There-Insertion

There-InsertionAuthor(s): Edwin WilliamsSource: Linguistic Inquiry, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Winter, 1984), pp. 131-153Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4178370 .

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Edwin Williams There-Insertion

This article will explore the consequences of two very simple ideas about there-insertion sentences (TISs) in English: first, that there is an NP; and second, that there is a scope marker. The first assertion is unarguable-at least, no one has argued against it yet. The second, though, is denied in several thorough accounts, including Milsark (1974) and Safir (1982).

Once some auxiliary hypotheses are made (concerning, for example, the verb be, about which something must be said in any case), the main lines of the correct analysis of TISs, as well as some facts about there-insertion that I believe to be new, follow from these two ideas. Because of their simplicity, I will refer to them as the minimal analysis of there-insertion sentences.

Among the consequences of this line of inquiry is the conclusion that Jenkins's (1972) theory of the constituency of TISs is correct; that is, that the postcopular material in TISs is an NP and is not a "small clause," as several recent analyses have supposed (Safir (1982), Burzio (1982), Stowell (1981)):

(1) a. There are [some people sick]NP b. not: There are [some people sick]sc

I will supply some new arguments for Jenkins's hypothesis and rebut some arguments that have accrued against it; also, I will show (in section 1.5) that it follows from the "minimal analysis."

Other consequences discussed in the following pages are

(2) a. TISs do not involve NP movement. b. TISs do not involve Quantifier Raising (QR). c. S -- NP Aux XP, and the copula is an Aux. d. A head has scope over its X' maximal projection.

I would like to thank Avery Andrews, Mats Rooth, Ken Safir, Tim Stowell, and Steve Weisler for useful discussion of the ideas presented here. I would also like to thank the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, MIT, UCLA, and the University of California at Irvine for the opportunity to present the material to helpful audiences. Special thanks are owed to an anonymous LI reader, whose close and thoughtful reading of an earlier version of this article resulted in numerous improvements. I am especially indebted for this reader's contribution to the discussion of extraposition in section 1.1; to the argument from Heavy NP Shift in section 1.1; to the unfortunately still murky question of the distribution of postnominal AP modifiers in section 1.4; and to clarifying the derivation of the bare NP theory from the "minimal analysis" in section 1.5.

Linguistic Inquiry, Volume 15, Number 1, Winter 1984 0024-3892/84/010131-23 $02.5010 131 (1984 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology



132 EDWIN WILLIAMS

1. The There Be NP Analysis

In this section I will consider arguments in favor of Jenkins's position that the postcopular material in TISs is simply an NP, not a small clause, as in (lb), or some other structure, such as (3), as Milsark (1974) and others have proposed.

(3) There are [[some people]NP [sick]AP]vp

1.1. Arguments

One of the most telling observations in favor of the bare NP theory, made by Jenkins himself, is that the bare NP structure can generate all of the strings that are called TISs; that is, given the full set of NPs that exist in English, it would be impossible to prevent the generation of all of the TISs (considered simply as strings) with the structure (4):

(4) there be NP

For example, in the following pairs of sentences, the first is a TIS, and the second is a sentence that unambiguously exhibits an NP that would allow the there be NP analysis to be imposed on the TIS:

(5) a. There is someone sick. Someone sick is in the next room.

b. There is someone believed to be a liar. Someone believed to be a liar is in the next room.

c. There is someone running. Someone running is in the next room.

These observations at least make the bare NP view a candidate for the analysis of TISs. Other arguments also strongly favor the bare NP analysis. This analysis predicts

that the possible termini of TISs are exactly the possible termini of NPs, since TISs terminate in NPs. The absence of such structures as (6) is thus predicted:

(6) *There was a friend of mine an imposter.

This is because NPs, apart from appositive structures, do not terminate with NPs:

(7) *A friend of mine an imposter is in the next room.

No other analysis proposed for TISs can make this prediction. For example, the small clause analysis cannot, since there are small clauses of the form (8):

(8) [NP NP]: I consider [a friend of mine an imposter]

Nor can the classical NP postposing analysis of TISs, since the input to postposing is fully grammatical:

(9) A friend of mine is an imposter.



