Thompson - Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science

7/30/2019 Thompson - Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science

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Deliberative Democratic Theory and EmpiricalPolitical ScienceDennis F. ThompsonDepartment of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 0213email: dennis [email protected]

Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008. 11:497520

First published online as a Review in Advance on March 11, 2008

The Annual Review of Political Scienceis online at http://polisci.annualreviews.org

This articles doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.081306.070555

Copyright c 2008 by Annual Reviews. All rights reserved

1094-2939/08/0615-0497$20.00

Key Wordsdeliberative democracy, equality, participation, legitimacy,publicity

Abstract Although empirical studies of deliberative democracy have proated in the past decade, too few have addressed the questions

are most signicant in the normative theories. At the same tmany theorists have tended too easily to dismiss the empirical ings. More recently, some theorists andempiricists have been paymore attention to each others work. Nevertheless, neither is lito produce the more comprehensive understanding of deliberademocracy we need unless both develop a clearer conception oelements of deliberation, the conicts among those elements,the structural relationships in deliberative systems.

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INTRODUCTION

In a major recent study of deliberative democ-racy, the authors write that empirical re-search can merely be a helping hand in thebig controversies in democratic theory. But,

as a helping hand, empirical research has itsplace (Steiner et al. 2004, p. 42). The authorsmaybetoomodest.Someofthebestempirical work (including theirs) has the potential to of-fer more than a helping hand. But if the handof research is to guide as well as help, it must be systematically directed toward the coreproblems in deliberative theory. Empirical in-quiry can more effectively inuenceand inturn be inuenced bynormative theory if both theorists and empiricists proceed with a

clearer conception of the elements of deliber-ation. They can then more productively ad-dress two general problems that have not re-ceived theattention they deserve: theconictsamong those elements, and the relationshipsof the parts of deliberative democracy to its whole.

At the core of all theories of deliberativedemocracy is what may be called a reason-giving requirement. Citizens and their rep-resentatives are expected to justify the laws

they would impose on one another by givingreasons for their political claims and respond-ing to others reasons in return. (For a survey of the meaning and variety of theories, seeGutmann & Thompson 2004, pp. 139; themost important collections of recent theoret-ical writings include Benhabib 1996, Besson& Marti 2006, Bohman & Rehg 1997, Elster1998, Fishkin & Laslett 2003, Macedo 1999.)Deliberative theorists differ to some extent on what counts as an adequate reason, how

extensive the reason-giving forum should be, whether procedural norms are sufcient, andthedesirabilityofconsensusas a goal.Butthey agree in rejecting conceptions of democracy that base politics only on power or interest,aggregation of preferences, and competitivetheories in the tradition of writers such asSchumpeter and Downs. These conceptionsdo not give sufcient weight to the process of

justifying to ones fellow citizens the laws would bind them. (For various statementthe contrast with other theories, see Coh1989; Habermas 1984, 1989, 1996; Gutm& Thompson 1996.)

Some of the claims of deliberative th

are not empirical. One of the most importbenets that theorists ascribe to deliberademocracy is that the decisions it produare more legitimate because they respectmoral agency of the participants. This benis inherent in the process, not a consequeof it. It is not appropriately subjected to dirempirical investigation. But other claimstheory makes plainly invite empirical inquand theorists themselves were among the to undertake empirical studies of delibera

(Chambers1996,1998; Dryzek& Braithw2000; Fishkin 1999; Fishkin & Luskin 2 Mansbridge1980).They treated the empiriclaims not as assumptions but as hypothemany of which in their view required furresearch.Then, as deliberative democracycame the most active area of political ory (Dryzek 2007), political scientists jothe venture. The result has been a prosion of empirical studies, now more numous than the normative works that promp

them. (For surveys, see Delli Carpini e2004; Mendelberg 2002; Ryfe 2005; Steet al. 2004, pp. 4352.)

Despite these impressive efforts, mucthe empirical research by political scienhas not fully engaged with the normative ory. Theorists and researchers often talk peach other (Neblo 2005). Some researchhave assumed that they can dispose of delibative theory by showing that political dission often does not produce the benets t

theorists are presumed to claim for it. Textract from isolated passages in various oretical writings a simplied statement abone or more benets of deliberative demracy, compress it into a testable hypothend or (more often) articially create a in which people talk about politics, and cclude that deliberation does not produce benets the theory promised and may e

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be counterproductive. The most insistently skeptical work in this mode is Hibbing & Theiss-Morses Stealth Democracy(2002). Re- viewing the results of their own focus groupsandother studiesof discussion in settings they consider deliberative, they argue that real-

life deliberation can fan emotions unproduc-tively, can exacerbate rather than diminishpower differentials among those deliberating,can make people feel frustrated with the sys-tem that made them deliberate, is ill-suited tomany issues and can lead to worse decisionsthan would have occurred if no deliberationhad taken place (p. 191).

Other studies recognize the limits of theirmethods, and are more qualied in theirconclusions but still present their largely

negative ndings as objections to deliberativetheory. In a survey of French citizens about government assistance for the unemployed, Jackman & Sniderman (2006) found that de-liberation does not lead to better grounded judgmentsthat is, judgments that reect ones considered view of the best course of action all in all (p. 272). Deliberation leadsmany people to ideologically inconsistent positions. A study of discussions about race in ve town meetings in New Jersey

(Mendelberg & Oleske 2000) found that in the integrated meetings (which had thediversity that deliberative democrats seek) thedeliberation failed to lessen conict, increasemutual understanding and tolerance, or re-duce the use of group-interested arguments. The meetings with all white participantsproduced consensus, but consensus against school integrationnot the result that deliberative democrats presumably favor.Using survey data and focus groups from six

communities in the UnitedStates andBritain,Conover & Searing (2005) examined the ex-tent to which political discussion satises thestandards set by political theorists: publicity,nontyranny and equality. They concludethat the discussions currently fall short of theideals of deliberative democracy, althoughthey see some potential for improvement in educational reforms. Rosenberg (2007b)

also nds that deliberation fails to providethe benets that some theorists claim for it,but suggests that a more collaborative andtransformative form of deliberation may have greater potential.

The objection prompted by these

studiesthat deliberative theory is not realistichas never impressed normativetheorists. They believe that it misses thepoint. Theory challenges political reality. It is not supposed to accept as given the reality that political science purports to describeand explain. It is intended to be critical, not acquiescent.

Theorists also challenge some of the em-pirical studies on their own terms. Dryzek (2007) sharply criticizes the methods of

Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, for example. Heargues that they ignore contrary evidence intheir own survey data, and that they use theconclusions of focus groups, who are in effect deliberating, to show that citizens do notwant to deliberate.

Yet most deliberative theorists now recog-nize that they cannot ignore empirical stud-ies without retreating into utopianism andrendering the theory irrelevant to ongoingpolitics. Despite his criticism of some of the

studies, Dryzek (2007, p. 250) acknowledgesthat other empirical ndings are quite capa-ble of discomforting theorists. In the samespirit, even while insisting that delibera-tive democracy is still in large part a criti-cal and oppositional ideal, Bohman (1998,p.422)concludes that the theory has come of age because it has recognized that the best and most feasible formulations of deliberativedemocracy require the check of empirical so-cial science.

The general conclusion of surveys of theempirical research so far is that taken to-gether the ndings are mixed or inconclusive(Chambers 1996, p. 318; Delli Carpini et al.2004,pp.33637;Janssen&Kies2005,p.331;Ryfe2005; Sulkin& Simon 2001, p.812). Themain reason for the mixed results is that thesuccess or failure of deliberation depends somuch onitscontext.The contingent character

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of these results may seem to give theoristshope. If only theorists can identify the right conditions, they can condently continue toextol the virtues of deliberative democracy (e.g., Gastil & Levine 2005, pp. 27374; Fung& Wright 2003, pp. 25960). They can use

even the negative ndings to point out de-fects in the system, and support reforms that would bring about conditions more favorableto deliberative democracy. When confronted with ndings that seem to confute his theory,Habermas is unfazed. He reads the contra-dicting data as indicators of contingent con-straints that deserve serious inquiry and. . .asdetectors for the discovery of specic causesfor existing lacks of legitimacy (Habermas2006, p. 420). Hisarticle is pointedlysubtitled

the impact of normative theory on empiri-cal research. It implicitly relegates empiricalresearch to the job of being merely a helpinghand. In that role, it posesno risk ofbecominga disruptive voice in the deliberative project.

