water to the crossingsite. The engineers subsequently loadedthe supplies and pulled the boats acrossthe river with ropes. Two crossings perboat were made without mishap until thelast boat on its second trip was hit nearthe far shore by an enemy shell and fivemen were killed.

The 2d Battalion medical aid station,set up in Dornot early on 8 September,merged during the afternoon with thatof the 3d Battalion, 11th Infantry, whichhad moved into two cellars across thestreet. Although litter squads were at-tached initially to the rifle companies,only one squad managed to get across theMoselle, and the others worked on thenear shore. Litter bearers first trans-ported patients to the railroad underpass;from there a jeep ran the gantlet of shell-fire into Dornot. The exposed nature ofthe road across the western hills fromDornot still necessitated a jeep carry fromthe aid station to an ambulance loadingpoint behind the hills. Later in theafternoon enemy small arms fire rakingthe open ground between the railroadand the river prevented movement evenof litter teams until after dark. Duringthis period 2d Lt. T. H. Pritchett, medicaladministrative officer of the 3d Battalion,and T/5 Charles R. Gearhart, liaisonagent from Collecting Company C, 5thMedical Battalion, crawled into this fire-swept area, gave first aid to three woundedmen, and crawled out again, pulling thepatients behind them. After dark, whensleet began to fall, further adding to thediscomforts of the wounded, 2d Lt. EdwinR. Pyle, 2d Battalion medical adminis-trative officer, crossed into the bridge-head and supervised removal of wounded

by boat to the west bank, where thelitter-jeep relay used earlier transportedthe patients to Dornot. After Lieuten-ant Pyle returned to the west bank about0430, 9 September, evacuation was ac-complished solely by infantrymen andaid men within the bridgehead who some-how managed to find boats or expedientfloats and moved their wounded com-rades to the west bank.40

At 2200 the night of 8 September the10th Infantry received orders to cross theMoselle on 10 September in the vicinityof Arnaville, south of Novéant.41 Asecond bridgehead was to be attempted,this time allowing a reasonable periodfor planning and co-ordination. In themeantime, the battle to hold oppositeDornot went on.

Holding the Dornot Site, 9- 10 September

By the morning of 9 September expec-tation evidently still existed above regi-mental level that the 11th Infantry'sbridgehead could be expanded andpushed to the south.42 Within thebridgehead itself there was no such op-timism. The men inside the little perim-eter knew that, if the German pressurecontinued as it had during the night, thefoothold could not even be held for long.The regimental commander, ColonelYuill, understood the situation and thusmade no attempt to reinforce the bridge-head. Any such attempt, he knew,would be suicidal.43

Before daylight on 9 September areport from a German prisoner that there

40 Moselle River Crossing; Combat Interv 38 withSikes, Halverson; Eleventh Infantry.

41 10th Inf Unit Jnl, 8 Sep 44.42 Irwin Diary; 5th Div G-3 Jnl, 9 Sep 44.43 Interv with Yuill.

30 THREE BATTLES

were about one thousand Germans in oneof the forts of the Verdun Group set offfrantic requests for air support to hit theforts at daylight. Colonel Yuill, tele-phoning a number of times to 5th Divisionheadquarters, said that "the bridgeheadis desperate" and "it is vitally importantthat we get an air mission." The re-quest was approved soon after daylightand planes were expected momentarily,but they did not arrive. At 0920 (9September), General Irwin telephonedthe XX Corps commander, GeneralWalker, to protest the fact that the planeshad been promised but had not appeared.While the 11th Infantry continued to cryfrantically for planes, division promisedthat, if nothing else, "they would sendcubs" (artillery observation planes). Butat 1045 the regiment received the wordit had apparently been fearing. Theplanes had been taken for missions againstthe primary target of Brest.44

Enemy pressure against the littlebridgehead continued. Counterattackfollowed counterattack: during the entiretime the battalion remained on the eastbank an estimated thirty-six separateenemy assaults were hurled against it.45

Throughout the day of 9 September, andexcept for occasional lulls on 10 Septem-ber, the rain of enemy shells continued,not only on the horseshoe woods and the

crossing site but on Dornot, le Chine, thehigh ground on either side of Dornot, andthe road to the west from Dornot. TheGermans made the most of their com-manding observation from Forts St.Blaise and Sommy, both of which provedimpervious to American artillery fire; andthe positions of the enemy's heavy gunsand mortars could not be detected, noteven from artillery observation planes.Shelling forced abandonment of all ef-forts to resupply the bridgehead in day-light, daytime activity resolving intohazardous efforts to evacuate the wound-ed. One of the wounded was ColonelAllison, the 23d Armored Infantry Bat-talion commander, the only field gradeofficer to cross into the bridgehead.Although evacuated, he died of woundssix days later.

Despite a tendency toward bunchingand almost banzai-like attacks, the enemyfacing the horseshoe defense was wilyand, it seemed to the defenders, oftenfanatical. Sometimes his attacks weresupported by tanks which would giveclose-in artillery and machine gun sup-port while the accompanying infantryclosed with persistence and courage.

After the first day's attack by elementsof the 2d Battalion, 37th SS Panzer GrenadierRegiment, the next major German attemptto eliminate the bridgehead was launchedat 2245 the night of 9 September by twocompanies of the 37th SS Panzer GrenadierRegiment, supported by fire from a thirdcompany of the same regiment. The at-tack marked the first mention in thisaction of this regiment's 4th Battalion.(The 1st Battalion had previously takenover defense of Forts Sommy and St.Blaise.) The attack proceeded satisfac-torily until shortly after midnight whenit bogged down under heavy American

44 5th Div G-3 Jnl, 9 Sep 44.

45 Although interviews and unit histories say "36separate counterattacks," the morning reports of theunits involved, particularly the valuable reports ofCompany K, 11th Infantry, would seem to indicateno such large number. While the enemy launchedseveral determined counterattacks against the bridge-head, others were no doubt local assaults. Whatmatters is that the enemy kept up continuous pres-sure. See Daily Rpts, 8-11 Sep 44, found in Heeres-gruppe "G" Kriegstagebuch 2 (Army Group G War Diary2), Anlagen (Annexes) 1.IX.-30.IX.44 (hereafter citedas Army Group G KTB 2, Anlagen 1.IX.-30.IX.44);37th SS Pz Gren Regt Miscellaneous File.

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 31

small arms fire. The Germans intimatedthat they had failed because the Amer-icans were continually bringing newtroops into the bridgehead. In additionto three battalions of the 37th SS PanzerGrenadier Regiment, the German unitswhich figured in the Dornot bridgeheadfighting were primarily the 282d InfantryBattalion (Battalion Voss), which had beenholding the line extending south from thecenter of the horseshoe woods, the SSSignal School Metz (Battalion Berg), and the208th Replacement and Training Battalion,all under the control of Division Number462. (The 3d Battalion, 37th SS PanzerGrenadier Regiment, was apparently in re-serve and was not actively committed inthis operation.) 46

The Americans in the bridgeheadcould take few prisoners. Representa-tive of enemy refusal to surrender was anevent in late afternoon of 9 Septemberwhen approximately a platoon of Germansattacked Company F. Some twentywere killed with automatic rifle and riflefire close to the defenders' foxholes; aboutfive others dropped behind the bodies oftheir comrades. Feigning wounds, al-though still holding on to their weapons,the five would not respond when men ofCompany F called out for their surrender.Fearing what might happen after darkif the Germans were left so close to theforward foxholes, Company F had noalternative but to shoot them where theylay.

A number of times the Germans triedanother ruse: while a German officershouted in English to "cease firing," agroup of the enemy would form for alocal assault to be launched during the

expected lull in American fire. Thetrick worked only once, and then onlypartially and to the enemy's disadvant-age, when the 1st Platoon, Company E,obeyed the command, only to realizewhen it was repeated that it was givenwith a foreign accent. Opening fireagain, the platoon wiped out a group offifteen to twenty Germans who hadstarted an assault.

On the west bank an enemy machinegunner, superbly camouflaged in a log-covered, well-sodded emplacement at thenorth end of the lagoon between the rail-road and the river, remained undetectedfrom the day of crossing until 10 Septem-ber, providing continual harassment totroops at the crossing site. With themuzzle of his machine gun remainingwithin his emplacement while he firedthrough a nine-inch aperture, the Ger-man could not be located. Although atnight he impudently sang German songs,the American troops still could not findhim. His position was not neutralizeduntil 10 September when it was placedunder area fire by 60-mm. mortars, auto-matic rifles, and rifles of Company I,11th Infantry.47

In midmorning of 9 September theCompany K commander, 1st Lt. StephenT. Lowry, was killed in the bridgehead.The one company officer who had notyet been killed or wounded, 1st Lt.Johnny R. Hillyard, assumed command.Just after daylight the next morning,Lieutenant Hillyard too was killed. The

46 37th SS Pt Gren Regt Miscellaneous File; MS# B-042 (Krause); MS # B-222 (Knobelsdorff).

47 Colonel Lemmon had no troops to send to clearout west-bank opposition. In answer to a requestfor such aid, regiment sent either a company or aplatoon (probably Company C, 11th Infantry) onthis mission, but Colonel Lemmon noted no decreasein enemy fire. Interv with Lemmon; Statement,Capt Stanley R. Connor to OCMH, Jun 50, filed inOCMH.

32 THREE BATTLES

1st sergeant, Thomas E. Hogan, tookcommand of the company.

Incidents of individual heroism con-tinued to be almost commonplace. InCompany G Pvt. Dale B. Rex took overa machine gun on the left flank when itsgunner was killed early on 9 Septemberand manned it through the remainder ofthe battle. Near-by riflemen estimatedthat Private Rex killed "wave after wave"of Germans; "hundreds," said the grate-ful riflemen. In Company K, T/5 Wil-liam G. Rea, a medical aid man, ren-dered continuous first aid to the woundeddespite machine gun and rifle fire. Oncehe crawled under fire 300 yards to reacha wounded man, returning unaided withthe patient and walking erect throughthe small arms fire. Almost all officersin the bridgehead were soon either killedor wounded because they moved fromtheir foxholes to encourage their men anddirect improvements on the positions.Some men reported that their officersapologized to them for being wounded.

The first night in the bridgehead themen dug slit trenches as fighting positionsand later improved them, developingwhat some dubbed "mole holes," a fox-hole dug at one end of a slit trench.Because their weapons' fire blasts re-vealed the defensive perimeter, crews ofCompany H's 81-mm. mortars abandonedtheir weapons and took up rifles fromthe dead and wounded to continue thefight. Even the rifle companies' 60-mm.mortars had to be shifted constantly toavoid revealing positions by fire blast.

Communications proved to be a brightspot. Although radio became the solemeans of communication, the SCR-300'sworked almost perfectly, aided by theproximity of the bridgehead to the bat-talion command post in Dornot. When

Company F's radio was battered by fireand Company G's lost and believed cap-tured, Company F joined in the use ofCompany K's radio and Company Gshared Company E's. One SCR-300,which had been taken across with themen of the 23d Armored Infantry Bat-talion, had been almost immediatelydestroyed; but the forty-eight armoredinfantrymen, reduced to an even smallernumber by continuing casualties, weresoon virtually integrated into the riflecompanies. Adequate replacement bat-teries for the SCR-300's were suppliedsatisfactorily at night. Even if the bat-teries had given out, communicationspersonnel were prepared to switch thebattalion SCR-284 to the same frequencyas the company SCR-536's. No attemptwas made to lay telephone wire acrossthe river, but an adequate net existed onthe west bank. A double trunk line fromthe 2d Battalion to the 11th Infantrycommand post was shot up so badly thatrepair was impossible and another linehad to be laid. The 2d Battalion alsohad telephone connections with the 3dBattalion, its own aid station and obser-vation post, and the 23d Armored In-fantry Battalion. Although a line waslaid the first night from the 2d BattalionCP to the crossing site, it was shelled outso quickly that replacement was notimmediately attempted.

The 11th Infantry regimental observa-tion post during the action was in aformer German bunker atop the hillmass just northwest of Dornot. A for-ward regimental command post was inanother bunker a few hundred yards be-hind the observation post on the reverseslope of the hill.48

48 Interv with Morse.

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 33

INFANTRYMAN AT FOOTBRIDGE OVER RAILROAD near Dornot. Soldieris carrying both a .30-caliber machine gun and a submachine gun M-3 (grease gun).

The supply performance of the firstnight was repeated the night of 9 Sep-tember by men of both the 2d and 3dBattalion Ammunition and Pioneer Pla-toons, even to manning the assault boats.Supply was under the direction of 2d Lt.Tyrus L. Mizer, 2d Battalion S-4.49

The combined 2d and 3d Battalion aidstation, under Capt. John M. Hoffman,

49 Moselle River Crossing. With the 2d Battalionand Company K in the initial assault went the follow-

ing ammunition: 5,000 rounds with each lightmachine gun; 9,000 rounds with each heavy machinegun; and 100 rounds with each 60- and 81-mm.mortar. Transported later were: 1,000 rounds of60- and 81-mm. mortar ammunition; 60,000 roundsof .30-caliber in machine gun belts; 13,000 rounds of.30-caliber in 8-round clips and 6,000 in 5-roundclips for BAR's; 200 antitank "bazooka" rockets;200 rifle grenades; and 200 hand grenades.

34 THREE BATTLES

2d Battalion surgeon, Capt. EmanuelFeldman, assistant regimental surgeon,and Capt. Panfilo C. Di Loreto, 3d Bat-talion surgeon, continued to operate inthe cellars of Dornot. To assist evacua-tion, a casualty relay point was estab-lished, shifting from the railroad under-pass to the first house in the eastern edgeof Dornot according to the vagaries ofenemy shelling. Enemy fire was usuallyso heavy at the crossing site in daylightthat litter bearers could not remain in thevicinity. Although medics made occa-sional trips to the site, many woundedhad to make their way back alone as faras the railroad underpass. At approxi-mately 2300 the night of 9 September,four men of Collecting Company C, 5thMedical Battalion,50 crossed by boat tothe east bank, collected casualties fromthe bridgehead, and returned. As theywere preparing to enter the boat for asecond trip, a round from an enemy tankblew the craft from the water. Althoughinfantrymen and aid men continued toget their wounded comrades across, theirswas the last actual evacuation from thebridgehead by west-bank medics.

Enemy casualties were no doubt higherthan American, but there was a steadyattrition among the defenders, and noreinforcements were coming in to help.Although it was obvious to anyone whoknew the local situation that the littleperimeter could not hold out much longer,the defenders had the temerity on themorning of 10 September to call forGerman surrender. If the Germans didnot capitulate, noted the War Diary ofthe 37th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, theAmericans promised to deliver such a

concentration of fire as their enemies hadnever seen before.

Not long after this demand for sur-render, the commander of the 2d Battalion,37th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, waskilled by American mortar fire, and thecommander of his 6th Company waswounded. Possibly because of these andother casualties, the German units on thenorth and northeast of the horseshoewoods made an unauthorized withdrawalto Jouy-aux-Arches but were ordered toreturn to their positions. Later the 2dand 4th Battalions of the regiment wereformed into Kampfgruppe Ulrich and or-dered to defend Jouy-aux-Arches, ap-parently a continuation of a strangeGerman preoccupation about the defenseof the northern village. While theAmericans throughout the action hadbeen most concerned with the forts ofthe Verdun Group, the Germans on theground had shown more concern aboutJouy-aux-Arches.51

1st and 3d Battalions, 11th Infantry

Since the original Dornot crossing on8 September, the 3d Battalion, 11th In-fantry, had continued to support thebridgehead from defensive positionsastride the high ground south and westof Dornot. On 8 September its Com-pany K had crossed into the bridgehead.The 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry, whichhad originally been along the Moselle tothe south near Arnaville, was relievedlate on 8 September by elements of the

50 T/5 Gearhart, T/4 George C. Berner, Sgt LeoW. Phelps, and Pvt Ernest A. Angell.

51 37th SS Pz Gren Regt Miscellaneous File. Unlessotherwise noted, this section is based on the followingsources: Moselle River Crossing; Combat Interv 38with Sikes, Halverson; Eleventh Infantry; Fifth InfantryDivision; 11th Inf AAR, Sep 44; Co K, 11th Inf,Morning Rpts, 9-10 Sep 44; Interv with Lt Col S. E.Otto (formerly actg S-3, 5th Div Arty), 5 May 50.

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 35

10th Infantry and ordered to move tohigh ground northwest of Dornot in orderto protect the left flank of the regiment.Despite casualties from heavy enemyshelling, the 1st Battalion by early morn-ing of 9 September had taken up positionsextending generally from Dornot to thevicinity of Hill 366 to the northwest.

The 11th Infantry still knew virtuallynothing about what was opposing it onthe north—the enemy position thatturned out to be Fort Driant. AlthoughColonel Lemmon, 2d Battalion com-mander, had sent a small patrol in thatdirection early on 9 September, the patrolhad not emerged from the woods and hadnot discovered Fort Driant. Late on 9September the 1st Battalion was orderedto send a patrol to investigate the area.A combat patrol from Company B wentout that night, returning the next morn-ing with the 11th Infantry's first concreteinformation that a German fortificationof some type existed on the regiment'snorth flank.52

Withdrawal at Dornot, 10-11 September

With other elements of the 5th InfantryDivision crossing the Moselle south ofDornot in the vicinity of Arnaville, Gen-eral Irwin decided early on 10 Septemberthat the Dornot bridgehead could bewithdrawn without undue hazard to thenew crossing. Because radio silence wasimposed on such a message, two volun-teers from Company I, 11th Infantry,Sgts. Arch H. Crayton and Frank Noren,swam the river in late afternoon to takethe withdrawal order to Captain Gerrie,the bridgehead commander. Both ser-geants carried copies of the order in the

event one did not get through, but bothmade the trip safely and plans for evacua-tion were readied to go into effect at 2115,10 September. That same evening at2000, the Germans, unaware of theAmericans' impending withdrawal, issuedan attack order for an all-out assaultagainst the little bridgehead. Using allelements of the 37th SS Panzer GrenadierRegiment (except the 3d Battalion), plussupporting tanks and artillery, the attackwas to jump off an hour and three quar-ters after the Americans were scheduledto begin their withdrawal.

Supporting the American withdrawal,the engineers planned to use the fewremaining leaky assault boats and a fewrubber reconnaissance boats for removingthe wounded, while ropes strung acrossthe river were to aid the able-bodied.The reconnaissance boats were to be in-flated and carried during daylight fromthe bivouac area of Company C, 204thEngineers, to the edge of the woods atopthe Dornot hills. After darkness theywere to be carried by hand to the crossingsite. A floating line, consisting of sixrubber reinforcing inserts ("sausages")connected end to end with rope, was tobe constructed as an added means ofassisting the able-bodied. One platoonof Company C, 204th Engineers, was tocontinue its work at the crossing sitewhile the remainder of the companyreadied equipment and brought it to theriver. Also assisting at the crossing sitewas to be one platoon of Company C,7th Engineers.

In preparation for the withdrawal, the3d Platoon, Company I, 11th Infantry,moved at midday to a position betweenAncy-sur-Moselle and the crossing site,facing generally northeast. Its missionwas to decrease the cross fire from the

52 Statement, Capt Connor to Hist Div; Interv withLemmon.

36 THREE BATTLES

bridgehead's left. The 2d Platoon wasdirected to take positions during theafternoon along the right of the lagoon tocover the bridgehead's right flank, whilethe 1st Platoon was directed to move soonafter dark to positions along the riverbanknear the northern edge of the lagoon.In the course of these movements duringthe afternoon, the Company I com-mander was seriously wounded and 1stLt. Raymond W. Bitney assumed com-mand.

The few officers and noncommissionedofficers remaining in the bridgehead wereto organize the operations on the eastbank, withdrawal to be by swimming,boats, and expedient floats. All weaponsand equipment were to be thrown intothe water. Guides were to be posted inthe rear of Dornot to direct the men toan assembly area where hot food, coffee,and clothes would be available. Notonly was the bridgehead to be evacuatedbut also the entire area around the cross-ing site and Dornot, because ColonelLemmon felt that once the Germans be-came aware of American withdrawalthey would plaster the west bank withshellfire. American artillery, whichwould continue to fire its usual defensivefires around the bridgehead perimeter,was to increase in intensity upon a greenflare signal to be fired by 1st Lt. RichardA. Marshall, Company I, as soon as theevacuation was complete. Upon thesignal, the artillery was to concentrateon the horseshoe woods and the areabetween the woods and the enemy fortsin the hope of catching enemy troopsthat would almost certainly move in assoon as the evacuation was discovered.

The 2d and 3d Platoons, Company I,effectively neutralized enemy small armsfire on the crossing site during the after-

noon, but at the cost of a number of killedand wounded by the enemy's artilleryreaction. About 2100 the 1st Platoon,Company I, with Lieutenant Marshall,the two platoons of engineers, and a fewmen from the 2d Battalion Ammunitionand Pioneer Platoon, who brought withthem nine litters, reached the river at thecrossing site. There was miraculouslyno shelling at the site itself. Along theroad between the railroad and Dornot,however, the engineers of Company C,204th, who were transporting the recon-naissance boats, ropes, and reinforcinginserts, were subjected to heavy shellingand thus delayed in reaching the riveruntil approximately 2200. But alreadythe withdrawal had begun with threebullet-riddled assault boats and one rope.

Men on the east bank assembled inthe darkness at the crossing site, whereloading of wounded was supervised byCaptain Gerrie. The able-bodied shedtheir equipment and clothes and beganto make their way individually across theriver, by swimming, by holding to theone available rope, or by utilizing buoy-ant devices such as empty water cans orammunition tins. Although the riverwas only about ninety yards wide andsix to seven feet deep, the water wasintensely cold and the current swift, andmany men were drowned. Others weresaved from drowning by the strength andcourage of their companions. Somemen, like Private Rex of Company G andT/5 Rea of Company K, made a numberof trips to assist other swimmers. An FCompany officer, 1st Lt. James E. Wright,was seen to make one crossing and goback to assist others, but he was not heardfrom again. Many men arrived in therear assembly area completely naked.

Since the reconnaissance boats had not

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 37

yet arrived, transporting the woundedwas a slow process. One of the threeassault boats was swamped at the eastbank on its first trip when too many mencrowded into it. In the other two, theprofusion of bullet holes made constantbailing necessary. Discipline in loadingwas generally excellent, but at one point,when Captain Gerrie left to search thewoods for others, a group of men becamepanic stricken. They were forced backinto loading formation by 1st Lt. Ross W.Stanley, Company G, assisted by Ser-geant Hembree, Company E, and T. Sgt.George A. Gritzmacher, Company K.Only when the 204th Engineers arrivedand put the rubber reconnaissance boatsand floating reinforcing inserts intooperation about 2230 did the evacuationof wounded speed up appreciably.

As the last boatloads of wounded wereleaving the far bank, Lieutenant Marshalland his communications sergeant, armedwith the important green flare for callingdown the prearranged fires of the sup-porting artillery, crossed to the east bankto determine that no men had been leftbehind. (Many men were so exhaustedthat they went to sleep while waitingtheir turn in the boats.) Already Lieu-tenant Stanley, Company G, who was inthe last boat, had made a last-minutecheck, but Lieutenant Marshall could notbe satisfied until he himself had investi-gated. Lieutenant Stanley's boat pushedout into the stream, leaving LieutenantMarshall and his communications ser-geant alone on the east bank. One ortwo German tanks came down to theriver's edge, firing point-blank across theriver at the withdrawal activity. WhileLieutenant Marshall and the sergeanthugged the ground to avoid detection,one enemy shell hit a boat carrying men

of Company H, just in front of that ofLieutenant Stanley, ripping away thefront of the boat. A number of Com-pany H's missing personnel were pre-sumed to have been in that boat.

With Lieutenant Marshall and hiscommunications sergeant still on the eastbank and the last boatloads of evacueesand crews leaving the water on the westbank, an enemy signal flare went up.By coincidence, the enemy flare wasgreen. Knowing that no matter whohad fired the green flare, the Americanartillery would soon respond, LieutenantMarshall and his communications ser-geant hurriedly pushed out into the riverin their rubber reconnaissance boat.The artillery did respond quickly, butonly two shells fell short in the river.The little rubber boat and its occupantswent unharmed.

This green flare had not only calleddown American artillery fire but possiblyGerman fire as well, for in the enemyattack order issued earlier use of a greenflare was to mean "shift fire forward."The presence of German tanks, use of thegreen flare, and re-establishment of con-tact between Jouy-aux-Arches and Cornybefore daylight the next day indicatedthat the Germans had launched theirall-out attack as planned, only to findthat the little American bridgehead hadbeen withdrawn, unwittingly, with onlyminutes to spare.

Despite precautions to see that no menwere left in the bridgehead, at least oneman, Pvt. Joseph I. Lewakowski, Com-pany G, had either fallen asleep or lostconsciousness in his foxhole about fiftyyards from the river. He awoke the nextmorning just as day was breaking.Climbing from his covered foxhole tofind himself alone, he "walked across

38 THREE BATTLES

dead Germans from his foxhole to theriver bank." (These German dead mayhave been casualties from American ar-tillery fire called down by the Germansignal flare.) Pulling himself across theriver by the ropes, which had been leftin position on the chance that someonemight have been left behind, PrivateLewakowski made his way to the rearand rejoined his company.53

In the assembly area after the with-drawal, the first estimate of bridgeheadlosses could be made. Company K,which had reinforced the 2d Battalion inthe horseshoe perimeter, emerged fromthe three-day battle with no officers andonly fifty men. The three rifle com-panies of the 2d Battalion had only twoofficers among them, and their totalcasualties numbered over 300. The 23dArmored Infantry Battalion, which hadfought on both sides of the river, likewisesuffered severely and sustained 200 cas-ualties in its four days of action. In thefive days following the withdrawal, evacu-ation of combat exhaustion cases soaredin all units.54

The Dornot bridgehead fight had beenprimarily an infantry-artillery battle witharmored commitment limited to theGermans. Company C, 818th TankDestroyer Battalion, with two platoons infiring positions near Dornot, did littlefiring except for ten rounds on 9 Septem-ber at two enemy tanks near the east-bank town of Corny; one tank was be-lieved hit. Company B, 735th TankBattalion, waiting for a bridge to be builtbefore joining the fight, did no firing.Air support, although requested manytimes during the battle, was not furnisheduntil the last day, 10 September, whenP-47's of the 23d Squadron, 36th FighterBomber Group, XIX Tactical Air Com-mand, made four raids on Forts St.Blaise and Sommy, dropping twelve 250-pound bombs and twenty-three 500-poundbombs. Later investigation showed thatthe bombs caused no structural damageon the heavy forts.55

53 This section based on the following sources:Moselle River Crossing; Combat Interv 38 withSikes, Halverson; Combat Interv 38 with EngineerOfficers on Bridgehead Operations (hereafter citedas Combat Interv 38 with unidentified engr offs);Eleventh Infantry; Fifth Infantry Division; 23d Armd InfBn, CCB, 11th Inf, 19th FA Bn AAR's and UnitJnls, Sep 44; 23d Armd Inf Bn, 2d Bn, 11th Inf, CosI and K, 11th Inf, Morning Rpts, Sep 44; Intervswith Lemmon and Lemmon-Yuill; Attack order,37th SS Pz Gren Regt, 10 Sep 44, found in 37th SS PzGren Regt Miscellaneous File. Regimental recordsof the 37th SS Pz Gren Regt cannot be found. Al-though the 37th SS Pz Gren Regt Miscellaneous Filemakes no mention of the German attack, the diaryconcerns itself only with the 2d Battalion, whose rolein this attack was passive and which would thus con-ceivably not mention the details of the attack.

54 Morning Rpts, which did not list a casualty untilit was unquestionably determined, sometimes as lateas a month after it occurred, show the following

figures for the period 7-15 September 44. It is theopinion of the historian that most of the casualtiesoccurring during the Dornot fight were recordedduring this period, that the large number of nonbattlecasualties was a direct result of the bridgehead battle,and that the units concerned suffered few, if any,casualties between 10 and 15 September.

55 818th TD Bn, 735th Tk Bn, AAR's, Sep 44;XIX TAC Opns File, 8-10 Sep 44. For an excep-tionally detailed study of bomb damage on Fort St.Blaise, see report of The United States StrategicBombing Survey, Fort St. Blaise, Verdun Group,

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 39

On 11 September the 2d Battalion andCompany K moved to division reserve inan assembly area near Gorze where theybegan to absorb replacements in men andequipment. The 23d Armored InfantryBattalion reverted to its parent organiza-tion, CCB, 7th Armored Division, moving

for rest and reorganization to the vicinityof les Baraques, just west of Gorze.56

It had been a costly fight at Dornotagainst a determined enemy. Withoutreinforcements the men had been unableto consolidate or expand their bridgehead.They had nevertheless held against al-most staggering odds until ordered towithdraw. Just how much their holdinghad affected the try for another bridge-head south of Dornot at Arnaville isapparent in a study of that later crossing.

Metz, France, copy filed in OCMH. "Bombs lessthan 2,000 lbs. caused no material damage and 2,000lb. bombs only caused damage when penetrationinto the concrete was gained or a very near missoccurred. Near misses produced some spalling fromthe concrete walls." Page 1. 56 11th Inf, 23d Armd Inf Bn, AAR's, Sep 44.

CHAPTER II

The Crossing at Arnaville(10-11 September)

Late on 8 September, the day of theDornot crossing, General Irwin had or-dered the commander of the 10th Infan-try, Col. Robert P. Bell, to force a secondcrossing of the Moselle approximatelytwo and a half miles south of Dornot,near the village of Arnaville. (See MapII.) General Irwin took this step afterhaving decided that the Dornot bridge-head was too rigidly contained to beexploited successfully. Already duringlate afternoon the 3d Battalion, 10thInfantry, had moved into defensive posi-tions, relieving the 1st Battalion, 11thInfantry, astride the high ground west ofthe river in the vicinity of Arnaville.Assigning the 10th the mission of crossingthe river and securing the high groundnorth of the village of Arry, GeneralIrwin had set the date of crossing for 10September but had left the exact hourand site to the discretion of the regimentalcommander.1

Early on 9 September Colonel Bellwent forward with his reconnaissanceparty to Arnaville, a tiny village just westof the railroad track that paralleled theMoselle. Finding that the area had not

been completely cleared of the enemy,the party divided into two patrols andmade its way to the river. Parallel tothe railroad track and the river the Amer-icans came upon a deep canal, whichcould be expected to complicate laterbridging operations. They found how-ever, that infantry could cross at a lockin the canal. Although approximately200 yards of open, marshy land extendedbetween the canal and the river, at oneplace a tree-shaded trail provided con-cealment to the water's edge. The river-bank itself was suitable for launchingassault boats. Detailed engineer recon-naissance could not be made until later,but it appeared that a suitable bridgesite existed where a military bridge hadbeen constructed and later destroyed bythe French Army in the campaign of1940. On the near bank the two hillsflanking Arnaville on the north and southcovered the Bayonville-Arnaville ap-proach road and provided direct-firepositions for supporting the assault.Arnaville was approximately one milesouth of the larger west-bank village ofNovéant and approximately two and ahalf miles north of another west-bankvillage, Pagny-sur-Moselle, in the XIICorps zone.

Beyond the river was another stretchof some 500 yards of open, marshy flat-land. A network of trails through it led

1 Unless otherwise noted this section is based on thefollowing sources: Moselle River Crossing; IrwinDiary; Combat Interv 38 with unidentified engr offs;Tenth Infantry; Fifth Infantry Division; 10th Inf, 5thDiv, 1103d "Engr (C) Gp, AAR's and Unit Jnls;author's visit to area, Jun 49; Ltr, Col Bell to HistDiv, 5 Apr 50.

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 41

to Voisage Farm at the intersection ofthe Arry road with the Metz-Pont-à-Mousson highway. From the north-south Metz highway, the ground roseabruptly to dominating east-bank hills.To the reconnaissance party, two of these,Hill 386 in the Bois des Anneaux and thewooded Côte de Faye (Hills 325, 370,and 369) seemed to offer natural de-fensive positions and were later assignedas battalion objectives. On the mapsused by the reconnaissance party, Hill325 on the Côte de Faye appearedwooded. In reality it was a bare knobexposed to direct fire from Forts Sommy,St. Blaise, and Driant. Although Colo-nel Bell realized that the dominantterrain feature in the area was Hill 396,one thousand yards east of Hill 386, hefelt that he could not expect his twoassault battalions to take and hold thishill the first night. Also impressed withthe consideration that up to this time noattempt to establish a bridgehead acrossthe Moselle had succeeded, except thetentative foothold now held at Dornot,Colonel Bell recognized that the successof his regiment was mandatory and hedid not want to assume more than hecould accomplish.

Southeast of Voisage Farm on the steepslopes of the east-bank hills stood thevillage of Arry, and northwest of the Côtede Faye and beside the river, the villageof Corny. Another factor of terrainwhich was to prove important was theconvergence in the vicinity of the crossingsite in the Moselle valley of two defilesfrom the west, at Arnaville and atNovéant, and a shallow draw leadingfrom Voisage Farm to a saddle betweenHills 369 and 386.

Returning about 1400 to his commandpost in Chambley, Colonel Bell issued his

attack order to his regiment and its usualcombat team elements: the 46th FieldArtillery Battalion (105-mm. howitzers);Company B, 7th Engineer Combat Bat-talion; Company B, 818th Tank De-stroyer Battalion (with one platoon ofReconnaissance Company, 818th, at-tached); Company B, 735th Tank Bat-talion; and Collecting Company B, 5thMedical Battalion. Also available toassist the river crossing by ferrying andbridging was the 1103d Engineer CombatGroup, including the 551st Heavy PontonBattalion, which was prepared to con-struct the bridge. Thirteen field artillerybattalions were available to furnish sup-porting fire.2 Designating the hour ofcrossing as moonrise, 0055, 10 September,Colonel Bell ordered his 1st Battalion tolead the assault and capture Hill 386 inthe Bois des Anneaux. The 2d Bat-talion was to follow at 0400 and capturethe Côte de Faye (Hills 325, 370, and369). The 3d Battalion was initially tohold its positions on the high ground inthe vicinity of Arnaville, support theoperations by fire as called for by theassault battalions, and protect the cross-ing site. Assault boats were to bemanned at the outset by Company B,7th Engineers, which was to be assistedin later ferrying operations by the 204thEngineer Combat Battalion of the 1103dEngineer Combat Group. Since ColonelBell's attack plan depended upon sur-prise, the engineers were to make nopreparations or further reconnaissance

2 5th Div Arty: 19th, 21st, 46th, and atchd 284th(the 50th and atchd 241st were in support of the 2dInf to the north); Corps Arty: 695th and 558th (5thFA Gp; the 274th, also a part of the 5th FA Gp, wasin support of the 2d Inf); 270th, 277th, and 739th(203d FA Gp); and 177th, 773d, and 943d (204thFA Gp); plus CCB, 7th Armd Div, Arty: 434th ArmdFA Bn.

42 THREE BATTLES

before dark except to assemble sixtyassault boats and crews in covered posi-tions in the vicinity of Arnaville. Theartillery plan, prepared with the adviceof Lt. Col. James R. Johnson, 46th FieldArtillery Battalion commander, calledfor no preparatory fires unless the crossingwas detected. Although guns would layon preparation fires across 1,200 yardsof front beyond the river, the only officerwho could call for them was the artilleryliaison officer with the 1st Battalion,Capt. George S. Polich. Check concen-trations on almost every possible pointof difficulty were available on call by anyofficer. One platoon of both CannonCompany and Antitank Company wasattached to each rifle battalion and wasto cross by ferry or bridge, whichever wasfirst available. Company B, 735th TankBattalion, was ordered to cross as soonas the bridge could be completed, whileCompany B, 818th Tank Destroyer Bat-talion, was to move after dark to hull-down positions on the bare hills northand south of Arnaville, prepared to en-gage enemy tanks and vehicles beyondthe river. An innovation in the ThirdArmy was due for a test in support of thecrossing: the 84th Chemical SmokeGenerator Company was ordered toinitiate at daylight a front-line large-areasmoke screen around the crossing site asprotection against German observation.This project would be a new combatexperience for all concerned, includingthe chemical troops. The regimentalcommand post was to be at Vandelain-ville, west of Bayonville.

Battalion Preparations

The 1st Battalion commander wasevacuated with yellow jaundice a short

while before the attack order was given,and the executive officer, Maj. WilfridH. Haughey, Jr., assumed command.Issuing a warning order to his companiesand directing them to a forward assemblyarea at Villecey-sur-Mad, near Waville,Major Haughey left with his S-3, com-pany commanders, and artillery liaisonofficer to reconnoiter the crossing site.There he made his attack plans: theadvance was to be made in column ofcompanies, A, C, D, Battalion Head-quarters, and B. Once across the riverthe same formation was to be followed,using two power-line clearings on theskyline as guides to the objective, Hill386. Company A was then to swingleft, eventually to tie in with the 2dBattalion, whose objective was the Côtede Faye, including Hill 369, to the north.Company C was to swing right, pushingout on the southern nose of Hill 386 inthe direction of Arry. Company B wasto dig in along the western edge of thewoods on the rear slope of the hill,mop up any resistance bypassed, andguard the right flank and rear againstany enemy countereffort from Arry.With each of the two assault companieswas to be a platoon of heavy machineguns of Company D. The men were tocarry with them a full canteen of water,all ammunition possible, and three unitsof K ration. A rear battalion commandpost was to be maintained initially inArnaville.

When the battalion officers returnedto Villecey about 1700, enough daylighthours remained to permit the platoonleaders to go to Bayonville, where theyobtained a brief and distant view of theobjective; but there was no time to givethe noncommissioned officers or riflemeneven that much of a reconnaissance. Al-

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 43

ARRY. Road with gooseneck curve out of Arry in upper left of photograph leads to theVoisage Farm. The southwest slope of Hill 386 is visible in upper right.

though most of the men of the 1st Bat-talion were veterans of one river crossing(the Seine), they were aware of theterrific pounding from artillery andcounterattacks which the 11th Infantry'sDornot bridgehead was receiving andsensed that this crossing would provemore difficult than their crossing of theSeine.

Meanwhile, the commander of the 2dBattalion, Maj. William E. Simpson, hadtaken his company commanders and staffto the hill south of Arnaville, overlooking

the crossing site, and had decided tolaunch his attack also in column of com-panies. After the scheduled crossing at0400, Company F, in the lead, was toadvance past Voisage Farm and moveup the shallow draw between its objectiveand Hill 386. Then it was to turn left(north) and follow the ridge line of theCôte de Faye to take, in turn, Hills 369,370, and 325. Following was to beCompany G and then Company E, thelatter assigned the mission of moppingup in the battalion's rear and on its left

44 THREE BATTLES

flank. One machine gun platoon ofCompany H was to be attached to eachof the two forward companies, and the81-mm. mortar platoon was to followCompany G. An advanced commandpost was to accompany Major Simpsonat the head of Company E.

The problem of getting adequate maps,the lack of which had plagued command-ers since the start of the Metz campaign,was finally resolved, even as the 1st and2d Battalion troops prepared to movetoward the river. Photomaps on a1:25,000 scale were received at 2300 thenight of 9 September.3

The Assault Crossing

Met on the west bank of the MoselleCanal by guides from Company B, 7thEngineers, the leading squads of the 1stBattalion, those of Company A, crossedthe canal footbridges and reached thecrossing site at approximately 0035. Thecompany having been previously dividedinto assault boat parties, there was oneguide for each of twenty boats, numbered1 through 20, which were supposed to bewaiting with their assigned engineercrews. But the engineers were not yetready, and it was 0115 before loadingbegan. As the boats pushed out intothe water, enemy outposts along the farbank fired a few scattered rounds fromtheir rifles, but there were no casualtiesand no delay. On the far shore the

company commander, Capt. Elias R.Vick, Jr., reorganized his men and by0200 was ready to move toward the ob-jective. In the meantime, the engineersreturned to the west bank and begantransporting men of Company C. Bythe time Company A had reorganized,two platoons of Company C were alsoacross the river.

Company A's movement across the flattableland toward the north-south Metzhighway and Voisage Farm brought theenemy to life. (Map 2) Machine gunsraked the bottom land and the crossingsite, and mortars began to find the range.Although a red enemy signal flare wentup, enemy artillery reaction was slow;it was not until daybreak that the firstartillery concentrations began to fall.This delay was probably due to poorenemy communications—brought aboutby shortages in personnel and equipment—so poor that sometimes it took severalhours for a message from troops in theMoselle valley to reach higher head-quarters in Metz.4 The 2d and 3dPlatoons of Company A deployed andadvanced in the face of machine gun fire,still inaccurate, to the north-south high-way. Here, more accurate fire from amachine gun at the Voisage Farm cross-roads enfiladed the road and pinned themen to the ditches on either side. When2d Lt. Karl Greenberg, 2d Platoonleader, made his way toward the cross-roads to locate the enemy gun, he wasfired upon and wounded. The companycommander, Captain Vick, moving tothe highway in an attempt to get hisassault platoons in motion again, was hitby the machine gun fire. He died ofwounds before he could be evacuated.

3 This section based on the following: MoselleRiver Crossing; Tenth Infantry; 10th Inf Unit Jnl,9 Sep 44; Combat Interv 38 with Simpson, CaptJohn L. Lynch, arty In off, and Capt John H.Lathrop, CO, Co E, 2d Bn, 10th Inf (hereafter citedas Combat Interv 38 with Simpson-Lynch-Lathrop);Interv with Lt Col William M. Breckinridge (for-merly Ex Off, 10th Inf), 30 Mar 50; and Ltr, ColBell to Hist Div. 4 MS # B-042 (Krause).

46 THREE BATTLES

Back at the crossing site, darknessand enemy fire had brought confusion.Ready to cross with his two remainingplatoons, the Company C commander,Capt. William B. Davis, could find engi-neer crews for only six of the twentyassault boats. While he was searching,the executive officer of Company D, 1stLt. Francis L. Carr, took part of his menacross, his own troops manning the boats.When the boats were returned to thewest bank, Captain Davis followed Lieu-tenant Carr's example and manned theboats with his infantrymen. Once onthe far shore, the officers attempted re-organization, but the enemy fire hadprompted the men to crouch behind asix-foot protecting bank, and here Com-panies C and D became intermingled inthe darkness. Before they could moveout, Company B was also landed.

Finally succeeding in reorganization,Company C pushed forward and tookcover alongside a stone wall that sur-rounded a small orchard at the northwestcorner of the Voisage Farm crossroads.The 81-mm. mortars of Company D wereset up in a sunken road along the river'sedge. The battalion commander, MajorHaughey, had crossed with Company C,and while Company B waited near theriver Major Haughey and his S-2, 1st Lt.Leo E. Harris, advanced to the highway.Here they made contact with the Com-pany A commander, 2d Lt. Warren G.Shaw, who had succeeded Captain Vick.With daylight fast approaching, MajorHaughey was well aware that permittinghis battalion to be caught under observa-tion on the exposed flatland would bevirtual suicide. Meanwhile, CompanyF, leading element of the 2d Battalion,already delayed in its crossing by the 1stBattalion's late start, had crossed the

river and come up behind Company A.Its commander, Capt. Eugene M. Witt,was impatient to get off the tableland andonto his objective before daylight andwanted to push through Company A.

While Companies A and C were stalled,they returned the enemy fire, makinggood use of rifle grenades and 60-mm.mortars. The 1st Battalion artilleryobserver, 1st Lt. George Dutko, utilizingthe previously registered check concen-trations, secured 199 rounds of artilleryfire, one concentration of which wipedout the crew of a 75-mm. antitank gunat a gooseneck curve in the VoisageFarm-Arry road.

Sending his S-2, Lieutenant Harris, toreconnoiter quickly for the most favorableroute to Hill 386, Major Haughey readiedCompanies A and C for a combinedassault designed to carry the battalion toits objective. When Lieutenant Harrisfound what he believed to be an avenueof approach, he delayed no longer. As-sembling one near-by platoon each ofCompanies A and C, in the growing lighthe led a dash past Voisage Farm and upthe hill. When the platoons jumped off,they met little fire of any sort, but thedistance and ascent were too great topermit such a pace all the way to thecrest. The men paused at the westernedge of the woods to reorganize and werejoined as they waited by the 2d Platoonof Company C.

Since the remainder of Company Ahad not moved, Captain Witt directed hisCompany F to pass through. Streamingthrough a gap in a low wall east of theroad, the leading platoon under 1st Lt.Andrew H. Paulishen was stopped tem-porarily by two enemy machine guns.A barrage of hand grenades dispatchedthe enemy, and the advance continued.

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 47

Generally following the trail that led eastup the Voisage Farm draw, Company Fturned north upon coming abreast ofHill 369, its first objective. The re-mainder of Company A, having at lastbegun to move, had followed CompanyF, and then turned to the south throughthe woods to reach the crest of Hill 386.

To the southeast, on the reverse slopeof Hill 386, Lieutenant Harris, with oneplatoon of Company A and two of Com-pany C, completed reorganization andbegan moving again toward the crest.Although the men encountered a smallGerman force, which they engaged with"marching fire and bayonets,"5 theiradvance to the crest was virtually unim-peded. At approximately the same time,S. Sgt. William J. Stone of Company Darrived at the crest from the north with asection of heavy machine guns. Havingfollowed closely behind Company F untilCompany F turned north to Hill 369,the machine gun section had chased asmall enemy force from the northern partof the crest. Immediately afterward themen began to dig in their weapons.Closely following them came 1st Lt.Robert B. Guy, also of Company D, andLieutenant Dutko, the artillery observer,who began to reconnoiter for machinegun and mortar positions and observation

posts. The remainder of Company Csoon joined its two leading platoons andbegan to dig in on the exposed southernnose of the hill, overlooking Arry to thesouthwest. The remainder of CompanyA, greatly disorganized after the fight atthe highway and the climb through thewoods, went into position on the left nearSergeant Stone's machine guns, but nocontact was made with the 2d Battaliondefenses to the north. Company D's81-mm. mortars were set up on the leftrear.

Shortly before 0830, Company B, stillcoming up from the river bottom, hadpassed the Voisage Farm crossroads whenits 3d Platoon, bringing up the rear,noticed a German tank approaching fromthe north along the Metz highway.Taking cover, their bazooka team readyto fire, the men of the platoon saw thetank advance to the crossroads and halt.Although the bazooka team attempted tofire, its rocket did not discharge. Thetank commander opened his turret, how-ever, and the 3d Platoon guide shot himin the shoulder. Buttoning up quickly,the tank fired two rounds over the headsof the platoon. Just at that moment anenemy artillery concentration fell nearthe crossroads, and the tank sped backtoward Corny. Meanwhile, CompanyB's 1st Platoon, seeing a Mark V tankadvancing from the outskirts of Arry,took cover in abandoned foxholes alongthe Arry road. The Mark V pulled backinto the town without firing. The pla-toon, followed by the rest of the company,then continued up the slope of Hill 386.A short while later the men saw the MarkV tank return, run over the foxholeswhere the 1st Platoon had been hiding,and retreat once more into Arry. By1000, Company B had taken positions

5 Although the term "marching fire and bayonets"became an ETO bromide and each instance of itsuse must be examined skeptically, the anonymousauthor of Tenth Infantry notes it in this instance andis supported by Colonel Breckinridge. See Intervwith Breckinridge. See also A Combat Narrative—Crossing of the Moselle River by the Tenth InfantryRegiment of the 5th Infantry Division (hereafter citedas 10th Infantry Combat Narrative), copy in OCMHfiles through courtesy of Lt Col Alden P. Shipley(formerly CO, 3d Bn, 10th Inf). Neither ColonelShipley nor Maj. Stanley Hays (formerly ExecutiveOfficer, 3d Battalion, 10th Infantry) believes thatbayonets were used. Interv with Shipley and Hays,26 Apr 50.

OBJECTIVES OF THE 2D BATTALION, 10th Infantry Regiment, in the Côte deFaye area. Large wooded area in the center is the Bois de Gaumont. Highway in foreground

leads to Corny and Metz on the left and to Pont-á-Mousson on the right. Moselle River canbe seen in lower left corner.

50 THREE BATTLES

from the right flank of Company C atopthe southern crest of Hill 386 down theslope to an orchard not far from the edgeof town. A patrol of one squad from the3d Platoon, sent to investigate Arry, re-turned with the report that at least aplatoon of German tanks and some in-fantry occupied the town.

The men of Company C had been as-signed positions on the exposed southernnose of Hill 386. About 0830, in themidst of their efforts to dig into the rockysoil, a platoon of enemy infantry appearedto the right front, evidently havingemerged from Arry. As the enemyplatoon began to move in, Pfc. WilburH. Dodson, a light machine gunner onthe right flank with the 1st Platoon,opened fire, accounting for most of theenemy before he himself was killed.Thus ended the first attempt by theGermans to recover the hilltop. It wasonly the first prick of the thorn whichArry was to become in the flesh of thebridgehead.6

The 2d Battalion Crossing

Although enemy mortar fire continuedto fall around the crossing site after the1st Battalion crossing, Company F, lead-ing the 2d Battalion, had begun its movein assault boats at 0430, only slightlybehind schedule. Its boats were mannedby Company B, 204th Engineers. Clos-ing up behind Company A where it wasstalled along the Metz highway, CaptainWitt, Company F commander, finallypassed his company through just at day-

break. The unit moved up the VoisageFarm draw until it was opposite Hill 369and then turned north toward its objec-tives. Three fourths of the way up thehill, Lieutenant Paulishen's lead platoonhad a brief engagement with a smallforce of entrenched enemy infantry, butotherwise the movement was uncon-tested. Passing initially along the for-ward edge of the Bois de Gaumont onHill 369 and then just east of a trail thatmarked the crest of the ridge line, thecompany advanced quickly to Hill 370and continued north toward Hill 325.Finding Hill 325 to be a bare, exposedknob, Captain Witt halted his company,and the men began to dig in along theeastern and northwestern edges of thewoods where they had unrestricted fieldsof fire against Hill 325.

Close behind the leading companycame Company G, its movement uncon-tested. Its men began to dig in acrossthe eastern and southeastern brow of Hill370 under cover of the woods. Thecompany's left flank was at a jaggedclearing in the woods on the southernnose of Hill 370 and its right flank onthe southern slope of Hill 369, the com-pany front thus extending almost athousand yards. Because the distanceto be covered was so great, the men wereforced to spread their foxholes thin; eventhe closest were more than ten yardsapart.

When Company E came forward be-hind Company G, its 3d Platoon wasmoved into the gap caused by the jaggedclearing between the two forward com-panies. Two squads of the 2d Platoonwent through the woods to the left rearto check for enemy stragglers and thendug in to the left rear of Company F'sleft flank. The remainder of Company

6 Both this section and the section following arebased on the following sources: Moselle River Cross-ing; Tenth Infantry; 10th Inf AAR, Sep 44; 10th InfUnit Jnl, 9-10 Sep 44 (from which most times ofaction were determined); Combat Interv 38 withSimpson-Lynch-Lathrop; Interv with Breckinridge.

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 51

E was held in reserve on the reverse slopeof Hill 370. One platoon of heavymachine guns of Company H was em-placed with Company F's left flank onthe northwest; another was with Com-pany G's left flank at the jagged clearing.The 81-mm. mortars were set up withinthat part of the clearing which extendedto the reverse slope of Hill 370. MajorSimpson's battalion headquarters wasalso dug in on the hill's reverse slope inthe woods.

Through the day, enemy action againstthe 2d Battalion was confined to scatteredand occasional mortar and artillery fireuntil just at dusk a platoon of enemytanks cruised across the bald crest of Hill325, apparently in a reconnaissancemove. Men of the 2d Battalion heldtheir bazooka fire, although some openedup with small arms. When Americanartillery concentrations were called forand received, the enemy tanks withdrew.

Counterattack From Arry

While men of the 1st Battalion werestill preparing their defensive positionsin the rocky soil of Hill 386, at approxi-mately 1230 shells from German tanksbegan to burst in the fir trees aboveCompany C's command post at thesouthern edge of the woods. The com-mand group was badly hit: the radiooperator was killed and the companycommander, Captain Davis, was woundedin both legs. Three Tiger tanks soonappeared on the bare southern slope ofthe hill from the direction of Arry. Fol-lowed soon by two other tanks, theymoved diagonally across the front ofCompany C's right platoon (the 1st),firing as they went. The 1st Platoon'sbazooka team opened fire but without

success, its rockets seeming to bounce offthe heavy armor. The tanks pushed on,closing to within a hundred yards of thefoxhole line. Cruelly exposed in theirshallow holes, the men were ordered by1st Lt. Carl E. Hansen, 1st Platoon, and1st Lt. Issac H. Storey, 2d Platoon, tofall back to the tree line. Once theyreached the woods, tree bursts from thetank guns brought even heavier casualtiesand confusion, and many men continueddown the rear slope. The woundedcompany commander, Captain Davis,remained in action, calling for artilleryand mortar support to stop the tanks.He would not give up until he finallycollapsed and was started back on astretcher, only to be hit a second time byshell fragments and killed.

Although no enemy infantry were ob-served, the lead tank commander openedhis turret and waved, as if to signal sup-porting infantry forward. An automaticrifle team shot the enemy tanker, and bythis time supporting mortar and artilleryfire was falling. If enemy infantrymenwere scheduled to follow, they did not,despite the confusion in the ranks ofCompany C.

In the meantime two more Germantanks emerged from Arry and advancedtoward the Company B positions alongthe Arry-Voisage Farm road. Aboutseventy-five rounds of shellfire causedheavy casualties in Company B's 3dPlatoon and command group, and abreak-through threatened. T. Sgt. Wal-ter E. Jenski of Company B followedalongside one of the tanks on the road,firing rifle grenades at its treads. Whenthat effort failed, he tossed a handgrenade at the turret. Despite his failureto knock out the tank, the tenacity ofCompany B's 1st and 2d Platoons

52 THREE BATTLES

prompted the two tanks to pull back intoArry, and the break-through was averted.

Although Company C had sufferedheavily and was disorganized, the Ger-man tanks on the hill pushed no fartherforward, moving on instead across thefront of the battalion where they facedCompany A. The men of Company Awere careful to take advantage of theconcealment offered by the woods intheir area, and the enemy tanks soonceased fire, although still remaining justoutside effective bazooka range in frontof the positions. Meanwhile CompanyC tried to reorganize. Its executiveofficer, 1st Lt. Eugene N. Dille, havingassumed command after the companycommander's death, sent one squad backto the original positions to outpost themand observe for further action, a secondsquad to regain contact with CompanyB, and a third to guard the companycommand post. Then Lieutenant Dillesearched the reverse slope for others ofthe company. Learning that many ofthe men had retreated all the way toVoisage Farm, he eventually succeededin locating about eighty and sendingthem back to their former positions.

This reoccupation of the open slopeprompted the German tankers to returnto action, and again the infantry hadlittle protection on the exposed nose ofthe hill. But, in almost movie-like tradi-tion, American P-47's suddenly enteredthe battle. They bombed and strafedthe tanks, dangerously close to the fox-holes, but successfully. One bomb ap-peared to bounce as it hit the ground andskidded to within a few yards of a groupof Company A men, but it did notexplode. In the face of the planes, theGerman tanks at last withdrew.

The intervention by the P-47's, a part

of the XIX Tactical Air Command, wasthe first positive response to numerousprevious infantry requests for air supportin the Moselle battle. Early on 9 Sep-tember the Ninth Air Force had ruledthat the XX Corps attack could beadequately supported by artillery. Butthat evening reports of a steadily worsen-ing situation reached the G-3 air officerat 12th Army Group headquarters.He therefore had authorized the releaseof as many fighter-bombers from theprimary target at Brest as the commanderof the XIX TAC should deem necessaryfor adequate bridgehead support. Al-though the XIX TAC still had manyresponsibilities—bombing at Brest, at-tacking with the XII Corps at Nancy,protecting the Third Army's exposedsouthern flank, and flying cover for heavybombers over Germany—P-47's weremade available. The planes that arrivedat such an opportune time at Arry werefrom the 406th Fighter Bomber Groupand had been vectored from a groundsupport mission in the Nancy area.They claimed fifteen enemy tanks de-stroyed. Besides assisting the 1st Bat-talion to repel the tanks, the planesbombed and strafed the enemy assemblypoint of Arry, leaving much of the townin flames. The only other air supportof the day in the local bridgehead areawas that of the 23d Squadron, 36thGroup, which bombed Forts Sommy andSt. Blaise in the Dornot bridgehead area.

Reports of the seriousness of the tankcounterattack against the 1st Battalionhad reached the 10th Infantry command-er, Colonel Bell, about 1335. There-upon he ordered his 3d Battalion, still inposition astride the west-bank hills flank-ing Arnaville, to leave Companies L andM in place and prepare to cross Com-

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 53

panies I and K in order to capture Arry.While these preparations took place, the1st Battalion set about reorganizing itslines. The Company A executive officer,1st Lt. William H. Hallowell, who hadbeen on the west bank organizing sup-plies, was sent forward to take commandof Company A, which Lieutenant Shawhad been commanding since the originalcompany commander's death soon afterthe river crossing. Collecting some sixtyCompany A men from where they hadtaken cover on the reverse slope, Lieu-tenant Hallowell moved to his company'spositions on the battalion's left and re-organized them. The 2d Platoon wasplaced on the right, the 1st Platoon inthe center, and the 3d on the left flank,echeloned to the left rear to protect thebattalion's left flank and the heavy ma-chine guns and mortars of CompanyD. The battalion commander, MajorHaughey, then ordered Company B tomove from its right-flank positions facingArry and take over the Company Csector. This time the area designatedtook advantage of the concealment ofthe woods. Company C was then as-sembled at the western edge of the woodson the reverse slope and prepared tofollow the 3d Battalion into Arry afterits capture. Its mission was to establishroad blocks with a platoon of antitankguns which were to be ferried across theriver after dark. Despite the havoccaused initially by the enemy's nooncounterattack, the 1st Battalion hadactually given up only the practicallyuntenable positions on the bare southernnose of Hill 386.

The Germans launched no more coun-terattacks against Hill 386 during theafternoon, but shellfire and long-rangemachine gun fire harassed the men there

for the rest of the day. A counterattackelsewhere was attempted soon after the1st Battalion action when both tanks andinfantry headed south from Corny, evi-dently in an effort to cut off the bridge-head at its base. With artillery observersand tank destroyer crewmen enjoyingperfect observation from the west-bankhills, this enemy effort was doomed fromthe start. Company B, 818th TankDestroyer Battalion, claimed one of theGerman tanks destroyed, and the othersfell back on Corny.7

Through the first three days in thebridgehead battle, the supporting fieldartillery and tank destroyers receivedfiring data from the forward companiesthrough both forward observer and in-fantry radios that were in direct com-munication with a regimental set atopthe regimental command post in a school-house in Vandelainville. An operatorat the regimental set relayed the informa-tion by telephone to the command postwhere the 46th Field Artillery Battalioncommander, Colonel Johnson, was con-stantly on duty. The regimental com-mander felt that one slip in this communi-cation system and a failure to getartillery fire at the precise momentneeded would mean that his precariousbridgehead would be wiped out.8

In the Dornot bridgehead action, theAmericans had experienced the initialgood fortune of attacking on the bound-ary line between two German battalions.In the Arnaville action, that initial good

7 This section based on the following sources:Moselle River Crossing; Tenth Infantry; 10th Inf,818th TD Bn, 46th FA Bn, AAR's, Sep 44; 10th InfUnit Jnl, 10 Sep 44; Fifth Infantry Division; Cole,The Lorraine Campaign, Ch. III, p. 143, citing NinthAF Opns Jnl, 9 Sep 44; XIX TAC Opns File, 10Sep 44.

8 Ltr, Col Bell to Hist Div.

54 THREE BATTLES

fortune had been even greater: theboundary between the German XIII SSCorps on the north and the XLVIIPanzer Corps on the south ran just northof Voisage Farm. This line also dividedthe 282d Infantry Battalion, attached toDivision Number 462, on the north and the8th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, a unit of the3d Panzer Grenadier Division, on the south.The infantry battalion was charged withthe defense of the Côte de Faye and thepanzer grenadiers with defense of VoisageFarm, Arry, and Hill 386. The counter-attack against Hill 386 was launched byelements of the 8th Panzer Grenadier Regi-ment, supported by attached tanks.9

The 3d Battalion Attacks Arry

In accordance with Colonel Bell'sorder at 1335, his 3d Battalion com-mander, Maj. Alden P. Shipley, had leftCompanies L and M in defensive posi-tions on the west-bank hills flankingArnaville. Companies I and K movedto the river, crossing about 1735 at thesame site as the other two battalions.The infantrymen took with them extraamounts of ammunition and extra ba-zookas and deposited them on the eastbank to create a bridgehead stockpile.

With Company K on the left of theVoisage Farm-Arry road and CompanyI on the right, the advance moved pastthe former Company B positions facingthe town and held up briefly on the out-

skirts while P-47's and artillery bom-barded the objective. Then the riflecompanies continued against virtually noresistance, ferreting the enemy fromhouses and cellars where he had soughtcover from the bombardment. TheAmericans fired antitank grenades atthree German tanks that were seen fleeingto the east toward Lorry, but the grenadesbounced off and the tanks escaped. Thetown was cleared by 2130, and the regi-mental commander, Colonel Bell, orderedthe companies to pull back to VoisageFarm: the 10th Infantry's lines were tooextended and an open flank at Cornyand a dangerous route of entry betweenHills 369 and 386 necessitated a bridge-head reserve. Returning to VoisageFarm, the companies dug in, there toremain for several days, subjected tomurderous enemy shelling.

Since Colonel Bell expected the 1stBattalion to hold Arry, and the 1st Bat-talion's plan was for Company C toestablish road blocks within the town,either the withdrawal order was prema-ture or Company C was late in moving in.In any event, it was 0300 when CompanyC headed into Arry. Advancing incolumn, led by the company commander,Lieutenant Dille, and the 3d Platoonleader, 1st Lt. Ralph R. Cuppeli, thedepleted company marched down themain street. Lieutenant Dille saw twoGermans approaching. Motioning forhis men to hold their fire, he waited untilthe Germans came closer and then hehimself fired, killing one. The otherGerman quickly returned the fire, wound-ing Lieutenant Cuppeli and killing Lieu-tenant Dille.10 Although T. Sgt. Robert

9 Morning Sit Rpt, Army Group G, 11 Sep 44, foundin Army Group G KTB 2, Anlagen 1.IX.-30.IX.44;MS # B-042 (Krause); MS # B-412 (Einem). Colo-nel Kurt von Einem was chief of staff of XIII SSCorps. The exact location of the boundary is notdefinite, but this deduction is based on prisoner ofwar information in 5th Division Unit Journal File,10-11 September 1944, and a captured German mapreproduced in Tenth Infantry.

10 This account of Lieutenant Dille's death is takenfrom Moselle River Crossing which is based on con-temporary interview information. It is supported

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 55

M. Johnson killed the German before hecould cause further casualties, it wasobvious that the enemy had reoccupiedthe town after the 3d Battalion's depar-ture.11

The wounded Lieutenant Cuppeli gaveorders for his platoon to withdraw, andthe entire company followed in a madscramble to escape. Reaching the fieldsto the north, Lieutenant Storey, the 2dPlatoon leader, managed to restore order.He took command of the company andmoved it back to the northern edge ofthe village, where the men began diggingin. At 0430 heavy artillery fire, pre-sumed to be both American and German,blanketed the area. With his handfulof men diminished even more, Lieuten-ant Storey wanted to withdraw. Hefinally established communication withhis battalion commander, and the com-pany was withdrawn about 0800 thenext morning (11 September) to thevicinity of the 1st Battalion commandpost on the reverse slope of Hill 386.Here again the men came under intenseenemy shelling and suffered furthercasualties. On Lieutenant Storey's re-quest, the company was moved to defen-sive positions on the left flank of CompanyA on Hill 386; now the company'sstrength was only forty-three men.

The 1st Battalion's 57-mm. antitankguns and its attached platoon from Anti-tank Company, which were scheduledto be part of the road block defenses inArry, were ferried across the river duringthe night, but already Companies I and

K had withdrawn to Voisage Farm.Since the antitank guns could not bemoved into Arry, they were hand-carriedto positions on the right flank of Com-pany B on the southwestern slope of Hill386 where they could cover the town andthe Arry-Voisage Farm road. The tworemaining companies of the 3d Battalion(Companies L and M) and Major Ship-ley's 3d Battalion headquarters crossedthe Moselle at approximately 1900.Battalion headquarters and the heavyweapons company moved to VoisageFarm to become a part of a bridgeheadreserve even before Companies I and Kwithdrew from Arry to join them, andCompany L went into a secondary de-fense covering the potentially dangerousVoisage Farm draw between the 1st and2d Battalions. Another platoon of 57-mm. guns from Antitank Company wentinto position near the north flank of thebridgehead, covering Corny, and the 3dBattalion's antitank guns, ferried acrossduring darkness, 11 September, were dugin just southeast of Voisage Farm to coverthe road south to Arry.12

The 11th Infantry Enters the Arnaville Fight

About noon of 10 September, GeneralIrwin, his plans already formulated forevacuating the 11th Infantry's Dornotbridgehead during the night, had orderedthat the 3d Battalion, 11th Infantry,under Maj. William H. Birdsong, cross

by Interv with Hays, 26 Apr 50, but is contrary tothe account in Tenth Infantry and to Interv withBreckinridge.

11 The 3d Panzer Grenadier Division claimed to have"recaptured" Arry at 0200. Morning Sit Rpt, ArmyGroup G, 11 Sep 44, found in Army Group G KTB 2,Anlagen 1.1X.-30.1X44.

12 This section based on the following: MoselleRiver Crossing; Tenth Infantry; Fifth Infantry Division;10th Inf AAR, Sep 44; 10th Inf Unit Jnl, 10-11 Sep44; Combat Interv 38 with Shipley, Capt John J.McCluskey, Co K, Capt Frank L. Bradley, Co M,and Capt Dale W. Baughman, arty ln off, 3d Bn,10th Inf (hereafter cited as Combat Interv 38 withShipley-McCluskey-Bradley-Baughman); Ltr, ColBell to Hist Div; Ltr, Col Shipley to Hist Div, 15Mar 50; Interv with Shipley and Hays.

56 THREE BATTLES

the Moselle, capture Corny, and protectthe north flank of the Arnaville bridge-head. The battalion was badly depleted:its Company K was already a part of thehard-pressed Dornot bridgehead and itsCompany I was heavily engaged support-ing the Dornot crossing from the westbank. Even should the battalion wait tocross until after the scheduled nighttimeevacuation of the Dornot bridgehead,Companies I and K would not be ableto join the new crossing, so diminishedand fatigued were they from the intensiveDornot fight. To strengthen the 3dBattalion, Company B of the 11th Infan-try was attached.13

Since the original Arnaville crossingarea was congested with the movementof the 3d Battalion, 10th Infantry, andthe 1 0 t h ' s supporting units, Major Bird-song's battalion was ordered to recon-noiter for another crossing site near by.With his reconnaissance party the bat-talion commander crossed the MoselleCanal paralleling the river just southeastof Noveant on the debris of a demolishedfootbridge. Finding the terrain woodedbetween the canal and the river andinformed by an attached engineer officerthat he could construct a footbridge acrossthe canal in time for the crossing, MajorBirdsong chose this site. Because ferry-ing operations were to begin soon afterdark at the original Arnaville site,arrangements were made with the 10thInfantry for transporting the battalion's

antitank platoon, the attached 2d Platoonfrom Antitank Company, 11th Infantry,and radio and litter jeeps to the far shore.There they would join their parent bat-talion in the vicinity of Voisage Farm.Upon crossing, the 3d Battalion, 11th(less Companies I and K, plus CompanyB), was to be attached to the 10th In-fantry. Crossing was scheduled for 0200(11 September).

Construction of a footbridge across thecanal took longer than anticipated, withthe result that the 3d Battalion's leadingcompany, Company L, was two hourslate in getting started. The assaultboats, manned by troops of the 160thEngineers, were finally pushed out intothe darkness on the river, the men ofCompany L taking with them a telephoneand laying wire as they went. WithCompany L presumably landed on thefar shore, the engineers returned. Com-pany B was loading when the CompanyL commander, Capt. Robert H. Williams,telephoned that his men had disembarkedonly to find that they had landed on anisland in the river. Neither previousmap nor ground reconnaissance hadrevealed the presence of this small, high-banked island, and aerial photographshad not been available. Since CaptainWilliams deemed the east bank beyondthe island unfit for a landing, the assaultboats had to be sent back to retrieve thecompany. In view of the short periodof darkness remaining, Major Birdsongsecured permission to cross his battalionat the 10th Infantry's Arnaville site.

While this mishap was taking place,the battalion's Antitank Platoon, radioand litter jeeps, and the attached 2dPlatoon, Antitank Company, 11th In-fantry, had been ferried across the riverby the 10th Infantry at Arnaville. Al-

13 3d Bn, 11th Inf, story is from the following:Moselle River Crossing; 10th Inf, 11th Inf, 1103dEngr (C) Gp, 160th Engr (C) Bn, AAR's, Sep 44;10th Inf and 11th Inf Unit Jnls, 10-11 Sep 44; TenthInfantry; Combat Interv 38 with Birdsong; Intervwith Breckinridge; Ltr, Col Birdsong to Hist Div;Interv with Coghill; Ltr, 1st Lt Rocco J. Barbuto(formerly plat ldr, AT Co, 11th Inf) to Hist Div,3 May 50, and atchd statement from Cpl EmidioDi Pietro (2d Plat, AT Co, 11th Inf).

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 57

though the organic Antitank Platoon andradio and litter jeeps waited for theirbattalion near Voisage Farm, the platoonsergeant of the attached platoon, T. Sgt.Harry O. Chafin, deduced that the rifle-men had already preceded him to Corny.Moving with its 57-mm. guns, the platoonpushed north up the Metz highway and,unsuspectingly, into German-held Corny.In the quick, violent fire fight that fol-lowed, most of the antitank platoonescaped, including eighteen men whoswam the river; left behind were theantitank guns and eight men.14 SergeantChafin led the survivors back toward theArnaville crossing site and this time lo-cated his battalion. He insisted upon

returning to rescue his men and guns butcollapsed as the battalion advancedtoward Corny.

Not until after daylight, about 0825(11 September), did the leading elementsof the 3d Battalion, 11th Infantry, succeedin crossing at the Arnaville site. (Map3) They immediately reorganized andpushed slowly north toward Corny, Com-pany L on the right, Company B on theleft, against occasional artillery andmortar fire. Company L advanced upthe bush-covered northwestern slopes ofthe Côte de Faye (Hill 325) and beganto dig in where the men could cover theopen northwestern slopes and have atleast visual contact with the 2d Battalion,10th Infantry, to the southeast. Com-pany B, breaking a thin crust of Germanground defense south of Corny, advancedto the town's outer buildings. There itfound one of the 57-mm. antitank guns,damaged beyond use, and took up posi-tions in and around an old brick factoryon the edge of town. By 1700 the Amer-icans had captured forty prisoners. TheReconnaissance Platoon and the Ammu-nition and Pioneer Platoon establishedoutposts on the northwestern slope ofHill 325 between Companies L and B,while the heavy weapons of Company Dwere distributed among the advance posi-tions. In late afternoon Company C,11th Infantry, was also attached to the3d Battalion, crossed the river, and wentinto a reserve position on the slope nearthe highway to the left rear of CompanyL. The battalion's organic AntitankPlatoon with its 57-mm. guns went intoposition echeloned in depth astride thehighway south of Corny. Depth inantitank defense was considered essentialbecause there was a logical avenue fortank attack not only down the Corny

14 As told by Corporal Di Pictro, in a statementattached to Lieutenant Barbuto's letter to the His-torical Division (note 13 above), the platoon nearedCorny and took cover while Sergeant Chafin movedforward to reconnoiter. He returned shortly anddirected the platoon to continue on the highwaytoward Corny. Arriving in the south edge of Corny,the men took cover in a brick foundry and a garageon opposite sides of the street. When "things didnot look good," Sergeant Chafin ordered the men towithdraw, bringing with them the 57-mm. guns andprime movers. As the men loaded, "hell brokeloose." Because much of the enemy fire seemed tocome from a near-by house, the men put one guninto action and fired several rounds into the house.For a while the enemy was silent, and again the menattempted to load on their carriers. But again theenemy opened fire. Seeing that the situation washopeless, Sergeant Chafin ordered his men to abandonguns and trucks and head for the river. CorporalDi Pietro ran through the garage, out a back door,and slid down an embankment. Working his waysouth under concealment of bushes, he encounteredfive other men of the platoon. When the Germansbegan to encircle them and to toss concussion gre-nades down the embankment upon them, CorporalDi Pietro was wounded in the right leg above theknee. Soon thereafter the six were forced to sur-render and with two other men also captured wereheaded toward the enemy rear. One of his com-panions was forced to carry the corporal on his back.While the seven others went on to prison camps,Corporal Di Pietro was taken to a front-line Germanhospital, where his right leg was amputated.

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 59

highway but also across the Côte de Fayeand down the northern woods line of theBois de Gaumont.

By nightfall the 3d Battalion was welldug in. Its original order to captureCorny was not followed, despite someobjection from the 10th Infantry, afterthe battalion commander, Major Bird-song, discovered the dominant observa-tion the Germans would have on defenseswithin the town. The Germans hadalso sown the town with mines and boobytraps, further discouraging the 3d Bat-talion's entry.

Counterattacks Against the10th Infantry—11 September

Having made probing attacks on 10September which evidently determinedthe locations of the 1st and 2d Battalions,10th Infantry, the Germans struck vio-lently against both battalions just beforedaylight the next morning (11 Septem-ber). The battles to hold against thesecounterblows assumed even more impor-tance with knowledge that the Dornotbridgehead had now been withdrawnand the Arnaville bridgehead was theonly footing the XX Corps possessed onthe Moselle's east bank. On the rightflank of the XII Corps a small footholddid exist at the tip of the Moselle tongue;and south of Nancy assault units of twodivisions were forming for a predawncrossing attempt. But holding at Arna-ville was vital, and at the time theGermans launched their counterattacksthe infantry situation was made evenmore precarious because the supportingengineers had not yet been able to bridgethe river. Of this handicap, the enemy,still holding dominant observation, wasprobably aware.

About 0500, at the first sign of light,a platoon of German tanks, followed byapproximately a company of infantry(elements of the 115th Panzer GrenadierRegiment), came from the direction of thetown of Vezon toward that portion ofthe 2d Battalion lines which rimmed theedge of the Bois de Gaumont along Hill370. Without artillery preparation butfiring their 88-mm. tank guns and ma-chine guns as they advanced, the tanksattempted to pulverize the defenses ofCompany F. They then pulled off toCompany F's right front to provide firesupport while accompanying infantryclosed in. With the defenders pinnedto their positions by the supporting fire,the German infantry worked in close,and fighting raged at hand-grenaderange. One enemy grenade knockedout a Company H machine gun on Com-pany F's left flank. Forward elementsof Company F began to fall back somefifty yards; but the enemy was apparentlyunaware of impending success, for theattack rolled around to the front ofCompany G, attempting to turn thecorner of the woods into the jaggedclearing. Here the Germans set upmachine guns, and for a few minutes thesituation looked almost hopeless; theAmericans' difficulty with radio com-munication had prevented their receivingartillery support. Capt. Lewis R. Ander-son, however, the Company G com-mander, managed to reach the corner ofthe woods and co-ordinated the fire ofa near-by section of heavy machine guns,his riflemen, and the 81-mm. mortars.Their efforts broke the enemy attack.Communication with supporting artillerywas finally established, and, as the enemyinfantry withdrew, heavy concentrationsfell on the German rear. The tanks too

60 THREE BATTLES

were discouraged by this fire. Except fora small enemy infantry contingent thatprobed up the draw on Company G'sright flank southeast of Hill 369, thecounterattack was ended. The probingeffort on the right flank was stopped whenCompany G's light machine guns annihi-lated a squad of the attackers.

With the counterattack broken, Com-pany F mopped up small groups andindividuals who had infiltrated aroundthe left flank, and another platoon ofCompany E was sent forward to takeposition between Companies F and G.Although the line had held, the enemycounterattack had cost the 2d Battalionslightly over a hundred casualties, furtherstretching the battalion's overextendedmanpower.

At approximately the time of the coun-terattack against the 2d Battalion, ele-ments of the 3d Panzer Grenadier and 17thSS Panzer Grenadier Divisions launched atwo-pronged attack against the 1st Bat-talion, 10th Infantry, on Hill 386. Onthe 1st Battalion's left front, some 500yards beyond Company A's forward fox-holes, stood a group of barrack-typebuildings which were not shown on thebattalion's maps. The first day in thesepositions, Lieutenant Dutko, the forwardartillery observer, had turned the fire of240-mm. howitzers and eight-inch gunson the buildings, only to find that theyconcealed an underground radar stationand underground barracks. All build-ings except one were destroyed. Fromthe ruins, as daylight came on 11 Septem-ber, emerged an estimated company anda half of German infantry. With artil-lery support ready on call, Company Aheld its fire, allowing the Germans tocome in close, out of the cover of occa-sional trees and into the company's

effective lanes of fire. Some of theenemy had advanced to within twenty-five yards of the forward foxholes whenCompany A, its supporting artillery, andSergeant Stone's machine guns of Com-pany D opened fire. The attack wasquickly broken; most of the Germans fellas casualties and fifteen were takenprisoner.

At the time that the infantry attackwas discovered, a platoon of Germantanks emerged from an orchard just eastof Arry and advanced north toward theCompany B positions on the southernportion of Hill 386. The oncomingtanks fired directly into the defenders'foxholes. Calls for artillery brought im-mediate results, and the American tankdestroyers on the high ground west ofthe river also opened fire. With theGermans still threatening, the 57-mm.antitank guns in position with CompanyB opened fire, their first rounds knockingout one of the tanks. The antitankcrewmen claimed another kill but ad-mitted it might have resulted from artil-lery or tank destroyer fire. The remain-ing enemy tanks concentrated their fireagainst the 57-mm. guns, destroying oneand, since the guns had not been dug in,15

making it impossible for the other crewsto operate. But the tanks had beendiscouraged by the reaction and with-drew to cover among the houses in Arry.Later in the day, planes of the 512thSquadron of the XIX TAC descendedagain on Arry. Their bombing andstrafing knocked out some ten Germantanks and assault guns, thus probablymaking a major contribution to the factthat the Germans launched no furtherground attacks against either the 1st or

15 46th FA Bn AAR, Sep 44.

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 61

the 2d Battalion during the remainderof 11 September.16

Supporting the Bridgehead

German artillery fire had first openedagainst the bridgehead at dawn on 10September. During the afternoon of thenext day it increased in tempo, and ar-tillery observers estimated that forty fixedGerman batteries and numerous rovingguns, ranging in caliber from 88-mm. to150-mm., were firing on the Arnavillesector. Since the larger portion of theGerman batteries was in concrete fortifi-cations, American counterbattery firewas not very effective. Despite the com-manding heights held by the Germans,most of their fire against the crossing sitewas apparently unobserved, possibly be-cause of an area smoke screen beingmaintained at Arnaville by the 84thChemical Smoke Generator Company.17

In the forward areas the enemy fire wasdefinitely observed and caused numer-ous infantry casualties, notwithstandingAmerican efforts to provide overheadcover for foxholes and emplacements.Artillery observers felt that the Germanshere demonstrated considerably moreartillery skill than usual, and no ammu-nition shortage was indicated. Usingsingle rounds of smoke or time fire toobtain a deflection correction, the enemyusually followed with five minutes ofheavy fire for effect. Although no time

fire for effect was noted, many shellsburst in the trees.18

A sometimes alarming shortage inAmerican artillery ammunition had de-veloped. This shortage was chronicthrough all Third Army artillery units inearly September, a result of the samelogistical difficulties that had brought thegasoline drought. On 9 and 10 Septem-ber XX Corps artillery units had fireda total of about 20,000 artillery roundsper day, eating heavily into their allot-ment. They were now forced to curtaildrastically their counterbattery and har-assing fire. Again, as at the time of thegasoline shortage, the soldier fighting forhis life found it difficult to understandthese logistical difficulties. Fortunately,air support was able to take over some ofthe artillery missions, 411 sorties by planesof the XIX TAC on 11 September beingalmost equally divided between the Brestand Moselle fronts. Only one missiondirectly affected the Arnaville bridge-head, that of P-47's of the 492d Squadron,48th Fighter Bomber Group, whichdamaged a gun position 3,000 yardssoutheast of Metz and destroyed a damon the Moselle just southeast of Ars-sur-Moselle.19 Despite the ammunitionshortage, the thirteen field artillery bat-talions in position to support the Arna-ville crossing fired, on 10 and 11 Septem-ber, a total of 12,774 rounds, most ofthem in support of the bridgehead.20

Supply of the bridgehead during thefirst two days was handled primarily by16 This section based on the following: Moselle

River Crossing; Tenth Infantry; 10th Inf, 46th FABn, AAR's, Sep 44; 10th Inf Unit Jnl, 11 Sep 44;Combat Interv 38 with Simpson-Lynch-Lathrop andShipley-Bradley-McCluskey-Baughman; Cole, TheLorraine Campaign, Ch. III, p. 149, citing XIX TACMorning Summary, 12 Sep 44; IPW Rpt, 10th InfUnit Jnl File, 11 Sep 44.

17 For details of smoke operations see below,Chapter III.

18 46th FA Bn AAR, Sep 44.19 XIX TAC Opns File, 11 Sep 44, and Cole, The

Lorraine Campaign, Ch. III, p. 149, citing XIX TACMorning Summary, 12 Nov 44. For more informa-tion on the Moselle dam see below, Ch. III, sectionentitled "Armor Crosses at the Ford."

20 Combat Interv 38, Artillery on the ArnavilleCrossing (hereafter cited as Arnaville Artillery).

62 THREE BATTLES

Service Company, 10th Infantry, theAmmunition and Pioneer Platoons of thebattalions, and the Mine Platoon of the10th Infantry's Antitank Company. Theinfantry claimed that these units hadvirtually replaced the engineers in thetask of ferrying rafts and assault boats.21

On the first day of the Arnaville cross-ing, S. Sgt. James O'Connell, CompanyB, 10th Infantry, trying to find a placefor his jeep to cross the Moselle Canal,met a local French girl. Pointing to aspot in the canal, she beckoned thesergeant to follow, raised her skirts, andwaded into the water. The water wasshallow, and the sergeant found that hecould cross on what he described as a"submerged concrete bridge."22 In thismanner kitchen trucks also crossed thecanal and were ferried across the riverlate on 11 September, thus making atleast one hot meal daily available totroops in the bridgehead after the firstday. Although some supply and medicaljeeps were ferried across, mud and steepslopes made their use impracticable eastof the Metz highway, and vehicles oper-ating on the flatlands were constantlyexposed to observed enemy shelling. Oneplatoon of Cannon Company, 10th In-fantry, had originally been attached toeach of the rifle battalions, but delay in

ferrying operations had prompted theregimental commander to make otherdispositions of the organic howitzers.All six guns were placed on the hill southof Arnaville where they continued to firein support of the bridgehead infantryuntil the bridgehead was secured.

When the rifle companies clamored formore bazookas to assist in fighting enemytanks, the 10th Infantry's HeadquartersCompany rounded up forty-nine addi-tional rocket launchers and sent them intothe bridgehead. Communications per-sonnel laid eight telephone lines, exclusiveof artillery lines, into the bridgeheadduring the first two days. Although atone time all eight lines were knocked outby enemy shelling, communications per-sonnel continued to work under shell-fire until communications were workingsmoothly again. All three of the 10thInfantry's battalion aid stations were setup in one of the few buildings in thebridgehead: the farmhouse at the VoisageFarm crossroads. Through incessant ar-tillery fire on the flatlands leading to theriver, casualties were evacuated by jeepsto the crossing site after having beencarried by litter from the forward linesto the aid station, often by their infantrycomrades.23

21 Ltr, Col Bell to Hist Div; Tenth Infantry; Intervwith Breckinridge. For details on bridging opera-tions see below, Ch. III.

22 Ltr, Col Bell to Hist Div.

23 Tenth Infantry; Ltr, Col Bell to Hist Div; CaptFerris A. Kercher, Personal Experience of a CannonCompany Commander, MS for Advanced Officers'Class I, The Infantry School, copy filed in OCMH.

CHAPTER III

Smoke and Bridging Operations(9-14 September)

It had been anticipated that crossingsof the Moselle would initially and forsome time after establishment of bridge-heads be exposed to commanding Ger-man observation. A new technique inThird Army river crossing operations hadtherefore been planned: a large-area for-ward smoke screen to assist bridgingefforts. The 84th Chemical Company,a smoke generator unit, was attached tothe 5th Division on 6 September to pro-vide such a screen. Unfortunately, atthe time of the Dornot crossing, the 84thhad not yet arrived from employment ontruck-driving tasks with the Red BallExpress supply route from the Normandybeaches. Not until the crossing at Arna-ville was it able to begin its new assign-ment.

The assignment was new in manyways. It was the first of its kind in theentire European theater. Neither the5th Division nor its supporting engineershad ever before worked with a smokegenerator unit in a river crossing action.And, like other smoke generator units inthe ETO, the 84th Chemical Companyhad been trained only for rear-area anti-aircraft missions, not for assault support.Screening operations at Arnaville werethus to prove a new experience for allparticipants.1

The 84th Chemical Company wasplaced under operational control of the1103d Engineer Combat Group, whichwas to construct the Arnaville bridges,and under the general supervision of the5th Division chemical officer, Lt. Col.Levin B. Cottingham. After the 10thInfantry received its orders late on 8September to cross at Arnaville, ColonelCottingham instituted a meteorologicalstudy of the area, finding that weatherreports available from the air forces couldbe supplemented by local observationsfrom supporting artillery and natives ofthe region. He determined that theprevailing wind was of a low velocity andfrom the west. Both Colonel Cotting-ham and the chemical company com-mander conducted reconnaissance anddecided that if generators were placed atPosition 1, about a thousand yards west

1 Unless otherwise noted, the story of smoke opera-tions is from the following sources: Lt Col Levin B.

Cottingham (formerly chemical officer, 5th Div),Employment of a Smoke Generator Company in anAssault Crossing of the Moselle River, Combat IntervFile 38; Lt Col Levin B. Cottingham, "Smoke Overthe Moselle," The Infantry Journal, August, 1948;Ltr, Col Cottingham to Hist Div, 28 Mar 50; PaulW. Pritchard, Smoke Generator Operations in theMediterranean and European Theaters of Operation,MS, Ch. VI, "Operations with the Third Army"(hereafter cited as Smoke Generator Operations),Hist Sec, Office of the Chief of the Chemical Corps.See also observations on smoke operations by en-gineer officers in Combat Interv 38, EngineerOperations at Arnaville (hereafter cited as EngineerOperations).

64 THREE BATTLES

MAP 4

of Arnaville behind the hill mass onArnaville's north flank, the prevailingwind would carry the smoke through theArnaville defile, spread it over the cross-ing site and into the enemy hill positions,and thus cover the entire crossing areawith a haze that would deny enemy airand artillery observation on both theapproaches and the crossing site. (Map4) Being so placed to the west of the hillmass, the generator positions, oil supplydump, and unit personnel would be pro-tected from enemy fire and could bereadily supplied along the Bayonville-

Arnaville road. Because of these ad-vantages, the presumed improbability ofa wind change, and the 84th's lack ofexperience under forward-area combatconditions, it was decided that nogenerator would be placed initially atthe crossing site.

An observation post was to be estab-lished with the Cannon Company, 10thInfantry, on the crest of the hill south ofArnaville. Another was to go on the hillnorth of the town. Communication be-tween observation posts and the smokecontrol officer, Colonel Cottingham, at

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 65

the crossing site was to be by radio; theengineers had tactical control of thesmoke through the control officer. Lack-ing time for special training, troops of the84th moved into Position 1 and theobservation posts during darkness, 9-10September.

The 84th was equipped with the newM-2 smoke generator, a weapon espe-cially designed for forward-area screen-ing, and was prepared to supplement thescreen with M-1 and M-4 smoke pots.Fog oil had to be hauled by the 5th Divi-sion's Quartermaster Company trucksfrom the Third Army depot at Troyes,some 180 miles in the rear, to the 84th'sbivouac area, about four miles to the rearof the forward dump at Position 1.Company trucks were to haul oil andother supplies the last four miles tothe generator positions. Originally onlytwelve generators were to operate atPosition 1, but the number could beincreased or decreased as the situationdemanded, forty-eight generators beingavailable. Assault elements of the 10thInfantry were scheduled to cross theMoselle between midnight and dawn themorning of 10 September, and the 84thgenerators were to begin making smokeat daylight, 0600, 10 September.

Smoke Operations Begin

Smoke operations began on schedule.By the time the 1st and 2d Battalions,10th Infantry, were crossing the Metzhighway and advancing toward theirhilltop objectives east of the river, activityat the crossing site was almost as wellhidden from the enemy as it had beenwhen the infantry crossed under coverof darkness. Although enemy artilleryfire did begin at daylight, that which fell

around the crossing site was evidentlyunobserved.

A sudden shift in wind direction fromwest to northeast about 1000 sent thesmoke away from the crossing site. Thescreen rapidly dissipated and exposed theopen terrain around the river to thedominant German observation. Thefact that enemy artillery took immediateadvantage of the opportunity empha-sized, according to chemical officers, theprotection afforded by the screen and thenecessity of re-establishing it.

The possibility of a wind shift hadevidently been discounted, for now asecond reconnaissance was necessary be-fore new generator positions could beoccupied. Position 2, only a few yardsfrom the river and behind an abandonedrailroad embankment six to eight feethigh, was chosen. A number of menunder 2d Lt. Frank W. Young movedfour generators to the new site, and smokewas started again before noon. A searchfailed to locate the chemical companycommander and revealed that the troopshad abandoned the generators and sup-plies at Position 1. The company com-mander was subsequently relieved. Withthe company executive officer across theriver reconnoitering for new positions,the 1st sergeant finally succeeded inrounding up some of his men and organiz-ing details for moving spare generatorsand oil to Position 2. Inadequately pre-pared for combat operations and minusa company commander to lead the way,many of the chemical troops took position"only after considerable persuasion."2

The 84th's executive officer, 1st Lt.George R. Lamb, was given command ofthe company, and the 1103d Engineer

2 Smoke Generator Operations.

66 THREE BATTLES

TRUCK-MOUNTED SMOKE GENERATOR IN OPERATION

Combat Group commander was givenspecific control over the smoke opera-tions. The 5th Division chemical officerwas to continue providing technicalsupervision.

Through the afternoon the smokescreen was maintained by the fourgenerators at Position 2, augmented bysmoke pots to conceal the line of gen-erators. Meanwhile, preparations weremade for establishing additional posi-tions. Position 3 was set up in lateafternoon along the railroad embankmentbeside the Arnaville-Noveant road justnorth of Arnaville. Before daylight (11

September) eight generator crews andgenerators were ferried across the riverto occupy Position 4, almost directlyacross the Moselle from Position 3 on theflatlands some 150 yards from the river.To test the feasibility of night operationsin the event of enemy air attack, screeningcontinued through the night of 10-11September at Positions 2 and 3. Thesmoke clung low to the ground and hidthe crossing site from observation bymoonlight. It drifted slowly under atwo-mile north wind. Because no nightair attack developed, further night opera-tions were not considered necessary. On

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 67

11 September Position 5, between thecanal and the river and south of thecrossing site, and Position 6, between therailroad and the hill south of Arnaville,were established. They were not putinto operation but were kept in readinessfor use when the situation demanded.One generator was mounted on a truckto move up and down the Arnaville-Noveant road on the west bank in orderto cover gaps that might develop in thescreen.

During the early morning of 11 Sep-tember, while the infantry were battlingGerman counterattacks on Hills 370 and386, enemy artillery fire around thecrossing site was virtually nonexistent.Since the smoke interfered with bridge-building operations, someone among theengineers decided that further screening,at least for the present, was unnecessary.About 0900 an unidentified engineerordered smoke operations to cease.3

As soon as the smoke had cleared thearea, enemy artillery reaction was "swiftand deadly. Two pieces of heavy en-gineer equipment were damaged, a jeepwas demolished, and a number of engi-neer personnel were wounded and killed.The chemical officer, Colonel Cotting-ham, acting in the emergency in the nameof the division commander, ordered thescreen re-established. But during thisperiod and the period the day beforewhen wind change had removed thescreen, the enemy had been given anopportunity to lay his artillery pieces;the chemical personnel felt that theeffects of the restored screen would havebeen better had these two lapses notoccurred. The engineer group com-mander, Lt. Col. George H. Walker, felt

that "too great emphasis" was placed onthe smoking operations. Because "theGermans were well aware" of the bridg-ing operations, knew the terrain thor-oughly, and "had already registeredseveral effective barrages," he believedGerman artillery fire on the bridgingsites was affected more by enemy ammu-nition limitations and other target re-quirements than by American smoke.4

After restoration of the smoke, controlof smoke operations was returned to the5th Division commander to be exercisedthrough the division chemical officer.On 12 September and on subsequentdays until 8 November, the 84th Chem-ical Company, and later the 161stChemical Smoke Generator Company,maintained "continuous"5 smoke duringdaylight around the Arnaville site. Un-observed enemy shellfire resulted in theevacuation of eight men for combatfatigue, wounded seven, and killed two.It made supply, particularly east of theriver, a difficult problem. Nevertheless,the inexperienced chemical troops stuckto their task. Artillery liaison planesproved most effective in observing todetermine the effectiveness of the screen,and at least three flights were made dailyfor this purpose. The convergence ofthe draw and defiles with the Mosellevalley near Arnaville caused such variancein wind conditions that often the smoke

3 Ibid. See also Ltr, Col Cottingham to Hist Div.

4 Ltr, Col Walker to Hist Div, 30 Mar 50. Nomention of smoke operations at Arnaville is to befound in available German records.

5 Smoke Generator Operations. According to Ltr,Col Walker to Hist Div, "During the morning of 12September . . . the bridge site was entirely devoid ofsmoke. . . . Whether this was caused by wind or byimproper operation of the generators, I cannot say,but the fact remains there was clear visibility betweenthe bridge site and the enemy-held high ground . . .during the entire morning of 12 September. Enemyfire during this period was infrequent and ineffective."

ARNAVILLE CROSSING SITE (aerial photograph taken on 6 October 1944). TheRupt de Mad Creek seen in right foreground passes under the lock on the canal near the Moselle

River. Semi-permanent bridge south of Site 1 was constructed after the Arnaville bridgeheadaction.

70 THREE BATTLES

from two generators only a hundred yardsapart drifted in opposite directions; butthe dispersion of the generators after theinitial wind change on the first day, plussmoke pots and mobile generators onboth banks, helped to keep the screeneffective. An M-2 generator consumedan average of fifty gallons of fog oil perhour; during the first twelve days ofoperation 1,535 smoke pots and a dailyaverage of 2,200 gallons of fog oil wereexpended.

Bridging the Moselle

Colonel Walker's 1103d Engineer Com-bat Group, attached to the 5th Division,consisted of the following units: the 160thand 204th Engineer Combat Battalions,6

the 551st Heavy Ponton Battalion, the989th Treadway Bridge Company, the537th Light Ponton Company, and the623d Light Equipment Company. As-sistance in engineer operations could alsobe expected from Company B of the 5thDivision's organic 7th Engineer CombatBattalion. Initial ferrying of the 1stBattalion, 10th Infantry, in assault boatswas done by the organic engineers; the2d and 3d Battalions, 10th Infantry, wereferried by Company B, 204th Engineers;and the 3d Battalion, 11th Infantry, byCompany C, 160th Engineers. Con-struction of infantry support rafts wasbegun during 10 September by CompanyB, 204th Engineers, but heavy enemyartillery fire delayed the work. Only afew rafts were completed before daylight,11 September.7

Bridging operations east of Arnavillewere complicated not only by the fact ofdominant enemy observation but also byseveral difficult terrain features at thecrossing site itself. In effect, the engi-neers would have to bridge two streams,and possibly three. The first was thedeep Moselle Canal, 80 feet wide. Nextcame the Moselle itself, approximately250 feet wide. There was also the Ruptde Mad, a small east-west tributary run-ning through the Arnaville defile, passingunder the canal, and emptying into theriver north of the crossing site. (Map 5)

Reconnaissance revealed that southeastof Arnaville, near the junction of thenorth-south railroad with a southwesternspur rail line, a narrow trail overgrownwith vegetation led up the steep dike ofthe canal to the remains of a one-waysteel truss bridge which had been con-structed by French military engineers in1940. The bridge itself had been de-molished, and its debris blocked the site.Opposite this possible bridge site wasanother high dike, but beyond the dikeanother narrow trail led to the river andto an outlet road beyond the river leadingto Voisage Farm. The banks of the riverhere offered satisfactory prospects for afloating bridge. To reach this crossingof the canal, vehicles would initially haveto travel south out of Arnaville on thePagny highway, thus crossing the Ruptde Mad on an existing masonry archbridge between the town's main streetand a railroad spur that joined the mainrail line northeast of Arnaville.

The most direct route from Arnavilleto the river led due east through under-6 On 9 Sep the 150th Engr (C) Bn had been de-

tached. See 150th Engr (C) Bn AAR, Sep 44.7 The engineer story is based on the following

sources: Combat Interv 38 with unidentified engroffs; Engineer Operations; 1103d Engr (C) Gp, 160thand 204th Engr (C) Bns, 551st Hv Pon Bn, 989th

Tdwy Br Co, 537th Lt Pon Co, 623d Lt Equip Co,AAR's, Sep 44; Ltr, Col Walker to Hist Div. Thepreliminary narrative, Engineer Operations, is ex-tremely valuable.

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 71

MAP 5

passes beneath this same railroad spurand the main rail line to a lock on thecanal. Although foot troops had beenable to cross the canal at the lock, ap-proximately thirty feet of bridging wouldbe necessary for vehicular traffic. Butto reach either River Site 1 or anotherpossible bridging site (River Site 2, north-east of the canal lock) vehicles wouldhave to cross the Rupt de Mad, which

ran northeast between the canal and theriver. River Site 2 also offered an outletroad beyond the river to the Metz-Pont-à-Mousson highway. After cross-ing the canal, vehicles might turn northalong the canal dike to reach the riverat a shallow rapids which offered thepossibility of a fording site. Engineersrecognized, however, that a large amountof bulldozer work would first be necessary

72 THREE BATTLES

on steep west and east banks of the riverbefore fording might be accomplished.Another terrain feature—later to provean advantage against enemy shelling—was the section of abandoned railroadembankment about eight feet high whichstretched at intervals along the river bankfrom south of River Site 1 to River Site 2.Because of frequent gaps in the bank, itwould be no obstacle in reaching theriver bridging sites.8

Initial Planning and Operations

With Company B, 204th Engineers,engaged in constructing infantry supportrafts at the Arnaville site and CompanyC, 160th Engineers, still busy in thevicinity of the Dornot bridgehead, theremainder of the 1103d Engineer CombatGroup 9 on 10 September made plansfor its bridging operations and assembledmaterials and construction equipmentwest of Arnaville. Actual bridging op-erations were not to begin until the nightof 10-11 September.

The initial engineer plan envisionedconstruction by Company B, 204th En-gineers, of a double treadway bridgeacross the canal at the lock. A secondthirty-foot section would be requiredacross the Rupt de Mad in order to giveaccess to the river. Concurrently the537th Light Ponton Company was to

remove the demolished steel truss bridgeat the southern canal bridge site anderect a Bailey bridge. As soon as equip-ment could cross the canal, the 989thTreadway Bridge Company, assisted byCompany B, 160th Engineers, was toerect a treadway bridge at River Site 1,while Headquarters Company, 204thEngineers, conducted bulldozer opera-tions to level the banks at the fording site.Company A, 204th Engineers, was torelieve Company B, 204th, of its ferryresponsibilities. The remainder of theengineer group would be called upon asneeded.

Heavy enemy artillery fire met theengineers as they began their work, butnot long after midnight (10-11 Septem-ber) Company B, 204th Engineers, hadplaced the double treadway span acrossthe canal at the lock and had begun workon a treadway section across the Rupt deMad. Meanwhile, Headquarters Com-pany, 204th, moved to the fording siteand began to level the high riverbanks.Despite intense artillery fire, which killedtwo bulldozer operators, the ford waspronounced ready for vehicles at approxi-mately 1030, 11 September.

As the 537th Light Ponton Companywas moving from Arnaville toward thesouthern canal bridge site, enemy artil-lery fire demolished the masonry spanacross the Rupt de Mad just south ofArnaville's main street. Receiving achange in orders, the 537th began con-struction of a double-double Bailey bridgeto replace the masonry span across thetributary stream. Although enemy ar-tillery fire continued to be heavy onArnaville, only two vehicles were dam-aged and no personnel casualties resulted.The bridge was completed by 1500, 11September.

8 In addition to previously quoted sources, thisterrain study is based on maps and photographs inOCMH files and a visit by the author to the area inJune 1949.

9 The Light Equipage Platoon, 537th Light PontonCompany, was occupied in the Dornot vicinity.The organic 7th Engineer Combat Battalion wasdisposed as follows: Company A with the 2d InfantryCombat Team to the north; Company B assistingferrying operations at Arnaville; and Company Cstill occupied with the Dornot bridgehead.

DOUBLE TREADWAY SPAN ACROSS THE MOSELLE CANAL placed byCompany B, 204th Engineers. Remains of one-way steel truss bridge can be seen in background.

74 THREE BATTLES

Not long after 0200 (11 September)Company B, 204th Engineers, completedthe small section of treadway bridgenecessary across the Rupt de Mad nearthe canal lock and began moving equip-ment and bridging materials for theerection of a treadway bridge at RiverSite 1. Work had been in progress foran hour when about dawn severe enemyartillery fire wounded several men anddamaged eight pneumatic floats. An-other heavy shelling almost an hour laterhalted work while the men took coverbehind the abandoned railroad embank-ment. When work was resumed, stillunder a smoke screen, enemy artilleryreaction was virtually nonexistent. Itwas at this time (about 0900) that someunidentified engineer, evidently hopingto speed construction, ordered that the84th Chemical Company cease its smokeoperations. German artillery reactedalmost as soon as the smoke clearedaway. An air compressor and a Brock-way truck were damaged, and a quarter-ton truck was demolished by a direct hit.Approximately eight engineers werewounded, and six were killed. Shellscontinued to fall at five- to ten-minuteintervals, and the company was with-drawn to a position of safety west ofArnaville.10

Armor Crosses at the Ford

Until 11 September the 735th TankBattalion had been waiting in a forwardassembly area west of Arnaville for com-pletion of a bridge across the Moselle.Although the 818th Tank Destroyer Bat-talion had entered the action with firesupport from its Company B in positionsatop the high hills flanking Arnaville, thetank destroyers also were awaiting abridge to cross the river and join activelyin the bridgehead fight. At 1030 on 11September when Headquarters Com-pany, 204th Engineers, completed level-ing the banks at the fording site north ofthe bridging sites, it seemed likely thatarmored elements might at last join thebattle. The floor of the river at the fordwas of gravel and most of the stream wasnot over two feet deep. Near the farshore, however, a sixty-foot channel wasfound where the depth was from four tofour and a half feet, a dangerous, evencritical, depth for armor. Seeking tolower the water level, supporting artilleryunits attempted to puncture a damacross the Moselle south of Ars-sur-Moselle to the north while engineersworked to lay sections of treadway bridgeon the river bottom in the deep channel.

The dam had not been broken by1500. Nevertheless the 1st and 2dPlatoons of the 818th Tank DestroyerBattalion began to hazard the crossing.Movement was slow and exasperating.Almost every time a vehicle crossed, thetreadway sections on the bottom had tobe repaired. At one time enemy artilleryfire literally blasted the treadway sec-tions out of the river. One tank de-

10 Engineer accounts of this action are in sharpdisagreement with Chemical Corps accounts, settingthe time of shelling before daylight. With the excep-tion of Ltr, Col Walker to Hist Div, these accountsdo not even mention the discontinuance of smoke.Chemical Corps accounts, specifically Smoke Gen-erator Operations and Ltr, Col Cottingham to HistDiv, are accepted because they more nearly agreewith messages from the engineers recorded in the10th Inf Unit Jnl, 11 Sep 44. It cannot be deter-mined who gave the order to cease smoke except thatColonel Cottingham's letter to the Historical Divisionsays, "The order was given by the engineers to thebest of my knowledge. . . ." Colonel Walker's letterto the Historical Division declares, "I ... recall that

the 5th Division Engineer stated that I must haveordered the smoke to cease but this was not correctand I so stated at the time."

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 75

stroyer was hit and disabled by artilleryfire, and by 1630 only six destroyers wereacross the Moselle. Tanks of CompanyB, 735th Tank Battalion, next attemptedthe crossing and met with more success;only six tanks crossed under their ownpower, but three that stalled were towedthe remaining distance.

Since artillery had failed to puncturethe dam south of Ars-sur-Moselle, P-47'sof the 492d Squadron, 48th Group, gaveit their attention. They scored a hitabout 1830, blasting a big hole in thedam and lowering the water level seveninches at the ford. By early the nextmorning (12 September) the remainderof Company B, 735th Tank Battalion,and two platoons of Company B, 818thTank Destroyer Battalion, were able tocross the river and move into assemblyareas behind Hills 369 and 370, east ofthe Metz highway.11

Bridging Efforts Continued

When efforts at constructing a tread-way bridge across the Moselle at RiverSite 1 were postponed in early morningof 11 September because of enemy shell-ing, the only bridgebuilding activity inthe Arnaville vicinity through middaywas that of the 537th Light Ponton Com-pany. By 1500 it finished constructionof a double-double Bailey bridge acrossthe Rupt de Mad just south of Arnaville'smain street. Headquarters Company,204th Engineers, was working at the ford

in its efforts to cross tank destroyers andtanks, and Company A, 204th, wasassisting Company B, 7th Engineers, withinfantry support rafts at two ferry pointssouth and north of the original assaultcrossing site.

In late afternoon (11 September) workon a treadway bridge across the riverwas ordered resumed, this time at RiverSite 2. Two companies were assignedthe task: Company B, 160th Engineers,and the 989th Treadway Bridge Com-pany. Both were under the supervisionof the 160th Engineer Combat Battalioncommander, Maj. Thomas L. Howard.The engineer group commander, ColonelWalker, was present at the site through-out the night and until about noon thenext day.

Working under concealment providedfirst by the smoke generators and then byearly darkness, the engineers had suc-ceeded by approximately 2100 in com-pleting a third of the bridge when enemyartillery again showered the area. Sev-eral engineers were wounded, and workwas halted twenty minutes for reorgani-zation and for testing equipment. Op-erations had hardly been resumed whenthe enemy fire began again, woundingseveral men. While the engineers soughtcover behind the abandoned railroadembankment, Colonel Walker sent amessenger to the 10th Infantry commandpost requesting counterbattery fire, onlyto learn later that the messenger failed tolocate the command post. When workwas resumed after about twenty minutes,five or six shells landed some fifty yardsaway. They failed to interrupt work atthe site but knocked out one of two engi-neer powerboats with a direct hit. Theboat's operator was never found. As anorder went back for the third and last

11 Engineer Operations; Irwin Diary; 735th TkBn, 818th TD Bn, AAR's, Sep 44; 10th Inf UnitJnl, 11 Sep 44; General Notes: The Crossing of theMoselle River and the Defense of the Bridgehead bythe 10th Infantry Regiment (hereafter cited asGeneral Notes on Arnaville operations) in CombatInterv 38 File; XIX TAC Opns File, 11 Sep 44.

76 THREE BATTLES

powerboat to be brought forward, theonly crane on the bridge site was damagedby another shelling which again forcedengineer withdrawal behind the railroadbank. Again the shelling stopped, againequipment was tested preparatory toresuming work, and again enemy pro-jectiles hit the area. While the engineerswaited under cover, Colonel Walker wentpersonally to the 10th Infantry CP andrequested counterbattery artillery fire.Both the 10th Infantry commander,Colonel Bell, and his artillery officer,Colonel Johnson, wanted to do what theycould, but demands on limited artilleryammunition by the infantry in the bridge-head and the engineer commander'sinability to give information on locationof enemy batteries doing the firingnegated his request.

On his return to the bridge site,Colonel Walker found that enemy artil-lery was still taking effect. About 0200at least one enemy self-propelled gunfired some ten to fifteen rounds of directfire into the embankment and the canaldike. An hour later enemy artillery firewas blanketing the area at frequent inter-vals. Deciding that it was pointless toretain the engineers at the river whenthere was no hope of using the necessarymachinery, Colonel Walker ordered theirwithdrawal to Arnaville. He and an-other engineer officer remained at thesite.

Thus engineer activities around thecrossing site came to a temporary halt.The hard-pressed bridgehead still lackeda vehicular bridge. There was feelingamong infantry commanders that despitethe difficulties involved the engineerswere not pressing their work sufficiently.General Irwin himself had ordered thata bridge be completed the night of 10-11

September "at all costs"12 but notedprivately that the "best hope is to havea ford in by daylight and possibly atreadway bridge." 13 On 11 Septembernot even the ford was usable until mid-afternoon. On this date General Irwinnoted: "Engineers at bridge not wellcoordinated." 14 The 10th Infantry S-3journal noted later in the day of 12 Sep-tember "deficiencies by the engineers ingetting the bridge ready for use." What-ever the criticisms, the two engineercompanies that had been working thenight of 11-12 September had been hardhit by the severe enemy shelling. Theyhad lost not only personnel but vitalequipment, of which there was an acuteshortage in Third Army during thisperiod. Although the engineer groupcommander felt keenly his responsibilityto the infantry, he also believed it un-warranted to commit his personnel andequipment recklessly, thus inviting anultimate delay that might prove far morecostly than a temporary delay.15

German Counterattacks—12 September

As engineer activity around the Arna-ville crossing site came to a halt in earlymorning of 12 September, preparationsbegun by the enemy the night before fora continuation of his counterattacksagainst the bridgehead's infantry sud-

12 10th Inf Unit Jnl, 10 Sep 44.13 Irwin Diary.14 Ibid.15 This section of the engineer story is from: En-

gineer Operations; Irwin Diary; 10th Inf Unit Jnl,11-12 Sep 44; 1103d Engr (C) Gp, 160th Engr (C)Bn, 989th Tdwy Br Co, AAR's, Sep 44; Ltr, ColWalker to Hist Div. Colonel Walker's comments,particularly on the action the night of 11-12 Sep-tember, are in valuable detail. See also Certificate,Maj Howard W. Clark, Asst XX Corps Engr, 14Sep 44, atchd to Ltr, Col Walker to Hist Div.

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 77

denly erupted in artillery, armor, andground action all along the line. Earlywarning of enemy intentions had comethe night before when a platoon ofGerman tanks took position beyondbazooka range on Hill 325 and directed20-mm. and machine gun fire againstCompany F in the edge of the Bois deGaumont. (Map 6) While harassmentof Company F continued sporadicallythrough the night, men of Company Aon Hill 386 could hear enemy troopmovement several hundred yards infront of them. S. Sgt. Leslie W. Griffincrawled forward of the company's lineswith a telephone and directed artilleryfire against the sounds. The movementceased, but tanks could be heard at inter-vals through the night on the Arry-Lorryroad.

About 0300 (12 September) a prepara-tory mortar and artillery barrage beganin front of both the 1st and 2d Battalionlines. Moving forward in hundred-yardjumps, the barrage rolled across the creststo the reverse slopes, subjecting thedefenders to the heaviest fire they hadyet encountered in the bridgehead. Thefirst counterattack, a well co-ordinatednight attack, hit Company A on Hill 386at approximately 0330. When the com-pany heard the enemy forming up someone hundred yards in front of its lines,Lieutenant Dutko, the forward artilleryobserver, called for fire. Although theartillery cut into the rear of the attackers,causing some disorganization, the attackhad already moved in under this fire,hitting primarily against the 1st Platoonin the company's center. Stationing S.Sgt. Carmine F. D'Anillo with an auto-matic rifle near the 3d Platoon on theleft and a light machine gunner and abazooka team on the right beside the 2d

Platoon, Lieutenant Hallowell, com-manding the company, ordered the 1stPlatoon to withdraw about 150 yards.Even as Company D's heavy machineguns on Company A's left flank fired intothe flank of the German attack, the ene-my troops moved into the 1st Platoon'spositions. Sergeant D'Anillo openedfire with his automatic rifle and thelight machine gunner and bazooka teamon the right joined in. D'Anillo con-tinued firing even after four men with himbecame casualties and he himself washit in the stomach. Supported by thisfire, the 1st Platoon, aided by some menof the flank platoons, stormed back intoits positions. The German attack wasbroken.

The attack against Company A hadbeen made by two enemy companiesnewly equipped and well armed withautomatic weapons. Company A foundfourteen machine guns and other auto-matic weapons in the area. Most of theattackers were killed and few prisonerstaken except the wounded, and manywounded refused to surrender as long asthey had weapons. Company A hadsustained twenty-five casualties. Theattack was evidently to have been sup-ported by tanks attacking from Arry, butsupporting artillery and 57-mm. antitankguns kept the town covered, and no tankeffort developed.16

On the left flank of the bridgehead theenemy counterattack was a little latergetting started and was primarily a tankattack. Two platoons of tanks and acompany of infantry were detected about

16 1st Bn story from the following: Moselle RiverCrossing; General Notes on Arnaville operations;46th FA Bn AAR, Sep 44; 10th Inf Unit Jnl, 12 Sep44; Tenth Infantry.

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 79

0400 moving in from the direction ofVezon against the 2d Battalion elementson the left portion of Hill 370. Heavyprotective fire from west of the river fromartillery, tank destroyers, and CannonCompany, 10th Infantry, was laid on theGermans before they could get close tothe lines, and the attack was stopped.

About an hour later, four enemy tanksmoved in against Company L, 11th In-fantry, now on the lower slopes of Hill325 to the left of Company F. After thetanks had fired about a dozen scatteredrounds against 10th Infantry positions inthe Bois de Gaumont and against thebridge site, Company L's bazooka menopened fire. When one tank was hit,although not knocked out, the four with-drew. Farther down on the slope aplatoon of tanks, led by a half-track,moved in against the outposts establishedby the Reconnaissance and Ammunitionand Pioneer Platoons of the 3d Battalion,11th Infantry. The half-track boggeddown on the muddy slope and bazookamen fired at the tanks; thereupon theenemy abandoned the half-track and thetanks withdrew.

On the extreme left flank of the bridge-head, the positions of Company B, 11thInfantry, in the buildings around a brickfactory in the southern edge of Corny,were hit about the same time, just beforedaylight. At 0530 Company B reportedthe approach of a platoon of infantryaccompanied by four tanks, presumablythose whose earlier attack had beenthwarted by the bogged half-track. Thecompany reported that it had only onebazooka and that even though the infan-try could be stopped the tanks mightbreak through. Major Birdsong, thebattalion commander, therefore sent hisorderly, Pfc. Harry Saghbazarian, on

foot to the tank destroyer assembly areanorth of Voisage Farm to guide tankdestroyers into firing positions against thethreat.

Spearheading the attack, the fourenemy tanks passed through the Com-pany B positions. One of the 3d Bat-talion's 57-mm. antitank guns, mannedby 1st Lt. Mitchell J. Hazam and S. Sgt.Cline Bills, opened fire on the lead tankand set it ablaze. The second Germantank returned the fire, knocking out boththe crew and the antitank gun and forcingthe other antitank gun crews to takecover. As the three remaining enemytanks continued to advance, the tankdestroyers of Company B, 818th TankDestroyer Battalion, reached firing posi-tions, fired, knocked out one of the threetanks, and damaged another. Mean-while, Company B, 11th Infantry, hadheld its small arms fire and allowed theenemy infantry to get into its positions.On signal the men opened fire from theircovered positions in the houses, catchingthe German infantry in a deadly crossfire. Twenty-three Germans were killed,seven wounded, and twenty-eight cap-tured. The two remaining enemy tanks(one of them damaged) raced backthrough the company's positions. Al-though Pfc. Walter A. Andrews, Com-pany B, shot the commander of one ofthe tanks through the tank's open turret,both tanks escaped into Corny and hidthrough the day and night. The nextmorning when one tried to escape on theMetz highway to the north it was set onfire by tank destroyers firing from westof the river. Later the remaining tank,previously damaged by the 818th's de-stroyers, was found abandoned in Corny.The Germans had been beaten back butnot without cost; in its right flank platoon

80 THREE BATTLES

Company B had lost the platoon leaderand eighteen men, missing in action.17

Although heavy enemy shelling, mostof it against the reserve positions aroundVoisage Farm and on the reverse slopesof the hills, continued for almost an hour,by 0800 (12 September) the third majorcounterattack against the Moselle bridge-head had been defeated. Prisoners takenwere from the 282d Infantry Battalion, aseparate machine gun battalion, a sup-porting tank battalion (103d), the 115thPanzer Grenadier Regiment of the 15th PanzerGrenadier Division, which had moved intothe area the day before, and the 17th SSand 3d Panzer Grenadier Divisions. Thatnight the 15th Panzer Grenadier Divisionbegan a move south to the Nancy sector,leaving the burden of the Arnaville fightto the 17th SS and elements of the 3dPanzer Grenadier Division. The Americansknew nothing of the 15th's shift at thetime. A belief prevalent among both5th Division and CCB personnel thatthey were fighting the elite troops of theMetz military schools is not borne outby German records. These school troopswere in the German "bridgehead" westof Metz surrounding Forts Driant, Mari-val, and Jeanne d'Arc and were beingengaged by the 2d Infantry and otherelements of the 7th Armored Division.Some were north of Metz fighting the90th Infantry Division. All were underDivision Number 462. Not until after theArnaville bridgehead was secure did anyof these school troops enter the Americanbridgehead battles south of Metz, except

for one battalion of signal school troops(SS Signal School Metz) which foughtagainst the 2d Battalion of the 11th In-fantry opposite Dornot. (Replacementbattalions in the area, though originallyunder Division Number 462, were not schooltroops.) Not that the Arnaville bridge-head was being opposed by inferiorGerman troops: the 17th SS Panzer Grena-dier Division had been refitted and itscombat value considerably increased; the3d and 5th Panzer Grenadier Divisions hadnuclei of elite personnel and even at thisperiod carried a German classification ingeneral combat effectiveness of II—better than average.18

Plans To Expand the Bridgehead

At daylight on 12 September the forcestill available to General Irwin forstrengthening his Arnaville bridgeheadseemed at first glance sufficient. Butstrings were attached to it. The 1stBattalion, 11th Infantry, which had notyet crossed, was actually already com-mitted in holding the division's northflank north of Dornot, and its CompaniesB and C were attached to the 3d Battalionin the bridgehead. The 3d Battalion'sCompanies I and K could not be con-sidered fair exchange because of thebattering they had received at Dornot.Although the 2d Battalion, 11th Infantry,still had not crossed, it too had beenravaged in the Dornot battle and was farfrom reconstituted. Furthermore, it wasthe division's only infantry reserve.

17 2d Bn, 10th Inf, and 3d Bn, 11th Inf, stories fromthe following: Moselle River Crossing; Combat Interv38 with Birdsong and Simpson-Lynch-Lathrop; 10thInf Unit Jnl, 12 Sep 44; 818th TD Bn AAR, Sep 44;Ltr, Col Birdsong to Hist Div.

18 MS #B-042 (Krause); MS # B-728 (ColonelAlbert Emmerich, formerly G-3, First Army); variousLtrs and Rpts, 9-16 Sep 44, found in Army Group GKTB 2, Anlagen 1.IX.-30.IX.44; IPW Msg, 10th InfUnit Jnl File, 12 Sep 44.

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 81

There remained CCB, 7th Armored Di-vision, which was alerted to cross themoment a bridge could be completed.General Irwin was alarmed about thelack of infantry to support the combatcommand, for the unit's 23d ArmoredInfantry Battalion had been reducedalmost to a cipher in the Dornot fighting.In addition, the 5th Division commandercould count on Companies C and D,735th Tank Battalion, and Company C,818th Tank Destroyer Battalion. (TheA Companies of both units were attachedto the 2d Infantry Combat Team whichwas attached to the 7th Armored Divisionin its fight to contain the enemy west ofMetz.) With his division short approxi-mately 60 officers and 1,600 riflemen,General Irwin asked for additional rein-forcements. The XX Corps commander,General Walker, considered briefly a planto aid the 5th Division by leaving the 2dInfantry alone to continue the attack westof Metz and sending CCA, 7th ArmoredDivision, to the bridgehead; but the 7thArmored Division commander advisedthat it would take more than one infantrycombat team to contain these Germanforces. Therefore, XX Corps had toturn to a plan for wider reshuffling allalong the corps front.

Meanwhile, General Irwin tried tomake arrangements with the 4th Ar-mored Division, which had moved up tothe river at Pagny-sur-Moselle, south ofArnaville, for mutual support that wouldinclude a crossing by the 4th Armored atPagny. Late on 11 September the 4thArmored agreed to cross in conjunctionwith an attack by 5th Division elementsto break through Arry and take Hill 385to the southeast opposite the proposedPagny crossing. General Irwin accord-ingly laid plans for this attack, but at

0400 of 12 September the 4th Armoredsent word that it had to delay its crossingfor twenty-four hours. Throughout thatday, the shortage of infantry stymied anyplans to break out of the Arnavillebridgehead.19

Reinforcements for the Bridgehead

Colonel Walker, the engineer groupcommander, had evacuated all engineerpersonnel from the Arnaville bridge siteat 0300 the morning of 12 September.Two and a half hours later, noting thatenemy artillery fire had lessened, heordered that construction begin again ona treadway bridge at River Site 2. (SeeMap 5.) The 989th Treadway BridgeCompany, this time assisted by CompanyC, 204th Engineers, and one platoon ofCompany C, 160th Engineers, resumedwork at 0800. The delay occurred be-cause no troops had been kept on construc-tion alert after the earlier withdrawal.Artillery fire had dwindled to occasionalshelling in the near vicinity, and theengineers sustained no casualties. By1230 (12 September), some fifty-eighthours after the infantry had begun theircrossing, a treadway bridge at lastspanned the Moselle. Concurrently the537th Light Ponton Company's Foot-bridge Section combined assault boatsand support rafts into a footbridge to fa-cilitate evacuation of walking wounded.20

Ten minutes after the treadway bridgewas completed at River Site 2, tanks ofCompany C, 735th Tank Battalion,

19 Irwin Diary; 10th Inf Unit Jnl, 12 Sep 44;Moselle River Crossing; 5th Div G-3 Jnl, 12 Sep 44.

20 Moselle River Crossing; Engineer Operations;1103d Engr (C) Gp, 989th Tdwy Br Co, 204th Engr(C) Bn, 160th Engr (C) Bn, 537th Lt Pon Co, AAR's,Sep 44; 10th Inf Unit Jnl, 12 Sep 44; Ltr, Col Walkerto Hist Div.

TREADWAY BRIDGE AT RIVER SITE 2. Haze in background is from smokeoperations.

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 83

began moving over it into the bridgehead.The remaining platoon of Company Band the 3d Platoon, Company C, 818thTank Destroyer Battalion, followed, whilethe other two platoons of Company C,818th, maintained firing positions on thewest-bank hills flanking Arnaville. Afterthe destroyers came Companies A, B,and C of CCB's 31st Tank Battalion.They moved into an assembly area be-hind wooded Hill 370 east of the Metzhighway. CCB's tank destroyer sup-port, Company B, 814th Tank DestroyerBattalion, followed soon after.

The confined bridgehead was almostbursting with uncommitted armor (fivemedium tank companies, seven self-propelled tank destroyer platoons), butinfantry support to enlarge the maneuverarea was not available. CCB's 23dArmored Infantry Battalion was still tooweak from its Dornot fight for commit-ment, as was the 2d Battalion, 11thInfantry; and the 1st Battalion, 11th In-fantry, was holding a defensive positionnorth of Dornot protecting the division'snorth flank. The infantry already in thebridgehead possessed a reserve in the 3dBattalion, 10th Infantry. To commit itdespite the battered condition of the 1stand 2d Battalions, 10th Infantry, in anattack which would further extend theinfantry lines seemed inadvisable. TheGermans were still punishing the areawith shellfire from an arc of approxi-mately 210 degrees. They still held thedominant terrain feature in the area,Hill 396; the battered village of Arry;almost all of the north-flank town, Corny;and the bare slopes of Hill 325. On thenight of 12-13 September the enemyused his advantages profitably, plasteringthe bridgehead with artillery fire thattook inevitable toll among personnel of

the bunched armored units on the flat-lands along the Metz highway.21

Supporting the Bridgehead

The thirteen field artillery battalionscharged with support of the bridgeheadfired, during 12 September, a total of5,733 rounds, almost as much as on theopening day of the attack.22 No doubta large portion of this fire was directedat repelling the fierce counterattacks ofearly morning. In comparison with theweight of American shelling, however,General Irwin noted that "Boche artilleryhas actually had superiority today dueto our ammunition restrictions, and hasfired over whole area all day long."Planes of the 371st Fighter BomberGroup, XIX Tactical Air Command,taking advantage of another cool, clearday with good visibility, augmentedAmerican artillery throughout the day,causing General Irwin to comment: "Airfurnished splendid support today and hasbeen of greatest value. It cooperatesquickly and efficiently, and has uncannyability to find targets, both from ourdesignations and its own." Major mis-sions included bombing gun positions atMardigny, southeast of Arry, strafingtanks and infantry between Marieullesand Fey, and bombing the Verdun forts,Sommy and St. Blaise, all by P-47's ofthe 406th Squadron, 371st Group. Oneplane and pilot were lost.23

21 Moselle River Crossing; 735th Tk Bn, 818thTD Bn, CCB, 31st Tk Bn, AAR's, Sep 44.

22 Arnaville Artillery. This does not include the434th Armored Field Artillery Battalion of CCB,which placed some fire in the bridgehead during 12September but for which firing statistics are notavailable.