THERE-INSERTION 133

Another, parallel argument can be founded on the peculiar distribution of the preposition with. For reasons I do not understand, this preposition in one of its senses cannot appear in postcopular or predicative position, but only in attributive positions:

(10) a. *The man is with a green coat. b. The man with a green coat is here.

But this modifier is allowed in TISs:

(11) There is a man with a green coat.

The PP in (11) cannot be a postcopular or small clause predicate; it must be part of the postcopular NP. Of course, this possibility exists in all of the theories, since they all must admit some sentences that have the structure there be NP. For example:

(12) There is a God.

However, the proponents of the small clause and NP postposing theories would tend to limit the applicability of this structure to "purely existential" sentences, like (12). What is important about (11) is that it does not have the flavor of a purely existential sentence, despite the fact that it must be analyzed as one.

If the bare NP theory is correct, then "purely existential" sentences have no special status; in fact, I find the distinction between "purely existential" and "normal" TISs vague and incoherent. What can be the difference between (13a) and (13b) on this existential/normal dimension?

(13) a. There is a man with a green coat on. b. There is a man talking to Mary.

I believe the reason that neither of these has an existential flavor is that the NPs contain sufficient descriptive detail, unlike (12).

Another argument in favor of the bare NP theory is that the postnominal predicate cannot be fronted by Wh Movement:

(14) *How happy was there someone?

This follows directly from the bare NP theory, since the postnominal modifier is a part of the postcopular NP, and in general NP modifiers cannot be extracted by Wh Move- ment:

(15) a. There was [someone [how happy]AP]NP b. You met [someone [how happy]AP]NP c. *How happy did you meet someone?

Given the bare NP theory, (14) could not have been otherwise. Under other theories of TISs, however, (14) is an anomaly. The small clause theory



134 EDWIN WILLIAMS

cannot explain it, since extraction of the predicate of a small clause is in general allowed: (16) a. How happy do you consider [Bill t]sc

b. There was [someone [how happy]AP]SC Nor can (14) be explained by the transformational theory that derives TISs from copular sentences by postposing:

(17) a. Someone is how happy? b. How happy is someone? c. There is someone [how happy]

Thus, the bare NP theory is strongly preferred. One objection that could naturally be raised against this last argument in its favor is that although the postnominal modifier cannot be extracted, apparently the noun (plus article) can be:

(18) How many people were there t happy?

Given this fact, it would apparently be a mistake to include the predicate happy in the postcopular NP. In fact, though, the stranding of the postnominal modifier can be seen as the result of a general rule extraposing postnominal modifiers from NP, as such a rule will be needed anyway to account for the stranding of modifiers that any theory must treat as a part of the postcopular NP:

(19) How many people are there with green coats? Recall that the PP with green coats must be generated inside NP only, never in a postcopular or small clause predicate position; hence, (19) can be derived only via a rule of extraposition. Given this rule, (18) poses no special problem for the bare NP theory.

The extraposition in question obviously cannot be allowed to feed Wh Movement, or the prediction of (14) will be missed: if postnominal modifiers can be extraposed before Wh Movement, then they can be moved by Wh Movement.

If we simply call the rule of extraposition "stylistic," in which case it must apply after Wh Movement, we solve this problem, but run afoul of the fact (noted by Gueron (1978)) that some extrapositions feed LF, and therefore must apply in the derivation of S-structure. For example, if the conditioning of the appearance of any is a feature of LF, then the extraposition of the PP in the following examples must occur in the derivation of S-structure:

(20) a. Books weren't published b- anyone unknown. b. *Books by anyone unknown weren't published.

To pursue this point, there must be two extrapositions, one stylistic and one taking place before S-structure. If so, however, how is the pre-S-structure extraposition to be prevented from extraposing the postnominal complement of TISs and allowing the derivation of (14)? Apparently, as the following contrast shows, the pre-S-structure rule extraposes only PPs, not APs.

(21) a. The books arrived by Carroll. b. The books arrived torn.



