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The Real Mad Men: The 1960s — A Golden Age of Advertising

Max Nemhauser

Advanced History Seminar in Historical Research and Writing

Dr. Culclasure

10 April 2014



Nemhauser 2

Abstract

This essay looks at the advertising of the 1960s, a decade of marketing often called the

“Golden Age of Advertising.” The Sixties were host to a creative revolution in advertising. Until

then, the structure ad agencies put account managers were at the helm; bringing in the clients

was priority number one. In the 1960s, however, the power structure in the agency would move

from account executive to the creative department.

Using the Smithsonian Institute ’s online archives, the author created multiple collections

of advertisements, from Maidenform Brassieres to P&G Ivory Soap. By looking at the changes

that took place in the marketing strategies of these products, the creative revolution is made veryclear. In addition, the two largest figureheads of the creative revolution, Bill Bernbach and David

Ogilvy are profiled, and their contributions to the world of advertising are outlined. Companies

whose ads are referenced include Orbach ’s Department Store, Volkswagen Automobiles,

Hathaway Shirts, Schweppes Soda, Rolls Royce and others.

Among the reasons for the creative revolution are Ogilvy and Bernbach, evolving

technology in photography, widespread adoption of TVs in households and a more educated

public demanding higher quality in advertising.



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In 1959, Carl Hahn, the head Volkswagen Motors USA (VW), and Arthur Stanton, the

New York Volkswagen dealer walked back and forth down Madison Avenue stopping at all the

big ad agencies. 1 For weeks they visited agency after agency, walking in through big glass

revolving doors eager to see something new, and walking out with the same sulky expression.

Each time it was the same thing. Advertisements like Figure 1, a late 40’s ad for Chrysler’s

Plymouth. As Hahn says, “T he content of the proposed ads was always the same, a beautiful

house, very happy people in front, beautifully dressed — and a glamorous car. Even that in most

cases was not photographed but illustrated … with a stupid caption. But [they] didn’t have [any]

life. I had more and more presentations. I was desperate, I told Arthur [Stanton] this is justimpossible, we need an agency that fits our product.” 2

This was the sentiment expressed by many companies at the time. The fifties had

established advertising and marketing as an important factor in sales and profits. 3 Karen

Buzzard, in her book Chains of Gold: Marketing the Ratings and Rating the Markets , says that

“if the decade of the 50s was the childhood of television, it was also a time when everyone was

still relatively innocent. Both advertisers and their critics were a little wide-eyed to discover that

there could be a certain science to motivation and selling, and that, taken in groups, people were

somewhat predictable.” 4 Once companies and advertising agencies realized what they had

discovered, they immediately looked to capitalize on this newfound tool for increasing profits. In

1956, Fortune Magazine published a statistic that the total volume of advertising in the U.S.,

national and local, was approximately $10 billion, three times what it had been a decade earlier,

and rising at a rate of about 10 percent since 1953. 5

By 1967, this number had risen 50 percent, and amounted to an average of $75 spent on

advertising to each citizen annually. 6 Advertising spending was growing “faster than gross



Nemhauser 4

national product, national income, disposable personal income, or almost any other relevant

barometer.” 7

So when Hahn and Stanton walked into Doyle Dane and Bernbach (DDB), a young,

decade old advertising agency at the time, they were not expecting much. 8 When they walked out

of the tall Madison Avenue office building that day though, Hahn and Stanton were about to

make history. They had just signed a small $500,000, six-month ad budget for what would

become one of the most iconic ad campaigns in history. 9

In 1941, Bill Bernbach was at Grey Advertising, an older, established, predominantly

Jewish firm on Madison Avenue. Nicknamed a “Seventh Avenue” agency, because the clientswere often Jewish garment businesses located on Seventh Avenue, Bernbach had joined after

spending two months in the army, post Pearl Harbor. 10 He quickly rose up the ranks, and by

1945, he found himself copy chief. 11 Two years later, having risen to Creative Director, he sent a

memo to his department: 12

There are a lot of great technicians in advertising. And unfortunately they talk the best

game. They know all the rules. They can tell you that people in an ad will get you greater

readership. They can tell you that a sentence should be this short or that long. They can

tell you that body copy should be broken up for easier and more inviting reading. They

can give you fact after fact after fact. They are the scientists of advertising. But there’s

one little rub. Advertising is fundamentally persuasion and persuasion happens to be not a

science, but an art. 13

This memo has been copied and published and shared many times, and it is central to disciples of

Bernbach ’s philosophy, still today. It is even referred to as “his famous letter.” 14 But in 1947, it

was revolutionary.



