Thomas Stack Research Writing Sample- The 1970s- A Watershed Period in Sino-U.S. Relations

The 1970s: A Watershed Period in Sino-U.S. Relations

Thomas Stack

Prof. Ekbladh

US Foreign Relations Since 1900

27 April, 2015 (Edited January 2017)

Note: This research paper was written over the course of my final semester at Tufts University

and draws on background knowledge acquired in the pursuit of both my International Relations

and Chinese majors.

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Introduction

On December 16, 1978, a simple document of some 250 words articulated a policy shift

which would change the nature of Sino-United States relations, and indeed the face of

international relations, for decades to come. Through this document, known as the “Joint

Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the People's Republic of

China and the United States of America,” the U.S. officially recognized the People’s Republic of

China and its Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-led government as the official representatives of

Chinese people, reestablishing relations which had been frozen since the CCP came to power in

1949 and ending official relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan). 1

This Communique was not an abrupt, isolated policy shift in its own right, but rather was

the product of nearly a decade of negotiations deeply rooted in the political and economic milieu

of the time. Through this paper, I will argue that the greatest factor motivating the

reestablishment of Sino-American negotiations and the eventual release of the Joint

Communique was the shifting Cold War landscape of the 1970s, which altered the calculus of

power politics for U.S. and Chinese leaders. Of secondary importance, though also a significant

factor in motivating leaders on both sides of the Communique, were domestic political concerns.

Finally, I will argue that economic interests, though they may, in retrospect, appear paramount,

actually played a relatively small role in the decision to reopen China-U.S. relations as

articulated by the Communique.

Sino-US Relations 1949-1968: Cold War Enemies

Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, “Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic 1

Relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America (December 16, 1978)”

http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/doc/ctc/t36256.htm

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The period from 1949 to 1968 marked a low point in China-US relations. During the

Chinese Civil War (1946-1949), the U.S. government had supported Chinese nationalist forces of

the Kuomingtang under Chiang Kai-shek against the Communist forces of Mao Zedong, who

were seeking closer ties with the Soviet Union. When Mao’s forces overran the KMT in 1949

and forced them to flee to the island of Taiwan, the U.S. ambassador fled with Chiang. U.S. 2

opposition to Mao’s P.R.C. regime in mainland China was solidified by the Korean War, in which

the U.S. military, backing capitalist South Korea, squared off against the P.R.C. military, who

were supporting Communist North Korea. Consequently, the P.R.C. froze U.S. assets in

mainland China. This set the stage for a bitter freeze in relations between the U.S. and P.R.C.

which would remain the status quo until the end of the 1960s. During this time, the U.S. again

fought the P.R.C. through a proxy war in Vietnam, which served to further increase distrust

between the two governments. 3

The Taiwan Question

As a consequence of the above described split with the PRC, which controlled mainland

China beginning in 1949, the US began to cultivate a close relationship with the capitalist

Republic of China (R.O.C) in Taiwan. This relationship, which came to define U.S. dealings in

the region until the 1970s, was codified on December 2, 1954, by the “Mutual Defense Treaty

Between the United States and the Republic of China,” which broadly declares cooperation

between Taiwan and the US. Article V of the treaty boldly states,

Radha Sinha, “Sino-American Relations: Mutual Paranoia,” (New Work: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 2

46-49.

Sinha, “Sino-American Relations,” 50-673

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“Each party recognizes that an attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the

territory of either of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and

declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its

constitutional processes.” 4

That is to say, in the event that the P.R.C. should ever threaten the R.O.C. militarily, the United

States would step in to defend Taiwan.

Thus, as articulated by the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, the United States had clearly

thrown its support behind the R.O.C. in Taiwan in opposition to the P.R.C. in mainland China.

This support of the R.O.C. over the P.R.C. was made all the more decisive by the fact that both

parties have, since their founding, maintained a “One China Policy.” This policy dictates that

only one government can be the true representative of the Chinese people and that, therefore, the

recognition of one such government must come at the exclusion of the recognition of all others. 5

Therefore, by accepting the legitimacy of the R.O.C., the U.S. was, in the minds of mainland

China and Taiwan leaders, rejecting the legitimacy of the P.R.C.

Sino-U.S. Relations 1968-1978: Detente

Moving Toward a New China Policy

In the dark days of the 1950s and early 1960s, it must have seemed almost unimaginable

that relations between the P.R.C. and the United States would soon thaw. However, precisely

such a thaw began on September 17th, 1968, when the U.S. State Department sent a proposal to

“Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of China” in American Foreign 4

Policy, 1950-55

David Ekbladh, "Chinese Opera: Nixon Goes to China—Détente and its Meaning," Lecture, Tufts 5

University, Medford, MA, April 8, 2015.