THERE-INSERTION 135

In (21a), the PP by Carroll is a restrictive modifier of the subject NP-that is, it is given as information presumed necessary for the identification of the referent of the subject NP. Not so with the AP torn in (21b); (21b) is not synonymous with The torn books arrived. Rather, the phrase the books by itself is presumed to contain enough information for the identification of the referent of the subject NP, and the AP is a side comment. Assuming that the status of restrictive modifiers is determined from S-structure, we may consider that if there is a rule extraposing APs, it must apply after S-structure. If this is the case, then the rule cannot feed Wh Movement, and (14) cannot be derived.

A further argument for the bare NP theory can be derived from the action of Heavy NP Shift (HNPS) on TISs. HNPS can move the subject of a so-called small clause over the predicate, as in (22a,b):

(22) a. I consider several of George's recent acquaintances sick. b. I consider sick several of George's recent acquaintances.

However, parallel application of HNPS does not occur in TISs of the type in question:

(23) a. There are several of George's recent acquaintances sick. b. *There are sick several of George's recent acquaintances.

This failure of HNPS is inexplicable if the structure of (23a) is either (24a) or (24b).

(24) a. There are [NP AP]sc b. There [are NP AP]vp

However, if the structure is (25), HNPS of course cannot apply.

(25) There are NP

...... AP

1.2. The NP Aux XP Analysis

Why is the bare NP theory the correct one? In answering this question, I depart sharply from Jenkins's proposals. Under Jenkins's view, be is a main verb, the head of the VP of the clause, and the postcopular NP is the object of that verb in surface structure. I would like to consider instead the idea that TISs contain no VP, and that the postcopular NP appears in place of the VP and is dominated by S:

(26) S

NP Aux NP

there is someone sick



136 EDWIN WILLIAMS

There are several reasons for preferring this analysis to Jenkins's, which would assign this sentence the structure (27):

(27) S

NP VP

V NP

there is someone sick

One of the reasons for preferring (26) to (27) is that if we adopt (27), we will actually lose the bare NP theory of TISs; since the postcopular NP is in the VP, there is no reason that the VP could not contain a predicate modifying the NP, since the position X in (28a) is in general an object-modifying position:

(28) a. [V NP X]vp b. I [ate [the meat] raw]vp c. There [is [someone] sick]vp

(28c) exemplifies the structure (28a) just as (28b) does, but (28c) is counter to the bare NP theory. If the structure of TISs is as in (26), though, and if we suppose that the rule for S is (29),

(29) S -* NP Aux XP

where in TISs NP occupies the position of XP, then we have a means of enforcing the bare NP theory-there is no post-XP modifying position in (29).

Thus, if we can force TISs to have the representation (26), via rule (29), we will have guaranteed that the bare NP theory, which I have argued to be correct, is the only one available. It remains to justify rule (29) and to explain why the postcopular NP in TISs always occupies the XP position in (29) and never the NP position in (28c).

I will begin by justifying (29). The startling aspect of this rule is that it says that some sentences do not have main verbs, but may rather have "main adjectives" or "main nouns." Of course, for any choice of Aux other than be, XP will always be VP, since be is the only Aux that subcategorizes for any category other than VP. And if no Aux is chosen, XP must be VP, since there must be at least one verb (main or auxiliary verb) for the realization of Tense. Thus, (29) says that the following sentences are all parallel in structure, as indicated:

(30) a. John - will - leave NP Aux VP b. John - is - sick NP Aux AP c. John - is - a fool NP Aux NP d. John - is - leaving NP Aux NP e. There - is - [someone sick]NP NP Aux NP



THERE-INSERTION 137

(29) receives some justification from the fact that VP Deletion treats all of the constructions in (30) as parallel. For this reason, VP Deletion is better called XP Deletion:

(31) a. John will leave and Bill will _ too. b. John is sick and Bill is __ too. c. John is a fool and Bill is __ too. d. John is leaving and Bill is __ too. e. There is someone sick, and there was yesterday too.

