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Citation for final published version:
Bridge, Gary 2019. Habit, experience and environment: a pragmatist perspective. Environment and
Planning D: Society and Space 10.1177/0263775819882715 file
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publicationinEnvironmentandPlanningD:SocietyandSpace
Habit,experienceandenvironment:apragmatistperspective
GaryBridge,CardiffUniversity
Keywords
Habit,vitalism,experience,pragmatism,environment,Dewey
Abstract
Contemporarydiscussionsofhuman-environmentrelationsseehabitsasenabling
forcesofchange(becoming)incontrasttotraditionalviewsofhabitasroutineand
restrictiveelementsofidentity(being).Vitallife(becoming)isrealisedinhabit
throughbodyrepetition(Ravaisson)orthroughmaterialforce(Deleuze).Thispaper
arguesforthesignificanceofthepragmatistworkofJohnDeweythatsharesthis
dispositional,enablingviewofhabit,butdeniesanydualismbetweenlifeand
mechanism.ThepaperexploresDewey’sideaofhabitsasmechanismsofnatural
formsoforganisationthathavedifferentlifeforce,dependingonthesituational
qualitiesofenvironment-humantransactions.Thisapproachalsoimplicateshabitin
problematisation.Thepapergoesontodiscusstheimplicationsofpragmatist
thinkingforunderstandinghuman-environmentrelationsandtheplacethathabits
haveininterveninginandreformingthoserelationsthroughsocialactivismand
publicpolicy.
Introduction
Human-environmentrelationsaretheheartofhumangeography.Thewaythat
humansinteractwiththeirenvironments(betheynaturalorsocial)hastakena
particularturninrecentgeographicalresearchintermsofarenewedinterestin
habits,whichareseenasintermediariesinhuman-environmentrelations.Rather
thanseeinghabitsasconservativeforcesofroutinebehaviour,recentgeographical
attentionhasfocusedonhabitsasformsofbecomingandasvectorsofchange
(Dewsbury2011;Leaetal2015;Sharpe2012).Thisisinpartaresultoftaking
environmentalprocessesasmuchmorepartofhabitformationbyconceivingofthe
environmentas‘vital’(inhavingalifeforcebeyonditsconstituentparts)ormaterials
2
oftheenvironment(inorganicaswellasorganic)ashavinglife;‘forcefulmaterialism’
asDewsburyandBissell(2015)havedefinedit.GeographersrefertoFelix
Ravaisson’sOfHabit(2008[1838])asthesourceofthevitalistideaofhabit,orto
GillesDeleuze(1995)forthematerialistversion.Boththeseapproachesaccord
autonomytolifeforce.InthispaperIcontrasttheseideaswiththeideasofhabitin
pragmatistphilosophy,whichalsoseetheenvironmentasvitalandhabitsas
projective,acknowledginglifeforce,butseeingitasemergingfromnatural
mechanismsoforganisation(ofwhichhabitisone).Isuggesthowthenaturalismof
pragmatistphilosopherJohnDeweysituateshabitaslifeforceandorganisationina
waythatalsoacknowledgesenvironmentalforcesbeyondhumanpurposes.This
explainsinparttheintractabilityofhabits(theycannotbechangedbyanactof
consciouswillalone),butitalsoseesmechanismsintheenvironment(intheway
thathabitsareinevitablyimplicatedinproblematisation)thathavethepotentialto
openuphabitstomoreconscioushumaninterventionandchange.Thisisillustrated
infourwaysforpolicyformulationandsocialactivism:throughinterventionsinthe
formationofhabits;inovercomingtheclashofhabits;intheinstitutionalisationof
habits;inhabitsasbackgroundconditionsofwiderproblematisations,suchas
environmentalism.Inemphasisingapragmaticunderstandingofhabitthepaperis
alsobuildingonagrowinginterestinpragmatismingeographymorewidely(for
example,Harneyetal2016;WoodandSmith2008).
Contemporarydiscussionsofhabit
Theanalysisoftherelationshipbetweenhumansandtheirenvironmenthasseena
shifttowardsaccordingmoreforcetotheenvironmentandtoassemblagesofnon-
humanactants(objects,non-humanorganisms)aswellashumansinexplaining
activity,action,andevents(DeleuzeandGuattari1987;DaLanda2016).Thishas
beenpartofseeinghumansasjustonecomponentinamore-than-human
environmentinvolvingaflatterontologyofwhatconstitutessignificantactivity,one
inwhichtheprivilegedplaceofhumanactionandreasonhasbeendeflated.A
more‘vital’environmentisaresultofassembledenergiesseeneitheraslifeforce,or
asvitalmatter/materiality.Thisisunderpinnedbyaprocessualontologythatsees
allphenomena(includingwhatmightbeseenasinertmaterials/objects)as
emergentorbecoming.Stabilisingforcesthatmaintaincontinuityarere-evaluated
includingtheideaofhabit–seenasamediumofongoingactivitybetween
environmentandhumanstraditionallyconceivedasroutine-andnowseenasa
forceforchange.InthisreappraisalofhabittheworkofFelixRaviassonandGilles
Deleuzehavebeentakenup,andinsomecasesincomparisonwiththepragmatist
philosophyJohnDewey.
3
ComparisonsbetweenpragmatismandRavaisson’svitalismhavebeenmadeacross
disciplinaryapproaches(withthemedissuesonhabitinculturalgeographiesand
Body&Societyin2013).InhisdiscussionofthegenealogiesofhabitTonyBennett
(2013)makesthedistinctionbetweentreatmentsofhabit(includingDewey’s)that
areinthe‘organicmemory’tradition,incontrasttothe‘vitalist’traditionof
Ravaisson,Bergsonandothers.Theorganicmemorytraditionispost-Darwinianand
emphasisestheevolutionaryinfluenceoftheenvironmentonorganisms“inwhich
habitmediatestherelationsbetweeninheritedandacquiredcompetences”
(Bennett,2013,113).HenriBergson’svitalistcontributiondrawsonevolutionary
naturalismandmaterialismbut,incontrasttothesetraditions,accordsan
autonomousforcetolife(Bennett2013).BennettdiscussesBergson’s(2004[1912])
distinction(fromRavaisson)between‘habit-memory’and‘habitproper’,a
distinctionalsoevidentinDeleuze’s(1995)distinctionbetween‘sensory-motor
habits’and‘primaryhabits’.Thepointofthesedistinctionsistosuggestthatthereis
amoreprofoundformofhabit(‘habitproper’or‘primaryhabits’)thatcomesfrom
vitallifeforceormaterialforcethatisbeyondorganicmechanismsandthatmakes
habitssubjecttounconscious/subconsciouschange.
Ingeographyideasofhabithavebeenaddressedatdifferenttimesinwaysthat
reflectcertainkeytraditionsofgeographicalanalysis.Muchoftheclassicworkin
culturalgeographyattheturnofthe20thcenturywasconcernedwithestablishing
thesignificanceoftheroleofcultureandhabitsoflifein‘genresdevie’(Vidaldela
Blache1903)andsenseofplaceinthelandscapeagainstoverlydeterministic
interpretationsofenvironmentalinfluencesonhumanactivity(Sauer1925).Ina
relatedwayinthe1960sand70shumanpatternsofactivityandtheirroutinized
constraints(suchasspatialpathdependenciesandcouplingconstraints)werealsoat
theheartoftimegeographies(Hägerstrand1970).Theseapproachestosome
extentreflectthemoreKantianideaofhabitasroutine,especiallyitsfunctionin
place-making,buttheyalsopointtothemoreconstructiveaspectsofhabitinthe
socialconstitutionofmeaningandbelonging(Bissell2015).Furtherworkin
humanisticgeographyinthe1970sand80sdevelopedthephenomenological
aspectsofmeaningfulenvironmentsandtheimportanceofhabitinfeelingsof
belonging(Tuan1977;LeyandSamuels1978).