23 Quotes are from Irwin Diary. See also XIXTAC Daily Intel Sum, 12 Sep 44, XIX TAC OpnsFile.

84 THREE BATTLES

Infantry, tank destroyers, and artilleryall made claims of enemy armor kills on12 September. The 3d Battalion, 11thInfantry, destroyed one tank at Cornywith a 57-mm. antitank gun; bazookasof Company L, 11th Infantry, hit anotheron the open slopes of the Côte de Faye.Company B, 818th Tank Destroyer Bat-talion, knocked out two at Corny, whileCompany C, 818th, firing from west ofthe river, claimed one half-track and fourtanks definitely knocked out and onetank damaged. An unidentified corpsartillery unit claimed two tanks knockedout southeast of Arry with 155-mm. fire.The day's total of established kills, notincluding any that might have beenmade by air support, was ten.24

Bridgebuilding Continues

Late in the afternoon of 12 Septemberthe 551st Heavy Ponton Battalion wasordered to erect a reinforced heavy pon-ton bridge across the Moselle at RiverSite 1. Necessary abutments, trestles,and hinge-span rafts were to be con-structed during the night and await corpsorder for completion. Movement of thepontons and other equipment was alaborious process because the engineershad to use the same route as bridgeheadtraffic. In addition, a steep incline atthe canal lock crossing and a sharp turnat the second treadway over the Rupt deMad presented formidable obstacles tothe engineers' heavy trailers. Despitethese difficulties, the first load of equip-ment reached the river about 2100, andwork was begun by the 1st and 2d Bridge

Platoons, Company A, and the 2d BridgePlatoon, Company B. The engineersfinished all preliminary work by 0700and then retired to await the order forcompletion.

At noon on 13 September came theorder to resume construction. By thetime personnel and equipment, includingadditional materials necessary for thefloating portion of the bridge, had movedagain to the site through the maze ofbridgehead traffic, it was 1500. Con-struction thereafter proceeded rapidlywith no interference at first from enemyartillery. It would have taken approxi-mately one and a half hours' additionalwork to complete the bridge when Ger-man shelling began at 1745, driving theengineers to cover. Concentrations con-tinued to fall at fifteen-minute intervals,and work was resumed during the lulls.About 1830 the fire increased, concentra-tions landing every two or three minutes,until finally, five hours later, Lt. Col.Robert H. Latham, 1103d EngineerCombat Group executive officer, orderedwithdrawal.

The enemy shelling, presumably fromthe heavy batteries at Fort Driant,knocked out a section of the treadwaybridge at River Site 2, but the engineerswere able to repair it quickly. The 537thLight Ponton Company, which duringthe afternoon had begun construction ofa Bailey bridge over the southern canalcrossing site, also suffered casualties fromthe enemy shelling, including severewounds to its two bridge platoon leaders.The unit withdrew with the otherengineers at 2330.

Work was resumed on both bridges at1000 the next morning (14 September)with assistance at the heavy pontonbridge by Company B, 160th Engineers.

24 Combat Interv 38 with Birdsong; 818th TD BnAAR, Sep 44; and 10th Inf Unit Jnl, 12 Sep 44,from which the information on the corps artilleryunit was obtained.

HEAVY PONTON BRIDGE ACROSS MOSELLE near Arnaville was completed by551st Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion on 14 September 1944.

86 THREE BATTLES

Several metallic pontons that had beendamaged in the partially completedbridge were repaired in place. The craneand several vehicles had been knockedout and seven pneumatic floats had to bereplaced. Later, about 1330, shellingincreased, and all personnel withdrew.They returned to the job once againabout 1500 and in two hours completeda 250-foot reinforced heavy pontonbridge (Class 40 tons). At 1830 aneighty-foot double-single Bailey bridgewas completed across the canal at thesouthern crossing site. The two bridges,combined with the treadway bridges atRiver Site 2 and at the canal lock, gavetwo complete one-way routes over thecombined obstacles and completed engi-neer bridge construction at the Arnavillecrossing until after the bridgehead was

secured. Only maintenance was re-quired, and, although enemy shellingcontinued, there was no major damageto either the treadway or the heavyponton bridge until the ponton bridgewas hit on 28 September. Six metallicpontons and several pneumatic floatshad to be replaced, and the bridge wasagain ready for traffic the next morning.

The 1103d Engineer Combat Grouphad constructed a total of six bridgesacross three water barriers, the Rupt deMad, the Moselle Canal, and the MoselleRiver. In so doing they had suffered100 men wounded and thirteen killed.25

25 Engineer Operations; Ltr, Col Walker to HistDiv; 1103d Engr (C) Gp, 551st Hv Pon Bn, 537thLt Pon Co, AAR's, Sep 44. The 551st's detailedaccount of heavy ponton bridge construction isparticularly valuable.

CHAPTER IV

Build-Up and Expansion(13-15 September)

A cold, driving rain began during thenight of 12-13 September. By daylightthe little bridgehead across the MoselleRiver was a morass of mud boding nogood for the assembled armor and addingto the discomforts of the battle-wearyinfantry. The infantrymen, who hadseen little sleep for three days and fournights, were nonetheless grateful for asurcease from the fierce enemy counter-blows. Both the 1st and 2d Battalions,10th Infantry, atop Hills 370, 369, and386, had been reduced to 50 percent oftheir original strength, and battle fatiguehad become a serious problem.

Elsewhere in the bridgehead the 3dBattalion of the 11th Infantry (less Com-panies I and K, plus Companies B andC) continued to hold on the north flankin the southern edge of Corny, while the3d Battalion, 10th Infantry, remained inreserve around Voisage Farm. Also inassembled reserve were Companies B andC, 735th Tank Battalion; Company Band one platoon of Company C, 818thTank Destroyer Battalion; Company B,814th Tank Destroyer Battalion (CCB);and Companies A, B, and C, 31st TankBattalion (CCB).

At approximately 0900 on 13 Septem-ber a platoon of light tanks of CompanyD, 735th Tank Battalion, with one 105-mm. assault gun and one 81-mm. mortarattached, and the 5th Reconnaissance

Troop crossed into the bridgehead topatrol south along the east bank of theriver. No sooner had they headed souththan they were stopped by intense enemyshellfire.

Later in the morning the 1st Battalion,10th Infantry, sent a small foot patroltoward the troublesome south-flank townof Arry. By 1100 the patrol's report wasback, indicating promise for a drive toenlarge the bridgehead to the southeast:in Arry the riflemen had found only deadGermans and four enemy tanks, allknocked out; the town had been aban-doned. Another 1st Battalion patrol,going northeast from the battalion'spositions on Hill 386, also made no enemycontact. In the afternoon another pa-trol, this time a platoon from the 3dBattalion, 10th Infantry, investigatedArry and confirmed the earlier findings.Asserting that it would take more thana platoon to defend the town, the patrolwithdrew. Despite this evidence thatArry was not occupied, no 10th Infantrytroops were sent to hold the town. TheAmericans feared overextension of theirlines and felt that Arry, now reduced toa pile of rubble, could be controlled bythe troops on Hill 386 and by direct firefrom tank destroyers and Cannon Com-pany guns on the west-bank heights southof Arnaville.

Thus, notwithstanding signs of a pos-

88 THREE BATTLES

sible enemy withdrawal on the southeastand south of the bridgehead, littletangible effort was made immediately toexploit it. Although Brig. Gen. John M.Devine, new commander of CCB, cameinto the bridgehead in early afternoonwith orders from the 5th Division toattack, intense enemy shelling, a lack oftime for reconnaissance, and the deepmud that mired his tanks prompted himto ask that the attack be postponed untilthe next day. Permission was granted,and no further effort at expansion of thebridgehead was made during 13 Septem-ber. The remnants of the 23d ArmoredInfantry Battalion had already begun amarch toward Arnaville and the bridge-head, where they would have partiallyremedied the shortage of infantry. Theywere halted at Onville because of thedecision not to attack. The same enemyshelling that helped discourage GeneralDevine also forced the engineers toabandon bridge construction temporarily.As for American artillery units, theypassed their most inactive day of theoperation, feeling the pinch of theirammunition shortage and firing only2,533 rounds.1

Nevertheless, plans for expanding thebridgehead were being made on 13 Sep-tember. The XX Corps commanderinitiated a reshuffling of units by directingthe 90th Infantry Division to begin takingover a part of the 7th Armored Divisionsector west of Metz in order to permitCCA to prepare for movement into theArnaville fight. This was the first stepin a move which was eventually to release

all of the 7th Armored Division and the2d Infantry combat team for the fightin the south. General Irwin, despite theshortages of men and equipment in the2d Battalion, 11th Infantry, alerted the11th to be prepared to send anotherbattalion into the bridgehead. Mean-while, General Irwin's headquarters is-sued Operations Instructions 13, confirm-ing previous verbal orders and calling,primarily, for movement of the remainderof CCB into the bridgehead. The in-structions also ordered a subsequentattack by the combat command to seizeMardigny, to the southeast of Arry, andby the 3d Battalion, 10th Infantry, tocapture Hill 396. The day passed with-out significant developments on theground except at the bridge site.2

Impasse on 14 September

The morning of 14 September broughtmore rain, and attempted movement ofarmored vehicles produced only furtherchurning of the muddy soil. The pro-posed attempt to expand the bridgeheadto the south and southeast was againpostponed. Although Battery B, 434thArmored Field Artillery Battalion (CCB),crossed the river into the bridgehead,artillery fire was so intense that theremainder of the battalion stayed in itspositions west of Arnaville. Just afterdark, the 23d Armored Infantry Bat-talion, still not wholly reconstituted afterits Dornot battle, crossed to join the tanksof the 31st Tank Battalion. For thebattered 10th Infantry in its positionsatop Hills 370, 369, and 386 there was

1 This section based on the following: ArnavilleArtillery; Moselle River Crossing; Tenth Infantry;10th Inf, CCB, 31st Tk Bn, 735th Tk Bn, AAR's,Sep 44; 10th Inf Unit Jnl, 13 Sep 44; Ltr, Col Shipleyto Hist Div; Interv with Col Breckinridge.

2 Irwin Diary; General Notes on Arnaville opera-tions; 10th Inf and 11th Inf Unit Jnls, 13 Sep 44; 5thDiv G-3 Jnl, 13 Sep 44; XX Corps AAR, Sep 44;Moselle River Crossing.

RIVER GROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 89

some encouragement with the arrival of300 infantry replacements, includingtwenty-five inexperienced officers; butthese men were going to forward bat-talions where battle fatigue had becomea serious problem. When one soldier,a veteran of all the division's combat, hadhis carbine shot from his hand and hisclosest friend killed by a shell which fellnear his foxhole, he jumped up screamingand ran toward the enemy lines. He wascaught by a fellow soldier but had to beknocked unconscious before he could bequieted. Evacuated, he could not re-member what he had done.

Enemy activity against the forwardbattalions consisted of continued shellingand occasional small reconnaissance pa-trols that harassed the fatigued Americansbut were readily driven off. One suchpatrol was repulsed in an effort to goaround the left flank of Company B, 11thInfantry, at Corny by swimming theriver.

In early morning two platoons ofCompany C, 11th Infantry, relieved theReconnaissance and Ammunition andPioneer Platoons (3d Battalion, 11thInfantry) in the line between CompaniesL and B on the bridgehead's north flank.Then, in the afternoon, two platoons ofCompany L staged a raid on the baldcrest of Hill 325 on the Côte de Faye,driving off an enemy defensive force ofabout twenty men who had been dug inand were supported by machine guns.Some twenty minutes later the sameGermans counterattacked, but all wereeither killed or wounded. A larger enemygroup counterattacked from the left flankabout ten minutes later. Inasmuch asthe Company L attack had been intendedmerely as a raid to discover the enemypositions and the bare hill could be con-

trolled by fire, the two rifle platoonswere ordered to withdraw to their posi-tions on the lower southeastern slopes ofthe hill.

The 5th Reconnaissance Troop, whichhad crossed the day before and failed tocomplete its mission of patrolling southalong the east bank of the river, triedagain on 14 September and sent a patrolthrough Arry without enemy oppositionexcept for artillery fire. Pushing outalong the Arry-Lorry road, the patrolencountered an enemy pillbox. Twoenemy soldiers were talked into comingout of the pillbox and surrendering;eighteen remained inside, and heavymortar fire from beyond the hill forcedthe patrol to withdraw. Although Arrywas still free of enemy, once again theAmericans failed to occupy it.

On this date XX Corps issued a newfield order that instructed the 5th Divi-sion to expand its bridgehead and con-tinue the attack to capture Metz, whilethe 7th Armored Division was to crossinto the bridgehead and make a swingingmovement around the right flank throughMardigny. The armor was to force ahook around Metz from the southeastwhile the 5th Infantry Division attackedalmost due north against the city. Al-ready relief of elements of the 7th Ar-mored had been started west of Metz bythe 90th Division and eventually the 2dInfantry was to be returned to the 5thDivision. But for the time being CCB'sattachment to the 5th Division remainedin force.

Although the weather began to im-prove during the afternoon of 14 Sep-tember, a second delay in the attack wasgranted to permit regrouping and toallow further preparations. Regardlessof weather, the attack was to be launched

90 THREE BATTLES

the next morning, 15 September. Theoriginal 5th Division attack plan had tobe altered somewhat when XX Corpsprotested that it was not ambitiousenough to meet the orders assigned thedivision. As finally decided, CCB wasto pass through Arry to capture Mardignyand subsequently to move northeast totake the village of Marieulles; the 3dBattalion, 10th Infantry, was to captureHill 396; and the remainder of the di-vision was to build up on a line ofdeparture for continuation of the attackon Metz. This line ran from north ofCorny east and southeast to Marieulles,but no actual movement toward the linewas made on the first day of theattack.3

Attack in the Fog—15 September

The morning of 15 September wascloudy, and the bridgehead area wascovered with a heavy ground fog so densethat visibility was often reduced to be-tween ten and fifteen feet. Elements ofCCB began moving from their assemblyarea at 0903, and, despite the fog, thethrice-delayed attack to expand thebridgehead jumped off toward the south.(Map 7)

For the attack CCB had been dividedinto two forces. Force I, under ColonelErlenbusch, consisted of the 31st TankBattalion (less Companies A and D);

Company B, 23d Armored Infantry Bat-talion; and Battery B, 434th ArmoredField Artillery Battalion. It was to passthrough Arry, capture Hill 385 to thesouth of Arry, then move on to take Hill400 in the Bois le Comte, and be preparedto capture Lorry and Mardigny on order.Force II, under Lt. Col. William H. G.Fuller, consisted of Company A, 31stTank Battalion; the 23d Armored Infan-try Battalion (less Company B); and the434th Armored Field Artillery Battalion(less Battery B). Its mission was toattack south down the main Metz-Pont-à-Mousson highway to capture the villageof Vittonville. The two forces were thento tie in at a trail junction on the southernnose of Hill 400 southwest of Mardigny.

Initially CCB's Company B, 33d Ar-mored Engineer Battalion, was not to bebroken into attachments but held in theoriginal bridgehead assembly area withCompany D, 31st Tank Battalion, as thecombat command reserve.4 Likewise,Company B, 814th Tank Destroyer Bat-talion, was initially to remain in theoriginal bridgehead area and providefire support on call. Except for BatteryB, which had already crossed the riverand was to fire from positions within thebridgehead, the 434th Armored FieldArtillery Battalion was to support theattack from firing positions on the west-bank hills south of Arnaville. Additionalsupport was to be provided by 5thDivision and corps artillery units. Forthirty minutes before H Hour, all themedium and heavy artillery was todirect counterbattery fire against locatedand suspected enemy artillery positions.Thereafter counterbattery fire would be

3 This section based on the following sources:CCB, 7th Armd Div, 5th Div, 434th Armd FA Bn,10th Inf, 11th Inf, AAR's, Sep 44; 7th Armd Divand 5th Div G-3 Jnls and Files, Sep 44; Tenth Infantry;Moselle River Crossing; General Notes on Arnavilleoperations; Combat Interv 38 with Birdsong, Simp-son-Lynch-Lathrop. See XX Corps FO 11; 5thDiv FO 9; 5th Div Telephone Jnl; 5th Div OpnsInstructions 14. All four in 5th Div G-3 Jnl File,14 Sep 44.

4 Records fail to show when either of these unitscrossed into the bridgehead.

92 THREE BATTLES

continued by the 203d Field ArtilleryGroup. From H Hour to H plus fif-teen minutes, concentrations were tobe fired along Hill 385, and on othercritical terrain features in the immediatearea, including Hill 396, objective of the3d Battalion, 10th Infantry. Concen-trations were then to be shifted to Hill400 and the Bois le Comte from H plusfifteen to H plus thirty. Harassing fireon Lorry, Mardigny, and Vittonville wasto be continued at intervals from thirtyminutes before H Hour until H plusthirty. The line of departure for theattack was to be an east-west line fromArry to the river, and the hour of attack0900.5

By 0915 Force I, led by the tanks ofCompany C with Company B, 31st TankBattalion, and the infantry of CompanyB, 23d Armored Infantry Battalion, fol-lowing, had inched its way through thefog into Arry. Once past the town, thecolumn began to encounter occasionalresistance from small enemy groups, butthese appeared eager to surrender whenpressed. The main difficulty was stillwith fog and mud. A number of prison-ers had been taken by the time the firstobjective, Hill 385, was reached. At1030 the head of the column was on thesecond objective, Hill 400, in the Bois leComte, and by the time the sun began tobreak through, shortly before noon, theremainder of Force I had moved forwardand begun to consolidate its positions inpreparation for attack on Lorry, Mar-digny, and Marieulles.

Meanwhile Force II had proceeded

south along the main east-bank high-way toward Vittonville. Initially a dis-mounted infantry attack, Force II'sadvance was led by Company A, 23dArmored Infantry Battalion, supportedby Company A, 31st Tank Battalion.By 1225 the leading elements, hamperedat first by the fog and later by time-consuming ground opposition, includingsmall arms and mortar fire, had pro-gressed no farther than a point due east ofthe west-bank town of Pagny. Appar-ently in an effort to speed the attack inview of the success of Force I, the tankspassed through the infantry; but still theattack moved slowly. It was not untilabout 1600 that the tanks and infantryhalted on the northern edge of Vittonvilleto permit supporting artillery to fire apreparation against the town. In anhour and a half Vittonville was secured.The attack had cost Force II four menkilled and five missing.

A confusion in orders delayed Force I'sattack against Mardigny, and Lorry andMarieulles were left to be taken the nextday. Force I was ordered at 1510 toprepare to attack Mardigny, but beforea movement order was received CCBreverted to control of the 7th ArmoredDivision. At 1740 Force I was told toremain on Hill 400 until relieved byelements of the 5th Division, whereuponForce I was to capture Mardigny. At1845 this order was negated by anotherordering the immediate capture of Mar-digny. This time Company C, 31stTank Battalion, accompanied by a pla-toon of Company B, 23d Armored Infan-try Battalion, moved out in the attack.Against only token ground opposition,Mardigny was captured and outpostedby 2045. The remainder of Force I heldfor the night on Hill 400 in the Bois le

5 CCB, 31st Tk Bn, 434th Armd FA Bn, 10th Inf,AAR's, Sep 44; 10th Inf Unit Jnl, 15 Sep 44; CCBUnit Jnl and File, 15 Sep 44; Moselle River Crossing;Interv with Otto.

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 93

Comte and was relieved early the nextmorning by elements of the 5th Division.6

Objective—Hill 396

In conjunction with CCB's attack tothe south, the 3d Battalion, 10th Infantry,supported by Companies B and C, 735thTank Battalion, was ordered to captureHill 396. This was the dominant terrainfeature in the vicinity of the bridgehead,rising east of the 1st Battalion's long-heldpositions on Hill 386. From Hill 396one could observe the entire bridgeheadand on clear days see as far north asMetz.

Scheduled to begin at 0900, like theCCB attack, the 3d Battalion's attackwas to follow an artillery barrage begin-ning at 0830 against Hill 396. Thebarrage was to shift later to enemy townsbeyond the first hill mass. At first, thetwo tank companies were to lead, Com-pany B, 735th Tank Battalion, on theleft and Company C, 735th, on the right.Close behind the left tank company wasto be Company L, 10th Infantry, andbehind the right tank company, Com-pany K. While the two left companiesadvanced through the 1st Battalion lineson Hill 386 in order to take advantage ofsome woods cover, the two right com-panies were to enter Arry and followinitially the Arry-Lorry road to a trailthat branched to the northeast towardthe objective, Hill 396. Company I,10th Infantry, was to move northeastfrom the friendly positions on Hill 386and block to the north in a wooded draw

which separated Hill 386 from Hill 396,a logical avenue for enemy counterattack.

Despite heavy ground fog and muddyfooting, the attack moved off on time.On the right, the tanks of Company C,under Capt. Floyd R. Miller, followedby the infantry of Company K, passedthrough Arry by 0930. Moving alongthe Arry-Lorry road toward the trailthey were to follow to the objective, thetanks encountered a barricade across theroad and reported to Major Shipley, the3d Battalion commander, that they couldnot pass. An exchange of messages fol-lowed between the tankers, Major Ship-ley, and the regimental command post,in which the infantry commanders ex-pressed doubt about the impregnability ofthe barricade. At 1025 the tanks hadnot yet moved forward, and Colonel Bellordered the 3d Battalion to continue itsattack without them.7

As the tanks had first moved out, the3d Battalion's two assault companies hadfollowed closely. When the right tankcompany halted at the barricade, heavyenemy shelling centered to the rear ofthe tanks, catching the infantry in theopen and causing heavy casualties andconfusion, particularly in Company K.By the time the companies had reorgan-ized, the value of the preliminary artillerybarrage against Hill 396 had been lost,and Lieutenant Dutko, the 1st Battalionartillery observer, had another barragefired against the hill. The assault began.

On the left, 1st Lt. Robert Brown'sCompany B tanks preceded the infantryby approximately 300 yards. The ad-

6 CCB, 31st Tk Bn, 23d Armd Inf Bn, 434th ArmdFA Bn, AAR's, Sep 44; 10th Inf Unit Jnl, 15 Sep 44;Moselle River Crossing; General Notes on Arnavilleoperations.

7 10th Inf Unit Jnl, 15 Sep 44; Ltr, Col Bell toHist Div. Company C, 735th Tank Battalion, hadhabitually worked with the 11th Infantry whileCompany B had worked with the 10th Infantry.This was Company C's first combat experience withthe 10th Infantry.

94 THREE BATTLES

vance moved without incident until itreached the ruins of the barrack-typebuildings to the 1st Battalion's left front,which had housed a radar station andhad served as a base for previous enemycounterattacks against Hill 386. Therethe Americans overcame token oppositionby second-rate troops, thirty of whomsoon surrendered, and the attack movedon toward the crest of the objective.Meeting fire from enemy pillboxes whichhad evidently been constructed for train-ing by the Metz military schools, thetanks fired to button up the defenses asthe infantry stormed them. When thearmor at one point got too far ahead ofthe infantry, one tank herded a group ofprisoners back toward the advancinginfantry while the others waited for thefoot soldiers to catch up. By 1330, bothCompany L's infantry and Company B'stanks (except three that had mired onthe muddy slopes of the hill) were firmlyestablished on the objective.

On the right, the attack had gone moreslowly. Although Company K plannedto advance without tank support, theCompany C platoon of 1st Lt. James C.Blanchard, Jr., was ready to join it.But two of Lieutenant Blanchard's tanksmired early on the muddy slopes, andthe others wandered off in the fog in thedirection of Lorry, not to rejoin CompanyK's infantry until the objective had beentaken. It was not until about 1500 thatCompany K was established on its por-tion of the hill. Later, two Americantanks on the hill were damaged by enemyartillery fire; after Lieutenant Blanch-ard's tank arrived, an armor-piercinground from an enemy tank or antitankgun knocked it out as well.

Hill 396, the dominant terrain featurein the vicinity of the bridgehead, was at

last in American hands. Perhaps be-cause artillery missions were fired almostcontinuously against reported enemyassembly in woods northeast of the hill,expected German counterblows did notdevelop immediately on the ground.The enemy did react during the nightand the next day with obviously pre-planned artillery concentrations. By thistime Companies K and L had dug indeeply on the bald forward crest of thehill and suffered only minor casualties.The battalion headquarters was set up inthe sole remaining barrack-type building,and Company I reorganized its blockingposition in the draw between Hills 386and 396 to form a reserve for the 3dBattalion's defense. The tanks of Com-pany C, 735th Tank Battalion, were with-drawn to an assembly area near Arry,and Company B's tanks remained inreserve with Company I.

Not until early morning on 17 Sep-tember did the Germans launch theircounterblow on the ground, hitting Com-pany L from the northeast. Here forthe first time in the Arnaville bridgeheadarea the Germans used troops fromthe Metz military schools. Coming inthrough the darkness, a number of enemytroops succeeded in moving into Com-pany L's positions. Close-in fightingresulted, and the battalion command postwas threatened before Major Shipleycommitted his reserve company, Com-pany I, and one platoon of Company B,735th Tank Battalion. An attack by thereserve units up the northwest side of thehill restored the situation.8

8 Moselle River Crossing; General Notes on Arna-ville operations; Combat Interv 38 with Shipley-McCluskey-Bradley-Baughman; Tenth Infantry; 10thInf Unit Jnl, 15 Sep 44; 10th Inf, 735th Tk Bn, 46thFA Bn, AAR's, Sep 44; Ltr, Col Bell to Hist Div;Ltr, Col Shipley to Hist Div; Ltr, Lt Blanchard to

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 95

The Bridgehead Is Secure

With a firm northern anchor in Corny,southern anchors in Mardigny and Vit-tonville, possession of the vicinity's domi-nant terrain features, Hill 396 and Hill400, and two substantial bridges pro-viding ready access, the Arnaville bridge-head could be considered secure. Fivedays of bitter fighting had brought XXCorps its first successful Moselle crossingat a cost to the 10th Infantry Regimentalone of approximately twenty-five offi-cers and 700 men. The ill-fated Dornotcrossing, which had cost the 11th InfantryRegiment and the 23d Armored InfantryBattalion almost as many casualties, hadbeen an important element in the 10thInfantry's success, for it had held theenemy's attention during the initialstages of the Arnaville crossing.

After the successful attacks of the 3dBattalion, 10th Infantry, and CCB on 15September, the bridgehead was strength-ened as relief of 7th Armored Divisionunits to the northwest was continued and

elements of CCR began crossing theArnaville bridges. On 16 SeptemberCCA began to cross, and the 2d Infantryalso began to move in. The 11th Infan-try, relieving its 1st Battalion (less Com-panies B and C, plus Companies I andK) in the defense north of Dornot withthe reconstituted 2d Battalion, sent the1st Battalion into the bridgehead theafternoon of 16 September and assumedcommand of the original bridgeheadarea.

The attacks to break out of the bridge-head and capture Metz began again inearly morning, 16 September, with thecapture of Lorry by elements of CCB.Enemy guns were still able to shell thebridgehead area, including the bridgesites, and some of the fiercest fightingeither the 5th Infantry or 7th ArmoredDivision was to see in World War IIremained before Metz itself fell. Notuntil 22 November did the battle forMetz, which had seen its real beginningin the river crossings at Dornot and Arna-ville, come to a close with the formalcessation of hostilities and the fall of thecity. Four of the major forts still heldout and it was not until 8 December thatthe last of them, Fort Driant, capitulated.9

Hist Div; Interv with Shipley and Hays; Ltr, MajCharles W. McClean (formerly S-3, 3d Bn, 10thInf), to Col Shipley, 15 Apr 50, copy in OCMH filesthrough courtesy of Col Shipley; Sum of Sit Rpt(telephoned), First Army, 1835, 17 Sep 44, found inArmy Group G KTB 2, Anlagen 1.IX.-30.IX.44.

9 For an account of this later action, see Cole, TheLorraine Campaign, Chs. III, VI, VIII, and IX.

Order of Battle

5th Infantry Division

Headquarters, 5th Infantry DivisionHeadquarters, Special Troops

Headquarters Company705th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company5th Quartermaster Company5th Signal CompanyMilitary Police Platoon

5th Infantry Division Band5th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, Mechanized7th Engineer Combat Battalion (less Companies A, B, and C)5th Division Artillery, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery

21st Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. Howitzer)5th Medical Battalion (less Companies A, B, and C)2d Regimental Combat Team (attached to 7th Armored Division)

2d Infantry Regiment50th Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. Howitzer)Company A, 7th Engineer Combat BattalionCompany A, 5th Medical Battalion

10th Regimental Combat Team10th Infantry Regiment46th Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. Howitzer)Company B, 7th Engineer Combat BattalionCompany B, 5th Medical Battalion

11th Regimental Combat Team11th Infantry Regiment19th Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. Howitzer)Company C, 7th Engineer Combat BattalionCompany C, 5th Medical Battalion

Attached to 5th Division

1103d Engineer Combat Group150th Engineer Combat Battalion160th Engineer Combat Battalion204th Engineer Combat Battalion551st Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion989th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 97

537th Engineer Light Ponton Company623d Engineer Light Equipment Company

84th Chemical (Smoke Generator) CompanyTroop C, 3d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron284th Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. Howitzer)449th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion818th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Self-Propelled)735th Tank Battalion (Medium)Combat Command B, 7th Armored Division

31st Tank Battalion (Medium)23d Armored Infantry Battalion434th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. Howitzer, Self-Propelled)Company B, 814th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Self-Propelled)Company B, 33d Armored Engineer Battalion

In Support of 5th Division

Headquarters, XX Corps Artillery5th Field Artillery Group

695th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. Howitzer, Self-Propelled)558th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. Gun, Self-Propelled)274th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. Howitzer, Self-Propelled)

204th Field Artillery Group177th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. Howitzer)773d Field Artillery Battalion (4.2-inch Gun)943d Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. Howitzer)

33d Field Artillery Brigade203d Field Artillery Group

739th Field Artillery Battalion (8-inch Howitzer)989th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. Gun)999th Field Artillery Battalion (8-inch Howitzer)270th Field Artillery Battalion (240-mm. Howitzer)277th Field Artillery Battalion (240-mm. Howitzer)

Bibliographical Note

Soon after the Arnaville action, 2d Lt.F. M. Ludden, of the 3d Information andHistorical Service, conducted a series ofcombat interviews with the battle partici-pants. One such interview was con-tributed by Capt. Harry A. Morris.These combat interviews, together withpreliminary narratives written by Lieu-tenant Ludden, make up the basic ma-terial from which "River Crossing atArnaville" was constructed. The inter-views are with eleven officers and enlistedmen of the 10th and 11th InfantryRegiments and with unnamed soldiersof the 735th Tank Battalion and the1103d Engineer Combat Group. Thesame file contains also a particularlyvaluable preliminary narrative entitledEngineer Operations at Arnaville, anarrative by Lt. Col. Levin B. Cotting-ham entitled Employment of a SmokeGenerator Company in an Assault Cross-ing of the Moselle River, and preliminarynotes by Lieutenant Ludden on theArnaville crossing.

The 10th and 11th Infantry preservednot only their regimental journals butseveral battalion journals, containingmessages and orders. The 5th DivisionG-3 Journal includes occasional tran-scripts of telephone conversations whichreveal the tense atmosphere that some-times prevailed. The After Action Re-ports, compiled at the close of the month,are susceptible, as are most such reports,to error and the palliative powers ofhindsight. A notable exception is theAfter Action Report of the 551st EngineerHeavy Ponton Battalion, which gives

detailed and apparently reliable informa-tion on bridge construction. After Ac-tion Reports, unit journals, and journalfiles of all units involved, from battalionthrough corps, were examined. All suchunit records, as well as the combat inter-views, are in possession of the HistoricalRecords Section, Office of the AdjutantGeneral. Company morning reports,which usually contain little informationthat is not more readily available else-where, were examined to determine thecasualties in the Dornot battle. Photo-static copies of these are filed with theOffice of the Chief of Military History(formerly the Historical Division, SpecialStaff, U. S. Army).

A preliminary study by Dr. Paul W.Pritchard for the Historical Section,Office of the Chief of the Chemical Corps,was the basic document for constructingthe story of the 84th Chemical (SmokeGenerator) Company. This study isgenerally excellent, despite a slight tend-ency to overemphasize the importance ofthe screening operations. Another valu-able source on this subject is an articleby Colonel Cottingham, entitled "SmokeOver the Moselle" and published in TheInfantry Journal.

Primary source for air material wasthe Operations File of the XIX TacticalAir Command. Air records are in theHistorical Archives, Historical Division,Air University Library, Maxwell AirForce Base, Alabama.

A number of published unit historiesexist but have been used in this studyonly as secondary sources. These his-

RIVER CROSSING AT ARNAVILLE 99

tories, apparently prepared from Lieu-tenant Ludden's combat interviews andfrom unit records, are unofficial and havea tendency to color the action, at timesto the point of error in basic fact. TheThird U. S. Army After Action Report,a work about which such criticism is notapplicable, is useful for backgroundinformation.

Because the combat interviews andunit records left a number of major gapsin details of the action, the author con-ducted several postwar interviews andextensive correspondence with survivingparticipants. The information thus elic-ited proved valuable, especially in pre-senting the confused command picturein the vicinity of Dornot on 7-8 Septem-ber. In no instance, however, has thehistorian accepted postwar material asrefutation of any fact which can beestablished from contemporary records.These letters and interviews have beenfiled with the OCMH.

Sources for German material werepostwar manuscripts prepared by cap-tured German officers; letters, orders,and reports found in an annex to theKTB (War Diary) of Army Group G; anda detailed account of the Dornot actionfound in war diary pages constitutingpart of a miscellaneous file of the 2dBattalion, 37th SS Panzer Grenadier Regi-ment. The postwar manuscripts, pre-pared under the direction of the Historical

Section, U. S. Forces, ETO, and depend-ing almost entirely on the unaidedmemories of their writers, add immeas-urably to knowledge of the enemyoperations. MS # B-042 (Krause), ofparticular value in preparing this s tudy,is detailed and apparently accurate andunbiased. The annexes to the KTB ofArmy Group G are at a level of commandtoo high to be of much value in a smallunit account such as this, but in someinstances they were the only Germandocumentary source available. Becausefew enemy records at a small unit levelsurvived the war, the war diary pages ofthe 2d Battalion, 37th SS Panzer GrenadierRegiment, constitute an almost uniquesource. This source was used extensivelyto provide an enemy account of theDornot action which is admittedly outof focus with the level of narration of theenemy story in the Arnaville battle, butits intrinsic interest and value were con-sidered sufficient to warrant such irregu-larity. German manuscripts are to befound in the OCMH files, and officialGerman records are in the German Mili-tary Documents Section, DepartmentalRecords Branch, Office of the AdjutantGeneral. Additional material on theenemy side was obtained from G-2Journals and files of the 5th Infantry and7th Armored Divisions. Prisoner of warreports, when checked against enemymaterials, proved generally accurate.

BREAK-THROUGH ATMONTE ALTUZZO

the story of the 338th In-

fantry Regiment, 85th In-

fantry Division, in the

penetration of the Gothic

Line in Italy.

by SIDNEY T. MATHEWS

CHAPTER I

Developing the Gothic Line(10-13 September)

This is the story of an American break-through in the mountains of Italy. Itdescribes the main effort of an army thatnumbered 262,000 troops and includedten combat divisions. Of this mightyforce, less than a thousand men—onethird of 1 percent—made the principalattack. The assault force that actuallyclosed with the enemy and bore thebrunt of the fighting at the critical pointwas sometimes as small as a single platoonand never larger at any one time thantwo rifle companies of some 350 men.When a prize fighter strikes a blow againsthis opponent, his fist alone makes con-tact. So it is with the main effort of amodern military force: a fraction of itsbulk acts as the fist and delivers the punchin the name of the entire army.

On 10 September 1944, the II Corpsof the Fifth United States Army launchedan attack across the Sieve River in aneffort to reach the next major Germandefenses, the formidable Gothic Linestretching east-west across 170 miles ofthe rugged North Apennine Mountains.1

(Map III) For almost a year the Ger-mans had been using forced labor to

reinforce the natural defensive strengthof the mountains with pillboxes, minefields, and tank barriers, particularlyalong the limited number of mountainroads. Because terrain along north-south Highway 65 through the Futa Passdid not afford an effective natural barrier,some of the strongest positions had beenconcentrated in front of it.

Since the British Eighth Army hadalready broken through a portion of theGothic Line along the Adriatic coast, theFifth Army's attack was designed tosupplement and exploit the British ad-vance. It was originally scheduled tobe launched against the Futa Pass; whenintelligence information revealed theGerman strength there, the main FifthArmy effort by the II Corps on 10 Sep-tember was directed instead at il GiogoPass, on Highway 6524, seven milessoutheast of the Futa Pass. A penetra-tion through the Giogo Pass could beexpected to outflank the enemy strengthat the Futa Pass.2

It was recognized that any successfulattack against the Giogo Pass would

1 The name "Gothic Line" (Gotenstellung), used bythe Germans throughout the first half of 1944, waschanged to "Green Line" when the Allies began tothreaten the position. The former designation onlywill be used herein.

2 AAI Opns Order 3, 16 Aug 44, Annex B fromCapt John Bowditch, Fifth Army History, Pt. VII(Washington, 1947), pp. 201-04; II Corps FO 23,5 Sep 44, Fifth Army G-3 Jnl Files, Sep 44. Thisvolume of the Fifth Army History contains an excellentdescription of the North Apennines Campaign,within the limits of documents available during thewar.

104 THREE BATTLES

require capture of the dominant terrainfeatures on either side of Highway 6524:the Monticelli hill mass on the west (left)and Monte Altuzzo on the east (right).(Map IV) The 91st Infantry Division(Maj. Gen. William G. Livesay), spear-heading the American drive, was sched-uled to reach the outpost line in front ofthese two mountains, there to be relievedpartially by the 85th Infantry Division,under the command of Maj. Gen. JohnB. Coulter, which was then to make themain effort on a narrow front against thedominating peak, Monte Altuzzo. The91st Division was to co-ordinate by takingMonticelli while one of its regiments andthe 34th Infantry Division made holdingattacks farther west. Armor concentra-tions and heavy air action around theFuta Pass were designed to deceive theenemy into thinking the main attack wasto be launched there, but II Corps artil-lery was to give maximum support to theeffort at the Giogo Pass.3

The 363d Infantry of the 91st Divisioncrossed the Sieve River and advanced tothe Gothic Line against relatively lightGerman resistance. On the night of 11September the regiment found itself ap-proximately 2,000 yards south of Monti-celli and Monte Altuzzo.4 Since stiffopposition had failed to develop, the IICorps commander, Maj. Gen. GeoffreyKeyes, kept the 85th Division in reserveand ordered the 91st Division to continueits attack the next morning (12 Septem-

ber). It was to advance as far as possibletoward the two dominating peaks.5

The Terrain and the Enemy

The German defense of the Giogo Passsector of the Gothic Line was based on agroup of 3,000-foot peaks, including.Monte Altuzzo and Monticelli, whichflanked either side of the pass. Fromthese peaks eroding streams had cutnorth-south spurs and ridges parallel tothe planned axis of advance, dividing theterrain into compartments and pocketsthat provided excellent defensive loca--tions. Heavy stands of pine trees coveredthe northwest slopes of Monte Altuzzoand the area west of the pass, and oaktrees grew on the lower slopes of MonteVerruca (east of Monte Altuzzo). Else-where the ridges were overlaid with rockysoil, low brush, or grass, sparsely inter-spersed with scattered trees. What littleconcealment there was for an attackingforce came from the unevenness of theslopes; and the high peaks gave the de-fenders observation for miles to the south.

The only possible route for an armoredattack against the Giogo Pass was themain road, Highway 6524, which wasnarrow, full of sharp turns, and flankedby the bare slopes of Monticelli and byMonte Altuzzo. Since antitank weaponscould easily bring effective fire on thehighway, enemy engineers had devotedmost of their efforts to developing stronginfantry positions and had constructedheavy pillboxes and bunkers on the ad-jacent mountains. Some positions hadbeen blasted from solid rock; others hadbeen dug into the ground and built ofheavy logs. In many positions, machine

3 II Corps FO 23, 5 Sep 44.4 1st Lt Ralph E. Strootman, 363d Inf Unit

History, MS, Ch. III, "The Gothic Line" (hereaftercited as Strootman MS). Lt Strootman wrote thisstudy in early 1944. Unofficial Notes of Capt RobertF. Muller, S-3, 3d Bn, 363d Inf (hereafter cited asMuller Notes). Capt Muller made these notesduring the Gothic Line battles.

5 91st Div and 85th Div G-3 Jnls, 11-12 Sep 44;II Corps AAR, Sep 44.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 105

guns had been placed for interlockingcross fire, and in a number of cases barbedwire and antipersonnel mines had beenlaid across the approaches. Behind themain firing positions other bunkers,primarily of thick log construction, hadbeen built, generally on the north slopesof the mountains, to house mobile coun-terattack reserves.

Towering above the highway south-west of the pass, the Monticelli hill masswas a long, steep, backbone ridge with aconcave southern slope. East of thehighway, Monte Altuzzo was a highconical peak that rose to 3,037 feet, 181feet above Monticelli, and curved 650yards north-northwest down to the GiogoPass. From Monte Altuzzo's highestpeak, Hill 926, a main north-south ridgeran south 2,500 yards, a wavy, undulatinghill mass with narrow draws cutting itsslopes into uneven arms. Along thismain ridge line were at least sevendistinct hills or knobs, five of them southof Hill 926; from south to north, theywere Hills 578, 624, 782, two unnum-bered knobs which will be called Knobs1 and 2, Hill 926, and another unnum-bered knob which will be known asKnob 3.

Along the entire main ridge south ofHill 926, the ridge line was extremelynarrow, varying in width from one toten yards. North of Hill 782, any ad-vance up the eastern slope toward thecrest, Hill 926, was virtually impossible.Although this slope was not an escarp-ment, the gradient was too steep and therocks were too precipitous. Besides, fromhigher points on the main ridge—fromPian di Giogo, which stretched betweenthe northern slopes of Altuzzo and MonteVerruca to the east, and from the westernarm of Verruca itself—the enemy could

observe and cover with fire any attemptto advance up Altuzzo's eastern slope.On the western side of the mountainbeyond Hill 782 the slope was less pre-cipitous but even more exposed to enemyfire. In this area the Germans had builta main line of resistance (MLR) alongthe upper rim of a huge bowl, formedby the main Altuzzo ridge and a promi-nent spur curving west and southwestfrom Hill 926, which extended 200 yardsnorth and 500 yards west of Hill 782.The prepared positions of this line ranfrom Knob 2, about 250 yards short ofthe crest of the mountain, for 200 yardsnorthwest along a trail which skirted thetop of the bowl to the peak of the westernridge extending 500 yards to the west ofHill 926. On the peak of the westernridge German engineers had blastedbunker positions out of rock. Two bunk-ers covered the bowl, including the slopesof the main ridge north of Hill 782; abouthalfway down the bowl other mutuallysupporting positions could bring fire onthe lower ground around the base of thebowl. Well screened by camouflage,trees, and heavy brush along the upperslopes, the main German positions cov-ered the exposed approaches over thelower slopes of the bowl and along themain ridge line north from Hill 782.Scattered trees, bare rocks, and low brushalong the lower slopes of the bowl offeredscant concealment for attacking troops,and north of Hill 782 the narrowness ofthe ridge line offered no room fordeployment.

About 300 to 500 yards in front of themain line of resistance, the enemy haderected an outpost line on the southwestslopes of Hill 782. Consisting of threelog bunkers and an open zigzag trench,these outer defenses were spaced at

106 THREE BATTLES

irregular intervals and were covered bya weak barrier of barbed wire. Fromthem the Germans could place effectiverifle and machine gun fire in the drawson either side of the mountain and on thelower slopes of the main ridge. Besidesutilizing this outpost line, the Germanshad attempted to canalize any attackagainst Monte Altuzzo by erecting a bandof barbed wire fifteen to twenty yardsdeep across the western ridge of themountain (the west side of the bowl).No wire had been laid across the centraland eastern slopes of the bowl, evidentlybecause the enemy relied on the mutuallysupporting machine gun and rifle posi-tions to beat back assaults.6

Facing the American attack was the4th Parachute Division of the I ParachuteCorps of the Fourteenth Army. Except for asmall nucleus of experienced paratroop-ers who had been combat-schooled atAnzio, most troops in this division wereinexperienced boys with only threemonths' training. The division's re-serves were green troops who had neverfired ball cartridges, so inexperiencedthat the commander of the I ParachuteCorps stated his intention to use thereserves as pack animal drivers.7

The Fourteenth Army as a whole hadsuffered heavy casualties in the Alliedbreakout from the Anzio beachhead andthe pursuit to the Arno River. Althoughthe halt of the Allied offensive at the endof July had given the Germans as well asthe Americans a chance to absorb rein-forcements and equipment, FourteenthArmy's strength was well below that ofthe Fifth U. S. Army. It had beenweakened even further after the BritishEighth Army had launched its earlierAdriatic coast attack and four Germandivisions had been shifted to the TenthArmy on the east to meet this threat. Atno more than half strength, each divisionleft in the Fourteenth Army held a long frontaveraging ten miles, and the army'sreserves were reduced to two battalionsof the Grenadier Lehr Brigade.8

Despite the shortage of front-line troopsand reserves, the enemy intended to holdthe Gothic Line as long as his limitedresources would permit. On 8 Septem-ber each soldier in the 12th ParachuteRegiment, 4th Parachute Division, had re-ceived orders that " . . . the position is tobe held to the last man and the lastbullet even if the enemy breaks throughon all sides as well as against strongestartillery or mortar fire. Only on au-

6 Notes of numerous terrain reconnaissances of theAltuzzo and Giogo Pass areas by the author, includingthose with the following: Lt Col Willis O. Jacksonand his three rifle company comdrs, Capts Robert A.King, Maurice E. Peabody, Jr., and Redding C.Souder, Jr.; several plat ldrs and plat sgts; CaptPeabody and several of his NCO's; 2d Lt WilliamA. Thompson and enlisted survivors of Co C, 338thInf. (Ranks given for personnel interviewed arethose held at the time of the interview. Ranks givenin the text and index are those held at the time ofthe action. Detailed information concerning terrainreconnaissances and combat interviews may be foundin the Bibliographical Note.)

7 Entry of 13 Sep 44, Armeeoberkommando 14, Kriegs-tagebuch Nr. 4 (War Diary 4 of Headquarters FourteenthArmy), 1.VII.-30.IX.44 (hereafter cited as Fourteenth

Army KTB 4). German information used in thisaccount, except that taken from intelligence files,is based primarily on this war diary.

8 Entries of 10-13 Sep 44, Fourteenth Army KTB 4;338th Inf and 85th Div Intel Sums, IPW Rpts, andmisc Intel Rpts, Sep 44; MID, The German Opera-tion at Anzio, filed in OCMH. This last publicationis based on earlier volumes of the Fourteenth Army wardiary.

The so-called Lehr units in the German Army werecomposed of picked men and were originally used todemonstrate tactics at service schools in the zone ofinterior. Because of the growing manpower shortage,however, many of these units were transferred intactto active theaters and used in combat. Cf. ArtilleryLehr Regiment.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 107

thority of the company commander maythe position be abandoned."9

The 363d Infantry Attacks

The 91st Division launched its 12 Sep-tember attack in the early morning withthe 363d Infantry making the main effortup Highway 6524 to capture Monticelliand Monte Altuzzo. While the 1st Bat-talion kept pressure on the enemy on theleft flank, the 3d Battalion attempted toseize the two objectives. Company Kpushed toward Monticelli; Company Itoward Fonte Fredda along the highwaybetween the two mountains; and Com-pany L toward Monte Altuzzo.

German resistance stiffened, and nei-ther of the division's attacking regimentsgot farther than the enemy's outpostpositions.10 The II Corps commander,General Keyes, thereupon ordered hisoriginal plan for a co-ordinated attackto go into effect at 0600 the next morning.While the 34th Division on the left wingand the 91st Division in the center keptpressure on the enemy, the 85th Division,taking over the attack zone east of High-way 6524, would make the main effort toseize Monte Altuzzo and the Giogo Pass.The weight of the 91st Division attackwas to fall against Monticelli along thewest side of Highway 6524. GeneralKeyes ordered the 91st Division to con-tinue pressure on the enemy through theday of the 12th and to advance as far aspossible before the 85th Division launchedthe main effort. The II Corps com-mander realized that there would beconfusion when the 85th Division units

passed through the 91st Division beforethe latter was ordered to halt its attack.He believed, however, that uninterruptedpressure against the enemy was necessaryuntil the 85th Division took over themain effort.11

Although the 91st Division commanderwas not anxious for the 363d to attackthat night, the 363d Infantry commanderwanted to take Monticelli and MonteAltuzzo and secured division approval tocontinue the operation.12 He orderedhis 3d Battalion to continue the regiment'sprincipal mission. The battalion plannedto jump off again shortly after dark on 12September in a night attack. CompanyI, 363d, was to capture Monticelli; Com-pany L, Monte Altuzzo.13

Again the attack met with little suc-cess. Company I, after making anencouraging early advance, was pushedback to the cluster of houses at l'UomoMorto on Highway 6524.14 CompanyL's commander became confused in thedarkness and led his company by mistaketo the southwestern slopes of MonteVerruca. Some time after midnight heradioed his error to his battalion head-quarters and then moved his company

9 Captured order to soldiers of 12th Pcht Regt (4thPcht Div), 8 Sep 44, 338th Inf S-2 Files.

10 Strootman MS; 91st Div G-3 Jnl, 12 Sep 44;Fifth Army G-3 Jnl File, 12-13 Sep 44.

11 II Corps Opns Instns 23, II Corps G-3 Sup-porting File, Sep 44; Memo, Lt Col Thomas R.McDonald, 85th Div G-3, 12 Sep 44, regarding aconference of G-3's of the 85th Div, 91st Div, andII Corps, in 85th Div G-3 Supporting File, Sep 44;85th Div and 91st Div G-3 Jnls, 12-13 Sep 44; Intervwith Col Robert W. Porter, II Corps DCofS, 30June 50.

12 Interv with Col W. Fulton Magill (formerly CO,363d Inf), Washington, D. C., 5 Jul 49 (hereaftercited as Interv with Magill); Interv with Maj GenWilliam G. Livesay (formerly CG, 91st Inf Div),Fort Knox, Ky., 5 May 50. All interviews in thisstudy were conducted by the author.

13 Interv with Magill; Muller Notes; Combat Intervwith Capt Thomas M. Draney; Strootman MS.

14 Strootman MS; Muller Notes; 91st Div G-3Jnl, 12 Sep 44.

INFANTRYMEN IN FULL FIELD EQUIPMENT advancing toward the Gothic Lineon 10 September 1944.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 109

west. Not long before dawn he reachedHill 578, the lowest knob on the mainAltuzzo ridge line. There again thecompany commander lost his bearings;he reported that he was on Hill 782 andthat the crest of Monte Altuzzo (Hill 926)was the next rise straight ahead. Ac-tually the peak before him, hiding thecrest from his view, was Hill 782. Withorders to push on, Company L moved upthe southern slope of Hill 782 until itsleading platoons reached barbed wiredefenses and received fire from Germanmachine guns in bunkers forming the out-post line of the main line of resistance.Shortly after daylight on 13 September,Company L, after a stiff fire fight, cap-tured six prisoners and silenced threebunkers before heavy artillery, mortar,and machine gun fire halted the attack.15

In taking the three enemy bunkers, thetroops of the 363d Infantry created aconfused situation. Soon after the nightattack had begun, wire communicationsto the 363d's battalions had failed, andat daylight the regiment knew almostnothing of its 3d Battalion's location.Only a half hour before the 85th Divisionwas to launch its attack, the 363d Infan-try reported its Company L on the easternslope of Hill 782 approximately 200 yardsfrom the crest of the hill. Even then theregiment knew nothing of Company L'ssituation.16 The 85th Division's 338thInfantry, scheduled to take over Com-pany L's zone for an 0600 attack and touse the 91st Division's farthest advanceas its line of departure, was thoroughlyconfused by meager, contradictory, and

indefinite reports.17 Thus the II Corpsattack against the Gothic Line began inconfusion.

As Fifth Army drew up to the GothicLine, the Germans deduced from armoredand heavy bombing attacks that theAmericans would make their main attackin the Futa Pass area. To meet thethreat Fourteenth Army on 11 Septembershifted the left flank of the 362d GrenadierDivision to the east and requested ArmyGroup C to hold one regimental group inreadiness for use at Futa Pass. At therisk of straining its west coast defenses,Army Group C announced on 12 Septemberthat it would speed withdrawal of aregimental group from the 16th SS PanzerGrenadier Division for movement to theFuta Pass. The enemy had not yetascertained that the main Americaneffort would be made against the GiogoPass.18

Attack Preparations, 338th Infantry

At approximately 0915, 12 September,Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark, Fifth Armycommander, and General Keyes stoppedat the 338th Infantry command post andtalked briefly with Lt. Col. Willis O.Jackson and Lt. Col. Robert H. Cole,the 1st and 2d Battalion commanders,and Maj. Sherburne J. Heliker, the regi-mental S-3. General Clark told theinfantry commanders: "You had betterget on your hiking shoes. I'm going tothrow you a long forward pass into thePo Valley, and I want you to go get it."19

Such was the long-range importance ofthe Giogo Pass attack.

15 Combat Interv with Draney; Rpt, unidentifiedsoldier, Co L, 363d Inf, in 338th Inf Unit Jnl, 13Sep 44.

16 91st Div G-3 Jnl, 12-13 Sep 44; Combat Intervwith Draney; Interv with Magill.

17 Combat Intervs with the following: Jackson andCapt Thomas M. Quisenberry; 1st Lt Dawson L.Farber, Jr.; Peabody.

18 Entries of 9-12 Sep 44, Fourteenth Army KTB 4.19 Combat Intervs with Cole and with Jackson.

110 THREE BATTLES

About noon on 12 September, theregimental commander of the 338thInfantry, Col. William H. Mikkelsen,went to the 85th Division command post(CP) to receive the attack order.20 Itcalled for the 338th Infantry on the leftto take over part of the 363d Infantryzone for the main effort against MonteAltuzzo. On the right the 339th Infan-try would attack Monte Verruca. Onthe assumption that the main objectivein the Giogo area, Monte Altuzzo, wouldstill be in enemy hands at H Hour, the338th Infantry was to jump off fromwhatever forward positions elements ofthe 91st Division reached during thenight.21

Between one third and one half of the338th Infantry had experienced twomonths of combat against the heavyGustav Line near the Garigliano Riverand in the drive through the mountainsto Rome. Nearly all had at least beenindoctrinated during a ten-day period inAugust with patrols and holding actionalong the Arno River. The regimentthen had been out of the line for severalweeks of rest and training in mountainassaults. During the II Corps advancetoward the Gothic Line, the 338th In-fantry and the other elements of the 85thDivision had moved on the night of 11September by motor convoy across theArno River at Florence and up Highway65 to Vaglia, some ten to twelve milessouth of the 91st Division's front lines.22

Since the 338th had known for severaldays that it would make the main attackagainst Monte Altuzzo, its officers hadinitiated preliminary plans based ondetailed map study. An intelligencesummary had been distributed to thebattalions indicating that, although theenemy had not done as much work onthe Giogo positions as on other parts ofthe Gothic Line, they formed nonethelessa "formidable defense sector." A secondintelligence summary put out with the338th's attack order indicated that theenemy's intentions regarding defense ofthe pass were not yet clear. It alludedoptimistically to the poor quality of enemytroops. From prisoners of war capturedby elements of the 91st Division it hadbeen learned that the 12th Parachute Regi-ment, 4th Parachute Division, was defendingthe area.23

In midafternoon of 12 September Colo-nel Mikkelsen, the 338th commander,issued the regimental attack order. The1st Battalion, commanded by ColonelJackson, was to make the main effort,seizing Hill 926, the crest of MonteAltuzzo. The 2d Battalion, under thecommand of Colonel Cole, was to attackon the left along Highway 6524 to Point770, between Monticelli and MonteAltuzzo. The theory was that pressurealong the highway would assist the maineffort against Monte Altuzzo. In reservethe 3d Battalion, commanded by Maj.Lysle E. Kelley, was to follow the 1st upthe main ridge. All battalions were tomove soon after dark to forward assemblyareas from which they were to launch theattack at 0600 the next morning. Allthree were at full strength, carried normalallowances of equipment and combat

20 Combat Intervs with Mikkelsen and withJackson.

21 85th Div and 91st Div G-3 Jnls, 12 Sep 44; IICorps FO 23, 5 Sep 44; Fifth Army G-3 Jnl Files,Sep 44; Memo, Col McDonald, regarding G-3 con-ference, 85th Div G-3 Supporting File, Sep 44.

22 Combat Intervs with all surviving offs and EM,1st Bn, 338th Inf; 1st Bn, 2d Bn, 3d Bn, 338th Inf,Unit Jnls, Sep 44; 338th Inf Unit Jnl, Sep 44; 85thDiv G-3 Jnl, 11-12 Sep 44.

23 S-2 Memo on the Giogo Pass Defenses, 7 Sep 44,Annex to 338th Inf FO 3, 10 Sep 44.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 111

loads of ammunition, and could bereinforced from a regimental replacementpool of 250 men.24

The artillery plan for the attack in-volved use of the 329th Field ArtilleryBattalion (105-mm. howitzers) for direct-support fires on call from the 338thInfantry. In general support of theentire division were to be two other fieldartillery battalions of the 85th Division,the 328th (105-mm. howitzers), preparedto mass fires on call in either of the 85thDivision regimental sectors, and the 403d(155-mm. howitzers) for precision anddestruction fires and for long-rangeneutralization and harassing missions inthe division zone. (The remaining bat-talion of 85th Division artillery was indirect support of the 339th Infantry.)Reinforcing fires would be provided bythe 752d Tank Battalion (Medium) andthe 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion(Self-Propelled), which had also themission of providing antimechanized de-fense. Also in general support of the85th Division was to be the 178th FieldArtillery Group, which included three155-mm. howitzer battalions and one4.5-inch gun battalion. For long-rangecounterbattery fire and especially forknocking out heavy enemy fortifications,the 423d Field Artillery Group, consistingof two battalions (less one section) of240-mm. howitzers, three sections of8-inch guns, and two battalions of 155-mm. guns, was to provide general support

along the entire II Corps front. On 11September the long-range artillery hadmoved into position in the vicinity ofVaglia and the medium-range corpsartillery and the 85th Division artilleryto positions near the Sieve River. Maxi-mum fire was to be placed on known andsuspected enemy fortifications in theattack zone; and general support bat-talions, in addition to maintaining de-structive fires on enemy defenses, were toplace fire on roads and other routes ofentry into the area behind Monte Altuzzoto harass movement of enemy suppliesand reserves. No plans were madeinitially for a preparatory barrage.25

During the afternoon of 12 Septemberboth commanders of the 338th Infantry'sattacking battalions reconnoitered theforward area. Colonel Jackson, 1st Bat-talion commander, and Capt. ThomasM. Quisenberry, his operations officer,went forward by jeep at 1730 to select afinal assembly area, make a reconnais-sance, and secure information from the3d Battalion, 363d Infantry, whose Com-pany L was in the zone the 1st Battalionwas to take over the next morning. Be-fore leaving his command, Colonel Jack-son told his executive officer to start hiscompanies marching north at 1800 onthe road to Scarperia; he would meet thebattalion later and guide it to a finalassembly area.

Arriving at the command post of the3d Battalion, 363d Infantry, about 200yards north of the village of Ponzalla,Colonel Jackson found the situation per-plexing. The commander of the 3d

24 Combat Intervs with Jackson, Cole, and Mikkel-sen, and postwar interv with Kelley; 1st Bn, 2d Bn,3d Bn, 338th Inf, AAR's, and 338th Inf AAR, Sep 44.Although the regimental replacement pool was al-ways available during the battle of Monte Altuzzo,the commanders considered it unwise to send replace-ments forward over the exposed terrain or to try tointegrate them into rifle companies during heavyfront-line action. See Ltr, Col Cole to Hist Div,Nov 48, filed in OCMH.

25 85th Div Arty Opns Memo 18, 11 Sep 44, 85thDiv G-3 Supporting File, Sep 44; FA Annex to 85thDiv FO 21, 10 Sep 44, in 85th Div Arty Rpt of Opns,Sep 44; Arty Jnls, II Corps Supporting File, Sep 44;Annex 4 to II Corps FO 23, 5 Sep 44, Fifth ArmyG-3 Jnl Files, Sep 44; Combat Interv with Farber.

112 THREE BATTLES

Battalion, 363d, had not yet been in-formed that the 338th Infantry was topass through his units, and he wasplanning his own attack to secure Monti-celli and Monte Altuzzo. Company L,363d, was scheduled to make a nightattack against Altuzzo, and the battalionoperations officer predicted that the cap-ture of Altuzzo that night would be easyand that Company L would hold theobjective by dawn.

After selecting his forward assemblyarea in the vicinity of Tre Camin Farm-house, about 400 yards east of Ponzalla,Colonel Jackson sent a message for hiscompany commanders to come forward.When they arrived shortly after dark, heoriented them as best he could under thehandicap of the meager information heobtained from the 3d Battalion, 363d,and the lack of opportunity to make adetailed ground reconnaissance. Dark-ness had closed down before he couldsurvey the routes of approach to hisobjective, or even the objective itself,the crest of Monte Altuzzo. Until thenext morning he would have to base hisroute of advance on map study and whathe had seen of the hills from the CP ofthe 3d Battalion, 363d. Jackson still feltthat he could find out from the 363dInfantry at least the route of approachto the objective. At all events there wasthe possibility that the 363d Infantrywould have captured Monte Altuzzobefore dawn.

Jackson's plan of attack was to employa column of companies, A, B, and C,with one heavy machine gun platoon ofCompany D attached to each of the twoleading companies. He adopted thisflexible plan because of incomplete in-formation on the amount of resistancethat would be encountered and because

of uncertainty as to the location of thetroops through which his battalion wasto pass. The six 81-mm. mortars ofCompany D were to support the attackfrom positions on the slopes belowParetaio Farmhouse.26

Confidence in the 338th

There seemed to be an air of confidence—almost overconfidence—in the con-versations of Colonel Jackson and his 1stBattalion company commanders. Basedpartly on the intelligence appreciationby the 338th Infantry that the Germantroops on Monte Altuzzo were inferior,the confidence also stemmed from theoptimism of the 3d Battalion, 363d, whichexpected to take Monte Altuzzo withoutmuch of a struggle before the 338thshould be committed. The overlays ofenemy positions which the officers hadseen showed only a few defenses on MonteAltuzzo, much less formidable than onMonticelli. The fact was that the Ger-man positions on bare Monticelli weremore easily identified than those in thebrush and woods of Monte Altuzzo.None of the overprints showed the heavyfortifications on the peak of Altuzzo'swestern ridge or the ring of positionsaround the Altuzzo bowl. The confi-dence of the 1st Battalion officers wasstrengthened by events at large—dayafter day, newspapers and radio hadblared the news of victories on otherfronts, the British had already crackedthe Gothic Line below Rimini, and TheStars and Stripes had announced that theGerman Army in Italy was finished.27

26 Combat Intervs with Jackson and Quisenberry.27 S-2 Memo on the Giogo Pass Defenses, 338th

Inf, 7 Sep 44, Annex to 338th Inf FO 3, 10 Sep 44;Memo, The Defense of the Giogo Pass, 12 Sep 44,

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 113

During the night of 12-13 September,Colonel Jackson could not help worryingabout the obscure situation of CompanyL, 363d Infantry, which was supposedlyattacking up the Altuzzo ridge. Al-though he kept contact with the 3d Bat-talion, 363d, he was never able to secureaccurate information about Company Land therefore did not know where hisline of departure would be at 0600 thenext morning. His battalion was facedwith passing through a unit which hadnot been located and whose successagainst his own objective was not known.28

The men of the 1st Battalion, 338th,arrived just before midnight at theirforward assembly area in the vicinity ofTre Camin Farmhouse. Loaded downwith full packs and blanket rolls, theyhad marched on foot from Vaglia, twelvemiles up and down hills. Despite theirfatigue, they did not seem depressedabout the impending attack. Few sus-pected that a hard fight lay ahead, andmost shared the confidence of theirofficers. After digging in, the mendropped off to sleep.29

Colonel Cole, commander of the 2dBattalion, which was to assist the 1stBattalion's main effort against MonteAltuzzo by attacking up Highway 6524between Altuzzo and Monticelli, ex-perienced much the same difficulty as

Colonel Jackson. When Colonel Coleissued his attack order around midnight,designating two companies forward, oneon either side of the highway, he stilldid not know his line of departure, forCompany I, 363d Infantry, was stillmaking a night attack toward Monti-celli.30 The 2d Battalion, 338th Infan-try, awaited its morning attack in aforward assembly area, one to two hun-dred yards north of Ponzalla. The 3dBattalion, 338th Infantry, moved upduring the night to an assembly areaabout one mile south of Ponzalla andmade plans to follow in reserve behindthe 1st Battalion up the main Altuzzoridge.31

Preparations of Company A, 338th

As daylight approached on 13 Septem-ber, the men of Company A, 338thInfantry, who were to lead the 1st Battal-ion's movement against Monte Altuzzo,roused from their short sleep at 0430, ateK ration breakfasts, and prepared theirequipment for the attack. Each manfolded his shelter half and blanket intoa U-roll. The new infantry packs wereleft on the hillside behind the ParetaioFarmhouse. Stripped down to the barestgear needed, the men shivered a little.The night air was cool, and the old fieldjackets, olive drab uniforms, and summerunderwear in which they had swelteredthe day before were no proof against thecold morning drafts that swept over thehills.

The company commander, Capt. Rob-ert A. King, the 2d Platoon leader, 2d Lt.

338th Inf S-2 Jnl Files, Sep 44; Defense Overlaysshowing enemy positions in the Giogo Pass area,5-12 Sep 44, in 338th Inf AAR, Sep 44; CombatIntervs with Jackson, Peabody, King, Souder, andsurviving plat ldrs and EM, 1st Bn, 338th Inf; 1stBn, 338th Inf, AAR, Sep 44; Regtl and 1st Bn, 2dBn, and 3d Bn Aid Station Logs, 1-11 Sep 44; TheStars and Stripes (Med Edition), 6 Sep 44.

28 Combat Intervs with Maj Vernon A. Ostendorf,and with Jackson and Quisenberry.

29 Combat Intervs with the following: Jackson,Peabody, King, and Souder; plat ldrs of Co A, 338thInf; enlisted survivors in Cos B and C, 338th Inf.

30 Combat Interv with Cole; 2d Bn, 338th Inf,AAR, Sep 44.

31 Ibid.; 3d Bn, 338th Inf, AAR, Sep 44.

RELAXED FOOT SOLDIER of 338th Infantry in forward assembly area. Members ofthe 338th Infantry, resting and waiting, were not depressed by the impending attack.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 115

Harry R. Gresham, and the platoonrunner, Pfc. Bernard C. Van Kleeck, metColonel Jackson near the Paretaio Farm-house and went inside for map orienta-tion. Lieutenant Gresham's 2d Platoonwas to spearhead Company A's attack.Pointing on his 1:25,000 map to a smalltrail that seemingly led north to theobjective, Colonel Jackson designated itas the battalion's route of advance andgave Captain King and LieutenantGresham last-minute information. Onthe whereabouts of Company L, 363dInfantry, he could say only that elementsof that company were somewhere on themountain.32

Lieutenant Gresham's platoon ser-geant, T. Sgt. Adron G. Stevens, had inthe meanwhile been leading the 2d Pla-toon toward the farmhouse. LieutenantGresham met them outside and assembledhis squad leaders and platoon head-quarters for a conference.

After establishing communication bySCR (Signal Corps Radio) 536 withCompany A headquarters, the 2d Platoonleader, his squad leaders, and platoonheadquarters, followed by the platoonitself, walked thirty-five yards beyond arock wall above the Paretaio Farmhouseto a little road that ran northwest to ajunction with Highway 6524. Light wasbeginning to break on the lower slopesof the Altuzzo ridge. Although the crestof Hill 926 was still not visible, thewooded slopes to the north along thehighway could be seen for severalhundred yards.

Halting his platoon, Lieutenant Gresh-

am relayed to his squad leaders informa-tion about the enemy and the route ofadvance designated by Colonel Jackson.He assigned S. Sgt. Ira W. Wilson's 2dSquad as the scout squad of a squadcolumn formation, to be followed at aninterval of fifty yards by platoon head-quarters, the 1st Squad, and the 3dSquad, in that order. The lieutenantselected as the first bound for the scoutsquad a clump of trees some 600 yardsnorth of Paretaio near the head of a littlefork of Rocca Creek west of the openfields and olive orchards that lay alongthe west side of the main draw.

At approximately 0600 the 2d Platoonmoved out. Sergeant Wilson's scoutsquad had walked about fifty yards upthe little road when Lieutenant Greshamdiscovered that it led to the left insteadof to the right toward Monte Altuzzo, ashis map reconnaissance with ColonelJackson had indicated. Accordingly heordered Wilson to strike cross country tothe right in the direction of the selectedbound. Leading his men across a scrub-by slope east of the little road, Wilsonfound and followed a trail which ranhigh on the eastern slope of Hill 577,below the highway, to the south andeastern slopes of Hill 606 near l'UomoMorto. (Map 8) Possibly because theadvance was shielded by heavily leafedtrees and thick underbrush on either sideof the path, Lieutenant Gresham orderedthe platoon to decrease the distance be-tween men. The leading squad fileddown the trail across a little hump in theslope and over a small branch of RoccaCreek to the first bound, the clump oftrees on the nose of Hill 606. ThereSergeant Wilson halted his men and ob-served the open wheat field and olivegrove facing them. Bounding the field

32 Combat Intervs with the following: Gresham;T Sgt Adron G. Stevens; S Sgt Walter J. Michalek,Jr., S Sgt Edmond H. Carter, S Sgt Ira W. Wilson,S Sgt Stanley G. Hillier, and S Sgt Kenneth C.Pickens; Jackson and King.

MAP 8

ADVANCE TOWARD MT. ALTUZZO, Company A, 338th Infantry, 13 September 1944.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 117

and olive grove was a V-shaped drawchiseled by the winding mountain stream.

Wilson passed word down the columnto Lieutenant Gresham that he hadstopped. About one hour had passedsince the jump-off, and still there hadbeen no fire or sign of the enemy. WhenLieutenant Gresham came forward, henoted that observation of the wholeAltuzzo ridge was good and for the firsttime saw the highest peak of the moun-tain, Hill 926. He reported his positionto Captain King: he was at a point some1,200 yards southwest of Monte Altuzzo'screst.

Studying the terrain briefly with hisplatoon sergeant and leading squadleader, Lieutenant Gresham selected themain creek bed of the Rocca directlyacross the open field as the next boundfor the scout squad. For the scoutsquad's protection, he moved the 1stSquad to covering positions in the clumpof trees and directed the 3d Squad toclose up in rear of the 1st.

Because he feared mines in the fieldsand draws ahead, Lieutenant Greshamdirected Wilson to move his squad acrossthe open field in single file. The platoonleader then led Sergeant Stevens, PrivateVan Kleeck and Pvt. Donald R. Smith,platoon runners, and Pvt. Edmond H.Carter, an automatic rifleman, to thenose of Hill 606, and prepared to helpcover the scout squad's movement. Thesewere routine precautions. Gresham andhis men still thought that Company L,363d Infantry, was on Monte Altuzzoand that the 2d Platoon would merelypass through Company L.

Enemy Fire

It was nearly 0800 when SergeantWilson moved his squad from the clump

of trees into the open field. Sunlightstriking the western slopes of the Altuzzoridge had helped dispel the morninghaze, and the mountain ahead was clearlyvisible. The squad had advanced aboutseventy-five yards across the field whena machine gun from an enemy outposton the southwestern slope of Hill 782directly above la Rocca Farmhouse sud-denly opened fire. The first bulletsstruck the ground about twenty yards infront of the squad. There was little con-cealment in the field, and LieutenantGresham, back at the covering positionon the nose of Hill 606, could see thesquad plainly. As the men hit theground, the lieutenant shouted to Ser-geant Wilson to move into the creek bedabout fifty yards away; an instant later,as if the platoon leader did not knowwhat was happening, Sgt. Edgar A.Parks, the assistant squad leader, calledback, "There's somebody shooting at us,Lieutenant!" 33 For the moment themachine gun fire was so intense that themen could not reach the creek bed,though they were able to dash forwardto a little drainage ditch, two feet deep,which ran through the field.

Soon Private Carter, the automaticrifleman with platoon headquarters, lo-cated what he thought was the enemymachine gun position about 600 yardsaway on the southwest slope of Hill 782.Carter opened up with his Browningautomatic rifle (BAR), and the enemyweapon soon ceased fire. Sergeant Wil-son's squad ran forward quickly to takecover in the main bed of Rocca Creek.The action had taken about one hour,and the 2d Platoon found it had four menwounded.

33 Combat Interv with Gresham.

MONTE ALTUZZO AREA on right flank of the Giogo Pass.

La Rocca Farmhouse area, hidden by trees, is indicated by circle.

120 THREE BATTLES

INFANTRY APPROACH OVER OPEN FIELD. This area, under direct observationfrom Monte Altuzzo, was where the fast enemy fire hit Lieutenant Gresham's platoon.

Lieutenant Gresham was convincedthat the movement of more men acrossthe open field would unnecessarily exposethem. He therefore decided to send therest of the platoon, now some 200 yardsbehind the advance squad, off at a sharpangle to Sergeant Wilson's route. The1st and 3d Squads would push southeastdown the branch of Rocca Creek, whichran beside the southwest side of the opengrainfield to the main creek bed some500 yards away.34

Before moving again, Lieutenant

Gresham radioed company headquarters,and Captain King came forward. Thecompany commander told the platoonleader to continue the advance andpromised to have the 1st Platoon coverthe advance from the edge of the openfield until Gresham made contact again.Promising to call for artillery fire on theentire area from la Rocca to the top ofMonte Altuzzo, Captain King radioedColonel Jackson, who in turn asked forthe support fire from regiment.35 Therequest was passed through channels to

34 Ibid.; Combat Intervs with Stevens and withMichalek-Carter-Wilson-Hillier-Pickens.

35 Combat Intervs with Gresham, King, andJackson.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 121

the 363d Infantry, which refused to allowthe fire because its Company L was stillsomewhere on Monte Altuzzo.36

Minus the 2d Squad, which had takencover 300 yards to the northeast in theRocca Creek bed, Company A's 2dPlatoon moved out on its selected routedown the dry branch bed leading south-east toward the main draw. The leadingmen had advanced only about 150 yardswhen 120-mm. mortar shells began toshower the banks and bed of the branchcreek. Shouting for the men to takecover, Lieutenant Gresham hit theground. Up and down the creek bedthe men could see the shells kicking upthe dirt a few yards away or hear themplopping in the hay fields above thebanks. As the mortar fire continued,the 1st Squad leader, whose nervous con-dition had worried Gresham before,asked permission to return to the com-pany command post. Realizing thesergeant was unfit for duty, Gresham senthim back and ordered the assistant squadleader, Pfc. Ray C. Collins, to takecommand.

During and after the mortar concen-tration, Lieutenant Gresham tried invain to reach the company commanderby SCR 536. The platoon leader thensent back his runner, Private Van Kleeck,to report the platoon's position and theroute it expected to take as it continued.

The main body of the 2d Platoonagain moved down the creek bed. About200 yards farther, the lieutenant calleda halt. He sent two men ahead to tellSergeant Wilson—still with his 2d Squadon the other side of the field in the mainRocca Creek bed 300 yards to the north—to begin moving down the creek bed to

meet them. There was a dugout in theside of the bank where the platoon leaderhad halted his men. Inside were abouta dozen Italian civilians, and outside laythe still-warm bodies of a chicken, a dog,and a cow, killed by the mortar barrage.Assisted by Pfc. Joseph Farino as inter-preter, Lieutenant Gresham questionedthe civilians. They knew that Germansoccupied the territory into which theplatoon was moving, but had seen noAmericans either on the slopes of MonteAltuzzo or in the Rocca draw.

Again Gresham tried to make contactby SCR 536 with Captain King; againhe failed. Since Private Van Kleeckhad not returned, the platoon leader sentanother runner, Pvt. Richard E. Finkle,to the company command post, whichpresumably was still following down theslope north of Paretaio. About 1000 theplatoon finally made SCR 536 contactwith the Weapons Platoon leader, 2d Lt.Henry F. Robbins, who was at thecompany CP. Lieutenant Gresham re-viewed the progress of his platoon andsaid he planned to continue moving downthe creek bed.

The two men who had gone to makecontact with Sergeant Wilson returnedafter a round trip of about forty-fiveminutes, and Lieutenant Gresham andthe 1st and 3d squads moved out towardSergeant Wilson's squad. The twogroups joined forces around 1100, andthe entire platoon ate K ration dinnersin the creek bed at the base of the bigwestern finger of Hill 624.

Advance to Hills 624 and 782

With the 1st Squad in the lead, Lieu-tenant Gresham moved his platoon singlefile up the left branch of a Y-shaped draw36 Ibid.; 338th Inf Unit Jnl, 12 Sep 44.

122 THREE BATTLES

which mountain streams had carvedthrough the western slope of Hill 624.The men walked up the creek bed,barely wetting their boots in a water-course that months of rainless days hadcut to a trickle. Leaving the creek bed,they moved across the south side of thefinger of Hill 624, rounded the nose, andpushed on toward a grove of gnarledchestnut trees on the slope about 250yards west of Hill 624. Going uphill forthe first time since the jump-off, the mentrudged slowly, their bedrolls, cartridgebelts, bandoleers of ammunition, andM-1 rifles seeming even heavier thanbefore. The ground was rough anduneven, and the slope was steep.

When the platoon reached the chestnutgrove on the slope of Hill 624, enemymachine gunners and riflemen in theoutpost positions on the southern slopeof Hill 782 near the ridge line must havespotted the men's heads bobbing throughthe heavily foliaged but widely spacedtrees. The Germans fired sporadicallybut caused no casualties. Instead of re-turning the fire, Lieutenant Greshamhalted the column, and the men stretchedon the ground to rest.

A wild cry came suddenly from thehigher slopes of Hill 624. Four mensent to investigate found a dazed soldierfrom Company L, 363d Infantry. Hehad lost his rifle, helmet, arid field jacket,and was in a semicoherent condition.He told Gresham that the night beforehis company had made an attack to theright of where the Company A platoonwas now resting. His company, thesoldier said, had run into strong enemyresistance and had been driven back withheavy casualties. He had become sepa-rated from the rest of the company andhad no idea where it was. Sending the

man to the rear with a guide, Greshamradioed the information to CaptainKing.37 The company commander re-plied that he still thought the platoonwould meet only light opposition andinstructed the platoon leader to keepmoving toward the top of the mountain.38

Before pushing forward again, Lieu-tenant Gresham roughly marked the nextbound and route of advance. From thechestnut trees on the northwestern slopeof Hill 624, he could see a large fingerextending down from Hill 782. Theplatoon leader located on his 1:25,000map a clearly marked trail that woundfrom the top of Hill 624 northwest toand around the finger. He designatedthe finger as the next bound. Althoughfoliage and scrubby undergrowth pre-vented locating the trail on the ground,Gresham decided to move the platoonin a northeasterly direction anyway,hoping this would bring his men to thetrail.

Shortly after noon Gresham's troops,in single file, the 1st Squad still leading,moved forward again. They met noresistance as they passed between stuntedtrees and bushes across the western slopeof Hill 624. The leading men had goneabout fifteen yards when they came uponthe trail near the head of a creek thatflowed down the slope. Following thetrail, the 1st Squad moved along thesouthwestern slope of Hill 782 and, afterrounding the first of its two fingers, cameto the bend in the trail on the second,larger, finger which stretched down fromHill 782 to la Rocca Farmhouse. Whenthe squad halted, Lieutenant Greshamjoined Private Collins, the squad leader,

37 Combat Intervs with Gresham, Stevens, andMichalek-Carter-Wilson-Hillier-Pickens.

38 Combat Intervs with Gresham and King.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 123

and called the other two squad leadersforward. From the bend Gresham couldsee a peak to the left on a ridge thatseemed to extend east toward Hill 926,the crest of Monte Altuzzo, which stillwas not visible. Rather than pushdirectly toward the objective, Greshamdecided he would move his platoon tothe western peak and then swing righttoward the top of the mountain. Hismen could walk along the trail to thewestern ridge, then straight up the ridgeto the peak.39

After this decision Gresham radioed hisplan to his company commander. Cap-tain King, still confident that the enemywould not put up a stiff fight, approvedGresham's plan and urged the platoonto move along quickly.40 Earlier thatmorning, at 1007, Colonel Jackson hadprematurely reported to regiment thatCompany A's leading platoon had reachedthe lower southwest slope of Hill 782.41

Again Lieutenant Gresham's platoonmoved out, going around the bend anddown the trail that ran to the base of thebowl, which was formed by the largefinger of Hill 782, the western slope ofthe main ridge, and the western ridge.The men of the leading 1st Squad weredispersed along either side of the trailin a squad column formation, and behindthem in single file came the 3d and 2dSquads. Between men there was aninterval of ten yards, and the squads hadvisual contact. Thick undergrowth ofbushes and small trees along the trailconcealed the men from the enemy who,unknown to the advancing platoon, layin wait behind the semicircular ring of

defensive positions across the upper halfof the Altuzzo bowl.

About 150 yards from the bend of thetrail, the 1st Squad came to more openground where the overhanging foliagethinned and the path became clearlyexposed to enemy view from the westside of the bowl. About forty yardsstraight ahead the trail led downward tothe base of the bowl, then curved towardthe slope of the western ridge. At thebottom of the bowl, bare rocks juttedout from the uneven surface. Acrossthis space sprawled the trunks of thicktrees which the enemy had felled to pro-vide fields of fire. The slope beyond theclearing became steeper, and tiny moun-tain streams had cut small, narrow drawsin it and had left many arms of landwhich gave the galleria, as the Italianscalled it, a rough, uneven appearancewhen the sun was playing on it. Beyondthe right top center of the bowl toweredHill 926, Altuzzo's crest.

Reaching this open part of the trail, Pri-vate Collins halted his squad and waitedfor instructions. Lieutenant Greshamcame forward quickly and directed Col-lins to lead his men up the eastern slopeof the western ridge toward the rockypeak 500 yards west of Hill 926. Tocover the 1st Squad, he directed the 3d,under S. Sgt. Stanley G. Hillier, todisperse at the edge of the brush. The2d Squad took cover off the trail to therear.

Fire Fight in the Bowl

While the rest of the 2d Platoon wasgoing into position, Collins led the 1stSquad from the edge of the brush intothe open space. The men went abouta hundred yards before the enemy opened

39 Combat Intervs with Gresham, Stevens, andMichalek-Carter-Wilson-Hillier-Pickens.

40 Combat Intervs with Gresham and King.41 338th Inf Unit Jnl, 12 Sep 44.

124 THREE BATTLES

fire with machine guns and rifles fromthree directions: the left flank, front, andright flank—from positions on the topand halfway up the rocky western peak,from the upper west slope of the bowl,and from the main Altuzzo ridge linenorth of Hill 782.

At the first sound of fire, the 1st Squadhit the ground and scrambled for cover.Some men crawled behind a big chestnuttree which the enemy had left standing;others pulled themselves behind rocksand logs. There were no holes to hidein and the uneven ground provided littleconcealment. In a short time the menwere aware that the enemy lookeddirectly down upon them from behindrocks and prepared positions along thehigher slopes and the top of the bowl.One man, lying beside the big chestnuttree on the left front of the clearing, waswounded.

Soon after the 1st Squad was firedupon, the rest of the platoon at the edgeof the brush also received fire. Lieu-tenant Gresham ordered the men aroundhim to take whatever cover they couldfind and return the fire. In the 3dSquad Pvt. Diego Martines, attemptingto move across the trail, was hit in thechest by small arms fire and instantlykilled. Private Van Kleeck, who hadrejoined the platoon, began to carry theSCR 536 to Lieutenant Gresham at theedge of the brush. Two bullets struckhim in the leg, forcing him to the ground.As the heavy small arms fire continuedto saturate the area, Gresham orderedthe 3d Squad to move back around thebend in the trail on the large finger ofHill 782. Most of the 3d Squad andplatoon headquarters pulled back. Pri-vate Finkle, who had also been slightlywounded, stayed with Private Van Kleeck

in what seemed to be a relatively safeposition.

Although the men of the 1st Squad inthe open space were at first pinned down,Private Collins managed to direct themindividually back to the head of thewooded draw through which a branchran down beside a grainfield to la RoccaFarmhouse. Lieutenant Gresham thenshouted to Collins to move back downthe creek bed and rejoin the platoonbehind the crest of the large finger thatran from Hill 782 to la Rocca. Whilethe 1st and 3d Squads withdrew to thisposition, the 2d Squad, which had takenno part in the action, remained dispersedin covering positions on either side ofthe bend in the trail.42

At 1315 the 338th Infantry commandpost learned from the 1st Battalion thatCompany A was in a fire fight but wasmoving slowly forward. From his ob-servation post in front of Paretaio Farm-house, Colonel Jackson, 1st Battalioncommander, could see the battle, andfifteen minutes later correctly reportedthat his forward elements were at thebase of the bowl just beyond the largefinger of Hill 782 some 500 yards south-west of Hill 926.43

About 1345, after he had moved hisplatoon behind the bend in the trail,Lieutenant Gresham reported to CaptainKing by SCR 536, relating the story ofthe fire fight at the base of the bowl andstating that it would be impossible with-out artillery support to move farther inthe direction of Monte Altuzzo's crest.Captain King, promising to relay theartillery request and to send two litter

42 Combat Intervs with Gresham, Stevens, andMichalek-Carter-Wilson-Hillier-Pickens.

43 338th Inf Unit Jnl, 12 Sep 44; Combat Intervwith Jackson.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 125

squads to care for casualties, orderedLieutenant Gresham to hold where hewas, just above the trail behind the crestof the large finger of Hill 782.44

Supporting Fires

The request for artillery support wasquickly passed back to the regimentalcommander, who again asked the 91stInfantry Division for clearance. At 1350the 363d Infantry gave permission, statingthat its Company L had recently with-drawn from Monte Altuzzo.45 In addi-tion to this artillery fire, both ColonelCole (2d Battalion, 338th) and ColonelJackson requested that three mediumartillery battalions and the direct-support329th Field Artillery Battalion placeTOT (time on target) fire on the areanorth of the Giogo Pass. The missionwas fired with undetermined results.(Map 9) Through the remainder of theday, the 329th fired on enemy machineguns and mortars in the Altuzzo areaand laid down harassing fire.

Other close artillery support duringthe day was designed to fulfill the mis-sions of neutralizing and destroyingenemy defenses and isolating the battle-field from enemy reinforcement andsupply. The 403d Field Artillery Bat-talion (155-mm. howitzers) placed harass-ing fires on the highway through theGiogo Pass and a small road runningfrom the north slopes of Monte Altuzzoto the highway. The 178th Field Artil-lery Group fired missions against Germaninfantry in the Altuzzo vicinity, mortars,and a radio tower near the Giogo Passand neutralized guns 1,000 yards south

of Firenzuola. Since the enemy held thedominant ground observation, both 85thDivision and II Corps artillery dependedprimarily on air observation posts, whichwere in position to observe only a smallpercentage of the missions fired.

By midafternoon additional fire sup-port was being provided by Company B,752d Tank Battalion (Medium). At1530 the 1st Platoon, Company B,moved into firing positions about athousand yards northeast of Scarperiaand reportedly knocked out one pillboxon Monte Altuzzo with direct fire. The3d Platoon, Company B, moved intodirect firing positions east of Montagnana,about two thousand yards northeast ofScarperia, and fired on pillboxes, claim-ing two direct hits.

Besides the tanks, the 338th Infantryrequested the 85th Division to attach oneplatoon of tank destroyers to the tankcompany, a request later fulfilled. Com-pany B, 84th Chemical Battalion (4.2-inch Mortar), which had also beenattached to the 338th Infantry, remainedin an assembly area nearly seven milesto the rear and fired no missions on 13September. Company B, 310th En-gineer Combat Battalion, maintainedsupply routes in support of the infantryregiment.46

Assistance was also received fromtactical air support. Having receivedword early in the morning from divisionthat fighter bombers could be secured onshort notice, Colonel Mikkelsen, 338thcommander, had requested planes to

44 Combat Intervs with Gresham and King.45 338th Inf Unit Jnl, 13 Sep 44; 91st Div G-3 Jnl,

13 Sep 44; Combat Intervs with Jackson and Farber.

46 338th Inf, 339th Inf, and 2d Bn, 338th Inf, UnitJnls, 13 Sep 44; II Corps Arty Jnl, 13 Sep 44; 403dFA Bn and 178th FA Gp Unit Jnls and Mission Rpts,13 Sep 44; 329th FA Bn Unit Jnl and AAR, Sep 44;752d Tk Bn AAR, Sep 44; 84th Cml Bn Unit Jnl,13 Sep 44, and AAR, Sep 44; 310th Engr (C) BnUnit Jnl, 13 Sep 44.

HOWITZER AND TANKS MOVING FORWARD. A 240-mm. howitzer beingtowed into position (above) and a medium tank (below) fording Sieve River under cover ofsmoke screen.

128 THREE BATTLES

operate north of Monte Altuzzo. Dur-ing the day missions against enemy artil-lery, vehicles, supply and ammunitiondepots, and troop concentrations wereflown by the 239th and 244th RAF(Royal Air Force) and the 7th SAAF(South African Air Force) Wings of theDesert Air Force. The 7th SAAF Wingreported good results from six missionsagainst enemy strong points and alsobombed and strafed buildings one andone-half miles north-northeast of MonteAltuzzo. When gun areas two to threemiles northeast of the Giogo Pass werebombed and strafed, two direct bombhits caused a large explosion. The 7thSAAF Wing also destroyed one troopcarrier and two motor transports. The239th Wing attacked a motor transportpark 1,500 yards southwest of Firenzuolaand guns three miles north of the pass.Shortly after noon fighter bombers bombedand strafed enemy troops near Bagnolaat a point a mile north of the Giogo Pass,and a short while later tactical aircraftbombed and strafed three gun batteriesat Corniolo, three miles northwest of thepass. Other missions were flown againsta house at Collinaccia, 4,500 yards north-east of the pass, and against a self-propelled gun on the Firenzuola highway3,200 yards north of the pass.47

Company A at Hill 782

While Lieutenant Gresham's platoonhad been advancing to the lower slopesof Hill 782, the 1st Platoon, Company A,338th Infantry, had followed within con-necting distance. It reached the lower

slopes of Hill 782 without incident,arriving at a point where the trail crossedthe crest of the large second finger ofthe hill. (See Map 8.) There, about1600, the platoon leader, 1st Lt. John R.MacMinn, Jr., and his platoon sergeant,T. Sgt. Nelson B. Van Horne, halted theplatoon and went forward themselves toestablish physical contact with the 2dPlatoon. About an hour later, Lieu-tenant MacMinn received orders fromCaptain King to pass on the right of the2d Platoon and advance as far as possibleup Hill 782 toward the crest of MonteAltuzzo. If fire was received from thewestern ridge, the 2d Platoon was tosupport the 1st by fire.

About 1730 the 1st Platoon moved outin a column of squads—2d, 3d, 1st—upthe draw between two fingers of thewestern slope of Hill 782. Spaced aboutten yards apart in single file, the menclimbed the steep slope, sometimes in ahalf-crouch, sometimes crawling, andnearly always having to clutch bushesand branches of small trees for support.Passing the 2d Platoon where it hadhalted on the slope of the large fingerabout 450 yards from Hill 782's crest,the men continued toward the head ofthe little draw. When they reached thebarbed wire entanglement which stretch-ed all the way across the west slope, theymoved through without difficulty, en-countering three strands of ankle-highwire about seven yards wide. Althoughstakes for three other strands stuck outwaist-high above the ground, the wirehad not been strung.

As the leading men passed throughthe wire, they spotted a camouflagedmachine gun bunker thirty-five to fortyyards away at the head of the little draw.Halting the platoon, Sergeant Van Horne

47 85th Div G-3 Jnl, 13 Sep 44; 338th Inf UnitJnl, 13 Sep 44; MAAF Central Med Daily Opera-tional Sum, 13 Sep 44; 57th Fighter Group Opera-tional and Intel Sum, 13 Sep 44.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 129

crawled forward to the right of theposition. He could see that it was abunker constructed of heavy logs andcovered with layers of logs and dirtand a wooden platform that had a man-hole for an entrance. Branches had beenthrown across the top of the platform.Crawling closer, Sergeant Van Hornesaw two Germans, one in the manholeand one inside the bunker, visible throughthe embrasure. Evidently alerted, theGerman in the manhole entrance washolding a rifle and scanning the littledraw where the 1st Platoon had haltedjust above the barbed wire. In order tofire effectively Sergeant Van Horne hadto crawl within three yards of the position.When he tried to push the safety off hisrifle, for an agonizingly long moment itwould not budge. At what seemed likethe last split second before discovery, forthe German could almost reach out andtouch him, the sergeant shoved off thesafety catch and pulled the trigger. TheGerman dropped from sight into thebunker.

Unable to bring fire on the otherGerman inside the position, SergeantVan Horne shouted to the 2d Squadleader, S. Sgt. David C. South, to bringup a hand grenade. Van Horne directedthe two scouts into position to protecthim to the front and the rest of the 2dSquad to form a ring around the bunker.Pfc. Jerome J. Straus called out inGerman for the enemy to surrender orbe blown up with grenades. There wasno answer. Noting that a trench ledup the hill from the bunker, providinga second entrance into the position,Sergeant South pulled the pin from agrenade and tossed it through the trenchentrance. Only the sound of the ex-ploding grenade came from the position.

Sergeant Van Horne and the leadingmen of the 2d Squad then moved aboutten yards past the bunker toward theridge line along a rock ledge that stretchedacross the brow of the finger leading tothe crest of Hill 782. It was still day-light, and as the men moved their routeof advance became more bare. Weigh-ing these factors and the fact that therest of Company A was a hundred yardsdown the hill, Lieutenant MacMinnordered Sergeant Van Horne to with-draw and pulled his platoon back belowthe barbed wire to a point where a littlerise provided some concealment.48

When his men had returned to thisposition, Lieutenant MacMinn retracedhis steps to the 2d Platoon and talkedwith Lieutenant Gresham and the leaderof the 3d Platoon, 1st Lt. Charles T.Holladay, who had by this time alsocome forward. The three lieutenantsdecided that, instead of moving out intothe confusion of approaching darknesswithout further orders from CaptainKing, they would set up defensive posi-tions where they were. They establishedtheir three rifle platoons from the browof the large finger of Hill 782 across thelittle draw to the next finger to the right,above the trail on the southwest slope ofHill 782. The 2d Platoon was on theleft on the large finger, the 1st in thecenter in the draw, and the 3d on theright on the other finger.49

Several hours after darkness, about2230, Captain King and the WeaponsPlatoon under Lieutenant Robbins movedthe Company A command post from theslope west of Rocca Creek to the large

48 Combat Intervs with the following: MacMinn;Van Horne; South and S Sgt Harry B. Whary; King.

49 Combat Intervs with MacMinn, Van Horne,Gresham, and King.

130 THREE BATTLES

finger. During the advance of the rifleplatoons, the light machine guns and60-mm. mortars of Company A hadremained as a covering force on thesouthern slope of Hill 606 near wherethe 2d Platoon had first received its firethat morning. When Captain Kingreached his rifle platoons, he expresseddisappointment that they had not ad-vanced farther.

Confused Reports from the 363d

Throughout the morning and eveninto the afternoon of 13 September, poorcommunication between the leading pla-toons and the Company A commandpost, plus confused reports regardingCompany L, 363d Infantry, had made itdifficult for Colonel Jackson and ColonelMikkelsen to keep abreast of events or toissue intelligent orders for the attack.At 0900 the 363d Infantry reported thatits forward elements (Company L) wereon Hill 926, the crest of Monte Altuzzo,and estimated that the elements of the85th Division would not come abreastbefore 1400. Although Colonel Jacksonlearned in midmorning that CompanyL, 363d, was digging in on Hill 782, tothe 338th Infantry it was reported at1055 that Company L was on the top ofMonte Altuzzo. Again at 1135 the 363dInfantry reported to its division head-quarters that it had captured MonteAltuzzo and was then clearing outremaining snipers.

As time went on, the story graduallycame back that, far from being a push-over, the enemy had put up stiff resist-ance and had driven Company L, 363d,back from the crest of Monte Altuzzo.About 1400 the 338th Infantry informedColonel Jackson that Company L, 363d,

had withdrawn from Monte Altuzzo.At 1440 a soldier from the company re-ported to the 338th Infantry that hisplatoon had advanced to within 150yards of the peak of Monte Altuzzo thenight before, had knocked out threebunkers, and had captured six prisoners,all paratroopers.50

These conflicting reports left ColonelJackson confused about both the enemysituation and Company L's true location.Though his liaison officers tried all dayto find out Company L's true position,such information was not available atthe 3d Battalion, 363d.51 What hadactually happened was that, in an attackabout dawn, Company L had advancedonly to the barbed wire on the southwestslope of Hill 782. Shortly after middayit had withdrawn some 500 yards downthe main Altuzzo ridge. Until the pic-ture cleared as to what had happened toCompany L and what the enemy's in-tentions were regarding Altuzzo's defense,the 338th Infantry's plans continued tobe fluid and were based on the belief thatthe Germans would not resist strongly.

Colonel Jackson held the remainderof his battalion throughout the day be-hind the Paretaio Farmhouse. BeforeCompany A jumped off, he had plannedfor Company B to follow at a 500-yardinterval. By the time Company A hadcleared the line of departure, the morninghaze had lifted and Jackson felt move-ment of Company B before darknesswould invite needless risks.

Throughout 13 September the 1stBattalion, 338th, had thus cautiously

50 338th Inf Unit Jnl, 13 Sep 44; 85th Div and 91stDiv G-3 Jnls, 12-13 Sep 44; Combat Intervs withJackson, Mikkelsen, Quisenberry, Peabody, King,Souder, and Draney.

51 Combat Intervs with Jackson and Quisenberry;1st Bn, 338th Inf, AAR, Sep 44.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 131

committed only one company to the ad-vance against Monte Altuzzo. Theattack had been a developing movementto reach the Altuzzo ridge without heavycasualties, pass through Company L,363d Infantry, and locate the enemypositions. By the end of the day thebattalion had sustained about twentycasualties.52

While the 1st Battalion had beenmaking the 338th Infantry's main effortagainst Monte Altuzzo, the 2d Battalionadvanced along Highway 6524 about1,200 yards to l'Uomo Morto, almoston a line with the 1st Battalion's farthestadvance. The 2d Battalion's two assaultcompanies were stopped by heavy mortarand artillery fire and some small armsfire. They were hampered by beingunable to get clearance for supportingartillery fire because elements of the 363dInfantry (Company I) were in the areaand their exact location was unknown.At the end of 13 September the battalionwas still 1,100 yards short of its objective,Point 770.53

On either flank of the 338th Infantryadjacent units made some progress butin all cases failed to take their objectives.On the left the 363d Infantry attack upthe slopes of Monticelli had bogged downabout 1,500 yards short of the crest. Onthe right flank the 339th Infantry (85thDivision) had had no more successagainst Monte Verruca.54

All along the II Corps front on 13September the enemy had shown that hewas not withdrawing from the GothicLine without a struggle. In the area ofthe Giogo Pass there were already signsthat the fighting would be hard andcostly. On 12 September the 363dInfantry (91st Division) had sent twobattalions against Monticelli and MonteAltuzzo, and twenty-four hours later sixbattalions from both the 91st and 85thDivisions had been committed againstthe same features.55 While the attacksof 13 September had served to locatesome of the enemy positions, many othersstill remained to be identified, and thetask of reducing them had barely begun.

The Enemy Situation

During the afternoon of 13 Septemberthe 338th Infantry learned throughprisoners of war that a company ofeighty men held a front of about twothousand yards from Monte Altuzzo toMonte Verruca. Although this forcewould not have been sufficient to manall the prepared positions in the area, itwas large enough to occupy a number ofstrong points in the main line of resist-ance. In view of the small number oftroops in position when the Americanattack was launched, the Germans wereevidently waiting to see where the heaviestblow would fall.

During the night of 13-14 September,replacements arrived for the companieson Monte Altuzzo and On the othermountains in the Giogo Pass sector. Atleast one group of two officers and thirtymen arrived at the companies of the 12thParachute Regiment. Shortly after dark on

52 Combat Intervs with Jackson, Quisenberry, andDraney (who interviewed the other offs and NCO'sof his company after his return from hospitalization);91st Div G-3 Jnl, 13 Sep 44; Msg, Actg CO, Co L,363d Inf, in 910th FA Bn Unit Jnl, 13 Sep 44; 1stBn, 338th Inf, AAR, Sep 44.

53 Combat Interv with Cole; 2d Bn, 338th Inf,AAR, Sep 44; 2d Bn, 338th Inf, Unit Jnl, 13 Sep 44;338th Inf Unit Jnl, 13 Sep 44.

54 91st Div G-3 Jnl, 12-13 Sep 44; Strootman MS;Muller Notes; 339th Inf Unit Jnl, 12-13 Sep 44.

55 85th Div and 91st Div G-3 Jnls, 13 Sep 44.

132 THREE BATTLES

13 September, air reconnaissance identi-fied fifty enemy motor transports movingsouth from Firenzuola, ostensibly loadedwith paratroopers whom Partisans hadreported as having been sent to Firen-zuola a week earlier.

Although some radio intercepts andprisoner of war reports had indicated anenemy withdrawal, the II Corps G-2discounted such movement as being of alocal nature only. Intelligence was re-ceived that all three battalions of the12th Parachute Regiment were withdrawing,but the reported withdrawals were in-terpreted to be from outpost positions tothe main line of resistance. On MonteAltuzzo the enemy's defenses were stillintact except for the outpost positionswhich elements of the 363d and 338thInfantry had knocked out during theday. Even these positions were re-manned during the night.56

The Fourteenth Army was still not awarethat the Fifth Army's main effort wasbeing made up Highway 6524 towardthe Giogo Pass. Expecting the principalattack at Futa Pass, the Germans plannedto send one battalion of the GrenadierLehr Brigade on the night of 14-15 Sep-tember to the area south of Loiano asI Parachute Corps reserve. A second bat-talion was alerted for shipment the fol-lowing night. Impressed by the needsof his Tenth Army on the Adriatic front,Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring,commander of Army Group C, ordered the16th SS Panzer Grenadier Division to preparefor a speedy withdrawal from the westerncoastal sector of Fourteenth Army into armygroup reserve.57

56 338th Inf Unit Jnl, 13 Sep 44; 85th Div G-2 Jnland G-2 Rpts, 13-14 Sep 44; IPW Rpts and IntelSum, 14 Sep 44.

57 Fourteenth Army KTB 4, 13-14 Sep 44.

CHAPTER II

Peabody Peak(14 September)

MAP 10

After failing for two days to breach theGiogo Pass defenses, II Corps preparedto continue the attack on 14 September,using the forward positions as the line ofdeparture. On the left of Highway 6524the 91st Division, employing elements oftwo regiments, was to try again to captureMonticelli and Hill 844, which guardedMonticelli's western flank. On the rightof the highway the 85th Division, withtwo regiments abreast, was to renew theattack at 0530. While the 338th Infan-try was again to make the main effortagainst Monte Altuzzo, the 339th Infan-try was to continue its attack up theeastern and western arms of MonteVerruca. The 337th Infantry was toremain in division reserve.1

In the 338th Infantry's zone the 2dBattalion was to drive along the highwayto take Point 770, while the 1st Battalionwas to strike again up the main ridge ofMonte Altuzzo to capture the crest ofthe mountain. (Map 10) The 3d Bat-talion, in regimental reserve, was tomove at 0500 from its assembly area nearScarperia to the rear of the 1st Battalion.It was to follow the 1st up Monte Altuzzoon order, prepared to push north-northeast to the hills about two milesbeyond the Giogo Pass. Supplies of K

rations and small arms ammunition hadbeen brought to Ponzalla by jeep fromthe regimental supply point in Scarperiaand hand-carried the rest of the way tothe rifle battalions.

By midafternoon of 13 September Colo-nel Jackson had worked out a new planfor the 1st Battalion's attack againstMonte Altuzzo. Still regarding the ef-fort as a developing movement, he

1 85th Div and 91st Div G-3 Jnls, 13-14 Sep 44;337th, 338th, and 339th Inf Unit Jnls, 13-14 Sep 44.

134 THREE BATTLES

81-MM. MORTARS IN POSITION. Infantrymen of the 338th cleaning their mortarsoutside of Paretaio Farmhouse. Note trenches in background.

thought the cost in troops would be light.Company B, with one platoon of Com-pany D's heavy machine guns attached,was to leave the forward assembly areaat Paretaio Farmhouse at dark, cross laRocca draw, and come up abreast ofCompany A on Hill 782. Together thetwo companies were to attack at dawnup the main Altuzzo ridge to the crest,Hill 926, Company A on the west slopeand Company B on the east. Aftercapturing Hill 926, Company A was tocontinue to the knob on the north (Knob3) while Company B was to send a pla-

toon to Hill 862 to block any counter-attack from Pian di Giogo on the bat-talion's right front. The six 81-mm.mortars in position behind ParetaioFarmhouse were to fire on call at suitabletargets.

While no preparatory artillery concen-tration was scheduled, artillery supportwas to be available on call after H Hourminus 10 minutes. The 338th Infantry'sCannon Company was to place harassingfire in the area 1,000 to 1,800 yardsbehind the switchbacks on the highway.At 0700 two platoons from the 84th

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 135

Chemical Battalion, which had movedits 4.2-inch mortars to positions a fewhundred yards south of Ponzalla, were tostart firing on selected targets in theAltuzzo area. For air support ColonelMikkelsen, 338th commander, requestedmissions against German artillery posi-tions and strong points 4,000 yards northand northeast of the pass and on theroads north of the pass from Barco toFirenzuola.2

During the night prior to the nextattempt to take Monte Altuzzo, bothcorps and division artillery were busyfiring harassing and TOT (time ontarget) concentrations on areas aroundGiogo Pass, most missions apparentlydesigned to hamper enemy reinforce-ment and supply. Every hour the 403dField Artillery Battalion placed harassingfire on areas around Barco Village.Besides firing three harassing missions onthe north side of the Firenzuola road oneither side of the pass, the 403d fired 180rounds on Hill 1029 northwest of the passand placed a TOT mission just beyondit. Three battalions of corps mediumartillery put 485 rounds of harassing andTOT fire in front of the 338th Infantry.The targets were Hill 926, the northslopes of Monte Altuzzo, the slopes northof the pass, road junctions on the mainFirenzuola road at Barco and a thousandyards north of the pass, and other sensi-tive points in the enemy's lines of com-munication. Although none of the mis-sions were observed, the volume of fire

would seem to indicate that they ma-terially hampered enemy movement.3

Communication Failure

The failure of Company A's SCR 300about 2230 the night of 13 Septembercut off Captain King's only means ofdirect communication with the 1st Bat-talion, 338th Infantry. After a hurriedexamination showed the batteries werenot functioning, King sent three runnersto the battalion command post to securereplacement batteries. On the way therunners came under artillery fire in theRocca draw, delaying their arrival at thebattalion CP until 0200. Although theysecured new batteries and started backtoward the Company A command post,only one of the men arrived and then notuntil well after daylight the next morning.Even with the new batteries the radiowould not function. Further examina-tion showed that the trouble lay with thereceiver. Another runner was sent backfor new parts, but it was afternoon beforethey were received. Not until 1430, 14September, was the radio put back intooperation and communication restoredwith battalion. The platoon SCR 536's,which worked spasmodically, would nottransmit over such a distance in themountains, and telephone wire, strungduring the morning of 14 September, wasknocked out by enemy mortar or artilleryfire almost as soon as it was put in.4

Captain King, despite his communica-tions failure on the night of 13 September,went ahead with plans for the attack the

2 Combat Intervs with Cole, Jackson, Peabody,and King; 338th Inf and 2d Bn and 3d Bn, 338th Inf,Unit Jnls, 13-14 Sep 44; 338th Inf and 2d Bn and3d Bn, 338th Inf, AAR's, Sep 44; 85th Div G-3 Jnl,14 Sep 44. Two direct bomb hits and two nearmisses were Subsequently scored by planes on enemypositions north of the pass.

3 II Corps Arty Jnl, 13-14 Sep 44; 403d FA BnJnl and Mission Rpts, 13-14 Sep 44; 178th FA Gpand 423d FA Gp Rpts and Jnls, 13-14 Sep 44.

4 Combat Intervs with King, Jackson, and Gresh-am; 1st Bn, 338th Inf, AAR, Sep 44.

136 THREE BATTLES

next morning. At a conference of hisplatoon leaders at the company commandpost, he outlined the formation to beused. The 1st Platoon on the left andthe 3d Platoon on the right were to pushup the large finger and the draw to thetop of Hill 782, then swing left andadvance just below the ridge line on thewestern slope of the main Altuzzo ridgeto Hill 926. While these platoons wereadvancing, the 2d Platoon, following the1st, was to advance to a place from whichit could support the attack by fire. Onehour after the jump-off the WeaponsPlatoon was to pass through the 2dPlatoon and follow the 1st to give sup-port in event of counterattack. CaptainKing expected that as soon as CompanyB, which had left Paretaio before Com-pany A's radio went dead, reached theslope of Hill 782 the Company B com-mander would make contact with him.

While Captain King briefed his pla-toon leaders and tried to restore radiocontact with the battalion commander,back in the foxholes the men of thecompany snatched a few hours of fitfulsleep or stood watch through the darknight. In each foxhole the two or threemen took turns at guard duty, and at alltimes at least three men from each squadwere on the alert. Notwithstanding thefact that they had not occupied the crestof Monte Altuzzo or run into the com-pany of the 91st Division through whichthey had been scheduled to pass, the menand officers of Company A were still inhigh spirits. They still expected theattack the next morning to be an easyone.

As the hours passed, the confidence ofCaptain King and his platoon leaderswas tempered by anxiety over the where-abouts of Company B and their own

failure to restore contact with battalion.Nothing had been heard from the run-ners who had started back to the battalionCP for new radio batteries. Because heexpected the return of the runners at anymoment, Captain King did not evenconsider stringing wire between the rearCompany A command post on the noseof Hill 606, where the executive officer,1st Lt. Joseph E. Pizzi, was located, andthe forward CP on the lower slopes ofHill 782, where the rest of the companywas in position. Besides, if wire werelaid, when his men pushed up the crestof Monte Altuzzo the next morning theywould soon outstrip the company's supplyof telephone wire.

Company A Attacks the Outpost Line

Left to his own counsels by the breakin communications, Captain King finallydecided during the early morning hoursof 14 September that even if Company Bdid not make contact with him CompanyA would move up alone just before dawnand occupy the next peak, Hill 782.Further advances would then await thearrival of Company B or the re-establish-ment of communications with ColonelJackson. In line with this decision,Company A, with two platoons abreast,the 3d on the left and the 1st on theright, moved out at 0500 up the south-west slope of Hill 782 between the firstand second fingers that ran down fromthe ridge line. (Map 11) Both platoonsmoved in close column of squads forma-tion; the morning was too dark andinitially the ground too bushy fordispersion.5

5 Combat Intervs with the following: King,MacMinn, and Gresham; S Sgt Joseph K. Colosimo,S Sgt Gordon K. Grigsby, Sgt Hubert G. Albert,T Sgt Darius L. Daughtry, Van Horne, South, andWhary.

MAP 11

1ST BATTALION ATTACK, 14 September 1944.

138 THREE BATTLES

With the 3d Squad in the lead, fol-lowed by the 2d and 1st, the 3d Platoonwalked slowly up the slope of Hill 782,so steep that, to keep their balance, themen frequently had to crouch close tothe ground and grasp underbrush forsupport. As soon as the leading squadreached the barbed wire entanglement,the men stepped over it, only to runalmost head on into a German bunker.At the head of the column, the two scoutsand Pfc. Hubert G. Albert, acting 3dSquad leader, could see only the bareoutline of the German position throughthe darkness. The squad leader haltedhis squad and signaled to the platoonleader, Lieutenant Holladay, who wasthe fourth man in the column.

Anxious to avoid a fire fight, theplatoon leader ordered the two scouts towithdraw below the barbed wire andmove to the left. In compliance, thecolumn moved about twenty yards tothe left and the leading men started tocut through the wire with a wire cutter.As the last strands were being cut, themen saw a roving enemy patrol on theskyline about twenty-five yards away.They ducked below the entanglement,and Lieutenant Holladay directed themto move farther to the left to avoid thepatrol. Before they had gone more thana few yards farther, the first eight or tenmen lost contact with the rest of theplatoon. As the leading men halted toregain contact, they heard the sounds ofa fire fight to their right and began toreceive hand grenades and light mortarfire. Still unable to penetrate the dark-ness very far, the men could not makeout any Germans to the front. Finally,after four men had been wounded, the3d Platoon received orders from CaptainKing to withdraw to its old positions

below the barbed wire in the draw be-tween the first and second fingers on thesouthwest slope of Hill 782. All reachedsafety except Pfc. John Lakowicz andPvt. Marvin D. Beazley who lost theirway near the rock formations and stayedthere the rest of the day within a stone'sthrow of the enemy.6

On the right of the 3d Platoon, the 1stPlatoon of Company A in a column ofsquads—1st, 3d, 2d—had pushed up theslope of the hill. Stepping easily throughthe low-strung barbed wire, the 1st Squadhad gone a few yards beyond it when aGerman suddenly shouted, "Halt!" Atthe sound every man hit the ground, andS. Sgt. Herbert H. Davis, the squadleader, unable to determine the sourceof the cry, sent word back to the platoonleader for instructions. Lieutenant Mac-Minn relayed instructions for the squadleader to move his men over to the right.As the leading squad started out again,three Germans shouted at them. Pvt.Bruce A. Petty replied with his M-1 rifle,killing one German with his first shotand another with his second. OtherGermans replied furiously, seeminglywith every weapon they had. Fromclose-in positions on the front and rightfront they lobbed grenade after grenadeinto the area. Mortar shells fell allaround, and a machine gun in a dugoutto the right front began to find the range.One grenade wounded Pvt. Murray C.Faller and knocked the rifle from thehand of Private Petty, blowing him offthe bank of the slope.

The fire fight went on. In the dark-ness neither side could see the other well,and for both Germans and Americansthe unevenness of the slope severely

6 Combat Intervs with Colosimo, Grigsby, andDaughtry.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 139

limited effective fields of fire for smallarms. The enemy nevertheless had someadvantage in the grenade exchange be-cause of his higher position and betterknowledge of the terrain. As dawn ap-proached Lieutenant MacMinn observedthat his platoon held a very exposedposition in the bare area beyond thebarbed wire, and daylight could beexpected to improve the enemy's chances.Thus, for the sake of better cover, thelieutenant, with Captain King's approval,ordered the platoon to withdraw to thepositions from which it had jumped offabout forty-five minutes earlier. Whilethe platoon withdrew, Platoon SergeantVan Horne, who had been tending awounded man, Pfc. Raymond J. Charron,halted the 2d Squad a few yards belowthe barbed wire. Hearing German voicesand movement on the slope above, Ser-geant Van Horne and the 2d Squad firedin the direction of the sounds, but withundetermined results.7

All the platoon finally reached thejump-off point safely except Pvt. JamesR. Hickman of the 1st Squad, who hadreceived no word from the men aroundhim about the withdrawal. By the timehe discovered that he had been left be-hind, daylight had come and he wasafraid to move because of the exposedterrain. All day long he remained alonein this position thirty yards above thebarbed wire near the German dugouts,only an eighteen-inch bank hiding himfrom enemy view. Frightened at first,he became more composed as the daywore on, finally rolling into his blanket,which he had carried with him in theattack. Above, he could hear the Ger-mans; below, the men of Company A.

Through the longest day he had everspent he was sustained only by a coupleof swallows of water, one stick of chewinggum, and the urge to get back to hisoutfit. After dark, he crawled backthrough the barbed wire and rejoinedhis platoon.8

After Company A's attack began, themachine gun section of the WeaponsPlatoon could not find the 2d Platoon,through which it was supposed to passbefore taking up supporting positionsbehind the 1st Platoon. At the barbedwire, the platoon sergeant, T. Sgt.Thomas A. Culpepper, saw what lookedlike a mine and steered the machinegunners some distance, perhaps fifty toseventy-five yards, to the right. As themen started through the wire again, theyheard the enemy open fire on the 1stand 3d Platoons, who were in the leadon the left. The Germans evidentlyspotted the machine gunners too andcovered the area near them with flares,mortar fire, and grenades. Though hismen miraculously escaped casualties,Sergeant Culpepper knew they were ina difficult position. In any case, beforethe Weapons Platoon could be of muchassistance to the company, the platoonsergeant would have to get in contactwith the other platoons He decided towithdraw his men and try to regaincontact with the company commanderor the rifle platoon leaders. Too far tothe right to reach the positions held thenight before on the slopes of Hill 782,the machine gun section withdrew to atrail northeast of la Rocca; and beforeCulpepper regained contact with the restof the company, the short-lived attackhad ended.9

7 Combat Intervs with King, MacMinn, VanHorne, South, and Whary.

8 Combat Intervs with Van Horne and Hickman.9 Combat Interv with Culpepper.

140 THREE BATTLES

After its abortive attack, Company Astayed in covered positions on the south-west slope of Hill 782 below the barbedwire throughout 14 September. CaptainKing, out of communication with theremainder of the battalion, was in noposition to co-ordinate with Company B,which had been scheduled to make con-tact with Company A before both unitsjumped off toward the crest of themountain.10 At 1415 the 338th InfantryCP was informed that Company A wason the west slope of Monte Altuzzobeyond Hill 782 and on the upper centralpart of the bowl, some 250 yards northof its actual position on the southwestslope of Hill 782. The report also statedthat Company A had been forced to pullback because of a pillbox and well-emplaced riflemen.11

Company B Moves Out

On 13 September, after Colonel Jack-son had decided to commit Company Bin a dawn attack with Company A, Capt.Maurice E. Peabody, Jr., Company Bcommander, ordered his 2d Platoonleader, 1st Lt. John M. Neuffer, to senda reconnaissance patrol to locate a suit-able route of advance to the main Altuzzoridge. The patrol left at approximately1600 (13 September) from the vicinityof the battalion command post at Pare-taio. It was headed by S. Sgt. Hugh C.Brown, 2d Squad leader, and includedSgt. Gamelil Mullins, Pfc. Harold Cetel,Pfc. Marion L. Boston, and Pfc. KennyR. Beverage. Having followed the hightrail from Paretaio to the thick woodsthat lay at the edge of the open fieldwhere the leading squad of Company A

had first received fire that morning, thepatrol crossed the woods and spied alittle irrigation ditch that led across theopen field toward the main draw ofRocca Creek. By use of this route,Sergeant Brown concluded, Company Bcould gain the shelter of the creek bedand once there would be at the edge ofthe lower slopes of Monte Altuzzo.

After the patrol returned with thisinformation, Captain Peabody decidedthere would be no difficulty in movinghis men to the position which the bat-talion commander had told him Com-pany A occupied on the slopes of Hill782. Since the main Altuzzo ridge wasthe only ridge in sight along the route hismen would take, Peabody saw no needto ask for guides from Company A. Hefelt confident that he could make contactwith Company A by SCR 300 when hecame within radio distance.12 So sure,in fact, was Captain Peabody that, whenhe was asked how he knew he could findCompany A, the Company B commanderreplied, "Oh, I'm an old hunter—Ican't miss." 13

Before the jump-off, Captain Peabodywas also confident regarding the outcomeof the attack. Although he had alwaysregarded intelligence information skep-tically, he had concluded on the basis ofinformation he had received that theenemy held Monte Altuzzo only lightlyand that the positions were far less for-midable than those at the Futa Pass. APartisan report, which Captain Peabody

10 Combat Intervs with King and Gresham.11 338th Inf Unit Jnl, 14 Sep 44

12 Combat Intervs with Brown, Mullins, and Pea-body; Intervs and Notes of terrain reconnaissancewith Peabody, T Sgt Herman Ledford, and 1st SgtCharles J. Dozier; Capt Maurice E. Peabody, Jr.,Narrative of the Attack on Peabody Ridge, MS,Nov-Dec 44 (hereafter cited as Peabody MS), 1stBn, 338th Inf, S-1 Files.

13 Combat Interv with Souder.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 141

had seen, emphasized the weakness ofthe enemy's defenses in the Giogo Passarea. The defenses consisted, so thestory ran, of hasty machine gun fortifica-tions lacking even protective mines orbarbed wire. Having little confidencein the 363d Infantry, Peabody turned adeaf ear to the reports that its CompanyL had met heavy resistance during theday. The night before when he hadvisited the 3d Battalion, 363d, he hadnoted the conflicting statements whichthat battalion's staff officers had madeabout the location of its rifle companies.

As darkness neared, Company B madefinal preparations for attack. CaptainPeabody briefed his platoon leaders, andbefore dark all commissioned and non-commissioned officers except the assistantsquad leaders, who remained with themen, went to the top of the hill abovethe battalion command post and wereshown their objective, the highest peakof Monte Altuzzo, Hill 926, and the ridgewhich led up to it. From their observa-tion point the objective stood out likea giant inverted funnel, towering abovethe narrow valley and the smaller peaksaround it. None of the men suspectedthat any other part of the mountain couldever be mistaken for Hill 926.

Throughout the day the men of Com-pany B had been ready to move at amoment's notice. Each rifleman hadbeen issued two bandoleers of .30-caliberammunition totaling twelve clips orninety-six rounds, each light machinegun squad 750 rounds, and each riflesquad three or four hand grenades.14

During the early evening most of themen ate a K ration supper, drank water,and received the daily issue of a packageof cigarettes, a tropical chocolate bar,and a stick of chewing gum. To makesure that valuable information identifyingthe outfit did not fall into enemy hands,each man was checked by squad andassistant squad leaders for unit recogni-tion material. The arrival of mail notlong before the jump-off boosted morale,though it was too dark to read the mailand security too urgent to permit dis-tribution. While three of the platoonsleft their mail at the battalion aid station,the 3d Platoon took its mail along in thecare of the platoon guide, who later gaveit to an assistant squad leader, Sgt.David N. Seiverd.15

At 2115, while Company B was form-ing for its attack, the enemy shelled thearea around Paretaio Farmhouse butcaused no casualties. Fifteen minuteslater the company, with the 2d Platoonof heavy machine guns from Company Dattached, crossed its initial point atParetaio in a single column and walkednorth along the wooded slopes thatstretched east of the Scarperia-Firen-zuola highway. The company missionwas clear: to reach Company A on thelower slopes of Hill 782 and, after makingcontact, to advance up the eastern slopeof the main Altuzzo ridge while CompanyA advanced up the western slope untilHill 926 was occupied.

Leading Company B was the 2d Pla-toon, followed by the 3d Platoon, com-

14 Combat Intervs with Peabody and with 2d LtClemens M. Hankes, 2d Lt William J. Kelsey, andall surviving EM in Co B, 338th Inf. At the startof the Gothic Line operations, the 85th Division hadtwelve flame throwers; but since these weaponsweighed seventy pounds when filled with fuel they

were not considered suitable offensive weapons inmountainous terrain where every extra pound countedand where the problem of fuel resupply was great.Memo, Maj Charles L. Badger to 85th Div CofS,14 Sep 44, 85th Div G-3 Jnl File, Sep 44.

15 Combat Intervs with all surviving offs and EMin Co B.

142 THREE BATTLES

pany headquarters, the Weapons Platoon,the attached heavy machine gun platoon,and the 1st Platoon. At the end of thecolumn was a five-man detail which, asit moved, laid light telephone wire fromthe battalion CP. Because of the diffi-culty of movement over the rough terrain,the attached 2d Platoon of Company Dcarried only two heavy machine gunsinstead of its normal complement of four.Although the whole column easily ex-tended 500 yards on the ground, CaptainPeabody considered the formation neces-sary for strict control because of the darknight (one could see scarcely ten yardsahead), the rugged terrain, and thenarrow routes of approach to the line ofdeparture and the objective.

Following the high trail that woundalong the slope northeast of Paretaio,Company B struck a steep, narrow drawcut by a branch of Rocca Creek. Herethe men turned east, crossed the branch,and stumbled and groped their way downthe hillside toward the grainfield andolive orchard that stretched beside themain Rocca Creek. Reaching the edgeof the field, the column followed a pathacross the open ground to the deep,broad draw of the creek bed at a pointwhere large trees lined the stream. Asthe column moved across the draw, somemortar fire fell near by but did not delaythe advance.

Throughout the march, contact be-tween men was frequently broken. Inmost cases the break occurred at the rearof the column in the 60-mm. mortarsection and the attached heavy machinegun platoon where the heavy loads madeit hard for the men to keep pace with theriflemen. Every time contact was lostthe whole column had to stop until itcould be restored. During these periods

of waiting, some men fell asleep anddozed until the column was ready tomove out again. The delay would havebeen even worse without the constantuse of SCR 536's between platoons andcompany headquarters.16

When Company B left the main RoccaCreek bed it moved up the steep, rockyslopes of the finger of Hill 624 on thelower part of the main Altuzzo ridge.The first two or three men who startedup the hill grasped bushes for support,but their heavy weight pulled the bushesout of the rocky ground and those whofollowed had to help each other up theslope. After passing up their rifles, theygripped hands together and raised eachother from one level to the next.