Theorists should not take too much com-fort from the mixed or contingent characterof the empirical conclusions. The conditionsunder which deliberative democracy thrivesmay be quite rare and difcult to achieve.In a welcome collection that brings together

theorists and empiricists (Rosenberg 2007a),several of the theorists explicitly take up thischallenge(Warren2007, Cohen2007, Dryzek 2007).

The most promising approach for empir-ical research would therefore seem to be tocontinue trying to discover the conditionsin which deliberative democracy does anddoes not work well, while paying more at-tention to the question of to what extent theunfavorable conditions could change. Some

conditions (such as the absence of genuinely deliberative forums) might be affected by leg-islative measures or political action at localor national levels. Others (such as inequal-ities of resources) may be products of thesocial and economic structure of particularsystems. Still others (such as the fact of rea-sonable pluralism) may be essential charac-teristics of democratic systems. This poten-

tially fruitful approachwould address a cenconcern of deliberative theorythe possiities of its practical realization (for a sysatic statement of a similar approach, see F2007a). There wouldbe no guarantee that dliberativedemocracywould be vindicated,

with a more discriminating and wide-ranganalysis of the conditions that promoteor ipede it, we would have a clearer sense place in democratic theory and practice.Tseems a worthy and appropriate projectcollaboration of theorists and empiriciststerested in deliberative democracy. The a would not be reform as such (althoughconclusions may be useful to reformers would be to understand better the exten which the values posited by deliberative

ory can be realized under not only current balso potential conditions.However, any such project is more pr

lematic than this straightforward prospecmight suggest. Nocollaborationbetween thorists and empiricists is likely to make ther progress until three general problems amore fully addressed:

The analytic problem, which quires distinguishing the elementsdeliberationits concept, standa

and conditions.The internal conicts problem, whnecessitates recognizing that the cditions that promote some valuesdeliberative democracy may undermother values, including some that deerative democrats favor.The structural problem, which callsmoving beyond the study of isolateone-time deliberative experiences examining the relationship between

liberative and non-deliberative prtices in the political system as a wand over time.

THE ELEMENTS OF DELIBERATION The empirical studies typically begin wiconcept of deliberation and a list of bene

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is supposed to produce. These are sometimesdrawn from one or two theories, oftenmodied for the convenience of the research. While claiming (correctly) that deliberativetheories share a common core of values, theempirical studies actually adopt diverse con-

cepts of deliberation and examine different consequences under a range of conditions. The variations make it difcult to compare thendings of the studies and relate them to thetheories. That would not be an insuperableobstacle to collaborative work if thevariations were presented within a common framework. We could then say that, given any conceptionof deliberation, the practice is likely toproduce consequences of a certain kind underspecied conditions. But that would not over-

come this persistent problem: the elements of deliberation are often run together, as in thisdenition: . . . we have deliberative democ-racywhen, underconditionsofequality, inclu-siveness and transparency, a communicativeprocess based on reason. . .is able to transformindividual preferences and reach decisionsoriented to the public good (della Porta2005, p. 340). Better are those approachesthat distinguish the denition from the eval-uation of deliberation (the unit of analysis

from the democratic quality) (Nanz &Steffek 2005). But even so, the differencesamong the elements remain underanalyzed.

Three elements in the analysis of politicaldeliberationneedtobedistinguished:concep-tual criteria, evaluative standards, and empir-ical conditions. Each may be understood as adifferent kind of necessary requirement of de-liberation. Conceptual criteria stipulate what is necessary for a practice to count as delibera-tion. Evaluative standards specify what counts

as good (or better) deliberation. Empiricalconditions indicate what is necessary for pro-ducing good deliberation (or less strongly, what may contribute to producinggood delib-eration). Each is subject to empirical inquiry,but in different ways.

Itisunderstandablethatresearchersdonot always distinguish the elements. In deliber-ative theory itself, some of the same values

that specify the concept of deliberation ap-pear as standards that evaluate the practice of deliberation, and also as empirical conditionsthat promote it. Take the value of equality: A discussion does not count as deliberation at all if one person completely dominates; the

discussion is better deliberation to the extent that the participation is equally distributed;and the discussion is more likely to be moreegalitarian if the background conditions aremore nearly equal. This interaction is inher-ent inanda positive feature ofdeliberativedemocracy. It reects its self-correcting char-acter: Equal conditions produce a more equalprocess, which in turn produces more equalconditions, and so on. This dynamic processcan of course work in the opposite direction.

It can degenerate as the conditions becomemore and more unequal. Given the poten-tial confusions of dependent and independent variables that these interactions create, it isall the more important to keep straight the various elements of deliberation and to dis-tinguish the different levels of the values that each expresses.

Conceptual Criteria

Clarifying and limiting the scope of the con-cept is not an effort by theorists to imposexed and often narrow denition that effec-tively shuts scholars off from existing politicalrealities, as some suggest (Button& Mattson1999, p. 612). It is an important step in theanalysis because the choice of the concept de-termines the scope of any inquiry, and thesignicance of any conclusions for normativetheory. Empirical researchers do not have toagreeonasingleconceptofdeliberation.After

all, theorists have not been able to do so. But if the research is to be relevant to deliberativetheory, researchers must be clear about what practice they are investigating. Their charac-terization of that practice must at least partly coincide with what most theorists regard asthe core of the problem of deliberation. Moregenerally, any inquiry must have the concep-tual resources to be able to specify whether


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the particular practice under investigation isdeliberation or only discussion; and, indepen-dently, if it is deliberation, to what extent it isbetter or worse deliberation.

If the concept is too broadif it includesevery form of political talk (e.g., Cook et al.

2007)the conclusions will have uncertainbearing on deliberative theory (Cohen 2007,p. 222). Everyday talk and other forms of political discussion may contribute to devel-oping citizens political views and their ca-pacity to make political decisions, and thuscreate conditions that support deliberation, assome researchers on political discussion rec-ognize (Walsh 2003, 2007) andsome theoristsemphasize (Mansbridge 2007). But ordinary political discussion should be distinguished

from decision-oriented deliberation so that the relationships between the practices canbe systematically analyzed. Maintaining thisdistinction should not be taken to imply that other forms of discussion are somehow less worthy of a place in deliberative democracy. As the discussion of the problem of struc-ture (below) indicates, it is important to rec-ognize that deliberative democracy includesmany kinds of political interactionsother thandeliberation. But we can more clearly retain

the connection to the central aim of deliber-ative theory if we treat these other activitiesas part of a larger democratic process, ratherthan as instances of deliberation per se.

To capture the distinctive character of the kind of deliberation that is central tothe theory, researchers would do better toavoid an expansive concept of delibera-tion. They should focus on those featuresof the practice that directly relate to thefundamental problem deliberative theory is

intended to address: In a state of disagree-ment, how can citizens reach a collective de-cision that is legitimate? The rst two aspectsof the problem, disagreement and decision,characterize the circumstances of deliberativedemocracy. The third, legitimacy, prescribesthe process by which, under these circum-stances, collective decisions can be morally justied to those who are bound by them.

It is the key dening element of deliberademocracy.