Phenomenologyalsoinfluencedworkinhumanisticgeographythathighlightedthe
significanceofthebodyandcorporealityasthelocusofhabitinunderstanding
human/environmentrelations.Seamon’swork(1979),forexample,spatialisedthe
ideasofthephenomenologistMerleau-Pontythroughtheanalysisof‘bodyballets’
andtime-spaceroutinesofhabit’(seealsoBissell2015).Merleau-Ponty’sideasof
inter-corporealityandthesignificanceofhabitininfluencingmorecognitive
interactionaredevelopedbyLeaetal(2015)(viaCrossley’s2001work)intheir
analysisofhowmuchmindfulnessmeditationcanreflexivelychangehabits.Leaet
4
alseeagencyasdistributedacrossminds,bodiesandcontextsandthesewidertime-
spaceroutinescompromisetheabilityofmindfulnesstotransformhabits.Herethey
areregisteringthetensionbetweenhabitasconservationandroutineandhabitas
capacityandprojection.
Theideaofthedistributednatureofhabit,acrossbodiesandenvironments,takesus
towardstheinterpretationofhabitingeographyasemergenttendencyor
potentiality.ThusBissell(2015)seesashabitasa‘virtualinfrastructure’comprising
propensitiesanddispositions(Bissell2015).Thevirtualinfrastructureofhabitcan
berealisedinpracticalcompetencesincopingwithnewmilieu,butwithchanging
intensities(trackedintheexampleoflong-haulairtravel)thatinturnaffectsthe
capacitiesofbodiestoact(seealsoHynesandSharpe2015).
Analysingthesignificanceofthedistributednatureofhabitfortransportgeography
Schwanenetal(2012)makeaninsightfulcomparisonofRavaisson’sandJohn
Dewey’sideas.TheyacknowledgethesimilaritiesbetweenDeweyandRavaissonin
seeinghabitasatendencyandofthedynamicandprojectiveaspectsofhabit.They
alsonoteamoreenvironmentallydistributedideaofhabitinDewey’swork,in
comparisonwithRavaisson’smoreindividualisticframing.Thisalsoappliestothe
relationshipbetweenhabitsandtheinevitableclashofhabits,bothwithinthe
individualorganism,andbetweenhabitsinamoresocialsense,intermsofcustoms
andinstitutions.ThisispartofDewey’sargumentonhabitsinrelationtosocial
changeandsocialdivision,givinghisapproachagreaterradicaledge,accordingto
Schwanenetal(discussedlater).TheyseethemaindistinctionbetweenRavaisson
andDeweyinRavaisson’sideaofhabitasawayofunderstandingtheunityand
continuityofnaturewhereasDeweyisnotpreparedto“admittotheimprovised
spontaneityofalllife”becausethis“wouldbetolosesightofthedialectical
formationofthesocialthatissocrucialtopragmatism”(HynesandSharpe2015,69,
referringtoSchoenbach2004).
Iwilltakeupthequestionofthesedivisionsbetween‘life’andmechanismsinthe
restofthepaper,sufficetosaythat,assumingtheunityandcontinuityofnatureand
theautonomousforceoflifetakesusintotreatmentsofhabitingeographythatsee
itasacontractionofwiderworldly,immanentforces,certainstabilisationsofwhich,
individuateorentrainsubjectivities(Dewsbury2015).Thismoreopeninterpretation
ofhabitasaformofbecomingisseeningeographyinnon-representational
approaches.ThusThrift(2007)shiftstheemphasisonthehistoricityofpracticesand
habits(Bourdieu1977)towardstheirspatialitiesandtheirperformativeand
processualqualities.Thisalsoentailsvirtualities,thepotentialitiesofpracticesand
theirdispersive,differentiatingqualities,(ratherthanbeingconservingand
consolidating).Thisstartstoopenupthemoreemergent,projectiveideaofhabit
withingeography.Dewsbury(2015),forexample,analysesDeleuze’sideaofhabit
5
(viaRavaisson)aspassiveopennesstoachangingworldinwhichhabitisas‘an
occupation’enabledby‘materialaffordances’ofthelandscape,that,ratherthan
restrictingaction,allowssubjectstobeattentivetonewelementsthatcanbetaken
fromrepetition.Repetitionsareseenassingularitiesandaformofdifference,
ratherthaniterationsofsameness.Inthiswayhabitprovidesthebasisforan
enduringsenseofself(Dewsbury2015,32).
Thusingeographywehaveseenarangeofinterpretationsofhabit,fromneo-
Kantianconservationandroutine,(particularlyinrelationtoplace-making),through
tohabitasacontractionofmobileforcesoutofwhich(contingent)formsof
subjectivityareentrained.IntherestofthispaperIwanttoaddressthisshiftfrom
habitasmechanism/routinetohabitascontractionoflifeforcebyfirstofalltakinga
stepbacktoacknowledgethelong-standingphilosophicaldistinctionbetweenideas
oflifeforceandformsofnaturalorganisation/mechanismthatliebehindthe
distinctionsmadebetweenRaviassonandDewey.InthecourseofthisdiscussionI
argueforthevalueofDeweyanpragmatismincapturingbothvitalistideasofthe
environmentalongsideformsofactivity(especially,butnotexclusively,human
activity)asformsofnaturalorganisation/mechanism.Ratherthanreproducingthe
divisionbetweenlifeandmechanismpragmatismsuggestshowtoholdthem
togetherbutinawaythatlife(evenspontaneouslife)emergesfrommechanisms.
Thisinvolvesanexplorationofaworldlyideaofhabitandtheroleof‘experience’in
thecontractionofwidermaterialforces.Todothisthepaperfirstdiscusses
Ravaisson,DeleuzeandDewey’sideasofhabitinmoredetailbeforegoingonto
comparethem.
RavaissonandDeleuzeonhabit
RavaissonsituateshabitfirmlyinanAristoteliantraditionthatseeshabitasa
facilitativelifeforcethatreachesdownintonature(Ravaisson2008;Carlisle,2013).
Itisaproductofrepetition,notasroutine,butastheacquisitionofcapacities
throughthebody.Habitobservesa‘doublelaw’forRavaisson.Asanactivityis
repeated,thecapacityforfeelingorpassion(thatresultsfromtheorganism’s
passivityoropennesstotheworld)diminishesandthecapacityformovementor
actionisstrengthened.Atthesametimerepeatedhabitshavetheoppositeeffect
onmoralconduct,movingfromactivetopassive,fromsensationandmoral
sensibilitytowardsmoreunreflexiveaction.Habitbecomeslessandlessreflective
andmoreandmorecapable,thus“habitdemonstrate[s]continuitybetween
necessityandfreedom,willandnature”(Carlisle,2010:123).The“habit-body”isa
“dynamicunityofcapacitiesanddispositionstomove,tosense,toexperience,and
tounderstandinparticularways”(Carlisle,2013:162-3).Theseacquiredcapacities
canberealisedindifferentways–frombodyfinesseandaccomplishment(aformof
6
‘grace’),throughtomoredegraded,compulsiveperformativitiesofthebodyin
formsofaddiction.ForRavaisson,moralgoodnessissuesoutofnature,asa
reflectionofdivinespirit.ItcontrastswiththemoretraditionalKantianview,which
seeshabitasroutinebehaviour,andasarestrictionorimpedimenttoreason,that
shouldbeconsideredseparatelyfrommorallife(Carlisle,2013).