Nemhauser 5

The 1960s would be host to a creative revolution in advertising. Until then, the agency

structure put account managers were at the helm of a Madison Avenue agency; bringing in the

clients was priority number one. Soon, the power structure in the agency would move from

account executive to the creative department. 15 While this shift was pioneered by Bernbach, it

would not have been successful had other agencies not followed suit. Taking Bernbach’s theories

to heart, Madison Avenue quickly found a new voice in the 1960s, and it was a very loud one.

This transition was also noticeable in the ads that Bernbach and others began to produce.

In 1949, Bernbach met with Nathan Orbach, owner of Orbach’s, a department store that

mainly sold women’s apparel.16

Orbach had seen the work that Bernbach had done for his store(Figure 2) and was impressed. 17Orbach encouraged Bernbach to leave and create his own agency

with Orbach’s as the first client. At first Bernbach refused, but after Orbach confided that he was

planning to leave Grey Advertising anyway, Bernbach decided to leave. 18 Bernbach brought with

him Ned Doyle, an account director at Grey known for his ferocious ways of handling clients

who gave him trouble, and even ones who did not. 19 Maxwell Dane, a friend of Doy le’s, ran a

small agency in an even smaller office at 350 Madison Avenue. 20 It was there, on June 1, 1949,

that Doyle Dane Bernbach opened its doors and set the stage for a revolution in advertising.

DDB was Bernbach’s agency from the start. They strictly adhered to his no -adherence

policy. “We must develop our own philosophy and not have the advertising philosophy of others

imposed on us. Let us blaze new trails. Let us prove to the world that good taste, good art, good

writing can be good selling,” said Bernbach. 21 So when Carl Hahn and Arthur Stanton came into

his agency, Bernbach knew exactly how big an opportunity such as this one could be.

Carl Hahn describes his meeting with Bernbach in 1959, saying, “I went to these

primitive offices, no big conference room or hall, no ten vice presidents in blue suits with



Nemhauser 6

neckties and white shirts, and executive vice presidents and senior vice presidents; there was just

a man sitting on his desk in a windowless room, called Bill Bernbach by name, and he showed

me work he’d done for El Al [airlines] and more… and I decided what to do: offered six months

an advertising budget of half a million or so, which he accepted.” 22 Bernbach immediately got to

work setting up a team for BBD’s first car account. 23 Helmut Krone, a second generation

German-American who had once owned a VW, was chosen as art director, and Julian Koenig, a

young Jew from Yonkers who had once visited Germany, was signed on as copywriter. Koenig

had received a tip from a copywriter he had worked with previously, and when he interviewed

for the job, “Bernbach looked through his book and, in the now regular patter, hired him on thestrength of an ad for a root beer that had been rejected by a previous client.” 24

Hahn had already written the strategy he wanted DDB to take with Volkswagen. 25

Everything was to be simple, resonant, honest and straightforward. 26 It was Volkswagen’s policy

to change the external appearance of the car as little as possible, divergent from the U.S.

automakers’ policy at the time to take advantage of the image conscious public by obsoleting

their models every year. So Koenig wrote copy to be read like a friendly conversation,

straightforward, like a dvice from a neighbor. As Koenig said, “We just took [the] product and

said what made it good. And we were fortunate enough that there was a lot to say about the

VW.” The first VW ad that DDB ran was called “Think Small” ( Figure 3).