At the head of the column the 2dPlatoon, going east toward the ridge line,moved about thirty yards past a trail onthe slope of Hill 624 before the companycommander ordered the men to comeback to the trail and follow it through agroup of big chestnut trees. Althoughthe night was pitch black when thecolumn reached this area on the north-west slope of Hill 624, Captain Peabodycould see the crest of Monte Altuzzolimned against the skyline. He decidedto follow the trail and guide on the peakin the belief that this course would bringhim to Company A.17 At 0025, 14 Sep-tember, the 338th Infantry telephonedthe 85th Division G-3 that Company Bwas on the southwest slope of Hill 782about 500 yards below the peak.18

16 Combat Intervs with the following: 1st Lt RobertsClay; all surviving offs and EM of the Altuzzo actionin Co B, 338th Inf; Peabody. See also Intervs andNotes of terrain reconnaissance with Peabody et al.;Peabody MS.

17 Intervs and Notes of terrain reconnaissance withPeabody et al.

18 338th Inf Unit Jnl, 14 Sep 44; 85th Div G-3Jnl, 13-14 Sep 44.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 143

Another Prominent Ridge

Moving along the trail, Captain Pea-body lost sight of the main Altuzzo ridgeand the highest peak, which the steepslope and the dark night now hid fromview. As the trail wound back and fortharound half-circle bends, it was hard forthe company commander to be sure ofthe direction in which the column wasmoving. When he reached the lowerslopes of Hill 782 on the trail near wherehe thought Company A was located, hetried in vain to raise Captain King onthe SCR 300. The Company B com-mander then directed his men to continuearound the last bend of the trail on thelarge finger of Hill 782. Reaching thebase of the bowl where a big tree laysprawled across the trail, he stopped thecolumn to get his bearings and to markout the route of advance.

Captain Peabody noticed now for thefirst time that there were two equallyprominent ridges, one to his left and oneto his right, both running in a north-southdirection. He could not even see thehighest peak of Monte Altuzzo, for it wasnow hidden by trees and the steep slopethat led to it. Even in daytime the ridgeline on the left would have seemed fromthe base of the bowl higher than themain Altuzzo ridge on the right, becausethe peak, Hill 926, was obscured fromview. The sight of two equally highparallel ridges was a new and confusingidea to Peabody. Before leaving Pare-taio, he had studied the terrain with fieldglasses, maps, and aerial photographs,and there had been no question in hismind but that the main Altuzzo ridgewas the only prominent feature betweenMonte Verruca and Highway 6524 tothe west.

After another unsuccessful effort toraise Company A on the radio, Peabodyradioed Colonel Jackson that he was un-certain as to his location. So that hecould orient himself, he requested one ortwo smoke rounds on the highest peak ofMonte Altuzzo; but when the smoke wasfired Peabody could not see the roundsland and could only faintly hear theirexplosions.

With smoke failing to identify his ob-jective, the Company B commanderdecided that the peak he wanted to reachmust be on the left. If so, he deduced,Company B was then on the slopes ofMonte Verruca. Since the 339th In-fantry was scheduled to place a thirty-minute artillery barrage on that featureand then attack it at 0500, he didn't wantto prolong his stay in the area.

Before moving out again, he notifiedColonel Jackson that he would lead hismen to the ridge on the left, which hethought was Monte Altuzzo. The bat-talion commander, still out of communi-cation with Company A and in no posi-tion to dispute Captain Peabody's judg-ment of his location, gave his approval.19

At the 1st Battalion CP, informationregarding Company B's location wasmeager but highly optimistic. At 0200Captain Quisenberry, the battalion S-3,reported Company B on the east slopeof Hill 926 and Company A in the saddleto the north. Although he surmised thatthe two companies controlled the crestof the mountain, he awaited confirmationbefore reporting that information offi-cially. On the basis of this report, the338th Infantry at 0215 notified the 85th

19 Combat Intervs with Peabody and Jackson;Intervs and Notes of terrain reconnaissance withPeabody et al.; Peabody MS; 338th Inf and 339thInf Unit Jnls, 14 Sep 44.

JAGGED CREST OF WESTERN RIDGE leading to the summit of Hill 926. This isthe route taken by Captain Peabody's men. Note rock slabs jutting out from the bare ridge line.

CAMOUFLAGED LOG BUNKER on western ridge. From this position effective firecould be placed on lower slopes of bowl and across la Rocca draw.

146 THREE BATTLES

Division G-3 that the 1st Battalion, 338th,controlled Hill 926, with Company A onthe left and Company B on the right ofthe peak. In the advance, the reportindicated, neither company had met re-sistance except harassing mortar fire.The regiment reported that, while itscompanies might be even farther along,these locations were definite. It was0430 before the 338th Infantry learnedthat its leading companies were notnearly so far forward.20

The ridge which Captain Peabody hadselected as his objective was a boomerang-shaped spur of the main Altuzzo ridge.Branching off from Hill 926, the spur ranfor some 500 yards almost due west andculminated in a rocky peak. From thereit curved to the southwest and, con-tinuing roughly parallel to the mainAltuzzo ridge for another 700 yards,formed the western rim of the bowl atwhose base Peabody stood.

About 100 yards long and 2,650 feethigh, the rocky peak of this western ridgewas studded with enemy positions whichhad been blasted from solid rock andcovered the main ridge, the bowl on theeast, the eastern arm of Monticelli, andthe highway. For ninety yards acrossthe top of the peak, about ten feet belowthe crest, a zigzag trench, three feet wideand six feet deep, connected heavy logbunkers. Covered with two layers ofsix-inch logs, the trench was topped byheavy rock fragments and soil which somerged into the natural rock formationthat on first glance it was not visible fromthe outside. From two of the connectingbunkers, camouflaged with green mattingand facing toward the road some 400

yards to the west, effective fire could beplaced on troops attacking along thehighway up the bare ridge that led tothe crest of Monticelli. Another position—a double pillbox with apertures fortwo machine guns—faced toward themain Altuzzo ridge and could cover alarge part of the bowl with flanking fire.A fourth pillbox faced south and coveredthe draw between the western ridge andthe highway. Spaced at intervals alongthe connecting zigzag trench were twoobservation posts that faced the bowl.From them observers could detect move-ment up the main ridge from the crestof Hill 782 past the main line of resistanceon Knob 2. German riflemen in theselookout posts might easily fire across themain ridge line and the slopes of thebowl.

South of the western peak a series ofrock slab ledges extended down the ridgeline for a hundred yards before givingway to bushes and trees for another thirtyto forty yards. South of the woodedarea more rocks jutted out for anothertwenty-five yards to the south. Belowthese rocks and almost halfway down theridge was a bare, treeless, rockless areaof about fifty yards. About midwaythrough this open space, the enemy haderected a fifteen- to twenty-yard band ofbarbed wire which ran along the westernslope of this ridge, across the ridge line,and over its bare eastern slope into thebowl. Consisting of several strands, theknee-high barbed wire was covered inthe center of the ridge line by a manholetrench and on the east flank by a logpillbox. A machine gun from this pill-box could fire down the ridge line overthe barbed wire and bring flanking fireacross the lower half of the bowl, espe-20 338th Inf Unit Jnl, 14 Sep 44.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 147

cially the lower western slope of the mainAltuzzo ridge. Another log bunker hadbeen placed fifteen yards to the right rearof the first on the edge of the ridge lineand sited to rake the lower half of thebowl.21 On the night of 13-14 Septem-ber Captain Peabody was completely inthe dark about these positions and theconfiguration of the hill he had chosenas his route of advance.

By the time Captain Peabody hadmade his decision to go to the ridge onthe west, the hours of darkness were fastfunning out. No one in Company Bremembered the exact hour, but it musthave been well toward dawn. Muchtime had been lost traversing the roughground. There seemed to Peabody nogood reason for delaying further by tryingto reach Company A with radio, whichhad failed, or with patrols, which hadnot been tried. By this time he had thefeeling that no matter what he did hewould miss Company A. His primaryconcern was to lead his men out of thedraw to his left onto high ground beforedaylight. From experience he knewthat when dawn came the enemy covereddraws and lower slopes with mortar andartillery fire.22

Stepping over the felled tree at thebase of the bowl, the men of Company Bwalked up a trail that led west up therocky western ridge. Reaching the ridge

line, the 2d Squad of the leading 2dPlatoon moved steadily northeast on theeast slope until it ran into several strandsof concertina barbed wire that stretcheddirectly ahead across the eastern slope.Halting his squad, Sergeant Brown, the2d Squad leader, began to cut the strandswith wirecutters, but before the job wasfinished Lieutenant Neuffer, the 2dPlatoon leader, decided that too muchwire stood in the way. To find an easierroute he ordered the platoon to about-face, swing to the southwest, and advanceto the nose of the ridge line. Once thereit would turn north and push up towardthe peak of what presumably was MonteAltuzzo. Swinging in an arc along alittle trail, the 2d Platoon soon reachedthe southern end of a bare, open spacethat ran straight up the ridge line forfifty yards. On the march to this pointthe company had sustained two casual-ties; an automatic rifleman in the 1stPlatoon had wrenched his knee, althoughhe continued to limp along in the column,and a Weapons Platoon ammunitionbearer had been slightly injured when hefell from a steep ledge.

As soon as the 2d Squad, still in singlefile at the head of the 2d Platoon, reachedthe ridge line, the men moved just tothe left of the crest and walked across alittle dip in the open ground up to thebarbed wire. There the file haltedmomentarily while Sergeant Brown, whohad misplaced or left his wirecuttersdown on the east slope, sent for a paircarried by the assistant squad leader,Sergeant Mullins. After clipping thewire, Sergeant Brown reached the north-ern end of the entanglement and almoststumbled on a manhole trench hiddenby a mesh camouflage net. While the

21 The discussion of terrain and defenses on thewestern ridge is based on at least ten trips to the areaby the author from November 44 to April 45. Par-ticularly valuable reconnaissances were made withLieutenant Kelsey and Sergeant Dozier, 23 December44, and with Captain Peabody, Sergeant Ledford,and Sergeant Dozier, 24 March 45.

22 Peabody MS; Combat Intervs with Peabody andall other surviving offs and EM in Co B, 338th Inf.

148 THREE BATTLES

squad leader covered, the third man inthe column, Private Beverage, probedwith fixed bayonet into the position. Itwas empty.

Fire Fight at the Barbed Wire

Again the 2d Platoon's 2d Squadmoved forward, but before the men hadtaken more than a few steps a Germanwith a machine pistol in a dugout abouttwenty feet away on the right frontopened fire. The first burst woundedPrivate Beverage in the left arm andkilled Private Cetel, the rifle grenadier.Although the rest of the squad hit theground, other Germans in the same dug-out began to find the range with handgrenades. Both Pfc. Abraham Rubin,BAR man, and Lieutenant Neuffer werepainfully wounded in the face and hands,and the platoon leader was temporarilyblinded.

A moment later, from the right fronta machine gun in the dugout above thebarbed wire fired close to the men whowere hugging the ground in the middleof the entanglement. Most of this firewent over the men's heads, but two othermachine guns on the main Altuzzo ridgefired from the right flank and right rear,causing a number of casualties amongthe company's rear platoons. The mostdeadly fire came from a bunker whichwas dug into the side of the large fingerof Hill 782. Again and again a machinegun from this bunker raked the bareridge, making it worth a man's life tomove.

As the enemy's defensive fire began inearnest, Lieutenant Neuffer, his face andhands covered with blood from hisgrenade wounds, ordered Sergeant Brownto pull the leading men of the 2d Squad

back through the barbed wire and buildup a skirmish line. The other twosquads of the 2d Platoon built up on theleft flank and right rear of the 2d Squad,and the entire platoon returned theenemy's fire.23

As soon as the fire fight began, CaptainPeabody ordered the 3d Platoon to moveup abreast of the 2d, build up a skirmishline on its left flank, and attack up theridge line. Because of the heavy firewhich raked the exposed ground, the 3dPlatoon leader, 1st Lt. Clemens M.Hankes, formed a skirmish line to theleft rear of the 2d Platoon at the southernend of the bare spot, which droppedsharply from the hump to a steeper slopeand thus gave some protection from theenemy fire.24 The rest of Company Band the machine gun platoon of Com-pany D had been stretched out in azigzag column down the eastern slope ofthe ridge. At the sound of the first fire,the men in the rear had scattered forcover, hiding behind rocks and in littledepressions in the ground.25

While the fire fight was still in progress,a German soldier shouting "Kamerad"popped out of nowhere and surrenderedto the 2d Platoon's leading men. WhilePvt. Frederick Koss, a BAR ammunitionbearer, covered the enemy prisoner, Pvt.Idelrno Salmestrelli, an assistant squadleader, stripped him of a grenade belt

23 Combat Intervs with Peabody, Brown, Mullins,and Pvt Idelmo Salmestrelli; Intervs and Notes ofterrain reconnaissance with Ledford; Peabody MS.

24 Ibid.; Combat Intervs with the following: S SgtWilliam E. Ford, Lusk, Pfc Patrick H. McDonald,Jr., and Pfc Willie E. Guy; Hankes.

25 Combat Intervs with the following: T SgtArthur O. Tomlet, T Sgt Louis S. Campbell, S SgtJoseph T. Barrow, S Sgt James M. Burrows, S SgtJohn D. Brice, Pfc John S. Ptaszkiewicz, Sgt HowardC. Pecor, Sgt Alvin L. West, Pfc James W. Wright,and Pfc Arthur E. Collins, Kelsey-Dozier.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 149

and tossed it out of reach. The 2dPlatoon sergeant, T. Sgt. Fred C. Lang,quizzed the prisoner and learned that theenemy had posted about fifty men on thehill. Not far beyond the barbed wire,the German said, mines were planted onthe left and right of the ridge line, butthere were none in the center.

Before the brisk skirmish was over, thewounded platoon leader, LieutenantNeuffer, went down the hill, leavingPlatoon Sergeant Lang in command.Armed with the information supplied bythe prisoner, Sergeant Lang realized thathis men would have to push up the ridgeand take the peak before the approachingdaylight enabled the enemy to placeaccurate fire on the ridge and perhapssweep Company B back down the moun-tain. Failing to reach the company com-mander by SCR 536, he directed theplatoon guide, S. Sgt. Herman Ledford,to lead the way up the ridge with a smallpatrol and promised to follow closebehind with the rest of the platoon.26

Ledford's Patrol

Taking with him four men from the 3dSquad, Sergeant Ledford moved throughthe barbed wire ahead of the rest of the2d Platoon. In fear that the Germanswho had put up the short but stiff fightwere lying low while the patrol passed,Ledford's men examined the outpostposition which covered the wire entangle-ment and the bare spot on the hill below.Just past the entanglement SergeantLedford looked into a bough-lined slittrench right on the ridge line and foundit empty. On the right Pfc. Anthony J.Odierna examined the dugout fromwhich the grenades and the close-in

machine gun fire had come and foundonly a single dead German slumpedinside, a hole through his head.

Followed by the rest of the patrol,Sergeant Ledford continued up themountain through a space of brush andscattered trees a few yards to the left ofthe ridge line. Reaching the first rockslab ledge above the barbed wire, heplaced his two rear men in a position tocover the further advance of the rest ofthe patrol. Then, followed by PrivateOdierna and Pvt. William C. Brodeur,he moved through a relatively openbrush-covered space to a second rockledge. Private Brodeur, a heavy manwell into his thirties, was panting heavilyand looked as if he could not continue.The other two men stopped suddenlyat a path which crossed the ridge lineand examined a sign tacked on a tree.The sign read: "Minen."

Because he believed what the prisonerhad reported, that there were mines onlyon the east and west slopes and none inthe center of the ridge, Ledford was notinclined to heed the sign's warning. Hejudged—correctly—from the way the signwas placed that the enemy intended itas a ruse to deny use of the trail.

Undeterred by the mine warning,Ledford motioned for the two men whowere still in covering position at the firstrock ledge to join him. When theyarrived, he posted them as guards at thepath to protect the rear while he andOdierna and Brodeur continued up theridge.

Before moving out again, Ledfordasked Brodeur, who had been wellwinded by the first leg of the journey, ifhe could continue. Although the oldersoldier did not answer, when Ledford andOdierna started out they noticed that26 Combat Intervs with Ledford and Salmestrelli.

150 THREE BATTLES

Brodeur was still with them. Advancingon the left of the ridge line, the three menpassed through brush and small trees andfinally worked their way into a rockyarea. The higher they went, the steeperbecame the slope. Brodeur was nowfeeling the pace strongly and droppedfrom sight of the other two. Ledfordand Odierna continued to climb upward,most of the time on their hands and kneesover rocky ledges. They could hear thefire and watch the tracers from machineguns farther up the ridge firing over theirheads down the mountain.

When they finally reached the bottomof the last rock slab ledge below thesouthern end of the ridge's peak, theypaused briefly to get their breath andtake stock of the situation. Just abovethem beyond the top of the ledge theycould see dust raised by bullets from aGerman machine gun and could hearits staccato bursts. Sergeant Ledfordclimbed noiselessly up the face of therock slab and stuck his head over theedge. There, in full view and a scantten yards away, was the muzzle of theGerman gun.

Pulling his head down behind the rockledge, Sergeant Ledford called for PrivateOdierna to pass up hand grenades. Ifthe grenades failed to silence the machinegunner, Ledford whispered, Odierna wasto finish the job with his rifle. Whilethe gun above continued to sputter away,Ledford again edged up to where hecould see and flipped a grenade to hisright front inside the position. Themachine gun abruptly ceased fire. Al-most at the same moment, Odierna, whohad seen another German through theembrasure of a bunker to his left front,warned Ledford to watch for action fromthat side.

Since no sound came from the leftposition, Sergeant Ledford thought thatany Germans there were merely bidingtheir time before opening fire. To makesure that they would not fire, he againcrawled over bare rock to the top of theledge. Crouched between the two posi-tions, he tossed a hand grenade into theleft bunker. Following the explosion,all was quiet.

Over in the right position the Germanmoaned and jabbered. Aware that thenear-dead sometimes miraculously springto life, Ledford decided to make sure thatboth the gunner and his gun were out ofaction. Tossing another grenade intothe right position, he quickly movedtoward the barrel of the machine gun,which protruded from the embrasure.Keeping one eye on the German gunner,slumped inside but still moaning, hegrasped the overheated barrel, unlatchedthe barrel and firing mechanism, de-tached them from the mount, and pulledthe gun from the bunker.

Private Brodeur, who had fallen behindin the ascent, had by this time caught upand taken position near the other twomen. Private Odierna investigated theleft bunker and reported finding a badlywounded German, evidently felled bySergeant Ledford's second grenade. Notlong afterward another German cameout of a position behind the two bunkersand a few yards nearer the ridge's peak.First to see this new target, Ledfordkilled the German with a shot from hisrifle.

The sudden appearance of the lastGerman whetted the desire of the menin the patrol to investigate the positionson the peak. Both Ledford and Brodeurclimbed through the embrasure into theright bunker and strained their eyes

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 151

through the darkness, but inside the posi-tion all was quiet. They probed to findan interior exit; but in the inky black-ness the rough-hewn chamber seemeda dead end, and they crawled backoutside. Had they pressed the search,they might have discovered that the posi-tion was connected by a log-and-rock-covered trench with the bunker on theleft and other positions farther up thepeak.

By the time Ledford and Brodeur cameback into the open, the movement aroundthe two bunkers, if not the earlier shotsand exploding grenades, had attractedthe enemy on the upper slope of the bowlsouthwest of Hill 926. There on theright front where the Germans heldpositions in rocks and pine trees, enemyrifles and a machine pistol opened fireon the bunker area where the threeAmericans crouched. Although SergeantLedford replied with rifle fire, he hadfired only a clip or two before a bulletwounded him in the nose and face. Withblood streaming from his ears and nose,he called to Brodeur and Odierna, "I'mhit!" and started down the ridge.27

Odierna and Brodeur remained near thetwo positions at the southern end of thepeak, taking cover alongside the Germanbunkers.28

2d and 3d Platoons Move Up

As the wounded platoon guide walkeddown the hill, the rest of the 2d Platoonwas moving up the ridge above thebarbed wire. After the first skirmish,Sergeant Lang had ordered the rest ofhis men to advance up the ridge, directingthem to fire high in order to spare their

comrades in the patrol but still to pindown the enemy. Dispersed in smallgroups and keeping no regular skirmishline or other formation, the men movedas rapidly as the steep slope would per-mit. A few at a time, they duckedthrough the low brush, the rocks, andthe trees and pulled themselves from onelevel to the next. Although they firedoccasional shots, most men saved theirammunition in case they should laterrun into stiff opposition. Early daylightwas streaking the hillsides, but the morn-ing haze screened the men from theenemy on the main Altuzzo ridge andalong the slopes beside the highway.Because of limited visibility, the enemyput only harassing fire in the area, andmost shots passed harmlessly overhead.

About one hundred yards above thebarbed wire, the 2d Platoon passedthrough a heavily wooded area thatstretched across the ridge line and upalong the west slope toward the peakwhere a heavy rock formation droppedoff sheer into a gorge. Beyond the treesthe men came to another rock ledgewhere some took up positions. Otherscontinued past waist-high rock slabsstretching across the ridge line. To keeptheir balance as they climbed, the mendropped almost to their knees. Anothergroup walked to the left of the rocksthrough small, heavily foliaged trees untilthey came to a space between the top ofthe third rock ledge and another higherledge lying just a few yards below thesouth end of the peak. Here most of the2d Platoon stopped, but a few, includingPfc. Albert E. Wilson, Pfc. David R.Leon, and Pvt. Jules D. Distel, the 3dSquad's BAR team, climbed above thelast rock ledge where they could seeBrodeur and Odierna just above them.

27 Combat Intervs with Brodeur and Ledford.28 Combat Interv with Brodeur.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 153

After checking his men's positions, Ser-geant Lang tried in vain to reach thecompany commander by SCR 536.29

Shortly after the 2d Platoon hadreached these positions, but before themen had dug in, the two leading squadsof the 3d Platoon came up to the thirdrock ledge. (Map 12) Singly or ingroups of four or five men, they advancedup the hill in the face of only harassingfire. The squads kept no formation, andonly about fifteen men went the wholeway to the advanced positions. Of thosethat did, some stopped at the northernedge of the wooded area on the ridge linejust to the rear of the 2d Platoon, andothers took up positions between thesecond and third rock ledges from thepeak on the left flank in the bushes andsmall trees to the west of the ridge line.With these men came T. Sgt. William A.Scheer, the 3d Platoon sergeant, whojoined Sergeant Lang and organized hisown men in defensive positions before hewas hit in the arm by a burst of machinegun fire.30

Not long after the 3d Platoon reachedthe positions of the 2d, Private Brodeur,who from the highest rock ledge had thebest observation, spotted an enemy tankmoving from behind a house on the high-way to the front. It moved off the roadand came to a halt 500 yards to the northof and below Company B's advancedpositions.

While the tank was still too far awayto make a good target, Brodeur calleddown to Sergeant Lang for a bazooka,and the platoon sergeant relayed the

message to his bazooka team. Pfc. LeslieH. Albritton and his assistant bazookaman moved up to Sergeant Lang, butwhen the sergeant described the tank'slocation and the exposed position fromwhich the men would have to fire theassistant bazooka man protested. Ser-geant Mullins, assistant squad leader ofthe 2d Platoon's 2d Squad, heard theprotest and told the soldier to hand overthe ammunition. Taking the two rounds,Sergeant Mullins followed Brodeur andAlbritton to a small bare spot betweenthe two top rock slabs. Brodeur pointedout the target, and Albritton crawledfive yards farther to place the bazooka infiring position amid a clump of bushes.With Sergeant Mullins loading, Albrittonfired; the first round landed a hundredyards short.

The enemy tank started its motor anddrove around a bend in the road. AgainSergeant Mullins loaded the bazooka,and Albritton fired. The second rocketfell within twenty-five yards of the target,bringing from the tank a quick answeringround that barely missed the men on thewestern slope of the ridge. Having firedtheir only ammunition, the bazooka menwithdrew.31

The infantry-tank exchange was scarce-ly over before the men in the 2d and 3dPlatoons saw a half-dozen Germans walknonchalantly down the highway to thenorthwest. At the same time the 3dPlatoon leader, Lieutenant Hankes, andthe 2d (support) Squad of the 3d Platoon,who were farther down the hill but ontheir way up, saw the same movement.Both groups of Company B opened fire.An automatic rifleman, Pfc. Ira Jones,killed one of the enemy, but the others

29 Combat Intervs with Ford, Mullins, Salmestrelli,Pfc John E. Catlett, Pfc Leslie N. Albritton, PvtGeorge Itzkowitz, Distel, Leon, Wilson, and PvtThomas H. Sherman.

30 Combat Intervs with Ford, Lusk, Guy, andMcDonald.

31 Combat Intervs with Brodeur and with Mullins,Albritton, Catlett, Salmestrelli, and Itzkowitz.

154 THREE BATTLES

hit the ground quickly and deployedalong the road or in the woods. One ofthe Germans remained there almostforty-five minutes while the Company Briflemen tried to pick him off. Finallythe man rose, ran off a short distance,and plunged or fell into a ditch, possiblya victim of Company B's fire. A shortwhile afterward the survivors of thisGerman group set off a detonation whichblew up a section of the highway justbeyond the U-bend across the draw fromthe Company B positions.

All the while the men in the 2d and 3dPlatoons were becoming more exposedto fire from the flanks and rear. As theday grew brighter, the aim of Germanriflemen from the main Altuzzo ridge andthe slopes near the highway grew better.No matter how small the men managedto make themselves against the hard rockor bare ground, enemy sharpshooterspicked them off at frequent intervals.German riflemen even tried to creep upand surprise them and before beingdriven away caused several casualties.Most men had cover on the front, butfew had protection on the flanks or rear.Their attempts to dig foxholes in therocky soil succeeded in little more thanscraping away the topsoil. Sgt. HarveyE. Kirkes, acting 1st Squad leader, 3dPlatoon, and Pvt. Willie L. Guy, his riflegrenadier, tried to dig a double slittrench in front of a big rock ledge. Atfirst Private Guy dug while his companionwatched for the enemy. When the holewas about six inches deep, they shiftedplaces. Taking up the entrenching tool,Sergeant Kirkes had lifted it only a fewtimes before a German from the left nearthe highway killed him with a rifle shotin the chest.

The German marksmen from the mainAltuzzo ridge and the slopes near thehighway fired often at Sergeant Lang,who moved around more than the others,giving orders and organizing the defense.When the sergeant's position became toohot, he moved to the middle of the twoplatoons and dug another shallow holein the rocks. At two different timesSergeant Lang and Private Salmestrellidiscovered Germans on the west slopetrying to creep up on them but in bothcases drove them away by fire.32

After the unsuccessful effort to knockout the tank, Sergeant Lang and hisrunner, Pvt. Thomas H. Sherman, triedrepeatedly to reach Captain Peabody bySCR 536. Fully aware of his difficultand exposed position, the 2d Platoonsergeant wanted to have artillery fireplaced on the tank, report the discoveryof the Germans who had blown the road,and request reinforcements from the 1stPlatoon, which, although he did notknow it, was still below the barbed wire.After every effort to use the radio hadfailed, probably because its batterieswere weak after all-night operation,Sergeant Lang told Private Sherman togo down the hill with a message.

As the platoon runner moved downthe hill and reached the lower end of thewooded area where the mine sign hungon a tree, he met Lieutenant Hankes, 3dPlatoon leader; Pfc. Noble R. Mathews,his runner; and Pfc. Morris H. Kruger,a rifleman, who were coming up theridge. Behind them the 2d Squad ofthe 3d Platoon was still moving forward,

32 Combat Intervs with the following: Hankes andSeiverd, Mullins, Catlett, Leon, Guy, Lusk, Salmes-trelli, Itzkowitz, and Wilson; Pfcs Alton MOS andJohn Campbell; Brodeur and Pfc William Alberta.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 155

although the squad had not yet come insight. Private Sherman told LieutenantHankes about Sergeant Lang's messageto Captain Peabody, but he could notmake clear the tank's exact location.Lieutenant Hankes felt that if Shermanshowed him the way to the positionswhich the 2d and 3d Platoons held, hehimself could locate the tank's positionexactly so that accurate artillery firecould be placed on it. Blocking off thetrail near the mine warning sign andleaving his runner, Private Mathews, tosteer the support squad away from themines, the platoon leader followed Pri-vate Sherman up the hill.33

Accompanied by Sherman and Kruger,Lieutenant Hankes had gone only a shortdistance when he ran almost head oninto three Germans. Although bothgroups hit the ground quickly, the Ger-mans had had the first view, and scarcelybefore the three Americans had time toduck behind a low rock ledge a Germangrenade landed at Kruger's feet. Un-harmed by the grenade but knowing thatthe Germans had seen where they hit theground, the three men shifted slightlyto the right. The move gave no imme-diate relief, for more concussion grenadesstruck within a few yards of them.Stretched out on the ground, LieutenantHankes watched one five-second grenadeland a foot away from his legs. At first hestarted to pick up the grenade and throwit back, but as he hesitated, fearful thatthe grenade might blow off his hands orface before he could get it away, itexploded. When he regained his senses,he found that he had been wounded inboth legs.

Suspecting that the enemy was curious

to know the effect of the grenades, thelieutenant poked his carbine over theledge. The Germans fell for the trick.First a machine pistol, then a head, roseslowly above the edge of the rocks.Lieutenant Hankes fired, killing the in-quisitive German. Then Private Sher-man worked his way into a better positionand fired. From the high-pitched screamthat followed, he judged that he hadkilled another German.

With two of the three enemy disposedof, Lieutenant Hankes decided thatKruger and Sherman could manage thelone German that remained. Hamperedby the wounds in both legs, the lieutenantwormed his way down the hill aboutthirty yards. When he examined hispack, he found that bullets and grenadefragments had ripped the cans in his Krations and splattered food over theinside of his pack.

After taking sulfanilimide wound tab-lets, the lieutenant continued down thehill to the company command post, foundCaptain Peabody, and explained to himthe plight of the 2d and 3d Platoons. Intheir exposed position, he pointed out,they had suffered heavy casualties andneeded reinforcements and artillery fireagainst the tank. Their rear, he added,was threatened continually by Germanriflemen wandering almost at will overthe ridge. Peabody directed the lieu-tenant on to the battalion aid station andordered the acting 1st Platoon leader,Sgt. William J. Kelsey, to move hisplatoon up the ridge, clear out the sniperswho held out in rear of the lead platoons,and set up defensive positions on theflanks of the advance platoons.34

33 Combat Intervs with Hankes and Sherman.

34 Ibid. Combat Intervs with Peabody, Kelsey,and Dozier.

156 THREE BATTLES

First Counterattack

Farther up the hill, before the 1stPlatoon moved up to carry out its mis-sion, Sergeant Lang and his men nearthe top of the ridge were hit by a barragefrom 50-mm. mortars, opening the firstGerman counterattack. The men duckedfor whatever cover they could find behindrocks or in their shallow holes. Pfc.Lucien Harpin was wounded in the backby shell fragments, and Pfc. William C.Leonard, Jr., was killed.

After a few minutes of uneasy quiet,the men were struck suddenly from theright front by approximately forty Ger-mans. Machine guns and rifles on thefront and right flank blazed away, andhand grenades zoomed through the air,tearing up bushes on the left and nickingthe rocks on all sides. For the most partthe aim of the German grenadiers wasgood; but casualties were few, apparentlybecause the grenades were concussion-type instead of fragmentation.

Using BAR's, M-1's, and rifle gre-nades, the 2d and 3d Platoons returnedthe fire. On the right front the mencould see the Germans darting from rockto rock, getting closer all the while.Every time a German came into view,Sergeant Lang's men fired back, andthroughout the counterattack they keptarea fire on the enemy force. Some menon the left, not in position to return thefire, moved a few feet to the right wherethey took cover behind rock slabs andjoined the fight. Because of the dangerof hitting their comrades, only a few ofwhom could be seen from any one point,none of the Americans threw handgrenades.

During the fire fight a few mortarshells landed in the area, and the Amer-

icans spotted one of the mortars on theleft rear in the draw just west of the ridge.An automatic rifleman, Pfc. Alton MOS,kept the position covered the rest of thetime. At intervals when the Germanswould come out to man the mortar,which stuck out nakedly in open ground,Private MOS drove them back with rapidbursts from his BAR. Finally, after hisfire had wounded one German, the enemyabandoned the mortar.

The superior firepower of the 2d and3d Platoons finally beat off the counter-attack and drove the Germans back totheir bunkers and dugouts farther up thehill. Both sides had sustained severalcasualties, but neither knew the exactdamage it had dealt the other.

Although alert and resolute action hadstood off the first enemy counterattack,Sergeant Lang knew that his force hadgained only a temporary respite and thatif he were to continue to hold he neededreinforcements and more ammunition.35

He sent a second messenger, Pfc. John E.Catlett, to ask Captain Peabody forassistance. At the company CP belowthe barbed wire, Private Catlett, unableto find the company commander, de-livered the message to the executiveofficer, 1st Lt. George O. Erkman.Lieutenant Erkman started up the ridge,but rifle and machine gun fire turned himback at the southern edge of the barbedwire. He returned to the CP and di-rected his headquarters men to set upsecurity.36

Up the hill Sergeant Lang was growingmore anxious. No messengers had re-turned and no reinforcements had arrived.

35 Combat Intervs with Brodeur-Alberta and withFord, Seiverd, Mullins, Lusk, Guy, Distel, Leon,Wilson, Salmestrelli, Itzkowitz, and Catlett.

36 Combat Interv with Catlett.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 157

He sent two more men, Pfc. Donald J.Brown and Pfc. Patrick H. McDonald,Jr., with the same message for help. Al-though the two men started out togethercrawling over the rocks, Private Brownstopped for a moment to take a shot ata German. When Private McDonaldlooked back again, he saw that Brownhad been shot and was lying on his back.Seeing that his companion was beyondhelp, McDonald moved on down theridge. As he crossed the barbed wireunder fire and approached the CP area,he met S. Sgt. George D. Keathley, 1stPlatoon guide, and about seven othermen from the 1st Platoon moving up theridge. There too he found CaptainPeabody and delivered Sergeant Lang'smessage.

Captain Peabody replied that help wason the way and that he himself was goingup the hill at once. To remedy theammunition shortage he radioed thebattalion commander for resupply, andColonel Jackson promised to send ammu-nition at once. He directed the Com-pany B commander to hold his positionat all costs. From the battalion com-mand post Colonel Jackson sent avolunteer ammunition detail of twelvemen carrying six boxes of ammunition.When the detail entered the open fieldbeside la Rocca draw, small arms andartillery fire killed the leading man,wounded two others, and forced the restto turn back. Captain Peabody himselfsent two men to Company C for help.Heavy fire turned them back as well.37

Before dawn Colonel Jackson had re-ported that Companies A and B hadbeen almost on top of Monte Altuzzo

during the night and that he had orderedthem to occupy the crest. By 0655 hehad learned from Captain Peabody thatCompany B was in a fire fight, had sus-tained casualties, and was receivingeffective small arms fire from MonteVerruca (actually Monte Altuzzo).38

1st Platoon Moves Forward

Soon after the first counterattack hadended, part of the 1st Platoon of Com-pany B had responded to Captain Pea-body's order to move up the hill to assistthe advance platoons. Earlier, when theenemy had first opened fire on CompanyB at the barbed wire, the 1st Platoon hadbeen stretched out behind the 3d Platoonand had scattered in search of cover. Atthe sound of the fire fight, SergeantKeathley, the platoon guide, had told theleading squad leader, S. Sgt. Oliver N.Summerton, to remain in position whilehe made contact with Sergeant Kelsey,acting 1st Platoon leader, who was some-where up ahead. Taking with himSergeant Summerton's assistant squadleader, Pfc. Vincent C. Clarke, and sixother men from the leading squad,Sergeant Keathley moved around theeastern slope below the bare spot and thebarbed wire to the hump, where he foundSergeant Kelsey and Captain Peabody.For some time, certainly until well intothe morning, this handful of 1st Platoonmen remained in these positions whilePeabody tried in vain to reach the 2dand 3d Platoons by radio.

Lieutenant Erkman, the companyexecutive officer, attempted with moresuccess to locate and concentrate the restof the company around the command

37 Combat Intervs with all enlisted survivors inCo B, 338th Inf, and with Jackson and Peabody; 1stBn, 338th Inf, AAR, Sep 44; Peabody MS. 38 338th Inf Unit Jnl, 14 Sep 44.

158 THREE BATTLES

post, including the Weapons Platoon andthe heavy machine gun platoon of Com-pany D. All except the main part ofthe 1st Platoon, which had so dispersedthat the men were out of contact witheach other, were readily located andinstructed to put out security and lie lowfor the time being. Most men of the 1stPlatoon were scattered over the easternslope out of sight of each other and outof the physical control of their squadleaders. Accurate enemy rifle fire on thearea added to the confusion and lack ofcontrol.

After Captain Peabody's order for the1st Platoon to move up the hill, SergeantKelsey, the platoon leader, sent forwardPrivate Clarke and six other men fromSergeant Summerton's squad, who hadbeen below the hump. Sergeant Keath-ley, the platoon guide, then returned tothe eastern slope to assemble the rest ofthe platoon. Finding Sergeant Sum-merton, the platoon guide ordered him tomove out with the rest of his men and topass word back to the other squads tofollow.

Sergeant Summerton notified thesquads behind him and started forwardwith the two or three men remaining inhis squad. He had taken scarcely onestep forward before enemy fire from themain Altuzzo ridge wounded him. Thetwo men nearest him, Pfc. Arley Perkeyand Pvt. Hamilton Adams, moved backtoward the company command post.Although Private Adams was woundedon the way, Private Perkey reached theCP, obtained a BAR belt from 1st Sgt.Volley Casey, and started again over thehump toward the barbed wire. As heentered the bare space, heavy small armsfire drove him back for the second timeto the vicinity of the CP.

Despite the dispersion of the 1st Pla-toon, the message to move up filteredback to the other two squad leaders, Sgt.Nelson L. Simmons and S. Sgt. CharlesJ. Dozier. They, in turn, tried to password back to their men, but lack of adirect line of contact hampered theirefforts. In all, only half the men ofthe 2d and 3d Squads responded to theorder and followed their leaders. A fewmen, like Pvt. Louis S. Campbell andPfc. Joseph T. Barrow, of SergeantDozier's squad, did not receive word thattheir platoon was moving up but, seeingmen farther up the ridge, decided to jointhem. Others may not have heard thecall, as they said, and some men eitherheard it or saw other members of theplatoon ahead of them move out whilethey themselves stayed in place, afraidto follow because of the rifle fire theenemy was placing on the slope. Al-though one acting assistant squad leaderheard a man shout from the slope abovehim that the 1st Platoon was moving up,he did not want to believe his ears andshouted back to the man above to findout more about the movement. Hearingno reply and seeing no movement, theassistant squad leader decided to staywhere he was with the three men aroundhim until somebody in authority camedown and personally told him to moveup. All in all, some twenty men of the1st Platoon remained on the east slopeor below the company CP throughoutthe day. Occasionally, one or two wouldreturn rifle fire against the main Altuzzoridge; most made themselves as incon-spicuous as possible and took no part inthe action.

That half of the 1st Platoon whichwent up the hill had little trouble incrossing the bare space at the barbed wire

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 159

and sustained only two casualties beforereaching the top of the wooded area. Onthe way, one group of the platoon, ledby Sergeant Kelsey, had advanced to apoint just past the lowest rock ledge whena machine pistol opened fire, killing theplatoon radio operator, Pfc. Angelo F.Crespi. Dropping to the ground, therest of the men briefly exchanged firewith the German and then pushed on upthe hill to the north edge of the woodedarea. There Pvt. Kenneth T. Moorewas killed by a German rifleman whoslipped in close on the left flank.

About seventeen men of the 1st Platoonreached the north edge of the woodedarea and took up defensive positions.Private Clarke and six men went intoposition on the right flank on the eastslope, Sergeant Dozier's squad on theleft flank in the rocks just above thewooded area, and Sergeant Simmons,with four or five men, in the center.39

Only a BAR team was sent all the way upthe ridge through the higher rocks to thedirect assistance of the 2d and 3d Pla-toons; the others were, in effect, onlyguarding the rear of the forward posi-tions.40 If the 1st Platoon had pushedout on the right flank of the 2d and 3dPlatoons and tied in on a tight defensiveline, the result might well have beendisastrous. The eastern slope of theridge where the 1st Platoon would thenhave been was exposed and, because of

heavy underbrush to the front, had nofield of fire. Even the rocks in the center,which offered some cover to the 2d and3d Platoons, thinned out on the eastslope. Although the heavy band of treeson the west slope would have offeredconcealment, it would have allowed the1st Platoon no chance to observe enemymovement through the trees or to preventsurprise attacks.

From the positions which the platoondid assume in the center rear and rightrear of the forward platoons, it could atleast place area fire and, in some cases,direct fire on enemy counterattacks mov-ing across the eastern slope. Still the 1stPlatoon's coverage of the area was farfrom complete, and the right flank ofthe 2d and 3d Platoons remained ex-posed. Thus, owing largely to the openground and the configuration of the hill,the 1st Platoon could not round out aperimeter defense for Company B.41

Neither Sergeant Kelsey, acting 1stPlatoon leader, nor Captain Peabodyknew how far ahead of the 1st Platoonwere the 2d and 3d Platoon positions.Neither went up to find out or to seewhether the rear and forward defenseswere tied in tightly, and the men in theforward positions were left to wonderwhere the 1st Platoon was.42 Certainlythey had no reason to believe that it hadcome to their relief or was even in asupporting position.43

39 Combat Intervs with the following: Kelsey-Dozier; Dozier, Campbell, Barrow, Burrows, Sim-mons, and Casey; Pecor, Pfcs Luther Ingram,Marvin Cobb, James O. Brooks, Joseph T. La-Monica, Arley Perkey, and Pvt Edward L. Lazowski.

40 Intervs and Notes of terrain reconnaissances withKelsey-Dozier; Combat Intervs with all survivorsfrom 1st, 2d and 3d Plats, Co B, 338th Inf, especiallySalmestrelli.

41 Terrain information based not only on inter-views, but on several trips by the author to thewestern ridge from November 1944 to April 1945.

42 Combat Intervs with Peabody and Kelsey andwith all enlisted survivors in Co B, 338th Inf. Cap-tain Peabody stated that he never realized until hewent over the ground with the author how far aheadof his position were his 2d and 3d Platoons.

43 Combat Intervs with all enlisted survivors in 2dand 3d Plats, Co B, 338th Inf.

160 THREE BATTLES

Machine Guns and Mortars Move Forward

After half of the 1st Platoon had set upits defensive positions at the north edgeof the woods, the Weapons Platoon andthe heavy machine gun platoon of Com-pany D followed suit, each going forwardby squad bounds. Walking through thebarbed wire one man at a time, Sgt. JohnD. Brice's light machine gun squad didnot receive fire until the last man, Pvt.Raymond M. Babbitt, was hit in thehand. On the way up the ridge thesame squad tried repeatedly to silence aGerman machine gun that kept firingfrom the main Altuzzo ridge.

The machine gun section leader, S.Sgt. Arthur O. Tomlet, went up near the2d and 3d Platoons' sector to locatefiring positions, while his two squads pro-ceeded to the north edge of the woodedarea. Returning from his reconnais-sance, Sergeant Tomlet directed that thetwo guns be placed at the far end of thewoods where they would face the roadand cover the left flank. The forwardgun was placed in the rocks at the south-ern edge of the third rock slab ledge.The second was set up ten yards to itsrear and about halfway through thewoods. In the rocks ahead and on theeast slope, the section leader had found,there was neither zone of fire, cover, norconcealment for his guns. Hardly hadthe second gun been put in positionbefore Sergeant Tomlet was wounded inthe knee and toe by a rifle bullet.

Although the machine gun positionsof the Weapons Platoon were useful forfire on the draw between the westernridge and the highway, they could notbe used for repelling counterattacks ex-cept on the extreme left flank, because ofthe danger of hitting the riflemen on the

ridge up ahead. At intervals throughoutthe day the machine gunners placedharassing fire on the left flank, but mostof the time they found the uncoveredfiring positions too dangerous to man.Almost every time a machine gunnermoved, enemy fire wounded or killedhim.44

Behind the light machine guns the twoheavy machine guns of Company D weremoved up the hill a short distance abovethe east-west trail where they were set upin heavy brush at the southern edge ofthe woods. Although one heavy gunfaced up the eastern slope of the ridgeand the other up the western slope,neither was of much help to the CompanyB riflemen. For one thing the machineguns had to fire through woods, and thusfire could not be accurately observed.Except for some harassing fire, the gunswere used only when Germans wereactually seen—and none were seen untillate in the afternoon. The disadvan-tages, moreover, of firing these weaponsstraight up the ridge line were consider-able. Had they tried to cover the ridgeline and the riflemen near the peak, theguns would have had to be moved intothe open where they could have beeneasily knocked out. Even if the machineguns had shot straight up the ridge line,they could have covered only a small partof it, for the layers of rock ledges restrictedobservation and prevented accuratefiring.45

However limited the usefulness of themachine guns to the defense of the ridge,use of the 60-mm. mortars was even moreso. At the time of the 2d Platoon's fire

44 Combat Intervs with Brice and with Ptaszkie-wicz, Collins-West.

45 Combat Interv with Clay.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 161

GERMAN TRENCH AND OBSERVATION POST, part of the enemy's main lineof resistance along Highway 6524. Portion of the western ridge of Monte Altuzzo is visiblein the background.

fight at the barbed wire, the mortarsquads had been several hundred yardsdown on the lower east slope of the ridge.They remained below the hump untilnearly noon when they received an orderfrom Captain Peabody to move intofiring positions above the barbed wire.

As the mortar men grabbed theirequipment and started forward, Germanriflemen and a machine gunner on theslope west of the highway raked theground around them with fire. Afterthe Americans hit the dirt, the machinegunner soon stopped firing, but the enemy

riflemen were persistent. Although mostof the mortar men had some concealment,none had any cover. Only two menwere wounded, one of whom was hitthree times, but others had close calls.A bullet tore through the heel of oneman's shoe, and others struck the cloth-ing or equipment of at least four men.Digging in below the hump, the mortarsquads stayed there the rest of the day,lack of communication with the forwardplatoons preventing use of their weapons.46

46 Combat Interv with Sgt Lester F. Wise.

162 THREE BATTLES

Second Counterattack

Not long after the machine guns andthe 1st Platoon had taken positions in thewooded area above the barbed wire, theGermans launched a second counter-attack. Although men of the 1st Pla-toon's right flank joined the defense withharassing fire, the main brunt of theattack was borne again by the 2d and 3dPlatoons. Like the first counterattack,the second began with a mortar barrage,followed by heavy fire from automaticweapons on both the western peak andthe main Altuzzo ridge. Machine pistolsfired from close by, and a barrage ofgrenades landed among the men in thehigher rocks. In greater force thanbefore, the Germans pressed their coun-terattack while Sergeant Lang's menreplied with BAR's and rifles, continuingto fire even though their ammunition wasrapidly dwindling.

Because of the uneven slope and therocks, the men on the right front caughtonly fleeting glimpses of the enemy.Those on the left saw no Germans at allbut fired back over the rocks as the soundsof the battle came down to them.Suffering heavier casualties than before,the men in the forward positions finallymanaged to drive the Germans back tothe peak. In the process individual sup-plies of ammunition were almost ex-hausted, and the men used the onlymeans to refurbish the supply: those whowere still in fighting condition removedclips from their dead and woundedcomrades.

While the second counterattack wasstill in progress, Sergeant Lang more thanever felt the urgent need for reinforce-ments and resupply. The radio stillwould not work and, as far as Sergeant

Lang knew, every effort to get word toCaptain Peabody by runner had broughtno results. Since he did not know wherethe company commander was or whenhelp could be expected,47 he decided tosend another messenger, Private Salme-strelli for help.48

After climbing over two or three rockslab ledges, Private Salmestrelli reachedSergeant Kelsey and the half-dozen menof Sergeant Dozier's squad of the 1stPlatoon, who were in the lowest rocks atthe north end of the wooded area.Upon receipt of the message, SergeantKelsey sent one BAR team, Pfc. John C.Garlitch and Pfc. George J. Van Vlack,to bolster the defense. Pointing the wayto the two men, Salmestrelli started outbehind them, but he had not gone farbefore rifle fire turned him back. Re-turning to the 1st Platoon sector, hehelped Sergeant Kelsey remove two men,who had just been killed, from slittrenches about five yards apart. As soonas the holes were cleared, two other 1stPlatoon men hopped in them. PrivateSalmestrelli and the 1st Platoon menin this area who had no holes then beganto dig, but they were able only to scratchaway the topsoil of the rocky ground.Hit in the head by enemy rifle fire, the1st Squad's automatic rifleman, Pvt.George J. DiFabbio mumbled a fewwords and fell over dead into SergeantDozier's arms at the edge of his slittrench. Watching this, Private Salme-strelli tossed away his shovel and beganto cry. He moved down the ridge untilhe met Captain Peabody above thebarbed wire at the southern edge of the

47 Combat Intervs with Ford, Seiverd, Mullins,and with Lusk, Guy, Salmestrelli, Distel, Leon,Wilson, and Alberta.

48 Combat Interv with Salmestrelli.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 163

woods. Almost hysterical and badlyshaken by his experience, he cried thathe could not stay on the ridge any longer.Realizing the man was a nervous ex-haustion case, Peabody told him to godown below the barbed wire to thecompany command post.49

Third Counterattack

Sometime after noon, the enemy, usingfewer men than in the second counter-attack, launched a third against Com-pany B's right front. Again the 2d and3d Platoons felt the full force of theassault as mortar shells, grenades, andautomatic weapons fire landed amongthe rocks. Again the Germans wererepulsed, but before withdrawing to thepeak they had inflicted several more cas-ualties upon the two forward platoons.50

During and between counterattacks,while the casualties in Company Bmounted, the platoon aid men workedconstantly to bandage the wounded, easetheir pain with shots of morphine, andbolster the morale of the more seriouscases until evacuation could be accom-plished. Until the 2d Platoon aid man,Pfc. Edward J. Babbitt, Jr., was woundedafter the first counterattack, he movedback and forth under fire giving first aid.The rest of the day the wounded in thetwo forward platoons either treatedthemselves or were tended by their com-rades. At times ingenious devices wereimprovised. To help T. Sgt. WilliamA. Scheer, bleeding freely from a machinegun bullet wound in his arm, PrivateAlbritton and Sergeant Brown took a

shoe string which was being used in placeof a lost carbine strap and applied it asa tourniquet. In some cases the menwere too seriously wounded to respondto first aid treatment or were in positionstoo exposed to receive it. Because of thelack of litters, evacuation of the moreseriously wounded to the battalion aidstation, or even to the company commandpost below the barbed wire, was im-possible. Even with litters it would havebeen a strenuous, costly task to carry thewounded over the steep, exposed ground.51

Although all the ambulatory casualtiesmoved down the hill under their ownpower, for a long time most of them darednot cross the bare space at the barbedwire. In the area directly above thewire, Pfc. Joseph F. Bertani, 3d Platoonaid man, did yeoman service bandagingwounds and administering other first aid.By early afternoon some nine or tenwounded men had gathered in the brushabove the entanglement. After severalhours' wait, the bandaged men removedtheir helmets, stripped to the waist toshow they were noncombatant, andpassed through the wire behind Bertani,who improvised a white flag from a tri-angular bandage. The enemy let thempass without firing a shot.52

Company B's True Location

Through most of the struggle on theridge, much of Company B's distressarose from the fact that no one exceptthe Germans had correctly located itsposition. All day long Captain Peabodyhad reported to the battalion commanderthat his men were on the eastern slope of

49 Ibid.; Combat Interv with Dozier.50 Combat Intervs with Ford, Seiverd, Mullins,

and with Lusk, Guy, Distel, Leon, Wilson, Alberta,and Brodeur.

51 Ibid.; Combat Interv with Albritton.52 Combat Intervs with the following: Bertani,

MOS, Alberta, and Pfc Donald Brouthers.

164 THREE BATTLES

Monte Altuzzo just below the peak.53

At 1130 the 338th Infantry reported thatCompany B was inching forward on thesoutheast slope of Monte Altuzzo. Twohours later the 338th stated that thecompany was on the east slope of the"first nose of Hill 926." Again at 1500the 338th operations officer reported tothe 85th Division that Company A wason the west side of Hill 926 and CompanyB on the east side. Actually, at the timeof the report Company A was 500 yardssouthwest of the crest, Hill 926, andCompany B was 700 yards west and 100to 200 yards south of the location whereit was reported.54

It was only by chance that ColonelJackson discovered Company B's truelocation. Sometime during the after-noon Captain Peabody reported to bat-talion that he was receiving heavy firefrom the west—the left flank—and askedfor artillery fire to silence the enemypositions. As he weighed Peabody's callfor help, Colonel Jackson decided thatthis fire must be coming from Altuzzo'swestern ridge, and he accordingly orderedfire placed there. When the shells beganto land, Peabody radioed that the firewas falling just right—about two hundredyards straight ahead of Company B.For the first time Colonel Jackson knewthat Peabody was not on the mainAltuzzo ridge but on the ridge to thewest. The company commander stillinsisted that he was on the main ridge,55

and it was that night before the men ofCompany B learned that they had neverbeen on their objective.56

Supporting Fires

Notwithstanding the erroneous infor-mation at higher echelons about Com-pany B's location, throughout the daysupporting arms delivered heavy fire onthe Altuzzo and Giogo Pass areas. (SeeMap 9.) During the day II Corpsdirected its divisional and corps artilleryto maintain the "absolute practicablemaximum of artillery fire" in the attackzone of the corps' main effort until theGothic Line was breached. At the sametime II Corps listed the priority of firesin this order: observed, counterbatteryand countermortar, interdictory andharassing, and fires on known enemypositions, installations, or works.

During the day the 329th Field Artil-lery Battalion in direct support of the338th Infantry fired numerous TOT andobserved missions on enemy mortars,machine guns, and personnel, includingfive enemy vehicles, 1,000 yards north ofthe pass. During the morning a 155-mm. howitzer battalion of the 178thField Artillery Group fired five unob-served TOT missions of twenty to fortyrounds each north of Monte Altuzzo onwhat were presumably suspected reservepositions, assembly areas, and enemybatteries. At 1145 the 338th infantryrequested TOT on the area north ofAltuzzo's crest and along the highway300 yards northeast of the pass wherecounterattacking forces were thought tobe forming or moving. Shortly afternoon another battalion of the 178th FieldArtillery Group fired two missions onenemy personnel between the crest ofMonte Altuzzo and the Giogo Pass andin an area 500 yards northeast of thepass. Again the fire was unobserved.

Other supporting units were also ac-

53 Combat Interv with Jackson.54 338th Inf Unit Jnl, 14 Sep 44; 85th Div G-3

Jnl, 14 Sep 44.55 Combat Interv with Jackson.56 Combat Intervs with all enlisted survivors of Co

B, 338th Inf.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 165

tive. Beginning at 0800 all suspectedmortar locations were brought under fireby the 85th Division's countermortarsection, which included 4.2-inch mortarsand artillery. As a result, the 338th and339th Infantry noted a considerable de-crease in enemy mortar fire. From 0615to 1700 the 3d Platoon, Company B, 752dTank Battalion, from positions 2,000yards northeast of Scarperia, fired ninety-two rounds of high explosive in theAltuzzo area. During the day the 1stPlatoon, Company B, 84th ChemicalBattalion, in support of the 1st Battalion,338th Infantry, fired twenty rounds ofwhite phosphorus in the draw east ofthe Giogo Pass and on the slopes of Piandi Giogo. In direct support of the 338thInfantry, Company B, 310th Engineers,worked on supply and tank routes. Oneplatoon with a bulldozer worked on atrail that supplied the 1st Battalion,338th, from Highway 6524 north of Pon-zalla over the lower slopes of di CastroHill as far as Paretaio Farmhouse.Another engineer platoon cleared theroad of mines from Scarperia to Ponzalla,and a third platoon worked on a bypassto a firing position for tanks west of thehighway and about 1,100 yards south ofPonzalla.57

In support of the attack, fighter bomb-ers of the 239th RAF and 7th SAAFWings of the Desert Air Force were activeagainst enemy artillery and defendedpositions. The 239th RAF Wing flewfour missions south and southwest of

Firenzuola, resulting in good concentra-tions and several direct hits which de-stroyed five buildings and caused a largeexplosion in a gun pit. The RAF 239thalso bombed and strafed pits and diggings2,300 yards north-northwest of the passand another area on the Firenzuolaroad. The 7th SAAF Wing bombeddefended areas at Firenzuola and ex-ploded an ammunition dump and hita German self-propelled gun and com-mand post at Collinaccia, two and one-half miles northeast of the Giogo Pass.At 1805 tactical aircraft bombed andstrafed troops in woods and buildings twoand three miles north of the pass.58

Plight of the Forward Platoons

By midafternoon Company B, 338thInfantry, was hard pressed to hold on toits gains on Altuzzo's western ridge.(See Map 12.) At the end of the thirdenemy counterattack, the situation of the2d and 3d Platoons, which had reachedadvanced positions near the peak of thewestern ridge, was almost desperate.Not only was their stock of ammunitiondangerously short, but the repeatedenemy assaults had reduced morale to alow ebb and their combined fightingstrength to about twenty-five men. Itseemed the longed-for relief would nevercome, and rifle bullets continued tospatter the rocks and cause casualties.Seeing the deadly accuracy of the fire—no doubt influenced by the clear, hotweather that provided excellent obser-vation—many men felt they would notlive through the day. As time draggedon, they talked freely of their situation,

57 Memo, II Corps for divs and II Corps arty,14 Sep 44, 85th Div G-3 File, Sep 44; II Corps ArtyJnl, 14 Sep 44; 178th FA Gp Jnl and Mission Rpts,14 Sep 44; 338th Inf Unit Jnl, 14 Sep 44; 752d TkBn Opns Rpt, Sep 44; 84th Cml Bn AAR andJnl, Sep 44; 310th Engr (C) Bn AAR, Daily SitRpt, and Jnl, Sep 44; Combat Intervs with Jacksonand Farber; 329th FA Bn AAR, Sep 44.

58 85th Div G-3 Jnl, 14 Sep 44; 338th Inf Unit Jnl,14 Sep 44; MAAF Daily Central Med OperationalSum, 14 Sep 44.

166 THREE BATTLES

asking one another and wondering tothemselves why help did not come.Nerves that had been on edge all daywere now strained almost to the breakingpoint. Two privates cried out that theycould not stand it any longer, but Sgt.Albert A. Lusk grabbed both men andkept them near him.

Unless they received substantial rein-forcements and supplies of ammunition,Sergeant Lang knew his men could notwithstand another assault. Although theradio was useless and no messengers hadreturned from their mission of makingcontact with the company commander,the 2d Platoon sergeant still hesitated toleave his men. Finally, with his patienceexhausted and his mind made up that hecould delay no longer, he decided thathe himself must go down the hill to seethe captain. He must either obtain menand ammunition or secure permission towithdraw the two platoons to less exposedpositions.

Since he wanted to be able to give thecompany commander the latest and mostaccurate information, Sergeant Langordered Sergeant Lusk to send a BARman and a rifleman to the top of the peak.From there the men could observe enemyactivity and note whether another coun-terattack was forming. As the two-manpatrol moved up toward the peak, Ser-geant Lusk directed two riflemen tocover on the right flank and a BAR manon the left. If the patrol was fired on, itcould withdraw between the cone of fireformed by the covering men.

As soon as the BAR man of the patrolreached the peak, he stood upright,raised his gun to his shoulder and firedto the right down into the bowl. He hadfired only two or three rounds when hewas struck by automatic fire from the

upper end of the main Altuzzo ridge.As he crumpled to the ground, the rifle-man, who had followed closely, lookedup at the top of the peak but could detectno enemy movement. Hesitating onlyfor a moment, he scrambled down andreported what had happened.

Sergeant Lang Goes Down the Hill

When the patrol failed to discloseGerman intentions, Sergeant Lang, as-suming that the enemy would be backagain before long, told his men he wasgoing down to the company commander.Assuring them he would be back withinthirty minutes, he ordered them to holduntil he returned. He left S. Sgt. JohnB. Spears, the senior squad leader, incommand and started down the hill.

For a while after Sergeant Lang left,the men of the 2d and 3d Platoons feltmore at ease. From experience theyknew that the platoon sergeant was a manof his word and would do everythingpossible to relieve them from their pre-carious position. But as time wore onthe men became anxious. A half hourpassed; then an hour. Still SergeantLang did not return. Anxiety turned topremonition and then to certainty thattheir acting platoon leader had beeneither wounded or killed.

By this time the men seemed to them-selves to be in a hopeless position. Downto their last few clips of ammunition, theycould only watch and duck while theGerman snipers on the ridges to the eastand west continued to pick men off. Noone knew the whereabouts of the rest ofthe company. Each passing momentmade them more certain that SergeantLang, whose courageous leadership hadsustained them through the most hectic

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 167

day of their lives, would not return. Itwas thus little wonder that all the menwanted to withdraw; they waited onlyfor permission from someone in authority.Some did not wait silently for that butpleaded fervently with the senior non-commissioned officer, Sergeant Spears, togive the withdrawal order.59 But neitherSergeant Spears nor the only other squadleader remaining, S. Sgt. William E.Ford, wanted to take the responsibilityas long as Captain Peabody's and Ser-geant Lang's orders to remain continuedin effect.60

Farther down the hill at the lower endof the 2d Platoon's positions, a handfulof men did withdraw about twenty yardssoon after Sergeant Lang had starteddown the hill. Apparently out of con-tact with the main group of the 2d and3d Platoons, these men started back be-cause their ammunition was nearlyexhausted. Sergeant Mullins, amongthose who withdrew, had only two clipsleft, and others in the group had evenless. As soon as the men reached thenorthern edge of the wooded area theymet Sergeant Kelsey, acting 1st Platoonleader. "You men will have to go back,"Sergeant Kelsey said. "We have ordersto hold the hill and we will hold it."The men returned to their positions.61

When Sergeant Lang descended thehill, he found Captain Peabody besidea rock at the southern edge of the woodedarea and reported to him the desperateplight of his men. As the platoon ser-

geant and the company commander laystretched out on the ground, a riflebullet struck Lang in the head, killinghim instantly.62

Calling to Sergeant Kelsey, acting 1stPlatoon leader, Captain Peabody in-structed him to take charge of all the menin the company's forward defense, in-cluding the 2d and 3d Platoons' advancedpositions. When Sergeant Kelsey madehis way through brush, trees, and rocksback to the northern edge of the woodedarea, he ordered Sergeant Keathley, 1stPlatoon guide, to take command of the2d and 3d Platoons. Sergeant Keathleystarted up the ridge.63

Fourth Counterattack

Shortly after Keathley arrived at therocks just a few yards below the 2dand 3d Platoon positions, the Germanslaunched another counterattack—theirfourth and strongest. At the first soundof small arms fire and exploding grenades,Sergeant Keathley called down to the1st Platoon to send up reinforcements.Enemy mortar shells began to explodein the rocks around him, and the sergeantwas forced to take cover in a slit trenchwith a 3d Platoon rifleman, Pvt. WilliamB. Herndon. As the fight continued, anexploding mortar shell blew PrivateHerndon out of the hole, and anothershell, or possibly a grenade, explodedagainst Sergeant Keathley's abdomen,almost blasting his intestines from hisbody. Dropping his rifle and pressinghis side, the sergeant stumbled down the59 Combat Intervs with Ford, Lusk, Mullins, Distel,

Leon, Guy, Brodeur, Itzkowitz, and Seiverd.60 Combat Intervs with Ford and Guy. Guy's

position was very close to Spears' foxhole.61 Combat Intervs with Mullins, Kelsey, and

Dozier. Both Kelsey and Dozier confirmed theaction as related herein but added certain detailswhich the author was unable to substantiate.

62 Combat Intervs with Kelsey-Dozier and Pea-body; 1st Bn, 338th Inf, AAR, Sep 44; Peabody MS.Sergeant Lang was posthumously awarded the SilverStar.

63 Combat Intervs with Peabody, Kelsey, Collins,and Burrows.

168 THREE BATTLES

hill to the last rock above the woodedarea and fell into a slit trench. Seeinghim fall, Sergeant Dozier came to him.Writhing in agony, the wounded sergeantpanted a request that Sergeant Dozierremove his watch and send it back to hiswife. A moment later he was dead.64

Farther up the hill the fourth counter-attack had hit the 2d and 3d Platoonshard. Physically and mentally exhaust-ed, the men were almost out of ammuni-tion and deprived of decisive leadership.Grenades and small arms fire landed closeto their positions, and the men knew thata further stand was impossible. On theright flank and in the center, the attackseemed heaviest and at closest range.Soon after it began, Sergeant Spears,the ranking noncommissioned officer,called out to one of the other two squadleaders, Sergeant Ford: "If we don't pulloff here, we're all going to get killed.The Jerries are overrunning our posi-tions." 65 He was going to withdraw, heshouted. Though no one heard SergeantSpears give an actual order to withdraw,they did hear the shouting between thetwo sergeants. At that stage, the menneeded no urging. When SergeantSpears led the way, the men around himfollowed.

While Sergeant Spears' squad peeledoff from its positions and started downthe hill, the other men higher up and onthe left front followed suit, some spon-taneously and some at the orders ofSergeants Lusk and Ford. They formeda rough file that hurried down the moun-

tain on the west side of the ridge line.When they came to the third rock slabledge from the peak, which ran straightacross the crest of the ridge and faceddownhill, they turned west and walkedthrough occasional trees and bushes alongthe upper side of the rock, the high rockslab shielding them against machine gunfire from the south. No fire came fromthe slopes along the road or from thedraw to the west.

After moving west for approximatelytwenty-five yards along the upper sideof the rock slab, the retreating men cameto a place where the rock dropped offsharply. Since the rock at this point nolonger shielded them from the south, themen stopped and bunched up at theopening, afraid to continue through it.As the machine gun fire from the southsounded ever closer, the Americanscould see no way to get through the rockledge without exposing themselves dan-gerously. The harsh sound of Germanvoices floating up from the northwestadded to the uneasiness. Having noidea that the 1st Platoon and their owncompany's machine guns were less thantwenty-five yards away, the men wereready to believe the Germans had sur-rounded them. Some took off theirammunition belts and began to cry,"Kamerad."

An assistant squad leader, SergeantSeiverd, afraid that he would be capturedand with him the 3d Platoon's mail,which he had stuffed in his shirt, stoppedin the brush beside a tree near the ledgeand covered the letters with dirt. Find-ing a few moments later that he had notburied them all, he covered the resthastily with brush, hoping thereby tokeep from the Germans any intelligenceinformation the letters might contain.

64 Combat Intervs with Mullins, Burrows, Kelsey-Dozier, and Collins. Collins' statement of Keathley'saction was based on information given him byHerndon. Sergeant Keathley was posthumouslyawarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.

65 Combat Interv with Ford.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 169

When the three squad leaders, Ser-geants Lusk, Ford, and Spears, reachedthe opening in the rock slab, none of themtried to exercise firm control over themen, nor did they pause long at theopening. Braving the danger of firefrom the south, they merely led the way,calling out that it was possible to getthrough and letting anyone follow whowished. No one knew how many menremained and were captured, but alto-gether there must have been about fifteenmen in the group who went throughthe opening and withdrew safely.66

As fast as these men arrived at the 1stPlatoon and Weapons Platoon positions,Sergeant Kelsey met them and began toplace them in a new defense which Cap-tain Peabody ordered set up at the northedge of the wooded area. But beforethey could form a new line the Germancounterattack hit them again. Many ofthe Company B riflemen could not returnthe fire because their ammunition wasgone; others had only a clip or two left.The most effective small arms fire camefrom Sergeant Mullins, Private Wilson,and Private Barrow, who had foundseveral BAR magazines and kept thebarrels of three automatic rifles hot withbullets.

Despite the efforts of these men, theGermans, using hand grenades and riflefire to good effect, overran a portion ofthe right flank. The other men heardcries of "Kamerad." Many thought atfirst the sound came from the Germansbut soon saw that Company B men weresurrendering. As the men who con-tinued to hold looked up the hill, theysaw a column of about fifteen men fileup the ridge through the rocks. In the

lead was an American private holding astick with a roll of white toilet tissuestreaming from it. As the men surren-dered, Private Wilson, an automaticrifleman, wanted to fire on them, butSergeant Simmons, a 1st Platoon squadleader, forbade it. Some of those sur-rendering might be wounded men, and,in any case, Sergeant Simmons thought,the Germans would kill all the prisonersif the remaining Americans opened fire.Although someone yelled, "Put thatG. . .D. . . flag down!" the cry went un-heeded. The prisoners continued toclimb over the rock ledges toward thepeak and finally disappeared from sight.67

Help from Artillery and Mortars

Weakened by the capture of these men,especially by the collapse of the wholeright flank, the rest of Company B wassaved only by timely artillery and mortarfire. After the counterattack had begun,the forward observer of the 329th FieldArtillery Battalion, 2d Lt. Joseph P.Lamb, who was with Captain Peabody,had radioed to the command post of the1st Battalion, 338th Infantry, reportingtersely, "Counterattack," and then hadsnapped off his radio. On the receivingend of the message Lieutenant Farber,artillery liaison officer, who had learnedfrom Colonel Jackson earlier in the after-noon the correct location of Company B,called for fire on neighboring German po-sitions and the counterattacking forces.68

At 1650 two 155-mm. howitzer bat-talions of the 178th Field Artillery Group

66 Combat Intervs with Seiverd and with Ford,Lusk, Distel, Guy, Itzkowitz, Leon, Wilson.

67 Combat Intervs with Kelsey-Dozier, Mullins,Ford, Seiverd, Burrows, Barrow, Simmons, Lusk,Campbell, Leon, Distel, Guy, Wilson, Itzkowitz, andCollins-West.

68 Combat Interv with Farber.

170 THREE BATTLES

fired a total of 184 rounds on the slopesbetween Hill 926 and the peak of thewestern ridge. In midafternoon the403d Field Artillery Battalion had fireda total of 141 rounds of harassing fire onenemy machine gun positions along thehighway northwest of the western peakand on other suspected enemy positionsgenerally north of Monte Altuzzo. Mostof the missions by the 403d were unob-served, and their part, if any, in in-fluencing the local situation on thewestern ridge cannot be definitely de-termined. From the forward battalionobservation post in front of the commandpost at Paretaio, 2d Lt. Robert P.McGraw of Company D had noticed themovement of the enemy against Com-pany B and had directed 81-mm. mortarfire in its support. Though the mortarand artillery shells landed dangerouslyclose to Company B, none of the menwere injured. Giving ground to theaccurate and close-in fire, the Germansfinally abandoned their fourth counter-attack.69

A few minutes later Captain Peabodyreported to Colonel Jackson that Com-pany B had left only fifteen effectiveriflemen, two light machine gunners, anda platoon of heavy machine gunners.The report did not include the 1st Platoonriflemen or the mortar men below thebarbed wire and the hump. The 1stBattalion commander ordered the com-pany to remain on the ridge until darkand then to withdraw to the battalioncommand post at Paretaio. By 1630 theregimental command post had receivedthe report that Company B had been

counterattacked from three directionsand was off the peak of Monte Altuzzo.Colonel Mikkelsen, 338th commander,still did not know Company B's exactlocation.70

When the fourth counterattack wasover, Captain Peabody ordered what wasleft of his company to withdraw to thesouthern edge of the woods and build upa defensive position around the two com-pany D machine guns. Using a perim-eter defense, the company commanderhad the machine guns set up on eitherflank and the riflemen face up the ridgebetween them. On the left and rightflanks of the guns the ammunition bearersof the Company D platoon stood guard,while on the rear another handful ofCompany B riflemen took over the samejob. Other riflemen were assigned tocover the trail that crossed the ridge linesouth of the new defensive position.

With the defense reorganized, CaptainPeabody and 1st Lt. Roberts Clay, com-mander of the attached machine gunplatoon, discussed withdrawal to theCompany B command post below thebarbed wire. The memory of the cap-ture of the fifteen men still fresh in theirminds, both officers recognized the neces-sity for controlling the movement strictly.They planned for the riflemen to infiltrateacross the open space at the barbed wirewhile the machine guns covered thecrossing. To screen the movement thecompany commander asked battalion toplace smoke at the head of the draws tothe northeast and northwest of CompanyB's position. The first rifleman startedoff and, although fired on by a sniper,

69 Combat Intervs with the following: Peabody,Clay, Kelsey; all enlisted survivors in Co B, 338thInf; 1st Lt Robert P. McGraw. 403d FA Bn and178th FA Gp Mission Rpts, 14 Sep 44.

70 Combat Intervs with Jackson and Peabody;Peabody MS; 1st Bn, 338th Inf, Rpt of Opns, Sep44; 338th Inf Unit Jnl, 14 Sep 44.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 171

safely reached the southern edge of thewire. Other riflemen followed.

The withdrawal was still in its initialstages when a German rifleman openedfire from the left front near a bend in thehighway. When Lieutenant Clay, themachine gun platoon leader, failed inpointing out the German position byrifle fire, he grabbed the left machine gunhimself and began to fire it. Althoughthe tracers kicked up dirt all around thesharpshooter, they all missed the mark.As soon as the platoon leader wouldcease firing, the German would resumefire at anyone who tried to edge acrossthe open space at the barbed wire. Onlya handful of Company B men and noneof Company D had managed to filterthrough the wire. Some were still northof the entanglement when Captain Pea-body decided to abandon the attempt towithdraw until after dark. When nightdid come, the remainder of the companyand the attached platoon were at lastable to withdraw.

Before all the men had reached theCP area, they came under misplacedAmerican artillery fire. Captain Pea-body radioed Colonel Jackson, who at1900 telephoned the 2d Battalion thatartillery fire which was being used to stopa counterattack against Company E wasfalling short on Company B. The firewas promptly raised.

As Company B prepared to continueits withdrawal from the western ridge,Private Bertani, 3d Platoon aid man, withthe assistance of several other men, impro-vised two litters from blankets stretchedbetween rifles with fixed bayonets. Twononambulatory wounded men wereplaced on them, but Peabody decidedthat their evacuation with the rest ofCompany B would hamper the with-

drawal. He ordered that the woundedbe left there until litterbearers could besent back from the battalion aid station.Pvt. Charles C. Smith, one of thewounded men, guessed what was hap-pening. "You're going to leave me here,aren't you?" he asked. Private Bertanicould only assure him that litterbearerswould return soon to complete theevacuation.

After reorganization was completed,Company B and its attached machineguns moved off in a column of twosthrough the darkness. Utterly fatigued,but relieved from the tension that hadgripped them all day, the men walkeddirectly down the ridge through la Roccadraw and up the slopes along the high-way, arriving at the 1st Battalion com-mand post at Paretaio after a three-hourmarch. There the men were fed ham-burgers and hot coffee and sent to theslopes south of the farmhouse, whilelitterbearers evacuated the wounded whohad been left on the ridge.71

The Day's Action

For the second day the 1st Battalion,338th Infantry, had failed to breach theenemy's main line of resistance on MonteAltuzzo. Instead of the co-ordinatedassault which Colonel Jackson hadplanned, Companies A and B had madeseparate attacks on the main ridge andthe western ridge of the mountain.Major factors in the outcome were thefailure of Company A's radio and Cap-tain Peabody's mistake in judging his

71 This section is based on the following: PeabodyMS; 2d Bn, 338th Inf, Unit Jnl, 14 Sep 44; CombatIntervs with Clay, Bertani, and all enlisted survivorsof the action still in Co B, 338th Inf. Direct quotesare from Clay and Bertani.

172 THREE BATTLES

PEABODY PEAK looking to the south. Dust from Highway 6524 can be seen in background.Photograph was taken 22 September 1944.

location. Despite its lack of communica-tion with the battalion and with CompanyB, Company A had at least jumped offat dawn toward the peak of Hill 782, butafter a brisk fire fight and a short advancethe two leading platoons had drawn backto their starting positions. Notwith-standing repeated efforts to restore com-munication, the company had remainedout of touch with the battalion com-mander until midafternoon and knewnothing about Company B's plight onthe ridge to the west.

During the day-long battle, CaptainPeabody's men had penetrated the main

line of resistance on the western ridge buthad not occupied the main bunkers onthe peak. Since they had not consoli-dated their gains, the attack was abortive.The company's flanks had been exposedcontinuously, because the units on itsright and left were too far away to be ofassistance or were out of contact. Theonly tangible gain from Company B'sattack was the development for the firsttime of the strong enemy defense onAltuzzo's western peak.

By the end of the day Company Bcould not have held its gains withoutreinforcement, for the day's casualties

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 173

had sharply reduced its fighting power.Out of its strength at the jump-off ofabout 170 men, it had suffered ninety-sixcasualties including twenty-four killed,fifty-three wounded, and nineteen cap-tured or missing in action.72 Even thesurvivors were in no condition to continuethe battle or stand another harrowing daylike 14 September. Under the circum-stances Colonel Jackson had no choicebut to withdraw Company B and renewthe attack against Monte Altuzzo withfresh troops. To the men who hadfought there so hard, the western ridgecame to be known as Peabody Peak.73

While Company B had been making itsheroic but futile effort near the peak ofAltuzzo's western ridge, the units on itsflanks likewise failed to break throughthe enemy's defenses. On the 338thInfantry's left wing the 2d Battalionmade isolated advances along the high-way but in every case gave up the groundand at the end of the day found itselfback at its old positions near l'UomoMorto.74 On the 338th Infantry's leftflank the 91st Division's 363d Infantryhad attacked up the western slopes ofMonticelli but had been stopped shortof the enemy's main line of resistance.East of Monte Altuzzo the 339th Infantryof the 85th Division still was unable totake Monte Verruca despite extensive useof artillery, tanks, and tank destroyers.75

In front of the Giogo Pass the troops ofII Corps had failed everywhere on 14September to breach the enemy's MLR

and take the objectives which wouldoutflank the Futa Pass.

The Enemy Situation

By the morning of 14 September theGerman forces on Monte Altuzzo werenumerically stronger than they had beenthe day before. During the night (13-14September) the 1st Company, 4th AntitankBattalion (Kampfgruppe Hauser), with atotal strength of between 90 and 150men, was sent to reinforce elements ofthe 1st Battalion, 12th Regiment, 4th Para-chute Division. Although these men sus-tained some casualties while moving intoposition, most of them arrived in Altuzzo'sforward bunkers and were attachedeither as individuals to the 1st Companyor as a separate unit under the regiment.Initially forty-two men from the 4thAntitank Battalion were committed on theeast flank of the 1st Company, 12th Para-chute Regiment, but casualties reduced thenumber of effectives to twenty-five.Though originally armed with 75-mm.assault (antitank) guns, the company hadonly its complement of ten machine gunsfor its Altuzzo defense.

Besides these reinforcements, the enemyhad at least three understrength com-panies of the 12th Parachute Regiment inthe vicinity of Monte Altuzzo: the 1stCompany with forty-four men and the 3dand 11th Companies with fifty to sixty meneach. The enemy's MLR on Altuzzowas manned by 250 to 300 men in all—numerically the equivalent of one under-strength German battalion or one andone-half companies of American infantry.Because of the terrain, poor communica-tions, and lack of control, at no singletime during the five-day battle did theAmericans throw as many troops into

72 Co B, 338th Inf, Morning Rpt, 14 Sep 44, in 1stBn, 338th Inf, S-1 Files, Sep 44.

73 Combat Intervs with Jackson.74 Combat Interv with Cole; 2d Bn, 338th Inf,

Unit Jnl, 14 Sep 44; 2d Bn, 338th Inf, AAR, Sep 44.75 91st Div G-3 Jnl, 14 Sep 44; 339th Inf Unit

Jnl, 14 Sep 44; 339th Inf AAR, Sep 44; StrootmanMS.

174 THREE BATTLES

action on Monte Altuzzo as did thedefenders.

By noon of 14 September Americanintelligence reports indicated that the 1stBattalion, 12th Regiment, plus reinforce-ments, was on Monte Altuzzo, the 2dBattalion extended east from MonteVerruca, and the 3d Battalion was onMonticelli. Even at this point everybattalion of the 12th Regiment plus the 3dBattalion's reserve had been committed,although the enemy still maintained amobile reserve counterattack force ofcombat engineers. Though forced tobring up various noninfantry units forreinforcement, the local German com-manders had decided to hold MonteAltuzzo and the mountains on the eastand west of the Giogo Pass with all thestrength they could muster.

During the day civilian and prisonerreports and air observation located manyenemy weapons which were supportingthe German infantry in the Giogo Passsector. In the afternoon a Mark IVtank with a short 75-mm. gun was re-ported 200 yards north of the pass. Itmay have been the same tank that Com-pany B, 338th Infantry, tried unsuccess-fully to knock out during the morningwith a bazooka. At 1430 eight artillerypieces in position at Barco less than a milenorth of the pass moved two miles northup the Firenzuola highway to a clusterof houses at Molinuccio. Three bat-teries (twelve guns) of 150-mm. caliberwere at Corniolo three miles northwestof the pass. In addition, the 12th Para-chute Regiment was supported by two170-mm. guns from the Artillery LehrRegiment in position about 700 yards westof Firenzuola. The enemy fired only asmall amount of artillery into the 85thDivision area on 14 September, but most

of that received, mainly 88-mm. and170-mm., was directed against the 338thInfantry.

The main enemy effort on MonteAltuzzo during 14 September was directedtoward dislodgment of Company B fromthe rocky western ridge. Besides heavymachine gun cross fire from both flanks,the enemy struck with counterattackforces from behind rocks and over themost covered approaches. After thefirst counterattack between 1000 and1100, the 12th Parachute Regiment reportedthat Monte Altuzzo was again in itshands. At 1150 the 1st Battalion, 12thRegiment, was ordered to reassign strengthalong the MLR and commit all reserves.That the other three German counter-attacks of the afternoon cost it heavilyis attested to by the 1st Battalion's laterreport that it unconditionally needed areserve company. Among those killedwas the commanding officer of the 1stCompany, 12th Regiment.

During the night of 14-15 Septembera squad of German engineers laid minesfacing the 1st Battalion, 338th Infantry,on Monte Altuzzo and the 339th Infantryon Monte Verruca. On the main Al-tuzzo ridge S-mines were laid in thebarbed wire on the southwest slopes ofHill 782, but the mission was carried outonly partially—the mines neither werenumerous enough nor covered an arealarge enough to slow subsequent advance.

Although prisoner statements indicatedthat the highway from the Giogo Pass toFirenzuola had been knocked out byAmerican bombers, on the afternoon of14 September the enemy was reported tohave that main supply route open.Thereupon the 85th Division asked IICorps to put the road out by bombing,and II Corps approved the request,

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 175

adding that if air power could not knockit out harassing artillery fire would beplaced on it. Evidently one or the otherwas effective, for the enemy's front-linepositions did not obtain rations on 14September. At 2300 that night TOTartillery fire was placed on the knobnorth of Monte Altuzzo's crest.76

At the end of 14 September the Four-teenth Army was well aware that the 4thParachute Division was bearing the bruntof the Fifth Army attack against theGothic Line. But in light of FourteenthArmy reports the enemy had clearly notrealized that Fifth Army's main effortwas restricted to the Giogo Pass area.The reports indicated that the maineffort was on a nine-mile front from

Monte Frassino southwest of the FutaPass to Monte Altuzzo. The pressurealong the whole II Corps front was suchthat the Germans still had not divinedFifth Army's plan of outflanking the FutaPass by breaching the Gothic Line at theGiogo Pass.

Because of the anticipated withdrawalof the west flank of the German TenthArmy, the I Parachute Corps was told duringthe day to prepare for withdrawal of itseast flank to the crest of Monte Altuzzo.For reinforcement of the 4th ParachuteDivision, the 2d Battalion, Grenadier LehrBrigade, which had been in I ParachuteCorps reserve, was entrucked the night of14-15 September. Preparations weremade also to send the 1st Battalion, Grena-dier Lehr Brigade, which had been in XIVPanzer Corps reserve, to the 4th ParachuteDivision the following night.77

76 Foregoing information on the enemy situationis based on IPW Rpts, radio intercepts, and otherintel info in 338th Inf Unit Jnl and 85th Div G-2Jnl, 14 Sep 44, and in 85th Div G-2 Rpts, 14-18Sep 44; Intel Sums and IPW Rpts in 338th Inf JnlFiles, Sep 44. 77 Entry of 14 Sep 44, Fourteenth Army KTB 4.

CHAPTER III

Shellfire and a False Message(15 September)

After the attempts of 14 September hadfailed to break through the Gothic Line,elements of II Corps prepared again toassault the high ground on either sideof the Giogo Pass. Instead of attemptinganother simultaneous effort along thewhole front, individual units of the 85thand 91st Divisions planned to attack atdifferent times the night of 14 Septemberand the early morning of 15 September.On II Corps' right wing the 339th Infan-try (85th Division) was to attack atmidnight on 14 September to take MonteVerruca. The next morning at 0900the 338th Infantry was to attack to takethe crest of Monte Altuzzo and to ad-vance astride Highway 6524 toward theGiogo Pass. West of the highway the363d and 361st Infantry (91st Division)were to try again at 0500 to seize Monti-celli and Hill 844 to the west.1

The 13-14 September attacks haddemonstrated the enemy's intentions todefend Monte Altuzzo firmly and haddealt heavy casualties to Company B,prompting Colonel Mikkelsen, 338thcommander, to consider dropping the 1stBattalion into reserve and using the fresh3d Battalion to attack through the 1st'spositions. When this proposal was pre-sented to Colonel Jackson, the 1st Bat-

talion commander, he argued against it.Colonel Jackson well recognized thatCompany B was no longer an effectivefighting force, but he was equally awareof the fact that his A and C Companieswere in good condition. Company Ahad sustained only a few casualties indeveloping the Altuzzo defenses, andCompany C had not yet been committed.Jackson insisted therefore that his bat-talion could and would take MonteAltuzzo the next day. Yielding, ColonelMikkelsen gave the order to try again,this time with Companies A and C. Assoon as the two companies should reachHill 926, the 3d Battalion was then topass through and the 1st to drop intoreserve.2 Resupply of rations and am-munition from the regimental distribu-tion point at Scarperia was to continueto be made by jeep to the slopes behindParetaio Farmhouse.

Preparations for Attack

Because study through field glasses andconversation with Captain King hadshown that the main Altuzzo ridge wastoo narrow to accommodate more thantwo platoons initially, the 1st Battalion

1 338th Inf and 339th Inf Unit Jnls, 14-15 Sep 44;85th Div and 91st Div G-3 Jnls, 14-15 Sep 44;Strootman MS, Ch. III; Muller Notes.

2 Combat Intervs with Mikkelsen, Lt Col MarionP. Boulden, and Jackson. Colonel Jackson did notrecall this incident but thought it entirely possiblethat he had taken the position herein described.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 177

COMMAND POST AT PARETAIO FARMHOUSE. In this 1st Battalion, 338thInfantry, CP, the man on left using telephone is 1st Lt. Roberts Clay, Company D, 1st Battalion,338th Infantry; next to him, in foreground is 1st Lt. William H. Alston, Jr., 1st Battalion S-2;2d Lt. Joseph P. Lamb can be seen on extreme right, and next to him, using the telephone, is1st Lt. Dawson L. Farber, Jr., both of the 329th Field Artillery Battalion. In the back-ground, second man from left, bending over the table is Cpl. Mark Kolesar of the 329th. Theother two men are not identified.

commander decided that one platooneach from Companies A and C wouldattack abreast up the main ridge fromHill 782. The other platoons of eachcompany would follow by bounds. Be-ginning at H Hour, 500 smoke roundsfrom 105-mm. howitzers would screenthe movement for about one hour.3

For half an hour before the infantryattack, mortars and light, medium, andheavy artillery were to soften up theentire mountain position. For the heavy240-mm. howitzers and 8-inch guns,which were most effective against theprepared defenses of the Gothic Line,II Corps had given the 85th Divisionpriority in fire and a large ammunitionallotment. Cannon Company, 338th,3 Combat Intervs with Jackson and Farber.

178 THREE BATTLES

was assigned harassing missions in thearea behind Hill 926, and the 81-mm.mortars of Company D, 338th, and the4.2-inch mortars of the 84th ChemicalBattalion were to fire on targets west ofAltuzzo's western ridge and east of themain ridge which could not be reachedby artillery fire. Two machine guns ofCompany D were to support the attackfrom Hill 624. After the preparatorybarrage, all artillery concentrations wereto be fired on call.4

At dawn tanks and tank destroyerswere to strike at those pillboxes whichhad been located on the two ridges of themountain. During the night of 14-15September one tank from Company B,752d Tank Battalion, was dug in andcamouflaged in the vicinity of Hill 360,1,500 yards south-southwest of the lowerend of the main Altuzzo ridge. Althoughtwo other tanks were earmarked for usenear the Paretaio Farmhouse, the tankliaison officer found later that tankscould not move into the planned posi-tions. At 0430, 15 September, the 1stPlatoon, Company B, 805th Tank De-stroyer Battalion (Self-Propelled), wasattached to Company B, 752d TankBattalion. To assist the tanks in firingon pillboxes and targets of opportunity,the tank destroyers moved at 0845 upHighway 6524 more than a mile beyondScarperia and took positions just northof Montagnana, 4,200 yards southwestof Monte Altuzzo's crest.

During the night artillery fire wasplaced on the crest of Monte Altuzzoevery fifteen minutes. At 2300 artilleryfired TOT on the north hump, Knob 3,

north of the peak of Monte Altuzzo; andthe 403d Field Artillery Battalion letloose a TOT on an area just south of theGiogo Pass and at Bagnolo, one milenorth of the pass. Every fifteen minutesduring the night the 403d put harassingfire around the pass, along the highwaynorth and south of it, and on Hill 926.From 0400 to 0600 three guns fired eachmission every fifteen minutes and walkedup and down the Firenzuola highway fortwo miles north of the pass.

Although the 338th Infantry requesteda number of bombing missions, poor visi-bility forced postponement. Through-out the day bad weather was to preventflying of most bomber missions on theentire Fifth Army front.5

As soon as attack plans were completed,the 1st Battalion commander gave thewarning order to the Company A com-mander, Captain King, and the Com-pany C commander, 1st Lt. Redding C.Souder, Jr., and described the formationand supporting fires to be used. Specify-ing that the two companies maintainphysical contact, he left the companycommanders to work out their ownboundaries and exact routes of advance.6

After the briefing, Captain King andLieutenant Souder, each without theother's knowledge, apparently came todifferent views regarding the nature andprobable outcome of the attack. Anx-ious to push all the way up the mainAltuzzo ridge, Captain King understoodhis mission to be the capture of Hill 926.This time, he was sure, his men wouldbreak through the enemy's main line of

4 Ibid.; 2d Bn, 338th Inf, Unit Jnl , 14-15 Sep 44;338th Inf Unit Jnl, 14-15 Sep 44; 11 Corps Arty Jnl,14-15 Sep 44; 403d FA Bn Mission Rpts, 14-15 Sep44; 752d Tk Bn and 805th TD Bn AAR's, Sep 44.

5 338th Inf Unit Jnl, 14-15 Sep 44; 85th Div G-3Jnl, 14-15 Sep 44; MATAF Intel and Opns Sum, 15Sep 44; MAAF Central Med Daily Operational Sum,15 Sep 44.

6 Combat Intervs with Jackson, King, and Souder.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 179

resistance. Lieutenant Souder, on theother hand, looked upon the attack moreas a developing movement. He under-stood that Hill 926 was the assignedobjective but anticipated that the twocompanies would go only as far as theycould without sustaining heavy casual-ties. Having heard that Company Bhad suffered heavily the day before, hewas far from sanguine about the possi-bilities of another attack. He doubtedthat his men could reach the peak andcertainly did not believe they were beingcalled upon for an all-out effort.7

Captain King ordered that CompanyA attack in a column of platoons, the 2dPlatoon leading, followed in order by thelight machine gun section, the 1st Pla-toon, and the 3d Platoon. For CompanyC Lieutenant Souder directed the 1stPlatoon to lead, the 2d Platoon and thelight machine gun section to follow, andthe 3d Platoon to bring up the rear.During his conferences with his platoonleaders, each company commander, insome measure at least, must have passedon to his officers his own feelings aboutthe impending action, for the two platoonleaders, Lieutenant Gresham and 1st Lt.William S. Corey, who were to lead theCompany A and C formations, respec-tively, reflected the opinion of theircompany commanders. Aggressive andself-confident, Gresham felt sure he couldtake Monte Altuzzo the next morning.The more cautious Corey was skepticalabout the possibility of success.8

Company A was resupplied during thenight with water, K rations, and ammu-nition. The only shortage remaining

was in hand grenades. Some had beendropped on the way by men who wantedto lighten their loads, or had been lostduring the attacks of the first two days.There had been no resupply. Shortlyafter dark Captain King sent a smallpatrol beyond the barbed wire to theridge line of Hill 782, and the patrolreported considerable enemy movement.9

Company C started forward at ap-proximately 0300 from its positions onthe southwest slope of Hill 624. (Map13) Following the upper trail thatwound along the slopes to the north, thecompany stopped just before dawn nearthe first finger on the southwest slope ofHill 782, about 150 yards to the rightrear of Company A. There CompanyC established contact with Company Aand strung telephone wire between thetwo command posts. Captain King andLieutenant Souder arranged that theleading platoon of Company C wouldadvance up the slope ahead and moveto the left until it came abreast of theleading platoon of Company A at therocks fifty yards below the peak of Hill782.

From Hill 624 the men of Company Chad brought with them ammunition,water, and rations for the next day.Each man still had one belt and onebandoleer of .30-caliber ammunition butlike the men of Company A lacked a fullsupply of hand grenades. The leadingplatoons of both companies were four orfive men short of full strength. InCompany C's 2d Platoon, which was tofollow its 1st Platoon, the effectives werereduced by the evacuation of five nervousexhaustion cases as H Hour approached.

7 Combat Intervs with King, Gresham, andSouder.

8 Ibid.; Combat Intervs with Corey and with 1stLt David M. Brumbaugh.

9 Combat Intervs with Van Horne, King, andenlisted survivors in Co A, 338th Inf, and Gresham;338th Inf Unit Jnl, 14-15 Sep 44.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 181

While the 1st Battalion made its last-minute preparations to attack, the 3dBattalion, 338th Infantry, in reserve,moved to Hill 624 from Lutiano southeastof Paretaio Farmhouse. From this posi-tion the 3d Battalion was to follow Com-panies A and C closely and pass throughthem after capture of Hill 926. Com-panies K and L, each with one machinegun platoon of Company M attached,reached Hill 624 at 0600, made contactwith the rear elements of Company C,and learned the route of advance. Com-pany I, in 3d Battalion reserve, and themortar platoon of Company M remainednear Lutiano.

After daylight, the two company com-manders and platoon leaders of the 1stbattalion assault force issued final in-structions. Lieutenant Corey, who wasto lead Company C's 1st Platoon, told hismen to move up to the ridge line, thenswing to the left and go north a few yardsuntil contact was made with CompanyA's leading 2d Platoon. The movementwould be slow, Lieutenant Corey warned,because the location of the enemy wasnot known. Having never seen theterrain ahead except at a distance, thelieutenant had no idea that the ridge linewas as narrow as it actually was.10

Gresham and Corey Move Forward

Anxious to have his Company Aassault platoon at the rocks above thebarbed wire at 0900, when he wasscheduled to meet the leading platoon ofCompany C, Lieutenant Gresham di-

rected his men to move out in single fileat 0830 from their positions on the largefinger of Hill 782. The 3d Squad wasin the lead, followed by platoon head-quarters, the 2d Squad, and the 1stSquad.

Stepping over the low-strung barbedwire, the men came upon the dugoutthat Sergeant Van Horne had knockedout the afternoon of 13 September. Itwas now unoccupied. Continuing pastthe position, they reached the rocks justbelow the peak of Hill 782 about 0850.Although they had looked for CompanyC's 1st Platoon, it had been hidden fromthem by the steep, uneven slope to theirright. After a five-minute wait at therocks, Lieutenant Gresham saw severalmen of Company C approaching up thehill from his right rear.11

Approximately seventy-five yards tothe right of Company A's 2d Platoon, the1st Platoon of Company C had movedout about the same time from the trailon the southwest slope of Hill 782. Ina column of squads—the 1st, 2d, and 3d,in that order—the men walked up theridge in an open squad column andstepped across the low-strung barbedwire. Past the wire the leading squadfound unmanned enemy emplacementsreinforced with logs and covered withdirt. On the way up the hill, the 1stSquad, which was supposed to maintainvisual contact with Company A, couldsee Lieutenant Gresham's men occasion-ally, but most of the time the slope hidthem from view. As the head of thecolumn came within twenty yards of theridge line, the 1st Squad leader, S. Sgt.James O. Orr, stopped his squad and toldhis two scouts, Pfc. Lawrence F. Markey,

10 Combat Intervs with the following: Gresham-Stevens; Michalek-Carter-Wilson-Hillier; Sgt TonyL. White; Souder, Thompson, and Corey. 3d Bn,338th Inf, Unit Jnl, 14-15 Sep 44; 1st Bn and 3d Bn,338th Inf, AAR's, and 338th Inf AAR, Sep 44.

11 Combat Intervs with Gresham, Stevens, andCarter-Wilson-Hillier.

182 THREE BATTLES

TAKING A BREAK. These men of the 338th Infantry are taking a brief rest on theslopes near their CP. Note the supply of 60- and 81-mm. mortar shells in center.

Jr., and Pfc. Willie Burnett, to recon-noiter. Reaching the crest and peeringover the ridge line, the scouts noted onlya sheer drop just beyond it on the easternslope of Hill 782 and several Germanpositions on the next mountain to theeast, Monte Verruca.

By this time Sergeant Orr had noticedthe 2d Platoon of Company A on his leftflank. The Company A platoon seemedto be too high on the ridge to permitCompany C's platoon to swing left, moveabreast, and proceed north up the moun-tain without walking on the ridge line

exposed to heavy flanking fire fromMonte Verruca. At the report of visualcontact Lieutenant Corey directed his 1stSquad to move on to Company A's 2dPlatoon at the rocks, and in a few minutesSergeant Orr made contact with Lieu-tenant Gresham.12

The preliminary artillery barrage,which had begun at 0830, was now in fullswing. Every few minutes the 8-inch and240-mm. shells, designed to knock out en-emy pillboxes, were landing on the higher

12 Combat Intervs with Orr and with Gresham.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 183

slopes of Monte Altuzzo. Whereverthe heavy projectiles hit, they sent upa mingled mass of smoke, dirt, andrubble and rocked the ground aroundthe men of the 1st Battalion, scarcely 300yards away. At 0855 the 338th Infantryreported that a 240-mm. howitzer hadneutralized one pillbox on Hill 926.From 0815 to 0930 the 403d Field Artil-lery Battalion fired harassing missions oftwenty to thirty rounds each everytwenty minutes on the upper slopes ofMonte Verruca and the slopes to thenorth. Beginning at 0830 this 155-mm.howitzer battalion placed harassing fireevery five minutes on Hill 926 and from0925 to 0950 on the northern slopes ofMonte Altuzzo near the pass and alongthe highway just south of the pass. Be-fore the attack jumped off, tanks andtank destroyers, despite a delay in gettinginto position, fired on fifteen pillboxes inthe Altuzzo area.13

Wishing to make the most of thebarrage while it lasted, LieutenantGresham decided not to wait for Lieu-tenant Corey and the rest of Corey's pla-toon. The Company A platoon leaderwanted to take his men up the ridge whilethe artillery still pinned the enemy to hisholes and pillboxes, and for fifty yardsahead there was an area in which hisplatoon could move in some concealmentthrough the rocks to the peak of Hill 782.Directing his men to move out, Lieuten-ant Gresham told Sergeant Orr to askthat Lieutenant Corey have the 1st Squadof the Company C platoon follow Com-pany A's 2d Platoon until it halted.

Using a leapfrog system. Lieutenant

Gresham's platoon moved slowly throughthe rocks. As the leading squad ad-vanced, the other two rifle squads andone machine gun squad of the WeaponsPlatoon covered until a designated boundwas reached. The covering squads thendisplaced forward. Behind the machinegun squad came Sergeant Orr's squadof Company C and, within visual con-tact, the rest of the Company C platoon.Supported by the artillery fire the leadingmen reached the peak of Hill 782 withoutdifficulty. There the two platoon leadersjoined forces.

Corey and Gresham noted the sheerdrop of the eastern slope and agreed thatthe ridge ahead of them was too narrowfor two platoons to move abreast. Theydecided that Lieutenant Gresham's 2dPlatoon, Company A, would lead theway, single file, followed by LieutenantCorey's 1st Platoon, Company C.14 Asthe 2d Platoon started forward from therocks on the peak of Hill 782, smoke shellsbegan to land on the ridge ahead and inthe draw to the west. Although the firstshells fell too far to the left, LieutenantGresham was able to adjust the fire ofthe 105-mm. howitzers. In the heavymorning air the smoke clung to theground like gas. At 0930 the 329thField Artillery Battalion reported thatsmoke on Monte Altuzzo was good andshould be continued. While it did notprevent the attackers from seeing oneanother or the route of advance for a fewyards ahead, the smoke did severely limitGerman observation.

Fire at Knobs 1 and 2

After moving under the smoke screenabout seventy-five yards beyond Hill 782

13 Combat Intervs with Farber, Gresham, andJackson; 2d Bn, 338th Inf, Unit Jnl and 338th InfUnit Jnl, 15 Sep 44; 403d FA Bn Mission Rpts,15 Sep 44; 752d Tk Bn and 805th TD Bn AAR's,Sep 44. 14 Combat Intervs with Gresham, Orr, and Corey.

184 THREE BATTLES

to another little rise on the ridge line,Knob 1, the 2d Platoon of Company Awas hit by enemy fire for the first time.It came from a position about a hundredyards away on the left flank to the westof the ridge line. Pfc. Joseph Farinoreturned the fire, and the platoon leaderhimself sent a few rounds from his carbinein the same direction. The enemy fireceased, and Lieutenant Gresham directedthe 1st Squad, which was second in thecolumn, to take the lead and continueforward.

As soon as the 1st Squad started off itcame under close-in fire from the front.The squad leader, Pfc. Ray C. Collins,sent two men out to his left to sneak upon the Germans from the rear. Whenthe two men found an enemy machinegun, one covered while the other threwa hand grenade, rushed the position, andshot the single German he found inside.

The enemy fire and the discovery ofthe machine gun position led LieutenantGresham to believe that his men hadstruck the main line of resistance. Know-ing that his left flank was exposed, hehalted, passed word back for LieutenantCorey to come forward, and reportedwhat had happened to Captain King.The Company A commander, who hadmoved above the barbed wire beyond thedugout just below the rocks on Hill 782,kept urging the lieutenant to "Go ahead!Go ahead!" It seemed safe enough, forthe smoke still hung heavily over thebattlefield on the front and left flank.15

Heeding Captain King's urging, Lieu-tenant Gresham ordered his 2d Squadleader, Sergeant Wilson, to move his menthrough the leading 1st Squad. Walking

in an open squad column toward the nextbound, a rock formation on the next risein the ridge line, Knob 2, the squad hadgone only a few yards up the forwardslope of the second knob when machineguns and rifles opened fire from the leftflank and front. On the front the enemypositions were in the rocks squarely onthe ridge line approximately thirty yardsahead of Sergeant Wilson's squad.

These positions at Knob 2, locatedabout 250 yards north of Hill 782 and 300yards south of Monte Altuzzo's crest,comprised the east anchor of the Germanlines. Most were placed on or a fewyards west of the ridge line. The firstwas a fourteen-foot-wide, zigzag trenchwithout overhead cover about five feetbelow the ridge line, providing vantagepoints from which riflemen or machinegunners could fire down the ridge line orinto the bowl. A few yards north of thetrench and to its right rear on the ridgeline was a large rectangular hole, tenfeet deep, eight feet wide, and twelve feetlong, which had been blasted from solidrock but had no overhead cover. Itcould be used easily as a light mortarposition and could give concealment to anumber of troops. In front of the bighole were rocks piled two feet high anddeep on the front and west flank as con-cealment for a machine gun, which wassited to fire down into the bowl. A fewfeet to the east of the piled rocks wereheavy rock slabs three to four feet high;behind these the enemy could fire downon the east slope of the main ridge southof Knob 2. Directly to the rear of thesepositions on the upper slopes of Knob 2was a series of rock slabs five to ten yardswide. From these the enemy could fireacross the northern end of the bowltoward the western ridge of the mountain

15 338th Inf Unit Jnl, Sep 44; Combat Intervs withGresham, Jackson, Hillier, and King. Quotes arefrom Gresham and King.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 185

and across the steep and inaccessible rockformation on the east slope of the mainAltuzzo ridge.

A few yards to the west of the big holeoh the upper west slope of Knob 2 werea few large rocks and slit trenches. Someten yards west and below the big holethe enemy had a small trench about twofeet deep with stones piled up on the sideswhich faced southwest and south. Thisposition covered the trail that ran up thewest slope of Knob 2 from the ridge lineto the south.

From Knob 2, which was 300 yardssouth of the crest of the mountain (Hill926), the enemy MLR ran along the trailnorthwest around the upper end of thebowl to the peak of the western ridge.Along the trail the Germans had set upa number of machine gun and rifle posi-tions from which they could fire downthe main ridge line, into the heart of thebowl, or onto the western ridge. Aboutthirty yards northwest of Knob 2 on thetrail the enemy had the advantage of arock slab seven feet long and three feethigh, behind which he had set up adouble machine gun position by diggingtwo slit trenches and blasting a deep holeout of the rock. Northwest of the doubleposition were other large rock slabs be-hind which the Germans could fire intothe bowl and onto the western ridge.Halfway down the bowl in front of thesepositions along the trail was at least oneother prepared position—a log bunkerwhich merged into near-by trees so wellthat from a distance it could hardly beidentified.

In addition to the frontal defensesalong the trail, the enemy had flankingpositions along the west side of the bowlon Monte Altuzzo's western ridge, whereCompany B had been stopped the day

before. Except for the general locationof these western positions, Gresham andCorey knew little about the enemy de-fenses on either ridge. Some were sowell concealed that through the wholebattle the assault troops failed to locatethem.

When the fire began from the left flankand Knob 2, the leading squad of Lieu-tenant Gresham's platoon dropped to theground. At the head of the squad Sgt.Ira Wilson and his first scout, Pvt. DonaldM. Getty, located a machine gun nearthe ridge line. Facing down the bottomof the draw to the west, the machine gunhad no overhead cover; but on the leftfront a big stone and small bushes gave itsome concealment. Private Getty wasso close to the machine gun that he couldalmost touch the barrel. As he openedfire with his rifle, other Germans in theposition behind the rocks began to throwhand grenades at the squad, Pullingback about ten yards, Sergeant Wilsonand Private Getty sent word to Lieu-tenant Gresham, who was just behindthe 2d Squad, to pass up grenades.Though the supply was short, severalwere promptly passed forward. PrivateGetty and Pvts. Oscar Maynard andGeorge W. Schroeder pegged themtoward the enemy. The Germans re-plied with more grenades, causing nocasualties but bringing several close calls.Pvt. James S. Dorris deflected one gre-nade with his hands. Another landedbetween the legs of the assistant squadleader, Sgt. Edgar Parks, but he kickedit away before it exploded.

With the Germans still reacting vio-lently, Private Getty tried to work hisway around the right flank of the machinegun position where stones did not shieldit. As he crawled forward, he almost

186 THREE BATTLES

bumped head on into a German who hadjust emerged from the position. TheGerman surrendered. Sergeant Wilsontold Getty to prod the prisoner back downthe ridge line; and, as he left, the othermen in the 2d Platoon menacingly wavedtheir rifles, yelled, and swore at theprisoner.

At intervals during the grenade ex-change the Germans inside the positiontried to make a break to the rear. Eachtime they tried, the forward men in the2d Platoon picked off one or two Ger-mans with small arms fire. At the headof Sergeant Wilson's squad, PrivateSchroeder and Pvt. Waymon A. Banksshot one man who was directly to theirfront, and Lieutenant Gresham, firingpoint-blank with his carbine, killedanother.

After the first flurry of machine gunfire, the enemy's use of small arms wassporadic but close-in, although most ofthe bullets went wide of their mark.Gresham ordered his men to fix bayonetsfor close-quarter fighting and moved his1st and 3d Squads forward to join the 2d.With the 1st Squad on the left, the 1stand 2d Squads together tried to root theGermans out of the positions while the3d Squad supported the attack by fire.With a few well-aimed shots, the menflushed a few more Germans, killingseveral and driving the rest farther upthe ridge. As the two squads camewithin a few yards of the rocks on the topof Knob 2, heavy rifle and machine gunfire again halted the advance. No longerheld in their dugouts by the artillery fire,the defenders had crawled to better posi-tions on the platoon's left flank. For themen of the 2d Platoon this was the moredangerous, because the smoke screen hadlifted and an overcast sky was not enough

to cut off enemy observation from the topof the bowl. From the front the Germansagain tossed hand grenades, and from theleft flank machine guns on the westernridge began to rake the area.16

Flanking Attempt

Since the flanking and frontal fire wasgetting heavier and a few men had alreadybeen wounded, Lieutenant Gresham toldhis unit to take cover while he assembledhis squad leaders for a conference. Ashe was outlining the next move, Lieu-tenant Corey came forward to join them.Gresham proposed that while the 2dPlatoon of Company A kept pressure onthe enemy's front the 1st Platoon ofCompany C advance on the left, envel-oping the rock-protected Knob 2 posi-tions. Corey approved and returned tobring up his platoon.

As the Company C platoon came for-ward, Gresham made contact withSergeant Orr, Corey's 1st Squad leader,and told him to build up on his platoon'sleft. While the two leading squads ofGresham's platoon continued to keeppressure on the enemy by fire to the front,Orr directed his men one at a time outto the left along the trail that wound overthe western slope of Knob 2, approxi-mately twenty-five yards away from theridge line. They walked single file fifteento twenty yards down the trail past adead German, then dispersed in a skirm-ish line, building up on the left flank andleft rear of the Company A platoon.Each man in turn moved a little fartherto the left along the trail.

Sergeant Orr's men were no sooner inposition than Lieutenant Corey arrived

16 Combat Intervs with Gresham, Wilson, andCorey.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 187

and told the sergeant to move his squadfarther to the left so that the 3d Squadcould build up between the 1st and theCompany A platoon. Also, Corey said,the 2d Squad would build up on the leftof the 1st. As soon as all men were inplace, they would crawl forward andoutflank the Knob 2 positions.

The 2d Squad, which had followed the1st to the saddle on the ridge line wherethe trail turned left, passed through andaround Sergeant Orr's men and kept ondown the trail. At the far left flank ofthe 2d Squad, Pvt. Albert C. Borum, Jr.,led up the path, followed by Pfc. ReginaldW. Parrish and Pfc. Carl E. Hinrichsen.To the right rear of these leading men,the rest of the 2d Squad began to buildup a skirmish line. After rounding abend in the trail, Private Borum stoppedand passed word back to his squadleader, S. Sgt. Jay E. Garner, asking ifhe had gone far enough. SergeantGarner told him to go "a little farther,"but as Borum and Parrish started offagain they heard sounds of the enemymoving in for a counterattack. Standingerect, Parrish demanded the Germans'surrender.17

The Germans replied promptly withclose-range fire from rifles, machine pis-tols, and machine guns. Near the leftflank of the 2d Squad, the men saw threeGermans bearing a white flag and shout-ing, "Kamerad." Pfc. Edwin L. Buech-ler cried out, "What did you say?"18

The trio did not bother to reply, for thefamiliar ruse had gained all the timethey needed. Jumping into a trench

fifteen to twenty yards away from Ser-geant Garner's men, the Germans quicklyset up a machine gun and opened fire.The first burst wounded Pfc. Kenneth L.Fankell in one leg, and the fire thatfollowed drove others in the squad tomore concealed positions. For betterprotection, the leading men. PrivatesParrish and Borum, crawled back behindthe bend in the trail.

The enemy on top of the knob joinedthe action by tossing grenades close tothe Company C platoon. Pvt. Truett J.May, ammunition bearer in the 2dSquad's BAR team, was wounded slightlyand fell back to the platoon aid man forfirst aid. Farther to the right the 1stSquad of Lieutenant Corey's platoon feltthe force of the grenades even more thanthe 2d and 3d. Though no one waswounded or killed, many were badlyshaken by concussion. As Pfc. RichardM. Feeney was crawling across a littlerise in the slope above the trail, a grenadeexploded close by and shook him up con-siderably. Numbed, he shouted for theman directly behind him, Pvt. SubastianD. Gubitosi, to pull him off the small rise.A few moments later, after the two menhad crossed a small open space where theenemy had observation, another grenadeexploded near by. The concussion thistime gave Private Feeney a severe head-ache and knocked the camouflage nettingfrom his helmet. Three concussion gre-nades landed almost on top of Pvt. RobertH. Kessell, shaking him up and sendinghim scurrying down the slope below thetrail. Three grenades, one of which hithis helmet, another his rifle, and thethird the ground near by, convincedPrivate Markey that he had better movehis position. Sliding down the slope tothe trail, he ran to the right to the CP

17 Combat Intervs with the following: Orr, Thomp-son, Corey; S Sgt Clifford P. Marx, Pfc Richard M.Feeney, and Pfc Robert H. Kessell; Borum; Gresham.

18 Ibid.; Combat Interv with S Sgt Kenneth L.Fankell.

188 THREE BATTLES

of the Company A platoon. After ob-taining a rifle from a wounded soldierand casually smoking a cigarette, for hewas in no hurry to return to the hot spothe had just left, he crawled back up theslope. Farther up the knob he spottedwhat appeared to be a German positionand called down for a bazooka. Whenthe bazooka man arrived, he and PrivateMarkey discovered to the latter's em-barrassment that the enemy "position"was only an overturned tree stump.19

On the extreme right of the CompanyC platoon, the 3d Squad, which Lieu-tenant Corey had ordered to fill in thegap between the 1st Squad and theCompany A platoon, had just reached thedead German's body on the trail whenthe counterattack began farther up thehill. Although the grenades and smallarms fire were not landing dangerouslyclose, the squad leader, S. Sgt. George E.Price, halted his men and directed themto wait until the situation appeared saferbefore continuing up the slope to tie inwith Company A.20

During the counterattack only a smallnumber of men in Lieutenant Gresham'splatoon were in a position to fire, for theGermans were moving in from the leftfront on the western slope of Knob 2.But the three men on the left, PrivatesMaynard, Schroeder, and Banks, couldobserve the attack and did yeoman servicewith their rifles. By the time the coun-terattack was in full swing, Gresham'smen had exhausted their supply of gre-nades. Corey's men did not use theirmeager supply at all because of thedanger of hitting their own men who

were stretched out on the slope above thetrail.21 In the end the Germans werebeaten back, but the advantage gainedwas slight compared with the damageinflicted on Lieutenant Corey's platoonduring the counterattack by the explosionof a single shell.

Misplaced Shellfire

After the 1st and 2d Squads of Com-pany C's 1st Platoon had built up askirmish line, but while the 3d Squadwas still moving into position, fire eitherfrom artillery or from a direct-fire weaponsuch as a tank or a tank destroyer beganto land on the southwestern slope ofKnob 2. As the first shell struck a fewyards below the platoon, S. Sgt. DonaldB. Smith, assistant leader of the 2d Squad,who was on the right flank of his men,called out, "That's our own stuff fallingshort!" 22 A few minutes later a secondshell landed in the middle of the 2dSquad, spraying the nearest men withfragments and wrecking the morale ofothers near by.

Possibly because of the noise from ex-ploding grenades, Private Borum, whowas on the squad's left below the trail,did not hear either shell strike theground. As the dirt raised by the secondshell flew over his head, Private Borumturned over and saw that his squadleader, Sergeant Garner, had a gapinghole in his upper arm, shoulder, andchest. Garner was calling, "Get me out!Get me out!" 23 Borum shouted that hewould go back for help. As he crawled

19 Combat Intervs with Fankell, Borum, Feeney,Kessell, Markey, S Sgt Kyle F. Priestley, and May.

20 Combat Intervs with Sgt Loyd J. Duffey, PfcLouis J. Hart, Pfc Jackson P. Bagley, and with Corey.

21 Combat Intervs with the following: Corey,Thompson, and all enlisted survivors still in 1st Plat,Co C, 338th Inf; Gresham and Stevens-Michalek-Carter-Wilson-Hillier-Pickens.

22 Combat Interv with Borum.23 Ibid.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 189

down the slope toward the right, henoticed several other men lying motion-less near the trail and heard another,Pvt. Joe M. Self, moan for attention.Borum reached Lieutenant Corey andreported what had happened.

When the shell hit the 2d Squad, mostof the survivors were badly shaken upby the concussion, and all withdrew soquickly to the platoon CP that they didnot stop to find out the effects of theshell. Although Sergeant Smith andPrivate Borum, two of the uninjured men,both knew the toll had been heavy,neither could say at first how many or howserious the casualties were. To get thefacts, Lieutenant Corey sent the two menback up the trail to the left. Coming tothe wounded Private Self above the trail,they poured water down his throat andexamined the men around him. Theysaw at a glance that Sergeant Garner wasdead. Going a little farther to the left,they saw Private Parrish die just as theyreached him. Four more men werecounted dead, and another besides Pri-vate Self was wounded. All together,they discovered, the single shell had killedsix men, including the squad leader, andwounded two others. Sergeant Smithreported the casualties to LieutenantCorey at the platoon CP, and the Lieu-tenant marked them off in the littlenotebook in which he kept the names ofhis platoon.

The platoon aid man, Pfc. Boyd A.West, moved out to do what he could forPrivate Self, but as he walked up theslope above the trail the Germans openedfire. Although the shots went over hishead, the aid man waved a bandage sothat the enemy would discover his non-combat mission and cease fire. If theGermans saw the impromptu flag they

gave no sign, continuing to shoot overthe aid man's head. Despite the fire,Private West reached the wounded manand bandaged his knee, which had beenhit by a shell fragment. When he hadfinished, he withdrew to the platoon CP.

Lieutenant Corey was certain that theshellfire which hit his platoon was Amer-ican fire. He tried to get word back toLieutenant Souder, the company com-mander, to have the fire lifted, butneither his radio nor his sound-poweredtelephone raised the company com-mander. The telephone had failed whenthe shell had exploded, fragments havingkilled Pvt. Frank A. Jordan, who alongwith Pvt. George Balog had been carryingthe wire. Private Balog had scamperedback down the slope to a more secureposition, and when he returned to theplatoon CP the telephone would notfunction. With his own communica-tions out, Corey sent a messenger toLieutenant Gresham, urging that Gresh-am tell battalion to get the shelling liftedand that he himself come down at onceto Corey's CP. Lieutenant Gresham,accompanied by his runner, moved thethirty-five to fifty yards back to theCompany C platoon's CP and noted thedisorganized situation. Although hisown radio had been out during the coun-terattack, Gresham tried it again; thistime it worked, and he relayed Corey'srequest to Captain King.24

The news of what had happened toLieutenant Corey's platoon shocked Colo-nel Jackson and Lieutenant Farber, theliaison officer from the 329th FieldArtillery Battalion to the 338th's 1stBattalion, into immediate action. Both

24 Ibid.; Combat Intervs with the following: Balogand West; Feeney, Corey, Priestley, Gresham, andKing.

190 THREE BATTLES

tried through regiment, the 329th FieldArtillery, and the divisional and corpsartillery to get the fire lifted. LieutenantFarber felt sure that the two rounds hadcome from somewhere in the Sieve Rivervalley, but the offending gun could notbe located. Because a number of tanksand tank destroyers were in support ofthe 1st Battalion attack but under regi-mental (338th) control, the liaison officerguessed that one of them had been thesource of fire which had not been givenenough range to clear the mountain andhad landed in the midst of Company C's1st Platoon.25 Lieutenant Corey's menfelt certain that American artillery wasresponsible. The riflemen disagreed onlyover whether the two rounds came froma 105-mm. howitzer, from a 240-mm.howitzer, or from an 8-inch gun.26

Whatever the weapon, everybodyagreed that it was American, not Ger-man. Before long the news of what hadhappened reached all the firing battalions,and no more shells landed in the area.It is possible, however, that the shellswere enemy, for in the middle of theafternoon both the 85th Division G-2and division artillery reported that Ger-man shells had fallen on Monte Altuzzo.27

Although only a single round hadstruck Lieutenant Corey's platoon, theresulting confusion and the belief that itwas friendly fire had a demoralizingeffect upon those who survived. Theshell had dazed and shaken up most ofthe men left in the 1st and 2d Squads,including the 1st Squad leader, SergeantOrr. After the second shell exploded,

all the men had withdrawn quickly, atleast as far as the saddle between Knobs1 and 2 where the trail turned left awayfrom the ridge line. Some men hadrushed wildly down the mountain for 150yards, and a handful had gone all theway to the covered positions below thepeak of Hill 782 on its southwestern slopewhere they joined the 2d Platoon,Company C.

Lieutenant Corey tried now to bringorder out of chaos, to reorganize theplatoon's defense, and to bring back allthe men who had run down the ridge.With the assistance of his platoon ser-geant, Sgt. William A. Thompson, andthe platoon guide, S. Sgt. William S.Trigg, the platoon leader directed thosemen who had withdrawn to the saddlebetween Knob 1 and Knob 2 in the trailto build up a defense covering both sidesof the ridge line. All together not morethan eighteen men set up the new defensethirty-five yards to the rear of CompanyA's 2d Platoon. A few yards farther tothe rear in the rocks on the top of Knob1, Sergeant Trigg, an extra automaticrifle team, and the bazooka team con-tinued to guard the platoon's rear andthe extreme right flank.

After the shellfire had come in, Ser-geant Price, 3d Squad leader, had sentfour or five riflemen and his BAR manto positions on the slope above the trailto the left rear of Company A's 2dPlatoon. Except for Pfc. Michael Burja,who assisted Gresham's men on the rightflank, at no time while in these positionsdid the group fire at the enemy. The restof the 3d Squad either remained with theassistant squad leader, Sgt. Loyd J.Duffey, below the bend in the trail orstraggled farther down the ridge.

While Lieutenant Corey remained to

25 Combat Intervs with Jackson and Farber.26 Combat Intervs with all enlisted survivors still

in 1st Plat, Co C, 338th Inf.27 Ibid.; Combat Intervs with Jackson and Farber;

85th Div G-2 Jnl, 15 Sep 44.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 191

direct the defense at the bend of the trail,Platoon Sergeant Thompson went downthe ridge with the platoon runner, Pfc.Randolph H. Bishop, to bring back thosemen who, after the shellfire, had with-drawn past Knob 1 as far back as Hill782. Going back to the rocks at thepeak of Hill 782, Sergeant Thompsonfound several men, including an assistantsquad leader, and brought them back upthe ridge. This assistant squad leaderhad been so unnerved by the shelling thathe had walked on down the mountainbetween Knob 1 and Hill 782 and seatedhimself right on the ridge line in full viewof the enemy. All he could think aboutwas that Sergeant Garner, his best friend,had been killed in one lightning stroke.He remembered bitterly that that day,15 September, was Sergeant Garner'sbirthday.

Sergeant Thompson failed to find someof the stragglers, because they had goneeven farther down the hill to the south-western slope of Hill 782 just above thebarbed wire. One man whom he didfind refused to return on the ground thathis back hurt and that he had to go to thecompany CP for medical attention. Inall, the 1st Platoon sergeant made threetrips down the ridge to round up the half-dozen stragglers he brought back. Upontheir return they filled out the platoon'spositions, but such shaky, nervous mendid little to strengthen the defense.28

While the defense of the 1st Platoon,Company C, was being reorganized,Lieutenant Gresham informed Lieuten-ant Corey that his 2d Platoon, CompanyA, would try to move men to the rear ofthe Germans in the rocks on Knob 2.

Hoping that another attempt at envelop-ment might break the enemy resistance,Gresham asked that Corey's platoon pro-tect the left rear of his men. Gresham'splan awakened no enthusiasm in Lieu-tenant Corey, who doubted even thevalue of holding on in his bare, rockyposition. Haunted by the heavy lossesCompany B had taken the previous day,he feared that if his men remained theywould suffer a similar fate. In spite ofthese misgivings Corey promised that hismen would hold and would supportGresham's attack.29

Long-Range Fire and Counterattack

Before Lieutenant Gresham could movehis platoon forward again, the Germansopened fire from the right rear and leftflank, keeping the Company A men onthe defensive. The rear guard of Gresh-am's platoon, Platoon Sergeant Stevensand five other men, began receivingenemy fire from two machine guns on thewestern slopes of Monte Verruca. Al-though Sergeant Stevens' group quicklysilenced one of the guns with return fire,the other continued to harass them forsome time. Soon the group spotted fivemore Germans with a machine gun mov-ing up to the right rear about 500 yardsaway on the eastern slope of the Altuzzoridge southeast of the peak of Hill 782.Bringing a BAR and rifles to bear, theplatoon's rear guard killed or woundedtwo of the enemy and drove the rest tocover.

Scarcely had the long-range actionceased, when about fifteen Germanscounterattacked on the left flank ofGresham's platoon.30 (Map 14) Word

28 Combat Intervs with Duffey, Feeney, West,Borum, Bagley, Hart, Marx, May, Bishop, Burja, PfcEarl B. Gray, Corey, Thompson, Orr, and Priestley.

29 Combat Intervs with Gresham and Corey.30 Combat Intervs with Gresham and Stevens.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 193

had already come from an enemy radiointercept that the Germans were going tocounterattack soon from the north ornortheast. Although the 85th Divisionartillery reported at 1440 that it hadplaced fire on the area where the enemyforce was forming, the Germans stillstruck.