Ravaisson’sAristotelian,moreexpansiveideaofhabit,reachingintonatureand
encompassingthetensionsofvitalenergies,hascreatedanintellectuallegacy–
fromRavaissontoBergson(2004)andhisideaof‘élanvital’and’fromBergson
throughtoDeleuzeandhisfigurationsofneo-vitalisminassemblagesofmaterials
andorganisms.InDeleuze’shands(1995)Ravaisson’svitalismbecomesmore
materialist,asmicroormolecularrepetitionsofmatteraccumulatetoform(new)
habits,mostlysub-consciously.RepetitionforDeleuzeisarepetitionofsingularities,
singularitiesresultingfromtheconstantproductionoflifeandmatterinavibrant
world.ItinclinesDeleuzeandGuattari(1987)towardsaviewofnatureas
mechanismormachine(theycallnaturea‘warmachine’),inthedualismbetween
lifeandmechanism.Howeverthatmechanismisseeninmaterialisttermsinwhat
JaneBennetthascalledDeleuzeandGuattari’s‘machinicmaterialism’(Bennett,
2010).Itisaninsistentforceofmatter,“thethousandsofpassivesynthesesof
whichweareorganicallycomposed”(Deleuze,1995,74)thatinsinuateschangeinto
‘primaryhabits’1.ForDeleuze(1995)changesinoutwardperformancearetheresult
ofintensebiologicalactivitythatisnotsensibletotheactorashabitanditinvolves
body-brain-environmentadaption(Bissell,2013:122).Againitgivesautonomyto
lifeforce(asmachinicmaterialism).
HabitforDeleuzeisacontractionofmatterandthetemporalitiesemergentfrom
thewaythatmatter(inorganicthroughtoorganic)contractstheforcesofthat
compriseitspresentcondition:“[m]aterialityisitselfatendencytoelaboration,to
temporization,theprocessofbecomingaliveoftheinorganic:totheextentthat
mattercancontracttheforcesthatproduceitsparticularform,itisthistendency,
thispotentialityorthisvirtualorientation”(Grosz2013,231).Thisvirtualorientation
isanopeningout“withitsnecessaryduplicationofthepresentandtheactualwith
theunspentforcesofthepastandthevirtual”(233).Repetitionisarepetitionof
singularitiesthatproducedifferenceemergingfromtheramifyingforceoflife.As
Grosz(2013)definesit,fromaDeleuzianperspective,“habitisthepointoftransition
betweenlivingbeingsandmatter,enablingeachtobetransformedthroughits
engagementwiththeother”(Grosz2013,217).Shegoeson(andinawaythat
1InpursuingthisargumentDeleuzeandGuattari(1987)relinquishtheirnaturalism
foramoretranscendentideaoftheconstantforceofmatter,‘forcefulmaterialism’
(DewsburyandBissell2015).PaulPattonhasarguedrecently(2016)thatDeleuze
cannotbeseenasanaturalistphilosopher,relyingashedoesoncertain
transcendentalideals,suchasthenotionof‘absolutede-territorialisation’.
7
uncannilyresonateswithDewey’sideaofenvironment/organism‘transactions’-
discussedbelow)“…habitsarehowenvironmentsimpactandtransformtheforms
oflifetheyaccommodateandarethemselvesimpactedandtransformedbythese
formsoflife”(219).Thus,asorganisms,“humansemergefromacontractionof
habitswhicharestabilisedfrom‘unthinking’networksofrelations”(Colebrook2016,
258).
Theideaofhabitasacontractionofmatterwithdifferenttemporalitiesreflectshow
habithasacomplexrelationshiptotimeforDeleuze–inhisthethreesynthesesof
time.Habitinvolvesthepassivesynthesesthatconstituteapresent(firstsynthesis);
“habitisthefoundationoftime,themovingsoiloccupiedbythepassingpresent”
(Deleuze1995,79).Thesepassivesynthesesallowforsensationandreceptivityof
theorganism,thesynthesesoforganicandinorganicinteractionsandtheir
temporalities,inthebody.Memoryisamoreactivesynthesisoftime,inwhat
Bergsoncalleda‘purepast’(secondsynthesis).Ratherthanthepresentbeingan‘is’
andthepastan‘isnot’(orhasbeen)thefleetingnatureofthepresent,‘isnot’and
thepurepast‘is’throughtheselectionsofmemory(Smith2013).Buttheactive
synthesisofmemoryrequiresthepassivesynthesisofhabitsuchthat“habitisthe
constitutiverootofthesubject,andthesubjectatrootisthesynthesisoftime-the
synthesisofthepresentandthepastinthelightofthefuture”(Deleuze1991,93).
Thustimeisamanifoldofactiveandpassivesyntheses.Memorycausesthepresent
toflowbackintothepast,tobewhatthepresentisforthepast.Butwhilstmemory
particularisestimetheseparticularitiesaren’tnecessarilydifferentmoments
(O’Keefe2016).Similarlyhabittendstosmoothtime,tomakeitintogeneralities.
ForDeleuzebothmemoryandhabitmustberesistedinfavourofrepetition,asa
formofanticipationorvirtualitythatdifferentiatesandrepeatsonlysingularities
(seeO’Keefe2016,85-87)toproducethenew(future),orthirdsynthesisoftime.
ThetensionsandcomplexitiesofDeleuze’srenderingoftimearespatialisedby
geographersbydevelopinghisideasofassemblage,territorialisationandde-
territorialisation.Habitscanbeseenasmind-body-matterassemblagesthrough
which,thecontractionofmatterworks,from‘thethousandsofpassivesyntheses’of
matterallthewaythroughtodiscursiveformationsandterritorialisationsofmore
enduringmeaning.Thereareexcellentexemplificationsofthisin,forexample,
Dewsbury’s(2015)exampleoftheinstantiationofmatterviabodyroutinewithinthe
habitlandscapes(anddiscursiveformations)ofmilitarydrill(discussedabove).
TheRavaisson/Deleuzevitalistapproachseeshabitasacontractionoflifeforcethat,
throughits‘occupation’offorces,makeschangepossible.Habitsareplastic
(Dewsbury2015)andthusdistinctfromhabitasmechanismorformoforganisation,
especiallyanykindofself-legislatingorganisationthatonemightaccordtohumans.
ThislatterpointiswherediscussionsofhabitintheRavaissonian/Deleuzianmould
8
acknowledgebutthenveerawayfrommorepragmatistaccountsofhabit(seenas
socialmechanismswhichcanbereformed).Wenowturninmoredetailtothose
pragmatistaccounts.
Deweyonhabit,situationandexperience
HabitsarecentraltoJohnDewey’spragmatistphilosophyoforganism-environment
activity.Theycanbeseenasprimaryunitsoforientationoflifeactivity,orlife
function.Deweydefineshabitas:
“thatkindofhumanactivitywhichisinfluencedbyprioractivityandinthatsense
acquired;whichcontainswithinitselfacertainorderingorsystemisationofminor
elementsofaction;whichisprojective,dynamicinquality,readyforovert
manifestation”(Dewey1981a:31-2,myemphasis).