See Williams (1977) for further details. But VP Deletion does not delete XPs from any position other than post-Aux position:

(32) a. *John put in the drawer. (NP) b. *1 consider John __. (NP, AP) c. *1 kept John . (VP, e.g. swimming)

This restriction is accurately reflected in the structural description for the rule given in Williams (1977), namely (33):

(33) NP Aux XP

If all of this is correct, then we must adopt the there Aux NP analysis of TISs, for the postcopular NP is parallel to VP, not to the object of V in VP.

We must still discover how to prevent the postcopular NP from being the direct object of a main verb be. We can do this by stipulating that be is not a main verb, but rather an auxiliary verb; then, if it is followed by an NP, that NP must occupy the main predicate position of the entire clause.

This analysis of be as an auxiliary will be sufficient to guarantee the bare NP analysis of TISs-the copula will enforce the structure (34a), since the structure (34b) cannot satisfy the base rule (35):

(34) a. [There]NP [is]AUX [someone sick]Np b. [There]NP [is]AUx [someone]Np [sick]AP

(35) S -> NP Aux XP

Given that (35) is the correct base rule for S and that be is an auxiliary verb, each of which I have established independently, it follows that the bare NP analysis of TISs must be correct. Thus, I have provided not only the mechanisms for guaranteeing the bare NP analysis, but also an independent argument that it is correct: it is the only analysis compatible with the correct analysis of the auxiliary be.

Of course, if some post-XP modifiers are allowed in (35), such as time and place adverbs, then some TISs will be ambiguous ((36a)), but this ambiguity occurs in all types of sentences ((36b)):

(36) a. There is a man in the garden. There - is - [a man]Np in the garden There - is - [a man in the garden]Np



138 EDWIN WILLIAMS

b. I saw a man in the garden. I [saw [a man]NP]vP in the garden I [saw [a man in the garden]NP]VP

Still, sentences like (37a) will not be ambiguous, for the analysis (37c) will not be provided by the base rules:

(37) a. There is someone sick. b. There is [someone sick] c. *There is [someone] sick S -> NP Aux XP *AP

This difference between locative PPs and postnominal APs-that only the former, but not the latter, can be generated as daughters of S-can be confirmed by the way VP Deletion applies to TISs:

(38) a. *There was someone sick but there wasn't + dead. b. There was someone in the parlor, but there wasn't + in the garden.

In (38b) a full NP is deleted, since the PP is a daughter of S. But in (38a) only a partial NP is deleted; the AP dead is necessarily a part of the postcopular NP, since there is no position in S for AP. This difference strongly confirms the bare NP theory of TISs: only sentential modifiers that can be generated as the terminus of any sentence can occur at the end of TISs; predicates that specifically modify the postcopular NP are excluded.

1.3. Aux

The facts involving be are somewhat more complicated than indicated above, because there is a main verb be (MV be) in addition to the auxiliary be. MV be occurs as the second be in the following sentence:1

(39) John [islAux [being obnoxious]vp

It might seem that the existence of MV be jeopardizes the bare NP analysis, since it permits the structure (27), which itself permits post-NP adjectival modifiers in VP. But there is a good reason why MV be can never appear in a TIS: unlike the copular be, this be entails intentionality on the part of the subject.

' Akmajian and Wasow (1975) (AW) present an analysis of be similar to the one proposed here. Both analyses posit the existence of two be's, one dominated by Aux and the other by VP. Below are some differences between the two:

(i) In AW's theory, the Aux is always followed by VP; in mine, it is followed by XP, for any X. (ii) In AW's theory, the copula is under VP; in mine, it can be under Aux or VP, with different conse-

quences. (iii) In AW's theory, the NP of TISs is left-adjoined to the VP; in mine, it is generated in deep structure

in place of the VP (as the XP of S -* NP Aux XP). (iv) AW's theory includes clausal structures without Aux (gerunds); in mine, "clause" is always the

projection of Aux, so there are no Aux-less clauses. (v) AW's theory makes no semantic distinction between MV and auxiliary be; auxiliary be occurs in

D-structure only when VP-dominated be does. These differences are presented not as a criticism of AW's theory, but simply as a guide to the reader

interested in comparing the two theories in detail.