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the PRC’s embassy in Prague that ambassadorial-level negotiations be resumed. This was a

significant step as such high level talks had not been proposed by either side since 1955. Though

the proposed meetings never materialized, they marked the beginning of a new trend toward 6

detente in relations between the P.R.C. and U.S.

This move toward detente took a further step forward in January 1969 with the

inauguration of U.S. President Richard Nixon, who, despite his posture of being ‘tough’ on

communism, had long advocated improving ties with the P.R.C. Under the Nixon 7

administration, the back channel dialogue which had begun in 1968 continued, and was given a

major boost in April 1971 by the friendly meeting of the national ping pong teams of the U.S.

and the P.R.C. at an international tournament in Japan . Perhaps encouraged by this 8

development, Nixon’s then national security advisor Henry Kissinger withdrew from the public

eye during a visit to Pakistan in July 1971 and secretly flew to Beijing. In Beijing, Kissinger met

with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai to discuss issues including Taiwan and the “One China Policy.” 9

This first meeting of the P.R.C. and U.S. administrations proved productive, and was followed up

by a second secret meeting between Kissinger and Zhou in October 1971. 10

The stage was then set for the momentous events of February 1972, in which President

Nixon personally traveled to Beijing to meet with the P.R.C.’s Chairman Mao Zedong. During

John H. Holdridge, “Crossing the Divide: An Insider’s Account of the Normalization of U.S.-China 6

Relations,” (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 25-27.

Holdridge, “Crossing the Divide,” 30.7


“Getting to Beijing: Henry Kissinger’s Secret 1971 Trip,” USC US-China Institute, accessed March 8, 9

2015.

“Getting to Beijing: Henry Kissinger’s Secret 1971 Trip,” USC US-China Institute.10

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this groundbreaking visit, Nixon and Mao discussed a variety of issues regarding Sino-US

relations, including their respective views on the benefits of cooperation and what was to be done

regarding Taiwan. These discussions culminated in the “Joint Communiqué of the United 11

States of America and the People's Republic of China” of February 28, 1972, also known as the

“Shanghai Communique”. The document stated that “progress toward the normalization of

relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries” and that no

nation should “seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region,” thus officially articulating the efforts

to move toward normalization in relations which had already been underway through back

channels for years. In this vein, though official recognition had not been established, it was

agreed that the U.S. and the P.R.C would establish Liaison Offices in each other’s countries. 12

One point of contention between the P.R.C. and U.S. which the communique failed to

resolve was the status of Taiwan. The U.S. did, however, recognize the desire for “One China,”

while remaining fairly ambiguous about what that meant. Rather than articulating a strong

position on the status of the R.O.C., the document held that the U.S. “... reaffirms its interest in a

peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.” Along these lines, the

U.S. affirmed its “ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military

installations from Taiwan.” Therefore, though it had not officially abandoned Taiwan, the 13

Shanghai Communique sent a clear message that the U.S. was willing to break ties with the

R.O.C., at least militarily, in order to improve relations with the P.R.C.

“Mao Meets Richard Nixon,” USC US-China Institute, accessed March 8, 2015.11

“Joint Communique of the Peoples Republic of China and the United States (February 28, 1972),” 12

Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China, accessed April 26, 2015.

Joint Communique of the Peoples Republic of China and the United States (February 28, 1972),” 13

Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China, accessed April 26, 2015.

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With diplomatic communications reestablished through liaison offices beginning in 1972,

contact between the U.S. and the P.R.C continued throughout the 1970s. However, progress

toward full normalization of relations was put on hold by the Watergate scandal, which forced

Nixon to resign in August 1974 and abandon his promise to normalize relations with China in his

second term. Following Nixon, Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter reaffirmed the U.S. 14

commitment to normalize relations with the P.R.C. and carried out further negotiations.

The Joint Communique & Diplomatic Recognition

These negotiations culminated in the “Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of

Diplomatic Relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America,”

released in December 1978. Through this Communique, both parties agreed to extend official

recognition to the other, and to establish diplomatic missions in each other’s countries as of

March 1979. After thirty years, the United States and the Peoples Republic of China would 15

finally be linked by official diplomatic channels. In reestablishing such channels, the

communique states that each party should commit to the idea that,

“Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the

world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to

establish such hegemony.” 16

Robert G. Sutter, “U.S.-China Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present,” (Plymouth: Rowman and 14

Littlefield, 2013), 75.

“Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the People's Republic of 15

China and the United States of America (December 16, 1978),” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, Accessed April 26, 2015.


China and the United States of America (December 16, 1978),” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, Accessed April 26, 2015.