A state of disagreement. Some basic agreement is necessary to create the prlem that deliberative democracy is intento solve. Several empirical studies renize this criterion, although they use sligdifferent terms: cross-cutting exposure,simply diversity of opinion (Barabas 2p. 689; Jackman & Sniderman 2006; M2006, pp. 6, 14, 20, 139). If the participaremostly like-minded or hold thesame vibefore they enter into the discussion, theynot situated in the circumstances of delibtion. They do not confront the problem thdeliberationis intended toaddress.That isnto saythat discussionamong like-mindedpple cannot contribute to deliberative demracy. Such discussion can help citizens lmore about the reasons they hold their vieor perhaps even discover that they do agree as much as they thought they didcan also strengthen the views of group mbers and help mobilize the group for meffective political action. The effects of cussion among the like-minded can be pitive or negative for the democratic procand its differential consequences merit mempirical and normative attention. But tkind of talk should not be confused withcussion among citizens with diverse opiniDistinguishing the two, as indicated belownecessary to recognizing a potential conin deliberative democracy.

A collective decision. Deliberative demracy is focused on the circumstance in w

a group must make a decision to whichmembers are bound whether they agree wit or not. Although even political deliberacan have various purposes (see Fung 200its essential aim is to reach a bindingcision. From the perspective of deliberademocracy, other purposessuch as learnabout issues, gaining a sense of efcacy, or veloping a better understanding of oppos

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viewsshould be regarded as instrumental tothis aim.

Until recently, nearly all studiesandmuch of the normative theory investigateddeliberation by ordinary citizens rather thanpoliticians. (Steiner et al. 2004, an impor-

tant and welcome exception, is discussed fur-ther below.) Even in most empirical stud-ies of deliberation among ordinary citizens,the participants are not making or inuenc-ing actual political decisions. Much of theliterature in the surveys is based on smallgroupdiscussions and laboratory experiments(Mendelberg 2002). That is a limitation, not only because what is being studied is severalsteps removed from what deliberative theory is ultimately concerned about, but also be-

cause discussion alone is likely to produce dif-ferent empirical consequences than those of decision-oriented discussion. Empirical stud-ies suggest that the differences are signicant and their implications not always favorablefor deliberation (Fung 2007b; Janssen & Kies2005, pp. 325; Ryfe 2005, pp. 57, 61). On thefavorable side, if participants believe that they have a stake in the outcome and will have tolive with the decision and with their fellow decision makers, they may take the discussion

more seriously and try harder to reach a de-cision that is mutually acceptable. But know-ing that the discussion ends with a decisionthat counts may have just the opposite effects.Participants may act more strategically, show less tolerance for opponents, and take moreextreme positions. Groups such as juries that arecharged with reaching consequential deci-sions often polarize (Sunstein 2002), whereasFishkins juries (deliberativepolls), in whichthe participants are not asked to reach a col-

lective decision at all, are less likely to do so(Fishkin & Luskin 2005, p. 293). Theoristsare not surprised that, when group discussionhas little possibility of making a real practi-caldifference,thedeliberation is less criticaland emancipatory than they might wish (cf.Cohen 2007, p. 234; Rosenberg 2007a).

There is another reason that deliberativetheorists insist on a distinction between dis-

cussion directed toward helping individualsdevelop more informed preferences and dis-cussion directed toward helping groups reacha collective decision (Habermas 1989). Struc-turing a discussion that in effect asks partici-pants,Whatdo you, asan individual, prefer?

begins to resemble theaggregative democracy (adding up the well-informed preferences of individuals) that deliberative democrats crit-icize. Discussions framed by asking partici-pants, What action should we, as a group,take? come closer to the deliberative democ-racy (creatinga genuinelypublicopinion) that they favor. Some empirical evidence suggeststhat the frame-shift toward group ratherthan individual decisions has some of the pos-itive effects that the theorists hope for (Neblo

2007b). The criterion specifying that deliberationshould be decision-oriented does not im-ply that studies of groups that only discusspolitics, such as Fishkins deliberative polls,are not relevant to the study of deliberativedemocracy., The experiments conducted by Fishkin and colleagues have been among themost cited in the literatureof deliberative the-ory and practice. (Also, some of his more re-cent projects have involved groups that make

decisions or advise decision makers. See thereports and papers of his Center for Delibera-tive Democracy at http://cdd.stanford.edu. ) Although participants in discussions of thiskind may not make collective decisions, they may be seen as taking part in an early phaseof a process that leads to a deliberative deci-sion. Like subjects in some other studies of pure discussion, Fishkins subjects are prepar-ing for (or can be seen as modeling citizens who are preparing for) the making of po-

litical decisions for the collectivity. Fishkindoes not ask his subjects to make a col-lective decision, evidently because he wantsto mitigate the pressures toward conformity and encourage a greater capacity for inde-pendent judgment. But this raises a questionthat reveals a potential conict in deliberativedemocracy. To what extent is independent judgment compatible with making collective


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decisions?To answerthat question,weneed tostudy deliberation that leads directly to bind-ing decisions.

Studies that examine opinion formationmore generally can also be relevant to thestudy of deliberative democracy. For ex-

ample, some experiments suggest that thecross-cutting discussion favored by deliber-ative democrats may protect ordinary citi-zens against manipulation by elites. Individ-uals who discuss a political issue in mixedgroups (in which the members have been ex-posed to conicting perspectives on the issue)are less vulnerable to elite framing effects (thetendency to focus only on the subset of con-siderations that politicians and other leadersprefer to emphasize) (Druckman & Nelson

2003). Thus, the larger democratic processthat ends ina collectivedecision includes mul-tiple stages and various sites. All may be relevant to deliberative theory and are worthy of study, but they should be kept distinct so that their interrelationships and their role in theprocess as a whole can be more systematically investigated.

The legitimacy of the decision. Giventhese circumstances (the need for a collective

decision in a state of disagreement), deliber-ative democracy seeks a conclusion that is le-gitimate. The criterion of legitimacy is not only or mainly an empirical one. For a law tobe legitimate, it is neither necessary nor suf-cient that most citizens feel that it is. But it is necessary that citizens take part in a processaimed at producing laws that are mutually jus-tiable to all citizens. Hypothetical legitimacy is not sufcient. Thus the primary conceptualcriterion for legitimacy, and the most impor-

tant distinguishing characteristic of deliber-ation, is mutual justicationpresenting andresponding to reasons intended to justifya po-litical decision (Cohen 1989, 2007; Gutmann& Thompson 2004; Mendelberg 2002).

Theorists hold more or less expansive no-tions of this reasoning process (cf. Cohen2007 and Mansbridge 2007), but most agree on its essential characteristics: public-

spiritedness, equal respect, accommodatand equal participation.

Public-spirited reasoning is directed ward the collective good of the group that wbe bound by the decision, even if the reaalso refer to other goods. Assertions of po

are not justications at all, and claims ofinterest alone, thoughadmissable, arenotscient. Studies that distinguish arguing frbargaining, and identify deliberation withformer, capture many of the relevant featuof mutual justication (Holzinger 2005; R2000; Ulbert & Risse 2005), although mrecognize that arguing and bargaining ofgotogether inactualpoliticaldiscussion. Mtheoristswould include almost any kind ofpeal, provided that it is not merely or n

based on self or group interest. After all, ethe philosophical versions of the theoriesabout politics, not philosophy. Furthermothe appeal beyond self interest does not hto be sincere if it is plausible on the merits;tual arguments are what matter, not moti(except insofar as the motives are predicof future arguments). More broadly, reseashould focus not on deliberative intentibut on institutional functions (Warren 20pp. 27577). Empirical researchers theref

should not worry, as some evidently do, abformulating an independent test for sincity or truthfulness (B achtiger & Steiner 20pp. 16264; Steiner et al. 2004, pp. 1920166).

In addition to public-spiritedness, the rsoning must show respect to the participand their arguments, even if it challenges validity of the claims. In mutual justicadeliberators present their arguments in terthat are accessible to the relevant audie

and respond to reasonable arguments psented by opponents. The requirement of accommodat

means that the reasoning must keep opthe possibility of cooperation on other isseven if the deliberators do not specicpropose alternatives or initiate collaborati

Equal participation requires that no operson or advantaged group comple

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dominate the reason-giving process, even if thedeliberators arenotstrictly equal in powerand prestige.