THERE-INSERTION 139

In order to distinguish the two be's, we must examine the Aux and its relation to the clause (S). Essentially, Aux (the classical Modal-have-be sequence of verbs) is the head of S, so wherever Aux occurs, S is present, and wherever there is an S, there is Aux (or at least the possibility of Aux, since Aux can be null).

This point can be made by contrasting two sets of constructions based on VP, one set having a full Aux, and therefore being clausal, and the other having no Aux, and therefore not being clausal.

The clausal and nonclausal constructions can be distinguished on the basis of a number of properties that follow directly from the presence vs. absence of the Aux.

The clausal constructions are

(40) a. the tensed S b. the infinitive c. the gerund d. the acc-ing construction e. the nonrestrictive participle f. the nominative absolute

The nonclausal constructions are

(41) a. the perception verb participle complement b. the causative verb complement c. the perception verb stem complement d. the restrictive participle

By hypothesis, the clausal constructions are all instances of S NP Aux VP; the nonclausal constructions involve no Aux or S at all.2 The VPs of these constructions

2 Akmajian, Steele, and Wasow (1979) (ASW) present a somewhat more complex analysis. Each Aux element is introduced as the left member of a binary-branching structure:

(i) V' V .. . V2 be V' V3 have V2 S -- NP Aux VP Aux -* Tense Modal

In support of this they claim that various verbs in English subcategorize for one or another of these V's and that each V' occurs as the largest V-projection in at least one construction.

Contrast this with the theory proposed here, in which there are only two options: subcategorization either for S or for VP. Also, in contrast to ASW, I have been implicitly assuming that every phrase is strictly either itself a maximal projection or dominated by a maximal projection.

The empirical discrepancy between the two theories lies in the availability of V3 and V2 for subcategorization; the empirical question is, Do any verbs subcategorize for either of these? ASW claim that V2 occurs in imperatives, in why not constructions, and as complement to make and let. The evidence for this is very weak, however. First, there are imperatives with have, which therefore must contain V3, in ASW's terminology:

(ii) a. Please have finished by the time I return. b. Don't have finished by the time I return.

Furthermore, there is really no good reason that an imperative should not have a full Aux, for imperatives are surely sentences. Some have overt subjects, for example:

(iii) You come here.



140 EDWIN WILLIAMS

are not dominated by S. Thus, for example, the nonrestrictive (clausal) participle has the structure (42a), whereas the restrictive (nonclausal) participle has the structure (42b):

(42) a. [The man]NP, [PRO Aux singing]s, left b. [The man [singing]vp]Np left

Note that in this theory there is no special connection between VP and S. VP is not mentioned specifically in the rule for S; instead, XP is. Moreover, VP occurs in constructions apart from S (in English, the nonclausal constructions (4la-d)).

The first property that distinguishes between the two sets is the occurrence of as-

Second, ASW's claims about the why not construction seem factually wrong to me. The following example shows that this construction admits aspectual have, which ASW's subcategorization for V2 would preclude:

(iv) Why not have finished by the time I return? Third, their claim that "there is little reason to suppose that there is a semantic explanation" for the exclusion of aspectual have from the complement of make and let does not stand up well against examples like (v):

(v) If I could rewrite Russian history, I would let the revolution have already taken place by the time Lenin was born.

The fact that the odd supposition in (v) makes the appearance of aspectual have acceptable shows that its appearance is governed not by syntax, but by semantics in the loosest sense.

ASW claim that V3 occurs in gerunds and infinitives. They assume that these have the structure (vi): (vi) [NP V3]NP

In other words, infinitives and gerunds lack Tense and Modal by virtue of having a different phrase structure rule from tensed Ss. The question is, Is this the right way to characterize this lack, or can it perhaps be explained in such a way as to preserve a single base rule for all clausal structures? Suppose that Tense is the head of S (as in Williams (1981)); suppose further that to is the only tenseless modal. Then infinitives and tensed sentences will differ in the specification of the Tense feature on the S node:

(vii) a. S b. S

NP Aux VP NP Aux VP

I I must to

If this is so, then there is no need to exclude Tense and Modal from infinitives by manipulating the phrase structure rules; and similarly for gerunds. Thus, no special rule is needed for these structures, and there is no need for the V3 node proposed by ASW.