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This statement can be seen as a recognition that neither the U.S. nor P.R.C. would seek excessive

power in East Asia, and, importantly, that they would stand together against efforts by the Soviet

Union (to which the ‘other group of countries’ mentioned can be assumed to refer) to exert

power in the region.

Perhaps as significantly, in line with the One China Policy already discussed, the

Communique declared,

“The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.” 17

Though ‘unofficial’ ties would be maintained, the fact that U.S. leadership was willing to sever

all official ties with it’s R.O.C. ally in Taiwan speaks volumes about the perceived importance of

P.R.C.-U.S. relations. Indeed, the new U.S. position on Taiwan was formalized by President

Carter’s termination of the explicit support for Taiwan articulated in the 1954 Mutual Defense

Treaty and its replacement with the more vague Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979. Under the

TRA, the U.S. notes its support for a peaceful resolution to the dispute between Taiwan and

Mainland China, and suggests that it will keep selling arms to Taiwan. The TRA does not,

however, guarantee that the U.S. will come to Taiwan’s defense should it be faced with Chinese

aggression. 18

Motivations for Detente


China and the United States of America (December 16, 1978),” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, Accessed April 26, 2015.”

“Taiwan Relations Act of 1979,” USC US-China Institute, accessed April 26, 2015.18


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Having analyzed the diplomatic process by which Sino-American detente of the 1970s,

culminating in the 1979 Joint Communique, came about, I will now seek to analyze the

underlying factors which motivated this shift in relations. From my perspective, the shifting

political landscape of the Cold War played the largest role, followed by the somewhat less

significant but still relevant factor of Chinese and American domestic politics. Finally,

economics, though it may seem relevant from a contemporary perspective, appears to have

played a very small role in motivating U.S.-P.R.C. detente.

Shifting Cold War Landscape Alters Sino-U.S. Strategic Thinking

Based on my research, the greatest motivating factor behind the U.S.-P.R.C. detente of

the 1970s were shifts in Cold War politics. The first of these shifts was the Sino-Soviet split,

which isolated the P.R.C. from its former ally, the U.S.S.R. The beginning of this split can be

traced back to 1960, when Kruschev withdrew Soviet aid and advisors from the P.R.C over

ideological differences. This split deepened further, and became more internationally apparent,

with the 1962 closing of all Soviet consulates in the P.R.C. Relations grew more strained still 19

in 1968, when forces of the Soviet Union violently suppressed a democratic uprising in

Czechoslovakia known as the “Prague Spring.” This exemplified a new hardline Soviet policy

against Communist states seen as deviant, which came to be known as the “Brezhnev Doctrine,”

after the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. According to Amb. John H. Holdrige, who worked on 20

Nixon’s China policy,

Evelyn Goh, “Constructing U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From ‘Red Menace’ to ‘Tacit 19

Ally’,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 4.

Sutter, “US China Relations,” 69.20

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“The implications of this ideology for the ‘fraternal socialist states’ was obvious. If any of them deviated from the communist ideological ‘norm’ and went down the slippery path of ‘antisocialist degeneration,’ it then became the responsibility of the remaining members of the socialist camp to set the errant member back on the right course, even to the extent of using force, and quite in disregard of the concept of national sovereignty.” 21

Understandably, the Soviets’ apparent disregard for national sovereignty was deeply troubling to

the P.R.C., which shares a massive land border with the Soviet Union and was seen by many

Soviet officials as deviant from Marxist orthodoxy. What the Soviets did to Czechoslovakia, 22

they could attempt to do to China. Armed border clashes between the U.S.S.R and P.R.C. soon

broke out, including a bloody 1969 battle over the island of Zhenbao. These clashes were 23

followed by backchannel communications in which Soviet leaders suggested, in no uncertain

terms, that they were entertaining the possibility of an all-out invasion of China. In the face of

such escalating rhetoric, P.R.C. leadership became more inclined to accept diplomatic overtures

from the U.S., which could serve as a counterbalance to Soviet influence. 24

Meanwhile, the idea of Sino-American talks was made more palatable to leaders on both

sides by U.S. commitments to withdraw troops from Southeast Asia in accordance with the

Nixon Doctrine. This doctrine was first articulated by President Nixon at a press conference in

Guam in July 1969, at which he stated,

“Asians will say in every country that we visit that they do not want to be dictated to from the outside, Asia for the Asians. And that is what we want, and that is the role we should play. We should assist, but we should not dictate.... as far as our role is concerned,

Holdridge, “Crossing the Divide,” 23. 21

Sutter, “U.S.-Chinese Relations,” 69.22


Goh, “Constructing U.S. Rapprochement,” 4.24

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we must avoid that kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one that we have in Vietnam...” 25

In other words, through the Nixon Doctrine, U.S. leadership expressed a desire to decrease their

commitment of ground troops to American allies around the world. Instead, the U.S. would act

as a nuclear deterrent to attacks on its allies . Indeed, under the Doctrine, the U.S. withdrew 26

over 600,000 troops from Vietnam and elsewhere on China’s periphery. Naturally, from the 27

perspective of C.C.P. leadership, such a withdrawal could be seen as a U.S. retreat from attempts

to contain China in Southeast Asia. This, in turn, could be interpreted as a gesture of goodwill 28

which helped to pave the way for more amicable U.S.-P.R.C relations. From the perspective of

U.S. leadership, with less American troops present in the region, China could no longer be seen

as a direct threat to U.S. military assets and interests.