Noticethatnoneoftheserequirementsde-mands that deliberators use only pure reasonin their discussions. Most theorists regard af-

fective appeals, informal arguments, rhetori-cal speeches, personal testimony and the likeas important ingredients in the deliberativeprocess. They do not assume that only argu-ments that would satisfy philosophers will orshould carry the day. One of the most citedexamples of successful deliberation involvesSenator Carol Moseley Brauns highly emo-tional appeal that brought about the defeat of an amendment to renew the Daughtersof the Confederacys patent on their insignia

(Gutmann & Thompson 1996, p. 135). Exag-gerating the kind of rationality that deliber-ative theory requires is a common mistake. Much as Schumpeter criticized a classicaltheory of democracy that no theorist actu-ally held (Pateman 1970), some critics now attribute to deliberative theory assumptionsabout rational citizens that no theorist accepts(even as an ideal). Without attention to what theorists actually write, empirical researchersrisk creating a caricature of the theory. Even

a researcher as careful as Mutz (2008) doesnot always avoid this pitfall. In one sectionof her contribution to this volume, she criti-cizes deliberative theorywithout citing any theoristsfor assuming that only themessageshould matter in deliberation, not the char-acteristics of the speaker and the listener orthe context in which the communication oc-curs. No major theorist makes such an as-sumption.Manyexplicitlyaddress howfactorsother than argument quality can (and should)

bring about opinion change. The normative requirements that charac-terize deliberation are intended to be rela-tively minimal criteria. By differentiating de-liberation from other kinds of discourse, they are meant to isolate the practice that is thesubject of the inquiry. They do not includeall forms of political discussion, and they donot assume that the empirical consequences

of deliberation are necessarily benecial. Thecriteria could be formulated somewhat differ-ently depending on the purposes of the in-quiry, but however formulated they shouldbe weaker than their corresponding evalua-tive standards, which impose more stringent

demands on deliberation.

Evaluative Standards The evaluative standards provide a basis for judging the quality of the deliberation identi-ed by the conceputal criteria. The closer theactualdeliberationcomes to meeting thestan-dards, the better it is in terms of deliberativetheory. The standards are sometimes calledideals because theorists assume that although

they guide actual discussion they can never befully realized (see Thompson1970,pp.4551,86119).Butthey shouldnotbeunderstood as values derived from ideal theory or from any external theoretical source (Habermas 2005,p. 385). They are implicit in political practice,presupposed by the political communicationthat takes place in actual democracies. Even when participants fail to meet the standards,their attempts to communicate acknowledgethe signicance of the standards. The failures

(or the partial successes) of the participantscan be adequately understood only in termsof the standards.

Although this claim about the implicationsof a practice may be largely theoretical (asit involves interpreting what a given prac-tice presupposes), empirical examination of acloselyrelated question could be illuminating. To what extent do participants themselves ex-plicitly endorse the standards? Speakers may need to presuppose some basic standards of

communication in order to have any discus-sion at all, but they do not have to presup-pose standards that are specically delibera-tive. Some may come to a forum merely toadvocate their positions vigorously and tobring pressure on ofcials. When citizens with that kind of aim come together inthe same forum with citizens who wish todeliberate, the result may frustrate the aim


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of deliberative democracy. This conict be-tween different expectations (different viewsabout how the political discussion should beevaluated) is a fruitful area for further research(see Karpowitz 2003).

As more stringent versions of the concep-

tual criteria, the evaluative standards may de-mand more of what the criteria require (e.g.,more frequent or sustained appeals to thecommongood),oramorerobustformofwhat they require (e.g., a more active form of ac-commodation). The standards that apply tothe discourse itself are most plainly amplica-tions of the conceptual criteria. The standardof public-spiritedness simply demands moreof the same kind of other-regarding reasoningthat characterizes the minimal form of delib-

eration. (Itdoes notrule out affective, rhetori-cal, or informal appeals.)To assessmore of thecognitive content in the deliberation, someresearchers advocate a standard that focuseson the quality of the information the delib-erators usefor example, the extent to whichmembers of Congress rely on informed rea-sonable beliefs about . . .the impact of pro-posed policies (Mucciaroni & Quirk 2006,p. 5).

As for equal respect, the evaluative stan-

dard also simply requires more than itsconceptual counterpart. Deliberation rankshigher if more participants more often usearguments that the criterion emphasizes. Ac-commodation, as an evaluative standard, pre-scribes a positive effort toward cooperation,not merely avoiding actions that obstruct it,as required by the conceptual criterion. It corresponds to what some deliberative the-orists have called the economy of moral dis-agreement, in which citizens seek the ratio-

nale that minimizes rejection of the positionthey oppose and try to nd common groundon related policies (Gutmann & Thompson1996, pp. 8494). This standard may be dif-cult to operationalize, but some researchershave begun to develop empirical methods foridentifying and measuring what they deemconstructive politics or deliberative reci-procity, which are intended to capture much

of the content of the idea of accommoda(Steiner et al.2004,pp.5960,1079,178 Weale et al. 2007).

The evaluative standard of equal parpation goes beyond its conceptual cousinrefers to a stronger and somewhat differ

phenomenon. The standard applies not oto the discourse itself but also to its distrtion. Equality is obviouslya complexidea,theorists disagree about what kind of equathey think most important or relevant to liberation (Cohen 2007, Knight & John1997, Thompson 2008). But most agree tthe more the deliberation is inuenced by uequal economic resources and social stathe more decient it is. That is because deerative democracy is based on a moral p

ciple of reciprocity, a form of mutual resthat requires treating citizens as equals (eif, orespecially if, theyare not equal inpowIts justication is not primarily empiricalthough the extent to which it is satisedbe investigated empirically. The general sdardofequalityis appliedbothto the distribtion of membership in the deliberative band to the patterns of participation in the liberation itself. Equal opportunity, randselection, proportional representation, rep

sentative sampling, and equal time are amthe versions of the standard that may beplied to assess equality.

Whatever the standard, one of the mconsistent empirical ndings is that unspecial measures are taken, membershipparticipation are likely to be signicantlyequal (Delli Carpini et al. 2004, Mansbri1980, Mendelberg 2002). Although criticspeatedly brandish thendings of inequalitydeclare deliberative democracy fatally a

most deliberative theorists are neither sprised nor discouraged. They believe that liberation itself can help expose unjustequalities in politics and that the ndingsserve as a justication for leaders who wundertake special measures to counteract inequalitiessuch as requiring proportiorepresentation of disadvantaged groups inliberative bodies.

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Empirical research that simply reinforcesthe general conclusion that deliberation fallsshort of the standards of equality is thereforenot very illuminating. Research that showsspecically what conditions and changesmight mitigate inequality can be useful. Even

more valuable, and less common, is researchcomparing the inequalities in deliberative fo-rums with the inequalities in other politicalsettings. Because so much of democratic pol-itics is pervaded by inequality, the more fun-damental question is comparative: To what extent do deliberative forums satisfy variousstandards of equality more or less effectively than other political processes?

It might seem that these standards (andtheir corresponding criteria) are too compli-

cated for fruitful empirical analysis, but sim-ilar and no less complex measures have beenadopted by some political scientists with il-luminating results. The most systematic at-tempt to operationalize principles for iden-tifying and evaluating deliberation is at thecenter of the study of parliamentary dis-course by Steiner and his associates. Morethan most empiricists, Steiner et al. (2004,pp. 5261, 17079) have made a serious and well-informed effort to capture what theorists

regardas core elements of deliberation. Theirdiscourse quality index comprises codingcategories intended to track principles they nd in deliberative theory: Level of justi-cation (a reason, conclusion, and link be-tween them), content of justication (appealto common versus group interest), respect toward groups to be helped (empathy), re-spect toward the demands of others (articu-lated regard for an opponents proposal or ar-gument), respect toward counterarguments (a

positive statement about an opponents argu-ment against ones conclusions), constructivepolitics (presentation of an alternative or me-diating proposal), and participation (absenceof interruptions).