Theorderingorsystemisationinvolveshabitsin“settingupamechanismofaction,
physiologicallyingrained,whichoperates‘spontaneously’automaticallywhenever
thecueisgiven.Butmechanizationisnotofnecessityallthereistohabit”(Dewey
1981a:50).BythisDeweymeansthathabitsarealsoenabling(seealsoSchwanenet
al2012).LikeRavaisson,DeweytakesanexplicitlyAristotelianinterpretationof
habitsascapacitiesratherthanconstraints,whichareasmuchenvironmentalas
purelyorganic.Theyare“thingsdonebytheenvironmentbymeansoforganic
structuresoracquireddispositions”(Dewey1981a:15).Thus“functionsandhabits
arewaysofusingandincorporatingtheenvironmentinwhichthelatterhasitssay
assurelyastheformer”(p.15,myemphasis).Sincehabitsare(inpart)inthe
environmenttheyarealsonotconfinedwithinorganisms,letalonehuman
organisms.Theycomprise“mind-body-environmentalassemblages”(Bennettetal
2013,12)thatareconstantlyinterrelated,suchthatcertainorganicactionsarealso
environmentaladjustments.Thistensionbetweenhumanhabitsandenvironment
canbethoughtofastretchingorstrainingofhumanorganicrelationswiththeir
environments,whichisencapsulatedinDewey’scoreideaof‘transaction’.
Transactionreferstotheongoingco-constitutionoforganismandenvironment.By
thisDeweymeansthatenvironment-organismrelationsarenotthoseofinteraction
betweenrounded-outobjectsandcompletehumansbutareratherco-constitutive
processualrelationships.Thusorganicresponsestoanobjectoranenvironmental
featurearenottoitbutintoit(Dewey,1896:358).Organicactivityisnotconfined
totheorganismitselfbutis“asmuchinprocessesacrossand‘through’asin
processes‘within’skins”(Dewey2008b:119;Sullivan2001).Thisdissolvingofthe
distinctionsbetweenorganismandenvironmentispartofDewey’swiderpragmatist
9
efforttodissolveothertraditionalphilosophicaldualisms:-ofsubject-object,mind-
bodyandculture-nature.
Habitsarebundlesofenvironment-organismtransactionsandareinparticular
associatedwithallmobilehigherorganisms.Theycontainformsofintelligent
responsetotheenvironment,instilledinbodies(whatDeweycalled‘had’knowledge
-knowledgethatisintelligentbutnon-cognitive,asopposedtomorereflective
‘known’knowledge).Habitsapplytohigherorganismsasaresultoftheirmore
complexorganisationinthewaythattheytransactwiththeenvironment:
“Incontrastwithlowerorganisms…ahigherorganismactswithreferencetoa
spreadoutenvironmentasasinglesituation.Whatthesehigherorganismsdois
conditionedbyconsequencesofpastactivities:thereislearningorhabit-formation.
Inconsequence,anorganismactswithreferencetoatime-spread,aserialorderof
events,asaunit,justasitdoesinreferencetoaunifiedspatialvariety…Theaction
calledorganicisnotjustthatofinternalstructures;itisanintegrationoforganic-
environmentalconnections”(Dewey1981b:213,myemphases).
Therearetwokeypointshere.Thefirstisthatorganicactivityisasmuchafunction
ofenvironmentalrelationsasitisofrelationsthatareinternaltotheorganism.The
secondisthattheideaof‘situation’iskeyforDeweyanpragmatism;“theexistence
ofsituationsisaprimaryfact”(Dewey2012,239fn).Ifhabitsareprojective
dispositions,situationsareextensiveandenduringfields,ormodalities,ofthose
dispositions.Thisisafunctionofthefactthathigherorganismsrelyonmorevaried
andcomplexmixesofenvironments,whichincreasestheirvulnerabilitybutalso
enrichestheirhabitsandcapacitiesforresponse.
Thesituationalcontextsofhabitsbecomeespeciallyimportantwhenenvironment-
organismfunctioningencountersobstaclesordifficulties.Wheresituationsbecome
unfamiliartohabitualaction,orwhenestablishedhabitsclash,theybecomewhat
Deweycalled‘problematicsituations’(Dewey1986).Insomesensesthisunsettled
situationisafailureofhabitaslifefunctiontoensurethatlifegoeson.Thisis
experiencedqualitativelybyhigherorganismsinfeelingsofunease,apprehension,
fear-whicharesituational(notindividual),“itisthesituationthatis,forexample,
apprehensive”(Dewey1981b:xi).Theexperience(includingemotionalforce)ofthe
disturbance,issituational,asarethesubconsciousattemptstoresolveit(re-
arrangingenvironmentalmaterials,re-arrangingthesituation).Theprimaryenergies
ofhabitarebrokendowninthesituation–sothereissituationalconditioningat
workaswell.Ifproblematicsituationschallengehabitthenitishabitthatisthefirst
stepinre-framingtheproblem-solution(Dewey1986).Materialsinthesituationin
part-frametheemergentproblem-solution(ratherthansimplyrelyingonsomekind
ofrecallfromorganicmemory).
10
Apragmaticapproachthusplaceshabitinrelation(onacontinuum)to
problematisationandenquiry.Thereisa‘patternofenquiry’(Dewey1986)inwhich
habitiscentral.Habitisboththemediumandthemeanstoinitiatetransformation.
Equally,habitsproduceactionsand“theactmustcomebeforethoughtandhabit
beforetheabilitytoevokethoughtatwill”(Dewey1981a:25).Habitsarethebasis
for(moreoccasional)reflectivethoughtiftheproblematicsituationcannotbe
resolvedbyembodied,non-cognitiveaction.Thebaseoftheadjustmentisbiological
butthecontinuityofresponsecanbepushedallthewayintothecognitive/reflective
realm:“...Theneedforthisredirectionisthebase,biologically,oftensionandin-
tension,ofat-tentionandin-tention”(Dewey2012,223).‘Thought’asanatural
phenomenonistypicallysocialratherthanindividual,involvingcommunicationand
conflictoverproblems.‘Mind’issomethingachievedthroughcommunication,
ratherthanbeinganindividualcognitiveability.Clashesofhabitsinitiateformsof
reasoning:thecommunicativeorganisationofconflictingordiversehabits(Dewey
1981b;Bridge2005).
Habitsalsohaveaprofoundroleinthepragmatistepistemologyoforganism-
environmentrelations,aspartofawiderinterpretationoftheideaofhuman
‘experience’.Theenvironmenthereisthe“wholebiosocioculturalcontextofthisor
thatexperience”(Fesmire,2015,51).AsDeweyargues:
“experienceisofaswellasinnature.Itisnotexperiencethatisexperiencedbut
nature–stones,plants,animals,diseases,health,temperature,electricityandsoon.
Thingsinteractingincertainwaysareexperience…Experiencereachesdowninto
nature;ithasdepth.Italsohasbreadthandtoaninfinitelyelasticextent.It
stretches”(Dewey1981b:12-13,emphasisinoriginal).
Experienceencompassesmorethanwhatisactively‘known’.Itislimitedineffects,
bothinevolutionarytimeandbeingdependent“on[natural]forcesthatgotheir
ownwaywithoutourwishorplan”(Dewey1981a:200).Butasanobjective(rather
thanindividualorsubjective)force,experience(ofhigherorganisms)contributesto
theshapingofemergentnaturalprocesses.Thisisinpartbecausehigherorganisms,
especiallyhumans,areextensivelyinterconnectedwithdifferentenvironments,via
‘situations’orfieldsofhabitdispositionsof‘mind-body-environmentalassemblages’
(Bennettetal2013,12).
ComparingRavaisson,DeleuzeandDewey
Ravaisson,DeleuzeandDeweythusseehabitsasenablingdispositionsandforces
thatareimplicatedinchange.Neverthelesstherearemarkedcontrastsbetween
DeweyandRavaisson’s/Deleuze’sviewsofhabit.Thiscanbeseeninanumberof
11
interrelatedwaysthroughtheirideasofhabitinenvironment-organismrelationsand
thedistinctionsbetweenlifeandmechanism.