Further, the role of Cold War politics in prompting Sino-American detente can also be

understood in terms of growing U.S. concerns regarding the Soviet Union. In 1974, as

negotiations between the U.S.A. and P.R.C. were ongoing, Prof. Albert Wohlstetter of the

University of Chicago published an article titled “Is There a Strategic Arms Race?”, in which he

revived old fears that there was a growing ‘missile gap’ between the United States and the Soviet

Union, and that the Soviets were winning. Such ideas, coupled with the general sentiment that 29

Richard Nixon, “Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen,” in USCB: The American Presidency 25

Project, accessed April 26, 2015.

David Ekbladh, "Chinese Opera: Nixon Goes to China—Détente and its Meaning," Lecture, Tufts 26

University, Medford, MA, April 8, 2015.



Albert Wohlstetter, “Is There a Strategic Arms Race?” Article, Foreign Policy, 1974. JSTOR (http://29

www.jstor.org/stable/1147927?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents).

http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147927?seq=1%23page_scan_tab_contents

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U.S. power had been sapped by the Vietnam War, lead to an increase in fears of the Soviet Union

among the American public in the early 1970s. By tacitly allying with the P.R.C. against the

Soviets, therefore, U.S. leaders could help allay the concerns of their people by balancing against

Soviet power. Moreover, by the early 1970s, Nixon had begun efforts at detente with the

Soviets. One school of thought holds that, by perusing detente with the P.R.C. as well, Nixon

could force the Soviets to negotiate more quickly. 30

However, the idea that the shifting political landscape of the Cold War was the most

central and immediate cause of Sino-U.S. detente is not without its critics. One of the more

eloquent of these critics is Evelyn Goh, who attacks the traditional balance of power framework

of understanding warming Sino-U.S. relations as being overly realist. Goh argues that such an

interpretation falls short by assuming that “structural changes automatically induce appropriate,

rational responses from states.” Instead, she adopts the constructivist perspective that absolute 31

‘rationality’ is not the norm among states and their leaders, but rather that perceptions in global

geopolitics are often made up of “constructed realities.” In this vein, Goh points out two 32

major shortcomings of orthodox realist ‘balance of power’ explanations of Sino-American

detente.

On one level, Goh suggests that such accounts “lack historical context.” Noting that a

Sino-Soviet split became evident to the international community as early as 1962, she poses the

question, “Why did the balance-of-power response from Washington and Beijing take so

Sutter, “U.S.-Chinese Relations,” 66-67.30



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long?” If shifting Cold War relations were truly the driving force behind rapprochement, she 33

argues, major negotiations and reconciliation should have begun long prior to 1972. This is, on

its surface, a legitimate observation. However, it understates the importance of events of the late

1960s which fundamentally shifted the calculus of the Cold War balance of power. First, though

China and the Soviet Union had certainly not been on good terms since the early 1960s, it was

the conceptual threat of the Prague Spring in 1968 and the very tangible threat of a Soviet

invasion of the Chinese homeland in 1969 which seems to have pushed Chinese leaders to seek a

tacit U.S. alliance with which to counterbalance Soviet power. Second, as already discussed, it 34

was not until 1969 that Nixon first articulated his “Nixon Doctrine.” In doing so, he positioned

the U.S. as less of threat to Chinese regional dominance in Southeast Asia, which, in turn, led

Chinese leadership to see the Americans as a more agreeable partner with which to

counterbalance the Soviet threat. Considering the fact that the Chinese seemed somewhat 35

receptive to U.S. requests for negotiation in 1978, and that Kissinger himself was allowed to visit

Beijing by 1971, the historical record would appear to indicate that these events, very much

linked to the international balance of power, pushed China over the proverbial edge in their

willingness to negotiate with the United States. 36

Goh’s second major criticism of the idea that shifting Cold War politics was the driving

force behind China-U.S. rapprochement is that such an account is “...silent on how Nixon and