Their categories measuring the level andthe content of discourse track well both thecriterion and standard of public-spirited rea-soning. If the categories are not found tosome

degree (if they are coded 0 or 1), the discourseshould not count as deliberative at all, orshould not be regarded as sufciently deliber-ative tobeworthyof evaluation.Higherscoresqualify as better deliberation. The three re-spect categories are useful interpretations of

equal respect. The constructivepolitics cat-egory demands more than the minimal ac-commodation criterion and is better treatedas an evaluative standard. The participationcategory is a curious measure: It seems largely subjective and culturally variable. It dependson whether the speaker thinks the interrup-tion is signicant. A measure of speaking time(by gender, race, education) might be a moreuseful test of equal participation.

We need a second set of evaluative stan-

dards in order to assess the effects on par-ticipants. Empirical studies have more to say about these effects than about most other as-pects of deliberative democracy because theeffects track familiar categories of social sci-ence research. It is relatively straightforwardto test whether deliberation (under certainconditions) increases political knowledge, asense of efcacy, and other standard survey items. The very familiarity can lead re-searchers astray, however. From the perspec-

tive of deliberative theory, knowledge of thepolitical views of other participants, for exam-ple, is as important as knowledge of issues. If you are to respect your fellow participantsand even more if you are to be open to theirpersuasionyou have to understand their views and their reasons for holding them. Yet most studies tend to concentrate on whetherparticipants are better informed about pub-lic policies, candidates positions, andgovern-ment actions.

Another potential danger of familiarity is that the empirical tests may be mistak-enly identied with the similarly named but substantially different normative standards.Normative concepts of legitimacy (for exam-ple, a decision that cannot be reasonably re- jected by individuals seeking fair terms of cooperation) are not the same as empirical le-gitimacy, which is sometimes called a sense of


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legitimacy (for example, a decision that is ac-cepted because of a favorable attitude towardor trust in government). A decision may be le-gitimate in the normative sense but lack em-pirical legitimacy. Conversely, a decision may be normatively illegitimate but still perceived

as legitimate. These possibilities areworth ex-ploring as examples of potential conicts of the kind discussed below. But the explorationcannot get started if the normative and empir-ical concepts are not carefully distinguished when the evaluative standards are applied.

The third set of standards concerns theoutcome of the deliberation. The least prob-lematic of these standardsand those for which empirical research is likely to be themost useful in assessing outcomesare sim-

ply the composites of the standards that mea-sure the effects on individuals. For example,the extent and distribution of the change inpolitical knowledge in the group as a wholecan be presented and analyzed in any assess-ment of the effects on individuals. For cer-tain issues (those that turn mainly on mattersof fact and similarly objective consequences),empirical studies may help assess the quality of the outcome. This approachwould be most relevanttothosetheoristswhobelievethatde-

liberative democracyhas substantialepistemic value (Estlund 1997, Marti 2006).However, someotherstandardssometimes

deployed for assessing outcomes should beused for empirical research only with great caution, if they are used at all. The stan-dard most commonly invoked is consen-sus (Karpowitz 2003, Mendelberg & Oleske2000). Its problems are normative and empir-ical. First, there is no consensus among de-liberative theorists themselves that consensus

should be the goal of deliberation (Gutmann& Thompson 2004). Exposing and even in-tensifying disagreements may be desirable inmany circumstances.Second, it isdifcult em-pirically to distinguish consensus from com-promise (Steiner et al.2004, pp.9192). Someindirect evidence suggests that discussionmay change peoples minds and move a grouptoward greater agreement, but the effect is

not observed because it is latent and dela(Mackie 2006). People are more likely tothat they accept a decision as a compromthan that they have changed their mind. Epirical evidence may help evaluate the exto which deliberators change their minds,

the goal should not be to determine whetthe deliberation achieves consensus. (Fmore favorable view of consensus as paa research strategy, see Neblo 2007a.)

Another outcome standard for which hand of empirical research has not been vhelping is the justice of the decision. most systematic study of the capacity ofliberation to produce just outcomes in acpolitical settings nds no signicant relatship between the quality of the discourse

measured by the index cited above) and wegalitarian decisions (as indicated by thetent to which they help the least well (Sp orndli 2004). The outcomes seem tobest explained by the pre-existing preferenof the majority, which may suggest thatdistribution of power has a greater effect tthe quality of the reasoning. But this stis quite limited in scope. It is based on ing speeches in 20 debates that took pfrom 1971 through 1982 in the 22-mem

German Mediation Committee, an unusconstitutional body that meets in private makes recommendations to resolve dispbetween the two federal legislative chamb Moreover, the criteria for weak egalitarianare questionable. They are an exiguous inpretation of only one specic type of jusand do not take into account whether a pposed policy is more or less egalitarian theexistingpolicyitwouldreplace.Moregerally, theempiricalchallengesof isolating

effects of the deliberation on the justice ofoutcome are formidable because the interving causes are even more numerous and cplex than in the causal paths of the otherfects of deliberation.

A further normative problem complicempirical inquiry into the justice of outcomDeliberative theorists disagree not onlystandards of justice but also on whe

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substantive standards should be part of delib-erative democracy (Gutmann & Thompson2004). Yet all agree that to some extent thenature of justice should itself be the subject of deliberation. This creates what might becalled a problem of normative endogeneity.

The standard used for evaluating the deliber-ativeprocessisinuencedbytheprocessitself. What principle of justice should be accepted,and how it should be interpreted in particularcases, is supposed to be partly decided in that process.

Empirical Conditions The aspect of deliberation about which em-pirical inquiry has potentially the most to say

is the set of conditions that are necessary for,or at least contributory toward, good deliber-ation. As we have seen, good deliberation ismultifaceted, and any empirical inquiry intothe conditions that support it needs to beclearabout which evaluative standards are at issue.Composite standards (which combine severaldifferent measures of the quality of delibera-tion) may be appropriate for some purposes,butusing separate standards is more useful foridentifying conicts and trade-offs. This dis-

aggregated approach is consistent with what Mutz (2008) in this volume calls middle-rangetheoryand hasmore incommonwith it thanshe acknowledges. But as indicated below, theapproach supports (what she and some othersneglect) the study of the structure of deliber-ative democracy beyond individual instancesand particular conditions of deliberation.

Withrespect to empirical conditions, a dis-aggregated approach can help determine theextent to which satisfying onestandard entails

falling short on another because each requiresincompatible empirical conditions.For exam-ple, the more that trained facilitators lead adiscussion, the better the quality of the dis-course and the more participants learn, but the less equal the participation is likely to be.Bringing the deliberation closer to ofcials who are actual decision makers (enhancingone of the circumstances of deliberation) can

generate another kind of inequality. Without careful planningandstrongindependent con-trol, the ofcials tend to dominate; and whenthey do not, the citizens often simply use theoccasion to criticize the ofcials or to advo-cate theirown cause (Button& Mattson 1999,

Ryfe2002, Weatherford& McDonnell 2007). More encouraging is an important ongoinginvestigation of the interaction of membersof Congress with their constituents (Esterlinget al. 2007). In discussions with their congres-sional representative about immigration pol-icy, constituentsgainknowledgethat is usefulto make accountability effective.

Clearly the range of possible empiricalconditions is large, and part of the challengeof empirical inquiry is to decide which are

worth investigating. Examples of two typesinstitutional and culturalcan illustrate thechallenges that confront such research.