“Think Small” rocked the world of advertising. No one had ever taken a full page ad with

a product on just a quarter of that page. It was unheard of. But DDB and Volkswagen continued

to do what would never have been do ne with ads like “Lemon” ( Figure 4). It seems counter-

intui tive for a company to place a large photograph of their car and write “Lemon” underneath.



Nemhauser 7

But reading the copy, one discovers that the ad is a reference to Vo lkswagen’s high quality

control.

With the introduction of the 35mm SLR camera in, advertisers also gained another tool in

honesty. 27 Advertisers had an easier time with photography, which is considered a more honest

approach towards imagery. People are willing to believe photographs to be more truthful; and it

also allowed for a more ads in magazines to fit in better with articles that included photographs.

In fact, one of Helmut Krone’s earliest demands, in the beginnings of the Volkswagen campaign

was that there was to be no logos in the ads, as they signaled “advertisement” to the reader

immediately, and informs the reader to immediately turn the page.28

In 1963, DDB printed “Taxi,” a humorous take on the economic and size benefits that the

VW presented (Figure 5). Reading the copy, one learns that the VW Taxi was driven through the

streets of New York and that it “turned heads. ” This concept of putting VW Beetles in places

they did not normally belong became a pattern, and before long there were ads like “Police Car”

(Figure 6). Not to establish a formula, DDB kept flipping convention on its head with ads like

“Family Trip” ( Figure 7) for VW’s new station wagon, more commonly known as the VW Bus.

Not putting the product being advertised in the advertisement was against the rules — it was just

not something that ad agencies would do. 29 But the rest of Madison Avenue began to take notice.

In order to illustrate the attention paid to DDB’s new kind of advertising, consider an

advertising concept that began before the “creative revolution,” but flourished once it embraced

Bernba ch’s philosophy: Maidenform. Maidenform was a small lingerie company established in

New York during the Flapper Era of the 20s, on the premise that women no longer wanted to

wear corsets, binding and flattening their chests, but would rather have their breasts lifted and

held. 30 Maidenform’s “I dreamed I…in my Maidenform” campaign came out of the William



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Weintraub Advertising agency, an old Madison Avenue agency where, coincidentally Bernbach

had in fact first joined the world of advertising and marketing. 31

The “I dreamed” campaign was first printed in the early forties. Figures 8 and 9 are

examples of the bleak aesthetic and chauvinist attitude that was common at the time with many

ads. Aesthetically, they are monochromatic and not especially exciting. Shopping and getting

makeovers followed such traditional female gender roles; the ads were meant to appeal to the

common lady or housewife, or even a husband buying lingerie for his ideal wife, one who spends

all day in a brassiere and nothing else. Once DDB’s creative revolution started rolling, however,

the change in attitude towards advertisements, in aesthetics and in content, changed dramatically.This is clearly reflected in ads like 1961’s “I dreamed I walked a tightrope…” (Figure 10) and “I

dreamed I bar ged the Nile…”(Figure 11), from a year later. These ads also reflect the changing

mentality in 1960’s American culture, with the immediate and abrupt invasion of widespread

feminism and the acceptance of women into social and occupational positions not traditionally

ascribed to women. Part of the allure of these ads was that they seemed like an invitation into

this new culture of feminism and progressivism, with the pretense, however, of wearing a

Maidenform Bra.

The Maidenform “I dreamed” campaign became s o popular, in fact, that they were

parodied by the popular satirical publication, Mad Magazine .32 Mad made parodies of many

popular ad campaigns, and has become a sort of benchmark parameter in deciding which ads

have become culturally accepted or at least have reached wide enough of an audience to be

parodied with success. 33 Mad ’s parody of Maidenform, “Maidenfirm,” (Figure 12) was printed in

the fall of 1962, once Maidenform had successfully made its transition into DDB’s “creative

revolution” style ads and had adopted this new sixties approach to feminism and advertising. 34



Nemhauser 9

Maidenform, thus, exemplifies the degree to which DDB’s new philosophy was integrated into

an already existing and somewhat successful campaign.