Holdridge, “Crossing the Divide," 24-27.36

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Kissinger managed to convince others of the rationality of their new policy.” She points out 37

that China had historically been seen as a major U.S. enemy, and that the Nixon administration’s

ability to open the doors to U.S.-China reconciliation without massive political backlash cannot

be explained without extensive analysis beyond the realist ‘balance of power’ interpretation. In

this regard, Goh’s critique of realist explanations of Sino-American reconciliation is somewhat

legitimate. Cold war Power politics cannot entirely explain Nixon’s success. However, Nixon’s

ability to change opinions on China can be understood without venturing too far from the realist,

balance-of-power framework. First, Nixon was a president with sterling anti-communist

credentials. Indeed, he first emerged on the national political scene as a member of the House

Un-American Activities Committee in 1948. Such credentials certainly helped shield him from 38

some criticism in reaching out to China. Second, it should not be forgotten that Kissinger

arranged Nixon’s 1972 trip to China and the release of the Shanghai Communique in secret. 39

By the time political opponents and other critics would have had a chance to effectively attack

Nixon for his talks with China, he had already returned to the U.S. with a conciliatory agreement

in hand. Thus, though it was nonetheless impressive, Nixon’s ability to successfully open

negotiations with China is relatively understandable, and by no means conflicts with balance of

power explanations of the improving relationship.

In short, though Goh and constructivist critics like her raise some intriguing and valid

questions about whether the shifting Cold War political landscape was the central motivating


Conrad Black, “Richard M. Nixon: A Life in Full,” (PublicAffairs, 2007),129-135.38

“Getting to Beijing: Henry Kissinger’s Secret 1971 Trip,” USC US-China Institute, accessed March 8, 39

2015.

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factor behind China-U.S. rapprochement, their arguments ultimately fall short of disproving such

orthodox realist understandings. However, their interpretation is still valuable in that it allows us

to problematize more traditional power balance explanations, and to enrich our understanding of

the broad array of factors which did contribute to the detente in China-U.S. relations.

Domestic Political Motivations

Though the shifting political landscape of the Cold War was the dominant factor behind

the Sino-U.S. detente of the 1970s, the domestic political environment of each nation also played

a significant role. In China, U.S. overtures in the early 1970s regarding negotiations came at an

opportune time for Mao. As argued by Roderick Macfarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, due to

the political purges of the Cultural Revolution, members of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA),

who generally stood in contrast to Mao’s more radical faction, had gained significant power in

the CCP’s Central Committee by the late 1960s. Mao believed that this PLA faction, lead by Lin

Biao, would continue to gain power and influence, perhaps posing a threat to his leadership, if

the specter of war with the Soviet Union continued to loom large in the Chinese consciousness.

Consequently, “If the Soviet threat could be neutralized by an opening to the United States, then

the role of the PLA could be diminished...”, and preeminence of Mao’s radical faction could be

assured. Put another way, political infighting among the Chinese Communist Party may have 40

contributed to Mao’s decision to seek negotiations with the United States as a means to quiet

perceived political opposition from individuals such as Lin Biao.

Roderick Mafarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, “Mao’s Last Revolution,” (Cambridge: The Belknap 40

Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 320-321.

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Yet another domestic political factor which may have contributed to the Chinese

willingness to establish full diplomatic relations with the United States was the death of Mao

Zedong in 1976. Though he would be briefly replaced by the similarly radical “Gang of Four”

from 1976 to 1978, Mao’s death nonetheless marked the beginning of a transition to more

moderate Chinese leadership in the person of Chairman Deng Xiaoping and his successors. 41

This is significant as, though he had shown a willingness to open up to negotiations with the

United States, how far Mao would have been willing to go to improve Sino-American ties

remains to be seen. Indeed, Mao’s willingness to open relations with the international

community was thrown into question as late as July 1976, when his regime refused to allow

foreign aid in the recovery efforts following a major earthquake in Tangshan, due to Maoist

ideological dedication to ‘self reliance’. Moreover, whether U.S. leadership could have 42

managed to politically sell full diplomatic recognition of a P.R.C. government lead by Mao, one

of the ideological forefathers of global Communism, remains to be seen. With the ascendence of

the more moderate leader, Deng Xiaoping, in 1978, the idea of official recognition of China may

have become more palatable to the American public.

Domestic U.S. politics seem to have played a role in detente in other ways as well. One

factor, no doubt, was the anti-war movement which was swelling on college campuses and

throughout the nation from the late 1960s. Indeed, by 1971, nearly 70% of Americans supported

the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam, based on one poll. This increasingly negative 43



William L. Lunch and Peter W. Sperlich, “American Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam,” p. 26, 43

Article, The Western Political Quarterly, 1979. JSTOR (http://www.jstor.org/stable/447561).

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public opinion on the Vietnam War, coupled with the U.S. military’s inability to make significant

strategic progress on the ground, likely influenced Nixon to articulate and later to carry out his

intention to withdraw American troops from Southeast Asia through the Nixon Doctrine.