At 1320 the Germans on Monte Altuzzohad radioed that Hill 926 was firmly intheir hands. They stated that their"blocking position" ran from the trailcrossing at the north end of Knob 2 forabout 200 yards west-northwest. Theblocking position was being extended bythe 2d Battalion, 12th Parachute Regiment,to an observation post north of the peakof the western ridge near the switchbacksin the highway. Adding that the troopsthat had broken through at Hill 782were surrounded, the 3d Battalion, 12thRegiment, which occupied the main lineof resistance, declared it would throw theAmericans back to the southwest. Thereserves were to counterattack on theline from Hill 624 to Hill 782.31

The first word Lieutenant Gresham'smen had of the counterattack came fromthe Company C platoon, which reportedenemy movement to its left front and firefrom a bend in the trail. The Germanswere moving in from the western slopeof Knob 2, abandoned by Company C'splatoon after the second shell had burst.Using rifles, machine pistols, and gre-nades, the Germans came in close, some-times advancing within a few yards ofthe rear Company A men. LieutenantGresham's men not only fired point-blankwhenever a German came in sight butalso reacted with area fire. Although

the 1st Platoon, Company C, was not inposition for effective fire, a few men didfire in the direction of the attack. Sev-eral men in Gresham's platoon werewounded, though a few with light in-juries continued to fight. In the endsuperior fire power, mainly from theCompany A platoon, drove the Germansback up the ridge.32

Supporting Platoons on Hill 782

During the advance of the two leadingplatoons and during the enemy counter-attacks, the rest of Company A andCompany C had remained aloof fromthe battle, staying for the most part inconcealed positions behind the peak ofHill 782. The narrow, exposed route ofadvance west of the main ridge line andthe sheer drop-off on the eastern slopeleft no room for the deployment of moremen. Behind Lieutenant Corey's 1stPlatoon (Company C) had followed insingle file Company C's 2d Platoon.After the forward advance was stopped,the 2d Platoon leader, 1st Lt. David M.Brumbaugh, halted his men just west ofthe ridge line from Knob 1 to Hill 782,fifty yards to the rear of Corey's platoon.From that area the 2d Platoon could seethe fight in progress up the ridge butcould not give supporting fire withouttaking the chance of hitting the assaulttroops. The 1st Platoon of Company Ahad remained on the slope of Hill 782between the barbed wire and the peak;the other rifle platoons, the 3d of Com-pany A and the 3d of Company C, hadstayed below the entanglement near thecompany command posts.

31 85th Div G-2 Jnl, 15 Sep 44; 338th Inf Unit Jnl,15 Sep 44.

32 Combat Intervs with Gresham, Stevens, Priestley,Marx, Duffey, Markey, Feeney, Bagley, Hart, Burja,and Borum.

194 THREE BATTLES

While the attack was going on, noneof the machine guns were able to reachfiring positions from which they couldsupport the leading riflemen. One ma-chine gun squad of Company A hadfollowed Lieutenant Gresham's platoonto the top of Hill 782 but had not firedbecause of its exposed position. Theother squad set itself up briefly on theslope below the peak of Hill 782. To theright the light machine guns of CompanyC stopped above the barbed wire, wherethey had some concealment but lackedgood firing positions.

Although the 60-mm. mortars of bothCompanies A and C were set up indefilade on the slopes of Hill 782 andHill 624, respectively, they were neverused because the company commanderswere afraid their fire would fall on theattacking rifle platoons. But while theattack was in progress 1st Lt. Merlin E.Ritchey and T. Sgt. Zealin W. Russell,Weapons Platoon leader and platoonsergeant, Company C, with good ob-servation up the Altuzzo ridge, directedartillery fire on the big rock escarpmentbetween the enemy's main line of re-sistance on Knob 2 and the highest peakof the mountain, Hill 926.33

Back at the battalion and regimentalcommand posts Colonel Jackson andColonel Mikkelsen had received frag-mentary reports of the 1st Battalion'sprogress. At 1030 the 1st Battalion re-ported that Companies A and C wereabout 500 yards from the top of MonteAltuzzo and were still moving forwardunder mortar fire. An hour later the

1st Battalion reported that its troops,having struck resistance on the crest ofthe mountain, were on the west slope ofthe main ridge at a point a hundredyards beyond their actual positions onKnob 2. Again at 1206 the 1st Battalionreported that its attacking troops wereon the "1st Knob" of Monte Altuzzo,calling for lots of artillery fire on the"2d Knob." Finally, at 1405, Com-panies A and C were reported by the338th Infantry to have one platoon eachclosing for the assault against Hill 926with one platoon from each companyready to follow.34

Withdrawal

While Lieutenant Corey was reorgan-izing the 1st Platoon, Lieutenant Brum-baugh (2d Platoon, Company C), whowas behind a rock on Knob 1 and nearCorey, called Lieutenant Souder, thecompany commander, on his SCR 536.Brumbaugh asked permission to with-draw his platoon, which was stretchedout in column to the rear of the 1stPlatoon between Knob 1 and the crestof Hill 782. If his platoon withdrew tothe southwestern slope of Hill 782,Brumbaugh said, his men could havebetter cover and could still come to theassistance of the 1st Platoon if needed.Before giving permission, Souder said hewould have to get battalion approval.While Brumbaugh waited for the answer,Corey said to him, "I don't see why weall don't withdraw." 35 A few minuteslater the battalion commander approvedthe original request on the condition thatLieutenant Brumbaugh keep abreast of

33 Combat Intervs with the following: MacMinn,King, and T Sgt William H. Kohler; Ritchey,Russell, and T Sgt Dale E. Burkholder; MacMinn,White, and S Sgt Robert W. Kistner, Jr.; VanHorne, South, Whary, Colosimo, Grigsby, Albert,and Brumbaugh.

34 338th Inf Unit Jnl, 15 Sep 44; 85th Div G-3 Jnl,15 Sep 44.

35 Combat Intervs with Brumbaugh and Souder.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 195

the 1st Platoon's situation. The orderdid not apply to Lieutenant Corey's men,who were to remain in position fartherup the ridge and continue the attackwith the 2d Platoon, Company A.

Leaving Lieutenant Corey at his pla-toon CP on Knob 1, Lieutenant Brum-baugh moved his 2d Platoon single file250 yards to positions among the rockson the southwest slope of Hill 782, belowthe peak. Placing the 3d Squad leader,S. Sgt. Joseph S. Adams, in charge, thelieutenant and his platoon sergeant, T.Sgt. Tony L. White, continued downbelow the barbed wire to the companyCP, where the platoon leader explainedto Lieutenant Souder his reasons forrequesting withdrawal.36

It seemed ironical that a platoon whichhad sustained only one casualty beforewithdrawing to better concealment shouldnow suffer casualties. Enemy mortarshells began to pelt the area where Lieu-tenant Brumbaugh's men were digging in.The mortar concentration killed two menand wounded eight, including some fromthe 1st Platoon who had run down themountain after the stray artillery shellhad disorganized their platoon. Besidesinflicting these casualties, the enemyshelling also wounded Lieutenant Mac-Minn, 1st Platoon leader, Company A,and wiped out one Company A machinegun squad. The machine gunners hadjust set up below the peak of Hill 782to guard the right flank when one mortarshell wounded two men and killed theother three.37

After the 2d Platoon, Company C,had withdrawn to the slope below the

peak of Hill 782, a cry passed up toLieutenant Corey and his 1st Platoon:"Withdraw!" 38 Although the messagetraveled by word of mouth from man toman, no one remembered who started it,only that it had come from somewhereon the slope below. Making no effort tocheck the message, Lieutenant Coreyassumed it was authentic. His menpeeled off spontaneously as soon as theyheard the cry. To the platoon leaderand the men alike the withdrawal "order"was welcome, for it told them to do whateveryone apparently wanted to do.Corey started down the ridge behind hismen.39

Since no message for LieutenantCorey's platoon to withdraw had beenpassed up from the 2d Platoon, it seemslikely the cry originated with some mem-ber of the 1st Platoon who had seen the2d withdraw and thought or wished themovement to apply to him. When thewithdrawal started, Sergeant Thompsonand the platoon runner, Private Bishop,were between the 1st and 2d Platoons onthe ridge line between Knob 1 and Hill782, still trying to bring back stragglerswho had run down the hill after themisplaced shellfire. Had the cry for

36 Ibid.; Combat Intervs with Jackson, White, andKistner.

37 Combat Intervs with Jackson, White, Kistner,Brumbaugh, MacMinn, King, and Kohler.

38 Combat Intervs with all enlisted survivors in 1stand 2d Plats, Co C, 338th Inf, and with Corey.

39 Ibid. Although he did not so state in the firstinterviews held with him, Lieutenant Corey statedlater (13 April 45) that just before the cry to withdrawwas heard he had sent a note by runner to LieutenantSouder, requesting permission to withdraw. Coreysaid he reasoned that the attack had bogged down,that his men had sustained heavy casualties, and thatsounds from the left flank indicated that his platoonwas being surrounded. No reply had been received,the lieutenant said, when his platoon withdrew. Ifsuch a message was sent, it never reached the com-pany commander. The historian was unable to findany officer or enlisted survivor in Company C besidesLieutenant Corey who knew that such a message wassent. Cf. Combat Intervs with Souder.

196 THREE BATTLES

withdrawal come from the 2d Platoon,which was below them on the slope, theplatoon sergeant and his runner wouldcertainly have heard it. They heardnothing, only saw the main body of the1st Platoon above them moving fast onthe way down the ridge. They followedsuit.

When the withdrawing men reachedthe peak of Hill 782, they saw the casual-ties which the 2d Platoon had sufferedfrom mortar fire, and some men assistedthe ambulatory casualties down theridge. Others loaded themselves withextra rifles and went below the entangle-ment halfway down the slope to thecompany CP. A few men of the 1st and2d Platoons tried to improvise a litterof field jackets and rifles, but the effortfailed because the wounded man theytried to put on it was too tall. Pendinglater evacuation, they hid him in thebushes and hurried down the slope tojoin the rest of the company. For lackof litters, the other nonwalking woundedwere left on the slope above the barbedwire.40

As the 2d Platoon reached the com-pany CP, Lieutenant Souder, the com-pany commander, noticed that some 1stPlatoon men were arriving too. Theycould tell him only that word had comeup the line to withdraw, and they hadobeyed. When Lieutenant Corey ap-peared, Lieutenant Souder said he hadgiven no such authorization and had re-ceived no request from Lieutenant Coreyfor the 1st Platoon's withdrawal. Al-though he was angered by the platoon'sabandonment of its position, it was now

an accomplished fact about which hecould do nothing.41

After Company C had started to with-draw, Sergeant Stevens and the rearguard of the 2d Platoon, Company A,spotted two German squads of four meneach below the peak of Hill 782 on theeastern slope of the main ridge. Al-though the Germans were carrying lit-ters, Sergeant Stevens suspected thatmachine guns were hidden on them andhe directed his men to fire. Their shotskilled two of the Germans and drove therest to cover. A moment later, as if toconfirm Sergeant Stevens' guess aboutthe loads the Germans were carrying,two machine guns opened fire from thesame vicinity, wounding several men inLieutenant Gresham's platoon.42

In the midst of this new fire from therear, Lieutenant Gresham received wordthat Company C had withdrawn. Thecry to pull back had reached the rearmen of his platoon, and, as a few ofLieutenant Corey's men who were farth-est up the hill began to withdraw, someof Gresham's men started to follow.Alert to what was happening, Greshampromptly pulled his men back and senttwo scouts down to check with Corey'splatoon. The scouts confirmed Com-pany C's withdrawal. The lieutenanttried in vain to reach Captain King byradio and then decided that in the faceof the continuing heavy fire it would becostly, if not impossible, to remain un-aided in the Knob 2 positions. He toldhis squad leaders his decision and sentthe 3d Squad to protect the platoon'srear and to make contact with CompanyC. Moving some distance down the

40 Combat Intervs with Corey, Orr, Priestley,Marx, Bagley, Hart, Burja, Feeney, Thompson, andBorum.

41 Combat Intervs with Souder and Corey.42 Combat Intervs with Gresham and Stevens.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 197

ridge, the squad sent word back that theCompany C platoon could not be found.

While machine gun fire from the rightrear continued, Gresham ordered therest of his men to move back quicklydown the ridge. To speed their with-drawal, the men dropped their blanketrolls, brought along in the attack. Thetime was well into the afternoon, prob-ably about 1530. The withdrawal downthe ridge was well organized, and all theplatoon's wounded were evacuated exceptPrivate Dorris, who was left behind untila litter could be brought. PrivateBanks, who had shell fragments in hislegs and stomach and should have waitedfor litter evacuation, ran all the waydown to the company area below thebarbed wire because he feared being lefton the mountain. Almost the first manto reach the bottom of the hill, he col-lapsed at the company command postand had to be carried to the battalion aidstation.43

When Lieutenant Gresham, bringingup the rear of his platoon, reached therocks just below the peak of Hill 782where he had met the 1st Platoon, Com-pany C, that morning, he saw CaptainKing and explained to him the circum-stances which had brought about with-drawal. Captain King approved hisaction. Colonel Jackson in turn ap-proved the withdrawal of the two com-panies and told them to prepare for thenext assault.44

After the rifle companies' withdrawal,litter squads were sent up to evacuatethe wounded who had been left behind.A smoke screen cover was fired by the403d Field Artillery Battalion. Guided

by Pfc. Clifford P. Marx, 1st Platoon, tenmen returned for the wounded of Com-pany C. Five of them found PrivateHinrichsen above the barbed wire andpulled him out while the smoke was stillthick. Although the other five continuedup the ridge in an effort to reach PrivateSelf, they moved only a few yards pastthe peak of Hill 782 before the smokelifted and a machine gun from the frontdrove them back. Private Self was sub-sequently captured. While the smokelasted, several men of Company A'smortar section moved up the ridge andevacuated Private Dorris.45

During the battle Company A had lostthree men killed and fifteen wounded,and Company C nine killed, twenty-onewounded, and one missing in action—atotal for the two companies of forty-nine.While these losses were not excessive,they were felt strongly in a battalionwhich had already lost more than halfof Company B. The strain of battle wasbeginning to tell, and the number ofexhaustion cases was increasing. Thatnight an enemy mortar concentrationclose to the 1st Battalion aid station hita near-by outbuilding at Paretaio Farm-house, killed one litterbearer, and wound-ed several others.46

The Day's Action

The fourth attack against MonteAltuzzo on 15 September had broughtthe farthest advance yet on the mainridge. The leading platoons of Com-panies A and C had been within 250yards of the top of the mountain (Hill

43 Combat Intervs with Gresham.44 Ibid.; Combat Intervs with King, Jackson, and

Souder.

45 Combat Intervs with Marx and Gresham; 403dFA Bn Mission Rpts, 15 Sep 44.

46 Cos A and C, 338th Inf, Morning Rpts, 16 Sep44; 1st Bn, 338th Inf, Aid Station Log, 15 Sep 44.

198 THREE BATTLES

926) and had come under the nose of themain German defenses at the top of thebowl on Knob 2. Yet the attack hadfailed to knock out the heavy semicircleof positions guarding the top of the bowl.A major factor was the shellfire whichhad inflicted heavy casualties on Com-pany C's 1st Platoon and had demoralizedmost of the survivors.

In spite of the repeated failures, thecumulative effect of American efforts wasbeing felt. The infantry and the artillerywere inflicting casualties on the enemy,wearing down his powers of resistance,and forcing him to commit first the bat-talion and regimental reserves of the 12thParachute Regiment, then divisional andfinally corps reserves from other sectorsof the front.47

As on the day before, effective artillery,tank, and tank destroyer fire had beenplaced on the enemy bunkers on MonteAltuzzo. Several hits had been scored,and a few positions had been severelydamaged. Heavy artillery — 240-mm.howitzers and 8-inch guns—was creditedwith placing destructive fire on severalpositions.

In midmorning the 403d Field ArtilleryBattalion fired 112 rounds against enemyactivity on the slopes north of MonteVerruca and six rounds at Germanmortars between Hill 926 and Pian diGiogo to the east. The 329th FieldArtillery Battalion in direct support con-tributed a number of harassing missions,three TOT's, and observed fire on enemypillboxes, personnel, mortars, and ma-chine guns in the Altuzzo area. It alsofired a concentration to repel a counter-attack against the 1st Battalion, 338th.

With a ground observation post adjust-ing, a battalion of heavy corps artilleryscored four target hits on the crest ofMonte Altuzzo and three target hits onpillboxes on the western ridge, claimingat least one pillbox destroyed. At 1500the 85th Division artillery placed harass-ing fire on Monte Verruca and the areabetween Altuzzo and the highway.

During 15 September the 1st Platoon,Company B, 84th Chemical Battalion(4.2-inch mortars), in support of the 1stBattalion, 338th, fired harassing missionsof seven rounds of high explosive andforty-two rounds of white phosphorus.The 2d Platoon fired sixty rounds of highexplosive near the highway. In addi-tion, the 81-mm. mortars behind ParetaioFarmhouse fired in the draws east andwest of Monte Altuzzo.

From positions north of Scarperia,Company B, 805th Tank Destroyer Bat-talion, using forward observation, firedabout 1,000 rounds during the day atsuspected pillboxes and machine gunpositions at the long range of 4,000 yards.For the most part the destroyers' targetswere east of the highway in the GiogoPass area and on the slopes of MonteAltuzzo. The tank destroyers claimeddestruction of one pillbox. Because thepillboxes were high on the steep moun-tains and good firing positions could notbe reached by roads or the adjacent slopes,the tank destroyer guns had to shoot atlong range with a high angle of eleva-tion. Hits in the rock were damagingbut not destructive; hits in the aperturewere more effective. The 76-mm. gunon the destroyers had a good percentageof hits with both high explosive andarmor-piercing ammunition.48

47 IPW and S-2 Rpts, 338th Inf Unit Jnl, Sep 44;Radio Intercepts, 338th Inf Unit Jnl, and 85th DivG-2 Jnl, 13-15 Sep 44.

48 Mission Rpts in 403d FA Bn, and 178th and423d FA Gps, Unit Jnls, 15 Sep 44; 84th Cml Bn

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 199

CAMOUFLAGED TANK DESTROYERS (M-18) MOVING UP. Thesedestroyers of the 805th are en route to positions north of Scarperia.

Many positions, especially the heavyrock slabs and other open positionsaround the top of the Altuzzo bowl,remained unidentified and untouchedby supporting fires. Even where thebunkers were hit by light and mediumartillery, most of the personnel insideprobably survived. Unless the bunkers

were severely damaged they could beremanned as long as the Germans hadthe troops.49

While the 1st Battalion, 338th Infan-try, was making the main effort to cap-ture the crest of Monte Altuzzo, the unitson its flanks were equally unsuccessful inattacks against defenses in the rest of theGiogo Pass sector. On the 338th's right

Unit Jnl and AAR, 15 Sep 44; 85th Div G-2 andG-3 Jnls, 15 Sep 44; 805th TD Bn AAR, Sep 44;Combat Intervs with Capt Clarence D. Brown andother officers of Co D, 338th Inf; 752d Tk Bn AAR,Sep 44.

49 338th Inf Unit Jnl, 15-18 Sep 44; 85th Div G-2and G-3 Jnls, 15-18 Sep 44; Notes of several recon-naissances of the area by the author from Nov 44 toApr 45.

200 THREE BATTLES

flank the 339th Infantry at midnight on14 September attacked Monte Verruca,but the assault companies were stoppedby mines and barbed wire and thendriven back by mortar and machine gunfire. West of Monte Altuzzo alongHighway 6524, the 2d Battalion, 338th,made no advance from l'Uomo Morto.West of the highway the 91st Division's363d Infantry attacked up the westernridge of Monticelli during the earlymorning of 15 September, but failed tobreach the enemy MLR. Even the 361stInfantry, striking on the west of the 363d,failed to outflank Monticelli. At theend of 15 September the 85th and 91stDivisions had everywhere failed to breakthrough the Gothic Line.50

The Enemy Situation

During three days of fighting, the 12thParachute Regiment and the rest of the 4thParachute Division had sustained heavycasualties. By the end of 15 Septemberthe paratroopers of the 1st Battalion, 12thRegiment, in the Altuzzo sector were indire need of reinforcement. The 1stCompany had suffered especially heavylosses, including the company command-er's death on 14 September. A prisonercaptured later on Monte Altuzzo re-ported having seen eleven men killed andmany others wounded in the 1st Companybetween 13 September and the morningof 16 September. On 15 September the1st Platoon, 1st Company, alone had fivekilled and ten wounded. While infantryattacks had caused a number of thecasualties, artillery fire had been more

effective by killing and wounding Ger-man reinforcements as they moved intoposition. For example, as the EngineerPlatoon, 12th Regiment, came into the for-ward area, American artillery fire killedfour men and wounded seven.

The 12th Parachute Regiment's reserveand the reserve of the 3d Battalion haddefinitely been committed. Since thedivision's reserve troops were being sentin to strengthen the forces on MonteAltuzzo and Verruca, it seems likely thatthe reserves of the 1st and 2d Battalionshad also been committed. The enemyadmitted during the evening that the 4thParachute Division had committed its lastreserves and claimed that these had beenused successfully to block local pene-trations.

Even with the reinforcements of 14September the companies of the 12thRegiment were still short their normalcomplements. Their ranks were filledwith noninfantry replacements or para-troopers who had had short training andno specialized work, among them allheadquarters and service personnel of the4th Parachute Division who could be spared.During the night of 15-16 September theMonte Altuzzo sector was reinforced bythe 10th and 15th Companies, the EngineerPlatoon of the 12th Regiment, and a miscel-laneous group of twenty men from the4th Antitank Battalion, 4th Parachute Divi-sion. (Though the 15th Company's totalstrength on 10 September was eightymen, American artillery fire had by thenight of 15 September caused 20 percentlosses.)51

In addition to bringing up divisionreserves, the enemy began on the night

50 2d Bn, 338th Inf, Unit Jnls, 14-15 Sep 44; 85thDiv and 91st Div G-3 Jnls, 14-15 Sep 44; FifthArmy G-3 Jnl File, 14-15 Sep 44; Combat Intervswith Cole; 2d Bn, 338th Inf, AAR, Sep 44.

51 338th Inf Unit Jnl, IPW Rpts, and Intel Sums,14-18 Sep 44; 85th Div G-2 and G-3 Jnls, 15-18Sep 44; 85th Div G-2 Rpts, Sep 44.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 201

of 15-16 September to move units fromas far west as the sector north of Luccawhere the front was relatively quiet.After the enemy realized that the 12thRegiment alone could not hold the GiogoPass sector, the 2d Battalion, GrenadierLehr Brigade, which had been in corpsreserve north of Lucca, began to moveby trucks and horse-drawn vehicles toFirenzuola from where it could be sentto the forward positions. During 15September the 2d Battalion, Grenadier LehrBrigade, arrived at the I Parachute Corps,but the 1st Battalion was still on themarch. Although by the morning of 16September this small group of reinforce-

ments was on the way to the front-linepositions, these reserves were hardlystrong enough to enable the enemy tohold the Giogo Pass defenses for anyprolonged period. Furthermore, theywould not be available for more thanthree or four days. Sometime on 15 or16 September, Field Marshal Kesselring,commander of Army Group C, changed hisorders, allowing the 16th SS Panzer Grena-dier Division to remain in Fourteenth Army'scoastal sector. A condition of this changein order stipulated that the Lehr Brigadewould go to the Tenth Army during thenights of 18-19 and 19-20 September.52

52 Entries of 14-16 Sep 44, Fourteenth Army KTB 4.

CHAPTER IV

Advance to the Crest(16 September)

PAINTING OF MONTE ALTUZZO AREA from the slope in front of ParetaioFarmhouse. Painting by Sgt. Ludwig Mactarian, combat artist of the Fifth Army.

Although he still wanted anotherchance to take the crest of Monte Altuzzo,Colonel Jackson reported to the 338thInfantry after his 1st Battalion had beenstopped at the enemy's main line ofresistance on 15 September that his rifle

companies had sustained considerablecasualties and needed an opportunitythat night for rest and reorganization.Since Colonel Mikkelsen had been sickwith a cold and nervous exhaustion andwas confined to bed with a high fever,

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 203

the 338th executive officer, Lt. Col.Marion P. Boulden, was left to shouldermost of the routine work. The planswere worked out by the assistant 85thDivision commander, Brig. Gen. Lee S.Gerow, who had commanded the regi-ment during the training period in theStates. The night of 15 SeptemberColonel Jackson told General Gerow thatMonte Altuzzo could not be taken with-out a co-ordinated divisional attack.

General Gerow agreed to Jackson'srecommendation that the 2d Battalionattack abreast of the 1st the next day,and tentative plans were made later thatnight. They called for the 2d Battalionto advance up the highway at 2100, whilethe 1st Battalion would resume its attackagainst Hill 926 at midnight. The 3dwas to pass through the 1st after Altuzzo'screst was captured.1 These plans werecanceled by the 85th Division com-mander, General Coulter, in order toawait the outcome of an attack by the363d Infantry, 91st Division, againstMonticelli at 0600 the next morning.2

A co-ordinated attack by the two assaultbattalions of the 338th Infantry was tofollow as soon as Monticelli was secured.To prepare for this later operation, Com-pany F of the 2d Battalion attacked justbefore midnight to secure a little knob

along the highway 400 yards north ofl'Uomo Morto on Monticelli's easternarm. Although Company F knockedout two machine gun positions and trieduntil dawn to advance, the attack failed.3

While infantry plans were being shaped,corps and division artillery continued toharass the enemy's lines of communica-tion. During the night, for example, the403d Field Artillery Battalion put elevenTOT concentrations of thirty-six roundseach on the slopes of Hill 926, Pian diGiogo, Monte Verruca, and areas alongthe highway north of the Giogo Pass, andfired other harassing missions in thevicinity of the pass.4

During the night of 15-16 Septemberthe 1st and 2d Battalions, 363d Infantry,which had been attacking Monticelli,were hard-pressed to repulse five enemycounterattacks; well after dawn the nextmorning the 3d Battalion, 363d, scheduledto make an 0600 attack for which the338th Infantry's attack was waiting, hadnot yet pushed off. About 0800, reportsthat the enemy on Monte Altuzzo, rein-forced by the 10th Company, 10th ParachuteRegiment, was planning a counterattackled the 85th Division to alert the forwardinfantry elements and artillery observers.The threat never materialized and didnot interfere with the plans for resump-tion of the American attack.5

General Gerow's Plans for the 338th

On the morning of 16 SeptemberGeneral Gerow visited the 363d Infantry

1 Combat Intervs with Jackson, Boulden, and Cole;338th Inf Unit Jnl, 15 Sep 44; 2d Bn, 338th Inf,Unit Jnl, 15-16 Sep 44.

2 According to 85th Division records, the 91stDivision requested that the 338th Infantry delay itsattack on Altuzzo until Monticelli was taken.Records of the 85th Division make no note of thefact that a vigorous attack against Altuzzo might havehelped the 91st Division effort. Evidence from Gen-eral Gerow and from the 91st Division tends tocontradict this entry in the 85th Division records.338th Inf Unit Jnl, 15-16 Sep 44; 85th Div G-3Jnl, 15-16 Sep 44; Combat Interv with Gerow; Ltr,Maj R. H. Gordon, 91st Div historian, to the author,10 Mar 45.

3 2d Bn, 338th Inf, and 338th Inf Unit Jnls, 15-16Sep 44; Combat Interv with Cole.

4 403d FA Bn Mission Rpts, 15-16 Sep 44; 178thFA Gp and 423d FA Gp Mission Rpts, 15-16 Sep 44.

5 338th Inf Unit Jnl, 15-16 Sep 44; 85th Div G-2and G-3 Jnls, 15-16 Sep 44; 91st Div G-3 Jnl, 15-16Sep 44; Strootman MS, Ch. III. See also Intervswith Strootman.

204 THREE BATTLES

command post about 0800 and learned ofthe counterattacks that had delayed the363d's attack. The regiment still couldnot move. While he was at the CP,General Keyes, the II Corps commander,came forward and stated that he wantedthe 85th and 91st Divisions to make aco-ordinated attack at once againstAltuzzo and Monticelli. After four daysof unsuccessful attacks, he was mostanxious to capture the pass and completethe corps mission.

General Mark W. Clark, the FifthArmy commander, had become evenmore impatient as each day passed with-out a break-through of the Gothic Line.After observing the successive failures ofII Corps to crack the defenses in front ofthe Giogo Pass, Clark decided upon anenvelopment on the right flank of themain effort. He ordered the 85th Divi-sion to commit its reserve regiment, the337th Infantry, against Monte Pratone,northeast of Monte Altuzzo. The attackwas launched on the afternoon of 16September, only to bog down a thousandyards short of its objective.

Though General Keyes had not ob-jected to General Clark's effort to out-flank the Giogo Pass defenses, the corpscommander still expected the troops alongHighway 6524 to make the main break-through.6 To his request at the 363dInfantry CP for an immediate co-ordi-nated attack against Altuzzo and Monti-celli, however, General Gerow repliedthat the 363d was not yet ready or ableto push up Monticelli. A co-ordinatedattack, Gerow maintained, was thereforeout of the question, but he would direct

his 338th Infantry to proceed with itsattack against Altuzzo.

As he left the conference, GeneralGerow saw no solution but to give the338th Infantry the entire task. From thetime General Gerow had commanded the338th Infantry during the training periodin the States he had known its rankingofficers well. Jackson had been his regi-mental adjutant and Cole, a battalioncommander. Through intimate associa-tion in training and in combat, Gerowhad formed a high estimate of both offi-cers, and felt that the two battalion com-manders could perform any missionassigned them. Gerow, however, hadmisgivings about Maj. Lysle Kelley, the3d Battalion commander, and felt that,with Kelley in command, he could notrely on the 3d Battalion to break the crustof German resistance on Monte Altuzzo,As for the 2d Battalion, deployed alongHighway 6524, the pressure of time andthe open terrain precluded its use in themain effort.

Again, therefore, he decided to havethe 1st Battalion make the main effort.(Map 15) Despite the battering it hadtaken, Gerow considered the unit ablycommanded and still strong enough toseize the crest of Monte Altuzzo. Heworked out in his mind the plan ofattack: during the day Colonel Cole's 2dBattalion would push up the highway tolocate enemy positions which mightbring flanking fire against the maineffort up the Altuzzo ridge, and undercover of darkness the 1st Battalion wouldresume the advance to seize Hill 926.Before dawn the next morning the 3dBattalion would pass through the 1st andseize the knob north of Hill 926.7

6 Interv with Col Robert W. Porter, II CorpsDCofS, 30 Jun 50; 85th Div G-3 Jnl, 15-17 Sep 44;337th Inf Unit Jnl, 15-17 Sep 44.

7 Combat Interv with Gerow; Interv with Gerow,3 Dec 48.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 205

MAP 15

About 0900 General Gerow went tothe CP of the 2d Battalion, 338th Infan-try, and ordered Colonel Cole to jumpoff as soon as possible, locate the enemypositions along the highway, and pushup abreast of the 1st Battalion. Gerowenvisioned the 2d Battalion advancing asfar as possible without sustaining heavycasualties. If the 2d was unable toknock out enemy positions located, it wasto call for artillery support to neutralizethem. The battalion's assignment wastough, undramatic, and could be costly;its flanks would be exposed, and its routeof advance lay over open terrain.8

The 2d Battalion Attack

The 2d Battalion's attack up the high-way, beginning at noon, did not move

far. Company F, which made the at-tack, spotted some machine gun positionsand called for artillery fire but did notadvance abreast of the 1st Battalion'spositions on the main Altuzzo ridge.9

General Gerow became impatient for thedecisive movement, the 1st Battalion'sattack. He was most anxious for the 1stBattalion to reach its objective during thenight and for the 3d to pass through the1st before dawn. Changing his previousorders, he told Colonel Jackson to pushout before dark so that if he received firefrom the left flank in the 2d Battalionzone Colonel Cole could knock out theenemy positions or pinpoint them withsupporting fire. Despite the fact thatthe 1st Battalion had suffered numerouscasualties, General Gerow felt that thebattalion could take Hill 926; in any case,he knew that the 2d Battalion by its ownefforts could never break through on theexposed highway until the two mountainson its flanks were secured.

1st Battalion Prepares To Attack

At 1450 General Gerow told ColonelJackson that the 2d Battalion's advancehad been stopped and suggested that the1st Battalion launch its attack at 1530.Although Colonel Jackson agreed, hefound that the attack preparations re-quired more time than he had estimatedand accordingly set H Hour back to 1630.General Gerow's order called for the 1stBattalion to take the crest of MonteAltuzzo during the night and hold ituntil the 3d Battalion passed through.Then the 2d Battalion's Company E,reinforced, would move to the switch-

8 Combat Intervs with Gerow and Cole.

9 Ibid.; 2d Bn, 338th Inf, AAR and Unit Jnl,Sep 44.

206 THREE BATTLES

backs on the highway as Company Fadvanced along the left of the highwayto Point 770.10

Having received the attack order,Colonel Jackson arranged for supportingfires from the artillery, mortar, and direct-fire weapons. He arranged also forsmoke to screen the daylight period ofadvance. The sectors to be screened in-cluded Monte Verruca on the right andthe area along the highway on the left,for the weather was clear and observationexcellent. For the new attack the artil-lery plan was to isolate the Germaninfantry on Monte Altuzzo from resupplyand reinforcement by concentrating max-imum fire on the higher slopes of themountain mass in the vicinity of theGiogo Pass as far north as Rifredo.Medium artillery was to harass supplyroutes and destroy communications northof Monte Altuzzo. On the westernslopes of the mountain, including thewestern ridge, the 105-mm. howitzerswere to place time fire in the rocky,wooded areas to wipe out Germans inopen positions or in process of movinginto position. Once more the 8-inchguns and 240-mm. howitzers were toconcentrate against the dug-in and pre-pared positions located on both ridgesand the slope between them. The 81-mm. mortars of Company D and the at-tached 4.2-inch mortars were to fire onclose targets that were masked from theartillery.11

Already during the morning the heavyartillery had scored with telling effect incounterbattery fires. Using a ground ob-servation post, a battalion of heavy corpsartillery made three direct hits on a gun

on Monte Castel Guerrino, 3,200 yardsnorthwest of the Giogo Pass. This samebattalion later fired on four heavy gunsnorth of Firenzuola, scored two targethits, and had effect on all the guns. Ac-cording to the air observation post, an-other heavy battalion neutralized fourenemy guns one mile southwest of Firen-zuola. In midafternoon, before the newattack was launched, the 178th FieldArtillery Group fired a harassing missionin the draw between the Giogo Pass andBarco. Farther north along the Firen-zuola highway, harassing fire from aheavy corps battalion traversed the areafrom the pass to Rifredo and Puligno,one and one-half miles to the north.

Twenty minutes before the 338th In-fantry's new attack jumped off, the 403dField Artillery Battalion completed firinga preparation of ninety-four rounds onthe peak of Altuzzo's western ridge.Then, from 1610 to 1715, the 403dscreened the western peak and the slopealong the highway to the west withnearly 600 rounds of smoke. At the sametime the 1st Platoon, Company B, 84thChemical Battalion, smoked the areafrom Hill 926 to the pass. During thefirst hour of the attack, the 403d FieldArtillery Battalion also fired harassingmissions on Altuzzo's western peak, thehighway, and the north slopes of MonteAltuzzo between Hill 926 and the pass.

On the night of 16 September, Com-pany B, 752d Tank Battalion, in supportof the 338th Infantry, moved one platoonto the 339th Infantry's sector in order tohave a better position from which to fireon Monte Altuzzo. The tanks were toopen fire at daylight on 17 September.During 15 and 16 September, CompanyB, 310th Engineers, continued to main-

10 Combat Intervs with Gerow, Jackson, and Cole.11 Combat Intervs with Jackson and Farber.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 207

tain supply routes to the 338th's bat-talions.12

For air support the 338th Infantryacted on information received the nightbefore that on 16 September the closeair support program would operate from1130 to 1330 and from 1430 to 1830. Afew minutes before the 1st Battalionlaunched its attack, the 338th Infantryrequested bombing missions against pill-boxes and other defenses at Collinaccia,6,000 yards north-northeast of the GiogoPass; gun positions at Moscheta, 4,500yards northeast of the pass; and mortarsin a draw near Barco, about 1,600 yardsnortheast of Monte Altuzzo. An hourand a half later fighter bombers strafedand dropped four bombs in the area ofthe mortars. During 16 September the239th Wing attacked bivouac areas be-tween the Futa Pass and the Giogo Pass,and the 7th SAAF Wing bombed bivouacand defended areas near Puligno about3,000 yards north of the Giogo Pass.13

Last-Minute Instructions

Because of the narrow route of ap-proach up the main ridge to the crestof Monte Altuzzo and the necessity formaintaining close contact in darkness,Colonel Jackson directed that his 1stBattalion's attack proceed in a columnof platoons, designating Company C,which still had one fresh platoon, tomake the principal effort. Behind Com-pany C the 3d Platoon of Company Awas to follow; during the night another

platoon of Company A was to swing tothe left to secure Altuzzo's western ridge.Company A's 2d Platoon was to remainin battalion reserve on the slopes of Hill782, prepared to go as reinforcement toeither the main or western ridge. The81-mm. mortars and two heavy machineguns were to support the attack fromtheir respective positions behind ParetaioFarmhouse and the top of Hill 624.14

Because of the casualties during theprevious days, neither Company A norCompany C, even including weaponsplatoons and headquarters personnel,was at more than two-thirds normalstrength. Instead of 120 men in itsthree rifle platoons, Company A hadseventy-six men and Company C, seven-ty-two. Company A had borne thebrunt of attacks on 13 and 15 September,although not more than one platoon ofeach company had been engaged in ac-tual fighting. During the attack of 15September, Company C's 2d Platoon,although still in reserve, had sufferedmany casualties from a mortar concen-tration. The two assault companiescould count on no support from Com-pany B, which had sustained such heavylosses on 14 September on the westernridge that it was in no condition to makeanother major attack.15

Colonel Jackson left the co-ordinationof the advance to Captain King andLieutenant Souder, commanding Com-panies A and C, respectively. Each com-pany commander then planned his ownattack formation. Company C was toadvance in a column of platoons, the12 403d FA Bn, 423d FA Gp, and 178th FA Gp

Mission Rpts, 16 Sep 44; 338th Inf Unit Jnl, 16 Sep44; 752d Tk Bn AAR, Sep 44; 310th Engr (C) BnAAR, Daily Sit Rpt, and Unit Jnl, Sep 44.

13 338th Inf Unit Jnl, 15-16 Sep 44; MAAF CentralMed Daily Operational Sum, 16 Sep 44.

14 Combat Intervs with Jackson, Souder, and King.15 Ibid.; Combat Intervs with the following: 1st Lt

Albert J. Krasman; 2d Lt Walter M. Strosnider andT Sgt Pat H. Hinton; Gresham, Van Horne, Colo-simo-Grigsby-Albert, Corey, Thompson and White.

208 THREE BATTLES

fresh 3d Platoon leading. Following the3d was to be the section of light machineguns, the 2d Platoon, and the 1st. Cap-tain King of Company A ordered Lieu-tenant Holladay with the two squadsleft in his 3d Platoon to follow Com-pany C. He designated Sergeant VanHorne to take the 1st Platoon, the 60-mm. mortar section, and the single ma-chine gun squad left in the WeaponsPlatoon to the western ridge. The 2dPlatoon was to be in battalion reserve.

In last-minute instructions to his pla-toon leaders, Lieutenant Souder outlinedthe disposition of his platoons whenthey should reach the crest of the moun-tain. The 2d Platoon, Company C, wasto take up positions on the left and makepatrol contact with Sergeant Van Horne's1st Platoon, Company A, which wouldbe on Altuzzo's western ridge; the 3dPlatoon, Company C, was to be in thecenter on the peak of Hill 926; to itsright was to be the 1st Platoon, Com-pany C, and the 3d Platoon, Company A.Although he had never had a close viewof Hill 926, Souder believed that fourplatoons, all considerably understrength,could get abreast near the top of thesouth slope of Hill 926. After the 3dBattalion had passed through the 1st onHill 926, the men of Company C couldthen come back down the mountain tothe vicinity of the battalion CP, relax,reorganize, and eat a hot meal.16

Leader of Company C's 3d Platoon,which was to spearhead the attack, was2d Lt. Albert J. Krasman, a former pla-toon sergeant with a good deal of combatexperience and an officer in whose lead-ership Lieutenant Souder had full con-

fidence. At the beginning of the drivehe had been an excess Company C officerat the regimental replacement pool incharge of approximately forty 1st Bat-talion replacements and had thus madeno thorough map or intelligence studies.On 14 September when the companyexecutive officer had been wounded bya shell fragment, the 3d Platoon leaderhad replaced him and Lieutenant Kras-man had been called to take command ofthe 3d Platoon. Although the lieutenanthad seen no defense overlays of the enemypositions, he secured enough informationfrom Lieutenant Corey and SergeantThompson of the 1st Platoon about thepositions they had encountered on 15September to realize that in a new attackCompany C could expect resistance atany point from halfway up the Altuzzoridge to the crest. On the night of 15-16September, after Lieutenant Souder hadbeen informed that Company C mighthave to bear the brunt of the next attack,Lieutenant Krasman was sent with asmall patrol to reconnoiter 400 to 500yards in front of the company. He founda telephone wire which Company B hadlaid two nights before on the lower slopesof Hill 782 and followed it to the westernridge. There the patrol saw men ofCompany B who had been killed the daybefore and examined a bunker near thetop of the western peak. AlthoughLieutenant Krasman searched severaldead Germans, he found nothing of im-portance. From what he had seen him-self on this patrol and from what he hadheard from others, he expected a toughstruggle before he took Hill 926 andanticipated that his men would encoun-ter heavy cross fire from the left as theyadvanced up the main ridge.17

16 Combat Intervs with Jackson, Souder, King,Van Horne, Corey, Brumbaugh, Thompson, Kras-man, and Grigsby. 17 Combat Intervs with Krasman and Souder.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 209

ENEMY CASUALTIES. These paratroopers of the 12th Parachute Regiment were foundon the slopes of Monte Altuzzo.

The thirty men of Lieutenant Kras-man's 3d Platoon were generally ingood physical condition as H Hour ap-proached. Most had had some combatexperience, although only a handful hadengaged previously in a hard fire fight;hence the men could scarcely imaginewhat a real attack would be like. Mostof the noncommissioned officers and rifle-men were aggressive and in high spirits.Platoon Sgt. Richard E. Fent and S. Sgt.Walter M. Strosnider, the 1st Squadleader, who was to lead the point of theattack, were both intelligent, combat-wise, and full of courage. The morale of

some 3d Platoon men had been somewhatdepressed the day before by news thatthe 1st Platoon had sustained heavyCasualties from artillery fire, presumablyAmerican, and that the 2d Platoon, whichhad not even been engaged, had sufferedalmost as heavily from a German mortarconcentration. Two men in the platoonbecame emotionally unfit for combat anddid not join in the attack.18

In the other rifle platoons of CompanyC (the 1st and 2d), the survivors from

18 Combat Intervs with Pfcs Alfred D. Lightner,Loman B. Pugh, Frank Bury, Paul Myshak, andJohn K. Britton; Strosnider, Hinton.

210 THREE BATTLES

the previous day's attack still carriedvivid impressions of what had happenedthen, but most were in good spirits andcould stand a hard fight. Because of theprevious casualties and the evacuation ofa number of nervous exhaustion cases,the two platoons were far understrength,the 2d having eighteen men, the 1st,twenty-four. One squad of the 1st Pla-toon was sent by the company com-mander to bring the 2d Platoon up togreater strength, and the loss left the1st Platoon with only a single squad,the equivalent of one squad having pre-viously become casualties.19

In Company A morale was still highin the 1st and 3d Platoons, which wereto participate in the new attack, butthree days in the line had depleted ef-fective strength by almost half. More-over, what had happened to Company Bon the western ridge on 14 Septemberhad inspired caution in Sergeant VanHorne, who was to lead the 1st Platoon,Company A, to the western ridge.20

During the morning of 16 September,the 3d Platoon, Company C, pushed upthe southwest slope of Hill 782 to a smallstretch of level ground forty yards belowthe barbed wire, where it relieved asquad of the 1st Platoon, which had setup outposts the night before. There themen of the 3d Platoon dug slit trencheswhile awaiting the order to jump off.They received some mortar fire, restrict-ing movement but causing no casualties.

As the attack hour drew near, the menof Company C had supplies for a limitedtime only. Each man had the normal

load of ammunition (one bandoleer offorty-eight rounds and one belt of eightyrounds), but hand grenades, which couldbe expected to be useful for close-inmountain fighting, were in short supply.Some men had lost or dropped grenadeson the way to Hill 782; others had usedthem in the 15 September attack; andno resupply had been made. Althoughthe 1st and 2d Platoons gave their re-maining grenades to the leading 3d Pla-toon, the 3d Platoon still had only abouttwenty-five. During the day of 16 Sep-tember refilling the water supply fromRocca Creek 300 yards to the rear wasan arduous and slow process. Along theroute artillery shells were falling through-out the day, and only a few men couldget water at a time. Some were on out-post duty and could not go down to thecreek, and because of the warm day themen drank more water than usual. Theyknew they were going to attack but didnot know the jump-off time, and thusmany did not go down at all for water.During the night K rations and a re-supply of ammunition were brought upby the 1st Battalion Ammunition andPioneer Platoon, and each of LieutenantSouder's men was issued a day's Kration.

A few minutes before the attack wasto begin, the enemy, from temporaryoutpost positions on the southwesternslope of Hill 782 near the ridge line,opened fire on Company C's 3d Platoonoutposts. The men in the forward posi-tions withdrew a short distance downthe hill while Platoon Sergeant Fentmoved up to find out what had hap-pened. Fent could not find his outpostsand surmised that they had been cap-tured. Keeping on past the small stretchof level ground where the outposts had

19 Combat Intervs with White, Thompson, Orr,Brumbaugh, Corey, and all enlisted survivors in 1stPlat, Co C, 338th Inf.

20 Combat Intervs with Van Horne, South-Whary,and Grigsby.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 211

been, he went several yards beyond thebarbed wire, hid for a few moments be-hind a bush, and looked up the ridge.Spying a German soldier, Fent put hisrifle to his shoulder and fired, but hecould not tell whether he killed the Ger-man. Other Germans from positions onthe slope above replied with small armsbursts, forcing the sergeant to return tohis platoon.21

Capture of the Outpost Line

A few minutes later, at 1630, the 1stBattalion jumped off up the southwestslope of Hill 782. In the lead the 3dPlatoon, Company C, moved in a skir-mish line, two squads abreast, the 1stSquad on the left, the 2d on the right.(Map 16) The 3d Squad followed the1st in an open squad column and pro-tected the left flank. Although smokeshut off enemy observation from thecrest of the mountain, the 3d Platoon'sobservation on Hill 782 was good, andLieutenant Krasman's men could see aswell as the steep, uneven slope permitted.They crossed the barbed wire throughgaps cut in earlier attacks", and on theplatoon's right flank the 2d Squad sawseveral dead soldiers from Company L,363d Infantry, with their equipmentstrewn near the entanglement.

On the platoon's left flank, SergeantStrosnider's 1st Squad had moved a fewyards past the barbed wire when severalGerman riflemen in trenches near theridge line of Hill 782 opened fire. Theirshots wounded Pfc. Albert W. Parker inthe left ribs and raked the ground closeto the rest of the men. As the squad hit

the ground, the center and right flankmen fired back in the direction fromwhich they thought the enemy fire wascoming. At first they could locate noone, but as they strained their eyes forthe enemy an Italian soldier from theslope above came down and surrendered.He said there had been a few Germanswith him.

The men of the 1st Squad began tocrawl forward, only to be met by a bar-rage of hand grenades from the slopeabove them. About the same time amachine gun from the right front nearthe ridge line opened fire, kicking updust at Sergeant Strosnider's feet. Thesergeant shouted to the whole squad tothrow hand grenades, and the menquickly tossed grenades up the slopetoward where they thought the enemyto be. The BAR man, Pfc. Russell G.Elston, and his assistant, Pvt. FrankBury, saw a single German in a patchof light brush to the front and fired atclose range. Five Germans, eager to sur-render, were flushed out. They had beenin hasty positions on the ridge line southof Hill 782. The German machine gun-ner, who had fired only one long burst,had evidently escaped up the ridge. Twoenemy soldiers were killed and six cap-tured in the brief fire fight; the 1st Squadhad one man wounded.

On the 3d Platoon's right wing the 2dSquad had engaged the enemy outpostpositions on the southeastern slope ofHill 782. Although smoke hung heavilyover Monte Verruca to the east, as wellas over the western ridge of MonteAltuzzo to the west, the squad could seeclearly up the southwest slope of themain ridge. Shortly after the leadingmen had crossed the barbed wire, Ger-mans on the right front began to throw

21 Combat Intervs with the following: Lightner andPfc Carl Schwantke; Thompson, Krasman, Hinton,Strosnider, Orr, White, and Lightner-Myshak.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 213

hand grenades and opened fire withrifles. As the men hit the ground, thesquad leader, S. Sgt. Pat H. Hinton, sentforward the first scout, Pfc. Paul Myshak,to reconnoiter. Crawling to the ridgeline about 150 yards below the peak ofHill 782, Myshak saw nothing except theoutlines of Monte Verruca to the east.Moving back toward his squad, he spot-ted a trail leading to the left a few yardsbelow the ridge line. On the slope belowthe trail, he saw a lone German lying onthe ground with his rifle pointed down-hill. As the scout crept toward him, theGerman looked up; Myshak had himcovered, and the German surrendered.Back with the 2d Squad, Pvt. Karl Adlerquizzed the prisoner in German, elicit-ing information that two machine gunswere on the right front just over the ridgeline on the east slope of Hill 782.

Platoon Sergeant Fent decided thatwith the 2d Squad he could knock outthe two machine gun positions. Heplanned to move with two men of thesquad to the right and then to the lefttoward the positions while Sergeant Hin-ton and the rest of the squad went to theleft. Each group was to support theother with covering fire so that bothcould get near the enemy positions.While Sergeant Fent and his two menwould try to knock out the machineguns, Sergeant Hinton and the mainbody of the squad would cover by fire,catching any Germans who tried toescape up the ridge. Taking with himPfc. Walter W. Iverson, the automaticrifleman, and Pfc. Kermit C. Fisher,second scout, Sergeant Fent crawled tothe right and over the ridge line. Beforethe three men knew it, they were almostface to face with two Germans who werein the first position and another who

was lying beside it. It was camouflagedby bushes and harbored a machine gun.The two startled Germans jumped outof the position and ran to the left. Thethird man did not move so quickly, and,when Sergeant Fent motioned for him toget up, the German reached instead forhis rifle. Fent fired point-blank, killingthe German instantly, and moved thento investigate the other position. Ser-geant Hinton and the remainder of thesquad had come up in a skirmish lineabout twenty yards to the left. Withtheir arrival the other two Germans sur-rendered, and the squad damaged thetwo machine guns by denting the firingpins and housing with intrenching tools.

Heading back with the prisoners belowthe ridge line to the western slope, thesquad began to receive machine gun firefrom Hill 624, where Company M's sup-porting machine guns were positioned.As soon as the fire was reported, it wasstopped. By this time the 1st Squad hadadvanced to the north to a point wherethe route of approach up Hill 782 becamevery narrow, pinching out the 2d Squad.The 2d now followed the 1st.22

While the 2d Squad was taking themachine gun positions, Sergeant Stro-snider's 1st Squad, which had capturedsix prisoners after a grenade exchange,had paused to reorganize. Continuingforward again, the men turned left in askirmish line and approached the rocksnear the peak of Hill 782. As they nearedthe peak, the skirmish line became too ex-tended for the narrow approach and themen fell in behind Sergeant Strosnider ina single column.

Straight ahead the men saw a bush-flanked rock slab facing downhill. Notic-

22 Combat Intervs with Krasman, Lightner,Schwantke, Strosnider, Hinton, and Bury.

214 THREE BATTLES

ing something unnatural about the cam-ouflage around the rock, Sergeant Stro-snider looked closely and made out themuzzle of a machine gun pointing outover the slabs some ten yards away.Strangely, there was no fire from theposition. After the squad leader heaveda grenade over the rock slab, there wasstill no sound or sign of life. AgainSergeant Strosnider threw a grenade; itdid not explode. Assuming that theGermans were down behind the rocks,he drew back to get another grenade fromhis leading scout, Pfc. Carl Schwantke,and ran to the right of the position tothrow it. Close behind the grenade'sexplosion Strosnider charged the positionwith his rifle at his hip. As he reachedthe rock slab and looked inside, he foundthat he had been tossing grenades at fourenemy machine gunners, all dead. Asmall shell hole near the gun indicatedthat the crew had been killed by a mor-tar shell.

Fire Fight at Knob 1

Soon after the remainder of his 1stSquad had joined him, Sergeant Stro-snider spotted two Germans at the nextrise on the ridge line to the north, Knob 1.Both were walking south straight downthe mountain. By this time the shadowshad begun to lengthen and darkness wasapproaching. Thinking that the twoGermans might need little urging to giveup, Sergeant Strosnider directed PrivateSchwantke, who spoke German fluently,to shout to them to surrender. AsSchwantke called out, the two Germansstopped dead in their tracks, for a mo-ment replying with neither words norfire. Again Schwantke called out. Oneof the Germans dropped suddenly to the

ground and fired two bursts from amachine pistol; the other merely stooderect with his rifle in his hands and keptstaring down the ridge at the Americans.Sergeant Strosnider, Private Elston, andPvt. Fred D. Mingus opened fire withM-1 rifles and Pfc. Alfred D. Lightnerwith a carbine. The standing Germanslumped to the ground.

During the shouting and firing, two orthree more Germans had come along thehigher western slope of the ridge to thetop of Knob 1. Schwantke and Lightnerfired at them, while Sergeant Strosnidercalled for Pfc. Zemro F. Benner, riflegrenadier from the 2d Squad. Strosniderhimself fired the rifle grenade and wascertain that he hit one German. Twoothers on Knob 1 sprang up from theground and ran back up the ridge lineto the north.

Strosnider called for the Weapons Pla-toon leader, Lieutenant Ritchey, to bringup a machine gun and rake the area. Hewanted the machine gun to put overheadfire on and north of Knob 1, from whichthe Germans had fled, while his riflesquad pushed on from Hill 782 to theknob. Lieutenant Ritchey, who with hismachine gunners had followed closely be-hind the 3d Platoon, came up promptly.The lieutenant decided that overheadfire would fall too close to the advancingriflemen. Instead, after setting up hismachine gun in the big rock slab at thepeak of Hill 782, he ordered harassingfire on Knob 1, before the attack.

Thus far the 3d Platoon had receivedno machine gun fire either from the twoAltuzzo ridges or from Monte Verrucaon the right. By this time the darknesshad become too deep for the enemy to seethe advancing men or to place accuratefire on them. While Lieutenant Ritchey

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 215

fired the machine gun, the rest of the3d Platoon remained in single column be-hind the leading squad. LieutenantKrasman, 3d Platoon leader, was amongthe rocks in the middle of the leadingsquad. The lieutenant had adopted thiscolumn of squads in single file after reach-ing Hill 782 because the narrow route upthe ridge line prevented wider deploy-ment. He knew the formation would beuseful for keeping contact between indi-viduals and squads and for protecting theplatoon's flanks and rear so that theenemy could not encircle his troops.

During the advance up Hill 782, a 3dPlatoon runner had laid wire, and Lieu-tenant Krasman had a sound-poweredtelephone with him all the way. He usedthe telephone all night and during thenext day, not having to employ hisSCR 536. To the immediate rear ofthe 3d Platoon, the 2d Platoon stayedwithin visual contact.23

American Shellfire

After Lieutenant Ritchey had placedmachine gun fire on Knob 1, the 3d Pla-toon (Company C) again moved outfrom Hill 782. At the head of the columnwere Private Schwantke, Private Light-ner, and Sergeant Strosnider, in thatorder. They had gone about fifty yardsalong the trail just below and west of themain Altuzzo ridge line when harassingfire from American supporting weapons—artillery, tanks, or tank destroyers—began to fall about fifty yards to the front.Strosnider and his scouts stopped, afraidto continue up the ridge in the face ofthis fire. The sergeant sent word backto Lieutenant Krasman, who was several

spaces to the rear in the 3d Platoon col-umn, and the lieutenant relayed the mes-sage to the company commander, whopromised to have the fire lifted. Theshells continued to land near the leading3d Platoon men, who had stopped in asaddle on the main ridge line betweenKnob 1 and the next rise, Knob 2, ata point where the trail turned to the leftaround the west slope of Knob 2. Theshells were landing close to the rock-hewnpositions of the enemy MLR on Knob 2,positions which Sergeant Strosnider'smen had not yet located.

As the American shells continued tofall and one of his men was slightlywounded by a fragment, Sergeant Stro-snider went back himself to LieutenantKrasman and insisted that his squadcould not advance until the fire waslifted. The lieutenant again called Lieu-tenant Souder and was again promisedrelief. Fearing a repetition of the 1stPlatoon's unhappy experience of the daybefore, Krasman held up his platoon formore than an hour to make sure that theshellfire had stopped. He guessed thatit was only harassing fire, which mightmean that more rounds would land atany time.24

As soon as the shelling report was re-ceived at the 1st Battalion CP, ColonelJackson promised to have the fire liftedand ordered the 3d Platoon, Company C,to wait until he called back before resum-ing the advance. The 329th Field Artil-lery liaison officer, Lieutenant Farber,checked division and corps artillery with-out being able to find the unit which hadfired or even the direction from which itwas firing. When this search failed, allartillery in the II Corps was ordered to

23 Combat Intervs with Ritchey, Strosnider, Light-ner, Bury, Krasman, White, and Brumbaugh.

24 Combat Intervs with Krasman, Lightner,Schwantke, Strosnider, and Souder.

216 THREE BATTLES

cease firing for half an hour in the Altuzzoarea and 1,000 yards on either side ofthe main Altuzzo ridge line.

After the no-fire interval, ColonelJackson reported at 0125 to the 338th In-fantry that artillery was still firing in thearea where his men were advancing. Hebelieved it came from the rear and atabout half-hour intervals. After this re-port, the artillery no-fire line was pushedfrom the crest of Monte Altuzzo 1,000yards to the north. When no additionalfire came in, Colonel Jackson orderedCompany C to push on up the mountain.The time then was approximately 0200.25

1st Squad at Knob 2

As the leading squad of Company C's3d Platoon again moved forward, Ser-geant Strosnider and his two scouts heardthe sound of German voices to the front.Warning his men that they were nearingthe enemy positions, the sergeant in-structed them to move quietly and to usegrenades and rifles as a last resort. Thenight was so dark that the men did nothave to crawl in order to keep their ap-proach screened. Advancing slowly for-ward in a crouch and straining their eyesfor the enemy, the men proceeded in sin-gle file from Knob 1 up the forward slopeof Knob 2. In the lead and so close to-gether that they touched each other werePrivates Schwantke and Lightner andSergeant Strosnider. Coming closer towhere they thought they had heard Ger-man voices, they dropped to their handsand knees and crawled over the brush-covered slope a few feet to the left of theridge line.

Schwantke and Lightner suddenly

found themselves almost under the noseof a German machine gun sticking froma pile of rocks. No sign of life came fromwithin the position. Sergeant Strosniderjoined the two men. On the way up hehad heard whisperings over on his left,but the night was too dark to determinethe source. The cover of darkness hadenabled the leading men of Company Cto advance to the main German positionson Knob 2 without being discovered.Nor did the Americans discover the en-emy positions until they had almoststumbled over them.

Strosnider whispered for Schwantke totoss a grenade behind the rocks and forLightner to go to the right of the rocksto protect the flank. When Schwantkepulled the pin and threw his grenade, itsexplosion brought a howl from a Germanin a big hole a few feet away, directlybehind the machine gun and the piledrocks. Another German, who evidentlyhad been manning the weapon but hadnot detected the American's approach,cradled the machine gun and dashed upthe ridge about ten yards to the higherand rockier part of Knob 2. As he fled,Private Lightner bounded after him andcaptured him just as the German wassetting up the gun to fire. About thesame time a machine pistol opened upfrom straight ahead on the higher part ofKnob 2. Private Schwantke fired oneburst in that direction but stopped whenSergeant Strosnider told him to use agrenade instead. After he threw agrenade, the machine pistol ceased fire.

Sergeant Strosnider heard noises tothe left of the piled stones and tossed agrenade in that direction. Although hecould not see anyone, he heard one Ger-man cry out in pain while another ran.The two had been in slit trenches fifteen

25 Combat Intervs with Jackson, Krasman, andFarber; 338th Inf Unit Jnl, 16-17 Sep 44.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 217

yards below and to the west of a bigsquare hole in the center of Knob 2'sridge line. Following the explosion ofSergeant Strosnider's grenade, PrivateSchwantke called out to the Germansthat they would be safe if they wouldcome out with their hands up. One Ger-man asked who was calling. Schwantkereplied that the Americans were allaround them; they had better surrender.When a group of Germans fled up thewest slope of the mountain to the left ofthe main positions, Schwantke called outagain that the Americans had them sur-rounded and it was futile to try to escape.From below, on the upper western slopeof Knob 2, the Germans answered, andeleven returned to give themselves up.Strosnider, Schwantke, and Lightner hadsurprised the enemy and seized three po-sitions on Knob 2, had killed or capturedseveral Germans, and had driven therest from the MLR. These preparedpositions were the last German defensesto the north except the bunkers and ob-servation posts on the crest of Hill 926.But to the northwest along the woodedupper slopes of the Altuzzo bowl theenemy still manned positions behind tallrock slabs.26

Soon after the capture of the Germans,an enemy machine gun from somewherein the woods to the left front opened fireand then suddenly stopped. PrivateSchwantke called to the German crew tosurrender, and Lieutenant Krasman or-dered all men in the platoon to fire ifthe machine gun opened up again.When it did, the 3d Platoon returned thefire until abruptly the German weaponceased. Presumably it had been knocked

out or the 3d Platoon's fire was too heavyfor the enemy to continue the exchange.

After placing two guards at the bighole on Knob 2 to watch the eleven Ger-man prisoners, Lieutenant Krasman or-dered the platoon to resume its advanceto the crest of the mountain. The firefight on Hill 782, the exchanges with theenemy on Knob 1, the delay caused byAmerican shellfire, and the capture ofthe three positions on Knob 2 in theenemy MLR had all taken time. WhenCompany C's 3d Platoon jumped offagain, it must have been at least 0300.27

Advance to the Crest

Starting forward, Company C's 3dPlatoon moved from Knob 2 on the slopeto the left of the big hole. Still in thelead, Sergeant Strosnider's 1st Squadwalked along a path that ran ten to fif-teen yards to the left of the ridge line onthe west slope of Knob 2. The squadcame next to an east-west trail where itcrossed the main ridge line at the lowerend of a rock escarpment leading straightup to the peak, Hill 926.

Climbing a few yards up the steeprocks of the escarpment, the men of theleading squad could see that the groundwas much higher on their right front andan advance straight up the ridge linewould only silhouette them as theyclimbed. On the left the slope, althoughsteep, was more gradual, and the ad-vantages of defiladed and easier approachthrough heavy brush and trees promptedSergeant Strosnider to turn his men tothe left of the rock escarpment. Movingacross the rocks to a little draw west of

26 Combat Intervs with Lightner-Schwantke,Lightner, and Strosnider; Notes of terrain recon-naissance with Krasman and Strosnider, 21 Dec 44.

27 Combat Intervs with all enlisted survivors in 3dPlat, Co C, 338th Inf, Apr 45, and with Lightner-Schwantke, Krasman, and Strosnider.

218 THREE BATTLES

ARTILLERY-SHELLED AREA. Medical aid man pauses in his search for casualtiesunder pine trees sheared off at uneven lengths by supporting artillery fire.

the escarpment, the men reached cov-ered ground on a finger to the southwestof Hill 926. The heavy underbrushon this finger made progress difficult,and after advancing about a hundredyards the 1st Squad took a short restat a charcoal clearing to enable the othertwo squads to catch up. At the rear ofthe column near the east-west trail, a rollof telephone wire got out of control ofthe man who was carrying it and rolleddown the east slope of the main ridge; anew roll was brought up and wire laid

along the route the leading squad hadtaken.

Its short rest over, the 3d Platoonpushed on toward Hill 926. Initiallythe route was steep, rocky, and wooded.The underbrush was thick except for thelast fifty yards, where the southern slopeof the peak was pock-marked with shellholes and bomb craters. Passing largerocks and brush and then through a standof large pine trees sheared to unevenlengths by artillery fire, the men at lastemerged on the bare southern slope of

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 219

Hill 926, the long-sought crest of MonteAltuzzo.

Defensive Arrangements

Coming to a zigzag trench on the westside of Hill 926, the three leading menin the 3d Platoon, Private Schwantke,Private Lightner, and Sergeant Stro-snider, turned right to a big crater thathad once been a German observationpost. They stopped there only a momentand then walked a few yards up the slopeuntil they reached the top of the peak.Though dawn was fast approaching, itwas still dark; when they heard voicesclose by to the front, they could not locatethe source. The sounds actually camefrom a bunker a few feet away, half un-derground, and dug into the crest of Hill926, but Sergeant Strosnider and hisscouts did not discover that until later.28

Although a few of the leading menbegan to dig in, word came up the linefor them to withdraw and dig in on thesouthern slope of the hill. As soon asthey had moved back a few yards fromthe top of the peak to the southern slope,Lieutenant Krasman, the 3d Platoonleader, approached Sergeant Strosniderand asked why he had withdrawn. Ser-geant Strosnider explained about thevoices and the message.

While Sergeant Strosnider had beenat the top of the hill, Lieutenant Krasmanand Lieutenant Ritchey, the WeaponsPlatoon leader, had disagreed aboutwhere Company C should take up posi-tions. Krasman wanted to occupy theexact crest of the mountain; Ritcheythought a better defense could be set

up by withdrawing slightly and diggingin on the south slope.29 It is possiblethat some members of the 3d Platoon,hearing the discussion between the twoofficers, passed the message forward forthe leading men to withdraw. Krasmancalled Lieutenant Souder, reported thatthe 3d Platoon was on the crest of MonteAltuzzo, and asked what defense shouldbe set up. When Souder asked if hewere sure of his location, Krasman as-sured him there was no doubt. Orderinghis platoon leader to put out security,the Company C commander promised tocheck with Colonel Jackson and callback.30

Aware that 17 September was the bat-talion commander's birthday, LieutenantSouder called Colonel Jackson and said,"Colonel, I've got a birthday present foryou. We've captured Mount Altuzzo."Remembering vividly that, three daysbefore, Captain Peabody had been equal-ly sure Company B was on the crest ofMonte Altuzzo, Colonel Jackson wasdubious. But Souder insisted that Kras-man was certain of his location. Reas-sured that finally his troops had gainedthe objective for which they had beenfighting for four days, Colonel Jacksonordered Company C to set up a rear-slope defense at the southern end of Hill926 and hold it until the 3d Battalionpassed through.31

2d Platoon Follows to Hill 926

While Company C's 3d Platoon hadbeen advancing to Hill 926, the other

28 Combat Intervs with Krasman, Strosnider, Bury,and Lightner.

29 Combat Intervs with Strosnider, Hinton, andRitchey.

30 Ibid.; Combat Intervs with Krasman andSouder.

31 Combat Intervs with Jackson and Souder.

220 THREE BATTLES

units in the 1st Battalion column—ex-cept Company C's 1st Platoon—hadstayed within contact distance all theway up the ridge but had taken no partin the action. Directly behind the 3dPlatoon, the leading man of CompanyC's 2d Platoon had stayed close enoughto touch the last man in the 3d Platoon.Only once during the night had the 2dlost contact, just after the 3d Platoon hadseized the main enemy defenses onKnob 2 and had started up toward thecrest of Hill 926. The platoon sergeanthad then followed the wire laid by theleading platoon until contact was re-gained.32 The machine gun section ofCompany C followed the 2d Platoon andwas in turn followed by two squads fromthe 3d Platoon, Company A, commandedby Lieutenant Holladay. In this Com-pany A platoon were Sgt. Gordon K.Grigsby's squad of ten men and anothersquad of eight men led by Private Albert.Four men from the platoon took overfrom Company C the task of guardingthe prisoners at the big hole on Knob 2.33

At the start of the attack one squad ofthe 1st Platoon, Company C, had beenattached to the rear of Company C's 2dPlatoon. The remaining squad of the1st Platoon stayed with Lieutenant Coreyand protected the right flank of Com-pany C on the eastern slope of Hill 782.On the way up the mountain the leaderof Company C's 2d Platoon had heardnoises and movement on the flanks andhad passed word down to LieutenantHolladay (3d Platoon, Company A) toput out security on both flanks. Havingheard noises himself, Holladay told the

platoon guide of the 2d Platoon, Com-pany C, S. Sgt. Robert W. Kistner, Jr.,who was with the attached squad fromthe 1st Platoon, Company C, to moveout as rear security for the column. Inthe movement to the rear of the columnKistner and the squad lost contact.When they reached a point just northof Knob 2 where the telephone wireforked, one strand going to the left andanother to the right, they were unableto decide which wire to take. Afraidthat if they advanced on a route differentfrom Company C's 3d and 2d Platoons,they would be mistaken for Germans,Sergeant Kistner and Sergeant Price, thesquad leader, decided to hold wherethey were. Not long afterward the squadwas joined by the rest of the 1st Platoon,Company C—one squad—under Lieu-tenant Corey, the squad which initiallyhad been used to guard the right flank onHill 782. Corey had also come forwardby following the telephone wire. Thusthe understrength 1st Platoon was nowback together at the east-west trail atthe north end of Knob 2. The sound ofdigging reached the platoon from the leftnot far away, and in the belief that itmight be coming from the 2d and 3dPlatoons, which he knew were somewhereahead, Lieutenant Corey called out. Thedigging stopped and all was quiet.

In order to prevent interception of hisradio transmissions by whoever had beendigging, Corey pulled his two squadsback about fifty yards. He then tried toreach Lieutenant Krasman on the SCR536 to ask for guides to lead his men upHill 926. Failing, he radioed the com-pany commander, who relayed his re-quest. Krasman sent guides promptlyfor both the 1st Platoon and the 3d Bat-talion, whose leading men were just to

32 Combat Intervs with White and Brumbaugh.33 Combat Intervs with the following: Ritchey and

Colosimo-Grigsby-Albert; Albert; T Sgt Dale E.Burkholder.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 221

Corey's rear. Within half an hour sixguides from Hill 926 arrived. Droppingoff Pfc. Charles F. Gregory as guide forthe 1st Platoon, the other five continueddown the ridge to the companies of the3d Battalion.

1st Platoon's Advance

With Private Gregory at the head, the1st Platoon (Company C) moved outagain from Knob 2 up the Altuzzo ridge.To the guide's rear in single file cameLieutenant Corey, the 1st Platoon leader;Sergeant Kistner, the 2d Platoon guide;and the rest of the 1st Platoon. The firstfive men advanced twenty-five yards pastthe east-west trail up the rocks and into alittle draw directly west of the escarp-ment on the ridge line. At that pointthe enemy opened up with hand grenadesand a machine gun from the front andleft on the west side of the draw not morethan a hundred yards away. The rest ofthe 1st Platoon was east of the rock es-carpment. One of the first shots killedPrivate Gregory, and the other men hitthe ground. The night was still dark.Unable to go back and rejoin the rest ofthe platoon because of the exposed ter-rain, Lieutenant Corey and SergeantKistner followed the telephone wire laidby Company C's 3d Platoon. The othertwo men who had entered the draw withthem climbed up over the rocks on themain ridge line to the right.

The rest of the 1st Platoon—less thanone squad—opened fire with BAR's andrifles from the rocks on the right of thedraw. After a few minutes of this returnfire, the German resistance ceased. Re-organizing, the little group from the 1stPlatoon, minus Lieutenant Corey andSergeant Kistner, who had followed the

telephone wire on ahead, moved east ofthe rock escarpment and pushed on tothe crest of the mountain.34

After the three rifle platoons and themachine gun section of Company C, re-inforced by two understrength squads ofCompany A, reached the southern slopeof Hill 926, they set up a rear-slope de-fense in accordance with Colonel Jack-son's order, and Lieutenant Krasmandisposed the men as Lieutenant Souderhad directed. The 2d Platoon, whichhad the equivalent of two understrengthsquads, took up positions on the left flank.In the center was the 3d Platoon, whichset up three outposts, one in the left zig-zag trench, one in the center, and one onthe right near the crest of Hill 926. Lieu-tenant Ritchey, the Weapons Platoonleader, placed his one light machine guntwenty yards to the right rear of the rifleplatoons in a position that could coverthe right rear and flank. On the rightflank the defense was manned by thehandful of men from the 1st Platoon,Company C, and the two squads fromthe 3d Platoon, Company A. The 60-mm. mortar section of Company C andthe two machine guns of Company Dwere still in position on Hill 624.35

Advance up the Western Ridge

While Company C, reinforced by twosquads from Company A, had been ad-vancing to occupy the crest of the moun-tain, Hill 926, the 1st Platoon, CompanyA, had moved from Hill 782 to Altuzzo'swestern ridge. Starting out about duskwhile the leading elements of Company C

34 Combat Intervs with Corey, Thompson, Kistner,Marx, Markey, and Orr.

35 Combat Intervs with Krasman, Souder, Ritchey,and Burkholder.

222 THREE BATTLES

were at the top of Hill 782, SergeantVan Horne, acting platoon leader, ledthe twenty-two men of his platoon as theattached units followed. These con-sisted of a light machine gun squad, a60-mm. mortar squad, and several wire-men who laid telephone wire along theroute of march. The total force num-bered some thirty men. They moved in acolumn of squads, the 3d Squad forward.Leaving their foxholes on the lower south-west slope of Hill 782 just north ofla Rocca, they moved across the openspace at the base of the bowl to the lowerend of the western ridge. Then, goingseventy-five to a hundred yards from theridge line on the east slope of the westernridge, they encountered occasional mor-tar fire until they reached the barbedwire entanglement. The only casualtywas S. Sgt. William Nowakowski, a riflesquad leader, who was wounded by amortar shell.

When Sergeant Van Horne at the headof the column reached the barbed wire,he halted the men while he searched fortrip wires. Because of the depth of theentanglement at this spot, Van Hornemoved to the right, only to find morebarbed wire in even greater depth.Crossing the wire without further search,the platoon continued up the ridge with-out drawing enemy fire. About twentyyards east of the ridge line, the menclimbed in single file over rocks up thesteep slope until they came within fiftyyards of the western ridge's rocky peak.The early morning was still so dark thatthe men could see only a few yards ahead.

Sergeant Van Horne did not yet knowwhat progress Company C had made andhad heard no sounds which might indi-cate that Hill 926 had been taken.Cautious, in view of Company B's experi-

ence on the same ridge three days before,he directed his men to dig in and waituntil dawn when he could see and deter-mine how to get up to the peak. Al-though Van Horne's force was merelyto protect the left flank of the 1st Bat-talion's main attack force, throughoutthe night he and his men kept thinkingthat they had been given the mission oftaking an objective which a whole com-pany three days before had been unableto take and hold.

While the troops were still digging infifty yards south of the western ridge'speak, two bursts of machine gun fire fromthe main Altuzzo ridge in the vicinity ofthe enemy's MLR hit about fifty yardsto their rear. The men did not returnthe fire but waited for dawn and wordthat Company C had occupied the crestof Monte Altuzzo.36

Bypassed Pockets

During the advance of the main bodyof the 1st Battalion to Hill 926, the 3dBattalion had waited until Colonel Jack-son's leading troops had reached theirobjective before advancing from Hill 782.About 0315 Company K, in the lead,was notified of the 1st Battalion's successand ordered to follow the telephone wireup the slopes of Altuzzo until it met theguides sent down from the crest. Com-panies L and I were to follow in thatorder.

Moving in single file, Company Kcrossed the barbed wire on the southwestslope of Hill 782 and before daylight ad-vanced to Knob 1, some 300 yards shortof Hill 926. When the company reachedthe east-west trail which crossed the ridge

36 Combat Intervs with the following: Kohler andS Sgt James F. Reid; Van Horne and South-Whary.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 223

line just north of Knob 2 and 250 yardssouth of the peak, it came under smallarms fire from the left front around thetop of the Altuzzo bowl. Not certainthat it was German fire, the companycommander did not permit his men tofire back but directed them to find coveron the right among the rocks beyondKnob 2. Company L, following withthe rest of the 3d Battalion, lost contact.Well after dawn the leading elements ofthe 3d Battalion were still 200 yards shortof the 1st Battalion on Hill 926.37

Daylight of 17 September thus foundthe 1st Battalion, 338th Infantry, on itsobjective, the crest of Monte Altuzzo, andthe 3d Battalion strung out behind it onthe main Altuzzo ridge subject to enemyfire from bypassed Germans along thetop of the Altuzzo bowl to the west andMonte Verruca to the east. Besides theGerman troops who remained to becleared from this area, other small groupswere in the bunkers on the crest of MonteAltuzzo and on the knob north of Hill 926in position to counterattack. Althoughmuch hard fighting still lay ahead beforeall German resistance in front of theGiogo Pass could be overcome, large gainshad been made. Slowed by enemy re-sistance and shellfire, presumably Amer-ican, Company C had neverthelessknocked out the defenses on Hill 782 andKnob 2 and had killed, captured, ordriven back the forces manning the MLRon the main ridge. After this success,the bulk of the 1st Battalion had infil-trated under cover of darkness past theother rifle and machine gun positionsaround the bowl and the western peak to

the crest of Monte Altuzzo. ColonelJackson's force of barely a hundred menhad seized the main Fifth Army objectiveand made the first penetration of theGothic Line in the zone of the plannedbreak-through.

The fact that the 1st Battalion advancehad been slower than anticipated de-layed the 3d Battalion's approach march.Two of its companies lost contact witheach other, and the battalion failed topush forward aggressively. As a result,the 3d Battalion, which General Gerowhad ordered to pass through the 1stBattalion at dawn, was not in position toexploit the success of Jackson's assaultforce. Gains elsewhere in front of GiogoPass by the 2d Battalion, 338th Infantry,and the 363d Infantry, on the left, andthe 339th Infantry, on the right, had beennegligible.38

The Enemy Situation

By the time that the 1st Battalion,338th, launched its attack late on 16September, enemy reserves available fordefense of the Giogo Pass had beenseriously depleted. The 1st Battalion ofthe 12th Parachute Regiment radioed itslower units on Monte Altuzzo that theAmerican attack had to be held at allcosts because no more reserves could besent. A loose chain of outposts was tobe established that night to give warningof the attack.39

Besides small elements of the 4th Para-chute Division and a Lithuanian labor bat-

37 Combat Intervs with the following: 1st Lt MackL. Brooks and T Sgt Willie L. Kingsley; Maj LysleB. Kelley and Souder. See also 3d Bn, 338th Inf,Unit Jnl and 338th Inf Unit Jnl, 16-17 Sep 44.

38 Combat Interv with Cole; 2d Bn, 338th Inf,AAR and Unit Jnls and 339th Inf AAR and UnitJnls, 16-17 Sep 44; Strootman MS; 91st Div G-3Jnl, 16-17 Sep 44.

39 338th IPW Rpts and Intel Sums, 16-18 Sep 44;85th Div G-2 Jnl and Rpts, 16-18 Sep 44; 338th InfUnit Jnl, 16-18 Sep 44.

224 THREE BATTLES

talion, which could not be relied upon,the only unit available was the GrenadierLehr Brigade, the I Parachute Corps reserve,which was still on the way to the passsector and would not be free much longer.For the defense of the Giogo Pass area,Generalleutnant Richard Heidrich, theI Parachute Corps commander, consideredessential the retention of the Lehr Brigadefor three or four more days. Heidrich'sneed for his reserve was outweighed bythe desire of the Army Group C commander,Field Marshal Kesselring, to use it toreinforce Tenth Army on the Adriaticcoast. Kesselring in fact had agreed toleave the 16th SS Panzer Grenadier Divisionwith Fourteenth Army only on the conditionthat the Lehr Brigade would be sent toTenth Army on the nights of 18-19 and19-20 September. Because of the Alliedpressure on the Adriatic coast, Kesselringwarned Fourteenth Army that the LehrBrigade had to go to Tenth Army onschedule. Fourteenth Army accordinglydirected the I Parachute Corps to put theLehr Brigade in position where it could bedisengaged quickly.40

During the night of 16 Septembermore replacements were sent into the12th Parachute Regiment's sector. Ob-viously throwing in any troops that couldbe spared from other areas or the rear,the enemy committed small units piece-meal. At 2300 a machine gun platoonof about twenty-five men who had justcome from a battle school at Cuccianojoined the Monte Altuzzo defenses withthree heavy machine guns. During theday both battalions of the Grenadier LehrBrigade—except the horse-drawn ele-ments—had arrived at the I ParachuteCorps, and that night the 2d Battalion of

the brigade moved into position onMonte Verruca and Monte Altuzzo,arriving about the same time that the 1stBattalion, 338th Infantry, was pushingup the mountain. From a large groupof 360 to 430 Lithuanians who had comefrom Southern France, approximatelyseventy-five replacements went into theAltuzzo sector the night of 16-17 Sep-tember, twenty men going to each com-pany of the 1st Battalion, 12th Regiment.Although the Germans watched theLithuanians closely, about forty of themtook the advice of their Lithuanian lieu-tenant to desert at the first chance.

Against movement of replacements toforward positions, American artillery wasmost effective. One group of thirty-three replacements, for example, hadthirteen casualties on the way from Firen-zuola to positions in front of the GiogoPass. Prisoners captured from the 6thCompany, Grenadier Lehr Brigade, said theheavy artillery fire demoralized theirunit and inflicted heavy casualties as itmoved into position on Monte Altuzzoduring early morning of 17 September.According to the daily report of theFourteenth Army on 16-17 September,American artillery, supported by unre-mitting attacks of Allied planes, was soheavy that on the east flank forward ele-ments of the Grenadier Lehr Brigade nego-tiated the last kilometer to the front lineonly by crawling forward in smallgroups.41

Late in the afternoon of 16 Septembera battalion of the 178th Field ArtilleryGroup fired thirty-two rounds at anestimated twenty-five to forty German

40 Entry of 16 Sep 44, Fourteenth Army KTB 4.

41 338th Inf IPW Rpts, Intel Sums, and Unit Jnl,16-18 Sep 44; 85th Div G-2 Jnl and G-2 Rpts, 16-18Sep 44; Entries of 16-17 Sep 44, Fourteenth ArmyKTB 4.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 225

troops along the Firenzuola highwaynortheast of the Giogo Pass, and the airobservation post reported good coverageof the target area. The 403d FieldArtillery Battalion reported it had caughtapproximately twenty-five Germans inthe open 1,200 yards north of the passand wiped them out with 108 rounds.During the evening, as 200 Germansmoved south of Firenzuola, they werebrought under artillery fire with unde-termined results. Just before midnightanother battalion of the 178th FieldArtillery Group fired three unobservedTOT missions on Monte Verruca, Piandi Giogo, and the slopes along the high-way between Monticelli and MonteAltuzzo.

From 2100 to 0500 a battalion of the178th Field Artillery Group put fortyrounds of unobserved harassing fire onsuspected enemy artillery positions in thevicinity of Molinuccio. During thenight another battalion fired on enemyguns along the highway north of the passand in the vicinity of Rifredo. Theheavy guns of the corps artillery placedharassing and TOT fire on selected areasalong the highway. The 403d FieldArtillery Battalion fired twenty-eightharassing and nine TOT missions on

areas around the pass as far away asBarco and Rifredo, and the 329th FieldArtillery Battalion fired numerous ob-served missions on enemy pillboxes,mortars, and personnel.

About dawn on 17 September ColonelJackson (1st Battalion, 338th) reporteda general enemy withdrawal across hisfront,42 but the report was premature.His troops had breached the enemy'smain line of resistance and occupiedpositions in its rear, but the Germans stillheld on to main defenses along the upperpart of the bowl, and the infiltration pastthese defenses had not caused the enemyto make wholesale withdrawals. Al-though weakened by four days of fighting,the enemy still intended to hold MonteAltuzzo by committing additional rein-forcements. From radio intercepts the338th Infantry learned that remnants ofthe 3d Battalion, 12th Parachute Regiment,which had been relieved by the LehrBrigade at 0300, would be sent to reinforcethe 2d Battalion on Monticelli and the 1stBattalion on Monte Altuzzo.43

42 338th Inf Unit Jnl, 17 Sep 44; 403d FA Bn, 178thFA Gp, and 423d FA Gp Mission Rpts, 16-17 Sep44; 329th FA Bn Unit Jnl, 16-17 Sep 44.

43 Entry of 17 Sep 44, Fourteenth Army KTB 4;338th Inf Intel Sums and Unit Jnl, 17 Sep 44; 85thDiv G-2 Rpt and G-2 Jnl, 17 Sep 44.

CHAPTER V

Counterattacks(17 September)

MAP 17

On Hill 926 the Germans had observa-tion posts and bunkers for housing rein-

forcements and counterattacking forces.(Map 17) A few yards south of the crest

they had had two observation posts,which provided commanding views ofthe terrain to the east and west and asfar south as Scarperia. They had three-inch slits on the south side for observa-tion. By the time the 1st Battalion (-),338th Infantry, reached Hill 926, thewesternmost observation post had beenreduced by heavy artillery fire to a gapingshell hole. Originally both observationposts had been connected by zigzagtrenches, running on either side ofthe crest, to heavy bunkers behind thepeak. Built of heavy timber, the bunk-ers were roofed with four layers of ten-inch logs, capped with dirt. The rightbunker (looking from the Company Cpositions) was dug into the top of thepeak and the left bunker into the rearslope some ten to fifteen yards away fromand below the first. Since the bunkerscould withstand direct hits by mediumartillery, they provided good protectionfor counterattacking forces. Each posi-tion could accommodate as much as oneplatoon. Inside, the enemy had radioand telephone communication facilitieswith higher headquarters and subordi-nate units, including telephones to theobservation posts. Beyond the crest ofMonte Altuzzo all the way down thewooded slopes that ran northwest to theGiogo Pass and then onto higher ground,Hills 1029 and 1041, the enemy had con-

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 227

structed trenches and log bunkers thatfaced toward the highway.1

While the Germans on Hill 926 hadnot yet discovered the nighttime approachof the 1st Battalion, 338th Infantry, andwhile the 3d Battalion was strung outbehind the 1st on the main Altuzzo ridge,the men of Companies A and C began todig their holes on the hill's southernslope. Their entrenching tools madelittle headway in the rocky soil; after harddigging most of the holes were only twelveto eighteen inches deep, barely enoughto cover a man's body and too shallow toprovide much protection against shellfragments.

Lieutenant Krasman was checking theholes dug by his 3d Platoon (CompanyC) when his platoon sergeant, SergeantFent, reported the discovery of a dugoutwhich he wanted the platoon leader to see.Taking with them Private Schwantke,the German-speaking scout, Krasmanand Fent went to the near-by position, awell-camouflaged observation post (theright OP). After inspecting it briefly,they started to follow a connecting zigzagtrench on the east side of Hill 926 todetermine where the trench led. Asthey neared a bend in the trench, theyspotted a German a short distance ahead.Schwantke called out for his surrender.The startled soldier darted back downthe trench toward a bunker (the rightbunker). Krasman and Fent fired andthe German slumped to the ground. Aquick investigation of the trench revealedtwo 50-mm. mortars, a machine gun, andseveral packs with food, convincingKrasman that more Germans must beon the northern slope of Hill 926.

Assault on the Right Bunker

Instead of conducting a search bythemselves, the three men returned forhelp from the southern slope. AfterLieutenant Krasman called to his non-commissioned officers to hurry to thepeak with some men, Sergeant Strosniderand about fifteen soldiers from CompanyC rushed quickly to the top of the moun-tain. Private Schwantke, followed bySergeant Thompson (1st Platoon, Com-pany C) and several of his men, dashedto the right side of the crest of the hilland moved down the zigzag trench. Asthe men neared the last bend, machinegun fire from near the entrance to theright bunker halted their movement.Several times Private Schwantke tried togo past the bend, but each time a ma-chine gun burst drove him back. Lieu-tenant Krasman joined Sergeant Thomp-son in tossing hand grenades at the enemymachine gun and at other Germansbelow the north end of the trench. Thegrenades had no visible effect.

On the crest Sergeant Strosnider andhis group continued for a few yardsbefore taking cover in a large shellcrater. Scarcely a yard away they sawthe upper edge of a dirt-covered logbunker. There were doors on two sidesbut no firing aperture. The sound ofthe movement in the crater evidentlycarried quickly to the Germans insidethe bunker, for they soon cracked thedoor opening to the north and began totoss concussion grenades toward thecrater. Some near misses jarred thehandful of men in the crater, but the onlygrenade to land inside was a dud.

While several of the attackers, includ-ing Sergeant Strosnider, remained for afew moments in the bomb crater, Pfc.

1 Combat Intervs and Notes of terrain recon-naissances with Krasman and Strosnider, and withall enlisted survivors in Co C, 338th Inf.

228 THREE BATTLES

Elmer J. Kunze and Pfc. LawrenceMarkey, Jr., worked their way along thewestern slope when suddenly a Germanwearing an American helmet poppedfrom the entrance of the right bunker.For a moment both the German and thetwo Americans were startled. Markeythrew his rifle to his shoulder, but hesi-tated a moment too long in squeezing thetrigger. The German tossed a grenadefirst. Caught off guard, Markey andKunze darted back a short distance wherethey met Sergeant Strosnider and askedhim for hand grenades. With the squadleader's last grenade, the two men movedback on the west slope within a few yardsof the right bunker. After a brief lull aGerman inside the bunker opened thedoor and again tossed grenades at thetwo men. Kunze promptly replied withhis M-1. The German drew backinside, then opened the door at intervalsand threw out grenades, slamming thedoor each time before Kunze could fire.Sgt. Harvey E. Jones and Pfc. Ernst H.Becker, both of the 2d Platoon (Com-pany C), who had been on the left slopeof Hill 926 near the crest, had movedtoward the entrance of the right bunker,some ten feet from where Kunze wasfiring. Some of the German grenadeslanded within ten feet of Jones, and oneslightly wounded Becker. The two mendecided to try the right side of thebunker. After advancing halfway to theright zigzag trench they hit the groundas a German machine gun from the leftfront on Knob 3 north of Hill 926 sprayedthe area. Jones and Becker crawled tothe west side of the crest and found coverin the big shell crater which had oncebeen the enemy's western observationpost.

Back at the right bunker Markey paidlittle heed to the sound of the machinegun fire. While Kunze provided cover-ing fire, Markey sought an opening intowhich he could toss a grenade. As hemoved to the top of the bunker, a riflebullet struck him in the right shoulder.

About the same time, Pvt. Anthony W.Houston, who was with Sergeant Stros-nider's small group in the crater, put agrenade on his rifle and prepared to fire.Before he discharged the grenade, amachine gun burst from Knob 3 slicedinto him. After the burst the others inthe shell crater spotted Schwantke below,at the corner of the trench leading to thebunker. As Pfc. Kermit C. Fisher calledout, "There's Schwantke; let's go overand help him," he raised his head abovethe crater to climb out. A bullet fromthe enemy machine gun struck him inthe throat, and he fell back dead. Therest of the men in the crater crawledback slowly to the 3d Platoon's positionson the southern slope and to the rightzigzag trench.

On the crest of Hill 926 and along theright zigzag trench, Sergeant Strosnider'smen had failed to dislodge the Germansfrom the right bunker. Instead of rush-ing the position they had waited outsideto grenade or shoot the enemy. In theend machine gun fire from Knob 3 hadforced them to retire. The men withLieutenant Krasman and SergeantThompson in the right zigzag trench, in-cluding Private Schwantke, had beenstopped short of the bunker by machinegun fire from even closer range.2

2 Combat Intervs with the following: Jones, Becker,and Pfc John A. Palmer; Krasman, Schwantke,Thompson, Strosnider, Hinton, Markey, and Pugh.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 229

Assault on the Left Bunker

During this action, Sergeant Fent (3dPlatoon), Private Lightner, and Pvt. PeterKubina, Jr., moved to the left flank onthe west slope of the peak to locate enemypositions. Joining up in the zigzagtrench west of the peak, Lightner andFent pushed over the bush-covered slope,where they discovered the left bunker. Abespectacled German officer was on top.As Lightner moved toward the lower sideof the bunker near the exit to the trench,Sergeant Fent climbed up and shot theGerman. The shot aroused the enemyin the right bunker, who began to throwgrenades at Fent. Dashing back acrossthe top of the bunker, the platoon ser-geant dropped again into the left zigzagtrench, followed quickly by Lightner.The two men then withdrew about half-way up the trench. They fired at theright bunker, but without success. Againthey pushed forward in the trench towardthe left bunker, Lightner returning to theentrance and Fent again climbing ontop. Hearing voices inside, Fent calledout in German for the men in the positionto surrender.

As Lightner covered the entrance—atwo-part door that folded together—aGerman rushed out, hurling hand gre-nades. Lightner fired back with hiscarbine as the grenades sailed overhead.The first shot hit the German in thestomach. Slumping to the ground, hereached for his pistol, but before he coulddraw it Lightner shot him again in thestomach and the hand, knocking thepistol away. To make sure the man wasdead, Lightner pumped four more bulletsinto him. Picking up the pistol, Light-ner withdrew to his firing position at thecorner of the trench.

On top of the bunker Fent continuedto call for the enemy inside to surrender,and after a few minutes the Germansbegan to file out, one by one. Urged onby the platoon sergeant, fourteen Ger-mans, including a first sergeant, marchedout. Lightner searched them, and thetwo men marched them back to the bombcrater that had been an enemy observa-tion post.3 When interrogated, the firstsergeant said that the Germans weregoing to counterattack soon and wouldtry to hold Monte Altuzzo at all costs.They had been surprised, he said; other-wise, they would never have let theAmericans get past the MLR to the crestof the mountain. The German soldiersinside the bunker had wanted to sur-render after they had first heard theAmericans outside. Their lieutenant re-fused, and kept his men under controluntil he was put out of action by theAmerican fire.4

Return to the Bunker

Lightner and Fent again started backto the left bunker, leaving the fourteenprisoners in the charge of other CompanyC men. Just before they reached theposition, ten Germans led by a medicalaid man came up to surrender. Theyhad come either from Knob 3 to the northor from the wooded area on the northslope of Hill 926. After searching theprisoners, Lightner moved them back tothe bomb crater while Fent covered thebunker.

As soon as Lightner returned, both heand Fent went inside the bunker, thereto discover a large store of German equip-

3 Combat Intervs with Krasman, Lightner, andJones-Becker.

4 Combat Interv with Becker.

230 THREE BATTLES

ment: weapons, radios, telephones, andrations. A telephone rang while theywere investigating. Sergeant Fent an-swered, but the German at the other endof the line, evidently recognizing theAmerican accent, slammed down thephone. Sure that the incident had tippedoff the Germans that Americans were inthe bunker, Fent and Lightner shot holesin the radios and ripped up the telephonewires, so that the enemy could not usethe communications if he reoccupied theposition.

Fent and Lightner found fresh breadand cans of sardines, and ate greedily,for neither had tasted food since the daybefore. Gathering up other spoil, Light-ner slipped several watches on his wristand stuffed his belt full of knives. Thetwo men spent about twenty minutes inthe bunker before rejoining Company Con the southern slope of Hill 926.5

After the second group of prisonerswas brought back to the south slope ofthe hill, Lieutenant Krasman, feelingthat he could not spare men to take themto the rear, put the prisoners on theopen slopes below the Company C fox-holes. Two men were ordered to guardthem from their holes. Although theGerman first sergeant protested, Kras-man warned that his men would shoot ifthe prisoners tried to escape; they wouldhave to take the chance of getting shotby their own troops.6

When all the men who had been at-tacking the bunkers had returned, theplatoon leaders made further dispositionsto meet the counterattack predicted bythe German sergeant. Attempting toround out the defense on the left flank,Sergeant Strosnider directed Private

Kubina, 3d Platoon automatic rifleman,into the left zigzag trench on the westside of the peak to cover straight downthe trench, and farther to the left on theextreme left flank Pfc. Elmer Mostrom,another automatic rifleman, to covertoward Altuzzo's western ridge. Ser-geant Strosnider himself took position inthe pines on the western slope of the peak.7

The predicted enemy counterattackstruck soon after the new dispositions hadbeen made. (Map 18) Under a screenof long-range machine gun fire fromKnob 3 to the north, a platoon or moreof Germans advanced to within thirtyyards of Company C's position. Theytried to work around the flanks into ornear the bunkers and then around theside of the left zigzag trench. Althoughrelying primarily on rifles and handgrenades, they received direct supportfrom 50-mm. mortars and machine guns.The main enemy effort came from thefront and flanks, but Germans from therear, who had been bypassed and stillremained along the top of the bowl, alsoplaced fire on the south slope of the hill.

During the height of the counterattack,the 1st Squad, 3d Platoon, Company A,was moved to Company C's left flank tofill a gap. As in other counterattacksthat followed, these men frequently hadto stand or kneel to shoot, exposing them-selves to fire. After what seemed likean eternity the men on Hill 926, aidedby the harassing fire of supporting artil-lery, drove off the first counterattack.8

5 Combat Interv with Lightner.6 Combat Intervs with Krasman.

7 Combat Intervs with Strosnider, Krasman, andThompson; Notes of terrain reconnaissance withKrasman, Strosnider, and Thompson.

8 Combat Intervs with the following: Sgt John R.Maiorana, S Sgt Bruno G. Pegolatti, and S Sgt JohnPaludi; Krasman, Strosnider, Lightner, Hinton,Myshak, Colosimo-Grigsby-Albert, White, Pugh,and Pfc Francis A. Kaufman.

232 THREE BATTLES

Search for Spoil

With the counterattack ended, Pri-vates Lightner and Kubina, in search ofadventure and souvenirs, headed againtoward the left bunker. As they creptnorth along the slope near the left zigzagtrench, a German from the right bunkerbegan to throw grenades. AlthoughKubina replied in kind, he was unableto lob his grenades into the bunker.Both men edged back to the left trench,while the German tossed two more con-cussion grenades. The first grenade didnot explode; the second landed on Light-ner's helmet, blowing off the camouflagenet and knocking him to the ground.Kubina thought him dead and rolled himover. Lightner had only been dazedand, except for a throbbing headache,quickly recovered. Together the twomen followed the trench to the leftbunker.

They found it unoccupied, and aftertheir search had produced several pocketwatches Kubina looked out the entranceand saw eight Germans headed up thepath toward them. The Germans werecarrying machine gun parts and seemedto be moving in for another counter-attack. As Kubina continued to watch,four of the Germans disappeared fromview; the other four continued straighttoward the bunker entrance. Discover-ing that his BAR was down to less thanone full magazine, Kubina grabbed aloaded Italian carbine and opened fire,while Lightner fired with his own carbine.Their combined fire quickly killed thefour Germans. A few minutes later,Lightner saw another German approach-ing the bunker door, but when the Ger-man saw the American he threw his P-38pistol to the ground, raised his hands,

and shouted, "Kamerad." As he steppedinside the door to surrender, PrivateKubina's back was turned; Kubinawheeled around to see the German enter-ing and was so startled that he shotquickly, hitting the German severaltimes in the stomach. Kubina andLightner helped him to a double-deckerbunk and then resumed their search forspoil, taking turns at watching for theenemy. Before long their quest ended.Sergeant Fent came down to the bunkerand shouted into the door for them tocome out.9

Action on the Western Peak

Shortly after daylight Sergeant VanHorne's 1st Platoon, Company A, push-ing to take the western ridge, hadreceived word from Captain King bysound-powered telephone that CompanyC had taken Hill 926 and that the 1stPlatoon should move on and occupy thepeak of the western ridge. Before Ser-geant Van Horne could get started,Captain King passed the word that amachine gun on the western peak wasfiring on the main Altuzzo ridge. Hetold Van Horne to knock out the gun atonce.

Armed with a bazooka and subma-chine guns, Sergeants Van Horne, South,and Whary moved up the ridge, followedby the 1st Squad. Already South hadspotted the Germans, who continued tofire intermittently toward the main ridge.Moving in single file, the sergeants ap-proached the position. They noted thatthe machine gun was behind rocks andlogs near the crest. It was connectedwith dugouts and bunkers farther up the

9 Combat Interv with Lightner.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 233

peak by a log-covered tunnel camouflagedwith dirt and rocks. As they neared theposition, the machine gun stopped firing,but the two gunners were lying flat onthe ground at the entrance to the coveredtrench and observing intently toward themain ridge. So engrossed with thetroops on the main ridge were the Ger-mans that they did not see Van Horneand his men crawling toward them aboutten feet away. The three sergeants wereclose upon the right rear of the machinegun before the Germans spotted them.The gunners hurriedly tried to swing themachine gun around, but before theycould do so South killed them both withtwo bursts from his submachine gun.

Whary set out to investigate the cov-ered trench. Moving along the top, hesaw large shell holes, which eitherartillery or direct fire weapons hadknocked in the trench, and dead Germansoldiers sprawled inside and outside. Ashe peered down one hole into the trench,he noticed a German lieutenant with arifle. Standing directly above the enemyofficer, Sergeant Whary killed him witha burst from his submachine gun.

After the remainder of Van Horne'splatoon had reached the position andsearched the dugouts and connectingtrench, the platoon sergeant placed themen in a perimeter defense. One lightmachine gun was placed on the peak, andthe 60-mm. mortar just south of thepeak.

Before S. Sgt. William H. Kohler,machine gun section leader, and Pfc.James F. Reid, machine gun squadleader, found suitable positions for theirweapons, they heard the blast of a motor-cycle on the highway to the north. Bothmen opened fire at the sound. Whenthe motorcycle came into view moving

fast toward the first house on the highwaybefore the first switchback, Reid stoodup and fired, felling the German driverwith one shot from his carbine. Themotorcycle bounded over the hillside.Sergeant Whary, lying near the machinegunners at the top of the peak, noticedmovement in a pile of brush on the northside of the ridge. While he hesitatedmomentarily before firing, a Germannoncommissioned officer rose from thebrush, and Whary cut him down with awell-aimed burst.

Thus, by midmorning of 17 Septem-ber, the 1st Platoon (Company A) hadtaken its objective, Altuzzo's westernpeak, after one minor skirmish. OneGerman machine gun crew had beenkilled, its weapon put out of action, anda German officer and noncom also killed.It was apparent from what Sergeant VanHorne and his men saw that most of theenemy on the peak had already beenkilled by shellfire or had withdrawn toother positions. The dead who litteredthe hill bore testimony to the effectivenessof the supporting fires.

Early in the morning, after the hazehad lifted, Sergeant Van Horne could seethe main force of the 1st Battalion on thesouth slope of Hill 926. During the day,he and Lieutenant Krasman kept abreastof each other's activities by telephonecommunication with their respectivecompany command posts.

The principal mission remaining forCompany A's 1st Platoon and its at-tached mortars and machine guns wasto hold the western ridge and fire on theenemy who were still to the rear of the1st Battalion around the upper slopes ofthe Altuzzo bowl between the two ridges.During the day, especially in the after-noon, scattered groups of Germans tried

234 THREE BATTLES

to break out of these positions to a pathleading from the western slopes of themountain north toward the Giogo Pass.With good observation on the escaperoute which was completely open at onepoint Van Horne's force picked off fifteento twenty Germans during the day. TheAmericans received sporadic fire fromthe western slope of the main ridge wheresmall groups of Germans still held out.10

Action at Hill 926

About a platoon of Germans moved inat approximately 1000 for a second coun-terattack against the men of CompaniesA and C on Hill 926. Although prob-ably a little weaker than the first attack,the second was nevertheless made withvigor. The enemy relied on 50-mm.mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire.Just before the Germans opened up,Sergeant Strosnider, on the left flank,saw a machine gun squad of five mencoming through a small space in the tallpines toward the left zigzag trench. Be-fore he could fire, the leading German,who was carrying the machine gun,moved out of sight, but Sergeant Stros-nider fired his M-1 at the assistantgunner, killing him instantly. His com-rades then dropped their weapons andammunition and ran back in the direc-tion from which they had come.

As the counterattack opened, othermen of Company C placed effective smallarms fire on the enemy. Private Mos-trom, BAR man, shot one man who hethought was an Italian. Private Buryand other riflemen in positions near thepine trees on the left fired down the slopes

to the west between the two ridges onGermans trying to infiltrate the left flank.

Soon after Sergeant Strosnider hadrouted the approaching German machinegun squad, enemy machine gun firebegan to strike the left-flank positions,clipping the bushes around the handfulof Americans. Private Mostrom andPvt. Bruce Cohn, with BAR's, and Pfc.John Paludi, with an M-1 rifle, returnedthe fire. When Private Cohn was hit inthe ankle by a .30-caliber bullet, Lieu-tenant Brumbaugh told him to jump intoa hole on top of Sergeant Strosnider.Another German bullet struck Cohn'sback, which still protruded above thelevel of the ground. The men in theright zigzag trench, having run out oftheir own grenades, began to use enemygrenades lying close by, and the survivingGermans soon made a hurried with-drawal.

The slight respite only gave the 1stBattalion troops on Hill 926 time to feeltheir thirst more keenly. They had nowater other than the meager supply takenfrom Rocca Creek the day before, andmany canteens were completely dry. Upto this time the Americans on the hill hadsuffered about fifteen casualties; thewounded were in slit trenches under thecare of medical aid men. In the hopeof preventing another counterattack,Lieutenant Krasman and Sergeant Stros-nider combined as reporter and observerto direct artillery fire on the area northof the mountain's crest.11

Enemy Pockets and the 3d Battalion

While the 1st Battalion on the crest ofMonte Altuzzo assaulted the bunkers and

10 Combat Intervs with South-Whary, Kohler-Reid, Van Horne, King, and Souder; Notes of terrainreconnaissances with Van Horne, King, and Souder.

11 Combat Intervs with Krasman, Strosnider,Maiorana, Pegolatti, Paludi, Brumbaugh, Hinton,and Thompson.

GERMAN MATERIEL. American troops passing a knocked-out armored tracked vehicle(above) on the road near the Giogo Pass, and examining dual-purpose machine guns and radioequipment (below) in a dugout position.

236 THREE BATTLES

repelled German counterattacks, themain body of the 3d Battalion was stillstretched out down the main Altuzzoridge, under enemy fire from the flanks.Pockets of Germans, still holding outaround the top of the Altuzzo bowl, onMonticelli, and on Monte Verruca, rakedthe battalion with automatic weapons.

Despite the fire, the 1st Platoon, Com-pany K, which was leading the column,worked up on the right flank of CompanyC on the south slope of Hill 926 duringthe morning, and one squad took uppositions in the right zigzag trench witha handful of men from Company C.During the remainder of the morningand into the afternoon the rest of Com-pany K was strung out in a columnbehind the 1st Platoon. The companysuffered six casualties when a singlemortar shell exploded in the midst of aplatoon conference, killing the platoonsergeant and wounding the platoonleader, the platoon guide, and the threesquad leaders. By 0900 Company Khad sustained ten casualties in all.12

Throughout the morning and earlyafternoon General Gerow and ColonelMikkelsen, who had sufficiently recoveredfrom his indisposition to take a moreactive part in the operation, kept theirfingers on the pulse of the 3d Battalion.During frequent long visits to the 3dBattalion CP they badgered MajorKelley, insisting that he pass his troopsthrough the 1st Battalion and attackbeyond the crest of Monte Altuzzo toKnob 3. Neither Gerow nor Mikkelsenwas satisfied that the 3d Battalion wasexerting itself to close up to the forwardpositions of 1st Battalion, or that MajorKelley was aggressively pushing his rifle

companies to carry out his mission. Be-fore launching his attack, Kelley argued,he wanted his troops to clear out thepockets of resistance which, Company Kreported, were holding up its advance.Kelley ordered Company I, in battalionreserve, to send out one platoon to dothe job. The platoon went out butfailed.13 The main body of the 3d Bat-talion stayed below the crest of MenteAltuzzo, well short of the assault elementsof the 1st Battalion on Hill 926.

Not until midafternoon did MajorKelley apply enough pressure to get histroops started. At 1518 he notifiedCompany L that smoke would be placedin its area so that it could move. A fewminutes later, after the 339th Infantryon the right flank reported that largenumbers of Germans were withdrawingthrough the Giogo Pass, Kelley orderedCompany L to move ahead immediately.Company M was directed to put fiftyrounds of mortar fire on the withdrawingtroops, and chemical mortars were re-quested to lay smoke for Company L'smovement. At 1601 the Company Icommander reported that the enemy waswithdrawing on the north slope of Hill926. As a result of the smoke-screencover and German movement out of thearea, all of Company K was soon ableto reach the leading elements of the 1stBattalion, pass through them, and jumpoff toward Knob 3 beyond Hill 926.14

Company K Attacks Knob 3

Late in the afternoon, with its threerifle platoons abreast, the 2d and 3d

12 Combat Intervs with Brooks and Pfc Harold W.Peterson; 3d Bn, 338th Inf, Unit Jnl, 17 Sep 44.

13 Interv with Kelley, 1 Aug 45; Interv withGerow, 3 Dec 48; 3d Bn, 338th Inf, Unit Jnl, 17Sep 44.

14 Combat Intervs with the following: Peterson,Brooks, Krasman, Strosnider, Kelley, and Gerow.See also 3d Bn, 338th Inf, Unit Jnl, 17 Sep 44.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 237

MAP 19

Platoons going west of the crest of Hill926 and the 1st Platoon east of the crest,Company K attacked toward Knob 3.(Map 19)

Although the enemy had made somewithdrawals in the area, these evidentlydid not include troops on the northslopes of Hill 926 or on Knob 3. Aftermoving only a few yards, the 1st Platoonon the right was halted by fire from thevicinity of the right bunker. Elementsof the 2d Platoon on the left pushedalmost to the crest of Knob 3 despitestiff enemy resistance and harassing firefrom both the left and right bunkers to

their rear. The 3d Platoon in the centerreached a draw between the two hillswhere fire from the bunkers halted theadvance. With the enemy threateningto cut off both the advance platoons, thecompany commander ordered a with-drawal to the starting point.15

The withdrawal came none too soon.Striking from the front and from bothflanks, the Germans made a determinedeffort—their third counterattack—to en-circle the troops on Hill 926. Theenemy came in close, hurling hand gre-nades into the right zigzag trench andcausing some casualties. The 1st Bat-talion (-) and Company K fought backwith small arms and hand grenades, butthe supply of grenades was soon ex-hausted. Still the Germans came on.

During the height of the counterattack,Lieutenant Ritchey, Weapons Platoonleader (Company C), cradling a machinegun, ran forward to the men in the rightzigzag trench. Setting up the machinegun at the first bend in the trench, whilenear-by riflemen held ammunition beltsfor him, Ritchey unloaded several burstsat the attackers. The Germans repliedwith grenades which landed so close thatLieutenant Ritchey and the other menin the trench were forced to withdrawto less exposed positions on the southernslopes a few yards to the rear.

On the left flank the men of CompanyC came under German machine gun firewhich began before and continuedthrough the third counterattack. As theenemy attempted to work around the leftflank between the crests of the two ridges,many Company C men exhausted their

15 Combat Intervs with Brooks, Peterson, Kingsley,and S Sgt John S. Warzala; 3d Bn, 338th Inf, UnitJnl, 17 Sep 44.

238 THREE BATTLES

ammunition in trying to halt the attack.During the counterattack a German tankmoved around in the draw north ofAltuzzo's western peak and south of thehighway, firing ineffectively toward Hill926.

As soon as Company K's platoons,which had been attacking toward Knob3, had returned to the south slope andthe enemy counterattack had begun, theCompany K commander, 1st Lt. MackL. Brooks, directed his 60-mm. mortarmen to fire at the enemy. The CompanyK mortar men checked to see that theriflemen were in their holes and thenbegan lobbing shells some forty to fiftyyards in front of Company C. Firingalmost straight up into the air, the mor-tars put heavy concentrations on theenemy to the front and right front.After the first shells landed, the attackingGermans moved to the left. The mortarsection then adjusted fire and showeredthe enemy with an effective, close-inconcentration. As usual the supportingartillery put down timely concentrationson the Germans. Between 1700 and1800 the 403d Field Artillery Battalionalone fired three missions totaling 277rounds north of Monte Altuzzo's crest.The combination of artillery, mortars,and small arms proved too much for theGermans, and they abandoned the coun-terattack. Against the strongest enemyeffort to recapture Hill 926 the little bandof Americans had held firm and the waywas now cleared for moving on toKnob 3.16

The 3d Battalion Mops Up

After the last counterattack againstHill 926 had been repulsed, the 3d Bat-talion, 338th Infantry, assumed responsi-bility for holding the crest of MonteAltuzzo and pushing on to the north. Atwenty-five man patrol from Company Kwent out after dark and found the rightbunker on the north slope unoccupied.When this information was transmittedto the rear, new orders were issued forCompanies I and L to continue theattack to take Knob 3.

Company I experienced difficulty infinding its way in the darkness, but Com-pany L jumped off successfully andadvanced toward Knob 3. Its first op-position came from a small entrenchedenemy force at the top of the objective,but this group's three machine guns werequickly knocked out. Several prisonerswho were taken directed the men ofCompany L to two dugouts close by andassisted them in calling for the occupantsto surrender. In the attack and moppingup of Knob 3 the company capturedsixty-four prisoners in all at the cost ofone man wounded and two killed.Shortly after dawn on 18 September,Knob 3, the last remaining part of MonteAltuzzo, was securely in American hands.

On the morning of 18 September the2d Battalion, 338th Infantry, advancedalong the highway and occupied highground north of the highway betweenthe Giogo Pass and Monticelli. Duringthe day Companies I and L of the 3dBattalion continued their advance to thetown of Barco, 1,600 yards north of theGiogo Pass.17 (See Map IV.)16 Combat Intervs with Thompson, Hinton,

Ritchey, Krasman, Strosnider, Brooks, Kingsley, andall survivors still in Co C, 338th Inf, 1-10 Apr 45;338th Inf and 3d Bn, 338th Inf, Unit Jnls, 17 Sep44; 403d FA Bn Battle Mission Rpt, 17 Sep 44.

17 Combat Intervs with the following: Sgt MeredithR. Jenkins; Brooks, Kingsley, et al. See also 2d Bnand 3d Bn, 338th Inf, Unit Jnls, 17-18 Sep 44.

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 239

Break-Through on the Flanks

After the 338th Infantry had reachedthe crest of Monte Altuzzo, other unitsof II Corps completed the break-throughby seizing the peaks on either side. Tothe east, elements of the 339th Infantry(85th Division) secured all of MonteVerruca by noon of 17 September.Farther to the east, on the 85th Division'sright wing, the 337th Infantry capturedMonte Pratone during the afternoon.West of Highway 6524 and the GiogoPass, the 91st Division fought hardthroughout the night of 16-17 Septemberand the day of 17 September to reach thecrest of Monticelli in the afternoon. Thelast German resistance on the mountainended by the morning of 18 September.18

Monte Altuzzo had been captured andthe Gothic Line breached. The unitwhich had battled to reach the crest ofthe mountain, the 1st Battalion, 338thInfantry, had sustained 223 casualties.In repelling German counterattacks onceHill 926 was taken, the battalion hadsuffered twenty-nine casualties — twokilled and twenty-seven wounded, all inCompany C except two wounded inCompany A. The 3d Battalion, whichhad figured briefly in the abortive effortto push to Knob 3 north of Hill 926 andthe battle to hold the southern slope ofHill 926 and then had captured Knob 3,had sustained thirty-eight casualties, in-cluding three killed, four missing inaction, and thirty-one wounded. Mostof the 3d Battalion's losses had beensustained while it was stretched out tothe rear of the 1st Battalion on the main

Altuzzo ridge. During the five-daystruggle to take and hold Monte Altuzzo,including Knob 3, the 338th Infantry hadsuffered a total of 290 casualties—252 inthe 1st Battalion and thirty-eight in the3d—a figure that could not be consideredexcessive in view of the importance ofMonte Altuzzo to Fifth Army break-through plans.19

In the battle of Monte Altuzzo sup-porting units had played major roles.Artillery, tanks, tank destroyers, chemicalmortars, and the tactical air force hadall made important contributions toweakening the German positions andhampering movement of reinforcementsto the threatened area. Several hits hadbeen scored on enemy bunkers on themountain, the tanks alone claiming tohave knocked out seven bunkers during17 September. The effectiveness of thehits undoubtedly was exaggerated, be-cause light and even medium artillerywould not penetrate the heavy bunkers.Far more effective in the struggle hadbeen accurate, well-placed artillery timefire, which killed many Germans whilethey were in open emplacements ormoving into position.

As indicated by the large number ofenemy dead on the upper slopes of MonteAltuzzo, American shellfire had servedto disperse and disorganize the Germansand to inflict heavy casualties. For fourdays and nights, prisoner reports indi-cated, artillery fire and air support hadprevented front-line troops from receivingsupplies of food and water. Propagandaleaflets, fired by supporting artillery,proved less effective. Although manyenemy soldiers had read these leaflets—

18 85th Div G-2 Rpts, G-2 and G-3 Jnls, 17-18Sep 44; 337th Inf and 339th Inf Unit Jnls, 17-18Sep 44; 91st Div G-3 Jnl, 17-18 Sep 44; StrootmanMS; Muller Notes.

19 1st Bn, 338th Inf, Morning Rpts, 17-18 Sep 44;338th Inf, Casualty Rpts, Sep 44.

240 THREE BATTLES

which included safe-conduct pamphletsand sheets headed, "Why fight in Italywhen the Allies are in Germany?"—theirmorale had not been appreciably weak-ened.

Besides killing and wounding a largenumber of Germans, the 338th Infantrycaptured many prisoners. Although anaccurate breakdown of prisoner of warfigures is not possible, probably close to200 men were captured by the regiment.By 1200 on 18 September seventy-threeprisoners had passed through the regi-mental cage since the start of the GothicLine offensive, and during the twenty-four hours ending at 1200, 19 September,the total rose to 212. In view of thetime required to process the prisoners andsend them to the rear, the 338th Infan-try's action was probably responsible forthe capture of most if not all of them.20

The basic point was that the 338thInfantry and its supporting units had leftthe Germans with inadequate force toman their positions or to maintain aprolonged defense. The 12th ParachuteRegiment, as well as the reserves of the 4thParachute Division, had suffered heavylosses. Men of the Lithuanian laborbattalion had deserted in large numbers.Even the 2d Battalion, Grenadier LehrBrigade, the I Parachute Corps reserve, hadlost many men from artillery fire whilemoving into position on Altuzzo andVerruca and had not proved able to holdthe defenses. Even had it had no casual-ties, the battered Grenadier Lehr Brigade

could no longer be employed in theGothic Line positions: Field MarshalKesselring, the commander of Army GroupC, had ordered the unit shifted to theTenth Army to aid the hard-pressed troopsalong the east coast. When the Grena-dier Lehr Brigade left the area, no reservesremained to recapture that part of theGothic Line which had been lost. By1920 on 17 September Fourteenth Army haddirected the I Parachute Corps to abandonits positions and build a new defense inthe heights beyond Firenzuola. Beforemidnight, 17 September, the forwardtroops of the 12th Regiment had receivedthe order to withdraw.21

By the morning of 18 September, thetroops of II Corps had seized an areaseven miles in width on either side of theGiogo Pass. The Germans, hard hit byheavy losses and the lack of reserves,were in full retreat toward the heightsnorth of Firenzuola and, in the daysfollowing the break-through, offered onlylight rear guard resistance as II Corpsdrove north to reach the Santerno Rivervalley on 22 September. The rapidmovement exploiting the decisive break-through in front of Giogo Pass completelyoutflanked the strongly fortified FutaPass, which fell the same day withoutheavy fighting. By that time the Amer-ican II and British 13 Corps of FifthArmy had broken completely throughthe Gothic Line on a thirty-mile frontand were ready to continue the attacktoward the Po Valley.22

20 752d Tk Bn, 805th TD Bn, 178th FA Gp, and423d FA Gp AAR's, Sep 44; 338th Inf Unit Jnl,17 Sep 44; 329th FA Bn Arty Jnl, 17 Sep 44; 85thDiv G-2 and G-3 Jnls, IPW Rpts, Intel Sums, andG-2 Rpts, 13-18 Sep 44; all Combat Intervs andterrain reconnaissances; 338th Inf IPW Rpts andIntel Sums, 13-18 Sep 44.

21 338th Inf IPW Rpts and Intel Sums, Sep 44;Entries of 15-17 Sep 44, Fourteenth Army KTB 4;85th Div G-2 Jnls and Div Arty Rpt, Sep 44; 339thInf AAR, Sep 44.

22 Fifth Army G-3 Jnl and Files, 18-23 Sep 44;II Corps G-3 Jnl and Supporting Files, Sep 44.

BREAK-THROUGH. Troops of the 338th Infantry advancing along Highway 6524near the Giogo Pass on the morning of 18 September.

Order of Battle

85th Infantry Division

Headquarters, 85th Infantry DivisionHeadquarters, Special Troops

Headquarters Company785th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company85th Quartermaster Company85th Signal CompanyMilitary Police Platoon

85th Infantry Division Band85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, Mechanized310th Engineer Combat Battalion (less Companies A, B, and C)85th Division Artillery, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery

403d Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. Howitzer)310th Medical Battalion (less Companies A, B, and C)337th Regimental Combat Team

337th Infantry Regiment328th Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. Howitzer)Company A, 310th Engineer Combat BattalionCompany A, 310th Medical Battalion

338th Regimental Combat Team338th Infantry Regiment329th Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. Howitzer)Company B, 310th Engineer Combat BattalionCompany B, 310th Medical Battalion

339th Regimental Combat Team339th Infantry Regiment910th Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. Howitzer)Company C, 310th Engineer Combat BattalionCompany C, 310th Medical Battalion

Attached to 85th Division

752d Tank Battalion (Medium)805th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Self-Propelled)84th Chemical Battalion (4.2-inch Mortar)105th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 243

In Support of 85th Division

Headquarters, II Corps Artillery178th Field Artillery Group

178th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. Howitzer)248th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. Howitzer)339th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. Howitzer)939th Field Artillery Battalion (4.5-inch Gun)

423d Field Artillery Group697th Field Artillery Battalion (240-mm. Howitzer and 8-inch Gun)698th Field Artillery Battalion (240-mm. Howitzer and 8-inch Gun)985th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. Gun)

91st Infantry Division

363d Regimental Combat Team363d Infantry Regiment347th Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. Howitzer)Company C, 316th Engineer Combat BattalionCompany C, 316th Medical Battalion

Bibliographical Note

Alone among the studies in this volume,"Break-through at Monte Altuzzo" waswritten by the historian who obtainedthe basic source material, combat inter-views with more than 150 survivors ofthe action. The first interviews wereconducted during ten days in late Novem-ber, 1944, when the 338th Infantry wasin a rest center. In early Decembermore interviews with Lt. Col. Willis O.Jackson and the rifle company com-manders of the 1st Battalion, 338th In-fantry, were conducted on the Altuzzoterrain. From 20 to 25 December 1944,the author conducted additional inter-views in the rest center and visited thescene of the battle with all survivingplatoon leaders, platoon sergeants, andleading squad leaders of the 1st Battalion.The author spent an additional week inthe Altuzzo vicinity in February 1945, incompany with an artist and a draftsman.

When a preliminary narrative revealedgaps in the material, the author visitedthe 338th Infantry again from 20 Marchto 14 April 1945, conducting extensiveinterviews with all surviving enlisted menin Companies B and C and with someofficers who had not yet been interviewed.During this period he made two addi-tional reconnaissances of the Altuzzobattlefield, one with Capt. Maurice E.Peabody, Jr., Company B commander,and several of his noncommissioned offi-cers, and the other with all survivors ofCompany C. Interviews with personnelof the 363d Infantry and the 2d and 3d

Battalions, 338th Infantry, and with338th Infantry and 85th Division com-manders and staff officers were conductedfrom time to time during the entireperiod. Combat interviews on this op-eration are filed in the Office of the Chiefof Military History (formerly the His-torical Division, Special Staff, U. S.Army).

Unit records were useful for someadditional material and for checkingstatements in the interviews. All threebattalions of the 338th Infantry wroterelatively full After Action Reports.The 2d and 3d Battalions and the 338thInfantry kept fair unit journals of mes-sages sent and received, while the 1stBattalion kept only a sketchy journalwhich contains no record of messages andis of little value. Unit journals andsupporting papers of adjacent units andthe 85th Division provided the basicmaterial for accounts of those units.Unit records were likewise the primarysource for artillery, tank, tank destroyer,chemical, and engineer actions. Thejournals, mission reports, and AfterAction Reports of the artillery battalionsand groups are relatively good. Theexception is the records of the 329th FieldArtillery Battalion, which are meager,but this is largely compensated for byinterviews with 1st Lt. Dawson L. Farber,Jr., liaison officer with the 1st Battalion,338th Infantry. All unit records to in-clude Fifth Army were examined and arein the possession of the Historical Rec-

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 245

ords Section, Office of the AdjutantGeneral.

The basic source for German materialwas the text volume of Fourteenth ArmyWar Diary Number 4 (Armeeoberkom-mando 14, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4), coveringthe period of 1 July to 30 September1944. It is filed in the German MilitaryDocuments Section, Departmental Rec-ords Branch, Office of the AdjutantGeneral. Although the 4th ParachuteDivision records were not captured, muchreliable information about the lowerGerman units was obtained from radiointercepts recorded in 338th Infantry and85th Infantry Division records. Prisonerof war interrogations provided consider-able information about the nature ofenemy dispositions, the condition of thecombat elements, and the effect ofAmerican artillery fire.

Primary sources for air material werethe Mediterranean Allied Air ForcesDaily Central Mediterranean OperationSummaries for 1 to 20 September 1944,and the Mediterranean Allied TacticalAir Force Intelligence and OperationsSummaries for the same period. Airrecords are in the Historical Archives,Historical Division, Air University Li-brary, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Postwar interviews to clear up minorpoints in the narrative were conductedby the author with three officers whoparticipated in the operation. Thesemay be found in OCMH.