Bernbach’s creative revolution did not onl y extend to individual campaigns, though — it

also made its mark on individuals in the industry, even ones established in the industry. In 1939,

David Ogilvy, a British transplant to New York City and a fledgling advertiser, joined George

Gallup’s organization that focused on what had become the “Holy Grail of advertising”:

research. 35 Gallup, a former professor of journalism at Northwestern University, had begun

researching markets in the early 1930s. According to Cracknell,

He [Gallup] found that ads based on around sex and vanity were the most popular withwomen, the second most popular being those based on the quality of the product. Men

also ranked those as their top two, only in reverse order. But in the same survey, Gallup

found that those approaches were the two least favored by advertisers, who preferred ads

leading on efficiency and economy — which were the least favored by all readers.

This news turned heads. One of the largest firms at the time, Young and Rubicam (Y&R), hired

him to lead their research department, but after a few years, Gallup left to create the American

Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO) , now The Gallup Organization. Gallup’s first major success

story after setting out on his own was the correct forecasting of the 1936 election in favor of

Roosevelt. Ogilvy moved to Los Angeles and joined the growing organization in 1939, and

stayed through 1942. While at the AIPO, Ogilvy conducted hundreds of surveys of Americans,

learning how they perceived communication and entertainment, often pre-screening Hollywood

films to gain insight as to their possible box-office performance. In 1942, Ogilvy moved back to

New York City and anxious to begin on his own as a copywriter, founded the Ogilvy, Benson &



Nemhauser 10

Mather agency with an American partner and funds from the British agency he had left behind

when he moved to America.

Coming from a background in research, then, it is understandable that Ogilvy holds a

reputation as a cold, calculated agency director. 36 Says Dobrow , “David Ogilvy was perceived as

rigid and restrictive, and as a result, OBM was viewed as an agency that played by the

‘rules’…To Ogilvy, the word was king and the visual took a back seat. Market research, not

inspiration, was his guide. And humor had lit tle place in advertising.” Although he differed, then,

in philosophy from Bernbach, his results are eerily similar at times.

OBM first big break came with their Hathaway series. Hathaway, a tiny Maine-basedclothing manufacturer, came to OBM with a paltry $30,000 ad budget for their medium-priced

shirt range. 37 Ogilvy created an entire story behind the shirt, adding intrigue and narrative, which

the public ate up. Baron Wrangell, as he was named, also brought into fashion the eye-patch.

(Figure 13) According to Cracknell, it “became a popular prop at parties and offices, and other

campaigns aped it, even putting it on animals.” In an attempt to add a sense of higher class to the

ads, OGB ran them only in The New Yorker , and its ad manager said “he’d never see n such

interest in a campaign.” 38 According to Cracknell, the campaign had a 1,500% increase in sales

from the time they started at OBM until 1969, and “name recognition when from under 1 percent

to 40 percent in 20 years. 39 Dobrow, however, claims that Ogil vy’s success with Hathaway, and

with every one of his other successful campaigns came not from his abilities as an ad man, but

his genius as a researcher. 40

This claim is supported twofold. Dobrow builds this claim with a visual argument (Figure

14), assert ing that Ogilvy’s rules hindered creativity rather than helped it, asserting that many, if

not all of his agency’s ads looked so similar, they could be for the same product. 41 Cracknell



Nemhauser 11

affirms this, making the same argument, with two of the same ads as Dobrow, in fact (Figure

15). 42

This is not to sully Ogilvy’s talent as an ad man or marketer. His ads were extremely

popular, but this popularity seemed to follow a pattern. After creating ‘Baron Wrangell’ for

Hathaway, OBM created ‘Commander Whitehead’ for Schweppes (Figure 16), a mysterious

spokesman for the Schweppes Tonic Water company, which made waves in glasses across the

country, and up and down Madison Avenue. Ogilvy is best remembered for his classic Rolls

Royce ad (Figure 17), published only once — in just two newspapers and two magazines, but has

continued to be referenced to through today.43

The Rolls Royce ad is also considered to beOgilvy closest venture towards Bernbach’s creative style, as well. 44 Known to be steadfast in his

belief that the public responds to advertising technique over creative ideas, perhaps this ad stands

out so much in Ogilvy’s portfolio because it seems to defy what he had previously, and thereafter

defined as his ideology in advertising.