Therefore, the decreased concern among P.R.C. leadership regarding U.S. efforts to contain

China brought about by the Nixon Doctrine, as perviously discussed, was indirectly related to 44

the unpopularity of the Vietnam War in domestic U.S. politics. Moreover, Chinese involvement

in the Vietnam conflict had long been articulated as one of the reasons for U.S. involvement. As

far back as President Johnson’s administration, U.S. officials had been highlighting the dangers

of Beijing’s meddling in Vietnam based on the ‘domino theory’ and concepts of containment. 45

Perhaps, in Nixon’s view, by opening friendly negotiations with China, he could allay American

concerns about China’s Southeast Asian interests. In doing so, he could more easily extricate

himself from the Vietnam debacle.

Regardless of his reasoning, it is apparent that Nixon viewed reopening relations with

China as a political prize. According to Robert G. Sutter, he was particularly concerned about

letting such a political opportunity fall into the hands of his Democratic rivals . Statistically 46

speaking, Nixon’s assumption that opening China would be politically valuable proved correct.

According to Gallop polls, between the beginning of February and the beginning of March,

1972, during which period Nixon made his historic trip to China, his approval ratings jumped 4%


Robert Garson, “Lyndon B. Johnson and the China Enigma,” Article, Journal of Contemporary History, 45

1997. JSTOR (http://www.jstor.org/stable/261076).


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from 52% to 56% and disapproval ratings dropped 5% from 37% to 32%. Moreover, his 1972 47

campaign played up the theme of Nixon as a great peacemaker. In his August 1972 acceptance

of the Republican Presidential nomination, he asserted, “The dialogue that we have begun with

the People's Republic of China has reduced the danger of war and has increased the chance for

peaceful cooperation between two great peoples.” In this same vein, one 1972 Nixon campaign 48

ad proudly declared, in song, “Reaching out across the sea, making friends where foes used to

be. Giving hope to Humanity...” while displaying a dramatic photo of Nixon being greeted by

Mao . Clearly, Nixon understood the domestic political value of opening talks with China, and 49

was not afraid to use his success in this area to gain votes.

Though they were certainly significant, domestic political concerns played a less vital

role in China-U.S. rapprochement than did shifting Cold War politics. After all, many of the

domestic political factors above discussed, including Mao’s desire to stem the ascendency of a

PLA faction within the CCP and the introduction of the Nixon Doctrine, were closely tied to the

politics of the shifting Cold War balance of power. That is to say, many domestic political

motivations for restoring China-U.S. relations would not have come to prominence had it not

been for concerns about the shifting Cold War political landscape.

Moreover, any suggestion of the preeminence of domestic politics in shaping China-U.S.

relations must ignore the tangible domestic political opposition to detente which existed in both

“Job Performance Ratings for Richard Nixon,” Roper Center Public Opinion Archives, Accessed April 47

26, 2015.

Richard Nixon, “Remarks on Accepting the Presidential Nomination,” The American Presidency Project, 48

accessed April 26, 2015.

“Nixon 1972 Presidential Campaign Ad,” The Living Room Candidate, Accessed April 24, 2015. 49

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nations. In the P.R.C., many CCP officials, particularly those of Lin Biao’s PLA faction, appear

to have been opposed to detente with the United States on principle. Indeed, during one

declassified 1972 discussion with Nixon, Mao spoke of a “reactionary group which is opposed to

our contact with you,” almost certainly in reference to Lin Biao. Had Lin not been killed in a 50

plane crash in September 1971, which some say was orchestrated by Mao, such political 51

opposition could have proved to be a stumbling block to Mao’s efforts at improving Sino-U.S.

relations. Domestic opposition to detente was palpable in the United States as well. Luckily for

Nixon, his strong anti-Communist reputation largely protected him from some such criticism.

However, when President Carter attempted to decrease U.S. support for Taiwan in the wake of

the 1979 Joint Communique by terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 and replacing it

with the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, he faced staunch opposition from the Senate.

Some Congressmen even attempted to bring a constitutional challenge against the TRA, claiming

that Carter had overstepped his authority by reversing previous security agreements with Taiwan.

Though this challenge to improved Sino-U.S. relations failed, it demonstrates the real opposition

faced by such measures in the United States. Given such opposition, the decision to reopen 52

relations with China could not have been a foregone conclusion for any American President.

Therefore, domestic politics were ultimately less of a factor in bringing about detente than were

shifts in the Cold War political landscape.