A unit history of the 363d Infantry waspublished in 1948, but was not used inthe preparation of this study. Instead,the author used History of the 363dInfantry, a manuscript by 1st Lt. RalphE. Strootman, 363d Infantry historian,which was the basis for the publishedhistory.

Complete List of Combat Interviews

I. 338th InfantryA. Regimental Headquarters

Col William H. Mikkelsen, CO; LtCol Marion P. Boulden, Ex Off;Maj Robert E. Baskin, Jr., S-2; CaptFranklin M. Ludwig, S-1

B. 1st Battalion1. Battalion Headquarters

Lt Col Willis O. Jackson, CO;Maj Vernon A. Ostendorf, ExOff; Capt Thomas M. Quisen-berry, S-3; 1st Lt WilliamAlston, S-2; T Sgt WayneBrown, sergeant major

2. Company Aa. Company Headquarters

Capt Robert A. King, COb. First Platoon

Capt King and 1st Lt JohnR. MacMinn, Jr., plat ldr;Lt MacMinn; 2d Lt NelsonB. Van Horne, plat sgt; SSgts David C. South, HarryB. Whary, Herbert H. Davis,and William J. Nowakowski;Pfc James R. Hickman

c. Second Platoon1st Lt Harry R. Gresham,plat ldr; T Sgt Adron G.Stevens, plat sgt; S SgtsWalter J. Michalek, Jr., IraW. Wilson, Edmond H. Car-ter, Stanley G. Hillier, andKenneth C. Pickens

d. Third PlatoonT Sgt Darius L. Daughtry,plat sgt, S Sgt Joseph K.Colosimo, S Sgt Gordon K.Grigsby, and Pfc Hubert G.Albert; Pfc James J. Burk-iewa; Pfc Albert

246 THREE BATTLES

e. Weapons PlatoonT Sgt Thomas A. Culpepper,plat sgt; T Sgt William H.Kohler and S Sgt James F.Reid

3. Company Ba. Company Headquarters

Capt Maurice E. Peabody,Jr., CO; 1st Sgt Volley Casey;Pfc George H. Friesenborg;Pfc John C. Jones

b. First Platoon2d Lt William J. Kelsey,acting plat ldr, and 1st SgtCharles J. Dozier; Sgt Dozier;T Sgt Louis S. Campbell;S Sgt James M. Burrows; SSgt Joseph T. Barrow; SgtNelson L. Simmons; Pfc ArleyPerkey; Pfc Marvin Cobb;Pfc Luther Ingram; Sgt How-ard C. Pecor; Pfc James W.Wright; Pfc Joseph T. La-Monica and Pvt EdwardJ. Lazowski; Pfc James O.Brooks

c. Second PlatoonT Sgt Herman Ledford; S SgtHugh C. Brown and S SgtGamelil Mullins; Sgt Mullins;Sgt Albert A. Lusk, Pfc Wil-liam C. Brodeur, and PfcWilliam Alberta; Pvt IdelmoSalmestrelli; Pfc John E.Catlett; Pfc David R. Leon;Pfc Albert E. Wilson; PfcWillie L. Guy; Pfc Leslie N.Albritton; Pfc Jules D. Distel;Pfc Alton MOS; Pvt GeorgeItzkowitz; Pvt Thomas H.Sherman

d. Third Platoon1st Lt Clemens M. Hankes,plat ldr; S Sgt William E.

Ford; S Sgt David N. Seiverd;T/4 Joseph F. Bertani; PfcPatrick H. McDonald, Jr.;Pfc John Campbell

e. Weapons PlatoonT Sgt Arthur O. Tomlet; SSgt John D. Brice and SgtLester F. Wise; Pfc Arthur E.Collins, Pfc John S. Ptaszkie-wicz, and Pfc Donald Brouth-ers; Pfc Ptaszkiewicz; PfcCollins and Sgt Alvin L. West

4. Company Ca. Company Headquarters

Capt Redding C. Souder,Jr., CO.

b. First Platoon1st Lt William S. Corey, platldr; 2d Lt William A. Thomp-son, plat sgt; S Sgt James O.Orr; S Sgt Clifford P. Marx;S Sgt Kyle F. Priestley; SgtLoyd J. Duffey; S Sgt Ken-neth L. Fankell; Pfc RandolphH. Bishop; Pfc Earl B. Gray;Pfc Richard M. Feeney; PfcBoyd A. West; Sgt Albert C.Borum, Jr.; Pfc Michael Bur-ja; Sgt George Balog; PfcLouis J. Hart; Pfc LawrenceF. Markey, Jr.; Pfc JacksonP. Bagley; Pfc Truett J. May;Pfc Robert H. Kessell

c. Second Platoon1st Lt David M. Brumbaugh,plat ldr; Sgt Tony L. White,plat sgt; S Sgt Robert W.Kistner, Jr.; S Sgt HarveyE. Jones and Pfc Ernst H.Becker; S Sgt John Paludi;S Sgt Bruno G. Pegolatti; PfcFrancis A. Kaufman; SgtJohn R. Maiorana; Pfc Rob-ert H. Adams

BREAK-THROUGH AT MONTE ALTUZZO 247

d. Third Platoon1st Lt Albert J. Krasman, platldr; 2d Lt Walter M. Stros-nider; T Sgt Pat H. Hinton;T Sgt Hinton and Pfc AlfredD. Lightner; Pfc Lightnerand Pfc Carl Schwantke; PfcLightner; Pfc Walter W.Iverson; Pfc John K. Britton;Pfc Loman B. Pugh; PfcFrank Bury; Pfc John A.Palmer; Pfc Paul Myshak

e. Weapons Platoon1st Lt Merlin E. Ritchey,plat ldr; 2d Lt Zealin W.Russell, plat sgt; T Sgt DaleE. Burkholder

5. Company DCapt Clarence W. Brown, CO;T Sgt Rayford H. McCor-mack, 1st Plat sgt; 1st Lt JohnR. Ciccarelli and 1st Lt RobertP. McGraw, mortar sec ldrs,

and 1st Lt Lawrence S. Car-penter, Mortar Plat ldr

C. 2d BattalionLt Col Robert H. Cole, CO

D. 3d Battalion1. Company K

1st Lt Mack L. Brooks, CO;T Sgt Willie L. Kingsley; S SgtJohn S. Warzala; Pfc HaroldW. Peterson

2. Company LT Sgt Meredith R. Jenkins

II. 363d Infantry3d BattalionCapt Thomas M. Draney, CO, CoL; 1st Lt Ralph E. Strootman,historian, 3d Bn, 363d Inf (laterhistorian, 363d Inf)

III. 85th Infantry DivisionDivision HeadquartersMaj Gen John B. Coulter, CG; BrigGen Lee S. Gerow, asst div comdr

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT

the story of the 112th In-

fantry Regiment of the 28th

Infantry Division in the bat-

tle for Schmidt, Germany.

by CHARLES B. MACDONALD

CHAPTER I

Attack on Vossenack(2 November)

By October 1944, the First UnitedStates Army in Western Europe hadripped two big holes in the Siegfried Line,at Aachen and east of Roetgen.1 (MapV) Having captured Aachen, the armywas next scheduled to cross the RoerRiver and reach the Rhine. It plannedto make its main effort toward Duerenin the zone of VII Corps south and eastof Aachen and thence toward Bonn onthe Rhine. But east of Roetgen, wherethe 9th Infantry Division had breachedthe Siegfried Line and parts of a forestmass known generally as the HuertgenForest,2 V Corps was first to launch alimited flank operation. The 28th In-fantry Division, under the command ofMaj. Gen. Norman D. Cota, was orderedto make the V Corps attack; its initialobjective was to be the crossroads townof Schmidt.

Schmidt was an important objective.Lying on a ridge overlooking the upperRoer River, it also afforded a view of the

Schwammenauel Dam, an important linkin a series of Roer dams which the Ger-mans might blow at any time. The rushof floodwaters thus unleashed wouldisolate any attack which had crossed theRoer in the Aachen vicinity. Locatedin rear of the main Siegfried Line de-fenses in the area, Schmidt was an im-portant road center for supply of enemyforces. The capture of Schmidt wouldenable the 28th Division to advance tothe southwest and attack from the rear theenemy's fortified line facing Monschau,while a combat command of the 5thArmored Division hit the line frontally.Thus V Corps could complete the missionassigned by First Army—clearing theenemy from its area south to the RoerRiver on a line Monschau-Roer Riverdams. In enemy hands the Roer damsremained a constant threat to any majordrive across the Roer downstream to thenorth.

The Schmidt operation was expectedto accomplish four things: gain maneuverspace and additional supply routes forthe VII Corps attack to the north; pro-tect VII Corps' right flank from counter-attack; prepare the ground for a laterattack to seize the Roer River dams;3 and

1 Although the official German name for the forti-fied belt along the western German frontier wasWestwall, it was known to American troops as theSiegfried Line."

2 A misnomer. The "Huertgen Forest" was ac-tually only a small part of a forest mass extendingfrom southeast of Eschweiler (Meroder Wald) to thearea Lammersdorf-Rollesbroich-Steckenborn. It in-cluded the Wenau Forest, the Roetgen Forest, andother subdivisions. Since the entire forest mass wasknown to American troops as the "Huertgen Forest,"this term is used throughout this narrative.

3 Although this objective has come to be consideredone of the more important of the Schmidt operation,neither V Corps nor 28th Division attack ordersmentioned it. According to an interview with Col

252 THREE BATTLES

attract enemy reserves from VII Corps,thus preventing their employment againstFirst Army's main effort.

Because the permanent boundary be-tween V Corps and VII Corps intersectedthe planned zone of operations, FirstArmy on 25 October designated a tem-porary boundary to run just south ofKleinhau and north of Huertgen. Thiswould keep the Schmidt operation en-tirely within the bounds of V Corps.Between the northernmost positions ofthe 28th Division and the new corpsboundary, the defensive line was beingheld with a series of road blocks in theHuertgen Forest by the 294th EngineerCombat Battalion; south of the plannedzone of operations the line was being heldby the 4th Cavalry Group.

Taking over the 9th Infantry Division'ssector on 26 October, the 28th Divisionfound itself facing roller-coaster terrainthat was to play an even more vital rolethan usual in the attack on Schmidt.

(Map VI) Its front lines extended gen-erally along the Huertgen-Germeter-Rollesbroich road from Germeter throughRichelskaul to the vicinity of a forest-er's house, Raffelsbrand. To the northand south lay dense forests, the southernforests hiding numerous enemy pillboxesand the town of Simonskall. To the eastfrom Germeter ran a ridge topped by thetown of Vossenack, surrounded on threesides by deep, densely wooded draws withwooded fingers stretching up toward thetown itself. To the northeast was theHuertgen-Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge,dominating the Vossenack ridge. (In9th Division operations in this area, onebattalion had attacked between thesetwo ridges and secured positions in thewoods north of Vossenack, but a violentenemy counterattack in the woods south-west of Huertgen had forced the advancebattalion's withdrawal.) Through a pre-cipitous wooded gorge to the east andsoutheast of Vossenack ran the KallRiver, a small, swift-flowing streamemptying into the Roer near Nideggen.Although a river road ran generallynorth-south alongside the Kall, only asmall woods trail, very difficult to locateon the available maps and aerial photo-graphs, crossed the river in the directionof the 28th Division's attack. That trailled across the river and up another ridgeon which were seated the towns of Kom-merscheidt and Schmidt. This ridgealso dominated the Vossenack ridge, andSchmidt in turn commanded Kom-merscheidt. The Brandenberg-Bergsteinridge line, northeast of Vossenack andnorth of Kommerscheidt, was lower thanthe highest point of the Schmidt-Kom-merscheidt ridge but overlooked its lowerslopes where the towns of Schmidt andKommerscheidt were situated. Schmidt

Carl L. Peterson (formerly CO, 112th Inf), Bradford,Pa., 21-22-23 Sep 48, the Roer dams "never enteredthe picture." While the First United States ArmyReport of Operations—1 August 1944-22 February1945 (hereafter cited as FUSA Rpt) does say that theSchmidt attack was "a preliminary phase of a plan byV Corps to seize the two large dams on the Roer River. . . ," 28th Division troops probably did not con-sider the dams an objective. Just when the Americancommand fully realized the importance of the damsis not clear. The German command thought the28th Division attack was aimed at them, and theviolent German reaction was based primarily on fearof losing the dams. See postwar German accounts,MSS # A-891 and A-892 by Generalmajor RudolfFreiherr von Gersdorff (formerly CofS of SeventhArmy); MS # C-016 by General der Infanterie ErichStraube (formerly CG of LXXIV Corps); EuropeanTheater Historical Interview (hereafter cited asETHINT) 53 of Gersdorff; ETHINT 56 of Gersdorffand Generalmajor Siegfried von Waldenburg (for-merly CG of 116th Panzer Division). For a fullerdiscussion of the question, see The Siegfried Line, avolume under preparation in the series UNITEDSTATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 253

and Kommerscheidt were also surroundedby dense woods and deep draws.

Two important considerations influ-enced the planners of the Schmidt opera-tion. First, air support could isolate thebattlefield from large-scale interventionof enemy reserves, especially armored re-serves. Thus the Schmidt action wouldremain an infantry action inasmuch ascrossing tanks over the Kall River wasa doubtful possibility. The air task,extremely formidable because it involvedneutralization of a number of Roer Riverbridges—and bridges are a difficult targetfor air—was assigned to the IX TacticalAir Command of the Ninth Air Force.Second, artillery support could deny theenemy the advantages of the dominatingBrandenberg-Bergstein ridge. While theplanners displayed great concern aboutenemy observation from this ridge, VCorps had too few troops to assign theridge as a ground objective. Neutraliza-tion of the ridge by artillery would re-quire almost constant smoking of approxi-mately five miles and still could not beexpected to eliminate the most forwardenemy observation. But neutralizationby artillery was apparently the onlyavailable solution.

The 28th Division was strongly rein-forced for the operation. Major attach-ments included the following units: the707th Tank Battalion (Medium); the893d Tank Destroyer Battalion (Self-Propelled) (minus one company); the630th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Towed);the 86th Chemical Battalion (4.2-inchmortars); and the 1171st Engineer Com-bat Group. The 1171st consisted of the20th, 146th (minus one company), and1340th Engineer Combat Battalions.4

Artillery in direct support was to includethe 28th Division's organic artillery (the107th, 109th, and 229th Field ArtilleryBattalions of 105-mm. howitzers and the108th Field Artillery Battalion of 155-mm. howitzers); Battery A, 987th FieldArtillery Battalion of 155-mm. self-pro-pelled guns; 76th Field Artillery Battalionof 105-mm. howitzers; 447th AntiaircraftArtillery Automatic Weapons Battalion;and the attached tank destroyers andtanks. Two 155-mm. howitzer battalionsof the 187th Field Artillery Group of VCorps were later assigned in direct sup-port and a battalion of 4.5-inch guns ingeneral support. Also to furnish generalsupport were the 190th Field ArtilleryGroup of V Corps, consisting of one155-mm. gun battalion and one 8-inchhowitzer battalion, and the 188th FieldArtillery Group of VII Corps, consistingof one 155-mm. gun battalion and onebattalion (less one battery) of 4.5-inchguns.

The 28th Division's employment of itsregiments was virtually dictated by VCorps.5 The 109th Infantry was toattack north toward Huertgen in orderto prevent repetition of the enemy coun-terattack that had hit the 9th Divisionfrom that direction. It was also to carryout a secondary mission of securing a lineof departure overlooking Huertgen fromwhich another division might later cap-

4 The 1171st Engr (C) Gp also included the follow-ing: the 502d Engr Lt Pon Co, the 668th Engr Top

Co (detached during this opn), the 993d Engr TdwyBr Co, and the 2d Plat, 610th Engr Lt Equip Co.These units performed rear area duties and are notmentioned further in this narrative.

5 Combat Interv 77 with Cota. This dictation byV Corps was apparently based on the limitations ofterrain, number of troops involved, and missions ofthe attack as originally decided by First Army and12th Army Group. (All combat interviews on theSchmidt operation are by the 2d Information andHistorical Service and were conducted in November1944 or early December 1944.)

254 THREE BATTLES

ture the town. This later attack onHuertgen was to be a part of the mainFirst Army attack by VII Corps, and thesecuring of a line of departure for thelater attack was specifically assigned byFirst Army. The 110th Infantry was toattack through the dense woods to thesoutheast to secure a road from Schmidtto Strauch that would ease the problemof the tenuous supply route from Vosse-nack to Schmidt. The road could beused also in the later phase of the opera-tion, the planned co-ordinated attack toroll up enemy defenses facing Monschau.One battalion of the 110th Infantry wasto be held out initially as the division'sonly infantry reserve. The 112th Infan-try was to make the division's maineffort toward the east and southeast toSchmidt. Two major factors influencedthis deviation from the tactical doctrineof a convergent attack: (1) the lack oftroops available for the operation and(2) the necessity for performing the threeinitial missions: (a) protecting the northflank against counterattack and securinga line of departure overlooking Huertgen,(b) clearing the main route south towardStrauch in preparation for the latterphase of the attack, and (c) capturing theinitial division objective, the town ofSchmidt.

Attached to the 112th Infantry in themain effort to capture Schmidt were:Company C, 103d Engineer CombatBattalion (organic); Companies B and D,86th Chemical Battalion (4.2-inch mor-tars); and Company C, 103d MedicalBattalion (organic). In direct supportwere: the 229th Field Artillery Battalion,reinforced by Company C, 630th TankDestroyer Battalion (Towed); the 20thEngineer Combat Battalion; and Com-pany C, 707th Tank Battalion (Medium).

The 893d Tank Destroyer Battalion (Self-Propelled) and the remainder of the707th Tank Battalion (minus CompanyD, which was to assist the 28th Recon-naissance Troop in maintaining contactwith the 4th Cavalry Group in defensivepositions to the south) were to reinforcefires of the general support artillery.

The artillery plan called for conven-tional fires on known and suspected enemylocations, installations, and sensitivepoints, the bulk of them in the Huertgenarea to the north. The preparation wasto begin at H minus 60 minutes all alongthe V Corps front and the southern por-tion of the VII Corps front to conceal aslong as possible the specific location ofthe attack. At H minus 15 minutes,fires were to shift to local preparation,and after H Hour fires were to be sup-porting, chiefly prepared fires on callfrom the infantry. Since weather limitedair observation before the attack, coun-terbattery fires were based primarily onsound and flash recordings, which couldnot be considered accurate because ofunfavorable weather and wooded, com-partmented terrain. Ammunition waslimited but considered adequate, andantitank defense was also included in theartillery plan. Artillery units were lo-cated in the general area Zweifall-Roett-Roetgen, from which all expected targetswould be within effective range.

The engineer plan revolved around theattached 1171st Engineer Combat Group.One battalion of this group was to sup-port the 110th Infantry and one was towork on rear area roads. The 20thEngineer Combat Battalion, in supportof the 112th Infantry, was assigned theprimary engineer mission of opening thetrail from Vossenack across the Kall Riverto Kommerscheidt and Schmidt. In the

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 255

planning phases, engineer responsibilityfor security of the Kall River crossing wasemphasized, but the engineer plan asissued by the 1171st Group on 30 Octoberdid not charge any engineer unit withsecurity of the crossing. The plan statedonly that, because of the disposition offriendly troops, local security would berequired. The written engineer plan,including this statement, was neverthe-less approved by the 28th Division com-mander, the division engineer, and thecorps engineer.6

The 28th Division, whose men worethe red Keystone shoulder patch thatrevealed the division's Pennsylvania Na-tional Guard background, had partici-pated in the latter stages of the Normandybattle and had pursued the enemy acrossFrance and Belgium. Rested after al-most a month along a relatively inactivesector of the Siegfried Line to the south,the division was nearly at full strength,although there had been many replace-ments after an unsuccessful effort to pene-trate the Siegfried Line opposite Pruemat the close of the pursuit across Belgium.The major supply shortage was in alltypes of artillery ammunition, chronicthroughout First Army since Septemberwhen the Siegfried Line battles hadbegun. The supply of arctic overshoeswas also far under requirements; onlyabout ten to fifteen men per infantrycompany were equipped with them.There was little patrolling before D Day,partially because of the proximity ofenemy lines and partially because of the

limitations of the densely wooded terrain;but intelligence information obtained inthe area by the 9th Division was turnedover to the 28th. Maps to be used wereprimarily the standard 1:25,000 (Ger-many, revised), which could be consideredgenerally accurate, but aerial photo-graphs were usually not available inlower echelons.

When the 28th Division moved intothe area on 26 October, the men foundthemselves in a dank, dense forest ofthe type immortalized in old Germanfolk tales. All about them they sawemergency rations containers, artillery-destroyed trees, loose mines along poor,muddy roads and trails, and shell andmine craters by the hundreds. Thetroops relieved by the 28th Divisionwere tired, unshaven, dirty, and nervous.They bore the telltale signs of a toughfight—signs that made a strong impres-sion on the incoming soldiers and theircommanders. After the operation the28th Division commander himself, Gen-eral Cota, recalled that at the time hefelt that the 28th's attack had only "agambler's chance" of succeeding.7

The 28th Division G-2 estimated thatto the immediate front the enemy hadapproximately 3,350 men, to the north1,940, and to the south 1,850, all of whomwere fighting as infantry. Enemy re-serves capable of rapid intervention wereestimated at 2,000 not yet committed and3,000 capable of moving quickly from lessactive fronts. The G-2 estimate did notmention that holding Schmidt and theRoer River dams was an importantfundamental in the German scheme forpreventing an Allied break-through tothe Rhine.

6 Engr story is from the following: V Corps FactualStudy, Opns of the 28th Inf Div, Engr Sec, 2-9 Nov44 (hereafter cited as V Corps Study); Engr Plan,30 Oct 44, 28th Div G-3 Jnl File, Oct 44. For afurther discussion of the security problem, see below,Ch. III, n. 10. 7 Interv with Cota, Washington, D. C., 15 Sep 48.

256 THREE BATTLES

THE SCHWAMMENAUEL DAM located southeast of Schmidt. The holders of thisdam controlled the flow of water along the Roer River and could flood a wide area along its path.

Although the 28th's attack was origi-nally scheduled to be launched on 31October, rain, fog, and poor visibilitynecessitated postponement. Despite con-tinued bad weather, the attack wasordered for 2 November to avoid thepossibility of delaying the subsequentVII Corps attack. The 109th Infantrywas to initiate the action by launching itsnortherly thrust at 0900.8 While the110th Infantry and two battalions of the112th were not to attack until H plus

3 hours (1200), the 2d Battalion, 112th,was to join the 109th in the H Hourjump-off—0900, 2 November.9

Facing the planned American attackwas an enemy determined to hold theHuertgen-Vossenack area for several

8 All clock time given is that officially designatedby the Allies; during this period it was British SummerTime.

9 Unless otherwise noted, this introduction is basedon the following sources: FUSA Rpt; V Corps Opnsin the ETO, 6 Jan 42 to 9 May 45; V Corps Study;V Corps FO 30, 21 Oct 44, and V Corps Ltrs ofInstn, 23 Oct 44 and 30 Oct 44, V Corps G-3 Jnland File, Oct 44; 28th Div G-3 Jnl and File, 26Oct-2 Nov 44; Combat Interv 77 with Cota; CombatInterv 74, General Notes on 28th's Opns; 28th DivAAR, Nov 44; V Corps G-2 Jnl and File, Oct 44;FO 25, 28th Div G-3 File, 29 Oct 44; Intervs withPeterson and with Cota.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 257

reasons now apparent: the threat to theRoer dams; the dominating terrain of theridges in the area; the importance ofDueren as a road and communicationscenter; the threat to plans already madefor an Ardennes counteroffensive; andthe neutralizing effect of the HuertgenForest against American superiority inair, tanks, and artillery. The unitcharged with the defense was the 275thInfantry Division of the LXXIV Corps of theSeventh Army of Army Group B.

That an attack was imminent was al-ready known from obviously preplannedAmerican artillery fires and from reportsand observation of American troopmovement in the rear of Roetgen. Itwas also known that the new Americanunit in the area was the 28th InfantryDivision, although the Germans thoughtthe division a part of VII Corps insteadof V Corps.

North of the 275th Infantry Division theline was held by the 12th Volks GrenadierDivision, and to the south by the 89thInfantry Division, which was scheduled tobe relieved soon by the 272d Volks Grena-dier Division so that the 89th could be re-equipped. To the north, in Army GroupB reserve in the Muenchen-Gladbacharea, was the 116th Panzer Division. Al-though the Germans believed an Amer-ican attack imminent in the Vossenackarea, no specific precautions had beentaken in movement of troops, becausetiming and direction of attack were stillunknown.10

The 112th Makes the Main Effort

In the center of the 28th Division zonethe 112th Infantry, making the division'smain effort, was assigned the capture ofKommerscheidt and Schmidt. It hadthe secondary mission of protecting itsown north flank by the capture anddefense of Vossenack and the Vossenackridge. After the planned artillery prepa-ration beginning at H minus 60 minutes,the 2d Battalion, 112th, was to attack atH Hour (0900) to capture Vossenack andthe forward (northeastern and eastern)nose of the ridge. The 1st Battalion,112th, attacking at H plus 3 hours, wasto move in a column of companiesthrough defensive positions occupied bythe same regiment's Company A atRichelskaul. Then it was to attacksoutheast through the wooded draw southof Vossenack, crossing the Kall River ina cross-country move and taking Kom-merscheidt. The 3d Battalion, 112th,was to follow the 1st Battalion on orderand capture the final objective, the townof Schmidt.11

The 2d Battalion's plan for seizingVossenack and the Vossenack ridge calledfor an attack with two companies abreast(Company G on the left, Company Fon the right) from the line Germeter-Richelskaul east through Vossenack.Company G was to move along the opennorthern slope of the ridge to the nose

10 MS # A-891 (Gersdorff); MS # A-905 (Walden-burg); ETHINT 53 (Gersdorff); ETHINT 56 (Gers-dorff and Waldenburg); ETHINT 57 (Gersdorff);I c (G-2) Sit Map, 1 Nov 44, found in OB WESTKriegstagebuch, Anlagen (War Diary Annexes), Befehleund Meldungen, 1.-10.XI.44 (hereafter cited as OBWEST KTB Anlagen 1.-10.XI.44). OB WEST wasthe abbreviation of the headquarters of Oberbefehls-

haber West, Commander in Chief in the West. Seealso Relief Schedule, Abloesungsplan, 28 Oct 44, foundin OB WEST KTB Anlage 50 1.VII.-31.XII.44., Vol.I, 24.X-31.XII.44.

11 No copy of 112th Inf FO 30 can be found. Thisinformation is based on 112th Inf Atk Overlays, 31Oct 44, 28th Div G-3 File; 28th Div G-3 Jnl, Oct44; 112th Inf Atk Overlay, 1st Bn Plan of Attack,31 Oct 44, 112th Inf S-3 File, Nov 44; all combatintervs for the period. The general plan is sup-ported by FO 25, 28th Div G-3 File, 29 Oct 44.

258 THREE BATTLES

northeast of Vossenack; Company F wasto take the town itself and the easternnose of the ridge; and Company E was tofollow and complete mopping up of thetown. One platoon from Company Fwas to protect the battalion's right flankby advancing along the open southernslope of the ridge and was to be followedby one platoon of Company E.12

This 2d Battalion attack was to beassisted by a company of medium tanks,Company C, 707th Tank Battalion. Thefive tanks of Company C's 1st Platoon,plus two tanks from its 2d Platoon, wereto attack with Company G, 112th, onthe left; the three other tanks of the 2dPlatoon were to attack with Company F,112th, on the right. The remaining tankplatoon was to assist Company E in itsmop-up operations. Two towed gunsof Company B, 630th Tank DestroyerBattalion, and five 57-mm. antitank gunsof the Antitank Company, 112th, all inposition around Richelskaul, were to beprepared to assist the attack by fire.Company B, 86th Chemical Battalion,equipped to fire high explosive shells, wasto support the attack from positions alongthe Weisser Weh Creek in the woodeddraw west of Germeter. The night be-fore the attack Company C, 103d En-gineers, was to clear paths through

friendly mine fields to the east ofGermeter.13

The regiment's eighteen 81-mm. mor-tars were grouped under Company Hfor preparation and supporting firesagainst Vossenack. After capture of thetown, they were to revert to their respec-tive battalions. The Company D mor-tars were to concentrate their fire on thedraw south of Vossenack, Company Hon the houses in the town, and CompanyM on the wooded area north of the town,firing to begin twelve minutes before HHour. The Company H machine gunswere attached to the three rifle com-panies, the entire 2d Platoon going toCompany G on the left, the 1st Sectionof the 1st Platoon to Company F on theright, and the 2d Section of the 1stPlatoon to Company E for the mop-up.14

Before the attack Company E, 112thInfantry, was outposting the town ofGermeter, while the remainder of the 2dBattalion was in an assembly area in thewoods approximately 300 yards south-west of Germeter. (Map VII) On theleft (north) the 3d Battalion, 109th In-fantry, held Wittscheidt on the Huertgenroad and was to attack almost due northat H Hour. On the right (south) Com-pany A, 112th, held the Richelskaul roadjunction and was to be passed through atnoon (H plus 3 hours) by other elementsof the 1st Battalion, 112th, and the 3dBattalion, 112th, in the attack southeasttoward Kommerscheidt and Schmidt.The 112th's Cannon Company was to

12 Combat Interv 75 with the following: MajRichard A. Dana, S-3, 112th Inf; Capt John D.Pruden, Ex Off and later CO, 2d Bn, 112th Inf; 1stLt James A. Condon, Ex Off, Co E, 112th Inf; 1stLt Eldeen Kauffman, CO, Co F, 112th Inf. Theattack overlays dated 31 October 1944 in the 28thDivision G-3 File indicate that another platoon ofCompany E was to advance through the edge of thewoods north of Vossenack to protect the battalion'sleft flank, but this plan evidently did not develop.No mention of it is made in the OCMH combatinterviews or unit journals, and the interview withColonel Peterson indicates that he recalls no sucharrangement.

13 Combat Interv 76 with the following: 1st LtJames J. Leming, 2d Lt William D. Quarrie, S SgtPaul F. Jenkins, and 1st Lt James J. Ryan. All ofCompany C, 707th Tk Bn. See also V Corps Study;Combat Interv 75 with Condon.

14 Combat Interv 75 with Capt Charles L. Crain,CO, Co H, 112th Inf.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 259

provide supporting fires from positionsin the woods some 2,000 yards west ofGermeter. The 112th Infantry com-mand post was in a captured pillboxalong the Weisser Weh Creek west ofGermeter.15

The 2d Battalion Attacks

The morning of 2 November dawnedcold and misty, not quite freezing, butdamp and uncomfortable. At 0800, anhour before H Hour, artillery along theentire V Corps front and the southernportion of the VII Corps front roaredinto action. Fifteen minutes before jump-off time direct support artillery shiftedto targets in the immediate sector andwas joined by heavy weapons of the112th Infantry. By 0900 V Corps andVII Corps artillery had fired over 4,000rounds, and 28th Division artillery hadfired 7,313 rounds. Artillery liaisonofficers watched the preparation fromthe 112th Infantry observation post in anattic in Germeter, where the 112thregimental commander, Lt. Col. Carl L.Peterson, prepared to watch the attack.16

At 0900 the riflemen of Companies Gand F, accompanied by the tanks ofCompany C, 707th, began to passthrough the outpost positions in Ger-meter. Almost as soon as the prepara-

tory American artillery fire shifted tomore distant targets, the Germans repliedwith a heavy artillery concentration oftheir own upon the line of departure,and the attacking companies sustaineda number of casualties. Nevertheless theattack continued, and the men and tanksmoved out into the shell-pocked openfields leading east to the objective, plainlymarked in the morning mist by the shell-scarred tower of the Vossenack church.With the tanks taking the lead, the in-fantrymen fell in close behind, steppingin the tank tracks as a precaution againstantipersonnel mines. Scattered smallarms fire from Vossenack sprayed thetanks, and the Germans fired light mor-tar concentrations; but neither stoppedthe advance.17

Company G on the Left

On the left in its attack along the openslopes north of Vossenack toward thenortheastern nose of the ridge, CompanyG started out with its 3d Platoon on theleft, its 1st Platoon on the right, and its 2d,which was considerably understrength,in support. Its seven attached tanksinitiated the movement by swinging intoa line formation and firing four roundseach at the Vossenack church steeple,presumably to discourage any enemyobservation from the steeple.

Two gaps had been cleared in thefriendly mine field in the Company Gsector. Although the southernmost gapnear the center of Germeter was poorlymarked and difficult to locate initially,it was used because it was more directly

15 Combat Interv 75 with Condon and Capt JohnT. Nesbitt, S-1, 2d Bn, 112th Inf; 112th Inf AtkOverlay, 31 Oct 44. Information on the 112thInfantry Cannon Company is meager. Maj. AlbertL. Berndt, 112th Infantry Surgeon, in a letter to theHistorical Division, 18 Oct 48, says the companycontinued to support the operation from its originalpositions throughout the attack. Records show thatin later stages of the operation Cannon Company,112th, was attached to the 109th Infantry.

16 Interv with Peterson; V Corps Opns in the ETO;V Corps Arty S-3 Jnl, 2 Nov 44.

17 Combat Interv 75 with 112th Inf personnel;Combat Interv 76 with Leming-Quarrie-Jenkins-Ryan.

VOSSENACK. The damaged tower of the Vossenack church could be seen by men approach-ing from the northwest across the shell-pocked open fields.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 261

along the proposed route of advance.The assault platoons moved through thegap close in the wake of the seven tanks,about a squad of infantry following eachtank. The advance had only just begunwhen the driver of the lead tank on theleft, that of the tank platoon sergeant,T. Sgt. Audney S. Brown, misread themine-field markings and blundered outof the cleared gap. The tank hit a mineand blew a track. When the assaultplatoons and their six remaining tanksagain moved forward, the platoon leader'stank mired in a muddy patch of groundin the north-south draw which creasedthe ridge between Germeter and Vosse-nack, again halting the advance. Thetank company commander, Capt. GeorgeS. West, Jr., seeing the difficulty, cameforward in his command tank, picked upthe platoon leader, 2d Lt. William D.Quarrie, and took position on the rightof the formation. Again the attackmoved forward.18

With infantrymen following close intheir tracks, the tanks fired as they ad-vanced. A provisional platoon of .50-caliber machine guns supported theadvance from Germeter, its fire clippingthe edge of the woods north of Vossenack;fire from supporting 81-mm. mortars waswell co-ordinated and fell about a hun-dred yards in front of the attack forma-tion.

Even as the tanks were having theirdifficulties, the company headquarters ofCompany G and the attached machineguns from Company H ran into trouble.Either the light enemy mortar fire orharassing small arms fire from Vossenack

wounded the machine gun platoon leadershortly after the machine gunners leftGermeter, and the platoon sergeant tookover. A few minutes later the last manin Company G's headquarters groupstepped on a booby trap or a mine.When a man from the machine gunplatoon moved up to see if he could help,he stepped on still another booby trapor mine and was killed. The explosionset off about five antipersonnel minessimultaneously. Of the twenty-sevenmen who had been in this group, twelvewere injured or killed in the mine field.Only two noncommissioned officers, bothcorporals, remained out of the machinegun platoon's leaders. Although slightlywounded, they reorganized the platoonand continued forward.19

The assault rifle platoons also sufferedcasualties, both the 1st and 3d Platoonleaders being hit within approximately400 yards of the line of departure. Thatthe leaders should be wounded seemedironic, for as the advance continued theonly enemy opposition came from lightmortar fire. The supporting tanks firedas they moved, and many of the Germansin Vossenack, already weakened by longdays and nights of American artilleryfire and now faced with a co-ordinatedtank-infantry assault, fled north, east,and southeast. Past outlying farms andthrough the open fields north of Vosse-nack the Company G assault pushed onquickly and soon reached its objective,the nose to the northeast of the town. Inan attack for which the planners hadallowed three hours, Company G and itssupporting tanks and machine gun pla-toon had taken only one hour and five

18 Combat Interv 76 with Leming-Quarrie-Jen-kins-Ryan; Combat Interv 75 with 1st Lt Clyde R.Johnson, Co G, 112th Inf.

19 Combat Interv 75 with Crain; Combat Interv76 with Leming-Quarrie-Jenkins-Ryan.

262 THREE BATTLES

minutes, gaining the objective shortlyafter 1000 hours.20

Having reached the nose of the ridge,the company began to reorganize and todig in against counterattack. Its as-signed zone included a trail—actually anextension of Vossenack's main street—northeast of the town. The trail was inthe defensive sector of the 3d Platoon,which planned to tie in later with Com-pany F on the right. The 1st Platoontook up positions on the left of the 3d;the 2d Platoon, which had been in sup-port in the attack, came up almost anhour later and extended the semicircularperimeter to the left and left rear. Thetwo light machine guns went into positionwith the 1st Platoon to cover the com-pany's front with cross fire. When theplatoon of heavy machine guns cameforward, it was placed in position withthe 3d Platoon on the right to fire acrossthe company front in the other direction,thus forming a final protective line. The60-mm. mortars were moved up duringthe afternoon and placed in slight defiladeabout 200 yards behind the company.All defenses except the 60-mm. mortarswere on the exposed forward nose of theridge, in accordance with the battalionorder; despite this exposed terrain, themen were virtually ignored by the enemyfor the rest of the day. The six support-ing tanks churned around on the forwardslope of the ridge and fired to the north-east toward Brandenberg-Bergstein, as ifthe attack were going to continue in thatdirection. Company G's advance hadbeen surprisingly easy; its principalcasualties had been incurred in a minefield; only minor casualties had resultedfrom the artillery shelling at the line of

departure, light mortar fire, and theoccasional harassing small arms fire.

Company F on the Right

While Company G was launching itssuccessful attack on the left, Company Fhad also moved out at H Hour in acolumn of platoons preceded by its threesupporting tanks. The lead platoon, the3d, under 1st Lt. Eugene S. Carlson, wasto advance along the open southern slopeof the Vossenack ridge as the battalion'sright flank protection. Since the areasouth of the Richelskaul-Vossenack roadwas deemed too exposed to suspectedenemy positions in the southern woodsin front of Richelskaul, the 3d Platoonand its three tanks planned to advancenorth of the road initially, then turn southon the outskirts of Vossenack, cross theroad, and resume their movement to theeast. Company F's 1st Platoon was tofollow the lead platoon closely until itturned south. The 1st Platoon was tocontinue east through the town itself.The 2d Platoon was to remain in Ger-meter as support to move forward oncall. The section of light machine gunsand two 60-mm. mortars were attachedto the leading 3d Platoon; the othermortar was attached to the 1st Platoon.Also with the company was a section ofheavy machine guns from Company H.The three supporting tanks were underthe command of 1st Lt. James J. Leming,the 2d Tank Platoon leader and actingcompany executive officer.

The assault force moved out at HHour, the infantry platoon following soclosely behind its column of spearheadingtanks that for the first 500 yards theinfantry platoon leader, Lieutenant Carl-son, had his hand on the rear of Lieu-

20 Combat Interv 75 with Johnson; 112th Inf S-3Jnl, 2 Nov 44.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 263

tenant Leming's tank. There was noresistance except from light enemy mortarfire. When the tanks and the lead rifle-men passed the Germeter-Vossenack-Richelskaul road fork, the column veeredto the south across the main Vossenackroad as planned. Beyond the road thethird tank in the column continued toofar to the south before turning east againand ran into surprise German oppositionfrom the wooded draw to the south. APanzerfaust at the edge of the woodsknocked it out. The two remainingtanks and the accompanying infantryplatoon continued to the east, the tanksfiring toward the southern woods line atpossible enemy positions. They hadgone approximately 300 yards past thefirst wooded finger pointing towardVossenack from the south when the75-mm. gun on Lieutenant Leming's tankjammed. The tank's coaxial machineguns and bow guns incurred stoppagesthat "immediate action" would not clear,and the antiaircraft gun also failed whenits bolt jammed from overheating. Theadvance stopped. Lieutenant Lemingradioed for 2d Lt. Joseph S. Novak,platoon leader of the 3d Tank Platoonwith Company E in reserve, to comeforward in his tank and lead Leming'sone remaining tank forward.21

Back nearer the line of departure,Company F's 1st Platoon had followedabout 200 yards behind the lead platoonand its tanks. In an approach marchformation with the 2d and 1st Squadsforward and the 3d in close support, the1st Platoon passed through the gap in themine field and neared the Germeter-Richelskaul-Vossenack road fork. Atthis point, a sudden burst of fire came

from two or three hitherto undetectedGerman machine guns emplaced neara group of buildings at the road fork.The Germans had evidently held theirfire when the preceding tanks and in-fantry had passed.

This first burst of enemy fire hit the1st Squad heavily, wounding or killingall but three men. Although the 2dSquad and the remnants of the 1st builtup a base of fire, the Germans continuedto resist. To break the deadlock, theinfantry platoon leader, 2d Lt. John B.Wine, crawled to within twenty-fiveyards of the position and knocked out atleast one machine gun with a handgrenade. At the lieutenant's signal thetwo advance squads assaulted the posi-tion, overcame the German gunners, andcaptured four or five prisoners.

Reorganizing his platoon quickly,Lieutenant Wine continued without op-position into the outskirts of Vossenack.One squad began to operate on each sideof the main street. The men sprayedthe entrances of the houses with fire,tossed in hand grenades, and assaultedeach building in the wake of the grenadeexplosions. At least one Company Fman was wounded and another killed asthe enemy threw in scattered artilleryfire.22

The Company F commander, 1st Lt.Eldeen Kauffman, had followed the 3dPlatoon to a point just past the gap inthe mine field. He waited there for the1st Platoon and then followed it throughthe action at the road fork and on intoVossenack. When he heard over hisintracompany SCR 536 that the 2d

21 Combat Interv 76 with Leming-Quarrie-Jen-kins-Ryan; Combat Interv 75 with Kauffman.

22 Combat Interv 75 with Kauffman and S SgtCharles W. Cascarano, Co F, 112th Inf. See also28th Div citation recommendation for Lt Wine inCombat Interv 75 File.

264 THREE BATTLES

Platoon, in support at the line of de-parture in Germeter, was receivingintense enemy artillery fire, he orderedthe platoon to join him in Vossenack.

Lieutenant Wine's 1st Platoon, con-tinuing its advance, had almost reachedthe main crossroads marked by thechurch in the center of Vossenack.(Map VIII) At this point it was held upby small arms fire from the house on theleft just short of the crossroads. Sup-ported by fire from the rest of the platoon,half of one squad assaulted the house andnetted between thirty and fifty prisoners.The town of Vossenack as far east as thecrossroads was then in American hands.

Upon the arrival of the 2d (support)Platoon, Lieutenant Kauffman, the com-pany commander, ordered it to passthrough Lieutenant Wine's unit, whichhad become disorganized in its fight atthe crossroads. Except for three menlost to artillery fire in Germeter, the 2dPlatoon was at full strength. The ex-change in assault platoons was madeabout 1030 at the crossroads, approxi-mately an hour and a half after thejump-off. Though the advance hadbeen rapid, the leading elements ofCompany F had covered only a littlemore than half the distance to their ob-jective, whereas elements of Company Ghad already reached the northeasternnose of the Vossenack ridge.23

The 3d Platoon was still waiting onthe exposed slope south of the town forLieutenant Novak to come forward withhis tank from Germeter to assist the oneremaining operational tank of LieutenantLeming's platoon. When the assistancearrived, it developed that LieutenantNovak had evidently misunderstood the

request and, instead of coming forwardhimself, had sent S. Sgt. Paul F. Jenkinswith the 3d Tank Platoon's 2d Section,two tanks instead of one.

The advance continued and the threetanks came abreast of the town's maincrossroads. Seeing what they suspectedto be an enemy mine field ahead, thetankers changed their route of advanceand moved north with their accompany-ing infantry through the center of Vosse-nack. They followed the open northernslope over which the tanks with CompanyG had passed earlier. Without opposi-tion the three tanks and Company F's3d Platoon moved just to the right ofCompany G on the eastern nose of theridge. There the infantrymen began todig in on their objective.24

While the 3d Platoon was taking itsroundabout route forward, the 2d Pla-toon under 1st Lt. George E. Scott con-tinued its advance past the crossroads inVossenack. From a house on the left,two or three houses east of the crossroads,a German "Burp gun" (machine pistol)opened fire and halted the Americanswith its first burst. As Lieutenant Scottmoved up to one of his squads to meetthe situation, another burst killed himinstantly. The platoon sergeant thentried to organize a flanking force, but hetoo was hit and seriously wounded. Asquad leader was killed and his secondin command seriously wounded in anattempt to shift their squad to where itcould flank the position from the north.

Back at the Germeter line of departure,the remaining three tanks of LieutenantNovak's 3d Tank Platoon had startedforward shortly after Sergeant Jenkinsleft with the platoon's 2d Section.

23 Combat Interv 75 with Kauffman.

24 Combat Interv 76 with Leming-Quarrie-Jen-kins-Ryan.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 265

Novak's tanks, scheduled to assist Com-pany E in the Vossenack mop-up, movedtoo quickly for the infantry to keep paceand reached the crossroads ahead ofthe reserve company. There LieutenantKauffman seized the opportunity andcommandeered one of the tanks to helpin demolishing the burp gun resistance.The tanker fired two rounds at the build-ing indicated by Lieutenant Kauffman,and the F Company commander and hisrunner, Pfc. Bud Kern, charged thehouse close behind the tank fire. Insidethey found seven men and two Germanofficers, one of whom was already wound-ed. Kauffman and Kern killed theother officer, and the German enlistedmen promptly surrendered.

Lieutenant Novak, meanwhile, hadturned south with his tank, apparentlyintending either to use the southern slopeand so avoid the town as he moved east-ward or to help knock out the burp gunby firing on the house from anotherdirection. As he neared the southernedge of the town, his tank struck a mineand was immobilized. Since it couldstill be used as a stationary firing point,Lieutenant Novak stayed with his vehicle,while his two remaining tanks went onwith Lieutenant Kauffman and Com-pany F.

With the German burp gun resistancenow out of the way, the advance con-tinued. Lieutenant Kauffman tossed agrenade into the basement of the nexthouse as a routine precaution, with theresult that a group of Germans, whoproved to be staff members of the bat-talion charged with the defense of Vosse-nack, came out in surrender. Whenquestioned, one of the German officerspointed out the town's defensive positionson a map. There had been five thirty-

man companies in Vossenack, he said,and despite high losses another companyhad the mission of counterattacking toretake the town.

Lieutenant Kauffman shifted CompanyF's 1st Platoon, now reorganized, backinto the attack echelon and returned the2d Platoon to its original support role.Accompanied by the two tanks of Lieu-tenant Novak's tank platoon, LieutenantWine's men continued down the mainstreet, charging each building close be-hind assault fire from the tanks. TheGermans fired only a few desultory shotsin return, and by 1230 the 1st and 2dPlatoons had joined the 3d Platoon onthe final objective, the bald eastern noseof Vossenack ridge.25

Lieutenant Kauffman set up his Com-pany F command post in the last houseon the right (south) side of Vossenack'smain street. The 2d Platoon began todig in on the left next to Company G'sright flank. On the 2d's right was the1st Platoon, its depleted 1st and 2dSquads combined into one and designatedto defend a wooded draw that stretchedup toward the town from the Kall Rivervalley. The 3d Platoon dug in on the1st's right on a little exposed nose pro-jecting east between two draws. Thesection of light machine guns dug in withthe 2d Platoon on the left, the 1st(machine gun) Platoon from CompanyH with the right platoon, and the pro-visional .50-caliber machine gun platoonalone on the ridge farther to the south-west. One section of Company H 81-mm. mortars had moved up to firingpositions to the north of Vossenack assoon as Company G had reached its

25 Combat Interv 75 with Kauffman, Condon;Combat Interv 76 with Leming-Quarrie-Jenkins-Ryan; 112th Inf S-3 Jnl, 2 Nov 44.

266 THREE BATTLES

objective; after Company F completedits advance, the other sections displacedto the vicinity of the church. Throughthis day and the next, forward observersfrom the mortar platoon were with allthree rifle companies. Later, because ofenemy shelling, observers were pulledback to a central observation post in ahouse near the eastern end of the town.26

Company E Mops Up

The mission of Company E was tofollow Company F at an interval ofapproximately 300 yards to Vossenack.There it would complete the moppingup of German resistance in the town.One platoon was to move along the edgeof the woods on the south behind theright platoon of Company F in order toassist in protecting the battalion's rightflank. The 3d Tank Platoon underLieutenant Novak was to precede Com-pany E into Vossenack and assist inmopping up. One section of machineguns from Company H was also attached.

When the acting company commanderof Company E, 1st Lt. James A. Condon,saw Company F moving out at 0830 inpreparation for its attack, he began toassemble his men. Lieutenant Condonassumed that Company E was to waituntil all of Company F had gone forward,and as time passed Company F's supportplatoon still did not advance. CompanyE's premature assembly had brought themen out of their holes and buildings readyto move forward, and thus they fell easyprey to the German artillery and mortarfire which centered on the line of de-

parture. The company suffered a num-ber of casualties.27

Company E's 1st platoon, assigned theright flank security mission, preceded theforward movement of the company'smain body, following behind the rightflank platoon of Company F about 0920.(See Map VII.) The platoon leader, S.Sgt. Edward J. Beck, employed twosquads forward and one back with theassault squads in skirmish line and thesupport squad in squad column echelonedto the right rear.

Evidently not aware of the previousdecision to use the more defiladed routenorth of the Richelskaul-Vossenack roadinstead of the southern route, SergeantBeck's men had gone only about 300yards past the line of departure when twoenemy machine guns located in the edgeof the woods to the south opened fire.The Company E platoon was pinned tothe ground. Although Beck directed hismen to work forward by individual rushes,the enemy stopped even that forwardmovement by plastering mortar fire onthe exposed position. One man waskilled and several were wounded, includ-ing Sergeant Beck.

Several men, one of whom was hyster-ical and obviously suffering from shock,made their way back individually to theacting company commander in Germeterwith varying accounts of what hadhappened. Finally, as Lieutenant Con-don was starting the remainder of hiscompany toward Vossenack, an assistantsquad leader, Sgt. Henry Bart, returnedfrom the hard-pressed platoon and saidhe was now senior noncommissionedofficer in the platoon and in command.

26 Combat Interv 75 with Kauffman, Crain, Cas-carano. There is no available information on place-ment of Company F's 60-mm. mortars.

27 Combat Interv 75 with Condon, Crain, Pruden,1st Lt Clifton W. Beggs, Co E, 112th Inf; CombatInterv 76 with Leming-Quarrie-Jenkins-Ryan.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 267

When Sergeant Bart said there were onlya few of his men left, Lieutenant Condontold him to "pick up the remnants,"evacuate the wounded, and follow the tailof the company through Vossenack.Bart returned to his men, but the enemyfire blocked evacuation. Not until aboutnoon, when the 1st Battalion attackedsoutheast from Richelskaul and thusrelieved the pressure against CompanyE's 1st Platoon, did two men, SergeantBart and Pfc. Clyde Wallace, manage towork around behind the German ma-chine guns and take them from the rear.Private Wallace went back to the bat-talion command post in Germeter withtwo prisoners, and the remainder of theplatoon, reduced now to about thirteenmen, continued into Vossenack.28

While the 1st Platoon was still pinneddown in the open field, the remainder ofCompany E and its attached machinegun section continued on the mission tomop up in Vossenack. (See Map VIII.)In a column of twos on either side of themain road, the men advanced cautiously,checking all buildings and cellars andtaking occasional prisoners. Only oneman was wounded, a 2d Platoon rifle-man, hit in the arm by a shell fragment.29

Lieutenant Novak's three tanks, whichwere supposed to accompany CompanyE in the mop-up, soon outdistanced theriflemen and instead assisted Company Fin clearing the eastern portion of Vosse-nack. About 1040, shortly after Com-pany E must have first entered the out-skirts of the town, Captain West, thetank company commander, who hadmoved with Company G to the north-eastern nose of the ridge, received a radio

message asking for tank support forCompany E. On his way back via thesouthern route to help out, his commandtank hit a mine just south of the church,probably in the mine field which Lieu-tenant Leming's tanks had previouslysuspected and avoided. Captain Westdismounted and found that his battalionheadquarters tank had come up. It wasnear by performing forward observationfor the tank battalion's assault gunplatoon. West took over the headquar-ters tank to assist Company E in com-pleting its mop-up. Back on the north-eastern nose of the ridge, the tanks thathad reached the objective maneuveredaround in rear of the infantry positions.There Lieutenant Quarrie's tank threwa track, and the crew could not replaceit.3 0

About 1530 Company E finished itsattack mission in Vossenack and beganto prepare for the defense. LieutenantCondon placed his 3d Platoon on theleft (north) of town, generally along theline of houses on the northern side of thestreet, and his 2d Platoon similarly onthe right (south) side of town. Theremaining men of the 1st Platoon facedto the west in a defense within the townitself, denying the battalion rear. Lightenemy artillery fire fell as the companywas going into position, and two menwere killed, one of them Private Wallace,who had assisted Sergeant Bart in over-coming the German resistance southeastof Germeter and had returned aftertaking two prisoners to the battalionCP.31

During the afternoon a tank retrieverthat was sent into Vossenack to tow out

28 Combat Interv 75 with Condon and Col GustinM. Nelson, CO (after 7 Nov 44), 112th Inf.

29 Combat Interv 75 with Condon.

30 Combat Interv 76 with Leming-Quarrie-Jen-kins-Ryan.

31 Combat Interv 75 with Condon.

268 THREE BATTLES

Lieutenant Novak's damaged tank nearthe church was itself damaged by adirect hit from enemy artillery. Withhis own tank Lieutenant Leming triedto tow out Lieutenant Quarrie's tank,but his efforts were unsuccessful. Thetank company received permission about1600 to draw back to bivouac positionsin the western edge of Vossenack andthere went into a circle defense for thenight and effected gasoline and ammuni-tion resupply.32

The forward battalion command grouphad followed the attack closely and by1630 had established a command post ina house approximately 300 yards east ofthe church in Vossenack on the southside of the main street. The rear bat-talion command post moved up afterdark, every available man being pressedinto service to carry an extra load ofammunition for resupplying the com-panies.33

Artillery in the Vossenack Attack

The 229th Field Artillery Battalion indirect support of the 112th Infantry fireda total of 1,346 rounds from 0800 to 1200on 2 November, thus providing con-tinuous artillery support on call duringthe entire Vossenack attack. In addi-tion to the preparation fires, missionswere harassing, counterbattery, and tar-gets of opportunity. Company B, 86thChemical Battalion, fired 274 high ex-plosive and 225 white phosphorous roundswith its 4.2 mortars, and at various timesduring the day Vossenack was reportedburning and covered with a haze ofsmoke. Company D, 86th Chemical

Battalion, did not fire, having pulled outof firing position to be prepared to followthe 1st and 3d Battalions, 112th Infantry,to Schmidt.34

The 1st Battalion Attacks at H Plus 3 Hours

When the 28th Division moved intothe Vossenack-Schmidt area, the 1stBattalion, 112th Infantry, had initiallybeen in regimental reserve, but on 1November Company A had relievedelements of the 110th Infantry in defenseof the junction of the Richelskaul-Rollesbroich road with the Simonskallroad to the south. The rest of the bat-talion had remained in an assembly areaa few hundred yards west of Richelskaul.(See Map VII.)

The 112th Infantry's attack plan for 2November designated the 1st and 3dBattalions to attack cross country at Hplus 3 hours (1200) in a column ofbattalions, the 1st leading. They wereto move generally through the woodedpart of the southern slope of Vossenackridge, cross the Kall River, and seizeKommerscheidt. The 3d Battalion wasthen to take Schmidt, and both were toto be prepared to continue the attacktoward the southwest and Steckenborn.This was the division's main effort.35

The 1st Battalion, under the commandof Maj. Robert T. Hazlett, was to leadthe attack in a column of companies,Company B leading and passing through

32 Combat Interv 76 with Leming-Quarrie-Jen-kins-Ryan.

33 Combat Interv 75 with Nesbitt.

34 28th Div Arty Jnl, 2 Nov 44; 28th Div G-3 Jnl,2 Nov 44; Hq and Hq Co, 28th Div Arty, AAR,Nov 44; 86th Cml Bn AAR, Nov 44.

35 Combat Interv 75 with the following: Dana;S Sgt Nathanuel M. Quinton, 1st Sgt Harvey B.Hausman, T Sgt George A. Lockwood, S Sgt StephenJ. Kertes, and Sgt Travis C. Norton. Last five ofCo A, 112th Inf. See also 112th Inf Atk Overlay,31 Oct 44.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 269

Company A's Richelskaul defenses.Company C was to follow Company Bon order, and, after Company C hadpassed through, Company A was then toleave its defenses to follow. Attached toCompany B for spearheading the attackwas the 1st (machine gun) Platoon ofCompany D. The 2d (machine gun)Platoon was to support the attack byfiring up the wooded draw to the eastfrom positions with Company A atRichelskaul. The 81-mm. mortars wereto support on call from a position in adraw in the woods 900 yards behind theline of departure.36

No preparatory artillery barrage pre-ceded the men of Company B as theypassed through the Richelskaul defensesshortly after noon in a column of pla-toons—1st, 3d, 2d, Weapons. The firstphase line had been designated as agenerally north-south trail, some 400yards east of Richelskaul, which ambledsouth from Vossenack's western outskirtsto a juncture in the southern woods withthe road to Simonskall. As the 1stPlatoon advanced toward that trail, itwas fired upon from woods in the vicinityof the trail and pinned to the ground byintense enemy fire from small arms andentrenched automatic weapons. The 1stPlatoon leader, 1st Lt. Ralph Spalin,acting as point for his platoon, wasinstantly killed.

Capt. Clifford T. Hackard, the Com-pany B commander, committed his 3dPlatoon to assist the 1st, but in the at-tempted advance the 3d Platoon leader,2d Lt. Gerald M. Burril, was hit by the

enemy fire. Despite a broken leg, Lieu-tenant Burril dragged himself into a holefrom which he directed mortar fire withhis SCR 536. He was not evacuateduntil after dark when one of the men ofhis platoon and an aid man brought himout on a litter. Either the loss of itsplatoon leader or the enemy small armsfire, or both, kept the 3d Platoon fromadvancing farther.

About one and one-half hours after thejump-off, Captain Hackard committedhis 2d Platoon to the action. One squadfrom the 2d Platoon managed to work itsway far enough forward to cross the trail;there it too was stopped by the intensesmall arms fire. Despite heavy support-ing fire from Company D's 81-mm.mortars, the attack was stalemated. At1510 one concentration of twenty-fourrounds was fired by the 229th FieldArtillery Battalion at enemy machineguns along the trail just south of Com-pany B's attack route. This was seen bya forward observer and reported as"excellent," but no further mission wasrecorded as having been fired in this areaduring the day. Company B still couldnot advance.37

The 1st Battalion commander, MajorHazlett, went to the regimental commandpost about 1500 and talked with ColonelPeterson, the regimental commander.On his return, Major Hazlett announcedthat most of the gain of the day would beheld. Because of plans he had received

36 Combat Interv 75 with the following: S SgtEugene Holden, 2d Bn Hq Co, 112th Inf; S SgtJoseph R. Perll, Co C, 112th Inf; Capt RichardGooley, S-1, 1st Bn, 112th Inf; 1st Lt Jack E. Kellyand Sgt Thomas G. Hunter. Last two from Co D,112th Inf.

37 Combat Interv 75 with S Sgt Roy W. Littlehalesand Pfc Clarence J. Skain. Both of Co B, 112th Inf.See also Combat Interv 75 with Holden, Kelly-Hunter; 28th Div Arty Jnl, 2 Nov 44. The combatinterviews do not specifically state the commitmentof the 2d Platoon, although they do state that onesquad of this platoon worked its way across the trail.No mention is made of the use of Company B'sattached heavy machine gun platoon from Com-pany D.

271

for the next day, however, he did notwant to leave Company B "stuck so farout front."38 When Captain Hackardmade his way back about dusk, MajorHazlett told him to pull back his advanceelements (evidently the 2d Platoon) tothe remainder of the company, whichnow was in a small patch of woods about200 to 250 yards in front of the line ofdeparture, and to dig in there for thenight. This move was accomplishedafter nightfall.39

Thus, the 28th Division's main efforthad been halted after its one attackingcompany had hit stiff German resistance.Except for one mission, artillery supporthad not been utilized, and neither theother two rifle companies of the 1st Bat-talion nor any part of the 3d Battalionhad been committed. The battalion andregimental commanders apparently de-cided that, in view of the stiff oppositionencountered by Company B and thecomparative ease with which the 2dBattalion had taken Vossenack, theattack should be shifted to pass throughVossenack and avoid the resistance facingRichelskaul. At any rate, those werethe plans for the next day.40

109th and 110th Infantry Regiments Attack

To the north of the 112th Infantry'sdivisional main effort, the 109th Infantryhad jumped off at H Hour in its attackto protect the division's left flank andsecure a line of departure overlookingHuertgen. (Map 20) By 1400 the 1st

38 Combat Interv 75 with Holden.39 Ibid.40 112th Inf S-3 Jnl, 2 Nov 44. There is little

mention of this attack in either combat interviews orunit journals, and some combat interviews indicatethat some men even thought it was a "limited ob-

272 THREE BATTLES

Battalion, on the left, had two companieson its objective, the woods line west ofthe Germeter-Huertgen road. The 3dBattalion had attacked generally up theHuertgen road and committed all threerifle companies. They gained only about300 to 500 yards before being stopped bya wide enemy mine field. After twocompanies of the regiment's 2d Battalionhad moved up to a close reserve positiona few hundred yards behind the 1st Bat-talion, ostensibly to cover a gap betweenthe 1st and 3d Battalions, the regimentbuttoned up for the night.41

The 110th Infantry in the woods to thesouth had attacked at 1200, its 3d Bat-talion moving generally southeast in thecross-country direction of Simonskall andits 2d Battalion aiming for eight or tenpillboxes astride the main road southtoward Rollesbroich. These pillbox de-fenses later became known as the Raffels-brand strong point. Both battalionswere stopped after almost no gain bydetermined resistance and heavily forti-fied pillboxes. The 1st Battalion, 110thInfantry, was the division's infantry re-serve and was not committed. Thell0th's attack to reach the Strauch-Schmidt road and thus open the way forthe latter phase of the Schmidt operation

(the capture of the Strauch-Steckenbornarea) had made virtually no progress.42

Air Support

A vital mission in the Schmidt opera-tion, that of isolating the Vossenack-Schmidt battlefield from large-scale inter-vention of enemy armor, had beenassigned to the aircraft of the IX TacticalAir Command. Although the IX TACwas to continue its usual large-scaleoffensive against enemy transportationand communications, its main singleeffort was to be support of the 28thDivision. The air plan involved use offive fighter bomber groups—the 365th,366th, and 368th (P-47's), and 370th and474th (P-38's)—and the 422d NightFighter Group (P-61's).

On the first day of the 28th Divisionattack, a third of the IX TAC aircraftwere to perform armed reconnaissanceon all roads leading out of Schmidt to alimit of 25 miles, and another third wereto attack special targets and drop leafletbombs in support of the division. Butweather conditions prevented the firstplanes from taking off from their base atVerviers, Belgium, until 1234. Two offive group missions were canceled andtwo others were vectored far afield insearch of targets of opportunity. Onemission did succeed: twelve P-38's of the474th Fighter Bomber Group attackedBergstein at 1445 and continued on tohit barges on the Roer River, a Roerbridge at Heimbach, and two factorieseast of Nideggen. The 28th Division aircontrol officer reported that one squadronmistakenly bombed an American artillery

jective" attack. General Cota knows of no reasonwhy this attack was not pushed with more vigor; itwas not his intention that it be abandoned. SeeInterv with Cota. According to Colonel Peterson,it was not to be a major attack. See Interv withPeterson. The applicable FO is missing (see n. 11above), but the attack overlays agree with the versionas herein presented and are substantiated by Ltr,Brig Gen George A. Davis (formerly asst div comdr,28th Div) to Hist Div, 27 Dec 49, which says, "Thiswas definitely the main effort and it was not to passthrough Vossenack."

41 Combat Interv 77 with 109th Inf personnel;109th Inf S-2 and S-3 Jnls, 2 Nov 44; 28th Div G-3Jnl, 2 Nov 44.

42 Combat Interv 77 with 110th Inf personnel andNotes on Opns of the 110th Inf; 110th Inf, S-2 andS-3 Jnls, 2 Nov 44; 28th Div G-3 Jnl, 2 Nov 44.

OBJECTIVE: PILLBOXES. Troops of the 110th Infantry, on 2 November, movingthrough the woods (above). One of the heavily fortified pillboxes near Rollesbroich (below).

274 THREE BATTLES

position near Roetgen and caused twenty-four American casualties (including sevenkilled) before attacking Schmidt.43

The Enemy Situation

On 2 November staff officers of ArmyGroup B, the Fifth Panzer and SeventhArmies, and several corps and divisions,including the 116th Panzer Division, weremeeting with Generalfeldmarschall Wal-ter Model, Army Group B commander, atSchlenderhan Castle, near Quadrath,west of Cologne, for a map study. Thesubject of the study was a theoreticalAmerican attack along the boundary ofthe two armies in the Huertgen area.Not long after the meeting began, atelephone call from the chief of staff ofthe LXXIV Corps told of actual Americanattacks north of Germeter and in thedirection of Vossenack. The messagesaid the situation was critical and askedfor reserve troops from Seventh Army be-cause LXXIV Corps did not have the menavailable to close the gaps already openedup by the American attacks. FieldMarshal Model directed the LXXIVCorps commander to return to his com-mand and ordered the other officers tocontinue the map study with the actualsituation as subject.

As the map study continued, reportsof the 28th Division's attack continuedto come in, and it was decided to commitimmediately a Kampfgruppe of the 116thPanzer Division to assist local reserves ina counterattack against the 109th Infan-

try's penetration north of Germeter.The remainder of the 116th Panzer Divisionwas to follow later from its rest area nearMuenchen-Gladbach. The chance pres-ence of the various major commandersat the map conference facilitated prepara-tions for this counterattack. It wasdesigned to hit at dawn on 3 Novemberto eliminate the 109th Infantry's northernpenetration and to push farther south soas to cut off the Vossenack penetrationof the 112th Infantry. This was virtuallythe same type of counterattack whichhad threatened the 9th Infantry Divisionwhen it had held this area.44

Summary for 2 November andNight of 2-3 November

Beginning with a heavy artillery bar-rage at 0800 on 2 November, the 28thDivision attack on Schmidt had metvarying degrees of success. The 2dBattalion, 112th Infantry, had made oneof the more notable advances of the dayin seizing Vossenack and the Vossenackridge. Although the 1st Battalion, 112thInfantry, had attempted an attack south-east from Richelskaul toward Kom-merscheidt and Schmidt, its one com-mitted company had been held up bysmall arms fire and the attack not pur-sued, although the remainder of thatbattalion, plus the entire 3d Battalionand a company of medium tanks, hadbeen available. During the night planswere issued for a new attack the nextmorning to take the same objectives viaa different route.

To the north one battalion of the 109th43 FUSA and IX TAC Sum of Air Opns, 2 Nov

44, in Unit History, IX Fighter Command and IXTAC, 1-30 Nov 44 (hereafter cited as FUSA and IXTAC Sum); V Corps Study, G-3 Air Sec; CombatInterv 74 with Maj Edwin M. Howison, Air Ln Offfrom IX TAC to 28th Div; 28th Div G -3 Air Jnl,Nov 44.

44 MSS # A-891 and A-892 (Gersdorff); MS# A-905 (Waldenburg); ETHINT 53 (Gersdorff);Noon Sit Rpt, 3 Nov 44, found in OB WEST KTBAnlagen 1.-10.XI.44.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 275

Infantry had reached the woods lineoverlooking Huertgen, while another hadbeen held up by a previously unlocatedmine field. To the south the 110th In-fantry in a two-battalion attack hadgained nothing except comparativelyheavy casualties and the knowledge thatits opposition was much stiffer than hadbeen expected.

Although artillery support had beenexcellent, except in the attack of the 1stBattalion, 112th Infantry, where it wasnot requested, air support had beennegligible. Attached engineers had con-cerned themselves primarily with main-tenance of roads in rear areas, althoughCompany C, 103d Engineers, had clearedmines east of Germeter and had goneinto Vossenack after dark for roadclearance.

After dark all three regiments buttonedup for the night, evidently confining

themselves to resupply, for there was norecord of any patrolling. Meanwhile,the Germans, their defense facilitated bya chance map conference at Army Group Bheadquarters, were planning a dawncounterattack to eliminate both the 109thand 112th Infantry penetrations.

The 28th Division's main effort forKommerscheidt and Schmidt had on 2November been pushed with a surprisinglack of vigor, presumably because adecision was made somewhere in com-mand channels that the original attackplan would not be followed. Althoughthis decision was probably based onsuccess in Vossenack as compared withstiff opposition on the original route ofadvance, it had nevertheless set backconsiderably the hour by which Schmidtmight be taken. But on 3 November the112th Infantry would make anotherattempt to capture the objective.

CHAPTER II

The Main Effort Continues(3 November)

After the 112th Infantry's 2 Novemberattack through the draws south of Vosse-nack was abandoned, in its stead wassubstituted an advance in a column ofbattalions through Vossenack, thence tothe southeast into the Kall River gorge,up the slope to Kommerscheidt, and onto Schmidt. (Map 21) The 3d Bat-talion was to lead, the 1st to follow onorder, and the 2d to continue to hold inVossenack. With the Germeter-Richel-skaul road as a line of departure, theattack was to be launched at 0700 on 3November.

Company K, with one heavy machinegun section from Company M's 2dPlatoon attached and supported by the3d Tank Platoon of Company A, 707thTank Battalion, was ordered to spearheadthe 3d Battalion's advance. Echeloned300-400 yards to the left rear of CompanyK was to be Company L, with the othersection of Company M's 2d (machinegun) Platoon attached and the 2d TankPlatoon, Company A, 707th, in support.Company I was then to follow CompanyL, and the 1st Tank Platoon, CompanyA, 707th, was to be in mobile reserve.After the advance units had clearedVossenack, the 81-mm. mortars were togo into position in a small draw north ofVossenack, while the 1st (machine gun)Platoon of Company M was to fire fromthe southeastern nose of Vossenack ridge

to support the movement across theriver valley and up the Kommer-scheidt-Schmidt ridge line. The so-called"Greene Hornets," a special patrol groupof eleven men under 1st Lt. Jack B.Greene, assistant S-2 of the 3d Battalion,was to patrol the woods to the north be-tween Wittscheidt and Vossenack toprovide flank protection. From its posi-tions just east of Richelskaul where ithad made its short-lived attack the daybefore, Company B was to provide ademonstration by fire at H Hour andwould not accompany the 1st Battalionwhen it followed the 3d.1

The day of attack brought again thetype of weather that characterized almostall the Schmidt operation: cold, but notquite freezing, with a heavy mist hangingabout the wooded draws. The mist,threatening to turn at any moment todrizzling rain, made visibility poor andemployment of aircraft doubtful. Amorass of mud blanketed the area, miringvehicles on rear supply routes and stickingto the boots of the infantry.2

1 112th Inf FO 31 and Atk Overlay, 2 Nov 44,supported by subsequent entries in 112th Inf S-2and S-3 Jnls, 3 Nov 44, and 28th Div G-3 Jnl, 3 Nov44; Combat Interv 75 with Dana, Greene, and CaptGuy T. Piercey, CO, Co M, 112th Inf; CombatInterv 76 with the following: Capt Bruce M. Hostrup,1st Lt Raymond E. Fleig, and 2d Lt Richard H.Payne. All from Co A, 707th Tk Bn. See also VCorps Study, G-3 Sec; 112th Inf Sit Rpt, 3 Nov 44.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 277

Since Vossenack, the first objective forthe new attack, was already held by the2d Battalion, there was no artillery prep-aration before the attack except for con-tinuation of normal harassing missions.Unheralded by the big guns, the riflemencrossed the Germeter line of departureand shifted into the accustomed five-yardinterval between men. The movementwas uneventful until about 0730 whenthe formation halted at the church inVossenack to begin reorganization andadjustment to a new line of departure,the main street of Vossenack. As thedirection of the move was shifted fromeast to southeast, a brief but intenseenemy artillery concentration struck thebattalion. The troops took cover innear-by buildings and, except for oneman wounded in Company L, escapedcasualties.3

While the infantry reorganized, thesupporting tanks of Company A, 707thTank Battalion, were scheduled to pullahead to the nose of the high groundsoutheast of Vossenack and fire theirmachine guns at the woods line to thesoutheast in order to neutralize any enemyopposition which might be present. The3d Tank Platoon accomplished its missionwithout difficulty. The 2d Tank Platoonmoved farther east than had beenplanned, and the lead command tank of2d Lt. John J. Clarke struck a mine 300yards east of the church and was im-mobilized. The other tanks in theplatoon pulled back, turned to the south,

and joined in spraying the woods linewith fire as the infantry pushed forward.4

The Spearhead Advance of Company K

Company K moved out across the openspace to the south of Vossenack, its leftflank guiding on the Vossenack-Kom-merscheidt trail. Shells from light enemymortars fell with muffled explosions inthe muddy ground, but there was noartillery fire. The men moved rapidly,and by 0845 the lead elements had en-tered the woods, their presence maskingthe fire of the supporting tanks. Accord-ing to plan, the tankers raised their fire,using their hull guns as direct fire artil-lery against Kommerscheidt beyond thewooded Kall River gorge.

Descending the steep wooded slopetoward the Kall River, the men of Com-pany K were hit by enemy artillery fire.Tree bursts among the tall firs heightenedthe effectiveness of the shelling. Oneman was wounded and three were killed.Occasional sniper fire also began toharass them, and a man laying telephonewire was wounded in the leg and a staffsergeant killed.

At the Kall River the scouts came uponten Germans and opened fire, killing one.The other nine surrendered. The enemyoffered no other ground opposition, andthe men of Company K, surprised withthe ease of their attack thus far, wadedout into the chilling water of the Kall tocontinue their advance. They fordedthe river at a point just south of a mill,Mestrenger Muehle, shortly after 0900.

The Germans continued to shell thewooded valley with sporadic eruptionsof artillery that failed to halt Company

2 112th Inf S-3 Jnl, 3 Nov 44; V Corps Study, G-3Sec; Ltr, Col Edmund K. Daley (formerly Comdr,1171st Engr (C) Gp) to Hist Div, 20 Sep 48.

3 112th Inf S-3 Jnl, 3 Nov 44; Combat Interv 76with Hostrup-Fleig-Payne; Combat Interv 75 withCapt Jack W. Walker, CO, Co L, 112th Inf, and 1stSgt Robert C. Toner, Co I, 112th Inf. 4 Combat Interv 76 with Hostrup-Fleig-Payne.

279

K's advance up the steep slope east ofthe river. When the men reached theedge of the woods slightly southwest ofKommerscheidt, they saw the little townclearly. Shells from the supporting tanksnear Vossenack were falling among thescattered buildings. A small group ofGermans fired desultorily from the openfield between the woods line and thetown. Company K returned the fire,and eight Germans came forward tosurrender. As the Germans moved in,Company K's scouts deployed across theopen and into the village to reconnoiter,the supporting tank fire lifting as thetankers spotted the scouts moving acrossthe field. The scouts signaled all clear,and Company K moved into the firstobjective, a drab little community ofscattered houses. It had captured theinitial objective, against virtually noopposition, by 1300.

Schmidt, the final objective, wasclearly visible from Kommerscheidt. Itwas perched on the sloping eastern por-tion of the Kommerscheidt-Schmidt ridgeline (the highest portion of the ridge wassouthwest of Schmidt). Woods on allsides fringed the ridge, and between thetwo towns there were several pillboxesalong a dirt road. A group of Germansran from a pillbox on the right that wasmarked by the wreckage of an Americanairplane which had crashed almost ontop of it. Opening fire, the Americansdrove some of the Germans back into thepillbox and others into a wooded drawto the west.

The Company K commander, Capt.Eugene W. O'Malley, had begun toreorganize his men to continue intoSchmidt when the enemy fired a shortbut violent artillery concentration intoKommerscheidt, holding up the advance

280 THREE BATTLES

HUERTGEN FOREST. Enemy artillery fire falling over the heavily wooded slopescaused many casualties from tree bursts.

momentarily. As soon as the fire lifted,the company headed down the main roadtoward Schmidt, only occasional shotsfrom enemy rifles contesting the advance.A base of fire from the attached machinegun platoon and flanking fire from agroup of riflemen disposed of the Ger-mans who remained in the pillbox markedby the crashed airplane. At the outskirtsof Schmidt Captain O'Malley split hiscompany, one group continuing throughthe town's center and the other going toa small sector of the town on the south-west along the Schmidt-Strauch road.

They found the enemy in Schmidt, butlittle resistance. The attack was evi-dently a complete surprise to the Ger-

mans. Some were captured in thehouses where they were eating or hadjust eaten, and some were reported drunk.Others were caught as they rode bicyclesor motorcycles into the town, and stillothers were taken as they strolled alongthe main road into town from the westwithout any apparent thought of dan-ger.

In slightly more than seven and one-half hours—the time now: 1430—Com-pany K had advanced to Schmidt, thedivision objective. In neither Kom-merscheidt nor Schmidt had there beenappreciable German resistance, althoughG-2 sources determined later that a bat-talion of the 275th Division with a strength

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 281

of 8 officers and 276 men had beencharged with the defense.5

Company L Also Advances

At the start of the move from Vossenackto Schmidt, Company L was echelonedto the left rear, its 2d and 3d Platoonsforward. As Company K entered theKall woods, Company L was still in theopen between the town and the woodsand received heavy mortar concentra-tions, probably because Company K'smovement had alerted the enemy. Onceinside the woods the men could hearartillery fire falling near by but could notsee it, and their movement was unim-peded except by the steepness of the slopeand the wooded terrain.

The 3d Platoon on the right guidedalong the main Vossenack-Kommer-scheidt trail and neared the river. Spot-ting a lone German near a bridge acrossthe stream, one of the scouts shot him,and the platoon joined the remainder ofthe company in fording the river 300yards north of the bridge, finding theriver narrow and shallow with slopingbanks and a rock bottom. The com-pany's advance was keeping pace withCompany K, which at about the sametime, 0900, was fording the stream to thesouth near the Mestrenger Muehle.

Company L, with two platoons for-ward, continued up a steep slope beyondthe river, keeping inside the woods inorder to skirt the open fields to the northof Kommerscheidt and come upon thetown unobserved from the east. One

stray enemy soldier was taken prisoner,and later, about noon, some of the menreported they saw Germans in the housesof Froitscheidt, a small settlement acrossa shallow wooded draw to the east. Thecompany halted almost abreast of thissettlement, set up two heavy machineguns, and fired on one of the houses.Nothing happened; so the company com-mander, Capt. Jack W. Walker, sent apatrol to the buildings only to find thesettlement unoccupied.

The Americans continued and by 1400had reached their assault position in theedge of the woods east of Kommerscheidt.When Captain Walker checked in withhis battalion headquarters, he learnedthat Company K had already takenKommerscheidt and that Company Lwas to move on immediately to assist intaking Schmidt.6

Walker shifted his unit's attack forma-tion to put the 1st and 2d Platoons for-ward and the 3d in support, and Com-pany L moved south again towardSchmidt, staying within the woods lineeast of the Kommerscheidt-Schmidtclearing. It met no opposition. TwoGerman troop shelters with smoke com-ing from them lay on the route ofadvance, but they housed no enemyexcept for one wounded German whomthe men deemed beyond assistance.

It was now well after 1500, and anothermessage from battalion said Company Kwas already in Schmidt and directedCompany L to move ahead quickly.The men pushed on and entered Schmidtat the junction of the Bergstein andHarscheidt roads on the east, taking ap-proximately thirty prisoners from thefirst houses. Darkness, which came early

5 Combat Interv 75 with Dana, Walker, and 2dLt Richard Tyo, Co K, 112th Inf; Combat Interv76 with Hostrup-Fleig-Payne; 112th Inf S-3 Jnl,3 Nov 44; V Corps Study, G-3 Sec; V Corps AAR,Nov 44. 6 Combat Interv 75 with Walker.

282 THREE BATTLES

in the forests during the misty winterdays, began to increase, joining withharassing sniper fire to hamper thecompany in its mop-up of the town.Finally, complete darkness and a bat-talion order to shift to the defense haltedthe mop-up. Sniper and machine gunfire still came from a group of buildingsat the extreme southeast of town alongthe Hasenfeld road.7

Company I Follows in Reserve

The 3d Battalion's reserve company,Company I, minus its 1st Platoon, whichwas on security guard at division head-quarters, was still in Vossenack when themortar concentrations in the open areabetween the town and the Kall woodshit the two leading companies. AsCompany I started to follow the advance,mortar fire fell on its column as well,causing the company's 60-mm. mortarsection at the rear of the column to losecontact. The rest of the company en-tered the woods before the section leadercould re-establish contact. Since mortarfire continued on the open ridge andsince he had no knowledge of his com-pany's assigned location beyond the Kall,the section leader kept his group inVossenack and attached it to CompanyH. The main body of Company I hadno difficulty in the advance after enteringthe Kall woods and closed into Schmidtshortly after 1600.8

Company M Moves to Schmidt

When the Company M commander,Capt. Guy T. Piercey, received word that

Company K had captured Kommer-scheidt, he directed his 81-mm. mortarsin Vossenack and his machine gunplatoon on the Vossenack ridge to moveup quickly in order to provide close-infire support for the subsequent attack onSchmidt. Company K's later advanceinto Schmidt was so rapid, however, thatthere was no reason for the weapons mento halt in Kommerscheidt, and theymoved directly into Schmidt. It waswell after dark when they arrived.9

3d Battalion Medics

At the start of the attack on Schmidtthe 3d Battalion medical aid station waslocated in the woods west of Germeter.After the battalion reached Vossenackin early morning, 2d Lt. Alfred J. Muglia,Medical Administrative Corps, estab-lished a forward collecting point in theVossenack church. He used two jeepsand an M-29 weasel to transport patientsback to the rear aid station west ofGermeter. That afternoon, when the 3dBattalion had reached Schmidt, Lieu-tenant Muglia and several enlisted medicsmoved forward in a weasel to reconnoiterfor another aid station site. On thenarrow and slippery Vossenack-Kom-merscheidt route through the Kall woodsthe weasel threw its tracks and had to beabandoned, blocking the trail. Lieu-tenant Muglia returned to Vossenack,secured a litter squad and a jeep, anddrove back for several patients, possiblywounded men of Company K, who hadbeen attracted to the weasel's Red Crossflag. He evacuated all of them and,since it was almost dark, instructed the7 Company L story is from the following: Combat

Interv 75 with Walker, Piercey, and S Sgt FrankRipperdam, Co L, 112th Inf; 112th Inf S-3 Jnl,3 Nov 44.

8 Combat Interv 75 with Toner.

9 Combat Interv 75 with Piercey; Interv with CaptWayne E. Barnett (formerly 81-mm. mortar sec ldr,Co M, 112th Inf), in Kane, Pa., 22 Sep 48.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 283

litter squad to dig in for the night alongthe edge of the woods. Then he returnedto Vossenack and assisted evacuationthere during the night.10

The Greene Hornets

The special patrol group of twelvevolunteers, nicknamed the "Greene Hor-nets," served in effect as an intelligenceand reconnaissance platoon at the dis-posal of the 3d Battalion commander.Led by Lieutenant Greene the groupmoved out early in the morning on itsmission of patrolling the woods north ofVossenack just as the 3d Battalion wasleaving Germeter. Lieutenant Greeneand his men traveled north to Witt-scheidt, crossed the Huertgen road, andentered the woods to the east. Theyfound an abandoned German antitankgun and later came unexpectedly uponan enemy outpost defended by twomachine guns and a burp gun. So closedid the patrol come before either groupdiscovered the other's presence that theresulting fire fight became a hand gre-nade duel. The Americans quickly de-molished the outpost, killing one German,severely wounding another, and puttingthe rest to flight. Greene's men sufferedno casualties.

After investigating a draw in thewoods, the patrol moved back into theopen and into Vossenack. LieutenantGreene decided against carrying out asecondary mission of reconnoitering tothe southeast for an alternate supplyroute across the Kall River because ofheavy enemy shelling in the area. For

the same reason he made no effort torejoin his battalion across the river inSchmidt.11

The 1st Battalion Follows the 3d

The 1st Battalion, minus Company B,moved out of Germeter about noon onits way to Vossenack. Company B,after completing its demonstration eastof Richelskaul, had withdrawn intoCompany A's former positions aroundthe Richelskaul road junction. The restof the battalion, in the order A, BattalionHeadquarters, C, and D, reached Vosse-nack by 1330. There it changed direc-tion at the church and moved out acrossthe open space toward the Kall woods.Enemy artillery fire hit the column whileit was in the open and killed a CompanyD messenger. In the woods sporadic en-emy shelling continued, severely wound-ing a sergeant of Company A andkilling a mortar section runner.

Probably because the river was to beused as a reorganization phase line,Company A halted just north of thebridge site and began to dig in to protectitself against enemy artillery fire. Uponreaching the river farther to the south,Company C too began to dig in. Whenorders were soon given to continue, Com-pany C shifted to the lead in the columnof companies and advanced across thebridge and up a winding trail towardKommerscheidt. Darkness was rapidlyapproaching. At the woods line over-looking the open fields leading intoKommerscheidt, Company C halted andagain began to dig in, and Company Aand the remainder of the column passedthrough and into Kommerscheidt.

10 2d Lt Alfred J. Muglia, MAC, Rpt of Evacua-tion to 28th Div Surgeon, 11 Nov 44, in CombatInterv File 76 (hereafter cited as Muglia Rpt). 11 Combat Interv 75 with Greene.

284 THREE BATTLES

At 1614 the 28th Division chief of staffsent a message to Colonel Peterson, the112th Infantry commander, instructinghim to send his 1st Battalion to Schmidtto assist the 3d. These instructions ac-corded with the regiment's original attackplan. Regiment must have changedplans, however, for the 1st Battalionmade no effort to continue past Kom-merscheidt. The battalion, minus Com-pany B back at Richelskaul and CompanyC at the northern woods line overlookingKommerscheidt, closed into the townabout 2100. Division must have con-curred in the change, for at 2255 ColonelPeterson reported to it that he had abattalion in Schmidt and a battalion inKommerscheidt, and division issued nofurther recorded instructions. A divisionletter of instructions for 4 November(evidently prepared during the night of3 November) instructed the 1st Battalionto continue to hold in Kommerscheidt.12

The night was black, and the enemyharassed the defensive preparations inKommerscheidt with fire from heavymortars. The Company A commander,whose men composed the bulk of thetown's defenders, deployed his platoonsas best he could in the darkness, the 1stPlatoon defending to the east, the 2d

Platoon to the south, and the 3d Platoonto the southwest. A gap of severalhundred yards between the 2d and 3dPlatoons was partially closed with a thincover of personnel from the battalionAmmunition and Pioneer Platoon, andCompany A's light machine guns wentinto position with the 2d Platoon to coverthe main road to Schmidt.

Company D's machine gunners andmortar men had found the going slowand arduous in the darkness and over therugged terrain on the slopes of the riverdraw. Arriving in Kommerscheidt al-most an hour behind Company A, themen set up their defenses as best theycould. The blackness of the night addedto the normal confusion of moving intostrange territory. The move was finallycompleted, one section of machine gunsgoing to the left flank (east) and one tothe right (west), and the 81-mm. mortarsgoing into position in the rear (north)of the town. The other machine gunplatoon had been left with Company Bat Richelskaul.

The 1st Battalion command group,including the battalion commander,Major Hazlett, was established in a small,partially covered, trench-type dugout, inan orchard near a road junction on thenorthern edge of the town. Thus the 1stBattalion prepared for the night, itsCompany B still defending far back atthe line of departure at Richelskaul, itsCompany C in a support position at thenorthern Kommerscheidt woods line,and Companies A and D (minus onemachine gun platoon) in Kommerscheidtitself.13

12 Combat Interv 75 with Perll and Quinton-Hausman-Lockwood-Kertes-Norton; 28th Div G-3Jnl, 3 Nov 44. Colonel Peterson has notes from a3 November conference saying only, "3d Bn to besupported by 1st." He says it was his plan to sendthe 1st Battalion behind the 3d by bounds, and hedoes not recall that he ever planned to send the 1stBattalion to Schmidt, because he wanted to providea defense in depth in deference to the regiment'sexposed salient into enemy territory. He does notbelieve the battalion would have stopped if it had nothad orders to do so, for "Major Hazlett [the 1stBattalion commanding officer] was a man who hadthe courage to do what he was told to do." SeeInterv with Peterson.

13 Combat Interv 75 with Perll, Holden, Kelly-Hunter, Quinton-Hausman-Lockwood-Kertes-Nor-ton, and Sgt Tony Kudiak, A and P Plat, 1st BnHq Co, 112th Inf; 112th Inf S-3 Jnl, 3 Nov 44.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 285

1st Battalion Medics

The 1st Battalion medical personnelfollowed the battalion's initial advancefrom Germeter to Vossenack and thereset up a forward aid station. Within anhour, the medics were ordered to followthe battalion in a continuation of theadvance. Knowing neither the proposedroute nor the destination, Capt. PaschalA. Linguiti, the battalion surgeon, andhis Medical Administrative Corps assist-ant, 2d Lt. Henry W. Morrison, joinedthe rear of the battalion column withtheir medical personnel and a weaselcarrying aid station equipment. The ad-vance proved to be cross-country towardKommerscheidt, and they were forcedto abandon the weasel as they enteredthe Kall woods, five of the medics trans-ferring the equipment to their own backs.They reached Kommerscheidt about2200 and selected for their aid station thecellar of a house on the northern edge oftown.14

Artillery Support

Requests for supporting artillery mis-sions were few on 3 November, probablybecause the 3d and 1st Battalions ad-vanced with comparative ease. The229th Field Artillery Battalion in directsupport did fire 132 missions, most ofthem harassing. At 1340 Battery C,229th, displaced forward farther east inthe woods west of Germeter. Although

it was planned to displace the other twofiring batteries, later developments show-ed that proper support could be givenfrom the original locations.15 CompanyB, 86th Chemical Battalion, in directsupport of the 112th Infantry, fired onlyseventy-one high explosive and sixty-three white phosphorous rounds duringthe day, while Company C, in generalsupport of the entire division, smoked theopen ridges around Strauch and Stecken-born to the southwest of Schmidt.Company D was scheduled to follow the3d Battalion, 112th Infantry, in its earlymorning attack, but in the open betweenGermeter and Vossenack the mortar menwere pinned down by enemy machinegun, mortar, and small arms fire fromthe woods north of Vossenack. Withtank support, the company was finallyable to move into firing positions nearBosselbach Farm. There the enemy firecontinued, and the chemical mortar menwere forced to defend their position withrifles and bazookas throughout thenight.16

Vossenack

While the 3d and 1st Battalions ad-vanced to Schmidt and Kommerscheidt,the 2d Battalion, bothered but little byenemy artillery the first night in itsVossenack ridge positions, retained itsdefensive role. The men noted an in-crease in enemy shelling on 3 November,and those on the forward slopes of theexposed ridge discovered they could notmove from their holes in daylight withoutdrawing the fury of enemy artillery andmortars. The ridge became more and

14 Capt Michael DeMarco and Capt Paschal A.Linguiti, Report on Evacuation of Wounded fromVossenack, Kommerscheidt and Schmidt, 2-11 Nov44, to 112th Inf surgeon, 11 Nov 44, in CombatInterv File 76 (hereafter cited as DeMarco-LinguitiRpt); Capt Linguiti, Report on Misuse of Aid StationSite, to 112th Inf surgeon, 16 Nov 44, in CombatInterv File 76 (hereafter cited as Linguiti Rpt).

15 28th Div Arty Jnl, 3 Nov 44; V Corps Study,Arty Sec.

16 86th Cml Bn AAR, Nov 44.

286 THREE BATTLES

more pock-marked with the eruption ofshells, many of them from self-propelledguns on the Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge,and the building housing the battalioncommand post was hit several times.The supporting tanks of Captain West'sCompany C, 707th Tank Battalion, re-mained inside the town, seeking coveralongside the battered buildings. Com-munications to the rear were difficult,heavy shelling cutting telephone wiresalmost as soon as they were put in. Nightbrought intermittent relief from the shell-ing and became a period of almost franticresupply.17 Sometime during the daythe 2d Battalion was ordered by regimentto send one platoon east into the Kallgorge to secure the north-south river roadnorth of the Kall trail, but for someunexplained reason the mission was notcarried out.18

The Engineers and the Kall Trail

In close support of the 112th Infantry'sSchmidt attack was the 20th EngineerCombat Battalion of the 1171st EngineerCombat Group. The battalion's missionwas the development and maintenanceof a main supply route from Germeterthrough Vossenack, across the Kall River,and on to Kommerscheidt and Schmidt.(Map 22) Company B, 20th Engineers,was to be responsible for opening andmaintaining a one-way road from Richel-skaul to Vossenack to the Kall River

bridge, while Company A was chargedwith bridging the Kall, if necessary, andopening and maintaining a one-way roadfrom the river through Kommerscheidtto Schmidt. Company C was to be heldin battalion reserve in the woods west ofGermeter with the stipulation that it notbe committed except with approval ofthe group commander. Battalion head-quarters was to furnish three recon-naissance teams, each composed of anofficer, an SCR 300 operator, and anadditional man for security.

Attack planning had decreed that,because of the expected poor conditionof the Kall trail and exposed nature ofthe Vossenack ridge, engineer vehicles(with the exception of three-quarter-tonweapons carriers and quarter-ton jeeps)could not accompany the leading en-gineer troops. To meet this problem, aforward tool dump was established in thewoods just northwest of Richelskaul.Engineer troops near by were to be onthe alert to hand-carry the proper toolsand equipment after preliminary recon-naissance should determine the typeneeded.

The first information that the engineerscould go into action came on the morningof 3 November with a message that astreet clearance project in Vossenackneeded attention. Capt. Edwin M.Lutz, commander of Company B, 20thEngineers, and Capt. Joseph W. Miller,battalion liaison officer, went forwardwith a platoon of Company B and areconnaissance team, reaching the Vosse-nack church about 1300. When theyfound the road leading south toward theKall from the church blocked by twodisabled American tanks (probably thoseof Captain West and Lieutenant Novak)and a fallen wall, leaving only enough

17 Combat Interv 75 with Condon, Beggs, Pruden,Nesbitt, Cascarano, Johnson, Crain, Kauffman,Nelson, and 1st Lt Melvin R. Barrilleaux, CO, CoR, 112th Inf.

18 Overlay, 112th Inf to CO 2d Bn, 3 Nov 44, 112thInf S-3 Jnl and File, 3 Nov 44. Although the situa-tion overlay for 4 Nov, 112th Inf G-3 File, 4 Nov 44,shows this platoon in position, it is not supported byeither journals or interviews.

288 THREE BATTLES

space for a jeep to pass, the Company Bengineer platoon began immediately toclear a path around the block.

At a company command post of the2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, CaptainMiller and Captain Lutz were informedthat the Kall River bridge shown ontheir maps did not exist but that theriver was fordable, provided corduroywas supplied for the approaches. Radio-ing back to the tool dump for anotherplatoon of Company B to come forward,Lutz and Miller left on foot for a recon-naissance of the bridge site. After thetrail from Vossenack entered the woods,it became very steep, and a weasel witha thrown track (Lieutenant Muglia'sabandoned weasel) blocked the narrowroute. The trail was a kind of shelf, adirt wall with rock obstructions risingon the right. On the left the bankdropped off sharply. It would be atight squeeze for tanks, the two captainscalculated, but once the weasel was re-moved tanks might pass by hugging theright bank. At the bridge site itself theyfound that, contrary to the informationthey had received, there was a Class 30stone arch bridge in good condition.19

The two engineer officers returned toVossenack about 1600 and reported theirfindings to Company A of the 707th TankBattalion. The tank company com-mander, Capt. Bruce M. Hostrup, andhis men, whose fire had been masked bythe advance of Company K, 112th Infan-

try, into Kommerscheidt about 1300 (3November), had taken cover in a slightdefilade around the southernmost housesof Vossenack. On hearing that the trailacross the Kall gorge was passable,Hostrup with one of his tank platoonsraced across the open southern slope tothe woods line in the gathering darkness.He then halted the platoon and wentforward in his command tank to test thetrail.

About a quarter of the way from thewoods line to the river Captain Hostrupfound the trail becoming narrow, precipi-tous, and slippery. The trail's left shoul-der, which dropped sharply toward thedraw, began to give way under the weightof the tank. Although the road was ninefeet wide, so was the tank, and rockyformations jutting out of the right bankconfined movement to the trail itself.The tank slipped and almost plunged offthe left bank into the draw. Reversinghis tank, Captain Hostrup returned tohis platoon at the woods line and reportedto his battalion commander that the trailwas still impassable. About 1900 thebattalion commander, Lt. Col. RichardW. Ripple, radioed that the engineerswere to work on the trail all night andthat Captain Hostrup's tanks should beready to move through to Schmidt atdawn. The tankers returned to theslight defilade near the southern edge ofVossenack, and spent an uncomfortablenight. Throughout the hours of dark-ness, considerable enemy artillery andmortar fire plagued them. Shell frag-ments blew off sirens and headlights andperforated bed rolls and shelter halveson the outside of the tanks.

Sometime during the afternoon, asCaptain Hostrup's tankers had waitedfor word that the trail across the Kall

19 Combat interviews do not make clear that thebridge was checked for demolitions, but in ColonelDaley's letter to the Historical Division he says that,in compliance with the engineer plan, engineers of103d Engineer Combat Battalion should have beenwith the assault battalions and presumably did thechecking. A Class 30 bridge, capable of supportinga load of approximately thirty tons, could be expectedto meet the weight requirements put on it by aninfantry division.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 289

was open, one of the tanks had thrown atrack and another had bellied on a sharpridge in the open south of Vossenack.These mishaps together with the loss ofLieutenant Clark's tank (immobilized bya mine in eastern Vossenack at the startof the 3 November attack) left the tankcompany with only thirteen of its originalsixteen tanks when it had to moveforward at daybreak.20

To the engineers the approach of duskgave an opportunity to cross the openridge without danger of receiving ob-served enemy artillery fire. Led by 2dLt. Robert E. Huston, the B Companyplatoon that had been working on theVossenack road block moved down intothe woods with instructions to removethe damaged weasel. With picks andshovels, the engineers were to clear theroad as best they could by morning.They knew from preliminary planningthat they would have to provide theirown security while working: the infantrywould not take time to mop up in thewoods and would leave no troops therefor defense.

Another platoon of Company B, under1st Lt. George E. Horn, arrived shortlyafter Lieutenant Huston's platoon hadmoved out, but it holed up for the nightin Vossenack. Captain Miller and Cap-tain Lutz returned to their battalioncommand post to report the situation(including their belief that the road waspassable for tanks as it stood) and torequest a bulldozer in order to whittledown some of the right bank and widenthe trail. From six miles in the rear,both a bulldozer and an air compressorreached the work site about 0230. Bythis time Lieutenant Huston's men had

pushed the damaged weasel from thetrail by hand. The bulldozer proved oflittle value, for after about one hour'swork it broke a cable and could not beused further.

Meanwhile, late in the afternoon, in-formation had reached Company A, 20thEngineers, that it could proceed to itswork beyond the Kall, and the companymoved toward Vossenack. As the mencrossed the open space between Germeterand Vossenack, small arms and artilleryfire killed one engineer and woundedanother. In Vossenack, the main bodyof the company waited while the 2dPlatoon under 2d Lt. Robert K. Piercereconnoitered the bridge site and as faras it could toward Schmidt.

Lieutenant Pierce and his men re-turned about 2230 with news that thebridge was in good condition. They hadgone as far as the positions of CompanyC, 112th Infantry, at the top of the hilleast of the river. The road, said theplatoon leader, was clear except for somedebris and abatis and possible mines.Under no apparent pressure except toget the trail open by daylight, CompanyA remained in Vossenack for severalhours, suffering three men wounded andanother killed by enemy artillery as itdid so. At 0200 the 1st Platoon under1st Lt. John O. Webster went out withmine detectors to clear the trail from theriver toward Schmidt, and the remainderof the company joined the 1st Platoonbeyond the river at approximately 0600.21

20 Combat Interv 75 with Hostrup-Fleig-Payne,Lutz.

21 Engr story from Combat Interv 75 with thefollowing: Daley; Lt Col James F. White, Ex Off,1171st Engr (C) Gp; T/4 James A. Krieder, Co A,20th Engr (C) Bn; Maj Bernard P. McDonnell, S-3,20th Engr (C) Bn; Lutz; Capt Henry R. Doherty,CO, Co A, 20th Engr (C) Bn. See also Maj BernardP. McDonnell, Rpt of Bn Activity from 29 Oct-9Nov 44, 14 Nov 44 (hereafter cited as McDonnell

290 THREE BATTLES

MAP 23

About midnight an infantry supplytrain of three M-29 weasels loaded withrations, ammunition, and sixty antitankmines negotiated the supply trail acrossthe Kall and moved on to Schmidt.Since capture of the division objectivesome ten to fifteen hours earlier, verylittle had been done to improve the ad-mittedly precarious supply line that ledto Schmidt. No vehicular traffic otherthan the three supply train weaselsmanaged to get through on the night of3 November.22

The Night in Schmidt

The men of the 3d Battalion, 112thInfantry, who had found their afternoonentry into Schmidt virtually uncontested,suspended their mop-up operations short-ly after dark because of the darkness andthe necessity for readying their defense.Sniper fire continued to hamper defensiveefforts the remainder of the night, andCompany L drew some machine gun firefrom the uncleared houses along thesoutheastern Hasenfeld road. But ingeneral the night was quiet, and theinfantrymen felt a natural buoyancy overtheir easy afternoon success.

Company L established its 3d Platoonastride the Hasenfeld road to the south-

east, its 2d on the left of the 3d, and its1st Platoon on the 2d's left at the Har-scheidt road on the northeast. (Map 23)The company's two light machine gunsand a section of heavy machine guns fromCompany M were tied into the defense,and contact patrols operated betweenrifle platoons in order to cover theassigned ground adequately.

Company K, whose aggressive move-ment had landed the first Americantroops on the division objective, drew thedefensive assignment on the south andsouthwest and placed its three rifle pla-toons on line to cover the Strauch roadand the open area between the Strauchand Hasenfeld roads. With the com-pany went a section of heavy machineguns from Company M. Stray Ger-mans, apparently unaware that Schmidthad been captured, continued to wander

Rpt); Statement, Capt Lutz, relative to the opn of theengr plan, n.d. (hereafter cited as Lutz Statement);Statement, Capt Doherty, relative to opn of engrplan, n.d. (hereafter cited as Doherty Statement);Statement, Capt Miller, relative to engr opns 2-3Nov 44, n.d. (hereafter cited as Miller Statement);Lt Col J. E. Sonnefield, CO, 20th Engr (C) Bn,Personal Opn Rpt on Bn Activities from 29 Oct-10Nov 44, 14 Nov 44 (hereafter cited as SonnefieldRpt); Statement, Col Sonnefield, relative to opn ofthe engr plan, 6-10 Nov 44, n.d. (hereafter cited asSonnefield Statement). All in Combat Interv File75.

22 Combat Interv 75 with Dana; V Corps Study,G-4 Sec.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 291

into the Company K positions from thesouthwest and were taken prisoner. Alltogether Company K collected forty-fiveprisoners and placed them under guardin the basement of a house. They wereto be removed after daylight by regimentalmilitary police. Occasional sniper fireand one or two light enemy shellingshampered Company K's night defensepreparations, and the company com-mander, Captain O'Malley, was hit inthe stomach by an enemy bullet.

The reserve company, Company I, dugin on the north of town with its two rifleplatoons and light machine gun section,one platoon extending Company L's leftflank to the left rear and the other extend-ing Company K's right flank to the rightrear. Because of the all-around natureof the Schmidt defense, Company I wasreserve company in name only, and noneof the three rifle companies had beenable to hold out a support platoon.

Company M's 81-mm. mortars wereemplaced in the yard of a house aboutone fourth of the distance from Schmidtto Kommerscheidt. Near by, facingnortheast to assist one platoon of Com-pany I, was the remaining machine gunplatoon of Company M. The mortarmen dug in their weapons adequatelybut were so fatigued that they postponeddigging individual foxholes and preparedto pass the night in a small building inthe yard near their mortars.

The battalion commander, Lt. Col.Albert Flood, in a pillbox along theKommerscheidt road, which served ashis command post, wanted to get tanksor tank destroyers, or even 57-mm. anti-tank guns, into the Schmidt positionsbefore daylight; but the hours passed andno reinforcement arrived. The battalionhad to content itself with the sixty anti-

tank mines brought by the three-weaselsupply convoy after midnight. Themines were placed on the three hard-surfaced main roads into the town. Nocamouflage was attempted, but organicbazookas and small arms fire coveredthe mines and defensive artillery fireswere plotted around the town. Distribu-tion of the water and rations that arrivedwith the three-weasel convoy was toawait daylight.23 According to avail-able records, no staff officer or head-quarters representative of either the 112thInfantry or the 28th Division visitedeither Kommerscheidt or Schmidt duringthe night.

109th and 110th Infantry Summaries

Northwest of the 112th Infantry's sec-tor in the early morning of 3 November,the 3d Battalion, 109th Infantry, wasrenewing its attack to get through themine field along the Wittscheidt-Huert-gen road and reach the woods line over-looking Huertgen. Just as the attackwas beginning, the Germans counter-attacked the 1st Battalion, 109th Infan-try, in its woods-line positions west of

23 Combat Interv 75 with Dana, Piercey, Walker,Ripperdam, Tyo, Toner, and 1st Lt Leon Simon,asst S-3, 3d Bn, 112th Inf; Interv with Barnett;Interv with S Sgt Robert E. Black, 1st Plat, Co I,112th Inf, Bradford, Pa., 22 Sep 48 (hereafter citedas Interv with Black); V Corps Study, G-3 and TDSecs. The V Corps Study says the Antitank Com-pany commander tried to get forward with threeweasel-towed 57-mm. guns but could not because ofthe "blocked MSR," but other records show thatthe main supply route was never blocked until justbefore dawn, except for Lieutenant Muglia's medicalweasel, which was removed shortly after dark. Al-though the 112th Infantry S-3 Jnl for this dateindicates the battalion was in communication withregiment, no request for tanks is recorded. Such arequest was sent to the rear by the three-weaselsupply train, but this train obviously would not reachregiment until almost dawn or later.

292 THREE BATTLES

the road. (See Map 21.) Beginningabout 0730 the enemy hit twice withapproximately 200 men each time. Al-though both attacks were repulsed, the3d Battalion heard the battle and, mis-interpreting a message from regiment,sent two of its companies to the 1stBattalion's aid. These two companiesthen dug in behind the 1st Battalionwhile the remaining rifle company stayedat Wittscheidt. Since the 2d Battalionremained in reserve, the 109th Infantry'seffort to complete its northern missionhad thus been temporarily thwarted.24

In the woods to the south the 1st Bat-talion, 110th Infantry, was partiallycommitted during the day in a defensiveposition along the Richelskaul-Raffels-brand road. It engaged in no offensiveaction, however, and was still considereddivision reserve. The 3d Battalion madetwo attacks during the day toward thesoutheast while the 2d Battalion hit againat the Raffelsbrand pillboxes, but neitherbattalion gained and both took heavycasualties. Later in the day GeneralCota, the division commander, orderedthe 110th's 1st Battalion to move the nextmorning to Vossenack and attack duesouth to seize Simonskall. Such a movemight be expected to weaken the Raffels-brand resistance by threatening theenemy rear. To fill the gap that wouldbe left when the 1st Battalion moved out,Task Force Lacy was formed, consistingof a total of sixty-six men from the Anti-tank Mine Platoon, the Intelligence andReconnaissance Platoon, and a specialpatrol group, all under 1st Lt. Virgil R.Lacy. Commitment of the 110th's 1st

Battalion would leave the 28th Divisionwith no infantry reserve.25

Air Support

Although weather on 3 Novemberagain prevented any large-scale air sup-port, one armed reconnaissance missionby twelve P-47's of the 366th FighterGroup was over the target area at 1235and claimed three armored vehiclesdestroyed and three damaged northwest ofHuertgen. The same squadron claimeda house believed to be a headquarters,five motor transports, and three motor-cycles destroyed northwest of Huertgen,three light flak positions destroyed north-east of Kleinhau (one mile northeast ofHuertgen), a barracks strafed south ofHeimbach, and a radio tower damagedin Kleinhau. Another squadron of the366th Group was prevented from attack-ing in the 28th Division area becauseof weather conditions. It dropped itsbombs far afield in the Zuelpich area.26

The Enemy Situation

On 2 November the Germans had metthe American offensive with resistancefrom the 275th Division and plans for aKampfgruppe of the 116th Panzer Divisionto join local reserves in a counterattackagainst the 109th Infantry's penetrationnorthwest of Germeter. Utilizing ap-proximately 200 men (according toAmerican estimates), the counterattacktook place at dawn on 3 November butadmittedly experienced little success.

24 Combat Interv 77 with 109th Inf personnel;109th Inf S-3 Jnl, 3 Nov 44; 28th Div G-3 Jnl,3 Nov 44.

25 Combat Interv 77 with 110th Inf personnel;110th Inf S-3 Jnl, 3 Nov 44; 28th Div G-3 Jnl,3 Nov 44.

26 FUSA and IX TAC Sum, 3 Nov 44; V CorpsStudy, G-3 Air Sec; Combat Interv 74 with Howison.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 293

The higher German commanders, stillengaged in their map study at Schlender-han Castle, ordered one regimental com-bat team of the 116th Panzer Division tomove immediately to the Huertgen area.The remainder of the division was tofollow that night and the night of 4November. As a precautionary measure,major elements of one regimental combatteam of the 89th Division, which had begunto move out of the line for refitting afterbeing relieved by advance elements ofthe 272d Division, were held at Harscheidt,northeast of Schmidt, since the Americanattack now appeared to be aimed in thatdirection. The map conference was dis-continued at noon.

When Schmidt itself was captured bythe Americans during the afternoon,elements of the 1055th Regiment of the89th Division waited at Harscheidt andprepared for commitment. The 3d Bat-talion, 1055th Regiment, dug defensive posi-tions astride the Harscheidt-Schmidtroad and that night sent reconnaissancepatrols toward Schmidt. The 2d Bat-talion, 1055th Regiment, had not completedits move from the west to Harscheidt;when it did arrive in the vicinity beforedaylight on 4 November, it took positionastride the Schmidt-Strauch road westof Schmidt. Several prisoners capturedon 3 November by other units of VCorps had indicated that this Germanregiment was in process of relief, and the28th Division had been so informed.

When details of the 112th Infantry'ssuccess at Schmidt reached Seventh Army,a dawn counterattack on 4 November wasordered to eliminate the American ad-vance. It was to be launched by the1055th Regiment, assisted by assault gunsand an armored group of about twentyto thirty tanks from the 116th Panzer

Division's tank regiment, 16th PanzerRegiment, which had already been en routesouth and now was moved quickly to theHarscheidt area.

Meanwhile, the 60th Panzer GrenadierRegiment (116th Panzer Division) reachedthe Huertgen area and laid plans tocounterattack at dawn on 4 Novemberagainst the 109th Infantry's penetrationnorth of Germeter. Because of the diffi-culties of terrain and their own minefields, the Germans planned to committhe 116th Panzer Division's grenadier regi-ments on the north flank of the Americanbulge as infantry. A sizable part of itstank regiment was to fight with the 89thDivision around Schmidt and Kommer-scheidt.27

Summary for 3 November andNight of 3-4 November

Since the 28th Division had no knowl-edge of these extensive German prepara-tions, the 112th Infantry's situation asdaylight approached on 4 Novemberlooked surprisingly good. Its 3d Bat-talion had moved with almost amazingfacility to the division objective, Schmidt;its 1st Battalion had advanced andhalted in Kommerscheidt and along thewoods line to the north of Kommer-scheidt; and its 2d Battalion had held and

27 MSS # A-891 and A-892 (Gersdorff); MS# A-905 (Waldenburg); ETHINT 53 (Gersdorff);ETHINT 56 (Gersdorff and Waldenburg); Sit Rpts,2-4 Nov 44, found in OB WEST KTB Anlagen1-10.XI.44; 28th Div G-2 File, Nov 44; Order ofthe Day commemorating the battles of Kommer-scheidt and Schmidt, entitled "Division Review ofthe 89th Division" (hereafter cited as 89th DivisionOrder of the Day). This captured document isavailable only in translation by V Corps IPW Team11, as reproduced by Maj. Henry P. Halsell in hisunpublished manuscript, Huertgen Forest and theRoer River Dams.

294 THREE BATTLES

consolidated its defenses in Vossenack.Supporting engineers had begun workon the main supply route through theKall valley, although their work thus farhad been minor; and a company of tankswas poised to move over the Kall trailat dawn to join the Schmidt defense.Another company of tanks was presentto aid the Vossenack defense.

The division picture was not so bright,because two stubborn interrelated factspersisted: abominable weather was pre-venting isolation of the battlefield byair—indeed, preventing all but minor airactivity; although no major enemy armorhad been sighted and prospects weregood for getting American tanks toSchmidt, those American tanks still werenot there. The 109th Infantry to thenorth had experienced limited success;the 110th Infantry to the south had madeno gains.

It was logical to assume that, if the

Germans were going to hit back againstthe forces across the Kall, they wouldhave to strike soon. Otherwise the 28thDivision would be ready to start its pushto the southwest toward Strauch andSteckenborn; in fact, a G-3 letter ofinstructions the night of 3 Novemberinitiated plans for such a push.28 Al-ready the capture of Schmidt had cut theenemy's supply line to troops manningthe forts north of Monschau, and it wouldbe illogical to expect the Germans toaccept this situation with only a minordisplay of resistance.

28 28th Div G-3 Jnl and File, 3 Nov 44. Despitehis division's early success at Schmidt, General Cotanever actually expected to be able to execute thissecond phase of the attack without assistance. Withall his troops already committed, he had no unit withwhich to attack toward Strauch and Steckenbornunless he took the 1st and 3d Battalions, 112th,thus leaving what would become the 112th's rear(Schmidt and Kommerscheidt) completely unde-fended. See Interv with Cota.

CHAPTER III

Action at Schmidt(4 November)

Tanks Try To Cross the Kall

Before daylight the next morning (4November), the tankers of CaptainHostrup's Company A, 707th Tank Bat-talion, warmed up their motors foranother try at traversing the precipitoustrail across the river. The 1st Platoon,commanded by 1st Lt. Raymond E.Fleig in the forward tank, was to lead.

Lieutenant Fleig's tank had only justentered the woods and begun to advancealong the slippery narrow woods trailwhen it was jarred suddenly by an explo-sion. It had struck a mine which hadevidently gone undetected when theengineers had swept the road. Althoughno one was injured, the mine disabled atrack, and the tank partially blocked thetrail. (Map 24)

The platoon sergeant, S. Sgt. AnthonyR. Spooner, suggested winching the othertanks around Lieutenant Fleig's immobil-ized tank. Using the tow cable fromFleig's tank and the tank itself as a pivot,Spooner winched his own second tankaround and back onto the narrow trail.Fleig boarded what now became the leadtank and continued down the trail,directing Sergeant Spooner to repeat theprocess to get the remaining three tanksof the platoon around the obstacle.

As Lieutenant Fleig continued to inchhis tank down the dark trail, sharp curves

in the road which had not been revealedin previous map studies necessitated muchstopping and backing. The lieutenantnoticed that his tank was tearing awaypart of the thin left shoulder of the trailbut considered the damage not seriousenough to hold up vehicles in his rear.With slow, painstaking effort, he madehis way toward the river, crossed thebridge, and proceeded up the oppositeslope. There the route presented littledifficulty except for three switchbackswhere Fleig had to dismount and directhis driver. It was just beginning to growlight when his tank churned alone intoKommerscheidt.

Back at the start of the wooded portionof the trail, Sergeant Spooner succeededin winching the three remaining tanks ofthe platoon around the disabled tank.Sgt. Jack L. Barton's tank in the leadcame to a sharp bend made even moreprecarious by a large outcropping of rockfrom the right bank. Despite all effortsat caution, Barton's tank partially threwa track and was stopped. CaptainHostrup came forward to determine thedifficulty and directed the next tank inline under Sergeant Spooner to towSergeant Barton's lead tank back onto thetrail. The expedient worked, and thetrack was righted. Using Spooner'stank as an anchor, Barton successfullyrounded the curve. When he in turn

296 THREE BATTLES

MAP 24

anchored the rear tank, it too passed theobstacle and both tanks continued.

Making contact with Lieutenant Hus-ton, whose engineer platoon from Com-pany B, 20th Engineers, was working onthe trail, Captain Hostrup asked that theengineers blow off the projecting rock.The lieutenant had no demolitions, buthe made use of three German Tellermines that had previously been removedfrom the trail. The resulting explosiondid little more than nick the sharpestprojection of the rock.

The last tank in line, Sgt. James J.

Markey's, in spite of difficulty with acrumbling left bank, arrived at the rockoutcropping a few minutes later. Theengineer platoon assisted in guiding itsafely around the bend. Although fourtanks were now past the initial obstaclesof the narrow trail, the last three hadsome distance to go before they would bein a position to assist the defense ofKommerscheidt and Schmidt. It wasstill not quite daylight.1

1 Combat Interv 76 with Hostrup- Fleig Payne andRipple.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 297

Action at Schmidt

Sunrise on 4 November was at 0732.A few minutes before came the noise ofenemy artillery pieces opening fire, anda hail of shells began to crash among thehastily prepared defenses in the southernedge of Schmidt. The shelling walkedback and forth through the town formore than thirty minutes. Coming fromat least three directions—northeast, east,and southeast—the fire was so intensethat it seemed to many of the infantrydefenders to originate from every angle.

In line to meet the expected enemycounterattack the 3d Battalion, 112thInfantry, as previously noted, was in aperimeter defense of the town. (MapIX)2 To the east and southeast CompanyL defended the area between the Har-scheidt and Hasenfeld roads. To thesouth and southwest was Company Kbetween the Hasenfeld and Strauchroads. Company I, with only two rifleplatoons and its light machine gun sec-tion, had its 2d Platoon on the north andits 3d Platoon on the northwest. A sec-tion of heavy machine guns from Com-pany M was with Company L andanother with Company K, while theremaining heavy machine gun platoonwas on the north edge of town coveringan open field and wooded draw to thenorth near the 2d Platoon, Company I.The 81-mm. mortars were dug in on thenorthern edge of town near the machinegun platoon, and the battalion commandpost was in a pillbox just west of theKommerscheidt road 300 yards fromSchmidt. Antitank defense consisted of

uncamouflaged mines hastily strung acrossthe Harscheidt, Hasenfeld, and Strauchroads and covered with small arms andorganic bazookas.

Probably the first to sight enemy forceswas Company I's 2d Platoon on the leftof the Harscheidt road. Shortly afterdawn a runner reported to Capt. Ray-mond R. Rokey at the company CP thatobservers had spotted some sixty enemyinfantry in a patch of thin woods abouta thousand yards northeast of Schmidt,seemingly milling around forming for anattack. Having no communication withhis platoons except by runner, CaptainRokey left immediately for the 2d Platoonarea. Although the artillery forwardobserver at Company I's CP promptlyput in a call for artillery fire, for somereason the call produced no result untilmuch later.3

Company M machine gunners withthe left flank of Company L on the eastfired on ten or fifteen enemy soldiers whoemerged from the woods and dashed fora group of houses at Zubendchen, asettlement north of the Harscheidt road.From here the Germans evidently in-tended to regroup and make their wayinto Schmidt. A section of 81-mm.mortars directed its fire at the houses,scoring at least one or two direct hits,and observers saw Germans crawlingback toward the woods.

Other enemy infantrymen continuedto advance from the northeast. Com-pany I's 2d platoon employed its small

2 No overlays or maps showing the disposition ofthe 3d Bn, 112th Inf, can be found. Positions andmovement as shown on Map IX are approximate asdetermined from unit journals and combat interviews.

3 Combat Interv 75 with Toner; 28th Div ArtyJnl, 4 Nov 44; V Corps Study, Signal Sec. The VCorps Study quotes the division artillery communica-tions officer as saying that no request for fire failedto be transmitted during the entire Schmidt opera-tion. This artillery forward observer with CompanyI was killed, and reason for failure of artillery in thisinstance cannot be determined.

298 THREE BATTLES

KALL TRAIL SUPPLY ROUTE between Vossenack and Kommerscheidt on Vossenackside of gorge. Note thrown tank tracks on the right.

arms weapons to repulse a wavering,un-co-ordinated effort, preceded by lightmortar fire, which was launched againstits northeast position, possibly by thegroup seen earlier readying for anattack.

A heavier assault struck almost simul-taneously against the right-flank positionof Company L along the Hasenfeld roadon the southeast. Automatic riflemenwith the defending platoon opened up asthe enemy crossed a small hill to thefront. A German machine gun less thanfifty yards away at the base of a building

in the uncleared southeastern edge ofSchmidt returned the fire. When asquad leader, S. Sgt. Frank Ripperdam,crawled forward with several of his menuntil he was almost on top of the enemygun, five enemy soldiers jumped up,yelling in English, "Don't shoot! Don'tshoot!" Sergeant Ripperdam and twoother men stood up to accept the ex-pected surrender, only to have the Ger-mans jump back quickly into theiremplacement and open fire with themachine gun. Dropping again to theground, the sergeant directed a rifle

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 299

KALL TRAIL SUPPLY ROUTE with Kommerscheidt side of gorge in the background.

grenadier to fire at the machine gun.Ripperdam saw the grenade hit at leasttwo of the Germans, but still the machinegun fired. One of the Company L mensuddenly sprang erect and ran forwardbehind the slight concealment of a sparsehedgerow, firing his rifle in a one-manassault. The Germans shifted their gunand raked his body with fire, killing himinstantly. Sergeant Ripperdam and theremaining men withdrew to their de-fensive ring, but the Germans too hadevidently been discouraged, for there wasno more fire from the position.

Holding the enemy to their front with

small arms and mortar fire, the men onCompany L's right flank could see Ger-mans infiltrating on their right throughthe Company K positions. An enemymachine gun opened fire from a roadjunction near the uncleared houses onthe Hasenfeld road and prevented eventhe wounded from crossing the street tothe north to reach the company medics.On all sides of Schmidt except the norththe enemy was now attacking.

Supporting artillery of the 229th FieldArtillery Battalion was engaged in haras-sing fires until 0823 when the air observa-tion post called for and received twelve

300 THREE BATTLES

rounds on enemy personnel in the vicinityof Harscheidt. A previous call fromthe forward observer with Company Istill had produced no results. At 0850American artillery joined the battle withits first really effective defensive fires, 216rounds of TOT on a concentration ofenemy tanks to the east, just south of theHarscheidt-Schmidt road. From thattime on, artillery played its part in thebattle, the 229th alone firing 373 roundsuntil 1000, and supporting corps artilleryand the 108th Field Artillery Battalionof 155's joining the defense.4

Enemy tanks suddenly entered thebattle, obviously determined to exploitthe minor successes won by the advanceinfantry. With the tanks came otherGerman infantry: five tanks and a bat-talion of infantry were reported along theHarscheidt road and another five tanksand battalion of infantry along theHasenfeld road.5

The defenders of the two main roadsopened up with their rocket launchers,but the enemy tanks rumbled effortlesslyon, firing their big guns into foxholes andbuildings with blasts whose concussioncould kill if the shell fragments did not.On the Hasenfeld road, at least oneCompany L bazooka scored a hit on one

of the tanks; it stopped only briefly,swung off to one side, and clanked onits methodically destructive way. Suchseeming immunity demoralized the menwho saw it.

The attack against Company K on thesouth had spilled over to the southwest,and was joined by other enemy infantryattacking from the west. Company I's3d Platoon on the right of the Strauchroad found itself under assault. A runnerreported the situation to Captain Rokey,the company commander, who was stillwith his hard-pressed 2d Platoon on thenorth. Rokey sent word back for the 3dPlatoon to withdraw from its foxholes inthe open field to the cover of the houses.

Along the Harscheidt and Hasenfeldroads the German tanks spotted thefeeble rows of mines, disdainfully pulledoff to the sides, and skirted them. Thenthey were among the buildings of thetown and the foxholes of the defenders,systematically pumping round after roundinto the positions. On the south andsouthwest the situation rapidly disinte-grated. Company K's defenses brokeunder the attack.

American riflemen streamed from theirfoxholes into the woods to the southwest.As they sought relief from the poundingthey moved, perhaps unwittingly, fartherinto German territory. They were joinedin their flight by some men from Com-pany L.

Another Company K group of aboutplatoon size retreated into the CompanyL sector and there told a platoon leaderthat the Germans had knocked out oneof Company K's attached heavy machineguns and captured the other. Theenemy had completely overrun the com-pany's positions.

The Company L platoon leader sent

4 28th Div Arty Jnl, 4 Nov 44. Battery C, 229th,displaced forward on 3 November, and no breakdownon its firing for 4 November is available. During theentire period between 0600 of 4 November and 0600of 5 November Battery C did fire a total of 189 rounds;therefore some of these rounds would have comeduring the period mentioned here.