Although often painted as an opponent of Bernbach’s, and agreeably an opponent in

business with Bernbach, Ogilvy and his success furthered the advertising business’ creative

revolution of the sixties much farther than it would have gone if sol ely under Bernbach’s

direction. A copywriter, Ogilvy’s success helped facilitate the move of power in the agency from

account executive to the creative. Dobrow stands out in this argument, asking rhetorically, “…in

reality, how far apart were the views of these two new giants of the advertising industry?” 45 Both

believed that the product should be the centerpiece —the “hero” of the ad, 46 both believed in

originality and freshness, and neither believed in unrealistic representations of the products they

were selling. In legacy, Ogilvy and Bernbach are at opposing ends of the spectrum of technique,



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but in reality, their underlying approaches and attitudes about influencing public opinion are

quite similar.

When two pioneers in a field achieve success, it is not an indication, however, of a

complete renaissance in theory and methodology. And examples like Maidenform only provide a

specific window into the influence of the 60s’ creative revolution, as they emp loyed only one

agency, which folded in the 80s. 47 In order to prove the larger impact on the entire world of

advertising , look to Proctor and Gamble’s Ivory Soap.

In Figure 18, a 1945 ad for Ivory Soap created by Cox Advertising, the classic pre-60s

illustrations are at work.48

Multiple images and their accompanying stories create anoverworking ad, trying to do far too many things at once. Juxtaposed with Figure 19, it is clear

the transition that was made after DDB and OBM got the ball rolling. Simple photographs

replace hand illustrations; large, clear, legible type replaces the script- style’s less clear mimicry

of handwriting, all while preserving the casual rhetoric of the earlier ad. All of this is also present

in the transition of the Maidenform ads as well, however the Smithsonian Institute’s collection of

Ivory ads provide some extra information that the Maidenform collection does not have. Figure

20, an ad from 1992, shows a continued reliance on the techniques of the 1960s. The clear type,

large bright photography and simple phrasing of this example from the Saatchi & Saatchi

Advertising Agency show significant consistency with the Ivory ads of the 60s.

Bernbach died in 1982 at the age of 71, Ogilvy in 1999 at 88. Named the two most

influential men of the 20 th century in the advertising industry by Advertising Age magazine, their

work set a precedent for a new kind of advertising. 49 The advertising they influenced was so

successful, that in the late 60s and early 70s, Nicholas Johnson, commissioner of the Federal

Communications Commission accused TV networks of deliberately putting on dull programming



Nemhauser 13

to enhance the entertainment value of the commercials. 50 Obviously absurd, this episode is

indicative of the incredible power of the ads that came out of the 60s. In dollars and cents, one

can see the growth of the industry even more clearly. In 1960, the top ten agencies on Madison

Avenue made $1.5 billion in billings. 51 Ten years later, this number had reached $4 billion. 52

Madison Avenue was transformed in the 1960s. David Ogilvy and Bill Bernbach were a

large part of this transformation, but it was their employees who believed in them and it was their

clients who trusted their methods that allowed the creative revolution to take place. In 1957, a

small book was published by noted writer and social critic, Vance Packard, called The Hidden

Persuaders .53

Packard’s book was an exploration of the so -called “manipulators” that were th osein the advertising business. The Hidden Persuaders was an instant bestseller and fueled a decade

of national discomfort with the industry of advertising. Proof of its influence on the American

public, Professor David Gast cites Packard in his article “ Consumer Education and the Madison

Avenue Morality,” in which he argues for a more standardized and widespread “inoculation”

against advertising of American children in schools.

This may also be a cause of the creative revolution. As advertisers lost a hold on the

techniques that had worked in the decades preceding, it became clear that new forms were

required. This led to the more honest, conversational ads like DDB’s Volkswagen spots and

Ogilvy’s infamous Rolls Royce ad.