Intermsofhabitprocesses,forRavaissonhabitcanbeviewedasaformofrepetition
resultinginarangeofperformativeoutcomes.These‘performativepractices’are
understoodastheongoingintensivedynamicsofhabit,whererepetitionis
productiveofdifferencethat(unnoticed)canproduceapermanentchangein
dispositions(DewsburyandBissell2015).Deweyagreesthathabitscanbeacquired
byrepetition(keyforRavaissonandDeleuze)butthisisnottheiressence(Pedwell,
2016).Ratheritisthemodeofresponse;thewayofrespondingtosituationsthatis
key.Tothinkaboutrepetitionleadingtohabit“putsthecartbeforethehorse”
(Dewey1986:39):itisbecauseorganismshavehabitsthatrepetitionispossible.
Ratherthanthepossibilityofaestheticrefinementinbodilymovement(forexample)
beingamanifestationofakindofharmonicresonanceoforganismandenvironment
(asRavaissonsuggests),Deweyseesenvironmentalchangeasinevitable,resultingin
problematicsituations.Habitsarethosebundlesofenvironment-organism
transactionsthatarechallenged,aswellasbeingtheinitialmeansoftheirresolution,
transformation,oradaptation.
Therearealsocontrastingattitudestoenvironment-organismboundariesand
relations.Ravaisson’sandDeleuze’sinterpretationofthepassivityandpermeability
oftheorganismtothevitalenvironment(aslifeforceormaterialforce),andthe
imperceptiblechangesunderlyingmotor-sensorychangesto‘primaryhabits’that
result,fromaDeweyanperspective,seemstooone-directionalandone-sidedin
favouroflifeforce.Itmissesouttheorganisingenergiesandmodesofresponse
thatwecanseeintherelationshipbetweenhabits,andbetweensituationandhabit.
Intransactionaltermshabits“incorporateanenvironmentwithinthemselves.They
areadjustmentsoftheenvironment,notmerelytoit”(Dewey1981a:38,emphasis
inoriginal).ThevitalforceofrepetitionconceivedbyRavaissonandDeleuzeas
primaryhabitscannotimplychangethroughsimplelifeforce;thepushisalreadyin
part-organisedtosomedegree,itisalreadyparthabit(asaresultofprior
transactions).ThisiswhyDeweyarguesthathabitsandbehaviourcannotbe
changedbyreflectivewill,butonlyenvironmentally.AdifficultyofRaviassonand
Deleuze’saccountsofvitalismasakindofinsistentforcethatpermeateshabits,I
suggest,isthat,undertheguiseofsuggestingthecontinuousinterpenetration
environmentandorganism,itstrangelyreproducesacertainseparationbetweenthe
two:oneinwhichanenvironment(spiritualormaterial)isendowedwith
autonomouslifewhichaffectsthereceptive/passive‘habitsproper’
(Bergson/Raviasson)or‘primaryhabits’(Deleuze)oftheorganismtoinstantiatethe
change.Apragmatistconsiderationoftheorganisingenergiesoftransaction,
situationandexperiencepointtowidersocio-environmentalconditioningsthat
12
pointtocomplexgeographiesbetweenthe‘forcefulmaterialism’and‘affectmilieu’
identifiedincurrentgeographicalresearch(DewsburyandBissell2015).
Thisbringsustothedistinctionbetweenideasoflifeforceandmechanism.This
debatehaspersistedindifferentguisesinphilosophyoverseveralhundredyears.
Ravaissonwasinsomesensesrespondinginhistime(OfHabitwaspublishedin
1838)tothegrowinginfluenceofnaturalsciencewhichthreatenedtoexplainmuch
ofhumanlifeinmechanisticterms,andtowhichtheideaofvitallifewasarepostto
defendatheisticideaofspirit.Intermsofthecontemporarydebateoverhabits
Deleuzetakestheideaoflifeforcebutasamechanismoftheconstantforceof
matter.IncontrastDeweyseeshabitasmechanismthatdifferentlyorganiseslife
force.
Testa(2017)hasarguedrecentlythatinHumanNatureandConductDewey
developedastrongcriticismofideasoflifeforce(suchasBergson’svitalism,and,by
implication,Ravaisson’sonwhomBergsondraws)that“assumeadualismbetween
lifeandmechanism”(Testa2017:9).Deweyarguesthatalllifeismechanism.Inthe
caseofhumanorganismsitisaphysiologicalstructure,reachingintothe
environment,whichconstitutesamodeofspontaneousresponse.Butaswehave
seeninhisideaofhabit“mechanisationisnotofnecessityallthereistohabit”
(Dewey1981a:50,emphasisinoriginal).Italsopermitscreativityorvirtuosity(an
intelligentratherthanroutineuseofmechanism).
Dewey’spointthat‘alllifeismechanism’ismadeinanumberofways.Firstisthe
basicdifferentiationbetweenorganicformsoflifewithmorecomplexorganisms
havingmoreinteractivemechanisms:
“Alllifeoperatesthroughamechanism,andthehighertheformoflifethemore
complex,sureandflexiblethemechanism.Thisfactaloneshouldsaveusfrom
opposinglifeandmechanism,therebyreducingthelattertounintelligent
automatismandtheformertoanaimlesssplurge”(Dewey1981a:51)
Habitsasmechanismscantakedifferentforms,intermsoflevelsofskill,orintensity,
andhavedifferentlevelsofenergyacross(andindeedwithin)organisms.Thus,
ratherthanaseparationofcreativeélanvitalfromhabittoallowsomeforsomesort
ofspontaneityinnature,Deweymaintainsthatallformsofaction,frommechanical
actionthroughtothatofthecreativityoftheartist,arejustdifferenttypesof
mechanism.AsTesta(2017)argues,habitforDeweyisability,anartthatisformed
bypastexperience.Habitscanbeexpressive:thevirtuosoartistorperformeristhe
accomplishedtechnician“whofusesmechanismwiththoughtandfeeling”(Dewey
1981a:51).Therearehabitsthatarefullofenergyandexpansivenessandother
habitsthatstagnateanddelimitgrowth:‘living’and‘dead’habitsrespectively
(1981a).Flexiblehabitshavetobeinstantiatedinanautomaticway,justasmuchas
13
inflexibleones.Theforceandimpactoflifeenergycanalsochangewithin
mechanisms,aslivinghabitsbecomedeadones,asintelligent,reflexivehabits
becomeinflexibleandroutine.Mechanismsofsocialhabit(customs)organisemore
impulsive,spontaneousbehaviour:“themeaningofnativeactivitiesisnotnative:it
isacquired.Itdependsoninteractionwithamaturedsocialmedium”(1981a:65).
Thustheforceofhabitvarieswiththechangingnatureofthe(biosocial)
environment.This,Isuggest,hasadoubleeffect:intheorganisationofrepetition
‘goingin’tohabit(incontrasttothelineareffectofmaterialism)andintheway
repetitionis,orisnot,‘takenup’–theforce(orotherwise)thatithas.Someforces
maymisfire,ornot‘catch’inthisway.Lifeforcerequiresorganisation.Thatiswhy
Deweycriticisesthe‘aimlessspurge’thatheattributestopartofBergson’s(andby
implicationRavaisson’s)ideaofvitalism.