5 This estimate of enemy force is based primarilyon American estimates in combat interviews inOCMH, but agrees basically with German materialexcept that the Germans made no mention of anattack from the direction of Hasenfeld. These troopsmay have come originally from Harscheidt and inthe course of the attack moved over to the Hasenfeldroad.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 301

three men to his company commandpost in the vicinity of the church in thecenter of town to get a better picture ofthe over-all situation. The men quicklyreturned, reporting that they had beenprevented from reaching the companyCP by fire from Germans established inthe church. The three men had the im-pression that everyone on their right hadwithdrawn.

The enemy tanks plunged directlythrough the positions of the 1st Platoon,Company L, in the center of the com-pany's sector on the east. They overranthe company's 60-mm. mortars andknocked out two of them with direct hitsfrom their hull guns. Notifying thecompany command post that they couldnot hold, the Americans retreated to thewoods on the southwest where they hadseen Company K troops withdrawing.

Now the retreat of small groups andplatoons was turning into a disorderlygeneral exodus. Captain Rokey orderedhis 2d Platoon, Company I, to pull backto the protection of the buildings, but theenemy fire was so intense that controlbecame virtually impossible. The menfled, not to the buildings as they hadbeen ordered, but north and west overthe open ground and into the woods inthe direction of Kommerscheidt, therefinding themselves intermingled withother fleeing members of the battalion.It was difficult to find large groups fromone unit.

In the Company K sector, 2d Lt.Richard Tyo, a platoon leader, had no-ticed the withdrawal of the company'smachine gun section and 1st Platoon.On being told by the men that they hadorders to withdraw, Lieutenant Tyo tookcharge and led them back through thehouses of Schmidt toward the north and

Kommerscheidt. On the way they passedtwo men from the company's 3d Platoon,one with a broken leg and the other lyingwounded in his foxhole. The woundedmen said their platoon had gone "thatway" and pointed toward the woods tothe southwest. Tyo and his group con-tinued north, however, and joined theconfused men struggling to get back toKommerscheidt. There was no time totake along the wounded.

The headquarters groups of CompaniesL and K tried to form a line in the centerof Schmidt, but even this small semblanceof order was soon confusion again. Some-one in the new line said an order hadcome to withdraw, the word spreadquickly, and none questioned its source.A Company K man remembered theforty-five prisoners in the near-by base-ment, and two men headed them backdouble-time toward Kommerscheidt. Theother men joined the mass moving outof Schmidt.

The 81-mm. mortar platoon on thenorthern edge of town had received itsfirst indication of counterattack shortlyafter daybreak when a round from an88-mm. gun crashed against the housenear the dug-in mortars, seriously wound-ing a man outside the small building inwhich the mortar men were sleeping.The mortar men then joined in defensivefires on call from the rifle companies andwere so intent on their job that they didnot notice that the rifle companies werewithdrawing. Well along in the morn-ing a lieutenant from Company I stoppedat their position and told them the riflecompanies had all fallen back and enemytanks were only a few houses away.Carrying the seriously wounded man ona stretcher made from a ladder, themortar men withdrew. Once the with-

302 THREE BATTLES

GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR being escorted to the rear by military policemen on4 November. Forty-five prisoners were captured the day before during the assault on Schmidt.

drawal had begun, it lost all semblanceof organization; each little group madeits way back toward Kommerscheidt onits own.

The time was now about 1000, andwith or without orders Schmidt was beingabandoned. The battalion commandernotified those companies with whom hestill had contact that the battalion CPwas pulling its switchboard and that theyshould withdraw.

Little could be done for the seriouslywounded unable to join the retreat. Thebattalion aid station was far back, at the

moment in the Kall River gorge. Sever-al company aid men stayed behind withthe wounded to lend what assistance theycould. The bodies of the dead were leftwhere they had fallen.

Most of the American troops who wereto get out of Schmidt had evidently doneso by about 1100, although an occasionalstraggler continued to emerge until aboutnoon. By 1230 the loss of Schmidt wasapparently recognized at 28th Divisionheadquarters, for the air control officerdirected the 396th Squadron of the 366thGroup (P-47's) to attack the town. The

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 303

squadron termed results of the bombing"excellent."6

Struggle With the Main Supply Route

While the 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry,was engaged in its battle for survival inSchmidt, other troops of the regimentand supporting units were engaged inactivity which weighed heavily on the3d Battalion's battle.

The 3d Battalion aid station had re-ceived a message from Colonel Flood,the battalion commander, at 0500 to dis-place forward from Germeter where, ex-cept for a forward collecting station underLieutenant Muglia, it had remained evenafter its battalion had taken Schmidt.The aid station troops responded to theorder by establishing themselves at thechurch in Vossenack while Muglia tooksome of the equipment and personnel onto the edge of the woods alongside theKall trail. He had left one litter squadthere the night before. Sending all avail-able litter bearers to comb the area forcasualties, the lieutenant and T/3 JohnM. Shedio reconnoitered for an aid sta-tion site.

Beside the trail about 300 yards fromthe Kall River, Muglia found a log dug-

out approximately twelve by eighteenfeet in size. (See Map 24.) The entiredugout was underground except for afront partially barricaded with rocks.The roof had been constructed of twolayers of heavy logs, thus providing ex-cellent protection from all shelling exceptdirect hits. While the runner went backto Vossenack for the battalion surgeon,Capt. Michael DeMarco, and the re-mainder of the 3d Battalion medical per-sonnel, Lieutenant Muglia displayed aRed Cross panel at the cabin and pa-tients began to collect. An ambulanceloading point was established at the trail'sentrance into the woods.7

The three-weasel supply train whichhad reached Schmidt after midnight hadbeen under the command of 1st Lt.William George, the 3d Battalion motorofficer. Just before dawn the three wea-sels returned to Germeter, carrying thosemen who had been wounded in theSchmidt capture and mop-up. Lieuten-ant George then agreed to return toSchmidt with the battalion AntitankPlatoon leader to take back a miscel-laneous load of ammunition. On reach-ing the entrance of the main supplyroute into the woods southeast of Vos-senack shortly after dawn, the partyfound the trail blocked by LieutenantFleig's abandoned tank. Although othertanks had previously passed this obstacle,the group gave up its supply attemptwhen the enemy shelled the area and oneof the supply sergeants was killed.8

The abandoned tank gave trouble aswell to those tanks of Company A, 707thTank Battalion, which had not yet passedthe initial obstacles of the supply route.Four had managed to get through (at

6 The Schmidt counterattack has been recon-structed primarily from combat interviews, which areadmittedly sketchy because of the confused situationand number of casualties among key personnel, bothat the time and later, before they could be inter-viewed. Delay in information reaching the rear orfailure to record it leaves the unit journals of littleassistance. See Combat Interv 75 with Dana,Piercey, Toner, Ripperdam, Walker, Tyo; Intervswith Barnett, with Peterson, and with Black; 112thInf S-2 and S-3 Jnls, 4 Nov 44; 28th Div G-3 Jnl,4 Nov 44, 28th Div Arty Jnl, 4 Nov 44; V CorpsStudy, G-3, G-4, Signal and TD Secs. The airstrike against Schmidt was set by the 28th Div G-3Jnl, 4 Nov 44, at 1236, and by FUSA and IX TACSum, 4 Nov 44, at 1230.

7 Muglia Rpt; DeMarco-Linguiti Rpt.8 Combat Interv 75 with George.

304 THREE BATTLES

least one was in Kommerscheidt atdawn), but the rest were still strugglingwith the narrow trail. The 2d Platoon,which had only three tanks left, beganits journey before daylight. In S. Sgt.Anthony S. Zaroslinski's lead tank rodeLieutenant Clarke, whose own vehiclehad been immobilized by a mine theday before in Vossenack. When his tankreached Fleig's abandoned tank, SergeantZaroslinski, unaware that the 1st Platoonhad successfully bypassed the obstacle bywinching its tanks around it, attemptedto pass on the left. The venture endeddisastrously: Zaroslinski's tank slipped offthe road, and the sergeant found himselfunable to back it up because of the steepand slippery incline. The crew dis-mounted to investigate, and enemy shellsstruck home, killing Zaroslinski andwounding Lieutenant Clarke.

Sgt. Walton R. Allen, commandingthe next tank in column, decided to trysqueezing between the two disabledtanks, using Sergeant Zaroslinski's tankas a buffer on the left to keep his owntank from sliding into the draw. Suc-ceeding, he dismounted and turned histank over to Sgt. Kenneth E. Yarman,who commanded the next tank in thecolumn. Allen then led Yarman's tankthrough, boarded it, and continued downthe trail.

Sergeant Yarman, now commandingthe lead tank of the 2d Platoon, reachedthe bend where the rock outcroppingmade passage so difficult. As he triedto pass, his tank slipped off the left of thetrail and threw its left track. The nexttank under Sergeant Allen reached apoint short of the outcropping and alsoslipped off the trail to the left, throwingboth its tracks. About the same time,Sergeant Markey, who commanded the

last tank of the leading 1st Platoon andwas presumably already past the Kall,reported back to his company com-mander, Captain Hostrup, at the rockoutcropping. His tank had gotten stucknear the bottom of the gorge and hadalso thrown a track.

Only one tank, commanded by Lieu-tenant Fleig, had reached Kommer-scheidt. Two others were now past theriver. But behind them and full on thevital trail sat five disabled tanks. Stillfarther to the rear and waiting to comeforward were the four tanks of the 3dPlatoon. While the armor remainedstymied on the Kall trail, precious timewas slipping by. For some time now thecrewmen had been hearing the battlenoises from Schmidt, and by 1100 oc-casional stragglers from the Schmidtbattle had begun to pass them goingtoward the rear.9

Still working with hand tools on theKall trail were Lieutenant Huston's pla-toon from Company B, 20th Engineers,and all of Company A, 20th Engineers.Five Germans surrendered voluntarily toCompany A's security guards as the unitworked east of the river. Occasionalenemy artillery fire wounded six of itsmen. Huston's Company B platoon,informed by the tankers that they thoughtthey could replace the tracks on theirdisabled tanks without too much delay,worked to repair the damage done bythe tanks to the delicate left bank of thetrail. Although almost twenty-four hourshad elapsed since Company K, 112thInfantry, had first entered Schmidt,higher commanders still seemed unawareof the poor condition of the Kall trail.Only one engineer company and an ad-

9 Combat Interv 76 with Hostrup-Fleig-Payne.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 305

ditional platoon, equipped with handtools and an air compressor but no demo-litions, were working on the trail, and noone was blocking the north-south riverroad, both ends of which led into enemyterritory.10

While the struggle with obstacles onthe supply route went on and while thebattle raged in Schmidt, the 2d Battalion,112th Infantry, continued to hold itsVossenack ridge defenses. An enemypatrol in force hit Company F at ap-proximately 0630 but was beaten off withsmall arms fire and artillery support oncall from the 229th Field Artillery Bat-talion.11 When daylight came, the de-fenders had to steel their nerves againstrelentless enemy shelling. It seemed tothe soldiers forward of Vossenack thatthe enemy concentrated his fire on eachfoxhole until he believed its occupants

knocked out, then moved on. The shell-ing forced the 2d Battalion to move itscommand post during the day to an air-raid shelter about a hundred yards westof the church on the north side of thestreet. The companies initiated a prac-tice of bringing as many men as possibleinto the houses during daylight, leavingonly a skeleton force on the ridge.

In the western end of Vossenack,troops carried on their duties and trafficcontinued to flow in and out of the town.Someone coming into Vossenack for onlya short time, perhaps during one of theinevitable lulls in the fire, might nothave considered the shelling particularlyeffective. But the foot soldiers knew dif-ferent. To them in their exposed fox-holes, a lull was only a time of appre-hensive waiting for the next bursts. Thecumulative effect was beginning to tell.12

The Battle for Kommerscheidt

At dawn on 4 November, just beforethe Germans counterattacked at Schmidt,the officers of Companies A and D, 112thInfantry, took stock of their defensivesituation in Kommerscheidt and mademinor adjustments to the positions theyhad moved into the night before.13 (MapX) The Americans found themselvessituated on the lower portion of theKommerscheidt-Schmidt ridge, withdense wooded draws on three sides, andanother wooded draw curving aroundslightly to their front (southeast). Theirdefenses were generally on either flank of

10 Combat Interv 75 with Lutz, Doherty; Sonne-field Rpt; Sonnefield Statement. There was evi-dently confusion as to who was responsible fordefending the two flanks of the vital Kall trail.While infantry commanders seemed to think this ajob assigned the engineers, the engineers interpretedthe direction of providing their own security to meanclose-in security as their men worked. ColonelPeterson provides a possible explanation for the con-fusion in pointing out that originally the 112thInfantry was to have placed a number of defensiveoutposts to block both ends of the Kall gorge, butdivision had approved cancellation of this plan beforethe attack started to permit the 112th its full strengthfor the Schmidt attack. The resulting increased needfor greater engineer security measures was evidentlynot understood by the engineers. See Interv withPeterson. Par. 1b(3) from the Engineer Plan, 30October 1944, makes the engineer position clear:"Due to disposition of friendly troops it is possiblefor enemy patrols to infiltrate through our lines . . .especially . . . during the hours of darkness. Localsecurity will be required." (Italics supplied.)

11 Combat Interv 75 with Kauffman. Althoughseveral enemy patrols hit the 2d Battalion during itsstay in Vossenack, records are hopelessly confused onthe times and number of such patrols. For thisreason, no further mention is made in this narrativeof such patrols except for one against SergeantCascarano's Company F squad.

12 Combat Interv 75 with Kauffman, Johnson,Crain, Pruden, Nesbitt, Condon; 2d Info and HistSv Hist Off, personal observations on arty fire.

13 No overlays or maps exist showing the Kommer-scheidt defenses. Positions and movement as shownon Map X are approximate as determined from unitjournals and combat interviews.

306 THREE BATTLES

the town and south of the houses alongthe town's main east-west street. Lack oftroops had caused them to forego oc-cupying the houses along the southernroad toward Schmidt. Company C wasin a reserve position in the edge of thewoods to the rear, and Company B anda platoon of Company D's heavy machineguns were still back at Richelskaul. Theyhad tank support initially from only onetank, that of Lieutenant Fleig, CompanyA, 707th Tank Battalion, but just beforenoon Fleig's tank was joined by those ofSergeants' Barton and Spooner. Thebattalion command post was in a shallow,partially covered dugout in an orchardjust north of the town, and the aid stationwas in the cellar of a house on thenorthern edge of town. After daylightthe enemy harassed the Kommerscheidtpositions with occasional light artilleryand mortar concentrations, but it wasfrom the direction of Schmidt that themen could hear the heavier firing.

By midmorning it was evident thatsomething disastrous was happening inSchmidt. Small groups of frightened,disorganized men began to filter backthrough the Kommerscheidt positionswith stories that "they're throwing every-thing they've got at us." By 1030 thescattered groups had reached the pro-portions of a demoralized mob, reluctantto respond to orders of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of Com-panies A and D seeking to augment theKommerscheidt defenses.

Within the mass of retreating menthere were frantic efforts to stem thewithdrawal, and when the enemy didnot immediately pursue his Schmidt suc-cess groups of 3d Battalion troops beganto reorganize to assist the 1st Battalion.Company I, withdrawing through the

wooded draw southeast of Kommer-scheidt, found it had about seventy-twomen, and, with a few stragglers fromother companies, stopped in Kommer-scheidt and joined the center of the de-fense on the south. Approximatelytwenty-six men with Sergeant Ripperdamof Company L, augmented by a smallgroup of battalion headquarters person-nel, went into position on the northwestfringe of town, facing slightly south ofwest, on the right flank of the 3d Platoon,Company A. The remnants of CompanyK, including the group which had re-treated with Lieutenant Tyo, were or-ganized into two understrength platoons:one, with a strength of about fourteenmen, dug in to the rear of Kommerscheidt(north); the other faced the northeast toguard the left flank. The Company Dcommander, Capt. John B. Huyck, madecontact with Captain Piercey, CompanyM commander, and co-ordinated the fireof Company D's weapons with those sur-viving from Company M, three 81-mm.mortars without ammunition and threeheavy machine guns. The latter wentinto position on the southwest edge ofKommerscheidt. Despite these efforts atstopping the retreat, many men con-tinued past Kommerscheidt. Some werestopped at the Company C woods-lineposition, but others withdrew all the wayto Vossenack and Germeter. Rough es-timates indicated that only about 200men of the 3d Battalion were reorganizedto join Companies A and D in defendingKommerscheidt.14

Even as the 3d Battalion was beingknocked out of Schmidt, the battalion's

14 Combat Interv 75 with Kudiak, Holden,Quinton-Hausman-Lockwood-Kertes-Norton, Perll,Piercey, Kelly-Hunter, Ripperdam, Tyo, Dana;Combat Interv 76 with Hostrup-Fleig-Payne.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 307

assistant S-3, 1st Lt. Leon Simon, wasmaking his way forward with a regimentalorder which instructed the 3d Battalion tohold temporarily in Schmidt while the110th Infantry continued its attack againstRaffelsbrand. Lieutenant Simon got nofarther than Kommerscheidt and therewas directed by Colonel Flood, the 3dBattalion commander, to return and tellregiment he absolutely had to have moretanks. Despite radio communication withKommerscheidt, the Schmidt action wasa confused blur at regimental head-quarters west of Germeter along theWeisser Weh Creek. Before LieutenantSimon returned, the regimental executiveofficer, Lt. Col. Landon J. Lockett, andthe S-2, Capt. Hunter M. Montgomery,accompanied by two photographers anda driver, went forward in a jeep in aneffort to clarify the situation. WhenSimon returned to regiment, there hadbeen no word from Colonel Lockett'sparty. Colonel Peterson, the regimentalcommander, told Simon to lead him toKommerscheidt; and shortly after theyleft, the assistant division commander,Brig. Gen. George A. Davis, and his aidealso departed for Kommerscheidt.15

Although the enemy did not immedi-ately pursue his attack against Kommer-scheidt, artillery fire and direct fire fromtanks in Schmidt harassed attempts atreorganization. Then, about 1400, atleast five enemy tanks,16 accompanied bya small force of infantry, attacked fromthe wooded draw on the southeast.There could be no doubt now: Kommer-scheidt held next priority on the Germanschedule of counterattacks.

The enemy tanks, Mark IV's and V's,17

imitated the tactics they had used soeffectively earlier in the day in Schmidt,standing out of effective bazooka rangeand firing round after round into thefoxholes and battle-scarred buildings.Artillery observers with the defenderscalled for numerous concentrationsagainst the attack, but the German tanksdid not stop. From Schmidt otherGerman direct-fire weapons, possibly in-cluding tanks, supported the assault.18

From 1000 to 1700 the 229th Field Ar-tillery Battalion fired at least 462 roundsin the vicinity of Kommerscheidt-Schmidt, and fires were further aug-mented by the 155-mm. guns under corpscontrol and the 108th Field ArtilleryBattalion. Capt. W. M. Chmura, aliaison officer from the 229th Field Artil-lery Battalion, said these supporting fireswere "terrific."19

As the attack hit, Lieutenant Fleig(whose tank had been the first to arrivein Kommerscheidt) and the two other

15 Combat Interv 75 with Dana, Simon; Intervwith Peterson.

16 If later claims of enemy tanks destroyed arecorrect, there were probably more than five whichentered this battle.

17 Status report on tanks and armored vehicles of116th Panzer Division, 9 Nov 44, found in file GeneralInspekteur der Panzertruppen, Zustandsberichte (Inspec-torate General of Panzer Troops, Status Reports).This is a collection of detailed status and combatefficiency reports on the Army panzer divisions forNovember and December 44. Although IPW re-ports, found in 28th Division G-2 File, November44, and in V Corps G-2 File, November 44, as wellas almost all combat interviews on the Schmidtoperation mention "Mark VI" tanks, this sourcereveals that at this period the only combat tanks inthe 116th Panzer Division were Mark IV's and V's.V Corps G-2 files indicate that a few Mark VI tankshad been absorbed by the 116th from Panzer RegimentGrossdeutschland, but most evidence seems to indicatethat only Mark IV's and V's were employed in thisoperation.

18 Combat Interv 75 with Ripperdam, Dana,Piercey, Kudiak, Tyo; Combat Interv 76 withHostrup-Fleig-Payne.

19 V Corps Study, Arty Sec. See also, 28th DivArty Jnl, 4 Nov 44. See above, n. 4 concerningBtry C.

308 THREE BATTLES

tankers of Company A, 707th Tank Bat-talion, were in a partially defiladed posi-tion in a slight draw in the open justnorthwest of Kommerscheidt near thewestern woods line. The tankmen pulledtheir Shermans up on a slight rise andfired at the enemy tanks, Fleig claimingtwo of the attackers knocked out and hiscompanions a third. Noticing that theinfantry was retreating from the left flankof the town, Fleig moved in that directioninto a sparse orchard just in time to seea Mark V Panther coming into position.At a range of 200 to 300 yards, Fleig fired,hitting the German tank twice; but hewas using high explosive ammunition,and the Panther's tough hide was notdamaged. The lieutenant discoveredthen that he had no armor-piercing am-munition available, all of it being outsidein the sponson rack. When the Germancrewmen, evidently frightened by thehigh explosive hits, jumped out of theirtank, Fleig ceased firing and turned histurret to get at his rack and the armor-piercing ammunition. The Germansseized the opportunity to re-enter theirtank and open fire, but their first roundwas a miss. Working feverishly, Lieu-tenant Fleig and his crew obtained thearmor-piercing ammunition and returnedthe fire. Their first round cut the barrelof the German gun. Three more roundsin quick succession tore into the left sideof the Panther's hull, setting the tankafire and killing all its crew. Fleig re-turned to the fight on the town's rightflank.20

The surviving enemy tanks continuedto blast the positions around the town.One tank worked its way up a trail onthe southwest where Set. Tony Kudiak,

a 1st Battalion headquarters man actingas a rifleman, and Pvt. Paul Lealsy creptout of their holes to meet it with a ba-zooka. Spotting the two Americans, theGerman turned his machine guns onthem, then his hull gun, but both timeshe missed. Kudiak and Lealsy returnedto get riflemen for protection, and thencame back. While they were gone, thetank approached to within twenty-fiveyards of a stone building in the southernedge of town, a second tank pullinginto position near where the first hadbeen initially. Just then a P-47 airplaneroared down and dropped two bombs.The first German tank was so damagedby the bombs that it could not move,although it still continued to fire. Ser-geant Kudiak finished it off with onebazooka rocket which entered on one sidejust above the track, setting the tankafire. The second German tank backedoff without firing.21

The supporting P-47's were bombingand strafing so close to Kommerscheidt(the German tank was knocked out virtu-ally within the town) that the riflemenfelt that the pilots did not know Americantroops were there. They welcomed thesupport, but they threw out coloredidentification panels to make sure thepilots knew who held the town. TheP-47's were probably from the 397thSquadron, 368th Group, which was overthe Schmidt area from 1337 to 1500.The squadron reported engaging a con-centration of more than fifteen vehicles,and claimed one armored vehicle de-stroyed and two damaged.

In the midst of the battle, ColonelPeterson arrived on foot at the northernwoods line. He had abandoned his regi-

20 Combat Interv 76 with Ripple, Hostrup-Fleig-Payne. 21 Combat Interv 75 with Kudiak, Piercey.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 309

mental command jeep just west of theKall River because of the trail difficulties.At the woods line he took charge of aboutthirty stragglers who had been assembledthere from the 3d Battalion and led theminto Kommerscheidt.

With the arrival of air support and thecontinued hammering by artillery, mor-tars, small arms, and the three tanks, theGerman assault was stopped about 1600.The defenders had sustained numerouspersonnel casualties, but in the processthey had knocked out at least five Ger-man tanks without losing one of theirown three. Just how big a role a smallnumber of tanks might have played hadthey been available for the earlier defenseof Schmidt was clearly illustrated by thetemporary success at Kommerscheidt.22

General Davis, the assistant divisioncommander, who had also come forwardduring the afternoon, conferred in Kom-merscheidt with Colonel Peterson andthe battalion commanders in order to geta clearer picture of the situation. Hethen radioed information to division onthe condition of men and equipment in-volved in the fight beyond the Kall. Hespent the night in a Kommerscheidt cellarand returned to the rear the next morn-ing.23

As night came, the men of CompaniesA and D and the remnants of the 3dBattalion worked to consolidate theirKommerscheidt positions in the face ofcontinued enemy artillery harassment.Colonel Peterson, also deciding to spendthe night in Kommerscheidt, warnedLieutenant Fleig not to withdraw histanks for any reason, including servicing.

He feared an enemy counterattack thatnight and was concerned that, if eventhis small tank force were withdrawn,the nervous infantry might pull out too.

About 1500 that afternoon division hadordered the units in Kommerscheidt toattack to retake Schmidt, but apparentlyno one on the ground had entertained anyillusions about immediate compliance.The problem then had been to maintainthe Kommerscheidt position.24

The Kall Struggle Continues

While the infantry and tanks foughton in Kommerscheidt, the engineers wereproceeding with their job on the mainsupply route. Company A, 20th En-gineers, continued to work on the switch-back curves east of the Kall, and Lieu-tenant Huston's platoon from CompanyB, 20th Engineers, struggled with theeven more difficult west portion of thetrail. Although explosives had now beenbrought forward for use on the rock out-cropping, Huston's men could do noblasting for fear of further disabling thetanks that were being worked on near by.25

Captain Lutz, the Company B com-mander, sent a six-man patrol underLieutenant Horn from Vossenack to checkon a supposition that there was an alter-nate route to the Kall farther to the south-west. The patrol returned after havingbecome involved in a fire fight duringits reconnaissance. It had killed threeGermans and captured four prisoners.The proposed alternate route, Lieutenant

22 Combat Interv 75 with Tyo, Perll, Toner; Com-bat Interv 76 with Hostrup-Fleig-Payne; Interv withPeterson; FUSA and IX TAC Sum, 4 Nov 44.

23 Ltr, Gen Davis to Hist Div, 11 Dec 49.

24 Combat Interv 76 with Hostrup-Fleig-Payne;Combat Interv 75 with 1st and 3d Bn, 112th, per-sonnel; V Corps Study, G-3 Sec; 28th Div G-3 File,4 Nov 44.

25 Combat Interv 75 with Lutz, Doherty; Sonne-field Statement. Reason for not blowing rock out-cropping is given by Lutz.

310 THREE BATTLES

Horn reported, was a swampy firebreakblocked by felled trees. Captain Lutzthen ordered Horn to move with hisplatoon to the assistance of Huston onthe Kall trail.26

Company A's commander, Capt. HenryR. Doherty, satisfied with the work doneby his men on the trail east of the river,decided about 1430 to move his companyback across the Kall and into the woodssouth of Vossenack to bivouac for thenight. As he started the company backand reached the exit of the trail from thewoods southeast of Vossenack, he metGeneral Davis going forward to Kom-merscheidt. The general ordered thecompany to take up a specified defensiveposition on either side of the trail and to"guard the road near the bridge." Cap-tain Doherty reluctantly obeyed theorder, placing his 3d Platoon under 1stLt. Aurelio Pellino in the woods northof the trail near the western edge of thewoods and the 1st and 2d Platoons gen-erally astride the trail where it enteredthe woods. The 3d Platoon was toldto put a security guard of three menunder T/4 James A. Krieder beside thebridge itself. Except for the location ofthis guard, the positions designated wereof little value in defending the supplyroute, for a thick expanse of woods sep-arated the defenders from the bridge andthe defense covered only one part of thetrail, that near the entrance into thewoods.27

By noon on 4 November the tankersof Company A, 707th Tank Battalion,had accomplished little toward puttingback into commission their five disabledtanks along the Kall trail west of theriver. The company commander, Cap-

tain Hostrup, found tha t SergeantMarkey's tank, nearest the bridge, couldnot be pulled out, but he discovered acomplicated switchback trail running tothe left that would permit passage aroundit. (See Map 24.) Sergeant Yarman'stank, lead vehicle of the 2d Platoon, wasat the sharp road bend where the rockoutcropping hindered passage and hada thrown track which the tankers con-sidered could be replaced. Approxi-mately 150 yards behind was SergeantAllen's tank with both tracks thrown.Captain Hostrup felt that maintenancepersonnel would be necessary to putSergeant Allen's tank into operation,although with the aid of LieutenantHuston's engineer platoon the right bankof the trail beside it could be dug awaysufficiently to allow other traffic to pass.The other two tanks were those aban-doned by Lieutenant Fleig and Lieu-tenant Clarke (Sergeant Zaroslinski'stank) near the entrance to the woods,but other tanks had successfully ma-neuvered past them.

After several hours of trying, the tank-ers finally managed to replace the trackon Sergeant Yarman's tank. Yarmanpulled ahead about ten feet and the tankagain threw the track, this time damagingthe left idler wheel. Again the trackwas replaced, again Yarman drove ashort distance ahead, and again the trackjumped off. By this time it was almost1600 and men from the Kommerscheidtaction were pouring back along the trail,bringing with them tales of the fiercepounding to which they had been sub-jected. Radioing Colonel Ripple, hisbattalion commander, Captain Hostrupinsisted that, if more tanks were to getthrough to Kommerscheidt, more en-gineers were needed. Colonel Ripple

26 Combat Interv 75 with Lutz.27 Combat Interv 75 with Doherty.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 311

radioed back just at dark (about 1730)that more engineers were forthcomingand that maintenance crews for the tankswere on the way.

The Company A, 707th, maintenanceofficer, 1st Lt. Stanley Lisy, his crew, andthe battalion maintenance officer, Capt.George A. Harris, reached the disabledtanks about 1900. Starting to work im-mediately on Sergeant Yarman's tanknear the rock outcropping, LieutenantLisy's crew had the troublesome track onagain by 2200. The tank moved twenty-five yards farther and off came the track.Diagnosing now that the difficulty lay inthe damaged idler wheel, the men secureda good idler wheel from LieutenantFleig's abandoned tank at the head ofthe trail and went to work to install it onSergeant Yarman's tank.28

Soon after dark a tank supply groupof five weasels with quarter-ton trailersloaded with rations, tank ammunition,and .30-caliber ammunition for the in-fantry had started for Kommerscheidtfrom Germeter. Learning in Vossenackthat difficulties still existed on the mainsupply route across the Kall, its officers,Capt. William H. Pynchon, S-4, 707thTank Battalion, and 1st Lt. Howard S.Rogers, Reconnaissance Platoon leader,Headquarters Company, 707th, directedresupply of the tanks of Company C,707th, in Vossenack and went on aheadby jeep to reconnoiter the Kall trail.They returned later for the supply train,and the jeep and five weasels with trailersreached the woods entrance of the trailshortly after midnight. A guide carryinga white handkerchief went on foot infront of each vehicle. At a point wherethe trail slanted perceptibly toward the

left and was jagged with sharp rock pro-jections, the lead weasel threw a track.It took about fifteen minutes to replacethe track before the column could con-tinue.

Enemy artillery fire constantly har-assed the trail area, but the supplycolumn reached Sergeant Yarman's tankwithout casualties about 0100. Intensi-fying its efforts to install the new idlerwheel on the tank, the maintenance crewcompleted the job at approximately 0200.As the tank started forward, success atlast within the grasp of the exasperatedcrewmen, it moved only about ten yardsbefore the left shoulder of the trail gaveway, and once more off came the track.There was scarcely any alternative exceptto comply with a message that had beenbrought Captain Hostrup, the tank com-pany commander, by Captain Pynchon:"Holiday 6 [General Cota, division com-mander] wants to give you all the timepossible to retrieve your vehicles, BUTthat main supply route must be open bydaybreak. If necessary, you will roll yourimmobilized tanks down the slope andinto the draw."29

Captain Hostrup ordered SergeantAllen, whose tank was 150 yards up thehill, to fasten the tow cable of his tank toa tree and pull himself as far off the roadas possible. (Jeeps and weasels couldpass Sergeant Allen's tank while largervehicles could not.) Sergeant Yarman'stank at the rock outcropping was alsopulled off to the left with tow cablesfastened on trees, although digging on theright bank was still necessary to providesufficient space for passage. At Lieu-tenant Fleig's and Sergeant Zaroslinski'sabandoned tanks near the beginning of

28 Combat Interv 75 with Hostrup-Fleig-Payne.

29 Combat Interv 76 with Ripple, Hostrup-Fleig-Payne, Pynchon, and Rogers.

312 THREE BATTLES

MAP 25

the difficult section of the trail, it had al-ready been determined that tanks couldpass, and at Sergeant Markey's tanknearer the bottom of the draw, the com-plicated switchback to the left would pro-vide passage without necessitating re-moval of his tank.

Captain Pynchon's men assisted in thedigging at Sergeant Yarman's tank nearthe rock outcropping, but not until about0300 was passage assured. The men ofthe supply train were getting worried, forthey hoped to complete their mission toKommerscheidt and return before day-light provided the enemy visibility on theopen slope southeast of Vossenack. Themoon was up by the time they moved outagain, and visibility in the wooded riverdraw had improved.

As they reached Sergeant Markey'stank at the switchback, first glanceshowed that the heavily laden quarter-ton trailers would have to be manhandledaround abrupt bends in the trail, andeven then the weasels would have to do agood deal of slow backing and turning inorder to manage the tortuous route.(Map 25) Bisecting the trail above andbelow Sergeant Markey's tank were twobranches of a road fork formed, someseventy yards to the north, by the north-south river road and a road leading to theMestrenger Muehle. To pass SergeantMarkey's tank, each weasel had to be de-tached from its trailer, then backed upthe river road to the north because theshort turn at the intersection of the Kalltrail and the river road was too abruptfor a forward turn. At the sharp junc-tion seventy yards to the north the wea-sel's trailers were reattached after havingbeen pulled by hand over the slippery,rock-studded trail; and the weasels andtrailers then continued to the south along

the Mestrenger Muehle trail and backonto the main trail. The movement wasslow, tedious, and exasperating.

Beyond the Kall the supply train en-countered two more switchbacks whichnecessitated 180-degree turns, and thelaborious task of manhandling the heavytrailers had to be repeated. Despitethese difficulties, the supply group reached

Kommerscheidt about 0430. It was justbeginning to get light when the weaselsreturned to their supply assembly pointback at Germeter.30

The Engineers

Earlier in the evening, before CaptainPynchon's supply train had gone for-

30 Combat Interv 76 with Pynchon, Hostrup-Fleig-Payne.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 313

ward, the 3d Platoon, Company B, 20thEngineers, under 2d Lt. Reynold A.Ossola, was sent to assist LieutenantHuston's and Lieutenant Horn's engineerplatoons on the difficult western sectionof the Kall trail. With the 3d Platoonwent a second air compressor, 300 poundsof TNT, and a second bulldozer. Afterthe tanks were partially removed fromthe trail and Captain Pynchon's supplycolumn had passed, the engineers blastedthe rock outcropping. By 0400 the trailwas completely open. Ossola's platoonremained for maintenance work on thetrail, and Huston's and Horn's platoonsreturned before dawn for rest in Vosse-nack.31

Company C, 20th Engineers, origi-nally in battalion reserve, had movedduring midmorning of 4 November to aforward bivouac area near Germeter,and the company's 2d Platoon had goneout about 1330 on a mine-clearing mis-sion for the 109th Infantry. The head-quarters group and 1st Platoon, underthe company commander, Capt. WalterC. Mahaley, were ordered to move be-yond the Kall to a defensive bivouacpreparatory to assisting Company A,20th Engineers, on supply route main-tenance the next day. They left Ger-meter about 2330 on foot and by 0300(5 November) were in bivouac nearCompany C, 112th Infantry, where themain supply route formed a large woodedloop on the hill above the east-bankswitchbacks. One squad of the 3d Pla-toon had been ordered to remain at Ger-meter to guard a rear explosives dump.The other two squads were to move bytruck with 5,000 pounds of explosives to

the vicinity of the Kall bridge. Therethey were to be prepared to blow pill-boxes in the Kommerscheidt-Schmidtarea. Under the platoon leader, 2d Lt.Benjamin Johns, these two squads, the1st and 3d, arrived in Vossenack aftermidnight, learned that the Kall trail wasstill clogged with tanks, and returnedto the forward bivouac area near Ger-meter.32

Command and the Kall Trail

Misinformation throughout the day of4 November had kept division headquar-ters ill-informed about the condition ofthe vital main supply route across theKall gorge. Most reports repeatedly as-serted that the supply route was open,thus contributing to failure of command-ers to realize the seriousness of the situa-tion. Neither regiment nor division hadliaison officers on the spot. Not untilapproximately 1500 had General Cotaintervened personally by ordering the1171st Engineer Group commander, Col.Edmund K. Daley, to send a "competentofficer" to supervise work on the trail.Colonel Daley not only visited the areahimself but ordered the commander ofthe 20th Engineer Combat Battalion, Lt.Col. J. E. Sonnefield, to take personalcharge. Although the 28th Divisionchief of staff ordered the division engi-neer at 1730 to take charge of theengineer operations in the Kall gorge,the real supervision apparently camefrom Colonel Sonnefield.33

31 Combat Interv 75 with Lutz; 112th Inf S-3Jnl, 4 Nov 44.

32 Combat Interv 75 with White and Sgt WilliamO'Neal, 3d Plat, Co C, 20th Engrs; SonnefieldStatement.

33 28th Div G-3 Jnl, 4 Nov 44; 112th Inf S-3 Jnl,4 Nov 44; Combat Interv 75 with Daley; SonnefieldStatement.

314 THREE BATTLES

893d Tank Destroyer BattalionJoins the Action

The 893d Tank Destroyer Battalion,attached initially to the 28th Division asindirect artillery support but preparedto move forward to repel enemy tankattack, had only two gun companiesavailable for commitment—CompaniesB and C. Throughout the action Com-pany A was attached to the 102d CavalryGroup to the north. One Company Cgun had developed a leaking recoil mech-anism while firing the initial jump-offconcentrations on 2 November and wasevacuated. A total of twenty-three de-stroyers remained for commitment.

Until 4 November the tank destroyerswere in indirect firing positions just southof Zweifall and north of Roetgen andwere co-ordinated with the 28th Divisionartillery. By noon on that date the Com-pany C destroyers had moved to new in-direct firing positions 2,500 yards westof Richelskaul from which a reportedGerman tank repair and maintenanceshop in Nideggen would be within range.A Reconnaissance Company platoonleader attached to Company C, 1st Lt.Jack W. Fuller, went ahead to recon-noiter the Kall trail in the event the de-stroyers were later ordered to Kommer-scheidt.

At approximately 1530 the 28th Divi-sion antitank officer, Maj. William W.Bodine, Jr., ordered Capt. Marion C.Pugh's Company C to send two platoonsinto Vossenack as antitank protection.After a preliminary reconnaissance, 1stLt. Goodwin W. McElroy's 3d Platoonmoved into Vossenack about 1700, goinginto positions on the south of town nearthe church. The 1st Platoon under 1stLt. Turney W. Leonard took up a posi-

tion of readiness near Germeter, and the2d Platoon remained in the indirect firepositions west of Richelskaul.

Company B, 893d, started forward justbefore dark from the indirect fire posi-tions south of Zweifall to move to theGermeter vicinity as further antitank pro-tection. Several of the company's de-stroyers bogged down on the narrow,muddy forest road. When the remainingvehicles reached a point about a thousandyards southwest of Germeter, they met thebattalion commander, Lt. Col. SamuelE. Mays, who ordered them off the roadinto indirect fire positions. The area far-ther forward, Colonel Mays told them,was already too cluttered with personneland equipment. Moving his guns intoposition, the Company B commander,Capt. John B. Cook, made arrangementsfor a T-2 retriever to recover the destroy-ers that had bogged down, and all thecompany's guns were returned duringthe night. Two towed guns of CompanyB, 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion, wereset up during the night near the Vosse-nack church and six towed guns were putinto position along the Richelskaul-Germeter road.

About 2315 Captain Pugh, CompanyC, 893d, was ordered to prepare his com-pany for movement to Kommerscheidt.Company B, 893d, would take over theantitank support of Vossenack, Lieu-tenant Fuller and Capt. Sidney C. Cole,commander of the Reconnaissance Com-pany, 893d, made another reconnaissanceof the Kall trail and returned about 0200with news that the route was still cloggedwith disabled tanks but would probablybe open by daylight. Company C's 1stand 3d Platoons went into an assemblyarea near the entrance of the Kall trailinto the wooded valley, ready to move to

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 315

Kommerscheidt upon the opening of thetrail. The 2d Platoon under 1st Lt. Cur-tis M. Edmund started moving to thewestern edge of Vossenack about 0530 inorder to be ready to follow the other pla-toons across the Kall River. En routeone of Lieutenant Edmund's destroyersstruck a mine near Richelskaul and hadto be abandoned. The platoon, nowwith only two guns left, did not arrivein Vossenack until 0730.

Company B, 893d, designated to re-place Company C in Vossenack, movedup about 0430, picking up guides fromthe rifle companies of the 2d Battalion,112th Infantry, which its platoons wereto support. The 2d Platoon went intoposition just north of the houses acrossthe street from the Vossenack church.The 3d deployed north of the road andwest of the 2d. The 1st Platoon, under1st Lt. Howard C. Davis, moved towardthe northeast of Vossenack. Its infantryguide stood in the turret of Davis' de-stroyer. As the platoon moved, heavyenemy artillery fire fell in the area. Oneshell exploded against the counterbal-ance of Davis' vehicle and blew awayhalf the infantry guide's head.34

Air Support

Weather was again the controllingfactor on 4 November in air support ofthe Schmidt operation. The first airattack of the day hit Schmidt at 1235after the 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry,had been driven out. Schmidt and itsenvirons, including Harscheidt, were

bombed and strafed by two other squad-rons during the day, and air claimedone armored vehicle destroyed and twotanks damaged. Two other squadronswere to fly missions against Schmidt;one had to cancel its mission becauseof weather and the other squadron wasvectored to different targets. The lattersquadron eventually had to jettison itsbombs when the weather closed in. Amission against Nideggen claimed onemotor vehicle and four armored vehiclesdestroyed. In the difficult weather,these might have been termed satisfac-tory results; but the large-scale interven-tion of enemy armor was proof enoughthat air support was not accomplishingthe vital mission of isolating the Schmidtbattlefield.35

109th and 110th Infantry Summaries

Early on 4 November the Germanslaunched what some men called a coun-terattack, but it was probably an at-tempt at infiltration against the 1st Bat-talion, 109th Infantry, in the woodssouthwest of Huertgen. (Map 26) TheGermans were beaten off but not beforethey had infiltrated the battalion's rearand surrounded the battalion observationpost, capturing or killing about fifteenmen, including most of the battalion staffand the artillery liaison party. Twocompanies of the 2d Battalion later at-tacked almost due east in another attemptto take the remaining part of the originalregimental objective east of the Huert-gen-Germeter road. They were stoppedby mines and small arms fire along theroad. A special task force from the 109thAntitank Company, the 630th Tank

34 Tank destroyer story is from the following: Com-bat Interv 76 with Fuller, Cole, Pugh, Davis, SgtHammet E. Murphy, and S Sgt William B. Gardner.All from Co B, 893d. See also V Corps Study, TDSec; 112th Inf S-3 Jnl, 4 Nov 44.

35 FUSA and IX TAC Sum, 4 Nov 44; V CorpsStudy, G-3 Air Sec; Combat Interv 74 with Howison.

317

Destroyer Battalion, and the 103d Engi-neers failed in an effort to capture a Ger-man road block to the regiment's left ata junction of two roads in the draw of theWeisser Weh Creek.36

In the woods to the south the 110thInfantry held with two battalions andattacked with the other (the 1st) fromVossenack south to Simonskall in aneffort to turn the stiff opposition at Raf-felsbrand by threatening the enemy rear.The attack was launched before dawnand before the 112th Infantry was hit sodisastrously at Schmidt. The battaliontook Simonskall by 0900 against negli-gible resistance. About noon one com-pany was committed to clean out theeast-west portion of the Richelskaul-Simonskall road, and the 2d and 3d Bat-talions sent out patrols supported byartillery fire. These units found theenemy still facing them in force and show-ing no inclination to withdraw despitethe 1st Battalion's movement toward hisrear. Although the 1st Battalion's newposition sealed off one end of the north-south river road, there was nothing toindicate that the move had been designedto protect the Kall gorge from the south.That it served to prevent enemy move-ment along this road from the south isapparent, but the enemy still had accessto the Kall trail area from the souththrough hundreds of yards of unprotectedwoods.37

The Enemy Situation

With the execution of two early morn-ing counterattacks against the 28th Divi-

36 Combat Interv 77 with 109th personnel; 109thInf S-3 Jnl, 4 Nov 44; 109th Inf AAR, Nov 44; 28thDiv G-3 Jnl, 4 Nov 44.

37 Combat Interv 77 with 110th personnel; 110thInf S-3 Jnl, 4 Nov 44; 28th Div G-3 Jnl, 4 Nov 44.

318 THREE BATTLES

sion's penetrations, German reserves hadmade their first prominent entry into theSchmidt action. At dawn German troopsattempted to infiltrate the 109th Infan-try's salient north of Germeter but wererepulsed. But also at dawn the 1055thRegiment (89th Division), assisted by anarmored group of the 16th Panzer Regi-ment (116th Panzer Division), launched itscounterattack against the Americans inSchmidt.38 The 1st and 3d Battalions,1055th Regiment, supported by tanks andassault guns, attacked from Harscheidtagainst Company L, 112th Infantry, andthe 2d Platoon, Company I. Accordingto American accounts, this attack spilledover to the Hasenfeld road against ele-ments of Company L and Company K.The 2d Battalion, 1055th Regiment, whichhad not completed its move from thesouthwest when the Americans tookSchmidt, attacked from the west againstelements of Company K and the 3d Pla-toon, Company I. The first Germantroops actually to re-enter Schmidt wereone platoon and a communications sec-tion, plus tanks and assault gun support,of the 3d Battalion, 1055th Regiment. The1055th Regiment, still assisted by armoredelements of the 16th Panzer Regiment, con-tinued its attack that afternoon againstKommerscheidt. A battalion of the347th Infantry Division, adjoining the 89thDivision to the south, had been movedinto a defensive position astride theHasenfeld-Schmidt road, but there is noindication that this battalion participatedin the attacks.

The afternoon assault against Kom-merscheidt penetrated only the southernedges of the village, which the Americanshad not occupied. Meanwhile, news hadbeen received that Simonskall had fallen,and the German command ordered com-mitment of another unit, the 1056th Regi-ment (89th Division), although there is noindication that this unit actually enteredthe action until the next day.39 Theavailability of this regiment was a resultof the continuing arrival of units of the272d Volks Grenadier Division to relieve the89th Division. At some time during theday the 156th Panzer Grenadier Regiment(third regiment of the 116th Panzer Divi-sion) moved into the woods north ofVossenack and thus faced the 2d Bat-talion, 112th Infantry.

Also on 4 November, Army Group Band Seventh Army sent several artillery,assault gun, antitank, and mortar bat-talions into the sector, and LXXIV Corpscommitted the artillery and antitankguns of those of its divisions not affectedby the 28th Division's attack (possiblythe 347th Infantry Division, the 272d VolksGrenadier Division, and the 12th VolksGrenadier Division). These were in addi-tion to the organic artillery and antitankweapons of the three committed Germandivisions, the 116th Panzer, the 89th, andthe 275th, plus the assault guns of the 116thPanzer Division. These additions in sup-porting troops probably accounted forthe marked increase in German artilleryfire noted on this date.

38 89th Division Order of the Day states that the 2dBattalion, 60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, participatedin this attack, but the only 28th Division prisoneridentification of this unit on 4 November was on the109th Infantry front north of Germeter. 28th DivG-2 File, 4-5 Nov 44. See also V Corps G-2 File,and MS # A-905 (Waldenburg).

39 At this time the 89th Division had only two in-fantry regiments, the 1055th and 1056th, both badlymauled in the battles in France and reconstitutedfrom conglomerate units, plus assorted engineer,antitank, reconnaissance, artillery, signal, antiair-craft, and Landesschuetzen (local security) units. SeeMS # P-032a by Generalmajor Walter Bruns, for-merly CG of 89th Infantry Division.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 319

The over-all German plan, designedto restore the status quo which had existedon the opening day of the American of-fensive, had now begun to take shape.Initially that plan had directed only acounterattack from the Huertgen area tocut off the American penetration in Voss-enack, but when the move to Schmidthad revealed the strategic aim of theoffensive the plan had been broadened.Seventh Army had ordered that the wingsof the salient be held firmly against fur-ther widening, that the 89th Division(assisted by the 16th Panzer Regiment) re-take Schmidt and Kommerscheidt,40 andthat the 116th Panzer Division launch aconcentric attack to retake Vossenack.With Schmidt recaptured, the Germansplanned the next day (5 November) torenew the attack against Kommerscheidt,to continue the build-up of the 156thPanzer Grenadier Regiment against Vosse-nack on the north, and to send the Recon-naissance Battalion of the 116th PanzerDivision down the Kall gorge from thenortheast. The latter move was designedto accomplish two things: to put troopsinto position to assist a later attack againstVossenack and to cut off the Americansin Kommerscheidt by linking up in theKall gorge with elements of the 1056thRegiment (89th Division), which had beenordered to close a gap in German linescreated by the capture of Simonskall.The Germans did not realize that theirattempt at a link-up in the Kall gorge

would meet little resistance—the 28thDivision had taken virtually no defensivemeasures against the obvious possibilityof such a maneuver.41

Summary for 4 November and Night of4-5 November

This day of 4 November had beenestablished as a dark moment in the 28thDivision's battle for Schmidt, at least inthe sector of the main effort being madeby the 112th Infantry. One plannedphase of the operation, isolation of thebattlefield by air support, could alreadybe considered—no matter how explain-able by implausibility of the original mis-sion or by weather difficulties—a distinctfailure. Still, all was far from lost, andthough the man in the foxhole in Vosse-nack or Kommerscheidt or working thedifficult supply route might wonder ifsuccess were possible, preparations werebeing made to retake the territory lostduring the day.

The enemy had dealt the 3d Battalion,112th Infantry, a swift counterblow inSchmidt that morning; still, CompaniesA and D and three tanks and the rem-nants of the 3d Battalion had managedto hold in Kommerscheidt, although thepicture had looked dark when the Ger-mans struck there about 1400. But theGermans had reeled back from Kommer-scheidt, having lost at least five tanks andan unestimated number of men.

Still virtually intact was Company C,112th Infantry, in the edge of the woodsnorth of Kommerscheidt, and supporting

40 MS # A-905 (Waldenburg) shows only an"armored group" comprising twenty to thirty tanksof the 16th Panzer Regiment at Schmidt and Kommer-scheidt, but this "group" was commanded by theregimental commander and was a sizable part of theregiment. While other elements of this regimentapparently operated north of the American penetra-tion, reference to the armored group at Kommer-scheidt is hereafter made as 16th Panzer Regiment. Seealso MS # A-891 (Gersdorff).

41 MSS # A-891 and A-892 (Gersdorff); MS# A-905 (Waldenburg); MS # C-016 (Straube);ETHINT 56 (Gersdorff and Waldenburg); Sit Rpts,2-4 Nov 44, found in OB WEST KTB Anlagen1.-10.XI.44.; 28th Div G-2 Jnl and File, Nov 44;89th Division Order of the Day; MS # P-032a (Bruns).

320 THREE BATTLES

it was the 1st Platoon, Company C, 20thEngineers, farther down the trail towardthe river. But neither unit was in a posi-tion to defend the vital Kall bridge, andCompany A, 20th Engineers, ostensiblygiven such a mission, was in a defense inthe edge of the woods southeast of Vosse-nack with only a four-man security guardactually in a position to cover the bridge.

The Kall trail was now presumed to bepassable again after another day andnight of work, and one five-weasel supplytrain from the 707th Tank Battalion hadpassed and returned. Poised to moveacross the river along this route were theremainder of Company A, 707th TankBattalion (only five tanks, plus the threealready in Kommerscheidt), and Com-pany C, 893d Tank Destroyer Battalion,with ten M-10 tank destroyers.

Although persistent enemy shelling haddemoralized the defenders of Vossenack,the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, was stillin position there. Assisting it were aplatoon of tanks from Company C, 707thTank Battalion (the other tanks of Com-pany C had moved to ready positionsnear Germeter), and Company B, 893dTank Destroyer Battalion, with twelvenewly arrived tank destroyers. Com-pany B, 112th Infantry, except for thelosses in its initial attack on 2 Novemberwas still intact in its Richelskaul defenseto the rear.

Medical evacuation from Kommer-scheidt and Vossenack was evidently pro-ceeding successfully, although with diffi-culty from the hazards of the Kall trailand shelling along the Vossenack ridge.

Communication by telephone 42 had beenconsistently poor because of heavy enemyshelling, but radios were generally givingsatisfactory service, although the engi-neers in the Kall gorge had found recep-tion poor in the low areas. Nevertheless,all requests for artillery fire were appar-ently getting through. Weather wasstill hampering all operations, particu-larly air support, and, if it had not al-ready been deduced that air could notisolate the battlefield, continued enemycommitments would certainly prove it.

The 109th Infantry had met with littlesuccess in completing its mission in thewoods to the north but had held againstanother determined German counter-attack. To the south the 110th Infantryhad met its first success in this battlewith the capture of Simonskall, but theattack had used the division's only in-fantry reserve.

Artillery of the 229th Field ArtilleryBattalion in direct support of the 112thInfantry fired missions throughout thenight against possible enemy assemblyareas in the Kommerscheidt-Schmidtarea. The commanders hoped to dis-courage expected continuation of enemycountermeasures against Kommerscheidt.

42 On 3 November the 3d Battalion, 112th Infan-try, had laid telephone wire by hand as it advancedto Schmidt, and the 1st Battalion, 112th, laid wire toKommerscheidt. On 4 November both circuits ap-parently broke down, and despite efforts to replacethem enemy shelling and patrol action kept the wireout for the rest of the operation. Circuits betweenGermeter and Vossenack were repaired at leasttwenty times, but there were still long periods withno telephone communication to Vossenack. See VCorps Study, Com Sec.

CHAPTER IV

More Action at Kommerscheidt(5 November)

The men of the 1st and 3d Battalions,112th Infantry, remained in position intheir Kommerscheidt defenses in earlymorning of 5 November. (See Map X.)They strove to get a few fitful momentsof sleep despite the intense cold whichcame just before dawn. Many had noovercoats or blankets to keep them warmand tried to dig their foxholes deeper toward off the icy temperatures. Just atdawn the enemy's artillery and mortarssuddenly roared again into intensity, andthe disheartened infantrymen dreadedwhat they believed would follow. Theirpositions were at best hastily organizedwith a haphazard intermingling of com-panies and platoons, and they had onlythree tanks in support. A previous esti-mate that there were 200 men of the 3dBattalion in position was scaled down to100. In addition, there were combat-de-pleted Company A and the survivingheavy weapons of Company D. Com-pany C was in reserve along the woodsline to the north but in position to contrib-ute little by direct fire toward repelling anattack against Kommerscheidt itself, andCompany B and one heavy machine gunplatoon were still back at Richelskaul.

It was just after dawn when the enemyfire lifted, and through the early morningmist observers could see at least five Ger-man tanks emerge from their Schmidthide-out and head toward Kommer-

scheidt, firing as they moved. A smallforce of enemy infantry came out of thewooded draw to the southeast andlaunched an attack against Company A'sleft flank positions. The 1st Platoon andits heavy weapons support engaged theinfantry with small arms, machine gun,and mortar fire; and supporting artilleryof the 229th Field Artillery Battalion firedseveral heavy concentrations. The Ger-man infantry attack was stopped, but thetanks on the south continued on.

Lieutenant Fleig and his three tanksfrom Company A, 707th Tank Battalion,were in the shallow open draw on the north-west flank of Kommerscheidt. While theGerman tanks were still at long range, thethree American tanks moved to the crestof the little rise south of the draw andfired, scoring seven hits on one GermanMark V and immobilizing it. The re-maining enemy tanks continued to firebut did not press the assault. SupportingAmerican artillery continued to fire con-centrations on enemy tanks and troopsin Schmidt. At the cost of a number ofcasualties, among them both the com-pany commander, Captain Rokey, andthe executive officer of Company I, Kom-merscheidt had held aerain.1

1 Combat Interv 75 with Toner, Holden, Kelly-Hunter, Piercey, Quinton-Hausman-Lockwood-Kertes-Norton; Combat Interv 76 with Hostrup-Fleig-Payne; 112th Inf S-3 Jnl, 5 Nov 44; 28th DivG-3 Jnl, 5 Nov 44; 28th Div Arty Jnl, 5 Nov 44.

TANK DESTROYERS M-10 of 893d Tank Destroyer Battalion, moving up over anarrow, muddy forest road west of Germeter.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 323

Tank Destroyers Try for Kommerscheidt

The preceding night the tank destroy-ers of two platoons of Company C, 893dTank Destroyer Battalion, had moved toready positions southeast of Vossenackto await word that the main supply routethrough the Kall defile was clear of dis-abled tanks. That word came after theengineers had blasted at approximately0400, and Lieutenant Leonard, accom-panied by Lieutenant Fuller, reconnais-sance platoon leader, led out before dawnwith his 1st Platoon. As LieutenantMcElroy's 3d Platoon followed, one of hisdestroyers threw a track in moving out ofthe muddy assembly area, but the otherscontinued, finding that the supply routehad indeed been cleared but that totraverse it still took time-consuming cau-tion. Leonard's platoon reached Kom-merscheidt about 0930. By the timeMcElroy reached the woods line over-looking the town from the north, his de-stroyer had developed an oil leak andwas overheating. He halted to work onhis destroyer, holding up the vehicles ofhis platoon behind him; but eventuallyhe pulled his gun off the trail and joinedanother crew as the column continuedinto town. The 3d Platoon, 893d, joinedthe 1st in Kommerscheidt about 1000,making available a total of seven de-stroyers.2

Another Enemy Attack

About 0920 a message from Gen-eral Cota, the division commander,had reached Kommerscheidt, orderingColonel Peterson to renew the attack torecapture Schmidt without delay. Thatwas as far as the order got. As the mes-

sage arrived the men in Kommerscheidtwere being subjected to another Germanattack. Whether it was a new attack ora continuation of the stalled dawn at-tack, the infantrymen could not tell inthe confusion. They did know thatenemy infantry again assaulted the left-flank positions, coming in from thewooded draw to the southeast. Theenemy tanks joined this attack only withsupporting fire from Schmidt, althoughseveral tanks moved about out of sighton a road in the woods to the east, theirengines racing and sirens blasting, appar-ently trying to unnerve the Americans.

This second German assault of theday was in full progress when the self-propelled guns of Company C, 893dTank Destroyer Battalion, arrived inthe town. Lieutenant Leonard andLieutenant McElroy co-ordinated im-mediately with Lieutenant Fleig, thetank officer, placing Leonard's 1st TankDestroyer Platoon near the three tankson the right (west) flank of town and theother platoon, the 3d, on the left (east)of town. The destroyers joined with thethree tanks in firing back at the support-ing enemy tanks in Schmidt, but with-out reported success.

On the left flank, where the Germaninfantry had again assaulted, 2d Lt. RayM. Borders, Company M, seized anabandoned automatic rifle and sprayedthe infantry attackers, knocking out al-most two full squads of German machinegunners. Small arms, machine gun, mor-tar, and supporting artillery fire, plus thetimely arrival of the tank destroyers,halted the half-hearted German effort.Once again Kommerscheidt had held.3

2 Combat Interv 76 with Pugh, Fuller, and Lt ColSamuel E. Mays, CO, 893d TD Bn.

3 Combat Interv 75 with Piercey, Quinton-Haus-man-Lockwood-Kertes-Norton, Ripperdam, andKelly-Hunter; Combat Interv 76 with Hostrup-Fleig-Payne, Pugh, Mays.

324 THREE BATTLES

Events Along the Kall Trail

Except for some .30-caliber ammuni-tion brought up by Captain Pynchon,707th Tank Battalion, the first infantrysupplies to reach Kommerscheidt afterthe Schmidt withdrawal arrived justbefore dawn on 5 November before theGermans had launched their first attackof the day. The load included enoughemergency rations for all the infantryin the town and much-needed small armsammunition. In charge of the supplyconvoy was Lieutenant George, motorofficer of the 3d Battalion, 112th Infan-try, who had earlier led the three-weaselsupply train to Schmidt. He had movedthrough the main supply route withoutundue difficulty after the tanks had beenpulled off the trail.

George and his supply party startedback shortly after dawn. At an ammu-nition supply point established by thelieutenant at the exit of the Kall trailonto the open Vossenack ridge, the groupmet a force of tank destroyers on its wayto Kommerscheidt. George secured theassistance of the destroyers in transport-ing additional mortar shells and miscel-laneous ammunition which had been re-quested and then returned to the regi-mental motor pool west of Germeter.There the regimental S-4 put him incharge of getting all supplies to Kom-merscheidt.

Intending to lead another supply trainforward after dark that night, LieutenantGeorge first planned a reconnaissance ofthe trail in the hope of taking two-and-one-half-ton trucks forward. With S. Sgt.John M. Ward, Company I supply ser-geant, he again approached the entranceof the supply route into the Kall woodsand was surprised to see in the distance

two figures in German uniforms and an-other in American uniform. The Ameri-can-dressed figure waved and yelled tothem. Cautiously, Lieutenant Georgeand Sergeant Ward advanced. Theyfound that two of the men were Germanmedics and the third a wounded Ameri-can officer whom they recognized as the112th Infantry S-2, Captain Mont-gomery.

Captain Montgomery had gone for-ward the day before with Colonel Lock-ett, regimental executive officer, twocameramen, and a jeep driver and hadnot been heard from since. Now Cap-tain Montgomery revealed that the partyhad proceeded toward the Kall and hadbeen nearing the Mestrenger Muehlewhen it had run into a German ambush.Captain Montgomery had been woundedby the firing, and the entire party hadbeen captured. The uninjured Ameri-cans were led away and Montgomerywas left behind. Two German medicshad come upon him later, and, whilethey attended his wound, he had talkedthem into surrendering.4

The Tanks

About 0700, Captain Hostrup, Com-pany A, 707th Tank Battalion, startedfor Kommerscheidt with six tanks, in-cluding his own command vehicle. Heincorporated into one full platoon thefour tanks left of the 3d Platoon, under2d Lt. Richard H. Payne, and the onetank of Lieutenant Clarke's 2d Platoon.The 2d Platoon tank was apparently oneof those that had bellied or thrown atrack in the open south of Vossenack theday before. Hostrup put Lieutenant

4 Combat Interv 75 with George, Dana; 112th InfS-2 and S-3 Jnls, 5 Nov 44.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 325

Payne at the head of the column, and hiscommand tank followed in the rear.Payne arrived at the woods line overlook-ing Kommerscheidt about 0900 andhalted there at the direction of LieutenantFleig in Kommerscheidt. Still on theKall trail between Company C, 112thInfantry, and the river, Captain Hostrup'stank developed engine trouble, stalled,and could not be started again. The hillmass prevented direct radio communica-tion with Fleig, but using Payne's leadtank as a relay Hostrup directed Fleigto take command of the company untilhe could get forward in his own tank.Fleig summoned the five tanks underPayne into Kommerscheidt about 1300,assigning them the right flank positions.He and his three veteran tanks moved tothe left flank.5

Action Again in Kommerscheidt

Enemy artillery against Kommerscheidtcontinued intermittently after the secondGerman attack of the morning. Then,about 1400, word passed almost elec-trically through the thin line of riflemenin foxholes and buildings: "Tanks!"The fear of enemy tanks had becomealmost a psychological terror. A num-ber of men jumped from their foxholesand headed for the rear. Only quickaction by NCO's and officers preventeda general flight.

The report that enemy tanks were ap-proaching was half rumor, half fact. TheGermans did employ tanks at intervalsthroughout the afternoon, one or twotanks supporting small infantry forcesin what were apparently probing effortsagainst various sectors of the line; but no

general tank attack developed. Theenemy tankers contented themselves withfiring, often with deadly effect, from theirdominating Schmidt positions some 800yards away.

With the arrival of six tank destroyers(one was still at the woods line) and fivemore tanks, six destroyers and eight tankswere present for the defense. One de-stroyer was knocked out during theafternoon by enemy tank fire, leavingfive. The infantry was strengthenedslightly by the 2d Platoon of Company C,112th Infantry, under T. Sgt. CarlBeckes, moving up from the woods lineon the north.

An air strike by American P-47's hitthe Germans in Schmidt in midafternoon,and men of Company D, 112th Infantrysaw a P-47 blast a German tank with abomb at a crossroads in the northernedge of Schmidt. This was probablypart of an attack by a squadron of the365th Group. At one time during theafternoon, a group of Germans tried tocome in on the left flank of the Kommer-scheidt positions over an exposed knoll,but mortars of Companies D and M,despite an alarming ammunition short-age, broke up the attack before it couldgain momentum.

The enemy's probing efforts continuedthrough the afternoon but accomplishedlittle other than harassment of the alreadyfatigued defenders. Toward dusk camethe usual intense enemy mortar and ar-tillery barrage, succeeded by routinenoise of early night movement and inter-mittent shelling. The riflemen couldhear enemy tanks churning around totheir front, and the voices of Germansoldiers gave the impression that theenemy was collecting his dead. Onegroup of Germans got so close to the5 Combat Interv 76 with Hostrup-Fleig-Payne.

326 THREE BATTLES

defensive positions that the Germanscalled out for the Americans to surrender.A determined burst of small arms fire wasthe response.6

Company B, 112th, Moves Up

The success of the 110th Infantry'sflanking drive the day before to takeSimonskall was considered to eliminatethe necessity of holding Company B,112th Infantry, at Richelskaul. WithLieutenant Simon, assistant S-3, 3dBattalion, leading, the company and itsattached heavy machine gun platoonmoved out at midday in single file, pro-ceeding cautiously along the edge of thewoods south of Vossenack, down the Kalltrail, and into Kommerscheidt. Theonly casualty came when a stray roundof artillery fire fell as the company movedbetween the northern woods line andKommerscheidt.

Company B, minus one platoon, wentinto position on the southeast betweenthe 3d Battalion elements and CompanyA. The other rifle platoon under T. Sgt.Bruce Pitman was to go in with CompanyL and the 3d Platoon, Company A, onthe southwest. The platoon waited onthe edge of town for Sergeant Pitman tofind out from Captain Walker, CompanyL commander, what the platoon sectorwas to be. As the men waited, theGermans threw in their usual earlyevening shelling, driving the Americansto cover. When Pitman returned, hereorganized his men in the darkness.One man was missing, and the sergeant

again told the platoon to wait while hemade a search for him. A burning houseon the edge of town lent an eerie atmos-phere to an already tense situation, andthe men, feeling that every move theymade was silhouetted against the flames,scattered again. When Sergeant Pitmanfailed to return, a squad leader and theplatoon guide, S. Sgt. Roy Littlehales,went to took for him. They found himabout twenty-five yards away; he hadbeen hit by an artillery shell and wasbeyond medical assistance.7

The Tank Destroyers

The remaining platoon of Company C,893d Tank Destroyer Battalion, Lieu-tenant Edmund's 2d Platoon, with onlytwo guns, was delayed in reaching Kom-merscheidt because the company com-mander, Captain Pugh, wanted to makea personal reconnaissance of the situationbefore committing his last two guns.Edmund's two vehicles finally reachedthe northern Kommerscheidt woods linebetween 1600 and 1630. Captain Pughplaced them in the edge of the woods ina reserve position with orders to go intoKommerscheidt at daybreak. He hadbeen unable to find his two lieutenants,Leonard and McElroy, in Kommer-scheidt and left for Vossenack to try toget at least one replacement officer andto form a party for resupply of his guns.

Five operational tank destroyers werenow in Kommerscheidt and three werebehind the Company C, 112th Infantry,positions. One of the latter three wasLieutenant McElroy's with an oil leak.These were all the remaining guns of6 Combat Interv 75 with Dana, Ripperdam,

Kelly-Hunter, Perll, Holden, Piercey, Walker,Toner; Combat Interv 76 with Hostrup-Fleig-Payne; 112th Inf S-3 Jnl, 5 Nov 44; FUSA and IXTAC Sum, 5 Nov 44.

7 Combat Interv 75 with Simon, Littlehales-Skain,Walker, Kelly-Hunter; 112th Inf S-3 Jnl, 5 Nov 44.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 327

Company C, 893d.8 Although the in-fantry did not feel that the destroyerswere sufficiently aggressive, an opinionshared by the infantry regimental com-mander, the addition of tank destroyershad substantially strengthened the Kom-merscheidt defense.9

Command in Kommerscheidt

A forward command post group underMaj. Richard A. Dana, S-3, 112thInfantry, moved up about noon to thevicinity of the Company C, 112th, posi-tions and later shifted slightly to the rearto a hunting lodge alongside the Kalltrail. While this forward displacementcould be expected to assist the Kommer-scheidt defense in both command andmorale, it nevertheless left the rear com-mand post virtually nonoperative, pri-marily because communications werepoor and because no one was left innominal command. The S-1, S-4, andregimental surgeon had to base most oftheir information on hearsay from strag-glers and wounded and from occasionalsupply groups that got through toKommerscheidt.10

During the day Colonel Flood, the 3dBattalion commander, was evacuated forslight wounds and combat exhaustion.Before his evacuation Maj. R. C. Chris-

tensen, executive officer, assumed com-mand. The 1st and 3d Battalions hadlost so many men and had become sointermingled that Major Hazlett, the 1stBattalion commander, was placed inover-all command of both battalions.Captain Walker, Company L, was placedunder him in command of all infantryelements on the right flank, consistingnow of one platoon of Company A, ele-ments of Companies I and L, and, afterdark, Sergeant Pitman's platoon ofCompany B.11

Telephone facilities to the rear hadbecome almost nonexistent on 5 Novem-ber. Communications consisted primar-ily of radios, with some use made ofmessengers. After dark Lieutenant Si-mon, assistant S-3, 3d Battalion, wassent back with a message from ColonelPeterson to General Cota, delivered atabout 2300. In effect, the message saidthat the 1st and 3d Battalions were prettywell disorganized, that the men wereshell shocked, that the armor in Kom-merscheidt was not as strong as desired,that the tank destroyers were not suffi-ciently aggressive, and that he (Peterson)would try to reorganize and hold thetown. He added that if possible hewould try to retake Schmidt; but ap-parently such optimism on the part ofthe regimental commander was forced.12

The Engineers

The 1st Platoon of Company C, 20thEngineers, which had dug in the nightbefore with its company headquartersgroup to the rear of Company C, 112thInfantry, early on 5 November began

8 One tank destroyer had developed a leakingrecoil mechanism on 2 November; another had hit amine near Richelskaul on 4 November; a third hadthrown a track southeast of Vossenack; a fourth wasknocked out in Kommerscheidt that afternoon byenemy tank fire.

9 Combat Interv 75 with Simon, Kelly-Hunter;Combat Interv 76 with Pugh. In view of theenemy's terrain advantage and the lack of armor ontank destroyers, there seems to be insufficient evidenceto characterize the destroyers as nonaggressive.

10 Combat Interv 75 with Dana; 112th Inf S-3 Jnl,5 Nov 44; Ltr, Maj Berndt to Hist Div.

11 Combat Interv 75 with Walker, Simon, Dana.12 Combat Interv 75 with Simon; 28th Div G-3

Jnl, 5 Nov 44; Interv with Peterson.

328 THREE BATTLES

maintenance of the main supply routefrom the bridge to Kommerscheidt. Justbefore dark a nine-man mine detectordetail attempted to check the roadswithin the town, but enemy artillery firediscouraged its efforts. Lieutenant Os-sola's platoon of Company B, 20thEngineers, continued maintenance andrevetment of shoulders of the supply routewest of the Kall. Company A, 20th,which had gone into defensive positionsdesignated by General Davis in the edgeof the woods on the southeastern nose ofVossenack ridge, left one platoon, the 3d,in the defense and sent the others to workon the trail east of the Kall. Some menof the company assisted Company B withthe bulldozer and air compressors, andthe four-man security guard remained onthe river bridge.13

The Greene Hornets

Lieutenant Greene's "Greene Hornet"patrol squad had been inactive since itsfirst flank security patrol mission on 3November, thus ceasing virtually the onlypatrolling in which the regiment engagedduring the period. On the night of 4November Greene received orders to leada group of officers and enlisted men, whohad returned from Paris passes, to theirunits in Kommerscheidt. The lieutenantvolunteered to take an SCR 300 forwardwith him. He delivered it in Kommer-scheidt after its aerial had been "snappedby rifle fire" in the Kall valley; afterapproximately ten minutes' operation,the radio refused to function. Greenethen returned to the rear, stopped at theforward regimental switchboard in theformer German barracks at Germeter,

and began to assist the operators inplacing calls. When a party from the2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, discoveredthat his operator was Lieutenant Greene,he asked the lieutenant to relay firemissions—his own communications tosupporting fires had been knocked out.For the remainder of the operation, whilehis patrol group worked at bringing inprisoners, carrying rations, and perform-ing general supply tasks, LieutenantGreene continued to act as a fire relaywhich became known as the "GreeneHornet Switch" from his melodramaticanswer to all calls: "This is the GreeneHornet."14

Tank Supply

At approximately 2000 a 707th TankBattalion supply party with one jeep,three weasels, and one two-and-one-half-ton truck carrying gasoline, rations,water, two batteries, and a tank generatorreached the entrance of the Kall trailinto the valley woods. With a whitehandkerchief tied around his helmet,Captain Pynchon, battalion S-4, led theway on foot. The column moved slowly,often being held up to allow medicaljeeps to pass toward the rear. Some 300yards past the river bridge, the party wassubjected to eight or nine rounds ofenemy shellfire. One helmet was blownoff.

Reaching the woods line north ofKommerscheidt shortly after 2200, Capt.Donald C. Kelley, Headquarters Com-pany, 707th Tank Battalion, and 1st Lt.Charles S. Weniger, Service Companytransportation officer, continued with theweasels to the slight draw just northwestof Kommerscheidt. There they went on13 Combat Interv 75 with White, Lutz, Doherty,

Krieder.14 Combat Interv 75 with Greene.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 329

foot from tank to tank distributing thesupplies. Lieutenant Fleig asked themto report to Captain Hostrup that thetankers in Kommerscheidt would not usetheir radios except under absolute neces-sity, because they had been under almostconstant shelling all day and felt, rightlyor wrongly, that the radios were drawingfire.

Now that passage of the main supplyroute with a two-and-one-half-ton truckhad been proved feasible, LieutenantWeniger left with a weasel for Germeterin order to get additional trucks to bringup more ammunition while it was stilldark and establish a forward ammunitionsupply point. The lieutenant's weaselthrew a track immediately upon startingback, and he had to return for another.The second time he continued withoutmishap. Captain Kelley believed theexcessive number of thrown weasel trackswas due to the fact that the drivers werehastily converted infantrymen who hadhad only three days' experience with theirvehicles.

Captain Pynchon, Captain Kelley, andthe Headquarters Company supply ser-geant, S. Sgt. Curtis E. Walker, remainedin the Kommerscheidt area, and Lieu-tenant Rogers left for Germeter with theremaining empty weasel, the jeep, andthe two-and-one-half-ton truck just aftermidnight. The return column cameunder enemy mortar fire near the Kallbridge but escaped unscathed. At theexit of the trail from the woods southeastof Vossenack the truck found difficultyin climbing the steep, slippery grade.An engineer bulldozer close by was calledto assist, and the two big vehicles drewspasmodic machine gun fire from thewoods line to the southwest. There wereno casualties, and the column was soon

able to move on. It came under heavyenemy artillery fire in Vossenack buteventually reached Germeter safely about0330 (6 November).15

Infantry Supply

Lieutenant George, who was in chargeof supplying the infantry in Kommer-scheidt and who had earlier in the daycome upon Captain Montgomery and thetwo German medics, went forward againaround dusk with a supply force of onetwo-and-one-half-ton truck and severalweasels. Once the group reached thewooded part of the Kall trail, LieutenantGeorge put Sergeant Ward, the CompanyI supply sergeant, in charge of the trainand himself returned to Germeter foranother supply train. It consisted oftwo trucks, one jeep, and three weasels,two of which towed 57-mm. antitankguns from the 3d Battalion, 112th Infan-try. Once again reaching the entranceof the trail into the woods southeast ofVossenack, Lieutenant George told hismen to take cover in abandoned foxholesnear by while he made a reconnaissanceon foot. Farther along the trail he foundSergeant Ward and was told by him thatthe advance supply train had gonethrough, although one weasel had throwna track. The intense artillery fire in thearea had affected Ward's nerves so badlythat George sent the sergeant to the rearto report to the medics.

Returning to his supply train, Lieu-tenant George slowly and cautiously ledhis vehicles along the treacherous trail.Nevertheless, one of the weasels threw atrack. While the men detached theantitank gun, attached it again to the

15 Combat Interv 76 with Pynchon, Hostrup-Fleig-Payne, and Kelley.

330 THREE BATTLES

jeep, and began to transfer the weasel'ssupplies to the other vehicles, one squadof the 3d Battalion Antitank Platoonunder S. Sgt. Leo L. Cannon moved onahead in one of the remaining weasels.

The main column under LieutenantGeorge started forward again and hadalmost reached the bottom of the gorgewhen the men saw a sudden bright glowup ahead and heard an explosion. Afew minutes later a man from SergeantCannon's antitank gun crew staggeredback to them. Burned almost black,the soldier said the squad had been am-bushed. The Germans had blasted theirweasel with three phosphorous grenadesor shells. Moving forward to investigate,the remainder of Lieutenant George'ssupply group saw no Germans but foundanother antitank soldier burned slightlyand two others seriously injured. Ser-geant Cannon could not be found.

With this warning fresh in mind, thecolumn put out security for the con-tinuance of its movement. Six roundsof artillery fell near it at the switchbackseast of the river, but it reached the for-ward regimental command post unmo-lested. Lieutenant George establishedan ammunition supply point in thevicinity of the Company C, 112th Infan-try, positions, and the men dug in for thenight, the two 57-mm. guns going intopositions with the near-by infantry.

The time was now about midnight.Although the enemy ambush indicatedthat the Germans planned to infiltratethe supply route, the empty vehicles ofLieutenant Rogers, 707th Tank Battalion,moved through it without mishap aftermidnight. There was even an engineerbulldozer working in the area as thecolumn passed.16

Tank Destroyer Supply

Back in Vossenack to check on supplyand to try to get officer replacements,Captain Pugh, commander of CompanyC, 893d Tank Destroyer Battalion, re-ceived a radio message about 2200 fromLieutenant Edmund, 2d Tank DestroyerPlatoon leader, in the edge of the Kom-merscheidt woods. The 1st and 3dTank Destroyer Platoons from the townhad by this time joined Edmund's andall three were planning to move to Kom-merscheidt before daylight. But now,Edmund reported to Pugh, an unidenti-fied infantry captain, claiming that theinfantry in Kommerscheidt were pullingout without the presence of the destroy-ers, was ordering them back into Kom-merscheidt immediately. Captain Pughtold Lieutenant Edmund to hold thedestroyers where they were.

A few minutes later Captain Pugh re-ceived another radio message—to reportto the forward regimental command post.The trail to the command post across theKall was blocked by a supply train, andPugh had to wait. Lieutenant Edmundradioed again: the same infantry captainwas again insisting that the tank destroy-ers move back into Kommerscheidt.Radioing Colonel Mays, 893d command-er, for concurrence, Captain Pugh againordered Lieutenant Edmund to remainwhere he was. As the company com-mander still waited to cross the Kall, the1st Tank Destroyer Platoon sergeant,S. Sgt. Arlie W. Wilson, radioed that theinfantry captain was "raising hell," eventhreatening court-martial if the destroy-ers were not moved forward. CaptainPugh repeated his orders, but the 1st and3d Platoons went back into town shortlyafter the last call—they had apparently16 Combat Interv 75 with George.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 331

tired of wrangling. Hearing an explo-sion in the Kall gorge that meant oneof the supply vehicles ahead had hit amine, Pugh gave up his attempt to getforward that night and returned toVossenack.17

While Captain Pugh was waiting tocross the river, Lieutenant Fuller, recon-naissance platoon leader for the tankdestroyers, attempted to move forwardin an armored car to resupply the tankdestroyers in Kommerscheidt. When hereached the valley trail and found itblocked by a weasel and three or fourother vehicles, he returned to Vossenackwith ammunition and planned to makeanother attempt to go through the nextday. Apparently both Lieutenant Fullerand Captain Pugh had come upon thetail of Lieutenant George's last infantrysupply column.18

Back at the division command post,Colonel Mays, 893d commander, hadreceived what must have been a delayedreport that an infantry supply train wasmoving to Kommerscheidt about mid-night. He radioed his Company B inVossenack to be alert for this train andto attach one of its platoons to it. Thetrain had evidently passed before Com-pany B received the message, for thecompany never saw the supply column.19

The Medics

On 5 November the aid station of the1st Battalion, 112th Infantry, was still ina basement in the northern edge of Kom-merscheidt, while the 3d Battalion aidstation remained in the log dugout along-

side the main supply route in the Kallgorge west of the river. In Kommer-scheidt the 1st Battalion surgeon, CaptainLinguiti, had been disturbed by con-tinued concentration of fighting personneland equipment around his aid stationsite. After a supply train had depositedits load near the aid station entrancebefore daylight and distribution hadtaken place from there for several hours,he had no doubt about the cause of anenemy shelling that centered on thehouse, injuring several patients andkilling three medics.

During the afternoon medical weaselsand available jeeps, including that of the3d Battalion chaplain, were used toshuttle patients from the Kommerscheidtaid station to the 3d Battalion stationalongside the main supply route. Whenall patients from the forward site hadbeen evacuated, the medical officers de-cided to abandon the 1st Battalion stationexcept as a forward collecting point andto combine the two battalions' medicalfacilities in the log dugout. Eight litterbearers from the 1st Battalion and adriver with his jeep were left to man thecollecting point.

Many walking wounded were evacu-ated past the 3d Battalion aid station.They were sent on foot to the edge of thewoods southeast of Vossenack whereambulances from Company C, 103dMedical Battalion, maintained a forwardloading point. Lack of weasels andlitter bearers prevented further evacua-tion of many litter cases, although allpersonnel of the regimental aid stationwho could be spared had already beensent forward as substitute litter bearers.

The first indication the medical per-sonnel had of any impending infiltrationof the Kall trail came near midnight.

17 Combat Interv 76 with Pugh.18 Combat Interv 76 with Fuller.19 Combat Interv 76 with Mays, Davis-Murphy-

Gardner.

332 THREE BATTLES

Pfc. Delmar C. Putney, leading a groupof walking wounded from Kommer-scheidt, was stopped by enemy medics onthe trail east of the river. The Germansforced him at gunpoint to carry a wound-ed German soldier for some distancealong the trail. They then releasedPutney, and he made his way to the logaid station and told his story.20

Formation of Task Force R

By noon of 5 November wishful rumorhad spread among the fighting men inKommerscheidt that division was forminga special task force to take over theirpositions. They were to be relieved!The first indication of positive actionalong such lines did not come until lateafternoon when Colonel Ripple, com-mander of the 707th Tank Battalion, wasinformed by General Cota that he wasto command such a task force. Ripple'smen, however, were not to relieve thedefenders of Kommerscheidt but to passthrough them and recapture Schmidt.The Kommerscheidt defenders were tofollow and assist in holding Schmidt atall costs. The attack was to be launchedbefore noon the next day, 6 November.

Colonel Ripple learned that his taskforce was to consist of the 3d Battalion,110th Infantry, already weakened byfighting in the woods to the south; Com-

pany A, 707th Tank Battalion, alreadyin Kommerscheidt with nine remainingtanks; Company D, 707th, the battalion'slight tank company; Company C, 893dTank Destroyer Battalion, already inKommerscheidt but reduced by fourdestroyers and possibly a fifth (LieutenantMcElroy's with an oil leak at the Kom-merscheidt woods line); and one platoonof Company B, 893d. An SCR 193 wasto provide direct communication withdivision.

The infantrymen, only recently re-moved from a grueling battle againstfortified positions in the wooded 110thInfantry sector, left on foot from Ger-meter for Kommerscheidt about 0245 (6November). They numbered approxi-mately 300, a third of whom were heavyweapons personnel. The platoon of tankdestroyers from Company B, 893d, wasthe unit that received orders from ColonelMays too late to attach itself to an infan-try supply train moving through Vosse-nack about midnight. Just when thelight tanks of Company D, 707th TankBattalion, were to move to Kommer-scheidt was not made clear, for they hadbeen assisting the 28th ReconnaissanceTroop in blocking in the woods southwestof the 110th Infantry and did not leavethose positions until 8 November.

In Vossenack the infantry column wasdelayed by enemy shelling. On thesoutheastern nose of Vossenack ridge, itwas met by Captain Pugh, Company C,893d Tank Destroyer Battalion, whoasked for at least a platoon of infantry toaccompany a platoon of Company B'sdestroyers down the Kall trail. ColonelRipple refused. He considered his in-fantry force already too far understrengthand planned to take his column downthe firebreak to the river instead of using

20 Linguiti Rpt; Muglia Rpt; DeMarco-LinguitiRpt; Maj Albert L. Berndt, 112th Inf surgeon,Report on Medical Evacuation, to division surgeon,10 Nov 44 (hereafter cited as Berndt Rpt), CombatInterv File 76; Ltr, Maj Berndt to Hist Div. MajorBerndt says that Germans throughout this operationwore Luger or "P-38" pistols. Later, as a Germanprisoner, he noted all German medics wearing pistolsas "a part of the uniform." Once when an Americanofficer asked to see one of the pistols, he found its boltrusted tight. Berndt also said he never heard ofGerman medics firing.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 333

the trail. Almost as soon as the infantrycolumn entered the woods at the fire-break, it became engaged in a small armsfight which lasted almost the length of itstrek through the woods to the river.With the approach of daylight, TaskForce R's infantry component was stillfighting to get across the Kall.21

The Engineers

After dark on 5 November the twoplatoons of Company A, 20th Engineers,which had been working on the Kall traileast of the river, returned to their formerdefensive bivouac just inside the woodson the southeastern nose of Vossenackridge, leaving the company's four-mansecurity guard at the bridge. LieutenantOssola's platoon of Company B continuedto work on the supply route west of theKall and near the bridge, while the othertwo platoons of Company B remained allday in Vossenack. The 1st Platoon,Company C, was dug in near CompanyC, 112th Infantry, on the east bank nearthe Kommerscheidt woods line; the 2dPlatoon was still on a mine-clearing mis-sion with the 109th Infantry. The 3dPlatoon, Company C, under LieutenantJohns, whose mission to transport TNTto a forward dump had been postponedthe previous night, left Germeter about2200 with two trucks, one loaded with

5,000 pounds of explosives and the otherwith two squads of men. A third squadremained to guard the rear explosivesdump at Germeter.

After unloading the explosives near theKall bridge some time after midnight,the two squads crossed the river to jointheir company's 1st Platoon near Com-pany C, 112th Infantry, for the night.A heavy shelling hit them near the eastbank switchbacks, wounding two menand killing another, and LieutenantJohns returned to the Kail's west bankto deposit his wounded at the log aidstation. The remaining members of histwo squads began to dig in near the trailabout thirty yards west of the Kallbridge. Except for the four-man secur-ity guard at the bridge, they thus consti-tuted the only obstacle to uninterruptednorth-south German movement throughthe Kall gorge.22

Lieutenant Johns' two squads had beendigging in on the west bank near thebridge for only about ten to fifteenminutes (they thought the time was about0230 or 0300, 6 November), when a Ger-man jumped out on the trail some fifteenyards away, blew two shrill blasts with awhistle, and shouted something in Ger-man. The whistle blasts were the signalfor a maze of German small arms firewhich seemed to the engineers to comeupon them from all sides.

Before the firing started Sgt. WilliamO'Neal had been digging a foxhole withanother soldier on the left flank of theengineer squads. They struck a rock anddecided to try another spot. O'Neal hadhis hands full of equipment when theenemy struck. One German with a burpgun began firing from about seven yards

21 Combat Interv 76 with Hostrup-Fleig-Payne,Pugh, Ripple, Davis-Murphy-Gardner, Mays, andCapt George H. Rumbaugh and S Sgt Martin J.Joyce, 3d Bn, 110th Inf; 28th Div G-3 Jnl, 5 Nov 44;707th Tk Bn S-3 Jnl, 8 Nov 44; V Corps Study, G-3and TD Secs. According to Colonel Ripple the taskforce included Company C, 707th, instead of Com-pany A, 707th, but the 28th Division G-3 Journalstates that it was A, 707th. Since Company A wasalready in Kommerscheidt, it is assumed the G-3Journal is correct. V Corps Study and V CorpsOperations in the ETO mention neither company aspart of the task force.

22 Combat Interv 75 with Doherty, Krieder, Lutz,O'Neal; Sonnefield Rpt; Sonnefield Statement.

334 THREE BATTLES

away. Unable to fire because his riflewas at sling arms, O'Neal half jumpedand half rolled into a small patch of scrubpine. When the enemy began to sendup flares, he could see some of the engi-neers of his platoon lying on the groundnear by, whether wounded or dead, hecould not tell. It seemed to him that theGermans must have destroyed most ofthe two squads with their first blasts, forwhat little fire the Americans returnedseemed to come from the other flank ofthe position. Waiting until the shootingdiminished some thirty minutes later,Sergeant O'Neal crawled off through thetrees and came upon another member ofhis platoon who had been left as a guardat a pile of shovels. He had tried towarn the squads, this man said, but hadlost his way trying to find them. TheGermans, he said, had passed right byhim on their way up the trail.

Lieutenant Ossola's 3d Platoon, Com-pany B, 20th Engineers, had been work-ing on the trail near Lieutenant Johns'platoon. When enemy artillery firebegan to fall dangerously close, the mentook cover in a ditch near a culvert.Because they had put out no local secur-ity, the appearance of the Germans tookthem by surprise. The enemy set upmachine guns only a few feet from theditch, but the engineers held their firefor fear of revealing their presence.

Beyond the river, men of the 1st Pla-toon, Company C, 20th Engineers, couldhear German firing in the river valley,but they were afraid to return the fire andrun the risk of hitting other Americans.And at the bridge the four-man securityguard under T/4 Krieder heard the firstwhistle blasts and the subsequent firing.Five Germans later ran across the stonebridge, followed almost immediately by

twenty-five or thirty Germans, butKrieder and his men also feared revealingtheir presence to this superior force anddid not fire.23

About 0300 there was a knock at thedoor of the log dugout which the twoinfantry battalions shared as an aidstation. The visitor proved to be a Ger-man private who quickly called up aGerman NCO. A 3d Battalion medicalclerk who spoke German, Pfc. JosephCally, talked with the Germans, tellingthem that these were American medicscaring for wounded. The Germansasked if they had rations. When Callyreplied that they had enough for one day,the enemy noncom said he would returnwith more rations and some Germanmedics; in the meantime, the Americansmust remain. To insure compliance, aGerman guard was left at the door. Atintervals throughout the remainder of thenight the aid station personnel could seeGerman patrols near their dugout, in-cluding one group which mined the Kalltrail; but at daylight the German guardat the door was gone.24

The Situation in Vossenack

On 5 November the situation of the 2dBattalion, 112th Infantry, in Vossenackrepeated that of the day before exceptthat the condition of the men under theintense enemy shelling became more andmore critical. Occasional enemy patrolshit the exposed forward position of the

23 Engr story is from the following: Combat Interv75 with O'Neal, Lutz, White, Krieder, Doherty, andCpl Marion Martone, Co B, 20th Engrs; Lutz State-ment; Doherty Statement.

24 2d Lt Henry W. Morrison, MAC, 1st Bn, 112thInf, Report of Medical Evacuation, to div surgeon,10 Nov 44 (hereafter cited as Morrison Rpt), CombatInterv File 76; Berndt Rpt; Linguiti Rpt; MugliaRpt; DeMarco-Linguiti Rpt.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 335

Vossenack ridge, and shattered nervesgave rise to many reports of enemy coun-terattacks which did not actually develop.

Early in the morning the 2d Squad ofthe 1st Platoon, Company F, under S.Sgt. Charles W. Cascarano, in positionat the head of a shallow wooded drawleading into the positions on the east,saw about twenty Germans moving ina column of twos through the woodeddraw toward its positions. The squad'sautomatic rifleman sprayed the Germanswith fire, wounding nine, killing four, andputting the rest to flight. The woundedGermans lay where they had fallen forabout four or five hours, moaning andcrying, before five German medics witha cart picked them up.

The enemy shelled the open ridge withartillery from the direction of the Bran-denberg-Bergstein ridge and with self-propelled guns and tanks, sometimesfiring twenty or thirty rounds at onefoxhole before shifting targets. The mennoticed no lessening in the fire even whenAmerican planes were overhead. In theCompany E area, four men who wereusing a barn for shelter were buried inan avalanche of baled hay when theupper part of the barn collapsed from adirect artillery hit. Frantic efforts byothers of the company to dig out themen were unavailing, and the buildingburned.

The regular Company E commander,1st Lt. Melvin R. Barrilleaux, who hadreturned the night before from a Parisleave, visited his platoons after dark. Hefound most of his men so affected by theshelling that he felt they all should beevacuated. Many were in such a shock-ed, dazed condition that the platoonleaders had to order them to eat, and oneplatoon leader was himself evacuated for

combat exhaustion. Virtually the samesituation existed in the other threecompanies.

Intrabattalion communications werevery poor: when Lieutenant Barrilleauxreported to the battalion CP after thebuilding that housed his company CPhad burned, the battalion officers wereamazed to see him; they had thought himdead in the fire. Communications toregiment consisted of only sporadic radiooperation, and the artillery's wire to the"Greene Hornet Switch" operated onlyoccasionally.

The battalion commander, Lt. Col.Theodore S. Hatzfeld, had himself be-come a virtual combat exhaustion case.He insisted on remaining at his post, butCapt. John D. Pruden, the battalionexecutive officer, conducted the majorcommand functions.

Just before dark enemy shelling meth-odically wiped out six men in two-manfoxholes of Company G along the trailthat was an extension of the town's mainstreet. When the men near by saw theircompanions blown to bits, some pulledback to the houses, leaving an undefendedgap of more than a hundred yards in thecenter of the defense. Efforts by officersof both Company G and Company F tofill this gap went for nought. The troopsordered into the holes, utterly fatigued,their nerves shattered, many of themcrying unashamedly, would return to thedubious protection of the houses.

The company commanders reportedthe situation to battalion; battalion in-formed them it was being reported toregiment; and no relief came.25 Higher

25 Colonel Daley says that, after having seen thesituation in Vossenack on 4 November, he was soconcerned that he stopped by the 112th Infantry rearGP and reported it, possibly to the regimental S-3.See Ltr, Col Daley to Hist Div.

336 THREE BATTLES

headquarters may have failed to act be-cause there was no adequate regimentalor divisional reserve. One possible rem-edy, pulling the defenses back from theexposed forward nose to the line ofhouses, was not tried, and the regiment'ssituation report for the day listed thecombat condition of its command as"excellent."

Two towed guns of Company B, 630thTank Destroyer Battalion, in positionnear the Vossenack church, were dam-aged by the enemy shellfire. They weretowed out during the night. Three57-mm. antitank guns of Antitank Com-pany, 112th Infantry, went into the townduring the day but were supplied withonly armor-piercing ammunition andnever fired. The 2d Battalion's medicalaid station had been set up in the formerGerman barracks at Germeter underCapt. Morris Katz, battalion surgeon,and a forward collecting point was beingmaintained near the Vossenack church.Casualties were evacuated by jeep toGermeter.26

Armor in Vossenack

The ten remaining tanks of CompanyC, 707th Tank Battalion, had withdrawnfrom Vossenack with battalion approvalduring the night of 4-5 November to abivouac-ready position near Germeter.Lieutenant Leming's 2d Platoon movedup again at dawn on 5 November to fireinto the wooded draw north of Vossenackbecause enemy small arms and mortarfire had been reported from that direc-

tion. One of Leming's tanks was hit byhigh explosive fire that put its 75-mm.gun out of action, wounded the assistantdriver, and killed the driver. The re-mainder of the tanks returned to Ger-meter.

About 1300 1st Lt. James J. Ryan,company maintenance officer, went for-ward with a T-2 retriever from thebattalion maintenance section in an effortto fix a tank that had hit a mine on 2November. Enemy artillery made itimpossible for the repair crew to workexcept during occasional lulls, and thetank was eventually towed back toGermeter.

When the tankers were notified of areported counterattack against Vossenackabout 1400, both Lieutenant Leming's2d Platoon and Lieutenant Quarrie's 1stPlatoon went back into town. No coun-terattack materialized, and Leming'stanks withdrew again to cover positionsnear Germeter. Quarrie's platoon stayedin town in conformance with recentorders that the company had to keep atleast one platoon of tanks in Vossenackat all times.27

Until 5 November Company B, 707thTank Battalion, had been attached tothe 110th Infantry in its attack to thesouth; but because the heavily woodedterrain in that sector limited maneuver,its tanks had been employed only as close-support artillery. About noon of 5 No-vember the company commander, Capt.George S. Granger, was ordered to movehis platoons to Germeter preparatory torelieving Company C, 707th, in Vosse-nack. Delayed by mud and by tele-phone lines strung almost in the trails,for the indiscriminately mined forests had

26 Combat Interv 75 with Pruden, Nesbitt, Condon,Beggs, Barrilleaux, Kauffman, Cascarano, Johnson,Crain, and Cpl Joseph E. Philpot, Co G, 112th Inf;112th Inf S-3 Jnl, 5 Nov 44; V Corps Study, TDSec; Ltr, Maj Berndt to Hist Div.

27 Combat Interv 76 with Leming-Quarrie-Jenk-ins-Ryan.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 337

prompted communications men not tohazard movement off the trails whenlaying their wires, the tankers arrivedin Germeter shortly after dusk.

Plans were made between the two tankcompanies for Company B to take overthe mission of keeping one platoon inVossenack, and about 0500 the nextmorning (6 November) the 1st Platoonof 1st Lt. Carl A. Anderson, Jr., movedforward. Anderson had difficulty in thedark finding the route used by the Com-pany C tankers around the north of town.Not knowing where he would find thefront-line foxholes, Lieutenant Andersonshifted his tanks into a line formation.Several infantrymen running toward therear passed them. As the tanks crosseda slight rise before coming out on thenorthern nose of the ridge, the crewmensaw incoming small arms tracers fromthe draw northeast of Vossenack. Con-fused and alarmed by the running infan-trymen, the small arms fire, and the lackof orientation, the tankers opened firewith their machine guns on the woodeddraw to their front.28

The three tank destroyer platoons ofCompany B, 893d Tank Destroyer Bat-talion, which had moved into positionwith the rifle companies in Vossenack atdawn on 5 November, found the areasaturated with enemy mortar and artil-lery fire. Before noon all four destroyersof Lieutenant Davis' 1st Platoon withCompany G, 112th Infantry, had beenhit at least four times. The platoon'sinfantry guide had been killed as thedestroyers moved into position and sixmen had been wounded.

Shortly after dark the 2d and 3d Tank

Destroyer Platoons were moved back toready positions near Richelskaul. The1st Platoon, still in Vossenack, was alertedabout midnight to move to Kommer-scheidt with an infantry supply train.There was no sign of the supply train,and Lieutenant Davis' destroyers re-mained on the Vossenack ridge. Anhour or so before dawn the crewmen werealarmed to see infantrymen moving backfrom their foxholes.29

Meanwhile, Captain Pugh, commanderof Company C, 893d Tank DestroyerBattalion, and Lieutenant Fuller, whoseattempts earlier in the night to resupplythe destroyers in Kommerscheidt hadfailed, moved out again about 0530 withtwo jeeps in another effort to get ammu-nition and rations to Kommerscheidt.Fuller rode in the first jeep and Pugh inthe second with a driver and 2d Lt. LouisJ. Izzo. Izzo was going forward to takecommand of either the 1st or the 3d TankDestroyer Platoon in Kommerscheidt;both platoon leaders, Lieutenant Leonardand Lieutenant McElroy, were pre-sumably missing.

Lieutenant Fuller, driving his own jeepand accompanied by two enlisted men,had gone about 300 yards south of Vosse-nack on the open southeastern nose whenhe spotted what seemed to be about fortyGermans armed with machine guns,grenades, and at least one Panzerfaust.Captain Pugh, Lieutenant Fuller, andthe Germans seemed to act at once.Pugh yelled, "Look out!" and fired hisjeep's machine gun, but the weaponjammed. Fuller stepped on the gas, andhis companion in the front seat firedabout ten rounds from the jeep's machinegun. Captain Pugh jumped out of the

28 Combat Interv 76 with Anderson, S Sgt LetfordW. Walling, and S Sgt John B. Cook. All of Co B,707th Tk Bn. 29 Combat Interv 76 with Davis-Murphy-Gardner.

338 THREE BATTLES

left side of his jeep almost at the sametime that a Panzerfaust rocket grazed thetop of the jeep, wrecking the windshield.A husky German then came at him witha bayonet. He batted it away, sufferingonly a gash across three fingers, and ranback toward Vossenack. His driver andLieutenant Izzo also escaped and soonjoined Captain Pugh in the town.

The Germans turned their machineguns on Fuller's jeep and hit Fuller'sgunner as well as the enlisted man ridingin the back seat. The lieutenant yelledfor another burst from the jeep's machinegun, but the gunner answered, "I can't,Lieutenant; I'm dying right here!"Unable to give any assistance at themoment, Fuller made his way back tothe southern edge of Vossenack. Therehe found Captain Pugh, the driver, andLieutenant Izzo and told them he wantedto go back for the two wounded enlistedmen.

At that moment Pugh and Fullerspotted several tank destroyers headingout of Vossenack toward Kommerscheidt.These were from 2d Lt. Horace L. Smith's2d Platoon of Company B, 893d, whichhad been ordered forward from Germeterto join Task Force R in Kommerscheidt.Captain Pugh and Lieutenant Fullercommandeered two of them and wentforward again. It was still dark, andthe atmosphere was foggy. Near theambush site, they fired the destroyer'smachine guns, killing several of the Ger-mans and putting the others to flight.The rescue party found Pugh's jeepwrecked. The man in the back seat ofFuller's jeep was badly wounded, andthe gunner in the front seat was dead,shot through the stomach. A short timelater the infantry of Task Force R underColonel Ripple, 707th Tank Battalion,

arrived on the southeastern nose in theirmove toward the Kall firebreak andKommerscheidt.30

This action along the western portionof the Kall trail took place at a time when28th Division headquarters thought theentire trail open to traffic. ColonelDaley, 1171st Engineer Group com-mander, had made the first report ofenemy infiltration at 0355 (6 November)but at 0445 had informed division thatthe route was open and that the 20thEngineers had been told to keep it open.At 0635 Colonel Daley again reported todivision that the road was open at 0500.At 0715 General Cota ordered the en-gineer group commander to providesecurity for the bridge, and at 0747Colonel Daley reported that the 20thEngineers had men along the road. Notuntil 0800 (6 November) did ColonelDaley get what was apparently accurateinformation on the situation along theKall trail. He immediately ordered the20th Engineers: "Get every man youhave in line fighting. Establish contactwith the Infantry on right and left. . . ."Nothing was done to comply with thisorder, for by this time another crucialsituation farther to the rear had alteredthe picture.31

Artillery Support

During 5 November the 229th FieldArtillery Battalion, in direct support ofthe 112th Infantry, spent one of itsbusiest days, firing heavy and frequentconcentrations in the Kommerscheidt-Schmidt vicinity. The battalion fired

30 Combat Interv 76 with Fuller, Pugh. Quotesare from Fuller.

31 28th Div G-3 Jnl, 6 Nov 44; Combat Interv 75with Daley; Sonnefield Statement.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 339

249 missions totaling 3,947 rounds, in-cluding 247 neutralization missions, oneregistration, and one TOT. All com-panies of the 86th Chemical Battalionreverted to attachment to division artil-lery except Company D, which spent itstime withdrawing from its precariousposition at Bosselbach Farm and did nofiring.32

109th and 110th Infantry Summaries

There were virtually no changes on 5November in dispositions of the 109thInfantry. Engineers cleared a paththrough the mine field facing the 2dBattalion along the Huertgen-Germeterroad far enough to enable one companyto place outposts on the road. (Map 27)The enemy made limited counterattacksagainst almost all companies; most ofthem turned out to be patrols in force,and all were beaten off. During thenight the regiment carried out its wound-ed and brought up supplies. The carry-ing parties had to fight their way in andout through infiltrating enemy patrols.33

To the south in the 110th Infantrysector the 1st Battalion company that hadtried unsuccessfully to clear the east-westportion of the Simonskall-Richelskaulroad the day before was joined by acompany from the 2d Battalion. Thetwo units reduced several pillboxes andthen attempted to attack due south inorder to close the gap between the 1st and3d Battalions. Their attack was stoppedwhen they lost direction and hit the samedefenses that had been holding up part

of the 3d Battalion. During the after-noon Task Force Lacy, the small groupformed to defend along the Richelskaul-Raffelsbrand road, was moved to thegooseneck curve where the Simonskallroad turned south. When the 3d Bat-talion received orders to withdraw forcommitment with Task Force R to re-capture Schmidt, the battalion disen-gaged and crossed its line of departure inGermeter about 0245 (6 November).As daylight approached, it was fightingits way down the firebreak paralleling the112th's main supply route toward theKall River. 34

Air Support

Supporting aircraft were over thetarget area as early as 0835 on 5 Novem-ber and as late as 1625. It was the mostfavorable day thus far for air supportin the Schmidt operation. The 474thFighter Group had thirty-six P-38's overthe area from 0835 to 1015, attackingtanks and troops at Schmidt and in theSchmidt vicinity. Smoke and dust pre-vented observation of results. The P-38'salso bombed Heimbach and Schleiden,southeast of Schmidt, and Strauch, south-west of Schmidt. Enemy flak downedtwo of the planes, the first aircraft to belost in support of the 28th Division'sattack.

About noon a squadron of P-47's ofthe 365th Group bombed and strafedarmored vehicles just north of Branden-berg, but no results were observed. Inearly afternoon another squadron of the365th bombed twelve to fifteen armoredvehicles in a forest east of the Roer andsoutheast of Nideggen. The squadron

32 28th Div Arty Jnl, 5 Nov 44; V Corps Study,Arty Sec; 229th FA Bn AAR, Nov 44; 86th Cml BnAAR, Nov 44.

33 Combat Interv 77 with 109th personnel; 109thInf S-3 Jnl, 5 Nov 44; 28th Div G-3 Jnl, 5 Nov 44.

34 Combat Interv 77 with 110th personnel; 110thInf S-3 Jnl, 5 Nov 44; 28th Div G-3 Jnl, 5 Nov 44.

341

claimed ten vehicles destroyed. Thesame squadron also attacked fifty motortransports south of Gemuend and claimedeleven destroyed, eight probably de-stroyed, and two damaged. In mid-afternoon the 365th sent twelve P-47'sagainst Schmidt. This squadron claimedthat all its bombs hit in the center of thetown and that two motor transports weredestroyed. The last mission of the day,the bombing of Bergstein, was also bythe 365th. Except for small fires started,no results were observed.35

The Enemy Situation

On 5 November the German counter-measures lost impetus temporarily. The60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment (116thPanzer Division) sent only piecemeal at-tacks against the 109th Infantry north ofGermeter. Less determined attacks thanbefore were launched against Kommer-scheidt by the 1055th Regiment (89th Divi-sion) and 16th Panzer Regiment (116thPanzer Division). The 1055th Regimentmade note of the first prisoners it hadtaken in the woods near Schmidt intowhich elements of Companies K and L,112th Infantry, had retreated on 4November.

Late in the day elements of the 89thDivision,36 pushing up from the southwest,and the Reconnaissance Battalion of the116th Panzer Division, thrusting down theKall gorge from the northeast, met at theMestrenger Muehle. The Germans hadestablished contact through the gorge,

35 FUSA and IX TAC Sum, 5 Nov 44; V CorpsStudy, G-3 Air Sec; Combat Interv 74 with Howison.

36 It is indefinite whether these troops of the 89thDivision were from the 1055th Regiment or the 1056thRegiment. Sec MSS # A-905 (Waldenburg), A-891(Gersdorff), and P-032a (Bruns), and Sit Rpts, 5Nov, found in OB WEST KTB Anlagen 1.-10.XI.44.

342 THREE BATTLES

but American accounts indicate that adefinite line along the river or across theAmerican supply route had not beenformed.

The Germans claimed gains duringthe day by the 156th Panzer GrenadierRegiment (116th Panzer Division) and ele-ments of the 60th Panzer Grenadier Regi-ment against Vossenack, but Americanreports indicate that such progress wasconfined to moving up in the woodeddraw north and northeast of the town.To the south, elements of the 275thDivision continued to hold in the Raffels-brand area, and elements of the 1056thRegiment were committed to the defensealong the Kall gorge from southwest ofSimonskall northeast to the MestrengerMuehle. The 272d Volks Grenadier Divi-sion, south of the battle area, had beencontinuing its relief of the 89th Division inthe sector that the 89th had held beforeits commitment in the Schmidt fight.By the end of 5 November twenty-nineof thirty-four troop trains bringing the272d Division from a training area nearBerlin had been unloaded; the rest of thetrains arrived the next day. The 272dDivision assumed responsibility for thesector at noon on 5 November.

Although the German command be-lieved that the attacks of the 116th Panzerand 89th Infantry Divisions had effected "afirm containment" of the American pene-tration, they nevertheless on 5 Novembercompleted establishment of a secondarydefensive line on the north and northeastas an added precaution. This line,running from Grosshau through Klein-hau to Brandenberg and Bergstein, wasmanned by "fortress troops and emer-gency units."

In the evening of 5 November theGerman commanders readied an attack

to be launched by the 156th Panzer Grena-dier Regiment and elements of the 60thPanzer Grenadier Regiment from the woodsnorth and northeast of Vossenack againstthe shell-battered defenders of the Vosse-nack ridge. The Germans had soughtto build a road through these woods inorder that tanks arid assault guns mightjoin this attack, but their efforts hadfailed."

Summary for 5 November andNight of 5-6 November

As dawn approached on 6 November,the situation in Kommerscheidt wasrelatively stable. The infantry had heldthroughout the preceding day against anumber of minor German assaults, anddefenses had been bolstered by additionof five tanks (making a total of eight) andnine tank destroyers, although one de-stroyer had been knocked out during theday and one abandoned at the Kommer-scheidt woods line, leaving only seven.Company B, a heavy machine gun pla-toon of Company D, and a rifle platoonof Company C, all 112th Infantry, hadbeen moved into the Kommerscheidt line.Behind the town at the northern woodsline sat the remainder of Company C,112th Infantry, one platoon of CompanyC, 20th Engineers, the forward regimentalcommand post, a tank (Captain Hostrup'scommand tank), and two 57-mm. anti-tank guns. On the way forward was adecimated battalion of the 110th Infan-try, and scheduled to join this battalionwas a company of light tanks and another

37 MS # A-905 (Waldenburg); ETHINT 56 (Gers-dorff and Waldenburg); Sit Rpts and rail movementschedules, 1-6 Nov 44, found in OB WEST KTBAnlagen 1-10.XI.44.; 28th Div G-2 Jnl and File, Nov44; 89th Division Order of the Day: Entry, 5 Nov 44,found in OB WEST KTB 1.-30.XI.44.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 343

tank destroyer platoon which, togetherwith tanks and destroyers already inKommerscheidt, were to form Task ForceR to retake Schmidt. The attack wasto jump off sometime before noon, 6November.

In the Kall gorge the Germans hadgained the upper hand. They had in-filtrated the main supply route and hadmined the trail, leaving both the 3dPlatoon, Company B, 20th Engineers,and two squads of the 3d Platoon, Com-pany C, 20th Engineers, unaccounted for.Company A, 20th Engineers, was stillvirtually intact in a defensive bivouacnear the entrance of the trail into thewoods southeast of Vossenack. A four-man security guard was presumably stillat the Kall bridge, but for all practicalpurposes the enemy controlled the vitalriver bridge. The combined 1st-3dBattalion, 112th Infantry, aid stationstill functioned in the log dugout in theKall gorge, although the Germans wereall over the area. No vehicle that hadtried to use the supply route since about0200 (6 November) had been able to getthrough, not even medical jeeps andweasels. The 28th Division's G-2 Peri-odic Report for 5 November, in makingestimates of enemy capabilities, had failedto mention the possibility of such enemyaction coming down either end of theundefended Kall gorge.

At Vossenack the situation was perhapsworst of all, though its seriousness wasperhaps not so readily apparent. Rem-nants of the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry,still held the town, but they had beensubjected to three days and four nightsof murderous fire from German artillery,

self-propelled guns, and mortars. Themen had undergone about all they couldstand. The company commanders knewthe situation in Vossenack, and the bat-talion staff knew it (the staff had a com-bat exhaustion case of its own in itsbattalion commander); but neither regi-ment nor division seemed to appreciatethe situation fully.

One tank platoon of Company B, 707thTank Battalion, Lieutenant Anderson's,was moving onto the Vossenack ridge asdawn came. Lieutenant Quarrie's tankplatoon of Company C, 707th, and Lieu-tenant Davis' platoon of Company B,893d Tank Destroyer Battalion, were al-ready there. Also in Vossenack weretwo platoons of Company B, 20th En-gineers, and three 57-mm. antitank guns.

The situation of the 109th and 110thInfantry Regiments (except for assign-ment of the 3d Battalion, 110th, to TaskForce R) remained basically the same.The important development as dawncame on 6 November was still in the112th Infantry sector, for there the in-fantrymen of the 2d Battalion on theforward nose of Vossenack ridge wereleaving their holes. At the same timethe Germans were planning a dawn at-tack against them.

The 28th Division's activities on thisdate had not lacked supervision fromhigher commanders. The V Corps com-mander and later the First Army, VCorps, and VII Corps commanders hadvisited General Cota early on 5 Novem-ber. No instructions from these officerswere recorded.38

38 28th Div G-3 Jnl, 5 Nov 44.

CHAPTER V

Action at Vossenack(6 November)

On the Vossenack ridge the harassedcompany commanders of the 2d Bat-talion, 112th Infantry, their men un-nerved by three days and four nights ofintense enemy shelling, were apprehen-sive of what dawn would bring on 6November. As daylight came the menof Company G, in the most exposedpositions of all on the northern portionof the ridge (Map XI), became suspiciousof a strange silence. The Germans hadbeen showering them every morning be-fore dawn with a concentrated artillerybarrage, and today there was no fire.The mysterious portent of the quiet madesome of the riflemen almost yearn for theusual shelling. They knew that theircomrades in other units were as nerve-shattered as they were themselves, andthey knew also that a gap of over ahundred undefended yards separatedthem from Company F. In ones andtwos and threes some Company G troopshad been sneaking back into town duringthe darkness.

There was a burst of small arms fire.One of the men let go a piercing scream;then again everything was quiet. Aboutthirty minutes later, as daylight increased,German guns spoke, and artillery shellsplummeted in upon the shell-puncturednose of the ridge. Small arms fire,whether from the distance or from near

by the Americans could not tell in theconfusion, joined in. The men of Com-pany G had enough. Panic-ridden,many of them suddenly grabbed wildlyat their equipment and broke for therear. Word spread quickly that theGermans were attacking and the com-pany could not hold. Those who heldinitially saw others running back towardtown, and they too fled. The disorderlyretreat became a snowball, carrying withit any who chanced to be in its path.

The Company F commander, Lieu-tenant Kauffman, witnessed the retreatfrom his own command post in a buildingnear the eastern edge of town and im-mediately realized that it endangeredthe situation of his own unit. His pla-toons on the right of Company G werereceiving small arms fire from the woodeddraws to the front and he feared thatwith the defection of Company G hismen might be wiped out or captured.There could be no doubt that the Com-pany G position had collapsed. Kauff-man ordered his platoon leaders to with-draw their men to the line of buildingsand there to hold. The platoons beganto withdraw in small groups, but therewas no control. The mushrooming effectof the retreat had spread too quickly, andthe men could not be stopped when theyreached the houses. Although no one

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 345

professed to have seen any enemy sol-diers,1 the troops of both Company Gand Company F were convinced theGermans were attacking.

In the Company E command post,farther to the west in Vossenack, Pfc.Russell G. Ogborn had been operatingthe company SCR 300, forming a relaybetween the battalion command post andCompany G. The latter unit's radiowould not reach battalion. Ogborn heardthe Company G commander, Capt.George N. Prestridge, report that theenemy was attacking and that his com-pany was withdrawing. A few minuteslater the Company F commander brokein on the channel to say that CompanyF, too, was pulling out.

The Company E command grouprushed outside its cellar command post.Coming down the road from the eastwere panicky men from all four com-panies of the battalion, pushing, shoving,throwing away equipment, trying madlyto outrace the enemy artillery fire andeach other down the main street. Somewere helping the slightly wounded to run,but when the more seriously woundedcollapsed they were left where they hadfallen. Although the Company E offi-cers tried to question the men in theirflight, they could discern only one co-herent fact: withdrawal.

At his 2d Platoon command post,Lieutenant Barrilleaux, the Company Ecommander, located Lieutenant Kauff-man. The two officers could reach onlyone decision, that with everyone pullingback it would be useless to try to hold.Lieutenant Barrilleaux sent messengersto his other platoons telling them towithdraw.

The machine gunners of Company H,who had been with the rifle companies,attempted to cover the withdrawal of theriflemen and then joined the flight them-selves. When the company commander,Capt. Charles L. Crain, realized theubiquitous nature of the withdrawal, heordered his 81-mm. mortar men to moveback also. Artillery fire hit the mortarmen as they started out, causing a num-ber of personnel casualties and the lossof four mortars.

German soldiers still had not appeared.Sergeant Cascarano, whose squad haddefended a draw on the northeast in theCompany F sector, said he saw no enemysoldiers at all. Lieutenant Condon, theCompany E executive officer, said it washis opinion that there was either noenemy attack or one too small to havecaused such a rout. The men, Lieu-tenant Condon thought, had simplyreached the limits of endurance.2

Armor in Vossenack

When the rout of the 2d Battalion,112th Infantry, from the Vossenack nosebegan, available armor in the town con-sisted of the 1st Platoon, Company C,707th Tank Battalion, whose tanks wereunder Lieutenant Quarrie with CompanyF on the northeast, and the 1st Platoon,Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer Bat-talion, whose destroyers were underLieutenant Davis on the eastern edge oftown. Arriving at just about the timethe attack supposedly hit was the 1stPlatoon, Company B, 707th Tank Bat-talion, under Lieutenant Anderson. This

1 For a discussion of this question see below, pp.354-55, 371-72.

2 Combat Interv 75 with Johnson, Kauffman,Barrilleaux, Condon, Crain, Philpot, Cascarano,Beggs, Pruden, Nesbitt; Combat Interv 76 withDavis-Murphy-Gardner.

346 THREE BATTLES

unit had come up on the north side oftown into the Company G positions andwas under orders to relieve LieutenantQuarrie's platoon.

Word of the supposed German attackreached Captain Granger, Company B,707th, commander, in Germeter soonafter the retreat began. He started for-ward in his command tank and wasfollowed some fifteen to thirty minuteslater by his company's 3d Platoon. Theremaining two platoons of Company C,707th, consisting now of about six orseven tanks, including one taken over byCaptain West as his command tank,started forward shortly after CaptainGranger. The remaining platoon oftank destroyers, the 3d, and the remain-ing tank platoon of Company B, 707th,the 2d, stayed in ready positions nearGermeter. Thus, one full-strength pla-toon of tank destroyers and five platoonsof tanks (less about five vehicles) wereeither in Vossenack when the infantryretreat began or became available shortlythereafter.

When the infantry began to fall back,Lieutenant Davis' tank destroyer crew-men questioned a number of the fleeingmen but could determine only that therewere no more men left in the line. Thetank destroyers remained in position forapproximately thirty minutes after theretreat began; their crews saw no enemyattack materialize nor any enemy attemptto occupy the abandoned 112th Infantrypositions. Lacking infantry for protec-tion, Lieutenant Davis received permis-sion to withdraw his platoon fromVossenack to positions west of the town.It moved out shortly after 0815, thusleaving no tank destroyers in the town.

On the northeastern nose of the ridge,Lieutenant Quarrie's tank platoon of

Company C, 707th Tank Battalion, knewlittle about the situation except thateverything was suddenly confusion. Lieu-tenant Anderson's tanks fired as theyapproached and thus added to the tur-moil. Quarrie's men felt that this firewas wild and at random. The two pla-toons nevertheless exchanged positionsand Quarrie's platoon, except for Ser-geant McGraw's tank, which had backedinto a shell hole, withdrew to Germeter.Unable to move his tank, SergeantMcGraw radioed Captain West and wastold to have Lieutenant Anderson's pla-toon take his crew back to Germeter.Anderson evidently interpreted this mes-sage to mean that his entire platoon wasto take McGraw's crew back. He placedone man from the crew in each of histanks and began withdrawing slowly,firing occasionally in withdrawal at gunflashes on the Brandenburg-Bergsteinridge.

As this withdrawal took place, CaptainWest, arriving in his command tank,drove up beside Lieutenant Anderson'stank and shouted: "You shot your owninfantry in the back, and now you'rerunning off and leaving them." Westordered Anderson's tanks back to thenose of the ridge, accompanying themhimself. When they approached theinitial positions, heavy enemy artilleryand mortar fire seemed to register directlyon them, and there were no infantry,friendly or enemy, in sight. CaptainWest turned his tank around and yelledto Lieutenant Anderson: "Let's get thehell out of here."

The next tanks to move forward toVossenack in answer to the message ofenemy attack were those of CaptainGranger, Company B, 707th, and his 3dPlatoon under 2d Lt. Danforth A. Sher-

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 347

man. Lieutenant Sherman's tank de-veloped a hydrostatic lock at the startand would not budge. The platoonleader joined another crew and the re-maining five tanks moved to the Vosse-nack church, then continued east via aroute south of the town. Arriving in theeastern end of the town, the crewmensaw three or four tanks of Company C(evidently those of Lieutenant Quarriewhich had been relieved by LieutenantAnderson) withdrawing west along thenorth side of town; but they could seeno infantry. Captain Granger now re-ceived a request by radio from LieutenantAnderson for permission to move back toGermeter with some wounded and withthe crew of Sergeant McGraw's disabledCompany C tank. The captain ap-proved and Anderson's tanks started back(probably in the movement to whichCaptain West objected). Granger sawAnderson's platoon making its with-drawal, drove up to West's tank, andasked the situation. Standing in theturret of his tank, West replied, "Counter-attack." Granger could see no signs ofenemy attack other than heavy mortarand artillery fire. Just at that momenta heavy shell came in close, and CaptainGranger ducked. Rising again, he sawthat the hatches on the turret of CaptainWest's tank were gone and that theCompany C commander had been in-stantly killed.

As Lieutenant Anderson's platoon con-tinued its withdrawal, Lieutenant Sher-man's 3d Platoon, Company B, remainedamong the buildings in the eastern endof Vossenack, and Captain Granger him-self drove into the center of town tosearch for the infantry command post.Meanwhile, Company C's understrength1st and 3d Platoons had come into town.

Lieutenant Leming soon withdrew his1st Platoon back to Germeter, and the 3d,whose commander, Lieutenant Novak,still occupied his immobilized tank nearthe Vossenack church, halted in thevicinity of the church. Lieutenant Sher-man radioed Captain Granger from theeastern end of Vossenack that "we're allalone out here," and Granger in turnradioed Anderson in Germeter to bringhis platoon back up. Towing Lieuten-ant Sherman's disabled tank, LieutenantAnderson brought his platoon forwardagain, moved south of the church, andthen turned east again to join LieutenantSherman's platoon. An enemy tank orself-propelled gun scored a direct hit onone of his tanks, setting it afire. Theremainder of the platoon continued tothe east, firing as it progressed. Againthe Company C tankers still in town feltthat this fire was indiscriminate andclaimed it hit among those of the infantrywho had not reached the church.

Lieutenant Davis' tank destroyer pla-toon, which had withdrawn early fromVossenack, received orders at approxi-mately 0900 to return to town to act asoverwatchers for the tanks. Movingback in and attempting to find cover,one of the destroyers backed into a build-ing on the north side of the main streetand crashed into a cellar. Its gunpointed straight into the air like an anti-aircraft weapon. The remaining threeguns withdrew once again to Germeter.

Thus, by about 1000, when the in-fantry had abandoned the eastern halfof Vossenack, two platoons of CompanyB, 707th (Lieutenant Sherman's andLieutenant Anderson's), were in theeastern edge of town. In the vicinity ofthe church was the 3d Platoon, CompanyC, 707th, under Lieutenant Novak, who

348 THREE BATTLES

himself operated from his immobilizedtank on the southern edge of town. Theremainder of both Companies B and Cwas in the rear near Germeter, alongwith two platoons of Company B, 893dTank Destroyer Battalion. The otherplatoon of tank destroyers still waited atthe entrance of the main supply routeinto the Kall woods in its effort to joinTask Force R in Kommerscheidt.3

Engineers in Vossenack

When Captain Lutz, Company B, 20thEngineers, who still had two engineerplatoons and his company headquartersin Vossenack, saw the disorderly infantrywithdrawal early on 6 November, he senthis administrative officer, 2d Lt. HenryR. Gray, to the infantry command postto determine the situation. LieutenantGray evidently had not reached the com-mand post before he met an infantrycaptain who told him that he and hissmall group of men were the last onesaround, and they were leaving.

By this time the engineer battalioncommander, Colonel Sonnefield, had ar-rived at the Company B command post.He told Captain Lutz to move his menback to Germeter, collect the infantryweapons they had left in the rear, andthen take up a defense in Vossenack.Sonnefield also ordered Company A,20th Engineers, to pull out of its defensesat the entrance of the supply route intothe Kall woods and return for its heavierweapons.