In sum, then, it seems that the distinction between VP and S is sufficient and that finer distinctions are unnecessary. The finer distinctions are not theoretically innocent. They weaken X-bar theory in two ways: first, they necessitate the appearance of nonmaximal projections in base rules, subcategorizations, and trans- formations; second, they force the abandonment of a fixed single phrase structure rule for S.

A further shortcoming of ASW's theory is that it cannot rationalize the connection between the impossibility of all auxiliary verbs in a given construction and the concomitant impossibility of arb subjects (see (41)-(43)).

Incidentally, (v) shows that the bare stem construction does have a limited distribution as a clausal structure, specifically, as the (marginal, for me) complement of make and let. Consequently, we find the other signs of clausal complementation as well (though again marginally):

(viii) a. I would let the revolution be temporarily successful. b. I would make there be a whole new order.



THERE-INSERTION 141

pectual have; as expected, the clausal complements permit it, the nonclausal forbid it:

(43) a. Clausal i. John has left.

ii. to have left iii. his having left iv. with him having left v. John, having left

vi. John having left, .

b. Nonclausal i. *1 saw John having left.

ii. *1 made John have left. iii. *1 saw John have left. iv. *The man having left is here.

The second property distinguishing between the clausal and nonclausal constructions is the occurrence of auxiliary be. Of course, MV be can occur in both constructions. Auxiliary and MV be are easy to tell apart, since MV be ascribes intentionality to its subject. This is why, for example, the following sentence is odd:

(44) *John is being dead.

Since there are two be's, the second one must be MV be. This verb ascribes intentionality to John, but dead is a durative state presumably not under John's control at this point. Contrast this with (39), where the predicate obnoxious is controllable.

The prediction made here is that in the clausal constructions, auxiliary be can occur, but in the nonclausal constructions, only MV be is possible; hence, predicates such as dead should be excluded from the nonclausal constructions, but permitted in the clausal constructions:

(45) a. Clausal i. John is dead.

ii. to be dead iii. his being dead iv. John, being dead v. John being dead, ...

b. Nonclausal i. *1 saw John being dead.

(i') I saw John being obnoxious. (i") I saw John dead.

ii. *1 made John be dead. iii. *1 saw John be dead. iv. *The man being dead is here.

(45bi') shows that MV be is permitted in the nonclausal complements, as expected, as



142 EDWIN WILLIAMS

long as the predicate is controllable and nondurative. (45bi") shows that the restriction illustrated in (45bi) is not semantic in any obvious sense; that is, the event (45bi) tries to depict is a "seeable" one. Note how the restrictive (45aiv) and nonrestrictive (45biv) participles form a minimal pair with respect to this property, as with respect to the last.

If, as I argued earlier, VP Deletion is keyed to the presence of Aux, then we would expect it to occur in the clausal constructions, but not in the nonclausal constructions. This is correct:

(46) a. Clausal i. John has

ii. to have iii. Bill's being arrested is more surprising than his not having been iv. with Bill not having been __,

v. Bill was arrested, but John, not having been , returned. vi. Bill was arrested, but John not having been , we returned.

b. Nonclausal i. *Sam was arrested, and I think I saw Bill being

ii. *. . . I saw Bill be iii. *The man being obnoxious is taller than the one not being

If Aux is strictly the head of S and S is strictly the projection of Aux, then we might expect some connection between the occurrence of structural subjects and Aux, since only S has a structural subject. Thus, in the Aux-less nonclausal constructions, there will be no structural subject. One property of the structural subject position is that PRO can occupy it, and one property of PRO is that it can receive an interpretation of "ar- bitrary reference" (arb interpretation). Thus, we would expect the clausal constructions to permit an arb subject, but the Aux-less constructions not to:

(47) a. Clausal i. PRO to win is fun.

ii. PRO winning is fun. b. Nonclausal

i. *1 saw leave (I saw someone leave).