Mechanismsofhabitinteractinginamaturedsocialmediuminevitablyleadtoa
pluralityofhabitualdispositionsorwaysofresponding.Inseeinglifeforceas
insistentpressurecontractedbyhabitsintotheaestheticsofbodilypracticesand
subjectivities,contemporarygeographicalresearchhasbeenlessconcernedwith
thisfieldofcontestationofhabits.Conflictoverhabitsandthepluralityofhabits,for
anindividualorganismoragroupofhumanorganisms,finallybringsthecognitive
phaseofactionintoplay.Againingeographythefocusonhabitandaffecteclipses
anyconsiderationsoftherelationshipbetweenhabitandcognitionor‘thought’,
especiallywhenthelatterisassumedtobeassociatedwithsovereignwillandreason.
ForDeweyconflictbetweenhabitsrequiresresolutionandthatdemandsreflective
judgementonhabitorthejustificationbetweenconflictinghabits.Itisherethat
Dewey’scriticismoftheseparationofmechanismandlifeinrelationtohabithas
realbiteintermsofwidersocialcritique.Habitcanbecome(orbeenforcedas)a
mechanismthatisopposedtolife,informsof“over-mechanisation”(Testa2017,11)
inwhichorganicmechanizationisturnedintoinorganicmechanisation.This,for
example,informsDewey’sanalysisofthereificationofindustriallabourinwhich
livingpatternsofinteractionbecomeroutinehabitandthemechanisationof
productionturnsthehabitsofworkersintomechanisticones:reinforcinganhistoric
divisionbetweenthelabour/workingclassandleisure/bourgeoisclasses.Thusa
dualityoflifeandmechanismcanbecomeaforceofsocialdominationand
oppression2.Deweygoesontosuggesthowdualitiesoflifeandmechanismcanbe
overcome,throughinterventionsaimedatmelioratingandreformingthe
environmentandsituationofhabits.
ThefinalcontrastbetweenRavaissonian/Deleuzianandpragmatistapproachesto
habitisintherelationshipofhabittotimeandspace.Deleuze’semphasison
2HereDewey’ssocialcritiquehasconnectionstoideasofreificationandalienation
inMarxism(Bridge2013).
14
emergenceandconstant-becomingputshabitinthepresentasacontractionof
naturebutwithapassiverelationtotimethroughthe“thethousandsofpassive
syntheses”oforganiccomposition,“themovingsoiloccupiedbythepassingpresent”
(Deleuze1995,79).Memoryisamoreactivesynthesisoftimebutonethat
particularisesthroughanalogy(andthuslosesdifferenceornovelty).Deleuze’s
orientationistovirtuality:thepressofthefutureinthepresent,throughthe
repetitionofsingularities.
Incontrast,theDeweyanapproachtohabitemphasisesa‘live’presentinfusedwith
thepossibilitiesofthepast,inwhich“thepresentiscomplex,containingwithinits
selfamultitudeofhabitsandimpulses”(Pedwell,2016,110).Progressisanincrease
inpresentmeaning(110)inenvironment/organismtransactions.Intermsofmy
argumentsaboutthelinksbetweenhabit,situationandexperience-enduringand
extensivespatio-temporalsituations(ofhuman,non-humanandobjectrelations)in
experiencearepotentiallyrelevanttotheimmediateproblematicsituation.Dewey
(2012)seemstoimplythattheseextensiveandenduringenvironmentsinstantiated
inhabitandactioncanbethoughtofasakindofmeta-situation.Unliketheever-
becoming,emergent,future-forcingemphasisofRavaissonandDeleuze,this
operationofcombinedexperiencethroughhabitchargesor‘inhabits’thepresent
(Pedwell2016)3.Whilststillsharingaprocessontologythispragmatistapproach
opensupthepresenttomoreactive,action-orientatedinterventionthan
Deleuze/Ravaisson-inspiredgeographicalresearchinwhichhabitisa‘passive
synthesis’inapassingpresent.
Achargedpresentoffersthepotentialforare-arrangementofhabitenvironments
andthepossibilitiesofchangingthemechanismsofhabitsthroughsocialreform.In
thenextsectionIconsiderseveralaspectsofthis:educationpolicyandthe
formationofhabits;overcomingtheclashofhabitstoenablecollaborative
mobilisationforwelfarereform;therelationshipbetweenhabitsandinstitutions
throughinstitutionaldesignandinnovationforsocialreform;theroleofhabitin
framingenvironmentalpolicy.Thiscapturestherangeofinfluencesofhabit:from
theirformation;conflictofestablishedhabits;theinstitutionalisationofhabits;and
habitsasthebackgroundconditionofwiderproblematisations,suchas
environmentalism.
3Thisorientationtoacomplexpresentreflects,Isuggest,Dewey’swidersuspicion
oftreatmentsofchangeasever-becoming,inwhathecallsphilosophiesofflux,
whichactuallyreveal“theintensityoffeelingforthesureandthefixed”(Dewey
1981b:49).Philosophiesofflux(inwhichheincludesBergson’sideas)“[defy]
changebymakingituniversal,regular,sure”(49),yetanotherquestforcertainty,
ratherthan“acalltoeffort,achallengetoinvestigation,apotentialdoomofdisaster
anddeath”(49).
15
Habit,situationandpublicpolicy
InthissectionIconsidertwohistoricalinterventionsinhabitformationandtheclash
ofhabitsfromDewey’sowntime(inwhichhewaspersonallyinvolved)beforegoing
ontodiscusscontemporarypragmatist-inspiredanalysesoftherelationship
betweenhabitsandinstitutionalchangeandtheroleofhabitinpragmatist
environmentalpolicy.Inallthesecasestherelationshipbetweenhabitsand
problematisationarekey.
Afocusonthemechanismsofhabit(andconcernwithover-mechanisation)relates
stronglytotheformationofhabits,especiallyintheyoung.AsaphilosopherDewey
isprobablybestknownforhisworkoneducation(Dewey1980;2008a).Hethought
thateducationpolicyandpracticecouldhelpcultivatemoreintelligenthabits.He
criticisedtheUSschoolingsystemforitschalk-and-talkapproachtolearningandits
mechanisedwayofinculcatinghabits(intheformofsocialcustoms)intopupils,an
approachthatdeniedthemtheirnaturalcapacitiesasproblem-solvingorganisms
transactingwiththeirenvironment.Therewascreativepotentialthatcouldbe
encouragedintheyoungbeforetheirhabitsbecametooset.ThisiswhyDeweyput
somuchemphasisoneducationasacatalystforsocialreformmorewidely.
ForDeweytheproblemwiththeeducationsystemwasthatitembeddedand
reproducedcertaintraditionalvalues,thatatabroader,philosophicallevel,
separatedtheoryfrompractice,bodyfrommind,culturefromutilityandthe
labouringfromtheleisureclasses(Westbrook1991,172-3).In1894heestablished
theLaboratorySchoolinChicagotoinstigatehisideasofcooperativeproblem-
solvingeducation.Inthisapproachpupils’habitswerechallengedbyproblematic
situations(introducedaspartofthecurriculum)throughwhichtheirdifferenthabits
andperspectiveswerebroughttobearinordertosolve,incollaborationwithother
pupils(ratherthanasindividuals).Aswesawintherelationshipbetweenhabitand
enquiry,habitsarealsothefirstmoveintheformulationofproblem-solutions.Thus
inteachingchildrenhowtothinkitwasimportantnottoforce“alineofaction
contrarytonaturalinclinations”(Dewey1980:41,seeWestbrook1991,172)butto
incorporate‘presentoccupations’intothecurriculumtousethosedispositionsin
situationsthatbestopenedthemuptootherinfluencesandinclinations,through
cooperativeenquiry.Theschoolasamicro-socialworldallowedexperimentation
withformsofcooperativeenquiryandproblemsolvingthatwouldusherinmore
establishedformsofknowledge(suchasscientificknowledge).Inre-orientating
educationawayfrommechanisedhabittohabitasfuelforcreativeandcooperative
problemsolvingtheDeweyschoolhadconsiderablesuccess(MayhewandEdwards
1966)
16
Aswellaspolicyworkontheformationofhabitsinchildren,theclashofalready-
establishedhabitsofadultscanbebothobstructiveandproductiveforfurthersocial
reform.Thesignificanceofhabitinexperimentsinsocialreformwasevidentinthe
caseofthe19th/20
thcenturysettlementhousemovement,inwhichmiddle-class
philanthropistslivedandworkedinlow-incomeneighbourhoodstotrytofacilitate
differentformsofwelfarereform.Thismovement,inspiredbyToynbeeHallin
London,spreadacrosscitiesoftheUSandformedanascentwelfaremovement,
someoftheinitiativesofwhichwerelaterinstitutionalisedbytheUSFederalState.