The situation was chaotic, and as

Captain Lutz's engineers left town itseemed that they were the last to leave.Tanks also were withdrawing. Just out-side of Vossenack an artillery shell landednear the column and knocked CaptainLutz unconscious. When he revived andcrawled forward to where LieutenantGray was lying, he found the lieutenantdead.4

The Situation at Kommerscheidt

The defenders of Kommerscheidt werealso having their difficulties on 6 Novem-ber. With the coming of dawn came theroutine thunder of German shelling, andthrough the early morning mist the mencould see at least three enemy tanksmoving toward them from Schmidt anda large group of German infantry millingaround on the dominating Schmidt hill.Radio appeals for artillery fire broughtwhat many felt to be their most effectiveartillery support of the period, preventingthe German infantry from joining the bigtanks in the attack. The tanks them-selves advanced no farther than thenorthern edge of Schmidt but from therepoured direct fire into the houses andfoxholes of Kommerscheidt. On the leftflank in the Company A positions at leastseven men were killed by this fire, andCompany A's 3d Platoon was forced tomove its command post when tracers setfire to the building that housed it. Threemen from Company L were killed intheir foxholes by the shelling, and a roundfrom one of the tanks tore through theCompany L command post, woundingthe first sergeant and killing the companycommander's runner.

The tank and tank destroyer supportin Kommerscheidt occasionally peeked

3 Armor story is from the following: Combat Interv76 with Mays, Ripple, Davis-Murphy-Gardner,Leming-Quarrie-Jenkins-Ryan, Granger-Anderson-Walling-Cook. Direct quotes accredited to CaptainWest are from Granger-Anderson-Walling-Cook in-terview.

4 Combat Interv 75 with Lutz, Sonnefield, Doherty.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 349

over the shallow defilade provided bythe northern part of the hill and fired atthe German tanks, but without notedsuccess. Some of the infantrymen felttheir armor was letting them down, butothers took into account the dominantpositions held by the Germans. It wasclear to almost all that the friendly armorwas accomplishing at least one thingfavorable: its presence made the enemyinfantry seem reluctant to accompanytheir own armor in the attacks. In theirturn the American infantry showed anincreasing tendency to desert their fox-holes unless their armor was up forward.A number left their foxholes now, but theexodus was stopped before it couldspread.

Word passed among those who hadnot heard it during the night that smallarms fire was originating from the Kallvalley to their rear—a development thatmeant they were surrounded. In theCompany C, 112th Infantry, positions atthe northern woods line the firing in theriver valley was more apparent, and themen feared they would be attacked fromthat direction.

The enemy tanks soon seemed to tireof their target practice, and the situationonce again settled down to intermittentartillery and mortar fire. But this firewas enough to keep the riflemen pinnedto their holes, each man living out hispersonal hell within himself. It was coldand wet, and men were forced to disposeof excrement in K ration boxes, piecesof paper, or handkerchiefs and throw itout when the chance came, for it wasworth a man's life to be seen.5

Task Force R

The 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry,which was to constitute the main body ofTask Force R in the attempt to retakeSchmidt, crossed the Kall River about0815. Almost three hours later thetroops finally arrived at the Company C,112th Infantry, positions along the woodsline north of Kommerscheidt. They losttwo officers and fifteen men out of theiralready-reduced ranks to enemy smallarms and artillery fire as they foughttheir way across the river gorge. Mak-ing contact with Colonel Peterson, thecompanies were told to dig in temporarilyalong the woods line. Peterson felt afterseeing the battered battalion that was tobe his main striking force that the plannedattack would in all probability fail; henevertheless fully intended to go throughwith it.

In order to avoid the exposed openground north of Kommerscheidt, Lt. Col.William Tait, the infantry battalion com-mander, his S-2, and S. Sgt. Martin J.Joyce, intelligence sergeant, chose a routealong the edge of the woods to the south-west and moved on toward the 112thbattalions in the town. They had reacheda shallow draw just northwest of Kom-merscheidt when enemy riflemen in asquare patch of woods beyond openedfire. Both Colonel Tait and his S-2were wounded. The S-2 was unable toseek cover because of his wounds, andthe Germans fired again, killing him witha bullet through the head. Only thetimely intervention of Sgt. Marshall F.Pritts's tank destroyer saved SergeantJoyce and the battalion commander,whose right arm had been shattered bya bullet. As the tank destroyer fired intothe woods, one German was killed and

5 Combat Interv 75 with Ripperdam, Perll, Tyo,Toner, Simon, Kudiak, Walter, Quinton-Hausman-Kertes-Lockwood-Norton; Combat Interv 76 withHostrup-Fleig-Payne, Pugh; 28th Div G-3 Jnl,6 Nov 44.

350 THREE BATTLES

two others came out with their hands up,one of them pointing to the S-2's bodyand whimpering that he had not shotthat wounded man.

The tank destroyers of the 2d Platoon,Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer Bat-talion, which were to supplement thearmor of Task Force R, had tried tosecure infantry assistance in moving downthe Kall trail. Such assistance had beenrefused, and the platoon decided to goon alone. Just inside the woods thearmored troops met a group of engineerswho told them the road was blocked bydamaged weasels and mined. The de-stroyers pulled back to the edge of thewoods southeast of Vossenack and waited.Company D, 707th Tank Battalion, thelight tank company which was also tojoin Task Force R, apparently never leftits defenses with the 28th ReconnaissanceTroop southwest of the 110th Infantrypositions.6

Tank Demonstration in Kommerscheidt

About noon the enemy tanks inSchmidt resumed their deadly harass-ment of the Americans in Kommer-scheidt. Again infantrymen began toleave their positions. Some men wereso shaken and unnerved by this time thatthe mere sound of an enemy tank racingits motor caused them to run for the rear.With more and more infantrymen pullingout, the situation was fast becoming criti-cal. In an effort to stabilize the situa-tion, Colonel Peterson ordered the tanksand tank destroyers to take the German

tanks under fire. In compliance the 1stPlatoon of tank destroyers and Lieu-tenant Fleig's tanks on the right of townproposed a maneuver whereby the tankswould move up the crest of the hill todraw fire from the enemy tanks as thedestroyers made a flanking movementalong the woods line to the southwest.While the enemy's attention was directedat Fleig's tanks, the destroyers were tosneak in on his flank.

Lieutenant Fleig's three tanks movedout and almost immediately began todraw fire from Schmidt. The tanks re-turned the fire, but the tank destroyersdid not follow. The platoon leader,Lieutenant Leonard (whom CaptainPugh had thought missing but who hadturned up later in the command post ofthe 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry, withslight wounds), dismounted in the faceof small arms fire from an enemy pillboxand attempted to lead his destroyers intoposition. Still they failed to come up.Fleig saw Leonard move back to hisvehicles and gesture at the gun com-manders to follow him; again nothinghappened. Captain Pugh, the tank de-stroyer company commander, said laterthat the destroyers had bellied on thehidden stumps of a hedgerow that ranacross a field to the southwest of thetown. Lieutenant Fleig withdrew histanks to the slight defilade of the shallowdraw. The proposed demonstration hadnot gone as planned, but in exchange forjammed turrets on two of the Americantanks one German tank was claimeddestroyed and the enemy tanks hadceased firing.7

6 Combat Interv 77 with Capt George H. Rum-baugh and Joyce, 3d Bn, 110th Inf; Combat Interv76 with Pugh, Ripple, Fuller, Mays, Davis-Murphy-Gardner; Combat Interv 75 with Krieder; 707th TkBn S-3 Jnl, 8 Nov 44; Interv with Col Peterson.

7 Combat Interv 76 with Pugh, Hostrup-Fleig-Payne. For heroic action in the Kommerscheidtarea during 4-5-6 November, Lieutenant Leonard,who was subsequently seriously wounded, wasawarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.

IMMOBILIZED ARMOR near the beginning of the Kall trail between Vossenack andKommerscheidt. Kommerscheidt is the village on the horizon.

352 THREE BATTLES

Except for continuation of the heavyshelling, there was no more German actionagainst Kommerscheidt for the day. Thedefenders became more and more con-scious of the enemy's excellent observa-tion, both from Schmidt and Harscheidtto the south and southeast and fromBrandenberg and Bergstein to the north;and enemy shelling was costly. Infantrycasualties mounted, and two more tankssuffered jammed turrets. Only threetank destroyers remained fully opera-tional. The most seriously hit was Ser-geant Wilson's; one of its motors wasknocked out and the vehicle immobilized.Adopting it toward late afternoon as hiscompany command post, Captain Pughhad the crewmen of his damaged de-stroyers dig in near by as riflemen. Onecrewman who had been wounded wasplaced under the destroyer for protection.About fifteen minutes later an artilleryshell landed less than ten feet from therear of the vehicle, killing him.8

The Planned Attack on Schmidt

The late arrival of the 3d Battalion,110th Infantry, in the Kommerscheidtarea ruled out the possibility of launchingthe Task Force R attack against Schmidtat the scheduled time, noon of that day.Colonel Peterson and the task force com-mander, Colonel Ripple, still plannedthe attack, although the infantry com-mander, Colonel Tait, was seriouslywounded, the S-2 was dead, the S-3 hadbeen wounded the day before and hadnot even come forward, and the battalionitself had less than 300 effectives. Andonly the tanks and tank destroyers then

in Kommerscheidt could be expected tobe present as armored support.

Colonel Peterson issued hasty ordersabout noon and sent the infantry com-pany commanders to reconnoiter theirKommerscheidt line of departure. Therethe battalion executive officer, Maj.Robert C. Reynolds, was wounded in theright hand and chest and the Company Icommander was killed. Such misfortuneconvinced Colonel Peterson that withoutsupplies, without armor, and with anunderstrength infantry force, an attackon Schmidt was more futile than ever.He therefore ordered the 110th Infantrybattalion to consolidate its positions withCompany C, 112th Infantry, thus strength-ening the American defense in depth,and canceled the attempt to retakeSchmidt.

That night Kommerscheidt was quietexcept for the sound of enemy artillery.During lulls in the shelling the fatiguedriflemen could hear enemy tanks churn-ing about to their front.9

A New Defense Attempted in Vossenack

There had never been any order orig-inating from headquarters of the 2d Bat-talion, 112th Infantry, for the riflemenon Vossenack ridge to withdraw; but inearly morning (6 November) when thebattalion officers saw men streaming bythe command post, they knew what musthave happened. Running into the street,they attempted to halt the pell-mell re-treat. The few men they managed tostop were sent into position on an east-west line running generally across the CPbuilding about a hundred yards west of

8 Combat Interv 75 with 1st and 3d Bn, 112th,personnel for the period; Combat Interv 76 withPugh, Hostrup-Fleig-Payne.

9 Combat Interv 76 with Ripple; Combat Interv75 with Ripperdam, Dana, Kudiak; Combat Interv77 with Rumbaugh-Joyce; Interv with Col Peterson.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 353

the church. But many men continuedtoward the rear, and many of those whowere stopped resumed their flight as soonas the officers had turned their backs.The battalion adjutant and CaptainPruden, the executive officer who wasthe 2d Battalion's acting commander be-cause of the combat exhaustion of ColonelHatzfeld, divided responsibility for theline at the main street, each endeavoringto build up a line on his side of the street.

The 2d Platoon, Company E, under1st Lt. Clifton W. Beggs, had been amongthe last to leave the eastern half ofVossenack. Beggs attempted to build upanother line near the church. In theattempt at least two of his men werewounded. Lieutenant Barrilleaux thenarrived with word that the line was beingformed near the battalion CP. The pla-toon, one of the few groups which hadmaintained any semblance of order andcommand in withdrawal, followed thecompany commander's directions.

Company H managed to salvage twoof its .30-caliber machine guns, one with-out a water jacket and the other withouta tripod, and set them up along the CPline. Tied in with them was the fire ofa .50-caliber machine gun still in positionnear by.

Sergeant Cascarano, along with theplatoon guide of his Company F platoon,held up at the new defensive line. Thetwo men occupied the same foxhole untilan intense German artillery concentra-tion hit their area and they looked up tosee a number of men still running downthe road to the rear. With the impres-sion that everyone was leaving again,they joined the retreat, stopping onlywhen they reached the battalion rear aidstation in Germeter where several lieu-tenants were trying to form a unified

group to move back into Vossenack. Itwas night before that group was broughtback.

Despite continuous withdrawals of in-dividuals and small groups, by about1030 a line had been established withapproximately seventy men, who, for-tunately, had retained their weapons.No one seemed to have any illusionsabout the solidity of such a defensiveforce, but at least for the time being theretreat had been blocked.

By this time all infantrymen who couldget out of the eastern end of Vossenackhad apparently done so. American tankswere still there, however. A call forartillery support was sent in by someonewho either thought the armor had left orsimply ignored it. The first concentra-tion of approximately four volleys wasshort, and American shells fell amongthe handful of defenders at the battalionCP line.10 One shell hit a barn in whichmen from Company E's 1st Platoon hadtaken cover with their platoon sergeant,T. Sgt. Donald Nelson. Of the groupone man was killed and three seriouslywounded. As far as Sergeant Nelsonknew, only he and one other man wereleft of the platoon and the pair withdrewto the Germeter aid station.

Lieutenant Barrilleaux, Company Ecommander, with a group of his men whowere taking shelter along the west wallof a house in order to avoid the full thrustof continuing German artillery fire, wasthus fully exposed to the short Americanrounds. He rushed inside the battalionCP to try to get the firing stopped. Justas he stepped back outside another round

10 Combat Interv 75 with Nelson, Condon,Barrilleaux, Nesbitt. Artillery records are too in-definite to determine what American unit, if any,fired this concentration.

354 THREE BATTLES

exploded near by, killing his companyfirst sergeant and wounding the lieuten-ant himself in the face and leg. Hemoved back to the Germeter aid station.

Lieutenant Beggs, Company E, waswounded slightly in this firing and alsoreported to the aid station in Germeter.There his wounds seemed to him so minoralongside of "so much real misery" thathe decided his place was back with hisplatoon and returned to Vossenack.

Quick calls to the rear lifted the Ameri-can artillery fire after the four volleys.The few officers remaining with the bat-talion's infantry forces checked their de-fenses and found that more men hadwithdrawn and their line was now thinnerthan ever. But the retreat had beenstopped for the moment, and at noon theAmerican infantry still held half the townof Vossenack.11

Was There a German Attack?

Armored elements in Vossenack re-ported that they had never encounteredGerman infantry at any time during earlymorning of 6 November. Many of theinfantrymen also stated that they feltthere had been no real enemy attack.The impression of attack had been cre-ated, however, and that in itself provedenough to give half the town to theenemy.

Lieutenant Condon, Company E ex-ecutive officer, believed that there wasno actual German attack; if there was,it had not been large enough in itself tocause the rout that followed. He ex-plained that the Germans shelled the

forward nose, then lifted their fire infavor of long-range machine gun fire fromthe woods to the east and north. Next,as the small arms fire slackened and thedefenders rose in their holes to meet anexpected attack, the artillery let looseagain, causing more casualties. Thatprocess, the lieutenant said, gave theillusion of attack. Major Bodine, divi-sion antitank officer, was in Vossenackfrom 1000 to 1300 and said he saw noenemy infantry or tanks. The 2d Bat-talion men told him they were drivenfrom position by artillery and mortar fire.

Lt. Clyde R. Johnson, the WeaponsPlatoon leader of Company G, insistedthere was a German attack. When theretreat started, he and two other menwere in a covered hole that had been usedas the company observation post. Asthey began to climb from the hole, hesaid, a German soldier stepped over thecover, yelling something that soundedlike a command. The three Americans,Lieutenant Johnson, Pfc. I. Ortiz, andT. Sgt. Kenneth Jones, remained in theirhole, all the while hearing Germanvoices, until about 2000 that night, whenthey ventured out and eventually madetheir way back to Germeter.

Presence of at least some German in-fantry on the extreme nose of the ridgewas inferred by Lieutenant Kauffman,Company F commander. Five of hismen on the forward nose of the ridgewere captured, he said, and were kept inthe house in which his old companycommand post had been located. Kauff-man hazarded no guess as to the time oftheir capture. After nightfall, two ofthese men, S. Sgt. George A. Christianand Cpl. James Klinginsmith, escapedand made their way back to Americanpositions.

11 Infantry story is from the following: CombatInterv 75 with Pruden, Nesbitt, Barrilleaux, Condon,Beggs, Crain, Cascarano, Nelson, Philpot, Kauffman;112th Inf S-3 Jnl, 6 Nov 44; V Corps Study, G-3Sec.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 355

That the Germans did eventually fol-low the Americans into the eastern halfof Vossenack was confirmed, for by noonGerman infantrymen were definitely es-tablished as far west as the church. Butthat there must have been some time lagbetween the American retreat and theGerman occupation is apparent from thetankers. Both Lieutenant Sherman's andLieutenant Anderson's platoons of Com-pany B, 707th Tank Battalion, were inthe eastern edge of Vossenack until atleast midmorning. It is possible that thepresence of armor prevented the Germansfrom exploiting the infantry withdrawal.

German sources indicate that an earlymorning attack (0400) was planned butagree generally that the attack was de-layed, by failure of either the infantry orthe artillery to be ready on time. TheS-2 of the 229th Field Artillery Battalionreported that the attack, according to oneprisoner, jumped off at 0835. Somesources say there was "hand-to-handcombat" in the town, but presence ofenemy troops as far west as the churchcannot be definitely established prior tonoon. Capture of the first sizable groupof German prisoners was not reporteduntil 1630 in the afternoon.12

The Armor Builds Up a Line

By the time the infantry had built upsome semblance of a defense along theline of the battalion command post, Cap-

tain Granger, Company B, 707th TankBattalion, located the infantry commandpost. Colonel Hatzfeld, the infantrybattalion commander, was sitting insidewith his face in his hands, and CaptainPruden, the executive, told Granger whathe knew of the confused situation. Laterin the day Hatzfeld reported to theGermeter aid station, and Pruden as-sumed actual command.

Soon after Captain Granger's visit tothe infantry command post, at approxi-mately 1100, Lieutenant Sherman ra-dioed from the eastern edge of town:"Captain, it's getting too hot to handleout here. We are just taking fire anddoing no good." Captain Granger toldhim to withdraw his tanks to the vicinityof the church and the battalion CP andgo into position with Lieutenant Ander-son's 1st Platoon, which by this time hadgradually worked to the rear until it wasnow near the church on the south sideof town. Also in position in this areawere Lieutenant Novak's immobilizedtank and his 3d Platoon, Company C,707th Tank Battalion.

As Lieutenant Sherman was withdraw-ing with his tanks along the northernroute, he saw a column of infantryemerging from the woods on the northflank almost due north of the infantry CP.Since he could not definitely identify thecolumn as friendly or enemy, he did notopen fire.

Lieutenant Anderson's platoon on theright flank was receiving antitank firefrom the vicinity of Harscheidt on theKommerscheidt-Schmidt ridge. CaptainGranger made contact with the artilleryliaison officer at the infantry CP and hadartillery fire placed on the enemy gunflashes. Then he returned to his com-mand tank where he heard Sgt. Arthur

12 Combat Interv 75 with Beggs, Pruden, Condon,Johnson, Cascarano, Kauffman; Combat Interv 75with Hostrup-Fleig-Payne; Pugh; Granger-Ander-son-Walling-Cook; Davis-Murphy-Gardner. Seealso 28th Div G-2 Jnl, 6 Nov 44; 28th Div G-3 File,6 Nov 44; MS # A-905 (Waldenburg); MS # C-016(Straube); ETHINT 56 (Gersdorff and Waldenburg);Sit Rpts, 6 Nov 44, found in OB WEST KTB Anlagen1.-10.XI.44.

356 THREE BATTLES

Claugh's tank (in Anderson's platoon)open fire with its machine guns on thebuildings in the eastern end of Vossenack.Lieutenant Novak, Company C, openedfire at the same time on the woods lineeast of the town. When Captain Grangerchecked to see if Sergeant Claugh wassure he was firing at Germans, the ser-geant replied: "Hell, yes, I'm sure," andadded hastily, "Sir."

At almost the same time, LieutenantSherman's tanks arrived from the northside of town. Captain Granger directedthem into position with Lieutenant An-derson and Lieutenant Novak.

At approximately 1140 an infantryofficer ran to Captain Granger's tank andasked for tank support on the north flank.Granger moved with his command tanksome twenty-five yards north of the in-fantry CP. Coming up toward the townout of the wooded draw to the north werefifteen to twenty Germans, evidently thesame unidentified column seen earlier byLieutenant Sherman. When the com-mand tank opened fire, the German in-fantry hit the dirt, and Granger's gunnerput two rounds of high explosive into thearea where they had fallen. An enemyantitank weapon from somewhere in thenorthern draw fired, one round rippingthe ground directly in front of Granger'stank. He returned the fire, and theantitank weapon did not fire again.

Now there were three tank platoons inVossenack, all just south of town and ona general line with the infantry defense.One tank, Captain Granger's, was justnorth of the infantry CP. It was theonly tank covering the north side.13

In midmorning, after all tank destroy-ers had pulled out of Vossenack, General

Davis made contact with Colonel Mays,893d Tank Destroyer Battalion com-mander, and asked why there were nodestroyers in the town. Colonel May'sexplanation that the destroyers had foundno targets there and did nothing but drawenemy fire did not satisfy the general. Heordered all of Company B, 893d, backinto town, asserting that its presence wasnecessary for infantry morale.14 WhenMajor Bodine, the division antitank offi-cer, talked with General Davis, the as-sistant division commander relaxed hisrequirement, and only one platoon, the1st under Lieutenant Davis, was orderedback into Vossenack. Davis placed twoof his guns on the right side of the mainstreet west of the church and the thirdon the left to cover the north flank. (Thefourth gun was the one which had earlierfallen into a cellar.)

A second platoon of destroyers, the 3d,moved just east of Germeter, fired onreported enemy mortar locations in thedraw north of Vossenack, and then pulledback to the rear of Germeter. One gunfrom this platoon later moved south ofVossenack and joined Lieutenant Smith's2d Platoon, which still was waiting at theentrance of the main supply route intothe Kall woods in its effort to reachKommerscheidt and join Task Force R.15

About 1245, tankers in Vossenack dis-played their identification panels whileAmerican planes strafed the eastern endof the town and bombed the draw to thenortheast. Enemy artillery ceased com-

13 Combat Interv 76 with Granger-Anderson-Walling-Cook.

14 ". . . many enemy targets of opportunity suitablefor TD fire were not engaged. A few well-placedguns, each with alternate firing positions, could haveduplicated several times the destruction of enemyarmor accredited to [the American tank destroyers]."Ltr, Gen Davis to Hist Div, 27 Dec 49.

15 Combat Interv 76 with Mays, Davis-Murphy-Gardner.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 357

pletely as the American planes buzzedthe area, the first time in the Schmidtoperation that the presence of Americanaircraft seemed to have any appreciableeffect in silencing enemy guns.

After the air strike, the tankers con-tinued to fire intermittently at enemypersonnel in the eastern end of town, atthe wooded draw to the northeast, andat gun flashes on the Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge line. About 1615 eithera German Mark V tank or a self-pro-pelled gun fired from the vicinity ofMausbach-Froitscheidt and knocked outone of Lieutenant Anderson's tanks. Al-though Anderson returned the fire, therange was too great for his weakerAmerican guns.

At approximately 1800 LieutenantQuarrie came into town with his 3dPlatoon, Company C, 707th Tank Bat-talion, and evidently a portion of Lieu-tenant Leming's 1st Platoon, for he hadsix tanks. He relieved Lieutenant An-derson's platoon, and all of Company B,707th, then withdrew to Germeter. Ex-cept for Lieutenant Novak's immobilizedtank, Novak's Company C platoon alsowithdrew, and Quarrie's reinforced 3dPlatoon, plus one immobilized tank, re-mained as tank support for the defenseof Vossenack's western half. Also pres-ent as darkness came was LieutenantDavis' platoon of Company B, 893d TankDestroyer Battalion.16

The Engineers Act as Riflemen

Major units of the 1171st EngineerCombat Group were the 20th. 146th

(minus one company), and 1340th En-gineer Combat Battalions. The 146thBattalion had been assigned road main-tenance work in the rear areas, a taskwhich became most formidable becauseof the muddy conditions of the foresttrails. The other two battalions were indirect support of the 112th and 110thInfantry Regiments. One company ofthe organic 103d Engineer Combat Bat-talion had also been attached to each ofthe three infantry regiments. Engineersof the 1171st Group were to be preparedat any time upon four hours' notice forcommitment as riflemen.

In view of the chaotic situation inVossenack, the three engineer battalionswere alerted at various times during themorning of 6 November by various com-manders, including General Davis andColonel Daley, 1171st Group command-er. The first alert came early in the day,before Colonel Daley knew that CaptainLutz's two platoons had withdrawn fromVossenack, when the group commanderalerted Company C, 1340th Engineers,for movement into Vossenack. GeneralDavis met the Company C commander,Capt. Ralph E. Lind, Jr., about 1100 ashe was taking his company into a forwardassembly area17 near Richelskaul prepar-atory to moving to Vossenack. Davisordered the company to go instead to theKall bridge and secure it. He also or-dered a platoon of Company A, 20thEngineers, which had withdrawn fromthe main supply route on Colonel Sonne-field's orders, to accompany it.

Shortly after issuing these orders, Gen-eral Davis apparently changed his mind.16 Combat Interv 76 with Granger-Anderson-Wal-

ling-Cook, Leming-Quarrie-Jenkins-Ryan; CombatInterv 75 with Condon, Pruden. Although noreference to air attack against Vossenack is made inIX TAC records, this information is accepted becauseit comes from ground troops who saw the action.

17 At the time General Davis met these troops"they were not moving into assembly areas—theywere on the road moving away from the action."Ltr, Gen Davis to Hist Div, 27 Dec 49.

358 THREE BATTLES

CORDUROY ROAD. Adverse weather conditions required extensive road maintenancework by the engineers.

When he met Colonel Daley and hisengineer battalion commanders nearRichelskaul, he told Daley to send Com-pany C, 1340th, and those men of the 20thEngineers who had withdrawn fromVossenack, back into Vossenack to reportto the infantry commander. After es-tablishing that the situation in the townwas secure, Daley was to take them onto recapture the bridge area. Since theseorders conflicted with the general's pre-vious instructions to Captain Lind, the1171st S-3 left the meeting early to over-take Lind's company. He passed on thenew order and Company C, 1340th,headed for Vossenack about noon.

When Colonel Daley and the 1340th

commander, Lt. Col. Truman H. Set-liffe, left the meeting, they also overtookCompany C, 1340th, to accompany it toVossenack. On the way they met Lieu-tenant Pellino of Company A, 20th, whowas leading about thirty men back fromthe Kall trail area. Pellino and his menjoined the column, thus giving it twoplatoons of Company A, 20th. FromPellino Daley learned that there hadbeen no enemy action when the lieuten-ant had left his defensive bivouac on theKall trail. This information, the colonelfelt, changed the situation enough towarrant letting Company C, 1340th, andthe two Company A, 20th, platoons con-tinue to the bridge before the Germans

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 359

moved there in force. He could sendCompany B, 1340th, to Vossenack.Colonel Setliffe continued with the col-umn and Colonel Daley returned to the1340th command post at Richelskaul.Captain Lind, receiving his third changeof orders, headed once again for the Kallbridge.

When Colonel Daley reached Richel-skaul, he found Company B, 1340th,ready to move and awaiting orders. Hetold the company to proceed to Vosse-nack and then, after the situation therewas cleared up, to go to the bridge toassist Company C.

Learning then that the two companiesof the 146th Engineers were moving intoan assembly area about 700 yards westof Germeter, Colonel Daley gave ordersthere to the battalion's advance partyto have the battalion move to the edgeof the Germeter woods with the prospectof commitment in Vossenack. He andthe 146th commander, Lt. Col. Carl J.Isley, then headed for Vossenack to re-connoiter the situation.

With the 146th Engineers thus pre-paring for commitment in Vossenack,Colonel Daley radioed Company B,1340th, to bypass the town and movedirectly to the Kall valley to assist Com-pany C, 1340th, at the bridge. Thisorder completed commitment of all the1171st engineers, for the 146th had onlytwo companies and Company A, 1340th,was engaged in road repair and in oc-cupying captured pillboxes in the 110thInfantry sector to the south. This com-pany was not considered for commitmentin the 112th Infantry sector at this timebecause the extent of the German opera-tion was not known. The enemy mightalso be threatening on the 110th Infantryfront.

Colonel Daley and Colonel Isley ar-rived in Vossenack to reconnoiter shortlyafter 1300. Daley was wounded slightlyin the leg by shell fragments—not seri-ously enough to require evacuation. Thetwo engineer commanders made contactat the infantry battalion CP with CaptainPruden, fully in command of the rem-nants of the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry,since Colonel Hatzfeld's evacuation. Pru-den said he had to have relief withinthirty minutes; he could not be respon-sible for holding the hastily contrived lineany longer than thirty minutes with hisdemoralized force, now reduced to aboutforty men plus the tank support. Enemyinfantry were in full contact. WhenColonel Isley said it would take at leastone and a half hours to get his menforward, Captain Pruden asked him tohurry, saying he would hang on as besthe could.18

After Colonel Daley and Colonel Isleyhad gone into Vossenack, General Daviscame upon Company A, 146th Engineers,moving into its assembly area where ithad been directed by Colonel Isley toawait further orders. With the companywas Maj. Willard B. Baker, 146th S-3,who said General Davis told him: "Goin. Drive the enemy out of the town.Move. Get going."19

18 Story of engineer commitment is from the follow-ing: Combat Interv 75 with Daley, Pruden, Isley,Capt Thomas F. Creegan and 1st Lt Lumir T.Makousky, 1340th Engrs, and 1st Lt Clarence White,20th Engrs; Lt Col Truman H. Setliffe, Rpt of Opnsof CO, 1340th Engrs (hereafter cited as Setliffe Rpt);Sonnefield Rpt; Statement, Maj John G. Auld, ExOff, 1340th Engrs, to Hist Off (hereafter cited asAuld Statement); Maj Robert L. Argus, S-3, 1171stEngr (C) Gp, notes on operations of 6 Nov 44(hereafter cited as Argus Notes); Ltr, Col Daley toHist Div.

19 Combat Interv 75 with Baker.

360 THREE BATTLES

Many of the men were still wearingtheir hip boots from road work and thecommanders knew nothing of the Vos-senack situation. The company com-mander, Capt. Sam H. Ball, Jr., issuedinstructions to his platoon leaders as theymoved forward. He sent out several menas a point and told his 1st Platoon under1st Lt. William J. Kehaly to take theright (south) side of Vossenack's mainstreet, his 2d, Platoon under 1st Lt.Kenneth J. Shively to take the left(north), and his 3d Platoon under 1st Lt.William A. Anderson to be in support.Advancing in a column of platoons, onefile on either side of the Germeter-Vossenack road, the company enteredthe western edge of Vossenack and Cap-tain Ball directed the lead platoons tocontinue to the church and assume de-fensive positions. He himself reportedto the command post of the 2d Battalion,112th Infantry, with Colonel Daley,Colonel Isley, and Captain Pruden. Be-cause of General Davis' orders and thelack of preliminaries, troops were gettinginto town in less than the infantry cap-tain's requested half-hour.

As the 1st and 2d Platoons passed theinfantry CP, they began to receive haras-sing rifle fire from the eastern end ofVossenack. Pvt. Doyle W. McDanielclimbed atop a shed roof on the northside of the street in an effort to locate thisfire; he jumped down again and landedalmost on top of a German, whom heshot. When his platoon reached thecrossroads at the church, McDanielclimbed another building in another at-tempt to spot the enemy riflemen, onlyto be seen first himself and killed.

The 1st Platoon on the right (south),using "run and duck" tactics which in-volved advancing in short rushes singly

or in pairs, reached the crossroads andcaptured the church, taking eight or tenGerman prisoners at the cost of approxi-mately five engineers wounded. Othermen of the platoon took a building on theright of the church. By nightfall the com-pany had established itself completely ineverything west of the church. It heldthe church as well, one house beside iton the south, and three houses on thewest side of the street leading from thechurch toward the Kall gorge.20

Company C, 146th Engineers, fol-lowed Company A into Vossenack justbefore dusk. Capt. Vincent L. Wall,the company commander, was directedto take over defense of the north side ofthe main street, leaving Company A freeto defend the south side. Captain Walland the battalion S-3, Major Baker,went forward to reconnoiter after dark-ness had already come. As they at-tempted to go around the eastern sideof the church, a German threw a handgrenade at them, wounding CaptainWall. Both officers pretended to bedead until a German rose up, evidentlyto determine the effect of the grenade,and in so doing silhouetted himself. Ris-ing quickly to one knee, Captain Wallshot the German with his carbine, andthe two officers ran back around thecorner of the church.

Because of his wounds, Wall turnedhis company over to 1st Lt. Richard R.Schindler, who then established theCompany C platoons in the buildings onthe north side of the street—in the order1st, 2d, 3d—from east to west. All pla-

20 One of the German prisoners captured in Vosse-nack said his company commander had trieddesperately to determine the identity of these new-type American troops who wore this new-typeequipment—the hip boots.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 361

toons of Company A then shifted to thesouth side of the street.21

Meanwhile about thirty-five men ofCompany B, 20th Engineers, who hadwithdrawn that morning from Vossenackupon Captain Lutz's order, had been as-sembled near Germeter and were orderedby General Davis to assist the Vossenackdefense. Tying in with the defense ofthe 146th Engineers, they went into posi-tion south of Vossenack and west of thecrossroads where a wooded draw pointedfinger-like toward the town from thesouth.

After the arrival of Company A, 146thEngineers, in Vossenack, Colonel Daleyhad continued back toward Germeter,met General Davis, and explained thedisposition of his command. When Gen-eral Davis objected to the decision tosend the two companies of the 1340thEngineers to the bridge area before rein-forcing Vossenack, Colonel Daley radioedthe 1340th column to turn back. But,he discovered, Company C, 1340th, hadalready reached the bridge. He thenordered Colonel Setliffe, the battalioncommander, to leave whatever force hefelt was necessary to hold the bridge andreturn the remainder of the two com-panies to Vossenack. Setliffe decidedthat all of Company C was necessary tohold the bridge.

Colonel Daley next telephoned Gen-eral Cota and reported the situation.General Cota directed the 1171st com-mander to take command of all troopsin Vossenack and to assume responsi-bility for defense of the town. Since the1340th Engineers seemed to have control

of the bridge area and the 146th seemedadequate for the defense of Vossenack,Colonel Daley set up two commandgroups, one under Colonel Isley control-ling all troops in Vossenack and oneunder Colonel Setliffe controlling all inthe bridge and Kall trail area.22

The 1340th column had moved outabout noon for the Kall valley. The twoplatoons of Company A, 20th Engineers,dropped off at their former defensivebivouac at the entrance of the main sup-ply route into the gorge. Company B,1340th, had started out somewhat laterthan Company C, and reached only theCompany A, 20th, positions when Colo-nel Daley's radio message instructed it togo back to Vossenack. While the men ofthe company dug in near Company A,20th, their commanders went to Vosse-nack and talked with Colonel Isley, whonow was in over-all command of troopsin the town. Even though the positionsnow being occupied by Company B,1340th, were not very satisfactory, it wasdecided that the men should remain inthem rather than find new ones in thedark. Next day offered the possibilityof improvement.

In the meantime Company C, 1340th,with approximately ninety-two men andfive officers, had reached the Kall bridgewithout fighting and was in a defensiveposition by about 1830. The 3d Platoonunder 2d Lt. Jack H. Baughn and onesquad of the 1st Platoon crossed thebridge and dug in east of the river; the2d Platoon on the west bank dug in nearthe bridge and the Kall trail, facing gen-

21 Story of 146th Engrs is from the following: Com-bat Interv 75 with Isley, Baker, and Ball; Capt Ball,Rpt of Action of Co A, 146th Engrs, in Vossenack(hereafter cited as Ball Rpt), Combat Interv File 75.

22 Combat Interv 75 with Lutz, Isley, Daley;Sonnefield Statement; Setliffe Rpt; Col Isley, Noteson Opns of the 146th Engrs in recapture and defenseof Vossenack (hereafter cited as Isley Notes); Ltr,Col Daley to Hist Div.

362 THREE BATTLES

erally northeast in a platoon perimeterdefense. The remaining two squads ofthe 1st Platoon dug in south of the 2dbut still north of the bridge, facing gen-erally south and southwest. The com-pany had six machine guns, nine ba-zookas, and its usual complement of M-1rifles.

Thus, despite initial confusion and con-tradictory orders, the engineers had bynightfall established themselves in defenseas riflemen. In Vossenack were Com-panies A and C, 146th Engineers. Rem-nants of the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry—some forty men—provided local secur-ity for what became a combined infantry-engineer command post. A few strag-glers in Germeter were organized into aplatoon and moved up after dark.23 Atthe Kall bridge was Company C, 1340thEngineers. At the entrance of the Kalltrail into the woods southeast of Vosse-nack two platoons of Company A, 20th,and all of Company B, 1340th, were de-ployed. Farther west and south ofVossenack along the woods line approxi-mately two platoons of Company B, 20th,were in position.

Still beyond the river and tied in withCompany C, 112th Infantry, was oneplatoon of Company C, 20th Engineers,as well as the company's headquartersgroup. One squad of this company stillguarded a rear explosive dump nearGermeter, one platoon was on mine-clearing duty with the 109th Infantry,and two squads had been decimated thepreceding night by German infiltrationin the Kall gorge. One platoon of Com-pany B, 20th, had also been lost in theKall action. Company B, 146th, wason detached service with the 102d Cav-

alry Group, and Company A, 1340th,was still working with the 110th Infantry,although its company commander hadbeen warned during the afternoon thathis company might be pulled out at anymoment to join the other engineers inthe Kall gorge or at Vossenack.24

The Command Level

Throughout the morning of 6 Novem-ber 28th Division headquarters seemedto be aware of the withdrawal of the 2dBattalion, 112th Infantry, from Vosse-nack but failed to appreciate the with-drawal as the rout it actually was.Orders were given early that armoredunits be utilized fully to stabilize thesituation. At 1130 General Cota in-structed General Davis to secure boththe Kall trail and Vossenack and to usethe engineers, if necessary, as riflemen.General Davis had been on the scene allmorning, at least since about 0830, andacted either before receiving these ordersor immediately thereafter.25

Throughout the entire Schmidt opera-tion, V Corps had kept in close contactwith division headquarters, often by tele-phone conversations between the V Corpscommander and General Cota. In thelight of what division recorded in itsjournals, however, little accurate in-formation was available to pass on tocorps. The division's G-3 PeriodicReports, from which much of the corpsestimate of the situation could be ex-pected to be gleaned, seemed designed tosoften the effect of the various reverses.

23 Combat Interv 75 with Pruden, Nesbitt.

24 Combat Interv 75 with White, Daley, Bane,Makousky, Doherty, Isley, Creegan, S Sgt BenjaminA. P. Cipra, Jr., Co C, 1340th Engrs; SonnefieldStatement.

25 28th Div G-3 Jnl, 6 Nov 44; Combat Interv 76with Cole.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 363

On 6 November, for example, when tell-ing of the rout of the 2d Battalion, 112thInfantry, the G-3 Periodic Report stated:"2d Battalion received very heavy andconcentrated artillery fire, withdrew toreorganize and then regained their origi-nal position." Actually the 2d Battalionhad been routed, recovered none of theground it had lost, and had been de-stroyed as a fighting unit.26

The Night in Vossenack: Armor

Armored elements in Vossenack afterdark consisted of a composite platoon ofsix tanks under Lieutenant Quarrie,Company C, 707th Tank Battalion;Lieutenant Novak's immobilized tank;and a platoon of tank destroyers underLieutenant Davis, Company B, 893dTank Destroyer Battalion. At approxi-mately 2000 General Davis and CaptainGranger, Company B, 707th, checkedthe positions of Lieutenant Quarrie's pla-toon. Sometime during the night Sgt.John B. Cook, Company B, 707th, wentinto Vossenack and drove out a tank thathad been damaged that afternoon byartillery fire and temporarily abandonedby his unit.

Lieutenant Quarrie asked ColonelIsley, now in command in Vossenack,for either infantry or engineers to out-post his tanks, and a lieutenant and tento twelve men from Company B, 20thEngineers, were designated for the job.They dug in underneath each tank, andthe engineer lieutenant entered Lieu-tenant Quarrie's tank. About 0300 itreceived a mortar or artillery hit on theturret, another tank was hit on the enginecompartment, and the engineer guards

left. The engineer lieutenant left Quar-rie's tank, ostensibly to make an inspec-tion of his men, but did not return.

Quarrie was called to the infantry-engineer CP about 0500 to give recom-mendations on employing his tanks thenext morning to help retake the easternend of town. He told the planners thathis platoon was to be relieved at daylightby a platoon of Company B, 707th. Be-cause of exposure to enemy fire from theBrandenberg-Bergstein ridge, he advisedagainst using tanks on the north.

The 2d Platoon, Company B, 893dTank Destroyer Battalion, reinforced byone destroyer from the 3d, had waitedthrough the afternoon at the entranceto the Kall valley for word that the sup-ply route was reopened. At dusk theplatoon withdrew to Germeter to refueland await further instructions. Lieu-tenant Davis' 1st Platoon remained allnight in Vossenack.27

The Night in Vossenack: Engineers

When General Davis visited his infan-try-engineer CP in Vossenack at 2100,Colonel Isley explained to him the dis-position of his troops. General Davisreminded the engineer commander thathis mission in Vossenack was to defendthe supply route running through thetown and that he couldn't defend a sup-ply route by sitting on it. Indicatinggenerally on a map with a sweeping mo-tion of his finger the ground just south-east of the eastern edge of the town, thegeneral ordered Isley to put a company"out here." Captain Pruden pointedout that this was the area where his in-

26 28th Div G-3 Jnl, 2-9 Nov 44; 28th Div G-3Periodic Rpt, 6 Nov 44.

27 Combat Interv 76 with Davis-Murphy-Gardner,Granger-Anderson-Walling-Cook, Leming-Quarrie-Jenkins-Ryan, Fuller; Combat Interv 75 with Isley.

364 THREE BATTLES

fantry had found the positions so exposedthat they proved untenable. The gen-eral said the engineers could choose theirown exact locations but they had to putsomeone in the vicinity he had indicated.

To carry out these instructions, ColonelIsley ordered Company C, 146th Engi-neers, to take over the defense of bothsides of the Vossenack street. Then Com-pany A, 146th, guided by two infantrysergeants who had been in the forwardeastern position, was to move to the areaindicated. In compliance, LieutenantSchindler, Company C commander sinceCaptain Wall had been wounded, senthis 3d Platoon to take over the eastern-most defenses of Company A.

Before Company A moved out on itsnew mission, Lt. Col. James F. White,executive officer of the engineer group,arrived at the infantry-engineer CP andgave instructions for the next day. Atdaylight the 146th was to clear the easternend of Vossenack and then defend thenorthern flank of the town. Company B,1340th, the remaining elements of Com-pany A, 20th, and the two platoons ofCompany B, 20th, were to move up afterthe town was cleared and defend thesouth flank, and tanks were to be placedat the eastern nose of the town.

Despite this announcement of plans forthe next day, Colonel Isley felt that Gen-eral Davis' instructions to occupy theexposed nose of the ridge still had to beexecuted. Thus, Company A and itstwo infantry guides moved out about2315.28 In a tightly closed single-filecolumn because of the darkness, the Com-

pany A engineers moved to the south ofVossenack for about 400 yards to avoidthe light from burning buildings near thechurch, and then turned east. The com-pany had passed Vossenack's second mainnorth-south street when Captain Ball,the company commander, discoveredthat the infantry guides did not knowwhere their former positions were. Theywere lost. The company halted as Lieu-tenant Kehaly, the 1st Platoon leader,and one of the guides moved ahead inan effort to find the positions. They re-turned in about fifteen minutes withouthaving succeeded. Thinking they hadgone too far to the east, Captain Ballpulled the company back to within abouttwenty yards of a promontory of housesalongside the second main north-southstreet and again sent Lieutenant Kehalyand the guide to search for the positions.

The lieutenant and the guide had goneno more than forty feet when CaptainBall at the head of the waiting columncaught sight of a man squatting in afield not far away. As the man stoodup and fastened his trousers, CaptainBall told the soldier beside him to callout to him. The man said something inreply—Captain Ball thought it was inGerman—turned, and ran. When Cap-tain Ball fired, the man fell and lay moan-ing. Ball noticed another man movingalongside a hedge near the first houses;a shot from another American rifle rangout, and there was no further soundfrom the hedge.

Seeking to avoid what must be enemypositions in the houses, the captain passedword down his line of men to withdrawabout 200 yards down the slope to thesoutheast. As they did so, about fourburp guns opened fire, but the shootingwas high and the convex contour of the

28 Combat Interv 75 with Isley, White, Baker-Ball, and 1st Lt Bernard E. Meier, Co C, 146thEngrs; Lt Meier, chronological acct of events inVossenack (hereafter cited as Meier Acct), CombatInterv File 75.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 365

slope provided protection. Then theGermans fired flares, the first comingfrom the promontory of buildings nearwhich the Americans had seen the twoGermans. Other flares, accompanied bysporadic machine gun fire, rose from theKall woods to the south. Still others shotup from the west near the church, givingthe impression that the Company Aengineers were surrounded.

Lieutenant Kehaly and the infantryguide had rejoined the company. Call-ing a conference of his platoon leaders,Captain Ball concluded that, withoutbeing able to find the old infantry posi-tions, his troops could not accomplishtheir mission and should return to thewestern end of town. The Germans ob-viously knew they were on the ridge nowand would be alert for any new move.

With Lieutenant Kehaly and CaptainBall leading, the men moved farthertoward the draw to the south in order toavoid detection from Vossenack. Theyreached a point a few yards south of aroad fork which formed the supply trailand spotted two Germans who appearedto be laying mines. The Americansyelled at them, just to make sure theywere Germans, and then fired. The Ger-mans took flight and disappeared into aslight dip in the trail. Tossing a grenadetoward the dip, and then another, Lieu-tenant Kehaly and Captain Ball rolledover to where they could see into thedepression. They saw only one Germanwalking unconcernedly up the trailtoward Vossenack. Captain Ball firedat him and the German fell.

As sleet and rain began to make thecold night even more uncomfortable, thecolumn started forward again. WhenCaptain Ball passed the fallen German,he glanced back just in time to see that

the German was not dead and seemed tobe preparing to shoot. Both CaptainBall and his runner fired again. Thistime the German lay still.

Returning with his company to thewestern end of Vossenack, Captain Ballreported to Colonel Isley and was toldthat new plans were being readied foran attack in early morning. It was thenabout 0300, and the engineer companytook cover in the battered houses west ofthe command post.29

When Company C, 146th Engineers,had relieved Company A in its defenseof Vossenack to allow the flanking move-ment, the 3d Platoon under 1st Lt.Charles F. Rollins, Jr., had taken overthe defense of the church and the Com-pany A positions. About 0200 a machinegun position of this platoon slightlysouthwest of the church was hit by a Ger-man hand grenade, and the machinegunners withdrew to a near-by alternateposition from which they still couldcover their assigned target area. Takingadvantage of the darkness, the Germansabout the same time infiltrated into theeast portion of the church and openedfire with burp guns on the 3d Platoonmen in the other side of the church. Oneengineer was killed, the others withdrew,and the much-disputed church once againchanged hands.30

Southeast of Vossenack at the entranceof the Kall trail into the woods, Com-pany B, 1340th Engineers, and Com-pany A, 20th Engineers (now reduced toabout thirty officers and men), were har-assed throughout the night by enemyartillery fire pounding on the ridge behindthem. Because the shelling centered ap-proximately a hundred yards away, the

29 Combat Interv 75 with Isley, Baker-Ball.30 Combat Interv 75 with Meier; Meier Acct.

366 THREE BATTLES

engineers had few casualties. Two ma-chine gun outposts were established alongthe Kall trail between the woods andVossenack.

Back in Vossenack Colonel Isleyplanned a meeting for 0530 to co-ordi-nate for an early morning attack (0730)designed to retake the eastern half ofthe town. The tank officer who was torelieve Lieutenant Quarrie did not arriveat the command post until 0645, and theoriginal attack hour was therefore de-layed until 0800.31

Medics and Engineers Along the Kall

Because the Kall River supply routeremained mined and insecure during thedaylight hours of 6 November, the com-bined 1st-3d Battalion, 112th Infantry,aid station in the log dugout beside thetrail made no use of vehicles for evacua-tion. Several groups of walking woundeddid make their way along a wooded cross-country route that led around the southof Vossenack ridge up the draw toRichelskaul.32

T/4 Krieder, the engineer in charge ofthe security guard at the Kall bridge, hadno further contact with American troopsafter the 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry(infantry element of Task Force R),crossed the bridge about 0815. Movingback up the hill to report to their com-pany commander, Krieder and his mencame across five men from the 707thTank Battalion who had remained withtheir disabled tanks through the enemypatrol action the night before. Onetanker, Sergeant Markey, whose immo-

bilized tank had necessitated use of thecomplicated switchback west of the Kall,said he had remained inside his tank andcould hear the Germans knocking on thetank and talking. They had made noeffort to look inside.

When Krieder's group reached the exitof the main supply route from the woods,it found no trace of its company (Com-pany A, 20th Engineers), which had bythis time obeyed Colonel Sonnefield'sorders to withdraw. Since heavy shell-fire was falling over the route they wouldhave to follow to get back to Germeter,the men took cover in abandoned fox-holes along the woods line. They madecontact with their company in the after-noon when it returned to its positions.Despite a general belief that the Kalltrail was in German hands through theday of 6 November, T/4 Krieder madeno mention of having seen any Germansafter daylight.33

That afternoon when the men of Cap-tain Lind's Company C, 1340th Engi-neers, moved toward the Kall bridge,they made no enemy contact. By 1830they had established their defense nearthe bridge: the 3d Platoon and one squadof the 1st across the bridge on the river'seast bank; the 2d Platoon on the westbank along the Kall trail; the remain-ing two squads of the 1st Platoon on thewest bank facing south and southwest.(Map 28) Five men reconnoitered theMestrenger Muehle east of the river andfound it unoccupied.

At dusk the company commander,Captain Lind, sent two mine detectorcrews with several men as security tosweep the trail leading from the bridge

31 Combat Interv 75 with Creegan, Doherty, Isley;Ltr, Col Daley to Hist Div.

32 Muglia Rpt; Morrison Rpt; Ltr, Maj Berndt toHist Div.

33 Combat Interv 75 with Krieder; Combat Interv76 with Hostrup-Fleig-Payne.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 367

MAP 28

back toward Vossenack. About 200yards above the bridge, between thebridge and the infantry aid station, themen spotted four to six Teller mineswhich had evidently been laid hastilyin the mud of the trail. Before theycould remove the mines, a burp gun fromthe right flank opened fire. Althoughit was fast growing dark and the men

could not spot the enemy gunner, Cpl.Thomas W. Hamlett, in charge of thedetector crews, shot a full clip from hisrifle into the undergrowth, and the Ger-man did not fire again. The companyexecutive officer, 1st Lt. Lumir T. Makou-sky, directed the detector crews to moveback to their platoons and told CorporalHamlett to establish an outpost at theintersection of the Kall trail and thenorth-south river road.

It was well after dark before any enemyartillery fire hit the engineers' bridgepositions. Later, about 2330, a particu-larly heavy concentration showered thearea. Close on its heels came a groupof about twenty-five Germans, followingthe artillery so closely that they werealmost atop the 2d Platoon position onthe west bank when the shelling lifted.They opened fire with burp guns, ma-chine guns, and grenades, killing thesquad leader of the 1st Squad and wound-ing the 1st Platoon leader and CorporalHamlett.

The engineers' return fire seemed todisrupt the patrol's attack, although in-dividual Germans continued down theriver road toward the southwest. Theintense preliminary shelling had causedthe heaviest American casualties. Someof the engineers left their foxholes duringthe fire fight and retreated up the hilltoward the positions of Company A, 20thEngineers. Nevertheless, the enemy at-tack was stopped, and next morning theremaining engineers counted nine deadGermans.

The enemy continued to harass theCompany C, 1340th, engineers at thebridge the rest of the night with artilleryand mortar fire. Counting its heavycasualties of the night and the numberwho had retreated during and after thepatrol action, the company found itselfreduced to about half its original strengththe next morning.34

While the engineers suffered no moredirect attacks during the night, otherGermans were in the area. An enemysquad stopped at the log aid station, in-quired about the type of installation, andthen offered rations or any supplies that

34 Combat Interv 75 with Makousky, Cipra;Setliffe Rpt.

368 THREE BATTLES

might be needed. As long as there wereno firearms around, the Germans said,they would not fire upon the aid sta-tion.35

Supplies Cross the Kall

In the rear the assistant S-3 of the110th Infantry, Capt. George H. Rum-baugh, was called into his regiment'soperations room about 1930. Word hadbeen received there that both ColonelTait, commander of the 3d Battalion,110th Infantry, which had become a partof Task Force R, and Maj. Robert C.Reynolds, executive officer, had beenwounded. Since the extent of their in-juries was not known, Captain Rum-baugh was to go to the 3d Battalion nearKommerscheidt, taking with him twoweasels loaded with water, food, andmedical supplies. If he found both offi-cers seriously wounded, he was to assumecommand of the 3d Battalion.

As Captain Rumbaugh readied hisjeep and two weasels for the trip, helearned that five weasels and one jeepfrom the 112th Infantry were going for-ward under the command of 1st Lt.Robert W. Pratt. The two groups con-solidated and moved out about 2300.In Vossenack and on the open ridgesoutheast of the town, the supply columnreceived some harassing small arms firebut continued, although two of the wea-sels overturned in a sharp gully on thedark ridge and a third threw a track.The remainder of the column (two jeepsand four weasels) entered the valleyportion of the trail, only to be delayedafter entering the woods by felled treesof varying sizes, all of which had to be

pushed or pulled out of the way beforethe column could proceed.

As the column paused in the vicinityof the aid station, Captain Rumbaughthought he heard guttural voices fartherdown in the draw. Flattening themselvesunder their vehicles, the men could seetwo figures silhouetted against the abruptdrop to the left. When Captain Rum-baugh challenged, one of the figurestossed a hand grenade up the slope. Theconvoy personnel answered with fire fromtheir individual weapons, and CaptainRumbaugh tossed a grenade, ending thetrouble. Four dead Germans were laterfound near the location.

The party lost a jeep and trailer some-where along the route, but finally crossedthe river about 0200. Beyond the Kallthe column was delayed about an hourby a large fallen tree which had to beremoved with hand power, ropes, andaxes. Still later, another weasel threwa track attempting to bypass three tanksof Company A, 707th Tank Battalion,which had withdrawn to the woods aftertheir turrets had been damaged duringthe day by enemy artillery fire in Kom-merscheidt.

Captain Rumbaugh eventually reachedthe 112th Infantry forward commandpost, which had moved into the northernedge of Kommerscheidt, with just threeweasels and his own jeep—all that re-mained out of the original nine-vehicleconvoy. The time was about 0300(7 November). In Kommerscheidt Rum-baugh found that Colonel Tait had al-ready been evacuated to the combinedaid station in the Kall gorge and thatMajor Reynolds had wounds in his righthand and chest and was in no conditionto continue his duties. Major Reynoldswas placed in one of the weasels to be35 Morrison Rpt.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 369

returned to the rear, and Rumbaughassumed command of the 3d Battalion,110th Infantry.

Lieutenant George, motor officer ofthe 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry, who hadled a supply convoy to Kommerscheidtthe night before and had not yet left thetown, took command of LieutenantPratt's three empty weasels, adding themto his two two-and-one-half-ton trucks,jeep, and two weasels. The columnmoved out about 0400 (7 November),carrying as many wounded as possibleon what was to be Kommerscheidt's lastcasualty evacuation by vehicle.36

The jeep driver was killed by artilleryfire soon after leaving Kommerscheidt,but the remainder of the column con-tinued. Despite darkness, intermittentshelling, and a driving rain, the convoysnaked its way past the east bank switch-backs, across the bridge, and up theprecipitous west bank trail. Approxi-mately a hundred yards from the westernedge of the Kall woods, the big truckshad to be abandoned because a heavytree blocked the road. The woundedwere transferred from the trucks to theweasels. On reaching the edge of thewoods, the column discovered that agroup of Germans had dug in on theopen ridge to the right (slightly south ofeast from Vossenack). Lieutenant Georgesaw only one way out. With the wound-ed instructed to "fire like hell" in thedirection of the Germans, the vehiclesgunned their motors and raced acrossthe slippery open ridge, avoiding Vosse-nack itself by following the ridge southof the town all the way to Richelskaul.37

Artillery and Air Support

American artillery fire during 6 No-vember was credited with breaking up atleast one German attack against Kom-merscheidt and assisting the Vossenackdefense by firing numerous concentra-tions in the woods to the north and north-east of the town after withdrawal of the2d Battalion, 112th Infantry. Despitean ammunition shortage, the 229th fireda total of 3,949 rounds, but counter-battery fire was reduced critically.38

Adverse weather again hampered air-craft on 6 November, and the day's firstmission did not reach the target areauntil noon. Twelve P-47's of the 365thGroup bombed reported armored vehiclesjust northwest of Harscheidt as markedby red smoke from American artillery.Results were not observed. Anothersquadron of the 365th bombed smoke-marked tanks in Schmidt from 1310 to1430, and still another squadron of thesame group took up the Schmidt attackat 1425 and continued until 1520. Noresults of either mission were observed.Thirty-six P-38's of the 474th Groupbombed smoke-marked troop concentra-tions in the northwestern edge of Berg-stein and in the Brandenberger Wald,north of Brandenberg. The last recordedmission of the day, completed at 1627 andalso with no results observed, was bytwelve P-47's of the 365th Group whichbombed camouflaged tanks in the edgeof the woods northeast of Schmidt andsoutheast of Kommerscheidt. One othermission, reported by tankers and infan-trymen against the eastern end of Vosse-nack, was not recorded.39

36 Combat Interv 77 with Rumbaugh-Joyce; Com-bat Interv 76 with Hostrup-Fleig-Payne, Ripple;Combat Interv 75 with George; Setliffe Rpt.

37 Combat Interv 75 with George; Berndt Rpt.

38 28th Div Arty Jnl, 6 Nov 44; V Corps Study,Arty Sec; 229th FA Bn AAR, Nov 44.

39 FUSA and IX TAC Sum, 6 Nov 44; V CorpsStudy, G-3 Air Sec; Combat Interv 74 with Howison.

371

109th and 110th Infantry Summaries

Although the 1st Battalion, 109th In-fantry, beat off what seems to have beenan enemy patrol action at dawn on 6 No-vember, enemy infiltration in rear of theforward companies continued. Early inthe morning three 109th companies at-tacked generally northwest in an attemptto clear the wooded road network in thatdirection for the establishment of roadblocks. None of the units made appre-ciable gains, and they all withdrew totheir starting positions. The 109th In-fantry received a message from divisionat 1500 that it would be relieved duringthe night by the 12th Infantry of the 4thInfantry Division.40 (Map 29)

The 110th Infantry's 3d Battalion wascommitted during the day as a part ofTask Force R, and no other change tookplace in 110th dispositions except re-newal of the attack by two companies toclose the gap between the 1st and 2dBattalions. Control in the dense forestwas so difficult that by nightfall thesecompanies had not accomplished theirmission.41

The Enemy Situation

German records and 28th Division G-2sources indicate that an attack by the156th Panzer Grenadier Regiment and ele-ments (the 1st Battalion and probablythe 2d) of the 60th Panzer Grenadier Regi-ment was scheduled for 0400, 6 November,from the woods north and northeast ofVossenack. The Americans withdrew inthe early morning, but enemy troops, so

40 Combat Interv 77 with 109th personnel; 109thInf S-3 Jnl, 6 Nov 44; 28th Div G-3 Jnl, 6 Nov 44.

41 Combat Interv 77 with 110th personnel; 110thInf S-3 Jnl, 6 Nov 44; 28th Div G-3 Jnl, 6 Nov 44.

372 THREE BATTLES

far as records can definitely establishthe fact, did not enter Vossenack untilsometime between midmorning and noon.Even then the Germans held only theeastern half of the town as far as thechurch.

The Germans reported a temporaryreverse in the Kall gorge. The Recon-naissance Battalion of the 116th PanzerDivision had been pushed back by TaskForce R when Colonel Ripple's grouphad fought to cross the Kall River inorder to carry out plans to recaptureSchmidt. The Germans claimed thisAmerican "attack" had "tank support,"probably referring to the incident beforedawn on the open ridge southeast ofVossenack when Captain Pugh andLieutenant Fuller, 893d Tank DestroyerBattalion, had dealt with a German am-bush by using a platoon of tank de-stroyers. The Germans issued orders inthe afternoon to counteract this Kallgorge reverse, but unrestricted movementof the 1340th Engineers to the bridgearea in late afternoon indicates thatenemy units did not actually move backinto the area until well after dark.

Troops of the 275th Division and the1056th Regiment maintained their Raffels-brand-Simonskall defense throughout theday against the 110th Infantry, while ele-ments of the 60th Panzer Grenadier Regimentor of several fortress and engineer bat-talions42 that had been moved into thearea kept up heavy pressure north of Ger-meter against the 109th Infantry. AtKommerscheidt the 1055th Regiment andthe 16th Panzer Regiment continued their

efforts to dislodge the remnants of the1st and 3d Battalions, 112th Infantry.

Either on this day or on the day before,a German officer and several men of the116th Panzer Division carried a radio tothe edge of the woods south of the westernedge of Vossenack. Here they had anunrestricted view for directing artillery,fire against Vossenack and Germeter.

In the evening of 6 November thecommanding general of the 89th Divisionconvened his commanders and orderedthat the Americans at Kommerscheidtmust be annihilated. The 1055th Regimentand the 16th Panzer Regiment were to re-new their efforts there at dawn the nextday (7 November), while the 1056th Regi-ment was to continue its efforts to main-tain contact with the 116th Panzer Divi-sion's Reconnaissance Battalion near Mes-trenger Muehle in the Kall gorge.43

Summary for 6 November and Night of6-7 November

Lack of success in the 109th and 110thInfantry sectors added to the 112th In-fantry's difficult situation to make 6 No-vember and the night of 6-7 Novemberanother dismal period in the 28th Divi-sion's battle for Schmidt. In Kommer-scheidt the remaining men of the 1st and3d Battalions, 112th Infantry, althoughhaving withstood several minor Germanattacks during the day, together couldhardly have mustered two full-strengthrifle companies. In their rear at thenorthern woods line were the remnantsof Company C, 112th Infantry (less oneplatoon, which was in Kommerscheidt),

42 The 109th Inf made prisoner identifications inthis area of the following units: 18th and 20th LuftwaffeFortress Battalions, 600th Army Engineer Battalion, and253d Engineer Battalion, plus elements of the 275thDivision. 28th Div G-2 Jnl, 6 Nov 44.

43 MS # A-905 (Waldenburg); ETHINT 56 (Gers-dorff and Waldenburg); Sit Rpts, 5 Nov 44, found inOB WEST KTB Anlagen 1-10.XI.44.; 28th Div G-2Jnl and File, 6 Nov 44; 89th Division Order of theDay.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 373

and the 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry(now numbering less than 300 effectives),one platoon of engineers (Company C,20th), and two 57-mm. antitank gunswith crews. The supporting armor forthis Kommerscheidt defense now con-sisted of only three fully operational tankdestroyers (one had been completelyknocked out, five partially damaged)and four tanks (three had pulled back toCompany C, 112th Infantry, as rearguard after receiving damaged turrets).Only one supply convoy (three weaselsand a jeep under Captain Rumbaugh)had gotten forward during the period.The problem at hand was no longer torecapture Schmidt but to hold in Kom-merscheidt against the enemy's continu-ing attacks, which might well be expectedto begin again at dawn, 7 November.

In the Kall gorge only a few men andofficers of Company C, 1340th Engineers,remained in defense near the river bridge.Although the combined 1st-3d Battalion,112th Infantry, aid station still operatedthere, it was without any adequate evac-uation system. Only walking woundedhad gotten out during the period.Enemy patrols still moved almost at willacross the wooded portion of the vitalmain supply route. At the head of thewooded portion of the trail, Company B,1340th Engineers, and elements of Com-pany A, 20th Engineers, held defensivepositions which did little to defend thetrail after it entered the gorge.

In Vossenack the 2d Battalion, 112thInfantry, had been driven out of the east-ern end of the town, whether by actualGerman attack or by artillery fire aloneno one seemed able to ascertain. Whatwas definite was that this battalion, re-duced to something like forty to fiftyeffectives, could now be considered out

of the action. Thrown into the Vosse-nack battle in almost cavalry-like tradi-tion had been Companies A and C, 146thEngineers, who had established a defen-sive line along the crossroads at thechurch in the center of town. Supportedby the tanks of one platoon and the tankdestroyers of another, these engineerswere to attempt at daylight to retake theeastern end of Vossenack.

South of Vossenack and contributinglittle to any part of the action were aboutthirty men of Company B, 20th Engi-neers. Available in Germeter in readypositions to move to Vossenack on callwere two tank destroyer platoons ofCompany B, 893d; an almost full-strengthtank company, Company B, 707th; andless than a platoon of tanks of CompanyC, 707th.

During the afternoon the 28th Divisionhad received from V Corps a letter of in-structions providing for the relief of the109th Infantry by the 12th Infantry ofthe 4th Division during the night of 6-7November and the attachment of thisregimental combat team to the 28th Divi-sion. The 12th Infantry was to take overthe mission of the 109th, that of protect-ing the north flank, and was not to beused for any other mission. Upon reliefthe 109th Infantry was to be employedas directed by corps. But by daylightof 7 November relief of the 109th In-fantry had not been completed.44

For the moment in the 112th Infantrysector there were two immediate tasksat hand. While the 146th Engineers wereto attack to retake the eastern half ofVossenack, the defenders of Kommer-scheidt must brace in expectation ofanother strong German attack at dawn.

44 V Corps Ltr of Instns, 28th Div G-3 Jnl andFile, 6 Nov 44.

CHAPTER VI

Action Again at Kommerscheidt(7 November)

As daylight approached on 7 Novem-ber a cold winter rain added to themiseries of combat, and the Germansbegan to bombard Kommerscheidt withwhat the hard-pressed men of the 1st and3d Battalions, 112th Infantry, felt wasthe enemy's heaviest artillery barragesince their arrival in the battered town.Americans estimated that the Germansemployed four or five artillery battalions,and one officer checked the rate of fire.In a one-and-one-half-minute period hecounted about fifty explosions. The firelasted approximately thirty minutes.

About eighteen enemy tanks then ap-proached, many of them so close behindtheir artillery fire that some men werenot aware of their presence until theyopened fire. Enemy infantry variouslyestimated at from one to two battalionsaccompanied them, and other tanks orself-propelled guns supported the assaultfrom advantageous positions at Schmidt.1

On the left flank in the Company Apositions one enemy tank moved upclose, fired straight at the company com-mand post, and put direct fire into thefoxholes of both the 1st and 2d Platoons.Among those wounded was the companycommander, Capt. Seth R. Frear. Onthe right (west) flank as a tank movedin close against men of Company B, an

assistant squad leader, Sgt. John Ostrow-ski, killed three of the accompanying in-fantry with his M-1 rifle and then hit thetank with a rocket from a bazooka. Blacksmoke billowed up, and the tank backedaway to disappear in the noise and con-fusion of the battle. The four remainingmachine guns and two of the 81-mm.mortars of Company M were knockedout by the enemy tank fire. The tankthat fired on the mortars was in turnknocked out by the Company M com-mander, Captain Hackard, with a ba-zooka rocket.

Lieutenant Payne, platoon leader inCompany A, 707th Tank Battalion, spot-ted one of the German tanks movingaround the right flank of the town. Al-though shell fragments the previous dayhad damaged the elevating mechanismof Lieutenant Payne's gun so that he wasunable to depress it sufficiently to hit thehull of the enemy tank, his tank was stillmobile and scored two hits on the Ger-man's turret. Still the enemy tank keptcoming. Only when two American tankdestroyers came to Lieutenant Payne'said, each getting two rounds home, wasthe German tank stopped.

In the center of town LieutenantEdmund's tank destroyer knocked outa Mark V at a range of only thirtyyards, and another unidentified destroyerknocked out three enemy tanks. Crew-1 V Corps Study, G-3 Sec.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 375

men estimated they killed or woundedwith their machine guns about forty ofthe accompanying enemy infantry. ButLieutenant Edmund's tank destroyer andtwo others were knocked out shortlythereafter by the enemy tanks.

Outside the combined 1st-3d Bat-talion CP in the dugout in the orchardjust north of Kommerscheidt, the 1stBattalion Headquarters Company com-mander, Capt. Ross Martin, was seriouslywounded. As Colonel Peterson andMajor Dana, regimental S-3, draggedhim into the CP hole, Colonel Ripple,Task Force R commander, called fromoutside, saying a German tank was ap-proaching the dugout. Leaving a medicwith Martin, Peterson, Ripple, andDana walked back toward the northernwoods-line positions, consciously not run-ning because they wanted to avoid start-ing a general withdrawal. Shortly afterthey had left, the German tank ap-proached and fired almost point-blankinto the CP dugout.

Major Hazlett, the 1st Battalion com-mander, moved among both the 1st and3d Battalion positions encouraging thetroops to hold. By about 0830, how-ever, German tank and infantry infiltra-tion had so unnerved many of the menthat they were leaving their holes to runtoward the rear and the situation wasfast becoming critical. Back at the woodsline to the north, a jeep messenger sentby Colonel Peterson relayed instructionsto Captain Rumbaugh, 3d Battalion,110th Infantry, that he organize hisharried battalion and move it forwardto assist the Kommerscheidt defense.2

Before the battalion could be assembled,Peterson himself appeared—he had with-drawn from the orchard dugout only afew steps ahead of the approaching Ger-man tank. The colonel now changedhis orders to Rumbaugh, having decidedinstead to commit the remainder ofCompany C, 112th (one platoon wasalready in Kommerscheidt).

Before Company C could be commit-ted, Colonel Peterson received a writtenmessage transcribed by the division radiooperator, who had come up the daybefore with Task Force R, that he wasto report immediately to the divisioncommand post. He did not questionthe message for two reasons: (1) feelingthat the true situation in Kommerscheidthad been misrepresented to division, hewelcomed the opportunity to clear it up;(2) he had heard a rumor that he was tobe relieved of his command and that acolonel recently assigned to the divisionwas to replace him. Designating ColonelRipple to take over the Kommerscheidtdefense, Colonel Peterson left with a jeepdriver and one other enlisted man forthe division CP.3

2 This information is from Combat Interv 77 withRumbaugh-Joyce and Combat Interv 76 with Ripple.According to Colonel Peterson there was no suchplan to counterattack. He had planned his defensein depth because he felt all along that his troops

would be pushed out of Kommerscheidt. See Intervwith Peterson.

3 Information on this message is from CombatInterv 77 with Cota and Rumbaugh-Joyce; CombatInterv 76 with Ripple; Intervs with Gen Cota andwith Col Peterson. General Cota says definitely thatColonel Peterson was not to be summarily relievedof his command, that is, in the sense that his per-formance had not been satisfactory. Just who sentthe message cannot be determined, but General Cota,although originally doubtful, established to his satis-faction that it was sent. Colonel Peterson, laterwounded, did not know there was any doubt aboutthe message until well after the war was over. Themessage, he says, was left in the pocket of his over-coat, which was taken from him as he was beingevacuated. The possibility that it might have beena German ruse, Peterson discounts, although hecannot remember whether the message had beenauthenticated by its sender.

376 THREE BATTLES

After the infantry commander's de-parture, Colonel Ripple ordered Com-pany C, 112th Infantry, to move intoKommerscheidt, but the Company Ccommander and his men seemed toodazed to be capable of carrying out thatorder. Ripple himself attempted to leadthem forward, but they would not move.He told them to hold where they were.

More and more men in Kommer-scheidt were leaving their foxholes andrunning toward the rear. Some of theretreating men cried out to LieutenantPayne that German tanks were over-running the left flank; so LieutenantPayne's tank and another under Sgt.Andrew J. Lipe moved in that direc-tion. Spotting an enemy tank amongthe houses in the eastern edge of town,Sergeant Lipe opened fire, hitting theGerman tank with his first round ofarmor-piercing ammunition. With en-emy fire coming dangerously close toPayne's tank, the lieutenant radioed Ser-geant Lipe to withdraw and himselfpulled back into the shallow open drawnorthwest of Kommerscheidt. Appar-ently Sergeant Lipe did not hear. An-other German tank advanced throughthe center of town, fired, and knockedout both Sergeant Lipe's tank and an-other under Sgt. Marvin S. Olson. Ser-geant Lipe dismounted and took over atank destroyer whose crew leader hadbeen killed or wounded. He remainedwith the destroyer until it too wasknocked out.

Minus two tanks and three tank de-stroyers lost in the enemy attack, theremaining American armor began towithdraw toward the northern woodsline. In withdrawing two more tanksthrew their tracks. One of these wasLieutenant Payne's, which had bellied

on a sharp ridge in the ground. Nowthere remained only two tank destroyersand one tank.

With the departure of the scant ar-mored support, the infantry situation de-teriorated even more. Major Christen-sen, the 3d Battalion commander, orderedthe few remaining men on the right flankto withdraw, and Captain Piercey leftwith about fifty men. An enemy tankand two machine guns fired at them asthey retreated, and at least one of thegroup was hit by the machine gun fire.A shell from the tank blew another manalmost straight up into the air. The openfield over which the men withdrew wassoft from the rain, and it seemed to theretreating soldiers that it took a lifetimeto get across.

On the left -flank, about seventy-fivemen from Company A pulled back, butonly about fifteen withdrew safely to theCompany C, 112th, positions. Threemen, Pfcs. Nathanuel M. Quinton, Com-pany A, and Clarence J. Skain and LewisGardner, Company B, were pinned downby the enemy fire and could not get outwhen the others did. Later they turnedback several local assaults by enemy in-fantry before Gardner was killed by ashot from a near-by building. Quintonthrew a grenade into the building andsilenced the German marksman. Heand Skain then made a run for it, crawl-ing toward the woods on the east andeventually making their way back tothe northern woods-line positions. Theyescaped from Kommerscheidt sometimeafter midday, apparently among the lastAmericans to leave the town.

Evidently most of the remaining menwho had held and had not heard MajorChristensen's orders to withdraw eithersaw or heard of the enemy tank at the

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 377

CP dugout in the orchard. There agroup of American soldiers stood aroundthe tank with their hands raised in sur-render, a white flag clearly visible. Thisseemed to convince any who still held inthe buildings or foxholes that all was lost,and the final withdrawal was on.

As one such group under CaptainWalker, Company L, withdrew, a soldiertold Captain Walker that "a tall major"wanted to see him. The major provedto be Major Christensen, who told Cap-tain Walker to try to build up anotherline in the open field north of Kommer-scheidt. But the badly shaken men hesi-tated for only a few minutes before con-tinuing on toward the rear, and anyhope for another line in the open fieldwas lost. Captain Walker saw MajorChristensen turn and walk slowly backinto German-held Kommerscheidt.

Not all the men fell back on the north-ern woods-line positions. Many re-treated into the woods to the west wherethey either met more German fire or con-tinued across the Kall. Lieutenant Tyoof Company K was with one group ofabout twenty-one men, nine of whomwere wounded. A heavy enemy artilleryconcentration wounded five more menin Tyo's group as it approached the Kallbridge. Two were so badly hurt thatthe others were forced to abandon them.Tyo was later told by medics that thesemen were recovered. The others fordedthe river. One man went across withhalf of a foot gone; all that was left towrap the stump in was a dirty handker-chief. Across the river the woundedwere left at the log cabin aid station, andLieutenant Tyo and the six remainingmen dug in with a group from the 20thEngineers.

Frantic reorganization was now taking

place among the infantry positions of the3d Battalion, 110th, and Company C,112th, at the woods line north of Kom-merscheidt. Between 150 and 200 sur-vivors of the action in the town hadreached them and were hastily formedinto a provisional company and placedin a hasty defense. One tank, two tankdestroyers, and two 57-mm. antitank gunssupplied their support. Although therewere no illusions about the status ofKommerscheidt (Colonel Ripple had sentdivision a message at 1125 that the townwas considered lost), the woods-line de-fenders were still reluctant to call downtheir own artillery on the town. Theyknew that many of their wounded hadbeen left there and that other Americanshad been captured and still might be inKommerscheidt.

Throughout the morning's fight inKommerscheidt American artillery sup-port had been on the job and it continuednow to fire on approaches to the townand on Schmidt. Its communicationsappear to have been constant through-out, for response to calls for fire had beenprompt and accurate. Nevertheless, theshelling had failed to stop the enemytanks. With some missions directed inthe Vossenack vicinity, the 229th FieldArtillery Battalion during the day fired205 neutralizations, three TOT's, andfifty-two harassing missions.4

Although enemy artillery and mortarfire continued through the afternoon, the

4 Unless otherwise noted, the Kommerscheidt storyis from the following: Combat Interv 75 with Dana,Kelly-Hunter, Tyo, Quinton-Hausman-Lockwood-Kertes-Norton, Littlehales-Skain, Piercey, Kudiak,Walker, Ripperdam, Cipra; Combat Interv 76 withRipple, Hostrup-Fleig-Payne, Pugh; V Corps Study,G-3 and Arty Secs; Interv with Col Peterson; Com-bat Interv 77 with Rumbaugh-Joyce; 28th Div ArtyJnl, 7 Nov 44; 229th FA Bn AAR, 7 Nov 44.

378 THREE BATTLES

Germans did not press their advantageon the ground against the woods-linedefenders until about 1830 when theyfired flares that revealed four or five tanksfollowed by infantry approaching acrossthe open field from Kommerscheidt. Theenemy poured marching fire into thewoods-line positions, but the defenderscalled for supporting artillery, and thelead German tank was knocked out with-in a hundred yards of the woods line.The other tanks milled about to escapethe artillery fire and eventually withdrew.A prisoner captured later said that theassault had been made by a fresh infantrybattalion but that the tanks, while ma-neuvering to escape the American artil-lery fire, had backed over and killedsome of their infantry, disorganizing theattack. The regimental S-3, MajorDana, attributed the failure of the enemyattack to this lack of co-ordination aswell as to the fact that through the after-noon supporting artillery and aircraft hadpounded a rectangular patch of woodswest of Kommerscheidt which the Ger-mans seemed to be using as an assemblyarea.

As the night wore on the Americansstill held, though the German shellingcontinued and there were more casualtiesthat could not be evacuated because ofthe situation in the Kall gorge to therear. Some of the wounded died fromlack of medical attention, and many menfelt they all would be either killed orcaptured. Pfc. Joseph R. Perll, Com-pany C, 112th, using a rock, hammeredout the "H" which indicated his religionon his identification tags.

Thus, on the night of 7 November theremnants of the 1st and 3d Battalions,112th Infantry; the 3d Battalion, 110thInfantry; one platoon of Company C,

20th Engineers; and one tank, two tankdestroyers, and two 57-mm. antitankguns held the woods line north of Kom-merscheidt. During the day they hadbeen driven from their town defenses ata cost of many wounded, captured, andkilled, including the entire staffs of the1st and 3d Battalions, 112th Infantry.5

A New Commander for the 112th

Even as Kommerscheidt was beinglost, Colonel Gustin M. Nelson, formerlytrains commander in the 5th ArmoredDivision but desiring a more active com-bat assignment, was reporting to the 28thDivision CP. There he was assigned ascommander of the 112th Infantry andtold to make his way forward to hiscommand in Kommerscheidt. ColonelNelson subsequently tried at least fourdifferent times during the afternoon andearly evening to reach his new command.Each time he was stopped, once becauseof a guide's failure to find the unit hewas to accompany, and three times be-cause of enemy shelling.

Colonel Peterson, whom Colonel Nel-son was to relieve, had not yet reportedto either the 112th rear CP or the divisionCP. There was evidently no apprehen-sion, however, since no one at either CPseemed to know that he was supposed toleave Kommerscheidt, although he hadleft there between 0900 and 1000 thatmorning.6

5 Combat Interv 75 with Dana, Perll; CombatInterv 76 with Ripple, Pugh, Hostrup-Fleig-Payne;Combat Interv 77 with Rumbaugh-Joyce; 28th DivG-3 Jnl, 7 Nov 44; V Corps Study, Arty Sec. Thetime of the German night attack is established fromthe division artillery journal, 7 November 1944,which notes enemy flares near Kommerscheidt at1835.

6 Combat Interv 75 with Nelson; 28th Div G-3Jnl, 7 Nov 44; 112th Inf S-3 Jnl, 7 Nov 44.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 379

Along the Kall Trail

At dawn on 7 November as the battlefor Kommerscheidt had begun anew,remnants of Company C, 1340th En-gineers, still held a defensive positionaround the Kall bridge. The Germanshelling and attack during the night hadtaken a heavy toll of the company. Nearthe western entrance of the main supplyroute into the Kall woods were CompanyB, 1340th, and some thirty men of Com-pany A, 20th Engineers.

At approximately 1000 the men atthe bridge saw about twenty or thirtyAmericans, evidently from the Kommer-scheidt battle, cross the bridge in singlefile and head toward Vossenack. Alieutenant accompanied them. The menmoved hurriedly, although there wereno shots being fired at them and no shell-ing, and the engineers at the bridge didnot know quite what to think. Shortlythereafter the engineers heard shoutsfrom their own 3d Platoon, which withone squad from the 1st Platoon wasdefending across the river. These mensoon came racing back across the bridge,a machine gun from the vicinity of themill firing at them as they ran. Thesight of these men running and the soundof the firing reacted on others among theengineers, and almost all the few remain-ing men headed for the rear. Amongthem was S. Sgt. Benjamin A. P. Cipra,Jr., 1st Platoon, who stopped about noonat the Company B, 1340th, positions atthe western edge of the woods. Ciprareported to the Company B commander,Capt. Thomas F. Creegan, that all ofCompany C had retreated from thebridge.

But at the bridge six men, includingthe company commander, Captain Lind,

and a platoon leader, had remained.They hid behind a slight embankmentand observed small groups of Germansworking down from the direction of themill and clustering around a knocked-out American jeep.7

Company A, 1340th Engineers

When the other engineers of the 1171stEngineer Combat Group had been com-mitted the day before as riflemen, Com-pany A, 1340th Engineers, had beengarrisoning pillboxes and doing road re-pair work behind the 110th Infantry tothe south. The company commander,Capt. Frank P. Bane, reported to ColonelSetliffe, 1340th commander, early on7 November and was told to move hismen to a reserve position in the woodeddraw just south of Vossenack. On itsarrival, the company was hit by enemyartillery fire and sustained approximatelytwenty casualties, including one mankilled.

Between 1300 and 1400 Colonel Set-liffe learned that the Kall bridge hadbeen deserted. He immediately orderedCaptain Bane's company to move to thebridge and "stay there." Preceding themain body of the company, the battalionS-3 took charge of the company's 1stPlatoon and moved down the firebreaktoward the river. Halfway down the hillthe unit encountered six Germans dig-ging in a machine gun. The 1st Platoonovercame the Germans and then dug inalong the firebreak as a flank guard forthe main supply route. From the woodsnear by the S-3 heard a voice call out,

7 Combat Interv 75 with Cipra, Makousky,Creegan, Maj Bruce Renfroe, S-3, and S Sgt EarlisS. Gillespie, Co C, 1340th Engrs; Setliffe Rpt.

380 THREE BATTLES

"I have a message for (or from) GeneralCota." Thinking the call came from awounded German or that it was a Ger-man trick, the S-3 did not investigate.

Captain Bane and the remainder ofCompany A, 1340th, moved on downthe Kall trail, passing through the posi-tions of Company A, 20th, and Com-pany B, 1340th. They were joined bya platoon of Company B under 1st Lt.Kelsey C. Manin, six or seven men ofCompany C, 1340th, under LieutenantMakousky, and a provisional platoonfrom the remnants of Company B, 20th,under Lieutenant Horn, which had beendefending the southern draw leading uptoward Vossenack. The column met noopposition and finally reached the bridgearea where Captain Bane made contactwith Captain Lind. The two officers de-cided that they did not have enough mento occupy both sides of the river. Cap-tain Bane's two platoons of Company A,1340th, dug in on a small knoll just to thenorth (left) of the Kall trail near thejunction with the north-south river road,and the remainder of the engineers wereecheloned up the hill toward the north-west, adding depth to an all-around de-fense. Although patrol contact was main-tained with Company B, 1340th, at thewestern edge of the woods, no contactwas made with the infantry at the Kom-merscheidt woods line across the river.

As the engineers began to dig in about1500, they could see Germans digging inon the other side of the river and firedsporadically to harass them. After darkthere was occasional German shelling butno attack. The remaining elements ofCompany A, 20th, and Company B,1340th, at the western edge of the woodssoutheast of Vossenack also experienced

nothing more unusual than occasionalenemy shelling.8

Colonel Peterson's Return Trip

With Colonel Peterson when he leftthe northern Kommerscheidt woods linein midmorning to report to the divisionCP were two enlisted men, Pfc. GusSeiler, 1st Battalion Headquarters Com-pany, and a second soldier whose namethe regimental commander did not know.At the second elbow bend in the Kalltrail, heavy enemy small arms fire forcedthe trio to abandon their jeep and cutcross country through the woods. Com-ing again upon the winding trail near theriver, they saw several abandoned wea-sels and the bodies of two Americans whohad fallen on the trail and been run overby a vehicle. They pulled these bodiesoff the trail and removed several othersfrom the abandoned weasels. As soonas they had finished this task, Germanssomewhere along the river opened upwith small arms fire.

Colonel Peterson and the two enlistedmen plunged into the woods. Theyheaded south, hoping to ford the riverfarther upstream. Avoiding occasionalgroups of Germans, they were finally ableto cross the stream, only to come againunder small arms fire on the west bank.When they headed once more into thewoods to the southwest, they narrowlyavoided being hit by enemy mortar fire.Shortly thereafter they engaged in a briefsmall arms fight and killed two Germans,only to have another mortar concentra-tion come in. A shell fragment hit Peter-

8 Combat Interv 75 with Bane, Creegan, Lutz,Manin, Makousky, Doherty; Setliffe Rpt; 1340thEngr Jnl, 7 Nov 44.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 381

son in the left leg. At the time, thecolonel thought only that he had irri-tated a piece of metal still in his leg fromWorld War I. The second enlisted manasked permission to go ahead of theothers in order to obtain help. ColonelPeterson refused, but the soldier wentahead as a point and kept on, outdis-tancing the others.

Partly because Peterson's left leg wasgiving him trouble and partly becausethey believed the woods were full of Ger-mans, the colonel and Private Seilerdropped to their knees and began creep-ing. Fire from a German machine pistolto the left front tore through Seiler'sbody. Since Peterson had been on theright, the soldier's body served to shieldhim from the fire. Edging closer, heput an ear to Seiler's chest—the manwas dead.

Another hail of mortar fire fell in thearea. This time Peterson felt a burningpain in his right leg; when he tried tomove, he found the limb useless. Drag-ging himself laboriously, unable to useone leg at all and the other only par-tially, he retraced his route across theriver, not knowing exactly what heplanned to do after crossing, but hopingvaguely to find another route to the rearand avoid the Germans who seemedeverywhere in this section of the woods.

As he pulled himself from the wateron the east bank, three Germans passednear by. The third man in line spottedhim. Although Peterson was so dazedthat he could not remember actuallyshooting, he knew that he must havefired his submachine gun, for the threeGermans fled.

Again the officer dragged himselfacross the river to the west bank. Still

edging forward slowly because of hisparalyzed right leg, he crossed an openspace and entered the woods. Ameri-can voices and the sound of someoneusing a pick in the earth reached his ears,and more shells fell. He prayed andhad the impression he must have fainted.When he revived he heard Americanstalking again and called out for assist-ance. The picking stopped; again shellsfell in the area. Discouraged and hardlyaware of any reason for his actions, heagain dragged himself to the river,crossed, and then recrossed. When hereached the west bank again a littlefarther to the north, he saw two Germanswalk down the river road and sit down.Later two Americans came along theroad and took the Germans prisoner.Colonel Peterson called to them, andthe two Americans dropped into firingpositions. Hearing nothing further, theywalked away with the prisoners.

The officer had no energy to drag him-self farther. Sure now that it was onlya matter of time before he would die,he began to call out in a desperate effortto make himself heard: "General Cota. . . Colonel Peterson." Two Americans,apparently the same pair that had takenthe Germans prisoner, came out of thewoods again. This time they spottedhim and took him into their position.After an engineer corporal had adminis-tered morphine and plasma, they carriedhim on a stretcher to the rear.9

Attack To Retake Vossenack

At approximately 0530 on 7 NovemberColonel Isley, commander of the 146th

9 Interv with Peterson.

382 THREE BATTLES

Engineers, whose two companies nowheld the western half of Vossenack, helda meeting with his company command-ers, Captain Ball of Company A andLieutenant Schindler of Company C.Although the tank commander on thescene, Lieutenant Quarrie, did not at-tend the meeting because his platoonexpected to be relieved at daylight, theengineers had promise of tank supportfor an attack to retake the eastern endof the town. The relieving tank platoonleader, 2d Lt. Clarence A. Johnson,2d Platoon, Company B, 707th TankBattalion, and his company commander,Captain Granger, arrived about 0645.Orders were then hastily issued and theattack was scheduled for 0800.

The engineer plan called for prepara-tory artillery and mortar fire (includingthat of the 86th Chemical Battalion) forapproximately thirty minutes before theattack. Company A was then to recap-ture the church. (See Map XI.) Com-pany C's 2d Platoon was next to take allbuildings on the left (north) of the mainstreet, while the company's 3d Platoonwas to follow through the first buildingand attack across the street to take thefirst building east of the church on thesouth side of the street. Next objectiveof the 3d Platoon included all buildingson the south side. Company C's 1stPlatoon was to follow in a support role.Company A, after taking the church andproviding supporting fire to help Com-pany C take its first buildings, was tomove behind Company C and garrisonthe recaptured buildings. The platoonof tanks was to move along the southside of town, firing two rounds from its75-mm. guns into each building justbefore the engineers assaulted. Theplatoon leader of Company C's 1st

Platoon, Lieutenant Rollins, was to co-ordinate with the tank platoon leader,Lieutenant Johnson, by means of a seriesof simple hand signals: if he wantedmore tank fire, he was to point to thebuilding; if he did not, he was to pointdown the main street.

According to Company A's plan totake the church, one squad of its 1stPlatoon in the initial move would furnisha base of fire from the second floor of thefirst building west of the crossroads. Un-der cover of this fire, the other two squadswere to cross the north-south street. Theremaining two platoons were to waitunder cover until called up to garrisonthe buildings behind Company C.

No radio or wire communicationswere available for the attack—the 146thEngineers had been so hastily committedthe day before that this equipment didnot reach the unit. Nor were hand gre-nades available. A case that had beenbrought up in response to a requestlacked fuses.

The preparatory artillery and mortarfires got off on time; but near the 0800jump-off hour one of the engineer pla-toon leaders said he could not be ready,and the attack was postponed until 0815.Just as the American artillery ceasedfire, enemy artillery opened up on thewestern half of the town with a barragethat prisoners later said was to havepreceded a German attack. The 2dPlatoon, Company C, under 1st Lt.Bernard E. Meier, poised to attack onthe left of the main street, had severalmen slightly wounded, seven woundedbadly enough to require evacuation, andthree killed in this enemy barrage.

In Company A's assault against thechurch, the men moved out at 0815,the two assault squads rushing across the

REMAINS OF CHURCH AT VOSSENACK. After changing hands several times,the church was retaken on 7 November by Company A, 146th Engineers.

384 THREE BATTLES

street in ones and twos under cover offire from a third squad. Not a man washit. No one entered the church until afull squad had built up across the road.Then the men entered one at a time,firing through the main door, rushinginside, dodging to one side, firing again,and ferreting out the enemy in thechurch's rubble-strewn remains. Theykilled a number of Germans and tooksixteen prisoners. The squads next over-came a machine gun in the cemeterybehind the church and took up firingpositions to support the Company Cadvance on the left.

Lieutenant Meier's 2d Platoon, Com-pany C, which had been hit heavily bythe German artillery fire, was to takethe buildings on the left of the mainstreet. As the men made ready to assaultthe first building, they saw the muzzleof a machine pistol projecting from theonly window in the western wall of thestructure. The supporting tanks couldnot fire on this particular building, be-cause an orchard obscured their view.Lieutenant Meier therefore sent word toCompany A on the right to divert theGermans' attention by firing into thefront of the building, thus allowing hismen to rush the machine pistol.

Company A opened fire, and the muz-zle of the machine pistol was withdrawn.Meier and five of his men dashed acrossthe street and flattened themselves againstthe wall. When the machine pistol re-appeared, Lieutenant Meier was on oneside of the waist-high window, and Cpl.J. W. Crayton, an assistant squad leader,was on the other. Signaling to the lieu-tenant, Corporal Crayton jumped outin front of the window and fired hisM-1 rifle from the hip, putting five slugsinto the German. His body slumped

forward on the window sill, and Craytonpushed it aside. As he prepared to enter,another engineer yelled to wait—he hadfound an American hand grenade. Lieu-tenant Meier pulled the pin, but beforehe could throw the grenade a white flagwas waved from the window and a loneGerman came out in surrender.

Hearing other Germans moving inside,Lieutenant Meier called again to givethem a chance to surrender, and thentossed the grenade. The explosion wasfollowed by scuffling of feet and moaning.As the men prepared once again to enterthe window, the company commander,Lieutenant Schindler, ran forward withthe first German who had surrendered.The prisoner called out to his comrades,and nineteen more enemy soldiers filedout of the window. A search of thebuilding revealed only one other Ger-man, his body almost in shreds.

Meier's 2d Platoon now found itselfseparated from the next building on theleft of the main street by a large garden.Under covering fire provided by thecompany's machine guns, the platoonmoved across the garden and found theGermans in the next house ready to sur-render without much show of resistance.Inside the house the men discovered twocases of American hand grenades anddivided them with the 1st Platoon. Con-tinuing, the 2d Platoon took the re-mainder of the houses on the left withcomparative ease, repeating the processof covering each assault with machineguns and also receiving assistance fromthe tanks on the south of town. Theengineers found few prisoners, the Ger-mans evidently retreating house by houseahead of the American advance. Whenthe platoon neared the eastern end oftown, a large number of Germans at-

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 385

tempted to escape across the open fieldtoward the woods to the north. Thecombined fire of Lieutenant Meier's pla-toon and the Company A men who werefollowing to garrison the buildings ac-counted for most of those who fled. Assoon as the platoon reached the militarycrest of the hill, approximately fourhouses from the end of town, it haltedbecause these last houses did not appearto be occupied. The time was about1500.

Lieutenant Rollins' 1st Platoon, Com-pany C, had followed Lieutenant Meier'smen into the first house on the left ofthe main street. Supported by fire fromthe tanks on the south, Rollins' troopsstormed across the main street to the firsthouse east of the church and found thatthe Germans had retreated to the cellar.When the Germans heard the Americanson the first floor, they begged to sur-render, and the platoon took twenty-twoprisoners. The unit then systematicallyreduced the remaining houses on thesouth side of the street, delayed only oncewhen Lieutenant Rollins had to stop towork out signals with the tankers for sup-porting machine gun fire. The lieu-tenant was slightly wounded about 1400,but the platoon sergeant, S. Sgt. DonaldO. Gray, took command and finishedthe attack.10

As the five tanks of Lieutenant John-son's 2d Platoon, Company B, 707th,had advanced south of Vossenack in sup-port of the engineer attack, one roundstuck in the gun tube of Sergeant Cook'stank. The shell casing came off, butthe projectile refused to budge. The

crew had to use a sledge hammer againstthe rammer staff to free the round.Enemy fire opened a leak in the gastanks of another Sherman. The tankstayed in the fight even though its floorwas flooded with gasoline.

Farther forward the tanks began toreceive bracketing shellfire and wereforced to maneuver well back to therear and then go forward again closerto the buildings. As Sergeant Cook'stank approached the second north-southstreet, the engineer platoon sergeantcried out to him to watch for an enemyPanzerfaust behind the building to hisleft front. Almost immediately a roundfrom a Panzerfaust hit just to the rightof Sergeant Cook's tank. Cook quicklyreplied with two rounds of high explosive.The first missed but the second struckthe corner of the building just as anotherPanzerfaust was thrust around the cornerto be fired.

Another of the tanks, Cpl. Nick P.Orlando's in rear of the platoon, ranover a mine and was disabled. The crewdismounted and took cover in a buildingeast of the church.

The armor reached the extreme easternend of town and apparently intendedto advance beyond the engineers, whohad held up with four houses yet to go.At this point, however, the tanks beganto receive direct fire from self-propelledguns or tanks on the Brandenberg-Berg-stein ridge line. When Lieutenant John-son reported this fire to Captain Granger,the tank company commander requestedan air strike against the enemy gun posi-tions. The request was answered withtwelve P-47's of the 365th Group. Mostof the planes bombed and strafed theassigned target, but at least two of theP-47's bombed and strafed Vossenack

10 Combat Interv 75 with Baker-Ball, Isley, Meier;Isley Notes; Combat Interv 76 with Granger-Anderson-Walling-Cook; 28th Div G-2 File, 7Nov 44.

386 THREE BATTLES

itself. Sergeant Cook saw the planescircle Vossenack twice. Then the leadplane dived straight at the town, openedfire with its machine guns, and releasedits bombs. One bomb hit the road justin front of Cook's tank; the other droppedbeside the main street farther to the rear.The second plane also peeled off anddived on the town, its machine gunschattering. One of its bombs landed inthe road, and the second hit the housein which Corporal Orlando's tank crewhad taken cover. One man was seriouslywounded, and the tank driver was killed.Three of the engineers were slightlywounded; another was covered withdebris by one bomb and uncovered bythe blast from another. The IX TACreported this mission against Vossenackas being "at the request of the controller"and also reported that "at request, alsobombed and strafed . . . Bergstein."11

After the misdirected air strike, theengineers in the eastern end of town,fearing counterattack, were concernedabout the small number of men they hadleft after their attack. Late in the after-noon Lieutenant Meier went to the in-fantry-engineer CP west of the churchand rounded up those men who hadbeen sent back as escorts for the woundedand as guards for prisoners. The in-fantry survivors of the 2d Battalion,112th, took over the defense of the churchto allow an additional platoon of Com-pany A, 146th, to join the easternmostdefenses. Before dark the tank that hadbeen leaking gasoline retired to Germeterand Lieutenant Johnson's tank blun-dered into a bomb crater, thus leaving

three operational tanks tied in with theengineer defense.12

Task Force Davis

After the 12th Infantry Regiment ofthe 4th Division assumed responsibilityfor the 109th Infantry's wooded sectornorth of Germeter at 1250 on 7 Novem-ber, it held in place the remainder of theday and night. To the south two com-panies of the 110th Infantry tried againto close the gap between Simonskall andRaffelsbrand, but without success.13

The three 109th battalions assembledin the woods west of Germeter. Soonafter dark the 2d Battalion relieved the146th Engineers of its defensive role inVossenack, and took up positions in andaround the houses. Neither the 2d northe 3d Battalion had received any re-placements, and both were thus farbelow strength. The 1st Battalion hadreceived some 200 men and was to con-stitute part of a force designed to recap-ture Schmidt, a force to be known asTask Force Davis.

On the evening of 6 November Gen-eral Davis had given Colonel Mays,commander of the 893d Tank DestroyerBattalion, a number of rather indefinitereferences to a second major task force.Its first official designation or recognitionwas in Field Order 26 dated 070830,specifying a renewal of the attack to cap-ture and hold Schmidt. The task forcewas to be under the command of GeneralDavis and would consist primarily of the

11 Combat Interv 75 with Condon, Isley, Meier;Combat Interv 76 with Granger-Anderson-Walling-Cook; FUSA and IX TAC Sum, 7 Nov 44.

12 Combat Interv 75 with Meier, Isley; CombatInterv 76 with Granger-Anderson-Walling-Cook;28th Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Nov 44.

13 Combat Interv 77 with 110th Inf personnel;110th Inf S-3 Jnl, 7 Nov 44; 28th Div G-3 Jnl,7 Nov 44.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 387

following units: the 1st Battalion, 109thInfantry; the 112th Infantry (minus the2d Battalion); the 3d Battalion, 110thInfantry; Companies A and C, 707thTank Battalion; Companies B and C,893d Tank Destroyer Battalion. Smalldetachments of medics, engineers, sig-nalmen, and chemical mortar men wouldcomplete the list. On paper, this forceseemed imposing. Not one of the in-fantry, tank, or tank destroyer units,however, was anywhere near full strength;indeed, only the battalion of the 109thcould be termed an effective fightingforce, and that only because it had beenstrengthened during the night of 6-7November by replacements.14

About noon on 7 November ColonelMays was called to the Task Force DavisCP (set up with the 112th Infantry rearCP) to report on the location and status ofhis destroyers. Colonel Mays informedGeneral Davis that only two tank de-stroyers remained in the Kommerscheidtarea, and only one of them was capableof maneuver. In the Germeter vicinitythere remained seven destroyers of Com-pany B and four replacement destroyersof Company C. Four guns of CompanyB under Lieutenant Davis were stationedthroughout the day in the western endof Vossenack.

The mined and enemy-held Kall trail,Colonel Mays explained, had preventedother tank destroyers from getting to Kom-merscheidt. The general nonetheless in-sisted that all remaining destroyers mustcross the Kall immediately. On thegrounds that no infantry were available,Davis refused the tank destroyer com-

mander's request for a company, or evena platoon, of infantry to accompany hisvehicles through the river gorge. Maysprotested that, although the destroyershad machine guns, they were .50-caliberson antiaircraft mounts and were thusdifficult to use against infantry at closerange; the tank destroyers needed protec-tion to cross the Kall. General Davis saidhe wanted a platoon of tank destroyers toleave Kommerscheidt immediately, re-gardless of whether they had accompany-ing infantry; it was a direct order.15

As a preliminary to Task Force Davis'move to Kommerscheidt, the 3d Bat-talion, 109th Infantry, was ordered tomove immediately to the Kall bridge andsecure it. Although the battalion movedout about 1500 and at 1735 reported itwas in position, it was learned later thatnight that the battalion had lost its wayin the woods west of Germeter and haddug in about a thousand yards southwestof Richelskaul in rear of the 110th In-fantry.16

Movement orders for the main infantrycomponent of Task Force Davis, the 1stBattalion, 109th Infantry, were not issuedthrough the night. The remaining tanksof Companies B and C, 707th Tank Bat-talion (seventeen tanks), had been alertedfor possible movement to Kommerscheidtbut received no specific orders. News ofthe withdrawal from Kommerscheidt hadby this time circulated in the rear areas,and there was an increasing feeling aroundthe combined 112th rear-Task ForceDavis CP that the projected attack,

14 Combat Interv 76 with Mays; Combat Interv77 with 109th personnel; 109th Inf S-3 Jnl, 6-7Nov 44; 28th Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Nov 44; 28th Div AAR,Nov 44; TF Davis Jnl, 7 Nov 44.

15 Combat Interv 76 with Mays; TF Davis Jnl, 7Nov 44. Indirect quotes are from Mays.

16 TF Davis Jnl, 7 Nov 44; 28th Div G-3 Jnl, 7Nov 44; Combat Interv 77 with 109th personnel;109th Inf S-3 Jnl, 7 Nov 44; Ltr, Gen Davis to HistDiv, 27 Dec 49.

388 THREE BATTLES

should it ever be launched, would provefruitless. And in the meantime, GeneralDavis had received word from divisionto await additional instructions beforeissuing further movement orders.17

The Tank Destroyers Try To Cross the Kall

After General Davis during the after-noon had specifically ordered one platoonof tank destroyers to get to Kommer-scheidt immediately, Colonel Mays hadinstructed his 2d Platoon, Company B,893d, under Lieutenant Smith and as-sisted by Lieutenant Fuller, to attemptto run the Kall gantlet. Earlier in theday Fuller had gone forward in a half-track and determined that the main sup-ply route was still blocked; but prepara-tions were made with four destroyers toobey the general's order. Loaded withextra ammunition, rations, medical sup-plies, four additional machine guns, andwith several men from the ReconnaissancePlatoon as security, the four destroyersmoved out about 1500.

They had little difficulty getting throughVossenack, now held by the 146th En-gineers. When they turned south at thechurch and attempted to speed across the1,200 yards of exposed ridge between thetown and the woods, German artilleryshells, direct fire from self-propelled guns,and long-range machine gun fire show-ered upon them. Two of the M-10'sreceived direct shell hits and were knockedout. Another was hit by a shell on theleft driving sprocket and veered off theroad. The last destroyer neared the

woods but was going too fast and skiddedon the wet slope, plunging out of controlover the left bank of the Kall trail anddown toward the wooded gorge. Thecrewmen smashed their radios, removedgun parts, and withdrew toward the rearthrough the wooded draw south of Vosse-nack, their attempt at crossing the rivera failure.18

Armor in Vossenack

The 2d Battalion, 109th Infantry, hadassumed responsibility soon after dark forthe defense of Vossenack. To avoiddrawing enemy artillery fire on the town,the battalion commander and the tankersdecided to keep all tanks in ready posi-tions near Germeter. Lieutenant John-son's tank platoon withdrew to Germeter,and about 2100 the lieutenant's tank wastowed out of the bomb crater into whichit had fallen.19

Lieutenant Davis' 1st Tank DestroyerPlatoon had. remained in Vossenackthrough the day. After dark the tankdestroyer men, using a T-2 retriever, at-tempted to evacuate the destroyer thathad fallen into a cellar on the north sideof the street the preceding day. The T-2eased quietly into position, the tow cableswere fastened, and the retriever gunnedits motor to pull out the destroyer. Atthat moment heavy enemy mortar firecame in and one round landed on thenose of the destroyer, wounding two menand killing the driver of the retriever.The attempt at evacuation was aban-doned, and Lieutenant Davis' platoon

17 Combat Interv 76 with Mays; Combat Interv77 with 109th personnel; Ltr, Gen Davis to Hist Div,27 Dec 49.

18 Combat Interv 76 with Fuller, Davis-Murphy-Gardner, Cole, Mays; V Corps Study, TD Sec.

19 Combat Interv 76 with Granger-Anderson-Walling-Cook.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 389

passed the remainder of the night un-eventfully.20

Command

After Colonel Peterson was taken tothe rear, he was removed to the divisionCP at Roett, whereupon he asked to seeGeneral Cota. The general appeared,and Peterson explained the Kommer-scheidt situation, rather incoherently.He told of the message directing him toreport to the division command post.General Cota had sent no such message.At the time, he believed firmly that theregimental commander had abandonedhis troops. Although he never deter-mined who sent the message, the generallater did establish to his "complete satis-faction" that Colonel Peterson had ac-tually received instructions to return tothe rear.

Conversations later that afternoon be-tween General Cota and General Davisand between General Cota and the VCorps and First Army commanders re-sulted in Cota's positive recommendationthat all his troops be withdrawn west ofthe Kall River. Both the army andcorps commanders concurred. V Corpsordered that the 28th Division continueto hold the Vossenack ridge and thatpart of the Kall gorge west of the river,while withdrawing from the east bank.One regiment was to continue to worktoward the south, while a third regimentwas to be committed later with the 5thArmored Division to the south to assistin taking Strauch and Steckenborn.Late that night General Cota orderedthat the 112th Infantry pull back to an

assembly area for reconstitution; that the3d Battalion, 110th, revert to the 110thInfantry; and that the 109th Infantrycontinue to hold the Vossenack ridge andmove troops into the river gorge.21

Air Support

The first air mission of 7 Novemberwas at 1115 by a squadron of P-47's ofthe 365th Group against smoke markingsin Ruhrberg, southeast of Strauch, withno results observed. Shortly after noon,thirty-six P-38's of the 370th FighterGroup blaze-bombed eight suspected gunemplacements in the vicinity of Grosshau(some two miles northeast of Huertgen)as marked by smoke from American artil-lery. Pilots reported smoke and fireblanketing the entire area, and the groundcontrol officer said the targets were wellcovered by bombs. One aircraft waslost to enemy flak.

The misdirected mission against Vosse-nack by twelve P-47's of the 365th Grouplasted from 1230 to 1350. Pilots re-ported "one observation post believeddestroyed by bombing, no results ob-served on strafing." One light gun posi-tion was claimed probably destroyed inBergstein, and the town was left burning.In midafternoon another squadron of the365th bombed on smoke markings in the"west edge of Schmidt," possibly themission praised by Major Dana, 112thInfantry S-3, for having bombed asquare patch of woods west of Kommer-scheidt. After dark the 422d NightFighter Group flew an intruder missionover the 28th Division sector, giving par-

20 Combat Interv 76 with Davis-Murphy-Gardner.

21 Combat Interv 76 with Ripple; Intervs with ColPeterson and with Gen Cota; 110th Inf S-3 Jnl,7 Nov 44; 28th Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Nov 44.

391

ticular attention to enemy road move-ments east of Schmidt; no results wererecorded.22

The Enemy Situation

On 7 November the 1055th Regiment,supported by the 16th Panzer Regiment,finally succeeded in driving the Amer-icans from Kommerscheidt to the north-ern woods line. This news in enemyreports was tempered somewhat in thatthe 156th Panzer Grenadier Regiment andelements of the 60th Panzer Grenadier Regi-ment had lost the eastern half of Vosse-nack. The Germans had been planningan attack to take the western half of thetown at the same time the Americansstruck to recapture the eastern half, andin the battle that followed German losseswere "considerable." The attack in theKall gorge during the night of 6-7 No-vember against the 1340th Engineers hadbeen made by the Reconnaissance Battalionof the 116th Panzer Division, which claimedto have taken the Mestrenger Muehleagain after having sustained "consider-able losses" in the face of "strong enemyresistance."

On the northern and southern shoul-ders of the American penetration theenemy situation remained relatively thesame. The Germans claimed that theeffective employment of mines and mor-tars stopped another thrust toward Huert-gen and that an American attack incompany strength was repulsed at Raffels-brand. Prisoner identifications by the28th Division on this date indicated thatall three battalions of the 1056th Regimentroamed the Kall gorge between Simon-skall and Mestrenger Muehle and that

22 FUSA and IX TAC Sum, 7 Nov 44; V CorpsStudy, G-3 Air Sec; Combat Interv 74 with Howison.

392 THREE BATTLES

elements of the 275th Division and miscel-laneous fortress units continued to holdin the vicinity of Raffelsbrand.23

Summary for 7 November andNight of 7-8 November

At daylight on 8 November the 28thDivision was making plans for majorreadjustments in its lines, including with-drawal of all its troops from east of theKall River. But many of the division'stroops were still in a critical condition.The remnants of the 1st and 3d Battalions,112th Infantry, had finally lost Kommer-scheidt after a disastrous enemy tank-infantry attack but then had held alongwith the 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry, atthe northern woods line overlookingKommerscheidt. (Map 30) Only twotank destroyers (one of them immobil-ized), one tank, and two 57-mm. antitankguns remained for antitank defense.

In the Kall gorge one engineer com-pany (Company C, 1340th) had beenvirtually annihilated. Four engineer pla-toons now held positions along the Kalltrail, with two of the platoons located sothat they could fire on anyone enteringthe bridge area. A fifth engineer platoonheld to the south on the firebreak thatran parallel to the main supply route.The enemy held the Mestrenger Muehle,however, and the American engineershad no contact with the forces along theKommerscheidt woods line. Approxi-mately three more platoons of engineerswere at the entrance of the Kall trailinto the western edge of the Kall woods.

The combined 1st-3d Battalion, 112th,aid station still operated in the log dugoutalongside the trail in the gorge, but onlywalking wounded had been evacuatedduring the period. Although a chargeby four tank destroyers had been at-tempted, no resupply of any sort to theKommerscheidt force had been effectedacross this trail.

In Vossenack the eastern half of thetown had been recaptured during theday in a well-executed maneuver by twounderstrength engineer companies sup-ported by a platoon of tanks. The engi-neers, Companies A and C, 146th, hadlacked radios, grenades, and mortars.At dark they had withdrawn along withthe handful of survivors of the 2d Bat-talion, 112th Infantry, to assembly areaswest of Germeter. The 2d Battalion,109th Infantry, already battered from along fight in the woods to the north, hadtaken over defense of the town. It hadbeen relieved north of Germeter by the12th Infantry.

The 109th Infantry had ordered its 3dBattalion to the Kall bridge, but thebattalion lost its way behind the 110thInfantry. Although the 1st Battalion,109th, had been assigned as a part ofnewly formed Task Force Davis, it wasstill in an assembly area west of Germeter.The task force had for all practical pur-poses been abandoned during the nightafter its mission to retake Schmidt hadbeen negated by corps and army deci-sions to withdraw from beyond theKall.

New orders now awaited the 28th Di-vision. The immediate problems wereto withdraw those troops still east of theriver and to reinforce the defenders ofthe Kall bridge area.

23 Sit Rpts, 7 Nov 44, found in OB WEST KTBAnlagen 1.-10.XI.44.; 28th Div G-2 Jnl and File,Nov 44; 89th Division Order of the Day; ETHINT56 (Gersdorff and Waldenburg).

CHAPTER VII

Withdrawal Across the Kall(8 November)

General Davis on the morning of 8November ordered the 3d Battalion,109th Infantry, which had been unableto find its way to the Kall gorge the daybefore, to try again. It was to secure thearea in preparation for the subsequentwithdrawal of the American troops fromthe Kommerscheidt woods line. Accom-panied by General Davis and ColonelNelson—the latter was still attempting toreach the remaining elements of his newcommand, the 112th Infantry—the bat-talion moved out of its position in rear ofthe 110th Infantry. It advanced alongthe Simonskall road in the 110th sectorto the gooseneck curve, thence crosscountry through the woods to the north-south river road. At this road CompanyL dropped out of the column to serve asflank protection while the battalionmoved on to the bridge area, arrivingbetween 1300 and 1330. The men dugin near the Kall trail.

Company L forded the river almostdue west of Kommerscheidt and movedalong the east bank toward the bridgeon its mission of providing flank security.It met stiff resistance and suffered heavycasualties in a fight that lasted aboutthree hours. Unable to advance, thecompany eventually withdrew to the westbank and dug in east and slightly north ofTask Force Lacy's position, which was atthe gooseneck curve in the Simonskall road.

After the main body of the 109th bat-

talion had reached the bridge area andwhile Company L was still engaged onthe east bank, General Davis asked for avolunteer patrol from Company K, 109th.Its mission was to lead Colonel Nelsonacross the river to the Kommerscheidtwoods line and thus to reconnoiter aroute of withdrawal for the forces remain-ing across the river. Those who volun-teered were 2d Lt. Edward W. Tropp,T. Sgt. Robert McMillin, Sgt. AlexanderBretal, and Pfc. Lester Sunburg.

General Davis' orders to Colonel Nel-son were to reach the American forcebeyond the Kall and lead it in a with-drawal to the west bank. There Nelson'smen were to assemble temporarily withthe 3d Battalion, 109th, and then com-plete the withdrawal to an assembly areanear Richelskaul. Using a diamondformation, the patrol and Colonel Nelsonmoved out about 1445. They had goneapproximately 700 yards to the north(downstream) when they encountereda six-man German patrol. LieutenantTropp opened fire with his carbine, andthe Germans answered with a machinepistol. Firing his M-1 rifle from the hip,Sergeant Bretal hit one of the Germans,and the others retreated quickly, draggingtheir wounded comrade with them.

Turning east, Lieutenant Tropp's pa-trol forded the river and proceeded up asteep, clifflike slope beyond, throughanother stretch of dense woods, and

394 THREE BATTLES

eventually, without further encounterwith the enemy, into the American woods-line positions. Colonel Nelson madecontact with Colonel Ripple, who hadbeen commanding the composite forcesbeyond the Kall since Colonel Peterson'sdeparture, and then sent LieutenantTropp's patrol back across the river.1

The Day at the Kommerscheidt Woods Line

The remnants of the 1st and 3d Bat-talions, 112th Infantry; the 3d Battalion,110th Infantry; Company A, 707th TankBattalion; Company C, 893d Tank De-stroyer Battalion; and the 1st Platoon,Company C, 20th Engineers, had spenta comparatively quiet morning and after-noon in their hastily organized defensesalong the northern Kommerscheidt woodsline. Although occasional enemy artil-lery and mortar fire had harassed themand there had been more casualties, theshelling was nothing like what they hadexperienced before Kommerscheidt itselfwas abandoned. In the early morning,six enemy tanks had maneuvered fromnortheast to southwest across the frontat a distance of 300 to 500 yards, but theAmericans had called for artillery fireand the armored threat had not material-ized. Again that afternoon six enemytanks had appeared in the open north ofSchmidt; these were all reportedly de-stroyed by tank destroyer fire fromVossenack.2

Shortly before Colonel Nelson arrivedat the woods-line defenses, Colonel Ripplehad received a coded radio message fromdivision ordering him to withdraw hisremaining troops to the west bank of theKall. He was still awaiting reply to arequest for information about the situa-tion to his rear along the main supplyroute when Colonel Nelson arrived withLieutenant Tropp's patrol. The twoofficers issued joint withdrawal orders,asking for volunteers to carry out thewounded and designating Company L,110th Infantry, as a covering force.Colonel Nelson stipulated that the columnof wounded was to proceed directly downthe Kall trail just at dark. Anothercolumn of effectives was to go cross coun-try some thirty minutes later over theroute he had followed into the area. Thecolonel's theory was that the Germans,who evidently had patrols all along theeast bank, would let through a columnmade up entirely of wounded and litterbearers but would fire upon a columnthat included effectives. Every man wasordered to strip down to absolute essen-tials. All abandoned equipment, includ-ing the remaining tank and two tankdestroyers, was to be damaged as muchas possible without the use of explosives.Supporting artillery, which had been soeffective that Colonel Ripple felt he"could not have remained in the woodsline pocket for twenty minutes withoutit," was to fire a heavy concentrationagainst Kommerscheidt at 1800 to con-ceal noise of the withdrawal.

About two hours remained for prepara-tion. The men worked hurriedly to pre-pare litters for the wounded by puttingsaplings through overcoats and blanketsdonated by the effectives. They booby-trapped the tank, tank destroyers, and

1 Combat Interv 77 with 109th personnel; CombatInterv 75 with Nelson; TF Davis Jnl, 8 Nov 44;28th Div G-3 Jnl, 8 Nov 44.

2 Combat Interv 75 with 112th personnel; CombatInterv 76 with Pugh, Hostrup-Fleig-Payne; CombatInterv 77 with Rumbaugh-Joyce; 28th Div G-3 Jnl,8 Nov 44. Information on the destruction of enemytanks is from Combat Interview 76 with Davis-Murphy-Gardner and is told in greater detail laterin the narrative.

SUPPORTING FIRE rendered effective aid to 112th Infantry. Gun crew of 987th FieldArtillery Battalion firing a 155-mm. self-propelled gun (above), and men of the 86th ChemicalBattalion firing a 4.2-inch mortar (below).

396 THREE BATTLES

57-mm. antitank guns, destroying thoseparts which could be destroyed quietly.The tank was put on the Kall trail toserve as a road block. Use of a demoli-tion kit was ruled out for fear of the noiseit would create; it was buried. On fourremaining jeeps blocks were smashed andtires slashed. To cover the withdrawalCompany L, 110th, had to move to thepositions of Company C, 112th. Themove was accomplished by exchangingsmall groups in order to avoid bunchingup the men and possibly panicking theother troops should they see all of Com-pany C, 112th, withdrawing at once.

There were approximately 300 to 350effectives in the group, about twentywalking wounded, and thirty litter cases.Colonel Nelson and Captain Rumbaugh,110th, planned to lead the column ofeffectives, with Colonel Ripple bringingup the rear and checking for stragglers.

Just before the withdrawal was to be-gin, Captain Walker, commanding theprovisional 112th company, saw thecolumn of wounded preparing to leaveand thought the withdrawal had alreadybegun. He ordered his men out on thetrail, clogging it while the wounded weretrying to get through. When CompanyI, 110th, which was to lead the columnof effectives, saw this activity it too movedout on the trail, and only after some fif-teen minutes was the confusion straight-ened out. In the near-darkness, theprocession of wounded continued downthe trail toward the river, and CompanyI, 110th, led by Colonel Nelson, startedcross country at the head of the columnof effectives.3

Along the Kall Trail

While the woods-line defenders heldnorth of Kommerscheidt and preparedfor withdrawal, the engineers dug inalong the main supply route also sufferedfrom enemy artillery fire but experiencedno ground action. About noon a heavyartillery concentration hit the positionsof the 3d Platoon, Company B, 1340thEngineers, near the western edge of thewoods, killing twelve men, including the1340th medical officer and the executiveofficer of Company A, 20th Engineers,and wounding thirteen others. Thatafternoon the Company B, 1340th, com-mander, Captain Creegan, went to a rearaid station with trench foot, leaving 1stLt. Carl B. Setterberg in command.

When the 3d Battalion, 109th Infantry,moved into the area in the afternoon,General Davis told Colonel Setliffe,1340th commander, to have the trailcleared from Vossenack to the bridge inorder that the wounded could be evacu-ated. After a lieutenant from CompanyA, 1340th, checked all abandoned ve-hicles on the trail to determine if theywere booby-trapped, had three medicalvehicles removed, and cut out one roadblock of felled trees, Colonel Setliffe re-ported about 1700 that the trail was open.

Lieutenant Tyo, Company K, 112thInfantry, and a group of seven men hadspent the night before with the engineersalong the trail after having retreatedfrom the Kommerscheidt fight. In themorning the men were suffering so in-tensely from exposure and their feet hurtso much from the cold and dampnessthat Tyo decided to continue to the rear.Accompanied by a wounded engineer,the lieutenant led the men along thegorge toward the south in a circuitous

3 Combat Interv 75 with Nelson, Dana; CombatInterv 76 with Ripple; Combat Interv 77 withRumbaugh-Joyce. Direct quote is from V CorpsStudy, G-3 Sec.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 397

route that eventually led into the 110thInfantry sector. On the way they passedthrough a former enemy position thatwas littered with equipment and twodead Germans. Lieutenant Tyo in thelead passed safely, but the man behindhim stepped on a buried grenade or anti-personnel mine that was booby-trappedto another. Both exploded at once.The man behind the lieutenant lost afoot, Tyo was thrown to the ground, thewounded engineer's leg was broken intwo places, and another man was blinded.Too fatigued to carry the wounded, theothers left the two with leg and footwounds and led the blinded man withthem. As soon as they reached a bat-talion CP of the 110th Infantry, they sentback four aid men with two litters and aman with a mine detector for the twowounded. All others of the group exceptLieutenant Tyo and a sergeant wereevacuated with trench foot.

Near the Kall bridge, two platoons ofCompany K, 109th Infantry, were or-dered just before dark to go to the bridgeand secure it for the withdrawal. Theywere to knock out a German machine gunthat covered the bridge (possibly themachine gun at the mill). By the timethe platoons were organized for the move,it was well after dark, and when the firstof the platoons reached the bridge, themen found the withdrawal already inprogress.4

Vossenack

In Vossenack the usual heavy enemyshelling continued on 8 November. Theinfantry of the 2d Battalion, 109th,

escaped heavy casualties because theywere holed up in cellars and buildingsaway from the forward slope that hadproved so disastrous for the 2d Battalion,112th Infantry. There was no enemyground action. Just before dark Com-pany B, 109th, moved into the westernhalf of Vossenack while the remainder ofthe 1st Battalion, originally designated asa part of Task Force Davis, set up adefense in Germeter.

By arrangement with the 2d Battalion,109th, all tanks had withdrawn fromVossenack the night of 7 November, andthe tank destroyer platoon of LieutenantDavis withdrew just before dawn. Threeguns of the 630th Tank Destroyer Bat-talion (towed) and nine of the 109thInfantry's Antitank Company were in-stalled in the town. Despite this ar-rangement, the tanks and tank destroyerswere called back into Vossenack numer-ous times during the day because ofreports from both infantry and tankersof enemy tank movement on the ridgesbeyond the town. While most of thesereports were evidently erroneous andprompted by unsteady nerves and un-familiarity with the positions of destroyedand disabled American tanks, they never-theless served to keep a steady processionof American armor moving in and out ofVossenack throughout the day. Onceduring the morning Lieutenant Ander-son's platoon of Company B, 707th TankBattalion, radioed for Lieutenant Davis'tank destroyers to come back into townto fire on enemy tanks near Schmidt.The destroyers responded, only to claimthat the reported tanks were clumps ofbushes. Later Anderson's tankers firedon the suspected enemy tanks and claimedseveral hits. Anderson then called foran air strike against the suspected tanks,

4 Combat Interv 75 with Bane, Makousky, Tyo,Creegan; Combat Interv 77 with 109th personnel;Setliffe Rpt.

398 THREE BATTLES

planning to use artillery smoke markingsto assist the planes in spotting the target.When the planes appeared about 1030,several rounds of smoke fell near Vosse-nack and in rear of Germeter. Theplanes hit their target, but one aircraftdropped a bomb near a tank in Vossenackand several bombs fell in rear of Ger-meter. The planes were probably P-38'sof the 474th Group, vectored from amission of bombing gun positions northof Bergstein.

In the afternoon Lieutenant Davis'tank destroyers again moved into Vosse-nack in answer to a request for fire onenemy tanks near Bergstein. The sus-pected tanks turned out to be a house anda pillbox. Remaining in town, about1600 Lieutenant Davis spotted one MarkIV and four Mark V's moving in theopen near Kommerscheidt. His No. 1gun fired one round at the Mark IV,striking a little to the left. A secondround hit the target, and the Germancrew jumped out. All four destroyersthen began firing high-explosive ammu-nition. Lieutenant Davis' No. 3 gun hitone of the Mark V's with its second round,spinning the enemy tank halfway aroundand setting it on fire. The Americansturned their fire on the three remainingMark V's. The occupants of one jumpedout and were immediately killed orwounded. A second German tank caughtfire. Since the tank destroyers had a fewrounds of high velocity armor piercing(HVAP) ammunition, they depressedtheir muzzles to allow for the greatermuzzle velocity of the HVAP projectilesand scored several direct hits on the oneremaining Mark V. It did not moveagain.