The most difcult empirical condition tospecify is equality. It refers to the resources,including talents, status, and power, that par-ticipants bring to the deliberation (as distinct from the membership and participation that are the subject of the evaluative standards). If equality of resources were a requisite for de-liberation,thendeliberativedemocracywould

fail from the start. For many deliberative the-orists, one of the main points of deliberativedemocracy is to expose inequalities to pub-lic criticism and create less unjust conditionsin the future. They believe that deliberativepolitics can provide a more level playing eldfor the disadvantaged because, compared tocompetitive or other forms of interest grouppolitics, it does not track so closely the exist-ingdistributions of power in society. Still, un-equal resources are likely to produce unequal

participation in the deliberative forum. Apart from the studies that use ascriptive character-istics as indicators, almost no empirical work investigates how great this effect is likely tobe. We do not even know whether it is true,as some theorists plausibly argue, that undermany conditions deliberation is less affectedby prevailing inequalities than power-basedmodes of decision making.


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The most discussed empirical condition ispublicitythe requirement that the delibera-tive forum be open to scrutiny by citizens ei-ther directly or through themedia (Chambers2004, 2005). Deliberative theorists do not in-sist that all deliberation take place in public,

only that the second-order decision to delib-erate in private be subject to public deliber-ation at some stage (Gutmann & Thompson1996, pp. 96, 104, 117). But most theoristsemphasize the salutary effects of making rst-order arguments in public. They assume that such arguments will be more public-spiritedand mutually respectful if made in the open. When speakers have to defend their propos-als and preferences before a large and diverseaudience, they are more likely to appeal to

more general principles and to take seriously their opponents views (Benhabib 1996, p. 72;Cohen 1997 pp. 7677; Elster 1998, p. 12;Goodin 1992, pp. 12446). Even in interna-tional negotiations, the appeal to third par-ties that public deliberation makes possiblecan bring out universal principles (Ulbert & Risse 2005, pp. 35859).

Yet empirical research has also conrmed what common sense suggests: In many cases,politicians who deliberate in private are more

inclined to make candid arguments, recog-nize complexities, and offer concessions (seeChambers 2004, 2005).Moreover, evenif private discussions present more opportunitiesfor capture by special interests and for collu-sionamong partiesagainst the public interest,greater transparencyoften does nothelp, sim-ply because most citizens do not pay attention(Curtin 2006).

These mixed results (and assumptions)suggest that further research could help de-

termine in which settings and for which is-sues publicity would promote or underminedeliberation. In conducting this research, theempirical condition of publicity must be dis-tinguished from the normative requirement that deliberation be conducted in terms of public reason. This requirement, the scope of which is controversial among theorists, is aconceptual criterion of deliberation, as noted

above in the discussion of public-spiritedn The two should be kept distinct becauseempirical condition of publicity may afthe extent to which the conceptual requment can be satised. It is important to kn whether this hypothesis or its opposite is va

The more public the discussion, the mlikely the participants are to use public son, and the more likely the discussion is todeliberative.

Inathoughtfulreviewofthetheoryandidence on publicity, Chambers (2005, p. 2suggests that in addressing such hypothefutureresearch shouldadopt a more nuancidea of publicity and its effect on speakShe credits empirical approaches with shing the need to distinguish three kinds

effects that publicity may have on public son. Publicity can promote (a) rationality justifying ones beliefs, articulating premand conclusions, taking account of opping points of view; (b) generalityappealto the common good or the general intest; and (c ) plebiscitary reasonappealin what seems to be the common good, but wshallow, poorly reasoned pandering to worst we have in common (p. 260). Puforums, she suspects, are more prone to i

tionality and plebiscitary reason, whereas vate discussions are more vulnerable to ture by special interests and may not eavoid plebiscitary reason completely (butSteiner et al. 2004, pp. 12831, 165; andcomment by Chambers 2005, p. 263).

The most signicant analysis of insttional conditions at the level of the litical system is found in an ambitstudy of parliamentary discourse in GermSwitzerland, the United Kingdom, and

United States (Steiner et al. 2004). Usingdiscourse quality index cited above, Steand his colleagues found that institutiodesign matters for the quality of political course (p. 135). Issues make a differeDeliberation is less successful when opiis extremely polarized, as on the quesof abortion. But for many other importissues, institutional conditions are signic

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Among the conditions favorable to deliber-ation are coalition cabinets, multiparty sys-tems, proportional representation, veto pro- visions, and second-chamber debates.

The most interesting conclusion for delib-erative theory is that the variation in the insti-

tutional conditionshasdifferent effects on thedifferent aspects of deliberation (Steiner et al.2004). Respect is most affected by the con-ditions, level of justication draws mixedresults, and constructive politics shows lit-tle variation across institutional factors (ex-cept in the difference between rst and sec-ond chambers). The authors speculate that the persistence of positional politics (ratherthan constructive politics) is due to generalfeatures of the legislativeprocess. Inother set-

tings, such as civic forums where partisanshipis lessprominent andinitial positions have not crystallized, the discourse may display moreconstructiveattitudes.Evenif this turnsout tobe true, deliberative theorists maystill be con-cerned about the lack of constructive politicsin legislatures, which are after all important decision-making bodies.

Cultural conditions are no doubt impor-tant but have only recently received seriousattention from researchers specically inter-

ested in deliberative democracy. Although de-liberation is less necessary to the extent that the participants agree on political issues to bedecided,deliberationmaynotbepossibleatallif the participants do not agree on the framework for discussion (if some believe for ex-ample that only violence can resolve the dis-putes). Some cultural consensus on the valueof settling disputes by mutual accommoda-tion is probably necessary. That would sug-gest deliberation is not possible in segmented

societies and in many international disputes, where the parties are divided by deep culturaldifferences about howto deal with fundamen-tal disagreements. Surprisingly, several recent studieshave shownthat deliberationdoes takeplace in divided societies, and potentially at a higher level than many expect (OFlynn2006).Similarly, several scholars contend that the favorable outcomes of some important in-

ternational negotiations cannot be explained without reference to the efcacy of delibera-tion (arguing as distinct from bargaining)(Risse 2000, Schimmelfennig 2001, Ulbert &Risse 2005). Dryzek (2006) sees signicant possibilities for deliberation in large-scale in-

ternational forums, although only to the ex-tent that the discussion takes place in interna-tional civil society at some distance from theexercise of sovereign power.

THE CONFLICTS IN DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY One of the most important reasons for disag-gregatingtheelements of deliberative democ-racy in the way suggested here is to expose

potential conicts in its theory and practice. These are neglected by much of the theory and research. There is a tendency, evident inmuch of the work cited above, to treat de-liberative democracy as a cohesive set of val-ues that are jointly realized or jointly fail tobe realized. The benets of deliberation arepresumed to go together: As citizens engagein deliberation, they learn more about the is-sues, gain respect for opposing views, employ more public-spirited arguments, and so on.

Or if citizens fail to deliberate, they learn less,disrespect more, pursue self-interested goals,and so on. We miss the complexity and powerof deliberative democracy if we do not recog-nize the possibility that its elements may con-ict with one another, that not all the goodsit promises can be secured at the same time,and that we have to make hard choices amongthem. We miss the opportunity to pursue em-pirical work more relevant to normative the-ory because one of the most fruitful contri-

butions of empirical research is to expose thenature and extent of these conicts. The potential for this kind of contribu-

tion is illustrated by the conict betweentwo major values in deliberative theoryparticipation and deliberation itself (see Ackerman & Fishkin 2004, pp. 289301;Cohen & Fung 2004). Among democratictheorists, the turn toward deliberative theory


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has not displaced participatory theory. Al-though elitist versions of deliberative the-ory look with suspicion on citizen involve-ment in decision making, most deliberativedemocrats favor greater participation by cit-izens, if not in the deliberation itself then at

least in judging the deliberation of their rep-resentatives.Rather than transcending partic-ipatory theory, many deliberative democratssee themselves as extending it. To the stan-dard list of political activities in which citizensparticipatevoting, organizing, protestingthey add deliberating.