Gast and others continued their critique of the advertising industry, Hollywood took to

critiquing advertisers and “ politic ians…saw the movies [and] began to attack advertising.”

Through this, however, Madison Avenue was making more money than it ever had before. 54

Eventually, realizing that advertising would not be disappearing any time soon, politicians began

to see the value in advertising. One of the most controversial television commercials of all time



Nemhauser 14

was produced in 1964 for the Democratic Lyndon Johnson campaign . Nicknamed “Daisy,” the

black and white commercial showed a young girl plucking petals from a flower as a voice over

counts down from ten to zero —“until the little girl and the screen appear to vaporize in an

atomic e xplosion,” before settling on a black screen with the words “Vote for President Johnson

on November 3. ” “Daisy” brought back the controversy of advertising, and some believe that this

ad destroyed any possibility of the Republican candidate Barry Goldwater ’s assurances to the

public of his commitment to peace. 55

Not all ads of the 1960s were effective, then, and not all helped further advertising’s

reputation. The overall tone, however, of the output of Madison Avenue in the 1960s was one of positivity and progression. Once the 1970s arrived, advertising spending had nearly tripled,

advertising exposure had skyrocketed, and the American advertising industry had revolutionized

its merchandise from uncreative, bored advertisements to creative, unique and fresh

endorsements of products for the modern American.



Nemhauser 15

Notes

1Andrew Cracknell, The Real Mad Men: The Renegades of Madison Avenue and the

Golden Age of Advertising, (Philadelphia: Running Press, 2011), 86.

2 Ibid, 87.

3 Karen S. Buzzard, Chains of Gold: Marketing the Ratings and Rating the Markets ,

(Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1990), 78.

4 Buzzard, Chains of Gold , 78.

5 Daniel Seligman, “The Amazing Advertising Business”, Forbes Magazine , (New York:

Time, Inc., September 1956, Vol 54, No. 107), 10; from Karen Buzzard’s Chains of Gold .

6 David K. Gast, “Consumer Education and the Madison Avenue Morality”, The Phi

Delta Kappan , (Phi Delta Kappa International, June 1967, Vol. 48, No. 10) 485; JSTOR, 19

December 2013 www.jstor.org/stable/20371911 .

7 Seligman, “The Amazing Advertising Business”, 11 .

8Hazel G. Warlaumont, Advertising in the 60s: Turncoats, Traditionalists, and Waste

Makers in America's Turbulent Decade , (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2001), 167.

9 Cracknell, The Real Mad Men , 87.

10 Ibid, 55.

11 Ibid, 55.

12 Larry Dobrow, When Advertising Tried Harder , (New York: Friendly Press, Inc.,

1984), 20.

13 Ibid , 20.


15 Ibid, 50-51.

http://www.jstor.org/stable/20371911




Nemhauser 16

16 Ibid, 55.

17 Ibid, 55-56.

18

Ibid, 56.19 Ibid, 56.

20 Ibid, 56.

21 Dobrow, When Advertising Tried Harder, 20.


23 Ibid, 86.

24 Ibid, 92.

25 Ibid, 92.

26 Warlaumont, Advertising in the 60s , 174

27 Cracknell, The Real Mad Men , 73

28 Ibid, 88

29 Buzzfeed

30 Claudia H. Deutsch, "Dreaming of Bras for the Modern Woman." The New York

Times, Business, September 28, 2005.