OnekeycatalystofthismovementwastheHullHousesettlementinapoorItalian-
AmericanneighbourhoodinChicago,runbyJaneAddams,apragmatistcollaborator
withDewey(DeweywasontheBoardofTrusteesofHullHouse).
Intryingtoestablishcollaborationbetweenmiddle-classphilanthropistsand
working-classresidents,classandethnicdivisionswerenegotiatedthroughthe
‘interspatialities’(Jackson2001)ofHullHouse,usingdifferentcontextsofinteraction
tobreakdownandreshapeunderlying,embodiedhabits.Danceclasses,arangeof
sportingactivities,dramaandmusicalperformancewereallusedaswaysofeasing
theembodiedencounteranddevelopingtrustandcollaborationbetweenHullHouse
andneighbourhoodresidents.Workingonhabitinthiswayhelpedprovidethe
platformforstrongercollaborationonwidersocialinitiatives-overchildcare,air
pollution,neighbourhoodlaundryfacilitiesandmutualsavingsschemes,tonamebut
afew(Addams1969).
Aswelltheclashofhabitsproducingtheconditionsforexperimentalsocialreform
habithasalsobecomethefocusformoreformalpolicyintervention.Ina
contemporarycontextoneprominentexampleis‘nudge’policy,which
acknowledgesthesignificanceofhabitinhumanbehaviour,butusesvariouscues
andincentivesto‘nudge’habitualbehaviourinadifferentdirection(Thalerand
Sunstein2008).FromapragmatistperspectivePedwell(2017)critiquesnudgepolicy
pointingtoitsoverly-individualisedideaofhabitanditsnarrowfocusoncertainacts
oreventsthatprovidetheopportunityfornudging‘bad’choicestowards‘good’
ones4.IncontrastPedwell(2017)arguesforapragmatistapproachwhichoffersa
deeperanalysisoftheenvironmentalconditioningofhabitsandtheunderstanding
thattheyaredispositionsormodesofbehaviourthatrequiremuchmorebroadly
coordinatedandcollaborativepolicyresponses.Thisseesinterventionsin
societal/environmentalratherthanindividualterms.InthesameveinSchwanenet
al(2012)lookingattransportgeographiesseethewiderenvironmentofhabitas
crucialinchangingpatternsofbehaviour,inthiscaseencouraginglesscaruseinthe
bidforlow-carbonmobilities.TakinginspirationfromDewey’semphasison
4Its‘libertarianpaternalism’isalsoatargetofpragmatistcritique–seealso
Jonesetal(2011).
17
changingtheobjectiveconditionsofhabit(ratherrelyingonchangesofthoughtor
intentionontheonehand,ornudginghabitsontheother)Schwanenetalusehis
ideaofcustomassocialhabitstorecommendthatbroaderinfrastructuralchange
andawiderangeofstakeholders(beyondindividualcarusers)arerequiredto
transitiontonon-carbasedmobility.Theytoolooktotheyoungergenerationand
educationinitiativestoencouragetheformationoflow-carbonmobilityhabits,
pointingtosocietieswherethesecustomsaremoredeveloped(suchasthecycling
cultureintheNetherlands).
Thelevelofoperationneededtodealwiththedistributednatureofhabit,in
combinationwithDewey’sideathatsocialhabitscongealascustomsandare
institutionalisedinvariousways,means,Iwouldargue,thatinstitutionaldesignisa
particularlyappropriatelevelofinterventioninpragmatistpolicy-making.This
accordswithpragmatist-inspiredeconomicthinking,whichseesinstitutionalforms
ofactivityasbeingbasedonhabits(Veblen2002[1919]),whatGronow(2008)calls
‘habitualinstitutionalism’.Thischallengestheutilitarian,individualistcost-benefit
(rational-choice)approachesthatdominatecontemporarypolicyassessmentsand
interventions.Italsoopposesbehaviouraleconomics,whichdoesfocusontherole
ofhabit(suchasinnudgepolicy),butinwaysthatareoverlyindividualisehabits,
andareconcernedwithacts,ratherthanmorecontinuousdistributedmodesof
action,asPedwell(2017)argued.
Pragmatist-inspiredinstitutionalandpolicyanalystsexplorevariousinstitutional
designmechanismsthatgetusbeyondrational-choicemechanismsofincentive
compatibilitybetweeninstitutionsandcitizens,orbehaviouralarchitecturesthat
seektonudgetowardsgoodbehaviour.Theyadvocateinstitutionalexperimentation
asawayofdealingwiththeeffectsofnewtypesofinteractionsandentanglements
onhabitsinhuman,non-human,objectassemblagesthatproducenewproblematic
situations.
Pragmaticanalysisalsosuggestsasecond(higher)-orderfunctionofdemocratic
inputinthemonitoringoftheoutcomesofdifferentinstitutionalchoicesthatresult
fromexperimentation.Thisisalsoawayofstructuringdisagreementoverdifferent
institutionalchoices,aswellasdealingwiththeassociatedcostsofinstitutional
experimentationfordifferentsectionsofthepopulation(KnightandJohnson2011).
Institutionalexperimentationandmonitoringinvolvesarangeofdeliberative
forums,suchascitizen’sjuriesandpublicevaluationcommittees.Thisiswhat
ArchonFunghascalledpragmaticequilibrium–wheredemocraticagreementis
achievedthroughthepragmatictestingoftheconsequencesofdifferent
institutionalformsandpolicyarchitectures.Hecontrastspragmaticequilibriumto
thefamous“reflectiveequilibrium”ofRawls’s(1972)cognitive,rationalistapproach
topoliticaldisagreementandconflictinliberal,pluralistsocieties.WhatIarguehere
18
isthatthispragmatic,experimental,action-orientedapproachtoinstitutional
innovationexplicitlyengages,andproductivelyacknowledges,theroleofestablished
habitsandtheclashofhabitstoamuchgreaterextentthanitscognitive,rational-
choiceequivalent.Fungoutlinesaseriesofinitiativesthatdemonstratethis
institutionalexperimentation,suchaslocal,community-ledinstitutionalinnovations
tocounterracistpolicingpracticesandoverschoolreformincertainAfrican-
AmericanneighbourhoodsinChicago(Fung2001),aswellastheuseofcitizen’s
juriestodecidenewpoliticalinstitutionalarrangementsintheformofanewvoting
systeminBritishColumbia,Canada(Fung2007;seealsoWrightandFung2003).