Economic Motivations

“Mao Meets Richard Nixon,” USC US-China Institute, accessed March 8, 2015.50

Mafarquhar and Schoenhals, “Mao’s Last Revolution,” 322.51

Sutter, “U.S. Chinese Relations,” 78.52

Stack �19

Finally, upon beginning my research for this paper, I was convinced that economic

interests would have played a major role in promoting the China-U.S. detente of the 1970s,

which culminated in the 1979 Joint Communique. However, after extensive research, I must

conclude that economic factors, though they were considered by leaders on both sides of the

Pacific in deciding to improve Sino-U.S. relations, played a secondary role far less significant

than the Shifting Cold War landscape or domestic political concerns.

The logic behind my initial assumption was straightforward. After all, 1978 marked the

beginning of Deng Xiaoping’s “Reform and Opening” in China, which sought to liberalize the

P.R.C.‘s historically centrally planned economy. As part of these reforms, China began to seek

limited foreign investment in so-called “Special Economic Zones.” By reestablishing relations

with the United States, China could tap investment capital from the world’s largest economy. By

getting in on the proverbial ‘ground floor’ of investment in mainland China, U.S. investors stood

to make a major profit.

Some U.S. interest in opening up China’s massive economy did exist. Indeed, as far back

as 1967, Nixon had indicated in an article in Foreign Policy that “there is no place on this small

planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation.” Evidently, 53

Nixon took the economic potential of China’s massive population seriously. Moreover, in the

early 1970s, Senator William Fulbright organized hearings which touched on the issue of China’s

Richard Nixon, “Asia After Vietnam,” Foreign Affairs, October, 1967, accessed April 25, 2015,http://53

www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23927/richard-m-nixon/asia-after-viet-nam.

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23927/richard-m-nixon/asia-after-viet-nam

Stack �20

massive economic potential. In these hearings, organizations such as the U.S. Chamber of

Commerce emerged as proponents of Sino-U.S. detente. 54

However, despite their presence, it appears that such voices promoting economic reasons

for opening relations with China remained in the background of major debates on the subject.

Upon examining economic statistics, it becomes evident why. Even by 1988, a decade after

Deng’s “Reform and Opening” had begun, the total value of trade between the U.S. and the

P.R.C remained below $20 billion. In retrospect, this is an understandable outcome. After all, 55

China’s economic liberalization has happened through gradual stages. Even with the beginning

of Reform and Opening in 1978, the Chinese economy was still a primarily centrally planned

one, and would remain that way for years to come. Moreover, to foreign observers, including

Americans, it may have been difficult to gauge just how dedicated Deng’s regime was to

economic reform. After all, the CCP had historically been prone to seemingly unpredictable

policy shifts. In light of such gradual reform and well founded doubts about the future of

China’s economic liberalization, it is unsurprising that economic opportunities remained

secondary to Cold War and domestic politics as a motivating factor behind the China-U.S.

detente of the 1970s.

In light of this realization, I recognize that my initial presumption of the centrality of

economic concerns was likely biased by my experience with contemporary Sino-American

relations, in which trade is paramount. I failed to sufficiently account for the fact that this trade

Goh, “Constructing The U.S. Rapprochement,” 57-58.54

“Talking Points: June 3-17, 2009,” USC US-China Institute, accessed April 24, 2015. http://55

china.usc.edu/talking-points-june-3-17-2009.

http://china.usc.edu/talking-points-june-3-17-2009

Stack �21

is a relatively recent phenomenon. In the future, I will be more cautious about letting my biases

influence my analysis of historical events.

Conclusion

The 1970s marked a watershed period in China-U.S. relations. The “Joint Communiqué

on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the People's Republic of China and the

United States of America,” released in December 1978, was the culmination of a decade of work

by American and Chinese politicians to replace decades of mistrust between the U.S. and P.R.C.

with a working, productive diplomatic relationship. Though many factors motivated this shift in

relations, the most significant cause was the shifting international political landscape of the Cold

War, followed by somewhat less vital but still significant trends in the domestic politics of the

U.S.A. and P.R.C.. Finally, despite contemporary appearances, economic factors actually played

a relatively small role in the warming of Sino-U.S. relations.

Stack �22

Annotated Bibliography

American Foreign Policy, 1950-55; Basic Documents. [Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of China]. Washington, D.C.: Washington, U. S. Govt. Print. Office, 1957.

This primary source document details the pre-communique relationship of the United States with the Republic of China (Taiwan) at the expense of the People’s Republic of China (mainland China). Provides perspective on changes due to communique.

Black, Conrad. “Richard M. Nixon: A Life in Full,” PublicAffairs 2007. This secondary source covers the background of Nixon’s rise to power and his anti-

communist credentials.

“China,” Foreign Relations of the United States., edited by Nickles, David P. Vol. XIII, 1977-1980. Washington, DC: United States Department of State, 2013.