That night the destroyer crewmen haddifficulty in starting their motors. They

had no antifreeze, and the long periodsof standing with motors off in the coldhad worn down their batteries. Onlyafter a long and hard session of towingby the company's 3d Platoon did Lieu-tenant Davis succeed in starting hisvehicles.

During the day Company D, 707thTank Battalion, the light tank company,was withdrawn from support of the 28thReconnaissance Troop to the southwest,and one platoon was sent to Germeter.During the night eight more towed gunsof Company B, 630th Tank DestroyerBattalion, entered Vossenack. Two ofthese guns were knocked out by enemyartillery fire before they could be placedin position.

Although one platoon of tanks or oneplatoon of tank destroyers was in Vosse-nack at all times during the next few days,this was virtually the last active partici-pation of armor in the Vossenack fightwhile 28th Division troops remained inthe area.5

Withdrawal

After the initial confusion at the startof the withdrawal from the northernKommerscheidt woods line, the columnof wounded and volunteer litter bearersbegan to make its way slowly down theeast-bank trail toward the river. At thesame time, the column of some 300 effec-tives, led by Colonel Nelson, CaptainRumbaugh, and Company I, 110th In-fantry, moved cross country toward the

5 Combat Interv 76 with Granger-Anderson-Wal-ling-Cook, Mays, Davis-Murphy-Gardner, Leming-Quarrie-Jenkins-Ryan; Combat Interv 77 with 109thpersonnel; 28th Div G-3 Jnl, 8 Nov 44; 109th InfS-2 and S-3 Jnls, 8 Nov 44; 28th Div G-3 Air Jnl,8 Nov 44; 28th Div Arty Jnl, 8 Nov 44; 707th TkBn S-3 Jnl, 8 Nov 44; V Corps Study, TD Sec;FUSA and IX TAC Sum, 8 Nov 44.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 399

northwest to avoid the column of wound-ed. There was apparently no designa-tion of advance, flank, or rear guards.The order of march for withdrawal of theeffectives was as follows: Company I,110th; the provisional 112th companyunder Captain Walker; the tank, tankdestroyer, and engineer personnel; Com-pany C, 112th; and the covering force,Company L, 110th. Company M, 110th,was evidently sandwiched into the col-umn, and the few remaining men of Com-pany K, 110th, acted as litter bearers.

Darkness enveloped the column rapidlyunder the covering of dense trees. Tomaintain contact each man placed onehand on the preceding man's shoulder.The route lay through an area that hadbeen intensively shelled. Shattered treebranches and trunks and debris combinedwith nature's own obstacles, the steephill and the darkness, to make progressvery difficult. Colonel Nelson, who wasleading, had to go forward a few steps ata time with his head lowered, using hishelmet as a shield to keep his eyes frombeing gouged out by jagged branches,then pause to look up to see where hewas going.

In stripping down his equipment,Colonel Nelson had lost his compass. Atone point he reached an open area thatin the darkness looked like a large lake.He had heard that there were dams andlakes in the vicinity of Schmidt and sus-pected that without his compass he hadlost his way and come upon the edge ofone of the lakes. Taking a tentative stepand fully expecting to find himself inwater, he discovered that the ''lake" wassimply sky-glow coming through leaflessbranches of deciduous trees. The con-trast when coming out of the fir forest hadgiven the illusion of water.

Not long after the column of effectivesstarted out, enemy mortars fired into theriver valley and in rear of the withdraw-ing column. Many men scrambled forcover, breaking the column into severallarge groups. The darkness and woodsand debris made it impossible to re-establish contact all along the line.

Only a small group remained withColonel Nelson in what had been the leadof the column. They came to a big rocksurface and, investigating, found a sheerdrop below it. Leading the men aroundthe big rock, Colonel Nelson found him-self back on the Kall trail and amidst thecolumn of wounded. He halted hisgroup to let the wounded pass, hopingthat the main body of the column ofeffectives would find him. Eventuallyhe decided to wait no longer. Takinghis little group past the column ofwounded, Nelson reached the bridge,crossed over, and reported to GeneralDavis in the 109th defensive area.

The column of wounded, with itsroughly improvised litters and heavyloads, had had a difficult time descendingthe steep hill. As the men neared thebridge area approximately five rounds ofenemy mortar fire fell, wounding fivemen. The litter bearers continued nev-ertheless and reached the bridge. Therethey found four German soldiers guardingit and smoking openly. These guardshad apparently taken their posts at thebridge since Colonel Nelson's little grouphad passed over. At first the Germansprotested that only two men per litterwould be permitted to cross, but an un-identified American medic talked withthem and arranged for all to pass, in-cluding many of the litter bearers whostill had their rifles.

One group of effectives under Captain

400 THREE BATTLES

Rumbaugh had by this time been joinedby another group of approximatelyeighty men under Colonel Ripple. Bothhad been separated from Colonel Nel-son's lead group by enemy shelling. To-gether, Captain Rumbaugh and ColonelRipple headed their men down the trail,not knowing if the bridge were held bythe Germans, but determined to crosseven if they had to fight their way through.They had gone only a short distancewhen another enemy shelling began,scattering the men again and disruptingthe last semblance of organization thatremained after the earlier shellings.From this time on, a column as such didnot exist.

Colonel Ripple, Captain Rumbaugh,and a few men moved to the north inorder to ford the river. As they ap-proached the edge of the stream, Ripplefell about twenty feet down a steep rockyslope and was temporarily dazed. In ashort while he recovered, and the groupforded the river. Ripple continued witha few men into the area of the 3d Bat-talion, 109th Infantry. Before Rum-baugh went on, he sent a lieutenant backacross the stream to search the east bankfor any other men he might find. Thelieutenant returned shortly with sevenor eight men. Not having heard aboutthe temporary assembly area with the 3dBattalion, 109th, Captain Rumbaughdirected these men to guide on burningbuildings in Vossenack and move on tothe rear. He and several other menmade another quick search of the river-bank but found no other Americans.They continued their withdrawal thenup the west portion of the valley trail.On the way Rumbaugh and his smallgroup were stopped by an Americansoldier who told them of the temporary

assembly area. They joined the 3dBattalion, 109th, and dug in for thenight.

Captain Hostrup and Lieutenant Fleig,Company A, 707th Tank Battalion, hadabout fifty men with them when theywere separated from the main column.Unaware of the orders to dig in on thewest bank, they crossed the river andcontinued on to Vossenack, arriving thereabout 2300, probably the first group ofappreciable size to make its way to therear.

Other groups had varied experiencesin their withdrawal. Some stopped offwith the 3d Battalion, 109th; others con-tinued straight to the rear. The coldand the rain as well as the continuousenemy shelling drove some of those whotook temporary refuge at the assemblyarea to resume their journey to the rear.One group of eight men, including Ser-geant Toner of Company I, 112th Infan-try, found upon arrival in Vossenack thattwo Germans had somehow become in-termingled with them in the darkness.Another group with Private Perll, Com-pany C, 112th, wandered about almostthe entire night before crossing the river.This group reached the west-bank posi-tions about 0530 the next morning. Amortar section leader from Company M,112th, 2d Lt. Wayne E. Barnett, reachedthe river despite having been woundedby the enemy mortar fire. As he triedto cross, another man grabbed himaround the neck and almost drownedhim before he could break away. Finallyin Vossenack, Barnett and two other menwere fired on by replacements of the 2dBattalion, 109th Infantry, before theycould establish their identity.

Those who elected to remain throughthe night with the 3d Battalion, 109th,

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 401

were assembled just before dawn (9 No-vember) and guided to the rear. Whenlater reorganization took place, it waslearned that almost all who had startedthe withdrawal had finally made theirway out, even though the Germansfinally demolished the Kall bridge duringthe night of 8-9 November. A few indi-viduals continued to straggle to the rearfor the next two days, swelling to morethan 300 the number of men that hadbeen extricated from the pocket at theKommerscheidt woods line.6

Medical Evacuation

The engineers and the 3d Battalion,109th Infantry, had apparently made noeffort to include the combined 1st-3d Bat-talion, 112th, aid station within their de-fenses near the main supply route. Theaid station was thus situated in a kind ofno man's land between the American fox-holes and the Germans, and the enemycontinued to send patrols to the dugout.Two large groups of walking woundedhad nevertheless made their way outduring 8 November, although there hadbeen additional casualties from enemyshelling and sniper fire.

In the rear 1st Lt. Loyd C. Johnson, anambulance platoon leader from CompanyC, 103d Medical Battalion, had made

five attempts during the day to reach theaid station by weasel, but each time hehad been turned back by enemy shellingon the southeastern slope of the Vosse-nack ridge. At 1300 the 112th Infantrysurgeon, Maj. Albert L. Berndt, recom-mended to the division surgeon that atruce be arranged to evacuate the wound-ed. Neither this suggestion nor a subse-quent request addressed to the 112thInfantry S-4 for an attempt to supply theaid station by air was heeded.

At approximately 1500 LieutenantJohnson left with five ambulances andeight litter teams to go down the Simon-skall road along the route taken earlierby General Davis and the 3d Battalion,109th Infantry. He planned to establisha new ambulance loading point at thegooseneck curve on the Simonskall road,even though locating it there meant aone-mile litter carry over two highwooded hills. After dismounting andentering the woods, the litter bearers raninto an intense enemy mortar concentra-tion. The difficult terrain plus theGerman fire convinced Lieutenant John-son that the route would be all butimpossible.

After dark the column of woundedfrom the Kommerscheidt woods linebegan to stream into the aid station along-side the valley trail. Since their aidstation was already choked with litterpatients, the medics made no effort tocare for the walking wounded, merelydirecting them on to the rear. They hadto place new litter patients on the trailbeside the dugout with guards near byholding Red Cross flags. All availableblankets were taken from patients andother men inside and used to cover thoselying outside exposed to the rain andcold. In all, there were about sixty

6 Combat Interv 75 with Nelson, Perll, Toner,Dana, Quinton-Hausman-Lockwood-Kertes-Nor-ton, Kudiak; Combat Interv 76 with Ripple,Hostrup-Fleig-Payne, Pugh, Kelley; Interv withBarnett; Combat Interv 77 with Rumbaugh-Joyce;28th Div G-3 Jnl, 8 Nov 44; Rpt of Interv with 2dLt Henry W. Morrison by George Hicks in an elec-trical transcription of a news broadcast over RadioStation WJZ (New York) and the National Broad-casting Company Blue Network, 12 Nov 44, copy inOCMH through courtesy of Radio Station WPAY,Portsmouth, Ohio, and Albert L. Berndt, M.D.,Portsmouth, Ohio.

403

litter patients. Some of the men fromthe Kommerscheidt defense who hadserved as litter bearers in the long hauldown the east-bank slope were relievedof their weapons and informed that forthe present they were medics. Theothers were told to move on to the Amer-icans troops to the west.7

About 2300 the division surgeon tele-phoned Major Berndt that G-4 had or-dered thirteen weasels with an armedguard to proceed immediately to the log aidstation to evacuate the wounded. Whenboth Major Berndt and the regimentalS-4 protested the arming of the convoy,the plans were changed to send it forwardunarmed. The convoy reached thewoods just north of the entrance of thesupply route into the wooded gorge about0245 (9 November), but in the darknessthe men could not locate the trail. En-emy small arms fire lashed the Americanvehicles, killing a medic who had volun-teered to go along as a guide and forcingthe convoy to withdraw.

A four-weasel medical convoy, un-armed except for Lieutenant George, 3dBattalion, 112th Infantry, motor officer,also attempted to reach the aid stationafter dark, but these vehicles were at-tacked by Germans with hand grenadesand driven back without evacuating anywounded. Lieutenant George felt it un-reasonable to attempt the evacuation atnight when no one could see the Red Crossflags. Thus, as daylight approached on

7 Muglia Rpt; DeMarco-Linguiti Rpt. MajorBerndt suggests that, had the withdrawal from theKommerscheidt woods line come off in an orderlymanner, these wounded might have been evacuatedon to the rear rather than added to the burden ofthe aid station. But darkness, shelling, and generalconfusion had prevailed. See Ltr, Maj Berndt toHist Div.

404 THREE BATTLES

9 November, there had been no relief forthe growing group of wounded in the aidstation alongside the Kail trail.8

12th and 110th Infantry Summaries

On 8 November the 12th Infantry ofthe 4th Division, which had relieved the109th Infantry in the wooded sector northof Germeter, attempted to eliminate theenemy salient along the Weisser WehCreek by attacking with one battalioneast through the road blocks held by theadjacent engineers. Heavy enemy re-sistance prevented appreciable gains, andthe battalion withdrew to its originalassembly area. (Map 31) To the souththe 110th Infantry planned a new attackagainst the pillboxes of the Raffelsbrandstrong point. With the 1st Battalionholding in Simonskall, the 2d Battalionlaunched what was supposed to be a co-ordinated two-company assault againstRaffelsbrand, but when one company gotits attack time mixed up, jumped offearly, and was repulsed, the other com-pany's attack was canceled.9

Artillery and Air Support

During 8 November division artillerybattalions continued to fire primarily attargets of opportunity upon request whilethe corps and general support battalionsconcentrated on counterbattery. At1100 fourteen battalions fired a TOT on

the woods just west of Kommerscheidtwhere Lieutenant Anderson, 707th TankBattalion, had reported enemy tanks;results could not be determined. Sincethe first American smoke rounds of theday were not fired until 1115, the smokethat fell on Vossenack and Germeter andcaused the misdirected American bomb-ing at 1030 must have been from Germanguns. The 229th Field Artillery Bat-talion, in direct support of the 112thInfantry, during the day fired twenty-seven neutralizations, two TOT's, tworegistrations, and forty-two harassingmissions.10

Thirty-five P-38's from the 474thGroup flew the first air support mission of8 November. They hit gun positions inthe woods north of Bergstein and droppedtwenty-seven bombs on Schmidt andHarscheidt and twenty-one on Nideggen,all three strikes starting fires. One air-craft was lost, probably to enemy flak.Some of the P-38's that started on thismission were vectored from it to attackenemy tanks as called for by LieutenantAnderson, 707th Tank Battalion.

The day's second mission was directedagainst suspected enemy tanks, but thepilots of twelve P-47's from the 365thGroup could not find their target becauseof low clouds and instead bombed a high-way bridge at Untermaubach, north ofNideggen. This was only the secondrecorded attempt during the Schmidtbattle to hit any of the important Roerbridges. Another squadron of the 365thbombed a small town in the Zuelpicharea and attacked two warehouses atGemuend, setting them ablaze. TenP-38's of the 474th Group later hit the

8 Berndt Rpt; DeMarco-Linguiti Rpt; MugliaRpt; Combat Interv 75 with George; 28th Div G-3Jnl, 8 Nov 44; 1st Lt Loyd C. Johnson, CasualtyEvacuation Report (hereafter cited as Johnson Rpt),Combat Interv File 76.

9 Combat Interv 77 with 110th Inf personnel;110th Inf S-3 Jnl, 8 Nov 44; 28th Div G-3 Jnl,8 Nov 44.

10 28th Div Arty Jnl, 8 Nov 44; V Corps Study,Arty Sec; 229th FA Bn AAR, 8 Nov 44.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 405

CARGO CARRIER M-29 (WEASEL) pulling a jeep out of the mud near Vossenack.Vehicles such as this were used for evacuation of litter patients as well as for supply operationsduring the battle for Schmidt.

same small town in the Zuelpich area,and a fifth mission by twelve P-38's of the474th was recalled because of weather.

This was the last major participationof air support in the Schmidt operation.Several missions scheduled for the nextday were canceled because of bad weath-er, and after 9 November the IX TacticalAir Command returned to its primarymission of attacking transportation andcommunications deeper in Germany.11

The Enemy Situation

German activity on 8 November con-sisted primarily of patrolling and mop-ping-up operations near Kommerscheidtand Schmidt. With the support of twoassault guns, elements of the 89th Divisionlaunched another attack against thosemen of Companies K and L, 112th In-fantry, who had been surrounded since4 November in the woods southwest ofSchmidt. The Germans claimed to havetaken 133 prisoners in their attack. Therest, they reported, were annihilated.

11 FUSA and IX TAC Sum, 8-9 Nov 44; V CorpsStudy, G-3 Air Sec; Combat Interv 74 with Howison.

406 THREE BATTLES

"The results of this stubborn and bitterfighting," the 89th Division said, "justifythe losses which we, too, suffered." 12

OB WEST on this date ordered ArmyGroup B to provide for the "speedy trans-portation of booty" taken in the Kom-merscheidt and Vossenack areas "toWahn [Training Area] for purposesknown to this command." Some of thisAmerican equipment was probably turnedagainst this same 28th Division approxi-mately one month later in the Germancounteroffensive along the Belgium-Luxembourg borders.13

Summary for 8 November and 8-9 November

This day and night had seen the evacu-ation of all American forces from east ofthe Kall River. Although the with-drawal had not gone smoothly, morebecause of the difficulties of terrain anddarkness than because of enemy action,between 300 and 350 men had made goodtheir escape.

The 3d Battalion, 109th Infantry, had

joined the four engineer platoons in theirdefense of the west-bank supply route,but even the addition of this under-strength battalion had not eased thesituation of the combined aid stationalongside the trail. About sixty to sixty-five litter patients, more than could behoused inside the dugout, had accumu-lated, and medical evacuation was evi-dently to remain a major problem.

In Vossenack the 2d Battalion, 109thInfantry, had continued to hold, whilethe surviving tanks and tank destroyersof the 707th Tank Battalion and 893dTank Destroyer Battalion brought long-range fire against suspected enemy tanks.During the afternoon Company B, 109thInfantry, moved into the western end ofVossenack and the remainder of the109th's 1st Battalion took up a defense ofGermeter.

Both a limited-objective attack by the12th Infantry to the north and a one-battalion attack in the 110th Infantry'ssector against the Raffelsbrand strongpoint had failed. Another division fieldorder was issued during the afternoon,calling for reorganization of the 112thInfantry and assigning holding missionsto the 109th Infantry and the attached12th Infantry. The 110th Infantry wasdirected to work south toward Rolles-broich.14

12 Daily Sit Rpt, 8 Nov 44, found in OB WESTKTB Anlagen 1.-10.XI.44.; 89th Division Order of theDay.

13 This passage is based on a secret order of 8 Nov44, found in OB WEST KTB Anlagen 1-10.XI.44.This order was issued by the OB WEST chief of staffupon receipt of a telephone call from GeneralmajorHorst Freiherr Treusch von Buttlar-Brandenfels, amember of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. 14 28th Div G-3 Jnl, 8 Nov 44.

CHAPTER VIII

Conclusion(9-20 November)

Before the dawn of 9 November weatherconditions, already bad, became worse.The cold rain that fell on the litter patientsoutside the combined 1st-3d Battalionaid station in the Kall gorge changed tosnow, which continued after daylight.No relief vehicles had managed to getthrough, and the medical officers there-fore decided to attempt their ownevacuation.

About 200 yards up the trail they foundtwo two-and-one-half-ton trucks whichhad been abandoned the night of 6-7November by Lieutenant George, 3dBattalion motor officer, when he couldnot get them past a road block of felledtrees. The trail was too precarious topermit backing these trucks down to thelog dugout for loading, but patients couldbe hand-carried to them. Then the ve-hicles would have to take their chancesin running the gantlet of open ridgesoutheast of Vossenack. Not far fromthe trucks the medics found also a weaselthat, despite several holes in its gasolinetank, could be used if someone continu-ally poured gasoline into the tank. Theylocated five cans of gasoline and loadedthe weasel as well as the trucks withpatients, finding space for all but aboutten of the litter cases.1

Back at the regimental rear commandpost Major Berndt, the 112th Infantrysurgeon, was unaware that the woundedhad been withdrawn from the Kommer-scheidt woods line the night before.Telephoning G-4, he volunteered to gounder a white flag into the German linesto arrange a truce in order to evacuateany wounded still at the woods line. Theoffer was turned down. Berndt was toldinstead to determine the attitude of theenemy toward such a truce and to leavedetails and official confirmation forlater.2

With T/4 Wheeler W. Wolters actingas flagbearer and interpreter, MajorBerndt left Vossenack about 0950 andarrived at the aid station without havingbeen fired upon. (Map 32) He foundthe medical personnel loading the wound-ed onto the two trucks and the weasel.Major Berndt did not know it but divisionhad meanwhile changed its mind andauthorized a truce.3

Leaving the aid station, the medical ma-jor and T/4 Wolters continued to the river,where they found that the bridge had beendestroyed. As they stood on the brokenabutment debating the possibility and ad-visability of fording the river, a Germanrifleman stood up in a foxhole a short

1 Muglia Rpt; DeMarco-Linguiti Rpt; BerndtRpt; Morrison Rpt.

2 Ltr, Maj Berndt to Hist Div.3 Ibid.

408 THREE BATTLES

MAP 32

distance beyond the bridge site on theeast bank and called to them. Woltersshouted back the purpose of their visit,whereupon the enemy soldier jumpedfrom his foxhole, ran south along theriver bank, and disappeared into thewoods. Several minutes later approxi-

mately six Germans, including a lieu-tenant, ran toward the two Americansfrom the stream's west bank. Theyasked if the Americans were armed andaccepted their word that they were not.Through his interpreter, Major Berndtbegan to explain his mission when heheard another hail from across the river.

This time it was an American soldierleaning against a tree and obviouslywounded; a slit in his right trouser legrevealed a large field dressing on histhigh. "Hey, Major," he called, appear-ing to be crying, "come over and getme." Major Berndt replied that hecould not come just then. A few minuteslater two American aid men, each, carry-ing a five-gallon water can, walked non-chalantly down the Kall trail and askedthe major if they could fill their watercans at the river. He told them to goahead and, if possible, to get the woundedAmerican from the east bank.

When Berndt asked the German lieu-tenant for a truce to evacuate thewounded from the woods line and fromKommerscheidt, the lieutenant repliedthat all American wounded had beenevacuated. There remained, however,the problem of the wounded in the log-aid station. The German offered toevacuate these men, but Major Berndtdeclined, for fear of giving the enemy anopportunity to capture the Americanmedical personnel. The lieutenant thensaid that evacuation vehicles could passwithout interference from his men, buthe could not vouch for his ar t i l lery firebecause at the time the Germans werehaving communication diff icul t ies withtheir artillery. With this arrangement,the two officers exchanged salutes, andMajor Berndt and T/4 Wolters retracedtheir steps up the Kall trail, stopping atthe aid station to report the results oftheir conference.

The two American medics who hadgone to fill their water cans at the riversucceeded in getting the wounded soldierfrom the east bank. When they reachedthe west bank again, some of the Ger-mans who had been present at Major

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 409

Berndt's conference assisted them incarrying the wounded man toward theaid station. The engineers dug in northof the trail saw this mixed group ofAmericans and Germans and opened fire.A shout from one of the medics—"Holdyour — — — fire! We're bringing in awounded man"—stopped the shooting.4

Evacuation

While the truce arrangements werebeing conducted, the weasel and truckswith their load of American woundedfarther up the trail to the west begantheir journey toward the rear. Theymoved without undue difficulty to thecrest of the hill where the trail emergedfrom the western edge of the Kall woods.Beyond this point the route was blockedby abandoned American vehicles. Theweasel could get by, but the trucks couldnot. While the trucks waited, Lieuten-ant Morrison, 1st Battalion medical ad-ministrative officer, passed through withthe weasel and five patients and reachedVossenack.

Major Berndt and T/4 Wolters re-turned from the Kall gorge on foot,reaching Vossenack well past noon.Lieutenant Johnson, the ambulance pla-toon leader, was waiting in the town withone ambulance and had others availablein Germeter. Learning about the partialtruce from Major Berndt, Johnson wasconcerned about the German artillery,which had been the principal reason forthe failure of evacuation across the browof the Vossenack ridge. His concernwas tempered, however, by a realizationthat the continuing snowfall was steadily

decreasing visibility—to American ad-vantage. The lieutenant obtained avolunteer driver for his ambulance andmade a test run out across the open ridge.The enemy-held hills were shrouded in ahaze of falling snow, and Johnson knewthen that his mission would succeed.

New difficulties had arisen at thewestern edge of the Kall woods where theloaded trucks waited on the blockedtrail. A German captain and about tenGerman enlisted men had arrived on thescene.5 The enemy officer wanted to seethe medical officer in charge and talkedat length with Captain DeMarco, 3dBattalion surgeon. It was obvious thatthis German officer knew nothing ofMajor Berndt's previous truce arrange-ments, and he insisted that only seriouslywounded and medical personnel could beevacuated. He said that slightly wound-ed and nonmedical personnel (probablythose men who had been retained as litterbearers after the withdrawal from theeast bank) would be taken prisoner.

Lieutenant Johnson arrived with hisambulance, evidently while this discus-sion was taking place. The Germansgave him no difficulty as he loaded hisambulance with wounded. Returningto Germeter, he secured eight ambulancesfor completion of the task and led themback to the blocked trucks, arriving thereabout 1615.

As the eight ambulances were loaded,the Germans checked the seriousness ofthe patients' wounds and the validity ofthe medics' Red Cross cards. They al-lowed Lieutenant Muglia, 3d Battalion

4 Ltr , M a j Berndt t o Hist Div; Hicks, NationalBroadcasting Company transcription, 12 Nov 44,OCMH.

5 These Germans had been dug in near the entranceof the trail into the woods for some time and noattempt had apparently been made to dislodge them.They had been reported for two previous nights byLieutenant George, motor officer of the 3d Battalion,112th. See Ltr, Maj Berndt to Hist Div.

EVACUATION OF WOUNDED over the muddy ground of the Huertgen Forest.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 411

medical administrative officer, to accom-pany the ambulances, but not the twobattalion surgeons, Captains DeMarcoand Linguiti, nor Chaplains Alan P.Madden and Ralph E. Maness. Theywere being held, the Germans said, be-cause a large group of Americans whomthe Germans had surrounded might needattention from both medics and chap-lains.6 The German captain did agreethat an ambulance might return aboutnoon the next day for the four Americanofficers. As the ambulances pulled awaywith the last of the American woundedfrom the aid station, men in the rearambulance heard Chaplain Maddenshout, "Come back for us tomorrow."7

The surgeons and chaplains returnedto the log dugout. Heavy shelling andoccasional small arms fire in the areawounded still more Americans and in-creased the number of patients whogathered at the aid station. By the nextday there were twelve casualties in needof evacuation.

The next day, 10 November, the offi-cers went back to the top of the hill andagain talked to the German captain.Now the German officer insisted he wouldnot release them unless the Americansreturned all the slightly wounded Ger-mans whom they had evacuated andunless all the Americans in the area sur-rendered. As the parties conferred, theywere shelled. The Germans ran fortheir foxholes and ordered the Americansback to the aid station.

That same morning the Germans sentChaplain Madden into the 3d Battalion,109th Infantry, positions south of the Kalltrail with a surrender ultimatum; it wasrefused. The next day they again sentthe chaplain with an ultimatum; it toowas refused.

The day of the second surrender de-mand, 11 November, a German medicalofficer at the bottom of the Kall gorgerequested a truce in order that the Ger-mans might collect their dead. Havinghad no contact with the German captainnear the exit of the main supply routefrom the woods, this officer told theAmericans that they could evacuate theirwounded at the same time. Severallitter teams that had reached the aidstation on foot took advantage of theunexpected opportunity and evacuatedtheir wounded via a roundabout routethrough the woods to the south. Theythus avoided the hostile German captainand his men. Despite continued Amer-ican and German artillery fire—for thetruce was only between medics—the lastcasualties as well as the two surgeons andtwo chaplains finally reached the safetyof the rear.8

6 The surrounded Americans were probably themen of Companies K and L, 112th, who had re-treated into the German-held woods southwest ofSchmidt on 4 November when the 3d Battalion,112th, was knocked out of Schmidt. The 89thDivision Order of the Day says 133 of these men werecaptured on 8 November. It is possible the Germanshere had not learned of this capture, since it tookplace only the day before. Before dawn on 9 No-vember, three Americans from the trapped groupreturned to the 28th Division. They reported that,when they had left the group two days before to lookfor help, the men had neither water nor rations andwere under heavy enemy mortar and artillery fire.The possibility that any were still resisting, accordingto the three men, was remote.

7 What happened to the less seriously woundedand the volunteer litter bearers is not made clear.Neither is it clear what the 3d Battalion, 109thInfantry, and the dug-in engineers were doing all thistime. Their positions did not include the ambulanceloading area where the difficulty with the Germancaptain arose. Major Berndt states he saw noAmericans along the trail as he went forward on histruce mission.

8 Johnson Rpt; Morrison Rpt; Muglia Rpt;DeMarco-Linguiti Rpt; Berndt Rpt; Ltr, Maj Berndtto Hist Div.

413

Summary of Closing Action

On 9 November the troops of the 146thEngineers, who had gone into an assem-bly area after their infantry role inrecapturing the eastern half of Vossenack,resumed work on rear-area roads andlaid a mine field for the 109th Infantryon the eastern nose of the Vossenackridge. The remainder of the 1171stEngineer Combat Group stayed in theKall gorge as riflemen until 10 Novemberwhen they also withdrew and began rear-area road maintenance.

The 112th Infantry Regiment was re-organized on 8 November with the addi-tion of 515 replacements and was alertedto attack due north from Vossenack toseize the woods overlooking Huertgen.When G-1 intervened because the 112thhad such a large number of replacements,the 1st Battalion, 109th Infantry, wasordered to attack instead. (Map 33)Both the 1st Battalion, 109th, and the12th Infantry (4th Division) attacked on10 November to close up on the Huertgenwoods line. The 1st Battalion, 109th,succeeded partially after costly and de-termined enemy resistance. The 3dBattalion, 109th, remained in the Kallgorge while the regiment's 2d Battalionheld in Vossenack. Both units did occa-sional patrolling. To the south the 110thInfantry tried through 12 November toimprove its positions and reduce theRaffelsbrand strong point, but its com-panies were so depleted and its attackssuch feeble, piecemeal efforts that vir-tually no change in the line was effected.All these actions were the result of adirective issued orally by V Corps on 9November and given written confirma-tion the next day. They were apparentlydesigned to secure a line of departure

414 THREE BATTLES

overlooking Huertgen and to improve the28th Division positions in general.9

The Enemy Situation

On 9 November the Germans changedtheir counterattack plans against the 28thDivision. They returned to their originalidea of cutting off the Vossenack penetra-tion at its base by means of a drive againstthe penetration southwest of Huertgen.On the same date the 89th Division andelements of the 275th Division relievedalmost all of the 116th Panzer Division inthe Kommerscheidt-Vossenack area, andthe panzer division began to assemble inthe vicinity of Huertgen. During thenight of 9-10 November a new boundarybetween the 89th and 275th Divisions wasdesignated to run northeast just north ofBosselbach Farm. The 89th Division wascharged with responsibility for the areafrom just north of Strauch up to the newboundary, although some elements of the275th Division remained in the Raffels-brand area. The 275th Division's sectorran from the new boundary near Bossel-bach Farm north and northwest to itsoriginal right boundary, but those ele-ments in the Huertgen area where the116th Panzer Division was to attack wereattached temporarily to the panzer divi-sion. German artillery was regroupedto support the 116th's impending attack.

For three days, from 10 through 12November, a Kampfgruppe of the 116thPanzer Division, seriously depleted bythe Schmidt-Vossenack battles, attacked

southwest of Huertgen against the 12thInfantry but with only limited success.The 89th Division meanwhile reacted withstiff counterattacks against the 1st Bat-talion, 109th Infantry, in the woods northof Vossenack. To the 89th Divisionelimination of this American advance be-came "a point of honor." Although theGermans did surround elements of theAmerican battalion, a relief patrol brokethrough on 15 November to foil theGerman attempt at annihilation. Thiswas the last major enemy developmentbefore the 28th Division was relieved andpassed to control of VIII Corps.10

Relief of the 28th Division

When the 2d Ranger Battalion wasattached to the 109th Infantry and movedto the Germeter vicinity on 14 November,all elements of the 112th Infantry wererelieved, and the regiment moved southinto defensive positions in VIII Corps'Luxembourg sector. The 110th Infantrywas relieved by elements of the 8th In-fantry and moved south on 17 November.Relief of the 109th Infantry was com-pleted by the 8th Division on 19 Novem-ber, and the entire 28th Division wasrelieved of responsibility for the Vosse-nack-Schmidt area.11

The Schmidt operation had developedinto one of the most costly division actionsin the whole of World War II and repre-sented a major repulse to American arms.Exact casualty figures are difficult todetermine because casualties were re-

9 Combat Interv 75 with Doherty, Lutz; SetliffeRpt; Combat Interv 77 with 109th and 110th per-sonnel; Engr Gp Periodic Rpt and V Corps Directive,28th Div G-3 File, Nov 44; 28th Div G-3 Jnl, 8-15Nov 44; 110th Inf S-2 and S-3Jnls, 9-15 Nov 44.

10 MS # A-891 (Gersdorff); ETHINT 56 (Gers-dorff and Waldenburg); Entries of 10-12 Nov 44,found in OB WEST KTB 1.-30.XI.44.; Sit Rpts,9-10 Nov 44, found in OB WEST KTB Anlagen1.-10.XI.44.

11 28th Div G-3 Jnl, 14-20 Nov 44.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 415

ported by the month and the Schmidtoperation covered only a portion of amonth. However, after leaving this area,the 28th Division went to a relativelyinactive sector of the VIII Corps linewhere casualties for the rest of Novemberwere admittedly few. The majority ofthe month's casualties, therefore, can beconsidered to have occurred in theSchmidt operation.

Hardest hit of the three infantry regi-ments was the one that made the maineffort, the 112th Infantry. It had 232men captured, 431 missing, 719 wounded,167 killed, and 544 nonbattle casualties—2,093 officers and men lost in all. Troopsattached to the 28th Division suffered, ata conservative estimate, more than 500casualties, while losses in the divisionitself for November were 5,684. Theone-division assault, therefore, had claim-ed a toll in killed, wounded, missing,captured, and nonbattle casualties ofmore than 6,184 Americans.12

No accurate comparison between Ger-man and American casualties can bemade because German casualties arepurely an estimate and for a shorterperiod. From 2 November through 8November, 913 German prisoners werecaptured and an estimated 2,000 enemycasualties of all types were inflicted. Onthe basis of these figures it is apparentthat American losses were much higher,approximately 3,000 more than theGerman.13

American matériel losses in the Schmidtaction included sixteen out of twenty-fourM-10 tank destroyers of the 893d TankDestroyer Battalion and thirty-one out offifty medium tanks of the 707th TankBattalion. Other victims of both enemyfire and the treacherous terrain includedbulldozers, trucks, weasels, 57-mm. anti-tank guns, machine guns, mortars, andindividual weapons.14 Figures on ex-penditure of artillery ammunition areavailable only for the period 2 Novemberthrough 8 November. Counting tankand tank destroyer ammunition fired12 28th Div, 109th Inf, 110th Inf, 112th Inf, and

893d TD Bn AAR's, Nov 44; 707th Tk Bn S-1 Jnl,Nov 44; Engr Sec, V Corps AAR, Nov 44. V CorpsStudy, G-1 Section, estimates total casualties (battleand nonbattle) to the 28th Division and attachedtroops for the period 2-8 November 1944 at 3,684,but many casualties which occurred in this periodwere admittedly not reported until later, probablybecause of a general policy of delaying reports untilthe last possible date in the hope a missing or woundedman might return to duty. Also, this study did notinclude casualties from 8 to 20 November, althoughthese occurred in the Vossenack-Schmidt area. Atabulation from German situation reports reveals536 prisoners captured between 5 and 10 November,but an entry for 10 November raises the figure to641. The 89th Division Order of the Day claims 535prisoners. In MS # P-032a, Bruns states that the89th Division captured 600 prisoners at Schmidt andKommerscheidt. Only Straube, in MS # C-016,makes an exorbitant claim, speaking of "severalthousand prisoners." See Sit Rpts, 5-10 Nov 44,found in OB WEST KTB Anlagen 1.-10.XI.44; 89thDivision Order of the Day; MS # P-032a (Bruns);and MS # C-016 (Straube).

13 28th Div AAR, Nov 44. These figures make noallowance for German nonbattle casualties. TheGerman losses in LXXIV Corps since 2 Novemberwere estimated in a situation report of 7 Novemberas approximately 2,000. The only other availablesource of German casualties, records of the SurgeonGeneral of the German Army, gives cumulativetotals, but a tabulation from these shows that thetotal killed and wounded in the entire Seventh Armyfrom 1 to 10 November was 3,863. The "missing"figure for this same period is 40,782, completelyirreconcilable except for the possibility that theGermans were absorbing in their figures great num-bers of men missing from the fluid actions of latesummer in France and Belgium. See Sit Rpt, 7 Nov44, found in OB WEST KTB Anlagen 1.-10.XI.44.;and Cumulative Casualty Figures by the SurgeonGeneral of the German Army, found in Der Heeresarzt,OKH/Org.Abt., Arzt Meldungen, Monats-Meldungen1.VII.43-20.IV.45.

14 893d TD Bn and 707th Tk Bn AAR's, Nov 44;V Corps Study, G-4 Sec.

416 THREE BATTLES

indirectly and 4.2 chemical mortar am-munition, 92,747 rounds were expended.15

The original primary mission of the 28thDivision had been to capture Schmidtand be prepared to advance to the south-west to assist the 5th Armored Division intaking the Strauch-Steckenborn area.The division was also to guard againstcounterattack from the north, securea line of departure for a later attack byanother division against Huertgen, andsecure another supply route to the southfor the later attack on the Strauch-Steckenborn area. Although the 109thInfantry, assigned the mission on thenorth, did guard against counterattack,before it was called out to assist the112th Infantry it had not succeededcompletely in securing the desired line ofdeparture for the proposed Huertgenattack. The 110th Infantry to the south,attempting to secure the Schmidt-Strauchroad in preparation for a later divisionadvance to the Strauch-Steckenbornarea, experienced a bloody, costly actionthat netted little except the capture ofSimonskall. The 112th Infantry, makingthe division's main effort, capturedSchmidt but failed to hold it. The regi-ment's only final accomplishment interms of territory gained was the captureand defense of Vossenack, and in thataction the unit had assistance from the146th Engineers acting as riflemen. The109th Infantry, in this same sector, didlater establish itself in the woods north ofVossenack and along the trail in thewooded Kall gorge.

The mission of drawing enemy reservesto the area and away from a planned

major First Army attack in the VII Corpszone to the north had been accomplished—all too well. Because of weather con-ditions, the VII Corps attack failed toget off on time, and air support failed tokeep enemy armored reserves from theSchmidt area. Thus the 28th Division,making the only attack in progress onboth the First and Ninth Army fronts,was left to the wrath of enemy reserves.By the time the VII Corps attack waslaunched, the 116th Panzer Division hadreturned to reserve and the 89th Divisionhad taken over defense of Kleinhau-Brandenberg-Bergstein.

A group of V Corps officers, designatedby the corps commander to study theaction soon after the battle, concludedthat, despite the divergent nature of theSchmidt operation, tactical planning wassound under the existing circumstances.Many of the successes won by Americanarms from the Normandy landings on-ward had begun as gambles. Schmidtwas a gamble that failed. A number offactors had combined to bring failure,not the least of which were the violentGerman reaction, adverse weather condi-tions, an inadequate and unprotectedmain supply route, lack of regimentaland divisional reserves, the wide frontageand divergent missions, and the inabilityto neutralize the Brandenberg-Bergsteinridge. In the opinion of the V Corpscommander, Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow,few if any infantry divisions could haveachieved more against these obstaclesthan did the 28th.16

The town of Schmidt remained inGerman hands until the 78th Infantry

15 Artillery estimate from V Corps Study, ArtySec; Mortar, TD, and tank estimates from the follow-ing: 86th Cml Bn AAR, Nov 44; V Corps Study,TD Sec; 707th Tk Bn S-3 Jnl, Nov 44.

16 V Corps Study; Interv with Gen Gerow, 4 May48, Fort Meade, Md. General Gerow was the com-manding general of V Corps at the time of theSchmidt operation and at the time of the interviewwas the commanding general of the Second Army.

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 417

Division captured it in February, 1945—after the Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge hadbeen captured. The 78th Division's at-tack came down the Strauch-Schmidtroad and was assisted by a simultaneousattack from the direction of Brandenberg-Bergstein.17

As for the 28th Division, from Schmidtit moved south into Luxembourg along

the grand duchy's border with Germany.For more than two months this relativelyinactive sector of the Western Front hadbeen used for the orientation of newdivisions and the recuperation of old.In December, less than a month afterarrival of the battered division for restand reorganization, the Germans wrotea sequel to the Schmidt battle, castingthe 28th once again in a tragic role. Thistime the division lay directly in the pathof the enemy's counteroffensive in theArdennes.

17 For a story of this later attack and a higher-levelaccount of the 28th Division battle and events pre-ceding it, see The Last Offensive: Rhineland andCentral Germany and The Siegfried Line, volumesnow under preparation in this series.

Order of Battle

28th Infantry Division

Headquarters, 28th Infantry DivisionHeadquarters, Special Troops

Headquarters Company728th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company28th Quartermaster Company28th Signal CompanyMilitary Police Platoon

28th Infantry Division Band28th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, Mechanized103d Engineer Combat Battalion (less Companies A, B, and C)28th Division Artillery, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery

108th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. Howitzer)103d Medical Battalion (less Companies A, B, and C)109th Regimental Combat Team

109th Infantry Regiment107th Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. Howitzer)Company A, 103d Engineer Combat BattalionCompany A, 103d Medical Battalion

110th Regimental Combat Team110th Infantry Regiment109th Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. Howitzer)Company B, 103d Engineer Combat BattalionCompany B, 103d Medical Battalion

112th Regimental Combat Team112th Infantry Regiment229th Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. Howitzer)Company C, 103d Engineer Combat BattalionCompany C, 103d Medical Battalion

Attached to 28th Division

1171st Engineer Combat Group20th Engineer Combat Battalion146th Engineer Combat Battalion (less Company B)1340th Engineer Combat Battalion502d Engineer Light Ponton Company993d Engineer Treadway Bridge Company2d Platoon, 610th Engineer Light Equipment Company

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 419

12th Regimental Combat Team (4th Infantry Division)12th Infantry Regiment42d Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. Howitzer)1st Platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat BattalionCompany A, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion (Self-Propelled)

707th Tank Battalion (Medium)630th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Towed)893d Tank Destroyer Battalion (Self-Propelled) (less Company A)447th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion86th Chemical Battalion (4.2-inch Mortar)Battery A, 987th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. Gun, Self-Propelled)76th Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. Howitzer)

In Support of 28th Division

Headquarters, V Corps Artillery17th Field Artillery Observation Battalion (less Battery B)187th Field Artillery Group

187th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. Howitzer)953d Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. Howitzer)941st Field Artillery Battalion (4.5-inch Gun)

190th Field Artillery Group190th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. Gun)997th Field Artillery Battalion (8-inch Howitzer)

188th Field Artillery Group981st Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. Gun)172d Field Artillery Battalion (4.2-inch Gun)

Bibliographical Note

The primary source for writing "Ob-jective: Schmidt" was a series of detailedand comprehensive combat interviewsconducted soon after the battle by Capt.William J. Fox, Capt. John S. Howe, and1st Lt. Harry Jackson, of the 2d Informa-tion and Historical Service. Althoughtheir work was interrupted when the 28thDivision was hit by the German counter-offensive in the Ardennes, they neverthe-less produced more interviews on thisaction than were obtained for any otherspecific ground operation in the Europeantheater.

These interviews, so essential in anarrative at the small-unit level, aregenerally excellent, and, where checkedand supplemented by unit records, canbe considered highly reliable. Althoughthe interviewers were in the general areaat the time of the battle, they were notable to go over the terrain with the sur-vivors and had to rely on map studywhen conducting their interviews. Thevagaries of the Huertgen Forest terrainadded to the problems of locating posi-tions on a map. The only major gap inthe interview material is the lack of inter-views with artillery troops. Because ofthe limitations in scope of this study,detailed interviews with 109th and 110thInfantry personnel could not be fullyutilized.

After Action Reports of infantry unitsproved of little value: they are too generaland they tend to minimize reverses andoveremphasize successes. The lattertendency is true only to a limited degreeof the armored units' After Action Re-

ports. Those of the artillery units werethe basic source for accounts of artilleryaction, and their only major fault is inlack of detail. No battalion journals ofthe 28th Division were turned in forpermanent record, and entries in the112th Infantry regimental journals areoften sketchy, erroneous, or even non-existent at vital phases in the operation.The division journals are generally ex-cellent, and the journal of the 1171stEngineer Combat Group often providesvaluable messages, orders, and reports.A study of investigation, the V CorpsFactual Study, conducted soon after thebattle on almost every phase of the opera-tion by designated officers of V Corps,is comprehensive, but its statements donot correspond in all cases to contem-porary sources. All combat interviews,unit records, and the V Corps FactualStudy may be found in the HistoricalRecords Section, Office of the AdjutantGeneral.

Postwar interviews with Maj. Gen.Norman D. Cota and Col. Carl L. Peter-son and correspondence with Brig. Gen.George A. Davis, Maj. Albert L. Berndt,and Col. Edmund K. Daley proved ex-tremely valuable. These are in the filesof the Office of the Chief of MilitaryHistory (formerly the Historical Division,Special Staff, U. S. Army).

Maj. Henry P. Halsell's unpublishedmanuscript, Huertgen Forest and theRoer River Dams, provides a thoroughstudy of the Schmidt operation. Valu-able assistance was gained also from apreliminary manuscript entitled The

OBJECTIVE: SCHMIDT 421

Siegfried Line, which was prepared im-mediately following the war by the Sieg-fried Line Subsection, Historical Section,ETO. Those portions most helpful inwriting the Schmidt narrative were pre-pared by Capt. Frank C. Mahin, Jr., andMaj. Fred L. Hadsell. Neither of thesemanuscripts was used as a primarysource, but both were helpful as indexesto original material. They also may befound in the OCMH.

Sources for German materials wereprimarily postwar manuscripts preparedby captured German officers; entriesfound in the KTB (War Diary) of OBWEST, and letters, orders, and reportsfound in annexes to the KTB; and adocument issued by the 89th Division asan Order of the Day, giving an accountof the battles for Schmidt and Kommer-scheidt. The original of this captureddocument cannot be found, but a transla-tion is reproduced in Major Halsell'smanuscript. The information it gives isof a public relations nature and must bechecked carefully against other sources;the translation itself is awkward in placesand contains a number of minor errors,some of them possibly typographical.The manuscripts by the German officersare of limited value for a narrative writtenat the level of "Objective: Schmidt."They are often vague and muddled andsometimes biased, but are neverthelessuseful to substantiate and elaborate uponinformation gained from official Germansources or known from the American sideof the story. None of the manuscriptscompare favorably in reliability and fac-tual reporting with the Krause manu-script on the Arnaville action, althoughthe quality of the Gersdorff manuscriptsis readily apparent in his reporting of

high-level strategy and the broad outlinesof the Schmidt battle. The most trust-worthy enemy information is to be foundin the KTB and the annexes to the KTB.The annexes are particularly valuable indetermining times of enemy action andunits involved and in pinpointing loca-tions. The manuscripts are in the filesof the OCMH, and the official Germanrecords in the German Military Docu-ments Section, Departmental RecordsBranch, Office of the Adjutant General.Additional information on the enemy sidecame from S-2 and G-2 journals andfiles of the 112th Infantry and the 28thDivision. When checked against theGerman material, these proved valuablein locating movements and positions ofenemy units.

A unit history of the 28th Division waspublished in 1946 but was of little valuein preparing this study. A number ofjournalistic accounts appeared in U. S.newspapers soon after the action in 1944,but these too are lacking in accuracy andobjectivity. The following two worksare useful for background information:V Corps Operations in the ETO, 6January 1942 to 9 May 1945, and FirstU. S. Army Report of Operations, 1August 1944 to 22 February 1945, Vol-ume I, in the Historical Records Section,Office of the Adjutant General.

Primary sources of air informationwere the 28th Division G-3 Air Journal;the Unit History of the IX Fighter Com-mand and IX Tactical Air Command;and a combat interview conducted byCaptain Howe with Maj. Edwin M.Howison, air liaison officer to the 28thDivision from the IX TAC. The 28thDivision G-3 Air Journal and the AirCorps records are sometimes in disagree-

422 THREE BATTLES

ment. The interview and the air journalare in the Historical Records Section,AGO, and the other air records in theHistorical Archives, Historical Division,Air University Library, Maxwell AirForce Base, Alabama.

Information on terrain is based onmaps and photographs in OCMH files,combat interviews, the V Corps FactualStudy, and a visit by the author to thearea some five years after the action.

Glossary

AAI Allied Armies in ItalyAAR After Action ReportActg ActingAF Air ForceAnlage Appendix or annexA and P Ammunition and PioneerAR Army RegulationsArmd ArmoredArty ArtilleryAT AntitankAtchd AttachedAtk AttackBailey bridge Portable steel bridge of the "through" type.

The roadway is supported by two maintrusses composed of ten-foot sections called"panels" pinned together to form a con-tinuous truss. Capacity may be increasedby adding extra trusses alongside the first,by adding an extra truss on top of the firstto make a second story, or by both means.

Bn BattalionBAR Browning automatic rifleBazooka Recoilless antitank rocket launcher, hand-

carriedBazooka pants Additional armor to protect tank tracks from

antitank fireBr BridgeBtry BatteryBurp gun A colloquial term applied by American troops

to German submachine guns of the MP(Maschinenpistole) 40 type

(C) CombatCCA Combat Command A, one of the major, flex-

ible combat formations in armored divisionsCCB Combat Command B, in armored divisionCCR Reserve Combat Command, in armored

divisionCE Corps of EngineersCG Commanding GeneralCml ChemicalCO Commanding OfficerCo CompanyCofS Chief of Staff

424 THREE BATTLES

Comdg CommandingComdr CommanderCom CommunicationsCP Command postD Day Target date for the beginning of a specific

military operationDiv DivisionEM Enlisted menEngr EngineerEquip EquipmentETHINT European Theater Historical Interview of

former German military personnelETO European Theater of OperationsEx Off Executive OfficerFA Field ArtilleryFahnenjunkerschule German officer candidate schoolFeldgericht Military tribunal of summary natureFO Field order; forward observerFUSA First United States ArmyG-1 Personnel officer or section of divisional or

higher staffG-2 Intelligence officer or sectionG-3 Operations officer or sectionG-4 Supply officer or sectionGp GroupGren GrenadierH Hour Exact minute for the beginning of a specific

military operationHist HistoricalHq HeadquartersHv HeavyInf InfantryInfo InformationInstn InstructionIntel IntelligenceInterv InterviewIPW Interrogation Prisoners of WarJnl JournalKampfgruppe German combat group of variable sizeKIA Killed in actionK ration One of several types of emergency field ra-

tionsKTB Kriegstagebuch (War Diary)Landesschuetzen German local security units, designed for

rear-area service but later pressed intofront-line duty.

Ldr LeaderLn Liaison

GLOSSARY 425

Lt Lieutenant; lightLtr Letter(M) MediumM-4 (Sherman) American medium tankM-10 (Tank Destroyer) American vehicle, lightly armored, mounting

a 3-inch gun, highly maneuverableM-18 (Tank Destroyer) Same as M-10 but mounting a 76-mm. gunM-20 (Smoke Generator) A generator for making smoke from fuel oil

under combat conditionsM-29 (Weasel) Tracked, lightly armored cargo carrierMAAF Mediterranean Allied Air ForceMAC Medical Administrative CorpsMachine pistol German submachine gun, known to Amer-

ican troops as a "burp gun"Mark IV German medium tankMark V (Panther) German heavy tankMark VI (Tiger) German heavy tankMATAF Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air ForceMed Medical; MediterraneanMIA Missing in actionMID Military Intelligence DivisionMLR Main line of resistanceMm. MillimeterMsg MessageMtr MotorNachrichtenschule Signal schoolNCO Noncommissioned officerOB WEST Oberbefehlshaber West (Highest German

ground headquarters on the WesternFront)

OCMH Office of the Chief of Military HistoryOff OfficerOKW Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Armed Forces

High Command)OP Observation postOpn OperationPanther German Mark V heavy tankPanzerfaust Recoilless German antitank rocket, hand-

carried. A "one-shot" weapon.Pcht ParachutePL Public LawPlat PlatoonPon PontonPz PanzerRAF Royal Air ForceRcn ReconnaissanceRegt RegimentRet Retired

426 THREE BATTLES

Rpt ReportS-1 Personnel officer or section of regimental or

lower staffS-2 Intelligence officer or sectionS-3 Operations officer or sectionS-4 Supply officer or sectionSCR Signal Corps radioSec SectionSG Smoke GeneratorSherman American medium tank, M-4Sit Rpt Situation ReportS-mine German antipersonnel mineSP Self-propelledSS See Waffen-SS.Subj SubjectSum SummaryT-2 retriever Tank recovery vehicle of the M-31 seriesTAG Tactical Air CommandTD Tank destroyerTdwy TreadwayTeller mine German antitank mineTF Task forceTiger German Mark VI heavy tankTk TankTns TrainsTOT Time on target, a method of timing artillery

fire from various points to fall on a giventarget simultaneously.

Tp TelephoneTrps TroopsTUSA Third United States ArmyUSAAF United States Army Air ForceUSAF United States Air ForceWaffen-SS Combat arm of the SS (Schutzstaffel—Elite

Guard); in effect a partial duplication ofthe German Army.

Weasel (M-29) Tracked, lightly armored cargo carrierWIA Wounded in actionWpns Weapons

Basic Military Map Symbols*Symbols within a rectangle indicate a military unit, within a

triangle an observation post, and within a circle a supply point.

Military Units—Identification

Antiaircraft Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Armored Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Army A i r Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Artillery, except Antiaircraft a n d Coast Artillery . . . . . . .

Cavalry, Horse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cavalry, Mechanized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chemical Warfare Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Coast Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Infantry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Medical Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ordnance Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Quartermaster Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Signal Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Tank Destroyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Transportation Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Veterinary Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Airborne units are designated by combining a gull wing symbolwith the arm or service symbol:

Airborne Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Airborne Infantry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

*For complete listing of symbols see FM 21-30, from which these are taken.

428 THREE BATTLES

Size SymbolsThe following symbols placed either in boundary lines or above

the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying arm or servicesymbol indicate the size of military organization:

Squad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Platoon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Company, troop, battery, A i r Force flight . . . . . . . . . .

Battalion, cavalry squadron, o r A i r Force squadron . . . . . .

Regiment or group; combat team (with abbreviation CT followingidentifying numeral) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division, or Air Force Wing .

Division o r Command o f a n A i r Force . . . . . . . . . . .

Corps o r A i r Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Group o f Annies . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

EXAMPLES

The letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the unitdesignation; that to the right, the designation of the parent unit to whichit belongs. Letters or numbers above or below boundary lines designatethe units separated by the lines:

Company A , 137th Infantry . . . . . . . . . . . .

8 t h Field Artillery Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . .

Combat Command A , 1 s t Armored Division . . . . . .

Observation Post, 2 3 d Infantry . . . . . . . . . . .

Command Post, 5 t h Infantry Division . . . . . . . .

Boundary between 137th a n d 138th Infantry . . . . .

WeaponsMachine g u n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

G u n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

G u n battery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Howitzer o r Mortar . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Self-propelled g u n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press:

The War DepartmentChief of Staff: Prewar Plans and PreparationsWashington Command Post: The Operations DivisionStrategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945The Army and Economic MobilizationThe Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground ForcesThe Organization of Ground Combat TroopsThe Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service ForcesThe Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

The Western HemisphereThe Framework of Hemisphere DefenseGuarding the United States and Its Outposts

The War in the PacificThe Fall of the PhilippinesGuadalcanal: The First OffensiveVictory in PapuaCARTWHEEL: The Reduction of RabaulSeizure of the Gilberts and MarshallsCampaign in the MarianasThe Approach to the PhilippinesLeyte: The Return to the PhilippinesTriumph in the PhilippinesOkinawa: The Last BattleStrategy and Command: The First Two Years

The Mediterranean Theater of OperationsNorthwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the WestSicily and the Surrender of ItalySalerno to CassinoCassino to the Alps

The European Theater of OperationsCross-Channel AttackBreakout and PursuitThe Lorraine CampaignThe Siegfried Line CampaignThe Ardennes: Battle of the BulgeThe Last OffensiveThe Supreme Command

430 THREE BATTLES

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume ILogistical Support of the Armies, Volume II

The Middle East TheaterThe Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India TheaterStilwell's Mission to ChinaStilwell's Command ProblemsTime Runs Out in CBI

The Technical ServicesThe Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for WarThe Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to FieldThe Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in CombatThe Corps of Engineers: Troops and EquipmentThe Corps of Engineers: The War Against JapanThe Corps of Engineers: The War Against GermanyThe Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United StatesThe Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of InteriorThe Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor

TheatersThe Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of OperationsThe Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for WarThe Ordnance Department: Procurement and SupplyThe Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and BattlefrontThe Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume IThe Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume IIThe Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against JapanThe Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against GermanyThe Signal Corps: The EmergencyThe Signal Corps: The TestThe Signal Corps: The OutcomeThe Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and OperationsThe Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and SupplyThe Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

Special StudiesChronology: 1941-1945Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945Rearming the FrenchThree Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and SchmidtThe Women's Army CorpsCivil Affairs: Soldiers Become GovernorsBuying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air ForcesThe Employment of Negro TroopsManhattan: The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb

Pictorial RecordThe War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent AreasThe War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent AreasThe War Against Japan

Index

Aachen: 251Abbéville: 6Adams, Pvt. Hamilton: 158Adams, S. Sgt. Joseph S.: 195Adler, Pvt. Karl: 213Aerial photographs: 56, 252, 255Aid stations. See Medical aid men.Air attack. See Air squadrons; Air support.Air commands. See Tactical Air Commands.Air observation: 30, 125, 174, 206, 225, 254, 299Air reconnaissance: 132, 272. See also Aerial photo-

graphs.Air squadrons. See also Fighter Bomber groups;

Fighter-bombers.23d: 38, 52396th: 302397th: 308406th: 83492d: 61, 75512th: 60

Air support: 28, 30, 38, 38n, 52, 60, 61, 75, 83,125-28, 135, 135n, 178, 207, 239, 253, 272, 275,292, 294, 302-03, 308, 315, 319-20, 339-41,356-57, 357n, 369, 385-86, 389-91, 397, 404-05,416. See also Bombing; P-47's; Strafing.

Air-identification panels: 17, 308, 356Albert, Pfc. Hubert G.: 138, 220Albritton, Pfc. Leslie H.: 153, 163Allen, Sgt. Walton R.: 304, 310, 311Allison, Lt. Col. Leslie: 6, 14, 14n, 20, 30Amanvillers: 8, 13Ambush: 57, 57n, 330, 337-38, 372Ammunition. See also Artillery, ammunition; Short-

ages, ammunition.armor-piercing: 308, 336, 376, 398individual allotment: 54, 141, 177, 179, 210

Ancy-sur-Moselle: 7, 12, 13, 35Anderson, 1st Lt. Carl A., Jr.: 337, 343, 345-47,

355-57Anderson, Capt. Lewis R.: 59Anderson, 1st Lt. William A.: 360, 397, 404Andrews, Pfc. Walter A.: 79Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalions

447th: 253449th: 8

Anzio: 106Ardennes: 257, 417Armed Forces Operations Staff: 406nArmies, U. S.

First: 251-52, 253n, 254, 255, 343, 416Third: 3-4, 8, 28, 42, 52, 76Fifth: 103, 106, 132, 239Ninth: 416

Armored Divisions4th: 815th: 251, 378, 389, 4167th: 4, 5, 6, 8, 13, 14-16, 17-20, 21, 25n, 28, 80,

88, 89, 95Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 434th: 13, 17,

83n, 90Armored Infantry Battalion, 23d: 6, 7, 9, 12-20, 14n,

22, 23, 26, 32, 38, 39, 81, 83, 88, 90, 95Army Group, 12th: 52, 253nArnaville, terrain: 40Arno River: 106, 110Arry: 40-41, 42, 46, 47-55, 60, 77, 81-83, 87-93Ars-sur-Moselle: 7, 12, 75Artillery, American. See also Field Artillery Bat-

talions; Field Artillery Groups.adjustment of fire: 20, 183, 198, 238ammunition: 61, 76, 255blanket concentration: 17check concentration: 42, 46counterbattery fire: 61, 90, 164, 206, 254effect on enemy fortifications: 25, 30, 61, 239fires propaganda leaflets: 239-40forward displacement of: 28harassing fire: 134, 135, 170, 178, 183, 198, 203,

206, 215, 225, 377, 404liaison officers: 20, 25n, 42, 169, 259, 355liaison planes: 30, 67observation: 46, 47, 53, 60, 61, 64, 77, 164, 169,

170, 203, 269, 297, 307, 369plans: 41-42, 62, 90-92, 111-20, 164, 176-78, 206,

253, 254, 257preparation: 16, 42, 90-92, 93, 177, 178, 206, 254,

259, 382registration of fire: 339, 404request for: 28, 75, 76, 120, 124-25, 297, 297nshort rounds: 25, 25n, 26, 171, 188-91, 195,

215-16, 353-54smoke: 253, 389, 397-98support: 16, 26, 36, 41, 60, 61, 77, 79, 83, 90-92,

164-66, 169-71, 177-78, 182-83, 253, 268, 275,285, 338-39, 369, 377, 404

tank hull guns used as direct fire artillery: 277TOT: 125, 135, 164, 175, 178, 198, 203, 225, 300,

339, 377, 40457-mm. antitank: 20, 55, 57, 57n, 60, 77, 84, 258,

291, 291n, 336, 342, 34375-mm. tank guns: 38276-mm. tank destroyer guns: 198105-mm. howitzers: 111, 177, 183, 206, 253155-mm. howitzers: 111, 125, 164, 169-70, 183,

253, 307155-mm. guns: 84, 111, 253, 307

432 THREE BATTLES

Artillery, American—Continued240-mm. howitzers: 60, 111, 177, 183, 198, 2064.5-inch guns: 111, 2538-inch guns: 60, 177, 182, 198, 206, 253

Artillery, German: 12-13, 59, 61, 62, 65, 67, 72-77,81-83, 84-86, 88, 93, 94, 117-20, 135, 174, 259,281, 297, 301, 318, 335, 343, 344, 354, 367, 374,382

Assault boats: 7, 16-20, 28, 35, 36-37, 40, 41, 44, 46,50, 56, 62, 70, 81. See also Ferrying operations.

Attack plansarmy: 103-04corps: 3-4, 88, 89-90, 107, 133, 176, 251-52division: 8-9, 13-14, 80-81, 90, 253-55, 416regiment: 8-9, 109-11, 176-78, 203, 204-05, 256,

257-59, 268, 284battalion: 16, 42-43, 93, 107, 112, 113, 130, 207,

236, 257-58, 352company: 23, 135-36, 140-41, 262platoon: 122-23, 213

Attack plans, German: 23, 35Augny: 22, 25-26

Babbitt, Pfc. Edward J., Jr.: 163Babbitt, Pvt. Raymond M.: 160Bagnola: 128Bailey bridge: 72, 84Baker, Maj. Willard B.: 359, 360Ball, Capt. Sam H., Jr.: 360, 364-65, 382Balog, Pvt. George: 189Bane, Capt. Frank P.: 379, 380Banks, Pvt. Waymon A.: 186, 188, 197les Baraques: 39Barbed wire: 23, 105, 106, 109, 128, 129, 130, 138,

139, 140, 146, 147, 148-49, 151, 154, 156, 157,158, 160, 161, 162, 163, 170, 174, 179, 181, 184,194, 195, 197, 200, 210, 211, 222

Barbuto, 1st Lt. Rocco J.: 57nBarco: 135, 174, 206, 207, 225, 238Barnett, 2d Lt. Wayne E.: 400Barrilleaux, 1st Lt. Melvin: 335, 345, 353Barrow, Pfc. Joseph T.: 158, 169Bart, Sgt. Henry: 266-67Barton, Sgt. Jack L.: 295, 306Base of fire: 263, 280, 350, 382Battle fatigue. See Combat fatigue.Battle School at Cucciano: 224Baughn, 2d Lt. Jack H.: 361Bayonets: 47, 186, 338Bayonville: 40, 42, 64Bazooka: 47, 51, 52, 54, 62, 77, 79, 84, 153, 174, 190,

232, 291, 297, 300, 307, 308, 374"Bazooka pants": 26Beazley, Pvt. Marvin D.: 138Beck, S. Sgt. Edward J.: 266Becker, Pfc. Ernst H.: 228Beckes, T. Sgt. Carl: 325Beggs, 1st Lt. Clifton W.: 353, 354

Bell, Col. Robert P.: 40-41, 52, 54, 76, 93Benner, Pfc. Zemro F.: 214Bergstein: 252, 262, 272, 281, 286, 335, 341, 342, 346,

352, 357, 363, 369, 385, 398, 404, 417. See alsoBrandenberg-Bergstein ridge.

Berndt, Maj. Albert L.: 259n, 401, 403, 403n,407-09, 411n

Bertani, Pfc. Joseph F.: 163, 171Beverage, Pfc. Kenny R.: 140, 148Bills, S. Sgt. Cline: 79Birdsong, Maj. William H.: 55-59, 79Bishop, Pfc. Randolph H.: 191, 195Bitney, 1st Lt. Raymond W.: 36Blanchard, 1st Lt. James C., Jr.: 94Boats, rubber reconnaissance: 35, 36-37Bodine, Maj. William W., Jr.: 314, 354, 356Bois des Anneaux: 41Bois des Chevaux: 6Bois le Comte: 90-93Bois de Gaumont: 50, 59, 77, 79Bois des Ognons: 6Bombing: 38, 38-39n, 52, 75, 83, 109, 128, 135n,

165, 174, 302-03, 308. See also Air support.of dams: 75of friendly troops: 272-74, 385-86, 389

Borders, 2d Lt. Ray M.: 323Borum, Pvt. Albert C., Jr.: 187, 188-89Bosselbach Farm: 284, 339, 414Boston, Pfc. Marion L.: 140Boulden, Lt. Col. Marion P.: 203Boylan, Lt. Col. Vincent L.: 5Brandenberg: 252, 253, 262, 286, 335, 339, 342, 346,

352, 357, 363, 369, 385, 416, 417Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge: 252, 253, 262, 286,

335, 342, 346, 357, 363, 385, 416, 417Brandenberger Wald: 369Brest: 28, 30, 52, 61Bretal, Sgt. Alexander: 393Brice, Sgt. John D.: 160Bridges

Bailey bridge: 72, 75, 86double treadway: 72floating: 70steel truss: 70submerged: 62treadway: 20, 74, 81

Bridging operations, 9-14 September: 63-86British units. See also Royal Air Force.

Army, Eighth: 103, 106Corps, 13: 240

Brodeur, Pvt. William C.: 149-53Brooks, 1st Lt. Mack L.: 238Brown, T. Sgt. Audney S.: 261Brown, Pfc. Donald J.: 157Brown, S. Sgt. Hugh C.: 140, 147-48, 163Brown, 1st Lt. Robert: 93Brumbaugh, 1st Lt. David M.: 193-95, 234Buechler, Pfc. Edwin L.: 187Bulldozers: 71, 72, 165, 289, 313, 328, 329, 330

INDEX 433

Bunkers: 104-05, 128-29, 138, 146-47, 148, 150-51,185, 198, 199, 217, 219, 226-27, 229-30, 234-36,237, 239. See also Pillboxes.

Burja, Pfc. Michael: 190Burnett, Pfc. Willie: 182Burril, 2d Lt. Gerald M.: 269Burp gun. See Machine pistol.Bury, Pvt. Frank: 211, 234Buttlar-Brandenfels, von, Horst Freiherr Treusch:

406nBuxières: 6, 8, 9

Calley, Pfc. Joseph: 334Camouflage, German: 31, 105, 128, 146, 147, 213,

214, 227, 232-33, 369. See also Deception,German.

Campbell, Pvt. Louis S.: 158Cannon, S. Sgt. Leo L.: 330Carlson, 1st Lt. Eugene S.: 262-63Carr, 1st Lt. Francis L.: 46Carter, Pvt. Edmond H.: 117Cascarano, S. Sgt. Charles W.: 305n, 335, 345, 353Casemates: 24. See also Bunkers; Pillboxes.Casey, 1st Sgt. Volley: 158Casualties. See also Medical aid men; Wounded,

evacuation of.comparison between German and American: 415by friendly fire: 25, 25n, 171, 188-91, 215summary of: 414-15, 415ntrench foot: 397

Casualties, nonbattle: 415, 415n. See also Combatfatigue.

Catlett, Pfc. John E.: 156Cavalry Groups

4th: 252, 254102d: 314, 362

Cetel, Pfc. Harold: 140, 148Chafin, T. Sgt. Harry O.: 57, 57nChambley: 6, 41Charron, Pfc. Raymond J.: 139Chemical Battalion, 86th: 253, 258, 339, 382Chemical (Smoke Generator) Companies

84th: 8, 42, 61, 63-67, 74, 74n, 134-35, 178161st: 67

le Chêne: 7, 12-13, 14, 17, 30Chmura, Capt. W. M.: 307Christensen, Maj. R. C.: 327, 376-77Christian, S. Sgt. George A.: 354Church, Capt. Ferris: 23-25, 27Cipra, S. Sgt. Benjamin A. P., Jr.: 379Clark, Lt. Gen. Mark W.: 109, 204, 289Clarke, 2d Lt. John J.: 277, 304, 310, 324Clarke, Pfc. Vincent C.: 157, 159Claugh, Sgt. Arthur: 355-56Clay, 1st Lt. Roberts: 170-71Cohn, Pvt. Bruce: 234Cole, Lt. Col. Robert H.: 109, 110, 113, 125, 204Cole, Capt. Sidney C.: 314Colegrove, Capt. Eldon B.: 28

Collinaccia: 128, 165, 207Collins, Pvt. Ray C.: 121, 122, 123, 124, 184Cologne: 274Column

of battalions: 268, 276of companies: 268-69, 283of files: 181, 183, 186, 193, 195, 213, 214-15, 216,

221, 222, 232, 326, 364of platoons: 179, 181, 207, 262, 360of squads. See Squad columns.of threes: 236of twos: 136, 267

Combat CommandsA, 7th Armored Division: 6, 7, 8, 13, 81, 88B, 7th Armored Division: 6-9, 13-17, 21, 39,

80-83, 88-93, 95R, 7th Armored Division: 6, 7, 13, 95

Combat fatigue: 38, 56, 67, 87, 89, 121, 122, 163,168, 179, 197, 209, 210, 255, 266, 325, 335, 343,345. See also Morale.

Combat teams2d Infantry: 17, 81, 8811th Infantry: 8-9

Communications: 32, 44, 53, 62, 109, 130, 135,135-36, 140, 143, 158, 171-72, 173, 189, 206,286, 297, 297n, 320, 320n, 327, 335, 362, 382.See also Radio; SCR's; Telephones.

Concertina barbed wire: 147Concealment: 30, 40, 46, 47, 52, 53, 65, 75, 117, 123,

124, 129, 139, 159, 160, 161, 183, 184, 185, 187,194, 195, 299

Condon, 1st Lt. James A.: 266-67, 345, 354Cook, Sgt. John B.: 314, 363, 385, 386Corey, 1st Lt. William S.: 179-84, 185, 186-91, 193,

194-97, 208, 220, 221Corniolo: 128, 174Corny: 12, 22-23, 25, 37, 38, 41, 47, 53-59, 57n, 79,

83, 84, 87, 89, 90Corps, II: 103-04, 107, 109, 110, 111, 125, 131-33,

164, 173, 174-77, 204, 215-16, 239, 240Corps, V: 251, 251n, 252-53, 253n, 257, 259, 293,

343, 362, 373, 389, 413, 416, 416nCorps, VII: 251-52, 253-57, 259, 343, 416Corps, VIII: 414, 415Corps, XII: 8, 27, 28, 40, 52, 59Corps, XX: 3-5, 3n, 8-9, 14, 21, 27, 30, 52, 59, 81,

90, 95Cota, Maj. Gen. Norman D.: 251, 255, 271n, 311,

313, 323, 327, 332, 338, 343, 361, 362, 375n,380, 389

Côte de Faye: 41-43, 54, 57-59, 84, 89Cottingham, Lt. Col. Levin B.: 63-64, 67, 74nCoulter, Maj. Gen. John B.: 104, 203Cover: 12, 20, 28, 46, 47, 50, 53, 61, 72, 74, 75, 79,

93, 120, 123, 124, 139, 140, 148, 154, 156, 157,160, 161, 168, 185, 194, 223, 227, 237, 285, 329,334, 365, 366

Crain, Capt. Charles L.: 345Crayton, Sgt. Arch H.: 35

434 THREE BATTLES

Crayton, Cpl. J. W.: 384Creegan, Capt. Thomas F.: 379, 396Crespi, Pfc. Angelo F.: 159Cucciano, Battle School at: 224Culpepper, T. Sgt. Thomas A.: 139Cuppeli, 1st Lt. Ralph R.: 54

Daley, Col. Edmund K.: 313, 336n, 338, 357-59, 361Dams: 74, 75, 251, 251-52n, 255, 257Dana, Maj. Richard A.: 327, 375, 378, 389D'Anillo, S. Sgt. Carmine F.: 77Davis, Brig. Gen. George A.: 307, 309, 310, 328, 356,

357-58, 359, 361, 362, 363, 364, 386, 388, 389,393, 396, 399, 401

Davis, S. Sgt. Herbert H.: 138Davis, 1st Lt. Howard O.: 315, 337, 343, 345-46,

347, 356, 363, 388-89, 397Davis, Capt. William B.: 46, 51Deception, German: 25, 31, 149, 187, 196, 228,

379-80. See also Camouflage.Defense positions, American: 26, 47-51, 54, 57-59,

83, 87, 93, 94, 95, 129, 148, 154, 155, 157-58,159, 160-61, 169, 170, 193-94, 219, 221, 222,230, 233, 234-36, 262, 265-66, 268, 272, 283,284, 284n, 290, 291, 297, 305-06, 306, 309, 310,320, 321, 326, 328, 347-48, 352, 356, 356n, 357,360, 361-62, 364, 365-66, 377, 379, 380, 389,392, 394

Defense positions, German: 4-5, 7, 23-24, 54, 103,104-06, 109, 110, 112, 123, 124, 131-32, 140-41,146, 173-74, 184-85, 193, 198, 199, 216, 217,223, 225, 226-27, 238, 240, 257, 293, 342, 369,372, 414

De Marco, Capt. Michael: 303, 409Devine, Brig. Gen. John M.: 88Di Castro Hill: 165Di Fabbio, Pvt. George J.: 162Di Loreto, Capt. Panfilo C.: 34Di Pictro, Cpl. Emidio: 57nDickey, Pfc. George T.: 27Diersing, 2d Lt. John A.: 26Dille, 1st Lt. Eugene N.: 52, 54, 54nDirection, loss of: 143, 147, 339, 364, 387Distel, Pvt. Jules D.: 151Dodson, Pfc. Wilbur H.: 50Doherty, Capt. Henry R.: 310Dornot bridgehead: 3-39Dorris, Pvt. James S.: 185, 197Dozier, S. Sgt. Charles J.: 158, 159, 160, 162, 168Drake, 1st Lt. Nathan F.: 20, 23Dubuisson, Lt. Col. James G.: 6Dueren: 251, 257Duffey, Sgt. Loyd J.: 190Dutko, 1st Lt. George: 46, 47, 60, 77, 93

Edmund, 1st Lt. Curtis M.: 315, 326, 330, 374-75Einem, von, Col. Kurt: 54n

Liston, Pfc. Russell G.: 211, 214Engineer Combat Battalions

7th: 70, 72n20th: 253, 254, 286, 338, 357, 377103d: 288n, 357146th: 253, 357, 359, 361, 373, 382, 388, 413, 416150th: 28160th: 56, 70, 75204th: 37, 41, 70294th: 252310th: 1651340th: 253, 357, 361, 372

Engineer Combat Groups1103d: 8, 20, 28, 41, 63, 70, 72, 861171st: 253, 253n, 254-55, 357, 359, 379, 413

Engineer plans: 20, 41-42, 44, 72, 254 55, 382Engineers: 254-55, 327-28, 333-34. See also Engi-

neer units.act as riflemen: 357-62

Equipment: 75, 113, 122, 141, 415. See also Supplies.Equipment Co., 623d Light: 70Erkman, 1st Lt. George O.: 156, 157Erlenbusch, Lt. Col. Robert C.: 6, 90Eschweiler (Meroder Wald): 251n

Faller, Pvt. Murray C.: 138Fankell, Pfc. Kenneth L.: 187Farber, 1st Lt. Dawson L., Jr.: 169, 189, 215Farino, Pfc. Joseph: 121, 184Feeney, Pfc. Richard M.: 187Feldman, Capt. Emanuel: 34Fent, Sgt. Richard E.: 209-11, 213, 227, 229-30, 232Ferrying operations: 21, 41, 44, 55, 56, 70. See also

Assault boats.Fey: 83Field Artillery Battalions

19th: 8, 13, 17, 2721st: 1746th: 17, 41, 42, 5376th: 253107th: 253108th: 253, 300, 307109th: 253229th: 253, 254, 268, 285, 299, 305, 307, 320, 321,

338, 355, 369, 377, 404284th: 17, 28328th: 111329th: 111, 125, 164, 183, 189, 190, 198, 225403d: 111, 125, 135, 170, 178, 183, 197, 198, 203,

206, 225, 238558th: 17

Field Artillery Groups178th: 111, 125, 164, 170, 206, 224-25187th: 253188th: 253190th: 253203d: 92423d: 111

INDEX 435

Field OrdersXX Corps: 4, 8928th Infantry Division: 406

Fifth Army: 175, 223Fighter Bomber Groups

365th: 272, 325, 339-41, 369, 385, 389, 404366th: 272368th: 272370th: 272, 389371st: 83406th: 52474th: 272, 339, 369, 398, 404, 405

Fighter-bombers: 52, 54, 165. See also Fighter-Bomber Groups.

Finkle, Pvt. Richard E.: 121, 124Firenzuola: 125, 128, 132, 135, 141, 165, 174, 178,

201, 206, 224-25, 240First aid: 163, 189. See also Medical aid men.Fisher, Pfc. Kermit C.: 213, 228Flak: 339Flak tank: 22nFlame throwers: 141nFlank security: 17, 28, 35, 42, 170, 205, 220, 222,

230, 251, 254, 258, 264, 266, 276, 306, 373, 393Fleig, 1st Lt. Raymond E.: 295, 303-04, 306, 307-09,

310-11, 321-23, 325, 329, 350, 400Fléville: 6Flood, Lt. Col. Albert: 291, 303, 307, 327Florence: 110Fog: 90, 92, 93, 94, 256Fog oil: 65, 70Fonte Fredda: 107Footbridges: 44, 81Ford, S. Sgt. William E.: 167, 168, 169Fort Driant: 7, 12, 13, 25n, 35, 41, 80, 84, 95Fort Jeanne d'Arc: 13, 80Fort Marival: 13, 80Fort St. Blaise: 12, 13, 16, 17, 30, 38, 41, 52, 83

advance to: 23-27Fort Sommy: 12, 16, 17, 23, 30, 38, 41, 52, 83Fortress Metz: 3, 4-5Franco-Prussian War: 4Frear, Capt. Seth R.: 374Froitscheidt: 281, 357Fuller, 1st Lt. Jack W.: 314, 323, 331, 337-38, 372,

388Fuller, Lt. Col. William H. G.: 90Futa Pass: 103, 109, 140, 173, 175, 207

G-2: 4, 255, 343, 371. See also Intelligence.G-2 Periodic Reports: 343G-3 Periodic Reports: 362-63Gardner, Lewis: 376Garigliano River: 110Garlitch, Pfc. John C.: 162Garner, S. Sgt. Jay E.: 187, 188-89, 191Gasoline shortage: 3-5, 61Gearhart, T/5 Charles R.: 29Gemuend: 341, 404

George, 1st Lt. William: 303, 324, 329-31, 369, 403,407, 409n

German unitsArmy, Fifth Panzer: 274Army, Seventh: 274, 293, 318, 319, 415nArmy, Tenth: 106, 132, 175, 201, 224, 240Army, Fourteenth: 106, 109, 132, 175, 201, 224, 240Army Group B: 257, 274, 275, 318, 406Army Group C: 109, 201, 224, 240Battalion, 4th Antitank: 173, 200Battalion, 1st, 12th Parachute Regiment: 173-74, 200,

223, 224, 225Battalion, 2d, 12th Parachute Regiment: 174, 193, 200,

225Battalion, 3d, 12th Parachute Regiment: 174, 193, 200,

225Battalion, 18th Luftwaffe Fortress: 372nBattalion, 20th Luftwaffe Fortress: 372nBattalion, 1st, 37th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment: 26,

30Battalion, 2d, 37th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment:

22-23, 25, 30, 34, 38nBattalion, 3d, 37th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment: 31Battalion, 4th, 37th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment: 30Battalion, 1st, 60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment: 371Battalion, 2d, 60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment: 318n,

371Battalion, 103d Tank: 80Battalion, 208th Replacement and Training: 26, 31Battalion, 282d Infantry ("Battalion Voss"): 22-23,

31, 54, 80Battalion, 2d, 1055th Regiment: 293, 318Battalion, 3d, 1055th Regiment: 293, 318Battalion, 253d Engineer: 372nBattalion, 600th Army Engineer: 372nBattalion Berg. See Battalion, SS Signal School Metz-Battalion, 1st, Grenadier Lehr Brigade: 175, 201Battalion, 2d, Grenadier Lehr Brigade: 175, 201, 224,

240Battalion, Reconnaissance, 116th Panzer Division: 319,

341, 372, 391Battalion, SS Signal School Metz ("Battalion Berg"):

5n, 22, 23, 25, 26, 31, 80Battalion Voss. See Battalion, 282d Infantry.Brigade, Grenadier Lehr: 106, 106n, 132, 223-24, 224,

225, 240Corps, I Parachute: 106, 132, 175, 201, 224, 240Corps, XIII SS: 54, 54nCorps, XIV Panzer: 175Corps, XXXVII Panzer: 54Corps, LXXIV: 274, 318, 415nDivision, 3d Panzer Grenadier: 4, 54, 55n, 60, 80Division, 4th Parachute: 106, 175, 200, 223, 240Division, 5th Panzer Grenadier: 80Division, 12th Volks Grenadier: 257, 318Division, 15th Panzer Grenadier: 4, 80Division, 16th SS Panzer Grenadier: 109, 132, 201, 224Division, 17th SS Panzer Grenadier ("Goetz von

Berlichingen"): 4, 5, 22, 60, 80

436 THREE BATTLES

German units—ContinuedDivision, 89th Infantry: 257, 318-19, 318n, 341-42,

341n, 372, 405-06, 414, 415n, 416Division, 116th Panzer: 257, 274, 293, 372, 414, 416Division, 272d Volks Grenadier: 257, 293, 342Division, 275th Infantry: 257, 280-81, 292, 318, 342,

372, 392, 414Division, 362d Grenadier: 109Division, 347th Infantry: 318Division Number 462: 3n, 4, 5n, 22, 26, 31, 54, 80Regiment, 8th Panzer Grenadier: 54Regiment, 12th Parachute: 106, 110, 132, 173, 174,

198, 200, 224, 240Regiment, 16th Panzer: 293, 318, 319, 319n, 341,

372, 391Regiment, 37th SS Panzer Grenadier: 22, 30-31, 34, 35Regiment, 60th Panzer Grenadier: 341, 342, 372, 391Regiment, 115th Panzer Grenadier: 59, 80Regiment, 156th Panzer Grenadier: 318-19, 342, 371,

391Regiment, 1010 Security: 5nRegiment, 1055th: 293, 318n, 341, 341n, 372, 391Regiment, 1056th: 318, 318n, 319, 341n, 342, 372, 391Regiment, Artillery Lehr: 174

Germeter, terrain: 252Gerow, Brig. Gen. Lee S.: 203-05, 223, 236Gerow, Lt. Gen. Leonard T.: 416, 416nGerrie, Capt. Jack S.: 27, 35, 36Getty, Pvt. Donald M.: 185Giogo Pass, il: 103, 109, 125-28, 131-35, 140-41,

164-65, 173-75, 178, 198, 201-04, 206-07,223-25, 226, 234, 236, 238-39, 240

Gorze: 6, 7, 9, 14, 17, 28, 39Golenstellung. See Gothic Line.Gothic Line: 103, 103n, 104, 106, 109-10, 112, 131,

164, 176-77, 200, 204, 223, 239-40Granger, Capt. George S.: 336, 346-47, 355-56, 363,

382, 385Gravelotte: 6-7, 12Gray, S. Sgt. Donald O.: 385Gray, 2d Lt. Henry R.: 348"Green Line": 103nGreenberg, 2d Lt. Karl: 44Greene, 1st Lt. Jack B.: 276, 283, 328. See also

Greene Hornets."Greene Hornet Switch": 328, 335Greene Hornets: 276, 283, 328. See also Greene, 1st

Lt. Jack B.Gregory, Pfc. Charles F.: 221Gresham, 2d Lt. Harry R.: 113-25, 128, 179-86, 188,

189, 190-94, 196-97Griffin, S. Sgt. Leslie W.: 77Grigsby, Sgt. Gordon K.: 220Gritzmacher, T. Sgt. George A.: 37Grosshau: 342, 389Gubitosi, Pvt. Subastian D.: 187Gustav Line: 110Guy, 1st Lt. Robert B.: 47Guy, Pvt. Willie L.: 154

Hackard, Capt. Clifford T.: 269, 271, 374Hallowell, 1st Lt. William H.: 53, 77Hamlett, Cpl. Thomas W.: 367Hand grenades

American: 46, 51, 129, 141, 150, 156, 162, 167-68,169, 179, 184, 185, 188, 210, 211, 214, 216, 227,230, 232, 234, 237, 263, 265, 283, 365, 376, 384

German: 57, 59, 138, 139, 148, 155, 156, 163, 169,185, 186, 187, 188, 193, 211-13, 221, 227, 228,229, 232, 237, 360

Hand signals: 382Hankes, 1st Lt. Clemens M.: 148, 153, 154-55Hansen, 1st Lt. Carl E.: 51Harpin, Pfc. Lucien: 156Harris, Capt. George A.: 311Harris, 1st Lt. Leo E.: 46, 47Harscheidt: 281, 290, 293, 297-300, 300n, 352, 355,

369, 404Hasenfeld: 282, 290, 297-300, 300n, 318Hatzfeld, Lt. Col. Theodore S.: 335, 353, 355, 359Haughey, Maj. Wilfrid H., Jr.: 42, 46, 53Hazam, 1st Lt. Mitchell J.: 79Hazlett, Maj. Robert T.: 268, 269, 284, 284n, 327,

375Heidrich, Generalleutnant Richard: 224Heimbach: 272, 339Heliker, Maj. Sherburne J.: 109Hembree, Sgt. Claud W.: 26, 27, 37Herndon, Pvt. William B.: 167Hickman, Pvt. James R.: 139Highway 65: 103, 110Highway 6524: 103-04, 107, 110, 115, 131, 132, 133,

143, 165, 176, 178, 200, 204, 239Hill 325: 41, 43, 50, 51, 57, 77, 79, 83, 89Hill 360: 178Hill 366: 35Hill 369: 41-43, 47, 50, 54, 60, 75, 87, 88Hill 370: 41, 43, 50-51, 59, 67, 75, 77-79, 83, 87, 88Hill 385: 81, 90, 92Hill 386: 41-43, 46-50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 60, 67, 77, 87,

88, 93, 94Hill 396: 41, 83, 88, 90, 92, 93-94Hill 400: 90-92, 95Hill 577: 115Hill 578: 105, 109Hill 606: 115-17, 130, 136Hill 624: 105, 122-23, 142, 178, 179, 181, 194, 207,

213, 221Hill 782: 105-06, 109, 117, 121-30, 134, 136-38, 139,

140, 141, 142, 143, 146, 148, 172, 179-84, 190-97,207, 208-15, 217, 220, 221-23

Hill 844: 133, 176Hill 862: 134Hill 926: 105, 109, 110, 115, 117, 123, 124, 130, 134,

135, 136, 141-42, 143-46, 164, 176, 177-79,181, 183, 185, 193, 194, 197-98, 203, 204-05,206, 208, 217-23, 226-28, 229-39

Hill 1029: 135, 226Hill 1041: 226

INDEX 437

Hillier, S. Sgt. Stanley G.: 123Hillyard, 1st Lt. Johnny R.: 31Hinrichsen, Pfc. Carl E.: 187, 197Hinton, S. Sgt. Pat H.: 213Hip boots: 360, 360nHitler: 4Hoffman, Capt. John M: 33-34Hogan, Thomas E.: 32Holladay, 1st Lt. Charles T.: 129, 138, 208, 220Horn, 1st Lt. George E.: 289, 309-10, 313, 380"Horseshoe woods": 17, 22, 23, 25, 26, 30, 36Hostrup: Capt. Bruce: 288, 295, 295-96, 304, 310,

311, 324, 329, 342, 400Howard, Maj. Thomas L.: 75Howitzers. See Artillery.Huertgen Forest: 251, 251n, 252, 253, 254, 256-57,

258, 271-72, 274, 275, 283, 293, 315, 319, 389,391, 413-14

Huston, 2d Lt. Robert E.: 289, 296, 304, 309, 310, 313Huyck, Capt. John B.: 306

Identification panels: 17, 308, 356Infantry battalions

1st, 10th Infantry: 41, 42-43, 44, 51, 52, 53, 54,59, 60, 65, 70, 77, 87, 93

2d, 10th Infantry: 41, 43, 44, 50-51, 57, 59, 65,70, 77, 79, 87

3d, 10th Infantry: 40, 41, 52-53, 54-55, 56, 70,83, 87, 88, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95

1st, 11th Infantry: 9, 13, 34-35, 40, 80, 832d, 11th Infantry: 13-17, 14n, 20, 20n, 21, 24, 27,

28, 32, 33n, 38, 39, 80, 83, 883d, 11th Infantry: 8, 9, 13, 14n, 16, 17, 20, 21, 23,

29, 32, 34, 55-56, 57, 79, 84, 871st, 109th Infantry: 271-72, 291-92, 315, 371, 386,

387, 392, 397, 406, 4132d, 109th Infantry: 272, 292, 315, 339, 386, 388,

392, 397, 400, 4133d, 109th Infantry: 258, 272, 291-92, 386-87, 392,

393, 396, 400, 401, 406, 411, 411n, 4131st, 110th Infantry: 272, 292, 317, 339, 371, 4042d, 110th Infantry: 272, 292, 317, 339, 371, 4043d, 110th Infantry: 272, 292, 317, 326, 332, 339,

343, 349, 352, 366, 368, 368-69, 371, 373, 375,378, 387, 389, 392, 394

1st, 112th Infantry: 257, 258, 267-71, 274-76,283-85, 284n, 293, 294n, 306, 321, 327, 331, 343,350, 366, 372-73, 378, 392, 394, 397

2d, 112th Infantry: 256-58, 271, 274-77, 285-88,293-94, 305, 315, 320, 328, 336, 343, 344, 345,352-53, 359, 362, 363, 369, 373, 386, 392, 397

3d, 112th Infantry: 258, 268, 271, 274-76, 282-85,284n, 290, 293, 294n, 297, 303, 306-07, 315,319, 320n, 321, 324, 327, 329, 331, 343, 366, 369,372-73, 375, 378, 392, 394, 403, 409n, 411n

1st, 363d Infantry: 107, 2032d, 363d Infantry: 2033d, 363d Infantry: 107, 109, 111, 112, 113, 130, 203

1st, 338th Infantry: 110-13, 124, 130-31, 133-35,146, 169, 171, 174, 176, 181, 183, 189, 190, 194,198-99, 202, 203, 204, 205, 207-08, 215, 220,222-24, 227, 233, 234-36, 239

2d, 338th Infantry: 110, 113, 131, 133, 171, 173,200, 203, 204-05, 223, 238

3d, 338th Infantry: 110, 113, 133, 176, 181, 203,204, 205, 208, 219, 221, 222-23, 227, 234-39

Infantry Division, 4th: 371, 373, 404, 413Infantry Division, 5th: 4, 8-12, 13-14, 17, 20, 25n,

28, 30, 63, 70, 80-81, 88, 89-90, 92, 95Infantry Division, 9th: 251, 252, 253, 255, 274Infantry Division, 28th: 251-54, 252n, 255-57,

259, 268, 271-75, 284, 291-94, 302, 314, 317-18,319, 338, 343, 362, 372, 373, 378, 389, 391, 392,398, 406, 411n, 415, 415n, 416, 417

Infantry Division, 34th: 104, 107Infantry Division, 78th: 416-17Infantry Division, 80th: 8, 27Infantry Division, 85th: 104, 107-11, 125, 130, 131,

133, 141n, 142, 143-46, 164, 165, 173-76, 190,193, 198, 200-204

Infantry Division, 90th: 4, 7, 8, 80, 88, 89Infantry Division, 91st: 104, 107-10, 125, 131, 133,

136, 173, 176, 200, 203, 204, 239Infantry Regiments

2d: 8, 13, 80, 81, 89, 958th: 41410th: 13, 27, 29, 34-35, 40, 54, 56-61, 62, 63-65,

79, 87, 88, 93n, 9511th: 8, 13-14, 16, 21-22, 29, 30, 32, 35, 43, 55-59,

93n, 9512th: 371, 373, 386, 392, 404, 406, 413109th: 253, 256, 271-72, 274-75, 291-93, 313, 318,

320, 339, 341, 343, 362, 371-73, 372n, 386, 387,389, 392, 399, 404, 413-16

110th: 254-56, 268, 272, 275, 291-92, 294, 317,320, 326, 332, 336, 339, 342, 343, 350, 352, 357,359, 362, 372, 379, 386, 387, 389-92, 397, 404,406, 413, 414, 416

112th: 254-59, 268-71, 275-76, 286, 291, 293-94,304, 319-20, 335n, 338-39, 343, 346, 357, 359,368, 372-73, 378, 387, 389, 393, 404, 406, 407,413-16

337th: 133, 204, 239338th: 109-13, 124, 125, 130-34, 142-46, 164-65,

174, 176, 178, 194, 200-204, 206-07, 216, 225,239-40

339th: 110, 111, 131, 133, 143, 165, 173, 174, 176,199-200, 206, 223, 236, 239

361st: 176, 200363d: 104, 107-10, 125, 130-32, 141, 173, 176,

200, 203-04, 223Infantry supply: 329-30Infantry support rafts: 20, 70, 72, 75, 81Infiltration: 25, 60, 223, 234, 299, 305, 315, 318, 331,

338, 339, 343, 362, 365, 371, 375Intelligence: 4, 5, 13, 103, 110, 112, 132, 140-41,

149, 174, 190, 208, 255, 283

438 THREE BATTLES

Irwin, Maj. Gen. S. Le Roy: 8, 9, 13-14, 16, 27, 30,35, 40, 55, 76, 80-81, 83, 88

Isley, Lt. Col. Carl J.: 359, 360-61, 363-66, 381-82Iverson, Pfc. Walter W.: 313Izzo, 2d Lt. Louis J.: 337, 338

Jackson, Lt. Col. Willis O.: 109-21, 123-25, 130,133-34, 136, 140, 143, 157, 164, 169-73, 176,176n, 189-90, 194, 197, 202-03, 204-06, 207-08,215, 216, 219, 221-23, 225

Jenkins, S. Sgt. Paul F.: 264Jenski, T. Sgt. Walter E.: 51Johns, 2d Lt. Benjamin: 313, 333Johnson, 2d Lt. Clarence A.: 282, 385-86, 388, 409Johnson, Lt. Clyde R.: 354Johnson, Lt. Col. James R.: 42, 53, 76Johnson, 1st Lt. Loyd C.: 401Johnson, T. Sgt. Robert M.: 54-55Jones, Sgt. Harvey E.: 228Jones, Pfc. Ira: 153Jones, T. Sgt. Kenneth: 354Jordan, Pvt. Frank A.: 189Jouy-aux-Arches: 12, 16, 22, 23, 25, 34, 37Joyce, S. Sgt. Martin J.: 349

Kall River, described: 252Kall Trail, described: 288Katz, Capt. Morris: 336Kauffman, 1st Lt. Eldeen: 263, 264-65, 344, 345, 354Keathley, S. Sgt. George D.: 157-58, 167-68Kehaly, 1st Lt. William J.: 360, 364Kelley, Capt. Donald C.: 328, 329Kelley, Maj. Lysle E.: 110, 204, 236Kelsey, Sgt. William J.: 155, 157-58, 159, 162, 167,

169Kern, Pfc. Bud: 265Kessell, Pvt. Robert H.: 187Kesselring, Generalfeldmarschall Albert: 132, 201,

224, 240Keyes, Maj. Gen. Geoffrey: 104, 107, 109, 204King, Capt. Robert A.: 113-15, 117-20, 122-23, 124,

128-30, 135-40, 143, 176-79, 184, 189, 196, 197,207-08, 232

Kirkes, Sgt. Harvey E.: 154Kistner, S. Sgt. Robert W.: 220, 221Kleinhau: 252, 342, 416Klinginsmith, Cpl. James: 354Knob 1: 105, 184, 190-91, 193, 194, 195, 214-15,

217, 222Knob 2: 105, 146, 184-87, 188, 190-94, 196, 198,

215, 216-17, 220-21, 223Knob 3: 105, 134, 178, 228, 229, 230, 237-39Kohler, S. Sgt. William H.: 233Kommerscheidt, terrain: 252-53Koss, Pvt. Frederick: 148Krasman, 2d Lt. Albert J.: 208-09, 211, 215, 217,

219, 220-21, 227-28, 230, 233, 234Krause, Generalleutnant Walther: 3n

Krieder, T/4 James A.: 310, 331, 366Kruger, Pfc. Morris H.: 154, 155Kubina, Pvt. Peter, Jr.: 229, 230, 232Kudiak, Sgt. Tony: 308Kunze, Pfc. Elmer J.: 228

Lakowicz, Pfc. John: 138Lalopa, Pfc. Frank: 27Lamb, 1st Lt. George R.: 65Lamb, 2d Lt. Joseph P.: 169Lammersdorf: 251nLandesschuetzen (local security units): 318nLang, T. Sgt. Fred C.: 149, 151-57, 162, 166-67Latham, Lt. Col. Robert H.: 84Lealsy, Pvt. Paul: 308Ledbetter, Maj. Homer C.: 9Ledford, S. Sgt. Herman: 149-51Leming, 1st Lt. James J.: 262-64, 267-68, 336, 347,

357Lemmon, Lt. Col. Kelley B., Jr.: 14-16, 14n, 20, 25n,

27, 27n, 31n, 35, 36Leon, Pfc. David R.: 151Leonard, 1st Lt. Turney W.: 314, 323, 326, 337, 350,

350nLeonard, Pfc. William C., Jr.: 156Lewakowski, Pvt. Joseph I.: 37-38Lightner, Pvt. Alfred D.: 214-17, 219, 229-32Lind, Capt. Ralph E., Jr.: 357, 358, 359, 366-67,

379, 380Linguiti, Capt. Paschal A.: 285, 331, 411Lipe, Sgt. Andrew J.: 376Lisy, 1st Lt. Stanley: 311Lithuanian labor battalions: 223-24, 240Litter bearers: 29, 34, 171, 197, 282-83, 303, 331,

398, 399, 401-03, 409, 411, 411nLittlehales, S. Sgt. Roy: 326Livesay, Maj. Gen. William G.: 104Lockett, Lt. Col. Landon J.: 307, 324Loiano: 132Loing: 8Lorry: 54, 77, 89-95Losses, matériel, total: 415Lowry, 1st Lt. Stephen T.: 31Lucca: 201Lusk, Sgt. Albert A.: 166, 168, 169Lutiano: 181Lutz, Capt. Edwin M.: 286, 288, 289, 309, 348, 357,

361Luxembourg: 417Luzerailles Farm: 16, 23

M-2 smoke generator: 65, 70MacDaniel, Pvt. Doyle W.: 360McDonald, Pfc. Patrick H., Jr.: 157McElroy, 1st Lt. Goodwin W.: 314, 323, 326, 332, 337McGraw, Sgt. Joseph L.: 346McGraw, 2d Lt. Robert P.: 170

INDEX 439

Machine gunsAmerican: 44, 47, 50, 51, 53, 59, 77, 130, 134, 139,

141, 158, 160, 171, 178, 179, 181, 185, 194, 207,208, 214, 220, 221, 222, 233, 237, 258, 261, 262,265, 266, 267, 276, 277, 281, 284, 290, 297, 353,355-56, 365-66, 387

German: 25, 31, 46, 59, 77, 104-05, 106, 109, 117,122, 123-24, 128-29, 146, 148, 156, 168, 185,186, 187, 191, 198, 200, 217, 221, 224, 227, 228,232-33, 234, 237, 263, 269, 298-99, 323, 354

Machine pistol: 162, 216, 264-65, 333-34, 364, 365McMillin, T. Sgt. Robert: 393MacMinn, 1st Lt. John R., Jr.: 128, 129, 138, 139,

195Madden, Chaplain Alan P.: 411Maginot Line: 5Mahaley, Capt. Walter C.: 313Mail: 141, 168Main Effort

American: 5, 103, 104, 107, 109, 110, 132, 133,175, 199, 204, 207, 251, 252, 254, 257-59, 268,271, 271n, 272, 275, 276-77, 319, 416

German: 174Main line of resistance: 27, 105, 109, 146, 171, 172,

173, 174, 178-79, 185, 193, 194, 200, 202, 217,222, 223, 225, 229

Makousky, 1st Lt. Lumir T.: 367, 380Maness, Chaplain Ralph E.: 411Manin, 1st Lt. Kelsey C.: 380Map study, German: 274Maps: 12, 13, 44, 112, 115, 122, 208, 252, 255, 293"Marching fire and bayonets": 47, 47nMardigny: 83, 88-92, 95Marieulles: 83, 89, 90, 92Mark IV tank. See Tanks, German.Markey, Sgt. James J.: 226, 304, 310, 312, 366Markey, Pfc. Lawrence, Jr.: 181-82, 187-88, 228Marly: 22Marshall, 1st Lt. Richard A.: 36, 37Mars-la-Tour: 6Martin, Capt. Ross: 375Martines, Pvt. Diego: 124Marx, Pfc. Clifford P.: 197Mathews, Pfc. Noble R.: 154-55Mausbach: 357May, Pvt. Truett J.: 187Maynard, Pvt. Oscar: 185, 188Mays, Lt. Col. Samuel E.: 314, 330, 332, 356, 386,

387, 388Medical Administrative Corps: 282, 285. See also

Medical aid men.Medical aid men: 25, 27, 29, 33-34, 62, 197, 282-83,

285, 299, 303, 324, 331-32, 332n, 334, 367-68,373, 375, 392, 401-04, 407. See also Wounded,evacuation of.

Medics. See Medical aid men.Meier, 1st Lt. Bernard E.: 382-85, 386Mestrenger Muehle: 277, 281, 312, 324, 342, 366,

372, 391

Met fortifications: 3, 4-5Metz military schools: 4-5, 5n, 80, 94, 106n. See

also German units, Battalion, SS Signal SchoolMetz ("Battalion Berg"); Training, German.

Metz Officer Candidate School: 5nMikkelsen, Col. William H.: 110, 125, 130, 135, 170,

176, 194, 202, 236Military police: 291Miller, Capt. Floyd R.: 93Miller, Capt. Joseph W.: 286-88, 289Mine detection crews: 328, 366, 367Mines

American: 258, 259German: 59, 103, 105, 139, 149, 155, 165, 174,

200, 259, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 267, 272, 275,289, 291, 295, 297, 300, 315, 333, 336, 339, 343,362, 387, 397

Mingus, Pvt. Fred D.: 214Mizer, 2d Lt. Tyrus L.: 33Model, Generalfeldmarschall Walter: 274Molinuccio: 174, 225Monschau: 251, 254, 294Montagnana: 125, 178Monte Altuzzo, terrain: 104-06Monte Castel Guerrino: 206Monte Frassino: 175Monte Pratone: 204, 239Monte Verruca: 104-05, 107, 110, 131, 133, 143,

173-76, 182, 183, 191, 198-200, 203, 206, 211,214, 223, 224, 225, 236, 239, 240

Montgomery, Capt. Hunter M.: 307, 324, 329Monticelli: 104-05, 107, 110, 112, 131, 133, 146, 173,

174, 176, 200, 203-04, 225, 236, 238, 239Moore, Pvt. Kenneth T.: 159Morale, American: 37, 112, 113, 136, 141, 163,

165-67, 168, 179, 191, 198, 209, 255, 290, 300,305, 306, 309, 320, 321, 334-35, 356, 359-61.See also Combat fatigue.

effect of enemy tanks: 325, 350, 375effect of friendly fire: 350effect of friendly tanks: 349effect of mail: 141

Morale, German: 224, 239-40, 349Morrison, 2d Lt. Henry W.: 285, 409Mortars: 161, 169-70, 238

60-mm.: 194, 221, 222, 238, 26281-mm.: 44, 46, 47, 112, 134, 198, 206-07, 258,

261, 265, 269, 276, 284, 2974.2-inch: 125, 165, 198, 206, 253, 268

Mortars, German: 121, 164-65Mos, Pfc. Alton: 156Moscheta: 207Moselle Battery: 12Moselle Canal: 40, 44, 62, 67, 70-71, 86Moselle River, as a military obstacle: 5, 56, 70-71,

72, 74Moselle Valley: 12Mostrom, Pfc. Elmer: 230, 234Muenchen-Gladbach: 257, 274

440 THREE BATTLES

Muglia, 2d Lt. Alfred J.: 282-83, 288, 291n, 303, 409Mullins, Sgt. Gamelil: 140, 147, 153, 167, 169Myshak, Pfc. Paul: 213

Nancy: 52Negro units:

84th Chemical (SG) Company: 8, 42, 61, 63 67,74, 74n, 134-35, 178

161st Chemical (SG) Company: 67Nelson, T. Sgt. Donald: 353Nelson, Col. Gustin M.: 378, 393, 398, 399Neuffer, 1st Lt. John M.: 140, 147-49Nideggen: 252, 272, 314, 315, 339, 404Night attack

American: 107-09, 113, 216, 238German: 26-27, 30, 77-80

Night Fighter Group, 422d: 272, 389-91Ninth Air Force: 52, 253Noren, Sgt. Frank: 35Normandy: 8North Apennine Mountains: 103Novak, 2d Lt. Joseph S.: 263-68, 286, 347-48, 355,

356, 357, 363Novéant: 6, 9, 13, 17, 21, 29, 40, 56, 66Nowakowski, S. Sgt. William: 222

OB WEST: 4, 406, 406nObservation, American: 12, 28, 53, 63, 93, 117, 141,

160, 165, 194, 206, 211, 233, 297, 339, 372. Seealso Air observation,

dominant: 20forward: 198observation posts: 32, 64, 124, 146, 170, 198, 206,

217, 259, 266, 315Observation, German: 104, 105, 183, 187, 226, 228,

253, 259, 352dominant: 30, 59, 63, 65, 70, 125observation posts: 146, 226, 227

O'Connell, S. Sgt. James: 62Odierna, Pfc. Anthony J.: 149-51Officer Candidate Schools, German: 4. See also

Metz military schools.Ogborn, Pfc. Russell G.: 345Olson, Sgt. Marvin S.: 376O'Malley, Capt. Eugene W.: 279, 291O'Neal, Sgt. William: 333-34Onville: 13, 88Operations Instructions 13, 5th Division: 88Orlando, Cpl. Nick P.: 385Orr, Sgt. James O.: 181, 183, 186, 190Ortiz, Pfc. I.: 354Ossola, 2d Lt. Reynold A.: 313, 328, 333, 334Ostrowski, Sgt. John: 374Outposts

American: 6, 17, 57, 104, 210, 221, 223, 258, 339,363, 366

German: 44, 105, 109, 122, 132, 136-40, 149, 210,211-14, 283

P-38-s: 272, 339, 369, 389, 398, 404-05P-47's: 38, 52, 54, 61, 75, 83, 272, 302-03, 308, 325,

339, 341, 369, 385-86, 404Pagny-sur-Moselle: 40, 70, 81, 92Paludi, Pfc. John: 234Panzerfaust: 263, 337, 385Paratroopers, German: 106, 130, 131, 132. Sec also

Regiment, 12th Parachute under "German units."Paretaio Farmhouse: 112, 113-17, 121, 124, 130, 134,

136, 140, 141, 165, 170-71, 176, 178, 181, 197,198, 207

Parker, Pfc. Albert W.: 211Parks, Sgt. Edgar A.: 117, 185Parrish, Pfc. Reginald W.: 187, 189Partisans: 132, 140-41Passage of lines: 7, 9, 46, 117, 131, 136, 176, 187, 203,

205, 208, 219, 236, 258, 264, 269, 332lines undetermined: 107, 112, 113

Patrols, American: 7, 20, 21, 35, 40, 50, 87, 110, 140,149-51, 166, 179, 208, 238, 255, 276, 283, 290,309, 317, 320n, 328, 393, 414

Patrols, German: 22, 138, 293, 305, 305n, 339, 367,371, 373, 393, 394

Paulishen, 1st Lt. Andrew H.: 46, 50Payne, Lt. Col. Charles J.: 27Payne, 2d Lt. Richard H.: 324-25, 374, 376Peabody, Capt. Maurice E., Jr.: 140-41, 142-47,

148, 154-58, 159-64, 167-72, 219Pellino, 1st Lt. Aurelio: 310, 358Pennsylvania National Guard: 255Perimeter defense: 159, 170, 297Perkey, Pfc. Arley: 158Perll, Pfc. Joseph R.: 378, 400Pestridge, Capt. George N.: 345Peterson, Col. Carl L.: 251-52n, 259, 269, 271n, 284,

284n, 305n, 307, 308-09, 323, 349, 350, 352,375, 375n, 378, 380-81, 389, 394

Petty, Pvt. Bruce A.: 138Photomaps: 44. See also Maps.Pian di Giogo: 105, 134, 165, 198, 203, 225Pierce, 2d Lt. Robert K.: 289Piercey, Capt. Guy T.: 282, 306, 376Pillboxes: 94, 103, 104, 125, 146, 182, 198, 272, 279,

280, 339, 379, 404. See also Bunkers.Pitman, T. Sgt. Bruce: 326, 327Pizzi, 1st Lt. Joseph E.: 136Planning. See Artillery, American, plans; Attack

plans; Engineer plans.Po Valley: 109, 240Point 770: 110, 133, 206Polich, Capt. George S.: 42Pont-á-Mousson: 12, 41, 71, 90Ponton Battalion, 551st Heavy: 41, 70, 84Ponton bridge: 84-86Ponton Co., 537th Light: 20, 70, 72, 75, 81, 84Ponzalla: 111-12, 113, 133, 165Pratt, 1st Lt. Robert W.: 368, 369Price, S. Sgt. George E.: 188, 190, 220Prisoner identifications: 372n, 391

INDEX 441

Prisoners of warAmerican: 57n, 169German: 54n, 57, 110, 132, 174, 240, 415, 415n

Pritchett, 2d Lt. T. H.: 29Pritts, Marshall F.: 349Propaganda leaflets: 239-40, 272Pruden, Capt. John D.: 335, 353, 355, 359, 360,

363-64Pruem: 255Pugh, Capt. Marion C.: 314, 326, 330-31, 337-38,

350-52, 372Puligno: 206, 207Putney, Pfc. Delmar C.: 332Pyle, 2d Lt. Edwin R.: 29Pynchon, Capt. William H.: 311-12, 312-13, 324,

328, 329

Quadrath: 274Quarrie, 2d Lt. William D.: 261, 267-68, 336, 343,

345-47, 357, 363, 366, 382Quinton, Pfc. Nathanuel M.: 376Quisenberry, Capt. Thomas M.: 111, 143

Radar station: 60, 94Radio, American: 25, 32, 35, 53, 59, 64-65, 115, 120,

164, 169, 171, 196, 220, 267, 288, 320, 327, 329,345, 347, 348, 372. See also Communications,

failure of: 147, 154, 157, 162, 171-72, 328intercepts: 132, 193, 225

Radio, German: 223, 226, 230Raffelsbrand: 252, 272, 307, 317, 339, 372, 386, 391,

404, 406, 413Ranger Battalion, 2d: 414Rea, T/5 William G.: 32, 36Reconnaissance Troops

5th: 87, 8928th: 254, 332, 350, 398

Red Ball Express: 63Reid, Pfc. James F.: 233Repair. See Tanks, American, repair.Replacements

American: 39, 89, 111, 111n, 386, 387German: 200, 224

Reserves, American: 50-51, 54, 83, 87, 90, 94, 104,110, 113, 133, 176, 181, 204, 207, 208, 254, 268,272, 276, 282, 291, 292, 313, 321, 336, 379

Reserves, German: 106, 111, 132, 174, 175, 198, 200,201, 223, 224, 240, 253, 255, 274, 318

Reverse slopes: 47, 51, 52, 53, 80Rex, Pvt. Dale B.: 32, 36Reynolds, Major Robert C.: 352, 368-69Rezonville: 6, 7, 13Rhine River: 4, 251, 255Richelskaul: 252, 257-58, 266-67, 268-69, 271, 274,

276, 283, 284, 286, 306, 314, 315, 317, 321,327n, 337, 339, 357, 359, 366, 369, 387, 393

Rifredo: 206, 225Rimini: 112Ripperdam, S. Sgt. Frank: 298, 306

Ripple, Lt. Col. Richard W.: 288, 310, 332-33, 338,352, 372, 375-76, 377, 394, 400

Ritchey, 1st Lt. Merlin E.: 194, 214-15, 219, 221,237

River Site 1: 71, 72, 84River Site 2: 71, 72, 75, 81, 84Road blocks: 9, 53, 54, 252Road maintenance: 275, 357Robbins, 2d Lt. Henry F.: 121, 129Robertson, 1st Lt. Robert L.: 23Rocca Creek: 115-21, 122, 129, 140, 210, 234la Rocca draw: 134, 135, 142, 157, 171la Rocca Farmhouse: 117, 122, 124, 139, 222Rocket launchers: 62. See also Bazooka.Roer River dams: 251, 251-52n, 255, 257Roetgen: 251, 254, 257, 274, 314Roetgen Forest: 251nRoett: 254, 389Rogers, 1st Lt. Howard S.: 311, 329, 330Rokey, Capt. Raymond R.: 297, 301, 321Rollesbroich: 252, 268, 272, 406Rollins, 1st Lt. Charles F., Jr.: 365, 382, 385Rome: 110Ropes, used in crossing river: 29, 35, 36Royal Air Force: 128, 165, 207Rubin, Pfc. Abraham: 148Ruhrberg: 389Rumbaugh, Capt. George H.: 368, 369, 373, 375,

396, 398, 399-400Rupt de Mad: 70-75, 84, 86Russell, T. Sgt. Zealin W.: 194Ryan, 1st Lt. James A.: 336

Saarlautern: 22Saghbazarian, Pfc. Harry: 79St. Lô: 8Ste. Catherine's Farm: 17, 28Ste. Marie-aux-Chênes: 6Salmestrelli, Pvt. Idelmo: 148-49, 154, 162-63Santerno River: 240Sarre River: 3, 4, 5, 13Scarperia: 111, 125, 133, 141, 165, 176, 178, 198, 226Scheer, T. Sgt. William A.: 153, 163Schindler, 1st Lt. Richard R.: 360, 364, 382, 384Schleiden: 339Schlenderhan Castle: 274, 293Schmidt, terrain: 251, 252-53, 279Schroeder, Pvt. George W.: 185, 186, 188Schwammenauel Dam: 251Schwantke, Pfc. Carl: 214, 215, 216-19, 227, 228,

255, 286, 289, 330, 334Scott, 1st Lt. George E.: 264SCR-193's: 332SCR-284's: 32SCR-300's: 28, 32, 143, 286, 328, 345SCR-536's: 32, 115, 121, 124, 135, 142, 149, 154,

194, 215, 220, 263, 269Security: 255, 286, 289, 330, 334Security guards: 304, 305n, 320, 328

442 THREE BATTLES

Seiler, Pfc. Gus: 380, 381Seine River: 8, 43Seiverd, Sgt. David N.: 141, 168Self, Pvt. Joe M.: 189, 197Setliffe, Lt. Col. Truman H.: 358, 361, 379, 396Setterberg, 1st Lt. Carl B.: 396Shaw, 2d Lt. Warren G.: 46, 53Shedio, T/3 John M.: 303Sherman, 2d Lt. Danforth A.: 346-47, 355, 356Sherman, Pvt. Thomas H.: 154, 155Sherman tanks: 491Shipley, Maj. Alden P.: 54, 55, 93, 94Shively, 1st Lt. Kenneth J.: 308Shortages

ammunition: 61, 83, 88, 157, 162, 165, 167, 169,237-38, 254, 255, 325, 369

assault boats: 16bridging equipment: 76hand grenades: 179, 382, 392litters: 163, 179, 382, 392maps: 44overshoes: 255radios: 382, 392weasels: 331

Siegfried Line: 4, 251, 251n, 255Sieve River: 103, 104, 111, 190Silvester, Maj. Gen. Lindsay McD.: 4Simmons, Sgt. Nelson L.: 158, 159, 169Simon, 1st Lt. Leon: 306-07, 326, 327Simonskall: 252, 268-72, 317-20, 326, 372, 386,

391-93, 401-04, 416Simpson, Maj. William E.: 43-44, 51Skain, Pfc. Clarence J.: 376S-mines: 174Smith, Pvt. Charles C.: 171Smith, S. Sgt. Donald B.: 188, 189Smith, Pvt. Donald R.: 117Smith, 2d Lt. Horace L.: 338, 356Smoke: 16, 74, 74n, 170, 183, 184, 197, 206, 211, 285.

See also White phosphorus.and bridging operations, 9-14 September: 63-86generators: 65, 70, 75screen: 61, 186, 197

Sonnefield, Lt. Col. J. E.: 313, 348, 357, 366Souder, 1st Lt. Redding C., Jr.: 178, 179, 189, 194,

195, 196, 207-08, 210, 215, 219, 221South, S. Sgt. David C.: 129, 232South African Air Force: 128, 165, 207Spalin, 1st Lt. Ralph: 269Spears, S. Sgt. John B.: 166, 167, 168, 169Spooner, S. Sgt. Anthony R.: 295, 306Squad columns: 123, 128, 136, 181, 184, 211, 215,

222, 266Stanley, 1st Lt. Ross W.: 37Stars and Stripes: 112Steckenborn: 251n, 268, 272, 285, 294, 294n: 389, 416Stevens, Sgt. Adron G,: 115, 117, 191, 196Stone, S. Sgt. William J.: 47, 60Storey, 1st Lt. Issac H.: 51, 55

Strafing: 52, 60, 83, 128, 165, 207, 292, 308, 315, 339,356, 385-86

Strauch: 254, 272, 280, 285, 290, 293, 294, 294n, 297,300, 339, 389, 414, 416, 417

Straus, Pfc. Jerome J.: 129Strength, of troops. See Troop strength.Strosnider, S. Sgt. Walter M.: 209, 211, 213-19,

227-28, 230, 234Summerton, S. Sgt. Oliver N.: 157, 158Sunburg, Pfc. Lester: 393Supply: 30, 33, 61-62, 111 , 133, 165, 179, 254, 255,

268, 275, 283, 286, 290, 291, 291n, 294, 303-05309-12, 323, 324, 328-31, 333, 337, 348, 356,363, 366, 368-69

Switchbacks: 134, 193, 205-06, 233, 295, 309, 310,312, 330, 366

T-2 retriever: 314, 336, 388Tactical Air Commands

IX: 253, 272, 357n, 386, 405XIX: 52, 61

Tactical air support. See Air Support.Tait, Lt. Col. William: 349, 352, 368Talange: 7, 13Tank Battalions

31st: 17, 87, 88, 90707th: 253, 254, 320, 324, 332, 366, 406, 415735th: 8, 74752d: 111

Tank Destroyer Battalions630th: 253, 397805th: 111818th: 8, 74893d: 253, 254, 314-15, 356, 372, 386, 406, 415

Tank destroyers: 79, 178, 183, 198, 239, 253, 323,326-27, 327n, 346, 350, 352, 356, 356n, 387,397-98, 406.

Tank-infantry co-operation: 7, 9, 92, 93, 261, 262-63,265, 382

Tanks, American.effect on morale: 325, 349, 350, 375repair: 310-11, 336used against pillboxes: 178, 183

Tanks, Germaneffect of bazookas on: 51, 54, 84, 153, 174, 300,

307, 308, 374Mark IV: 174, 398Mark V: 47, 307, 308, 321, 374, 398

Task ForcesDavis: 386-88, 397Lacy: 339, 393R: 332-33, 333n, 339, 342-43, 349-50, 356, 366,

368, 371, 375Telephone wire: 32, 62, 142, 220, 222, 286Teller mines: 296, 367Terrain: 12-13, 40-41, 70, 104-06, 252-53Thionville: 4, 8Thompson, Brig. Gen. John B.: 6-7, 14-17, 14n, 21,

21n

INDEX 443

Thompson, Sgt. William A.: 190, 191, 195, 208, 227,228

Tiger tanks: 51Time fire: 61, 239TNT, use of: 313Tomlet, S. Sgt. Arthur O.: 160Toner, 1st Sgt. Robert C.: 400Training

American: 110German: 94, 106, 106n, 200

Tre Camin Farmhouse: 112, 113Treadway bridge: 20Treadway Bridge Co., 989th: 20, 70, 72, 75, 81Tree bursts: 51, 61, 277Trench foot: 397Trenches: 146, 154, 184, 185Trigg, S. Sgt. William S.: 190Troop quality, German: 4-5, 22, 80, 110Troop strength, depleted by combat

American: 17, 56, 80, 87, 176, 179, 197, 210, 264,321, 327, 332, 342, 349, 362, 367, 372, 386-87,413

German: 22, 106, 173Tropp, 2d Lt. Edward W.: 393, 394Troyes: 65Truces: 163, 407-08, 409, 411Tyo, 2d Lt. Richard: 301, 306, 377, 396-97

Untermaubach: 404l'Uomo Morto: 107, 115, 131, 173, 200, 203

Vaglia: 110, 111Van Horne, T. Sgt. Nelson B.: 128-29, 139, 181, 208,

210, 221-22, 232-33Van Kleeck, Pfc. Bernard C.: 115, 117, 121, 124Van Vlack, Pfc. George J.: 162Vandelainville: 42, 53Verdun: 3, 5, 6, 83Verdun Group: 12, 30, 34Verneville: 8, 13Verruca: 200Verviers: 272Vezon: 59, 79Vick, Capt. Elias R., Jr.: 44-46Villecey: 42Villecey-sur-Mad: 42Vittonville: 90, 92, 95Voisage Farm: 41, 43-57, 62, 70, 79, 80, 87Vossenack, terrain: 252-53

Wahn (Training Area): 406Walker, S. Sgt. Curtis E.: 329Walker, Lt. Col. George H.: 28, 67, 67n, 70, 74n,

75-76, 81

Walker, Capt. Jack W.: 281, 326-27, 377, 396, 399Walker, Maj. Gen. Walton H.: 3, 14n, 30, 81Wall, Capt. Vincent L.: 360, 364Wallace, Pfc. Clyde: 267Ward, S. Sgt. John M.: 324, 329Waville: 42Weapons. See entries for various types of weapons.Weasels: 282, 290, 311, 320, 328-30, 331, 407, 409Weather: 63, 89, 256, 259, 272, 276, 294, 315, 320,

365, 369, 398, 405, 407, 416Webster, 1st Lt. John O.: 289Wehrkreis XII: 5nWeisser Weh Creek: 259, 307, 317, 404Wenau Forest: 251nWeniger, 1st Lt. Charles S.: 328, 329West, Pfc. Boyd A.: 189West, Capt. George S., Jr.: 261, 267, 286, 346-47Westwall. See Siegfried Line.Whary, Sgt. Harry B.: 232White, Lt. Col. James F.: 364White, T. Sgt. Tony L.: 195White phosphorus: 165, 198, 268, 285Williams, Capt. Robert H.: 56Wilson, Pfc. Albert E.: 151, 169Wilson, S. Sgt. Arlie W.: 330, 352Wilson, S. Sgt. Ira W.: 115-21, 184, 185Wine, 2d Lt. John B.: 263, 264, 265Withdrawal

authorized: 6, 25, 35-39, 54, 55, 57n, 76, 77, 84,129, 139, 170-71, 173, 194-95, 237, 271, 339,345, 346, 364, 366, 371, 376, 377, 393-417

unauthorized: 65, 167, 168-69, 190, 195-97, 195n,219, 301, 306, 350, 352-53, 354, 362, 375, 376,379

Witt, Capt. Eugene M.: 46, 50Wittscheidt: 258, 276, 283Wolters, T/4 Wheeler W.: 407-08World War I: 4, 5, 381Wounded, evacuation of: 28, 29, 33-34, 62, 163, 171,

197, 269, 320, 373, 392, 394-97, 401-04, 407-11.See also Casualties; Medical aid men.

Wright, 1st Lt. James E.: 36

Yarman, Sgt. Kenneth E.: 304, 310-11Young, 2d Lt. Frank W.: 65Yuill, Col. Charles W.: 8-9, 13, 14-17, 14n, 20, 27,

29-30

Zaroslinski, S. Sgt. Anthony S.: 304, 310, 311Zubendchen: 297Zuelpich: 404Zweifall: 254, 314

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1993 330-589