Finally,(andbriefly)beyondmoreimmediateinstitutionalconcerns,habitcanalso
providethecontextforthewidestpossiblelevelofproblematisationandpolicy-
framing.Environmentalpragmatismhasadistinctiveapproachtoenvironmental
ethicsandpolicyinarguingagainstprominent(non-anthropological)argumentsthat
placeanintrinsicvalueonnature,separatefromhumaninterests(LightandKatz
1996;Weston1985).Centraltothisispragmatism’s‘transactionalrealism’(Sleeper
1986)thatdeniestheseparationoforganism-environmentinwhich,asIhave
discussed,habits(includinghumanhabits)andvaluesare‘in’theenvironment,just
asmuchastheenvironmentisinhabit.Apluralityofhabitsandvaluesinhereinthe
environment,towardswhichadeliberativeapproachtoenvironmentalethicsmust
beaddressed(ratherthanthemoreprominentunitary,all-encompassingapproach)
aspartofmoreparticipatory,democraticprocessofenvironmentalpolicy-making
(Norton1991;Minteer2012).
Conclusion
Apragmatistapproachtotheroleofhabitastheintermediaryinorganism-
environmentrelationshasanumberofaspectsthatrecommenditforgeographical
analysis.First,likethecurrentDeleuzeorRavaisson-inspiredresearchthe
pragmatistideaoforganism-environmenttransactionsacknowledgesavital
environment.Throughitsideaofexperienceasobjectiveforceitalsorecognisesthe
continuityofhumanlifewithnature.However,byrefusingtograntautonomous
forcetolife(élanvital),itavoidsthemoretranscendentalaspectsofvitalist
approachestohabit(spiritforRavaisson,aninsistentmaterialismforDeleuze).This
insistentempiricalorientationofpragmatismsuggestshowhabit,ratherthansimply
beingcontractionoflifeforce,isamechanismoforganisationoflifeforceswith
differentlevelsofexpression,someofwhichmaybeimprovisedorspontaneous
(suchasmechanismsunderlyingartisticexpression)inthewaythatavitalist
approachsuggests,butothersofwhichmightbe(over)mechanisedandpersistent
inwaysthatconstrictlife.
19
Ithinkthisgivesscopetoproblematizethemechanismsofhabitmuchmorethanits
vitalistrenderingingeography.Ratherthancreatingdualismsbetween’habit
memory’and‘habitproper’(thelatterresultingfromlifeforce)apragmatistview
seeshabitasonacontinuumoforganisationalformsthatmediatenaturalforces
(associatedwithdifferenthigherorganisms;frommechanisedtomoreexpressive
habitswithinorganisms).Thismakeswhatisanemergentdispositionalviewofhabit
muchmoreopentoproblematisationandintervention.Attentiontomechanisms
andlevelsoforganisationstartstodistinguishdifferentenvironmentsofhabit,which,
forhigherorganisms,areextensiveandcomplex.Thisgivesscopeforgeographical
analysisofenvironmentsofhabitandtracingtherelativitiesofspace(treatedas
extensivesituationsorfieldsthatsuchhabitsencompass).Apragmatistideaofhabit
alsoproblematizestime,butratherthandeflatingtheroleofthepresentasDeleuze
does(partofthewider20thcenturycritiqueofthemetaphysicsofpresence),
pragmatismusesaprocessontologytounderstandthepresentasfundedor‘live’
andopentopossibilitiesofintervention.Inthispresent,habitsareinterruptedby
problematicsituationsbutarealsothefirstpointoftheirresolution.
Aswellasproblematizingdifferentmechanismsofhabit(forthepurposesofanalysis
andintervention)aDeweyanapproachtohabitalsosituateshabitinrelationto
differentformsofproblematisation.Whereasvitalistapproachesingeographysee
habitscontractingimmanentforcesrealisedin‘affectivemilieu’(Dewsburyand
Bissell2015)forpragmatiststhepartnerofhabitisproblematisation,because,aslife
function,habitencountersfrequentdifficultiesorobjections.Theaffectualmilieuof
thevitalistscorrespondstothesituationalqualitiesofaffectinpragmatismbut
which,inthelatter,areunderstoodasthepromptsofemergingproblematic
situations.Thisproblematisationdemandsexperimentalaction,involvinghabitsand
situationalmaterials,andonlymorelatterly,ifatall,morereflexiveformsofaction
incontrolledenquiryinwhich‘thought’isasharedcommunicativeactivity.
Analysinghabitinrelationtoproblematisationandenquiryagainmeansexploring
habitsandtheirspatio-temporalrelations-fromextensiveandenduringsituations
ofhabitdispositionstothesharper,moreemphaticandmoreimmediate
problematicsituationswherehabitsaredisrupted.Deleuzian-inspiredgeographical
workhasshownhowhuman/non-human/materialassemblagesinfuse‘plastichabits’
(Dewsbury2015).Pragmatismacknowledgesthis‘thingliness’oftheworld
(Colebrook2015)whilst,atthesametime,showinghowtheseentanglements
problematizehumanlifethroughhabit.
Thepossibilitiesofinterventionincomplexmechanismsofhabitweresuggestedin
thepreviousexamplesofpolicystrategiestoaddresstheformation,clashand
institutionalisationofhabits.Pragmatismrecognisesthathabitsarenotjust
significantintermsofpolicyinterventionbutarealsoopentomanipulationand
dominationinthe‘over-mechanisation’ofhabit(betweenthelabouringandleisure
20
classes,forexample).Theseissuesbringpragmatismintoproductiveconversation
withthecontinuinginfluenceofMarxismandCriticalTheoryonsocialand
environmentalcritiqueingeography(Bridge2013).Atthesametimepragmatism
recognisesthedifficultiesoftheMarxistprospectuspreciselybecauseitfailsto
addresssocialhabitsthatpersistbeyondrevolutionarydisruption.
Apragmatistapproachtohabitopensupresearchonpersistentmechanismsof
socialdominationwiththemorevitalideaofhabitenvironmentsingeography.
BuildingoncurrentgeographicalworkthatstartstotakeBourdieu’sideason
embodiedhabitsbeyondthesocial(Leaetal2015)apragmatistapproachcombines
agreatersensitivitytothecomplexesofactors(human,nonhuman,objects)
implicatedinhabitmilieuwhilstmaintainingacritiqueofmechanismsofhabitthat
arepersistentandsignificantinsocialrelations.Inthisregardthereisalreadya
significantbodyofworkwithinpragmatistphilosophyandsociologyonformsof
social-environmentaldominationthroughhabit,suchasMacMullan(2009)on
‘habitsofwhiteness’andSullivan’s(2013)analysisofracismasaformof
discriminationanddominationthatpenetratesthroughtheskinofthehuman
organismproducing‘oppressioninthegut’.
Pragmatism’spositioningoftherelationshipbetweenhabitandproblematisation
alsoopensupawiderterrainofinvestigationthatdrawsonastrongstrandof
Foucault-inspiredpoststructuralistanalysisingeography(Murdoch2005;Crampton
andElden2007).Foucault’sworklookedathowdifferentcomplexesof
problematisation,forexampletheproblematisationofpopulationdensityandideas
ofvulnerabilitytodiseaseandcontagionintheplaguetowninDisciplineandPunish
(Foucault1977),havebeenseentocoalesceintopersistent(spatialised)formsof
governmentalityandsurveillance,resultingincertainformsofsubjectivity.
Exploringthefieldofproblematisationwithawiderideaofthepossiblesitesof
problematisation,including,butalsobeyond,‘governmental’ones(seeKoopman
2011;BarnettandBridge2017),andfromtheperspectiveofhabitratherthan
subjectivity,furtheropensuptheterrainofinvestigationonformsofsocialpower
(andthepossibilitiesofresistanceanddemocraticaction).Italsoopensupother
theoreticalquestions,suchasthedegreetowhichproblematisationsleadtonew
concepts(Deleuze–seeKoopman2018)ortonewactions(Dewey)asformsof
critiqueofsocietyandspace.
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