The most common empirical challengeto participatory theory has taken the sameform as the challenge to deliberative theory mentioned above. The theory is unrealistic,

critics say, because most citizens are not po-litical animals. They do not want to partic-ipate in politics, just as they do not want todeliberate about politics (Hibbing & Theiss- Morse 2002).This objection against partici-patory theory misses the point, just as it doesagainst deliberative theory. Participatory the-ory deplores the lack of participation in any current political system, just as deliberativetheorycondemnsthelackofdeliberation.Themore penetrating (and ultimately more con-

structive) empirical challenge to any norma-tive theory seeks to show that the values that it prescribes conict in practice. The theory falters not because current democracies failto realize its values but because one of its val-uescannotbe fully realized without sacricingone of its other values. Such a conict is espe-cially disturbing if the principles are equally indispensable to the theory. Standard trade-off techniques and pluralist approaches thenoffer no ready solution.

That conict is the challenge that Mutz(2006) poses to deliberative theory in herstudy of political networks in the UnitedStates. She supplements her database of threenational surveys with comparative studies inother countries. An admirable feature of herbook is its selective engagement with delib-erative theory. She does not try to test the whole theorya large package of variables

all rolled into one concept (p. 6). Her proach is disaggregated in the sense descriabove. She focuses instead on a specic essary criterion of deliberation: the expoto oppositional political perspectives thropolitical talk. This cross-cutting exposure c

ates what she calls diverse political netw which satisfy one of the key conceptual cria set out above for deliberation (a statdisagreement). Mutz nds that deliberatunder these circumstances provides somthe benets that theorists hoped for: recogtion of the legitimacy of opposing viewpoigreatertolerance, andgreater empathy forplitical opponents (pp. 8486). Yet these deerative benets come at a high participaprice.Herresearchsuggests that themore c

izens discuss politics with people whose vdiffer from theirs, the less likely they arengage in political activity (pp.89124). more they deliberate, the less they partpate. The moderate attitudes encourageddeliberation weaken some of the most powful incentives to participate. Opponents seless like enemies; mobilizing to bring abtheir defeat seems less urgent. Unlike czens who talk mostly with like-minded cpatriots, deliberating citizens nd themse

cross-pressured, and their views challenrather than reinforced. The conict between participation and d

liberation does not of course express a unisallaw.Wedonotyetknowenoughabouthgeneral the conict isunder what specconditions it is more or less likely to appIs it more likely in discussions about cekinds of issues? Is it more common in cussions among ordinary citizens than ampolitical leaders? Is it more frequent in in

mal interactions than in formal institutioCan forums for deliberation be structured ways to avoid or mitigate the conict? Savailable research bears on these questibut political scientists have much more wto do before democratic theorists would gup afrming both of these values. The piricists answer to the theorists general qution should prompt the theorist to ask m

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specic questions. The theorist needs the an-swers in order to evaluate how serious theconict of values is, and what steps are worthtaking to overcome it. The helping hand cangesture in new directions.

This conict is only one among many

possible tensions in deliberative theory that would repay further empirical and norma-tive analysis. Several are implicit in the earlierdiscussion of the elements of deliberation.Equal participation may lower the quality of the deliberative reasoning. Publicity may dothe same. Public deliberation may also beless conducive to mutual respect than private discussion. Decision-making authority may encourage polarization and positionalrather than constructive politics. Some fur-

ther conicts are suggested by recent stud-ies of institutional conditions. Consensus sys-tems (grand coalitions,multi-partystructures, veto powers) tend to produce better delib-eration than competitive systems, but at thecost of less transparency in policy makingand less accountability of ofcials (Steineret al. 2004). More generally, if the goal isrespectful deliberation that also entails argu-mentativechange, thentheactorrelationshipsshould not be too competitive, actors should

not have bound mandates, bodies should besmall and explicitly geared toward rationaldiscussion and reections. . . (B achtiger et al.2007, p. 98). This may not mean that deliber-ative democrats are forced to endorse a pre-modern and gentlemens club model of poli-tics, but it does suggest that they need to faceup to the tensions that empirical research ex-poses among their key values, and rene theirtheories to help decide the extent to whichone value should be sacriced for another.

Empirical research thus may pose somechallenging questions and even offer someprovocative answers, but it does not have thelast word. Exposing conicts among values isan important step, but it is closer to the begin-ning than the end of fruitful research into thenatureof deliberative democracy. If participa-tion and deliberation (or any other key valuesin deliberative democracy) stand in conict,

we still have to decide under what conditions which value should have priority, and whichcombination of thevalues is optimal. That de-cision depends partly on considerations that are not primarily empiricalsuch as concep-tions of human dignity and understandings of

the fair terms of social cooperation. The de-cision is usually not a matter of simple trade-offs but also entails a further normativechoiceof the best method for dealing with the con-icts (Goodin 1995). It is normative theory that ultimately determines the signicance of anyconict andtheappropriate mode of deal-ing with it. In that respect, it has the upperhand.

THE STRUCTURE OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY Most of the empirical research on delibera-tive democracy has focused either on a singleepisode of deliberation, as in one-time groupdiscussions, or on a continuing series with thesame group or in the same type of institu-tion. This limitation is understandable. Thechallenges of conducting research on discretecases is formidable enough without attempt-ing to relate the ndings to deliberation in

other parts of the political system, let alone tonondeliberative practices in the system. Yet deliberative theory is ultimately concerned with the democratic process as a whole, andtherefore with the relationships of its parts tothe whole. The theorys approach is decidedly not one size ts all, nor even deliberationall the waydown.Most deliberative theoristsrecognize not only that the practice of delib-eration may take different forms in different parts of the process, but also that it is only one

of many desirable modes of decision making.Deliberative democracy is more than a sum of deliberative moments. Deliberative theoristsmake room forsuch activitiesas interest groupbargaining and political protests (Mansbridge2007), but most insist that their roleandthe form they takebe justied at some stagefrom a deliberative perspective (Gutmann & Thompson 2004, Habermas 2005).


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How deliberation should be allocated within the democratic process thus becomesa key question. It is a question that has not received sufcient empirical or normative at-tention. Deliberative democrats should moreseriously think about legitimacy across mul-

tiple deliberative moments and the wider de-liberative system (Parkinson 2006, p. 174). They need to confront more systematically the structural problem of the division of la-bor in deliberative democracy. It is possibleto study the structure with the middle-rangetheories that Mutz (2008) recommends, but only if the theories are ultimately related tothe democratic process as a whole. This ef-fort is not to be confused with the testing of a grand theory. It is simply to try to ensure

that research is relevant toa central concern of political science andpolitical theorytheper-formance of the political system. That meansthat we must gobeyond the study of the inter-actions of small groups considered separately,and examine how those interactions relate tothe larger political institutions. It also meansthat we need to know more about how delib-eration relates to (not only compares to) othermodes of decision making.

Three approaches to the structural prob-

lem merit examination. The rst is what hasbeen called distributed deliberation (Goodin2005). Different aspects of the deliberativetask are assigned to different institutions, which can then be held to different delibera-tive standards. Party caucuses are expected tosatisfy standards of candor; parliamentary de-bates are better at reasonable arguments; thepublic at large in elections supposedly comecloser to achieving the common good; andpostelection bargaining can reach mutually

acceptable compromises. A similar division of labor might be derived from the conclusionthat parliamentary committees are better at fostering mutual respect whereas plenary ses-sions are better at articulating the public in-terest (Steiner et al. 2004).

The advantage of the idea of distributeddeliberation is that, by emphasizing that not all institutions are equally effective at pro-

moting all aspects of deliberation, it invfurther research into the comparative advtage of each institution. But it also facesculties. The various functions of delibtion cannot be kept as distinct in practicthe model implies. Arguing and bargaini

for example, are difcult to distinguish pirically, and their segregation in separatestitutions is normatively questionable. Eif a division of labor can be sustained, tis the further difculty of how the dispefunctions are tobecoordinated tocreatea rognizably deliberative system. Integratingfunctions into a coherent structure remainchallenge for both normative theory and epirical research.