The full prediction cannot be tested, for various reasons. First, certain clausal constructions, such as the tensed S and acc-ing constructions, cannot occur with PRO subject at all, so of course the arb interpretation cannot be found. Second, certain clausal constructions with PRO subjects are constructions of obligatory control (see Williams (1980)) and thus exclude the arb interpretation as well; the restrictive participle is one such.

Also, one may reasonably doubt whether the failure of arb interpretation to occur in the complement of perception verbs (47bi) really shows anything about the occurrence of Aux or S, since arb interpretation seems not to occur in VP complement constructions in general, whether or not they are clausal. Thus, for example, the PRO subject of the



THERE-INSERTION 143

complement of want in (48) cannot receive the arb interpretation:

(48) John wants PRO to leave.

But then why are nonclausal complements not found in positions in which they could receive arb interpretations, such as the subject position in (49)?

(49) *Be obnoxious would be fun. (stem complement)

Finally, if it is correct that TISs are instantiations of the rule S -* NP Aux XP, then of course clausal and nonclausal constructions will differ with regard to whether or not they can be TISs:

(50) a. Clausal i. There was someone sick. ii. I want there to be someone sick.

iii. With there being someone sick, . . . b. Nonclausal

i. *1 saw there being too many people sick. ii. *I made there be too many people sick.

iii. *1 saw there be too many people sick.

(Compare I saw it become clear that Bill had lied, which shows that the ungrammaticality of (SObi-iii) is not due to an exclusion of dummy subjects.)

As before, this property is not relevant to all of the clausal constructions, because some of them have PRO subjects and therefore cannot be TISs.

Otherwise, the only clausal construction in which there fails to appear is the gerund:

(51) *There's being too many people sick.

This is probably not because the gerund is not clausal; rather, it is probably because the possessive marker 's cannot be applied to a dummy. Note that the possessive marker cannot be applied to the dummy it, and also that in the related acc-ing construction, both dummies are allowed:

(52) a. *Its being clear that John was here upset Bill. b. With it being clear that John was here ... c. With there being too many people sick ...

Of the five properties discussed (allowing have; allowing nonintentional be; allowing VP Deletion; allowing arb subject; allowing there-insertion), I have rationalized the distinction between the two sets of constructions with regard to the first four, by saying that the clausal constructions are instances of S and contain Aux, whereas the nonclausal ones are not Ss, but bare VPs, and therefore do not contain Aux. But so far, I have not explained why there-insertion does not occur in the Aux-less constructions.

Of course, if it is insisted that there can occur only as the subject of auxiliary be, and not as the subject of MV be, then there will not occur in the nonclausal constructions.



144 EDWIN WILLIAMS

But why would there be restricted to auxiliary be? I will return to this question in section 1.5, but I give the answer briefly here: if MV be ascribes intentionality to its subject, and if there is a scope marker and not a variable, as I will argue in section 2, then this ascription would be peculiar, for scope markers do not have intentions.

The following example might at first glance appear to raise a problem for the analysis I have just given of MV be and there:

(53) There was a man being obnoxious.

The MV be might seem to ascribe intentionality to the scope marker there. Actually, though, the bare NP theory forces the analysis in (54):

(54) *There was [a man [being obnoxious]vp]Np

In this structure, the VP does indeed contain the MV be, but intentionality is ascribed to the head noun man, not there, since the VP modifier is internal to the NP. Thus, no anomaly results. Compare this to (55):

(55) *There [was]Aux [being a man obnoxious]vp

Here, the MV be anomalously ascribes intentionality to the scope marker there.

1.4. Problems

I will now consider several objections that can be raised against the bare NP analysis. First, Milsark (1974) cites the following example as a problem for the bare NP

analysis:

(56) There was a live pig roasted.