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/28/business/media/28adco.html

31 Tom Reichert, The Erotic History of Advertising , (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books,

2003), 145

32 Claudia Deutsch, “Dreaming of Bras for the Modern Woman” NY Times, September

2005

33 Stuart Elliot, “Skewering Madison Avenue for 60 Years” NY Times, October 2012

34 Deutsch, “Dreaming of Bras for the Modern Woman” NY Times, September 2005





Nemhauser 17

35 Cracknell, The Real Mad Men, 34

36 Dobrow, When Advertising Tried Harder , 36

37

Cracknell, The Real Mad Men , 3738 Ibid, 40

39 Ibid, 40


41 Ibid., 37


43 Dowbrow, When Advertising Tried Harder , 159; Cracknell, The Real Mad Men , 45;


45 Ibid, 36

46 Figure 7 – While the ad does not place the product centrally (it does not even show it),

there is no question that the product, the VW Station Wagon, is the most significant aspect of the

ad. Car ads such as Figure 1 and others from before Bernbach’s time often placed a happy

family, or a pristine suburban house with manicured lawn as the focus, and the car off to the side,

parked in the driveway. While this created an implied sense of significance in the car’s value as a

step towards this idyllic homestead, the ad was ostensibly selling a certain lifestyle, not the car

specifically.

47 Ad Age, http://adage.com/article/adage-encyclopedia/norman-craig-kummel/98801/

48 Smithsonian Archives, http://siris-

archives.si.edu/ipac20/ipac.jsp?&profile=all&source=~!siarchives&uri=full=3100001~!272986~

!0#focus



Nemhauser 18

49 Ad Age, http://adage.com/article/special-report-the-advertising-century/william-

bernbach/140180/

50

Dowbrow, 20051 Ibid. Billings represent the amount spent on getting an advertisement to its audience,

whether through paying a magazine publisher for ad space, buying commercial time from a TV

network or putting up billboards, etc. This is the method through which an agency makes the

majority of its income; acting as a middle-man between those wanting to advertise and those

who can bring the advertisements to the public., 200

52 Ibid., 200

53 Mark Grief . “The Hard Sell.” NY Times Magazine, December 30, 2007.


55 Dobrow, 213



Nemhauser 19

Works CitedAdvertising Age, “William Bernbach,” The Advertising Century Special Report , March 29, 1999.

http://adage.com/article/special-report-the-advertising-century/william-bernbach/140180/

Buzzard, Karen S. Chains of Gold : Marketing the Ratings and Rating the Markets . Metuchen,

NJ: The Scarecrow Press, 1990.

Cracknell, Andrew. The Real Mad Men: The Renegades of Madison Avenue and the Golden Ageof Advertising . Philadelphia: Running Press, 2011.

Deutsch, Claudia H. “Dreaming of Bras for the Modern Woman.” New York Times , September28, 2005. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/28/business/media/28adco.html?_r=1&

Dobrow, Larry. When Advertising Tried Harder: The Sixties: The Golden Age of American Advertising . New York: Friendly Press, Inc. 1984

Doyle, Dane, Bernbach “More About Bill: Biography.” last modified 2011.http://www.ddb.com/BillBernbachSaid/more-about-bill/biography.html

Elliot, Stuart. “Skewering Madison Avenue for 60 Years.” New York Times , October 28, 2012.http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/29/business/media/mad-magazine-collects-60-years-of-

parodying-madison-avenue.html

Gast, David K. “Consumer Education & the Madison Avenue Morality.” The Phi Delta Kappan 48, no. 10 (1967): 485-487. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20371911

Grief, Mark. “The Hard Sell.” New York Times Magazine Sunday Book Review , December 30,

2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/30/books/review/Greif-t.html

Ogilvy & Mather, “David Ogilvy Biography.” http://www.ogilvy.com/About/Our-History/David-Ogilvy-Bio.aspx

Reichert, Tom. The Erotic History of Advertising . Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003.

Seligman, Daniel. “The Amazing Advertising Business”, Forbes Magazine 1956 Vol 54, No.107 quoted in Karen Buzzard, Chains of Gold : Marketing the Ratings and Rating the

Markets , (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1990), 78.

Warlaumont, Hazel G. Advertising in the 60s: Turncoats, Traditionalists and Waste Makers in America’s Turbulent Decade . Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001.


http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/28/business/media/28adco.html?_r=1&

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http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/28/business/media/28adco.html?_r=1&


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The_Real_Mad_Men_The_1960s_A_Golden_Age.pdf