A second approachdecentralized de

erationavoids this difculty by keepingpractice of deliberation itself in one piRather thandistributingdifferent deliberatfunctions to different institutions, it creaunied deliberative processes in many dient bodies. Instead of dividing deliberatiodivides the deliberators. The most prominexample of this approach is the Porto AlParticipatory Budget (Baiocchi 2005, F2007b, Gastil & Levine 2005). Citizeneachof the 16districts of this Brazilian city

sembleannually toconsider thebudgetpriotiesonpoliciesrangingfromsewageandhoing to health care and transportation. The sults of the reective preferences generin these and other sessions are then agggated into a single city budget.

The process certainly increases partiction and evidently produces genuine deeration about the issues in each district neighborhood. The difculty is that the liberation focuses on very local goods

needs and does not dispose citizens to tabout the greater good of the city, the jtrade-offs between jurisdictions or the gof the city through the longarc of time (Fu2007b, p. 179). The nal budget is produbyanaggregativeprocess,relegatingdelibetive democracy to a supporting role.If thisproachis tobeviable, its proponentsmustmore effective ways to encourage a bro

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perspective in the local deliberations and tointegratethedecentralizedbodiesintoadelib-erative process at central levels of the politicalsystem. (For a discussion of how mini-publicscan inuence decisions in the larger politicalsystem, see Goodin & Dryzek 2006.)

Iterated deliberation, the third approach,addresses this problem of integration. It also exemplies one of the most important features of deliberative democracyits dy-namic capacity for self-correction (Gutmann& Thompson 2004). The process of iterateddeliberation typically takes this form: A po-litical body (which may or may not be de-liberative) proposes a policy to a deliberativebody, which returns a revised version of thepolicy to the original body. That body re-

vises the policy again and submits it for fur-ther consideration to the deliberative body before it is enacted. This loop may continuethrough multiple phasesandmaybe expandedto include other institutions.If theinstitutionshave different capacities, iterated deliberationcan reap the benets of the division of laborin distributed deliberation without the costs.

The process for setting health care priori-ties in Oregon in the early 1990s is sometimescited as an example of iterated deliberation.

(For various interpretations of that process,see Fung 2007b, Gutmann & Thompson1996.) The states Health Services Commis-sion created a priority list of conditions andtreatments. After the listwaswidelycriticized,the commission consulted with a number of citizen bodies and other institutions, some of which were deliberative. A substantially revised list was considered by the commissionand then by the legislature. The nal result fell short of what many would have liked, but

it was better than the earlier proposals. Theprocess itself was certainly awed in many re-spects,but it toowas by deliberative standardsan improvement over what had gone before.

The general question remains, however:how to incorporate the need for expertiseand technical administration in a delibera-tive democracy (see Richardson 2003). Giventhe potential of iterated deliberation (and the

fact that it mirrors one of the key character-istics of deliberative democracy), we need tolearn more about the conditions under whichitworkswell.Forwhichissuesisitmoreorlesssuitable, which institutions should play what rolesin promotingit, and what is the optimum

point for bringing it to closure? All three of these approaches to dividingdeliberative labor (distributive, decentralized,and iterated deliberation) imply ambitiousprojects of institutional design. How shouldthedesignerschoosetheir approach?The nat-ural answer is: deliberatively, through a pro-cess that might be called meta-deliberation.Some deliberative theorists distinguish thepractice of deliberation from the conceptionof deliberation. They do not insist that every

practice in deliberative democracy be delib-erative but rather that every practice shouldat some point in time be deliberatively justi-ed (Gutmann & Thompson 2004, Macedo1999). The question of the place of delibera-tion in the larger process should be open todeliberative challenge itself.

If this approach seems more an abstract idea than an institutional proposal, considerthe citizens assemblies that are being usedto reform the electoral system in several

provinces in Canada, and in the Netherlands.Some 160 citizens, chosen more or lessrandomly, met weekends for nearly ninemonths in 20042005 in British Columbiato decide whether to recommend replacingthe current majoritarian system with some version of a proportional system. Eventhough the question was technically complexand potentially divisive, the members of this Citizens Assembly, by all accounts,managed to deliberate effectively (Blais et al.

2008, Thompson 2008, Warren & Pearse2008). The members of the Assembly werenot deliberating directly about the role of deliberation in their political system, but they were deliberating about institutionalchanges that could substantially affect that role. If such assemblies can successfully discuss and decide about electoral systems,they may also be capable of considering other


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issues of institutional design. They couldprovideapartialanswertothequestionofhow to decide deliberatively what place delibera-tion should have in deliberative democracy.

A citizens assembly does not entirely es-cape the general problems inherent in the

division of deliberative labor. The delibera-tion in the assembly is quite different fromthe deliberation in the public, who in theBritish Columbia case ultimately vote in areferendum on the assemblys recommenda-tions. (The assemblys deliberation is also dif-ferent from thedeliberation in the legislature, which in other circumstances may be the -naldecision-making body.) Members of an as-sembly engage, on relatively equal terms, in aprocess that the electorate can never hope to

match. Members reach conclusions for rea-sons thatmostordinaryvotersare not likely tofully appreciate. Designed to reduce the gapbetween citizens and experts, the process it-self can reproduce the problem that it was in-tended to overcome. But the deliberative gapmay be partlybridged if voters are prepared totrust the judgment of members. If the work of the members is made accessible, voters candeliberate about the fairness of the processrather than its results. The normative ques-

tion is whether this is an adequate form of de-liberation, andtheempiricalquestion is under what conditions citizens are likely to engageeffectively in this form of deliberation.

Deliberative theorists have only begun toanalyze the possibilities of meta-deliberationin such institutions as the citizens assembly. Any normative assessment will need to beinformed by the full repertoire of empiricalinquiry, including case studies, interviews with participants, opinion surveys, and

content analysis. The key question here, as with all the approaches to dealing with theproblem of the division of labor in delibera-tive democracy, is what are the most effectiveand desirable relationships among the variousbodies that operate within the structure of deliberative democracythose designed todeliberate, as well as those constituted todecide in other ways.

CONCLUSION The study of deliberative democracy, likpractice, has tended to observe a divisiolabor. The division of deliberative labor mor may not serve the practice wellthaone of the questions agged above for ther inquiry. But it is clear that a rigid dsion betweennormativeandempirical inqudoes not serve the study of the practice weallthat is one of the conclusions this revsuggests.Normativeandempirical inquirydistinct, and justiably so. Their methods aagendas diverge, appropriately so. But understanding of deliberative democracy fall short until theorists and empiricists tgreater steps to bridge this division. Somight say that unless philosophers becopolitical scientists, or unless those who are political scientists become philosophthere can be no end to troubles in our dipline; only then will the theory of deliberatdemocracy see the light of day. Indeed, sof the most valuable recent work on delibtive democracy is being produced by youscholars (such as B achtiger, Fung, and Neb who are as procient in normative theorin empirical social science.

But even with the division of labor thlikely to persist, collaboration can still go ward constructively if theorists and emcists systematically engage with each oth work. The questions each side poses can stulate answers that raise further questi which in turn identify new problemsan itative program of research that would mithedeliberative process itself.Such a progris more likely to be enlightening if theoand empiricists proceed with a common alytic understanding of the elements of de

eration, a deeper appreciation of the con within deliberative democracy, and greatertention to itsstructure. They need tostudy tdeliberation that takes place not only amcitizens but also between citizens and trepresentatives, and among representatthemselves. Theory and empirical reseamight then more oftenprogress hand in han

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DISCLOSURE STATEMENT The author is not aware of any biases that might be perceived as affecting this review.

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