This collection of primary source documents from the US government exposes discussions around detente with China and the communique specifically, providing a view of what motivated US government officials at the time.

Ekbladh, David. "Chinese Opera: Nixon Goes to China—Détente and its Meaning," Lecture, Tufts University, Medford, MA, April 8, 2015.

This secondary source provides background on the history of U.S. relations and rapprochement with the P.R.C.

Garrison, Jean A. Making China Policy: From Nixon to G.W. Bush. Boulder: Lynne Riener Publishers, 2005.

Secondary source providing background on difficulties faces by Pres. Carter in signing 1979 Join Communique.

"Getting to Beijing: Henry Kissinger's Secret 1971 Trip." USC US-China Institute, accessed 8 March, 2015, http://china.usc.edu/getting-beijing-henry-kissingers-secret-1971-trip.

Secondary source which provides background on Nixon administration’s first attempts at outreach and direct communication with the PRC, explaining origins of communique.

Goh, Evelyn. Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974 :From "Red Menace" to "Tacit Ally". Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Secondary source providing detailed information on how early detente between US and China proceeded in years prior to communique.

http://china.usc.edu/getting-beijing-henry-kissingers-secret-1971-trip

Stack �23

Holdridge, John H. Crossing the Divide: An Insider's Account of the Normalization of US-China Relations. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997.

Firsthand account of the evolution of the US-China relationship before and after the communique. Provides context.

“Job Performance Ratings for Richard Nixon,” Roper Center Public Opinion Archives, Accessed April 26, 2015. http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cfide/roper/presidential/webroot/presidential_rating_detail.cfm?allRate=True&presidentName=Nixon.

Primary source showing rise in Nixon’s popularity after 1972 China trip.

Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America, Website of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States (December 16, 1978).

The communique itself (primary source). This is what my paper is built around.

Lunch, William L. and Sperlich, Peter W., “American Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam,” p. 26, Article, The Western Political Quarterly, 1979. JSTOR (http://www.jstor.org/stable/447561).

Primary source regarding declining popularity of Vietnam war and its contribution to Nixon doctrine.

Mafarquhar, Roderick, and Schoenhals, Michael, “Mao’s Last Revolution,” Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006.

This secondary source details the argument that CCP infighting led Mao to negotiate with the U.S.

“Mao Meets Richard Nixon,” USC US-China Institute, accessed March 8, 2015. This primary source details Mao’s discussion of those opposed to reconciliation with the U.S within his own party

“Nixon 1972 Presidential Campaign Ad,” The Living Room Candidate, Accessed April 24, 2015. http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1972/nixon-now.

Primary source which loud’s Nixon’s achievements in opening China.

Nixon, Richard. “Asia After Vietnam,” Foreign Affairs, October, 1967, accessed April 25, 2015, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23927/richard-m-nixon/asia-after-viet-nam.

Primary source in which Nixon alludes to economic significance of China.

http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cfide/roper/presidential/webroot/presidential_rating_detail.cfm?allRate=True&presidentName=Nixon

http://www.jstor.org/stable/447561

http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1972/nixon-now

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23927/richard-m-nixon/asia-after-viet-nam

Stack �24

Nixon, Richard, “Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen,” in USCB: The American Presidency Project, accessed April 26, 2015. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2140

In this primary source, Nixon lays out the basis of the Nixon doctrine.

Nixon, Richard. “Remarks on Accepting the Presidential Nomination,” The American Presidency Project, accessed April 26, 2015. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3537.

Primary source in which Nixon talks about his record on China to gain support.

Sweetman, Arthur, and Zhang, Jun. Economic Transitions with Chinese Characteristics: 30 Years of Reform and Opening Up. Montreal: McGill- Queens University Press, 2009.

This secondary source provides some background regarding reform and opening in China the economic motivations for an improved relationship with the U.S.

Sinha, Radha, “Sino-American Relations: Mutual Paranoia,” New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

This secondary source provides background on the history of U.S. vs P.R.C. hostilities.

"Taiwan Relations Act of 1979." USC China- US Institute, accessed 8 March, 2015.

Primary source detailing change in status (official non-recognition) adopted by US toward Taiwan with release of communique.

"Talking Points: June 3 - 17, 2009." USC US-China Institute, accessed March 8, 2015, http://china.usc.edu/talking-points-june-3-17-2009.

Provides some charts and hard data backing up claims that trade between PRC and US has grown massively from 1978 into 21st century.

Wohlstetter, Albert, “Is There a Strategic Arms Race?” Article, Foreign Policy, 1974. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147927?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

This primary source from the period details concerns about the Russian missile gap which may have contributed to rapprochement with China.

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2140

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3537

http://china.usc.edu/talking-points-june-3-17-2009

http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147927?seq=1%23page_scan_tab_contents