He reasons that the NP live pig roasted is simply contradictory; since (56) is not contradictory, it must not contain any such NP, and so must be analyzed as (57):

(57) There was [a live pig]Np roasted

But a live pig roasted cannot be a contradictory NP, as it occurs unambiguously and without contradiction as the subject of the following sentence:

(58) [A live pig roasted last Saturday]NP was delicious

Thus, there is no reason that (56) cannot be assigned the structure picked out by the bare NP theory:

(59) There was [a live pig roasted]NP

A second argument against the bare NP theory, and in favor of the small clause theory of TISs, is based on the distribution of NPs with not Q specifiers, as in (60a,b):

(60) a. Not a single person came. b. *John saw not a single person.



THERE-INSERTION 145

Apparently such NPs can occur in subject position, but not object position. What, then, of the following example?

(61) There was not a single person sick.

If (61) has the structure assigned to it by the small clause theory of TISs, then the occurrence of the not is accounted for, since not a single person would then be in the subject position of a small clause:

(62) There was [not a single person sick]NP

This, then, is an argument for the small clause theory. However, this argument is based on a misstatement of the generalization concerning the distribution of these negative NPs; the correct generalization is that not NP can occur in positions immediately dominated by S. This includes the subject position, but also includes the postcopular NP position (the XP position in the rule S -> NP Aux XP; recall that the copula is an Aux). That this is the correct generalization can be seen from the following example:

(63) John is [not a single thing his mother wanted him to be]NP

This conclusion is confirmed in the case of TISs that must be "bare NP" TISs in any theory, the so-called purely existential cases:

(64) a. There is not a single God. b. There is [not a single man with a green coat]NP

Thus, this argument actually confirms that the copula is an auxiliary and that the postcopular XP in both TISs and ordinary copular sentences is dominated by S, since only then can the proper generalization about the distribution of not NP be stated.

A final problem facing the bare NP theory, perhaps the most pressing one, is that it postulates the occurrence of postnominal NP modifiers that have no complement. Such modifiers have drastically limited distribution:

(65) a. There are [some people sick] b. *1 saw [some people sick] c. I saw [some people as sick as dogs]

However, NPs with complementless postnominal modifiers (NCPM) are not limited to there-insertion contexts. Certain adjectives always occur in postnominal position:

(66) I talked to [the people present]

Furthermore, in subject position, especially in the subject position of copular sentences, NCPMs occur somewhat more freely:

(67) a. The people sick are in the next room. b. The people still sick are naturally more anxious than the people already

cured. (example from L. Frazier (personal communication))



146 EDWIN WILLIAMS

It seems that NCPMs can occur in positions dominated by S, but not VP-that is, in ordinary subject position and in postcopular position in TISs. The implied contrast in (67b) (sick/cured) seems to enhance the acceptability of the NCPMs in that sentence. Postnominal APs seem to be specially focused; this special focusing is independent of their syntax, but no doubt strongly determines their distribution. I cannot claim to fully understand the conditions under which NCPMs can occur, and therefore I cannot dismiss their absolutely free occurrence in TISs as a problem for the bare NP theory. I feel that their distribution might be connected to what Gueron (1978) has called the "presentational" use of NPs. Thus, there is some difference between the following two sentences that may follow from the fact that the first is presentational, but the second is not:

(68) a. Some people very sick arrived on the scene. b. ?Some people very sick shot Bill.

If this is so, then it is quite natural that NCPMs would occur in TISs, since TISs are paradigmatic "presentational" sentences. And in fact NCPMs do occur quite naturally in TISs of quite a different kind:

(69) a. There arrived some people very sick. b. There arrived [some people very sick] c. *There arrived [some people] very sick d. There arrived [a man with a green coat]

If these copula-lacking TISs are instances of the structure S there VP NP (as (69d) suggests), then the structure of (69a) must be (69b), not (69c), since (as shown earlier) S does not allow AP after VP. In that case these are further instances in which NCPMs occur. It is quite natural that NCPMs should occur in these sentences, since these TISs are also presentational sentences. In these cases the "small clause" analysis is not appropriate, since arrive and the other verbs that appear in these TISs are not verbs that take clausal arguments.

The special focus associated with postnominal modifiers illustrated in (67) may help to explain the slightly strained sound of (70a), as opposed to (70b):

(70) a. ?How many people sick were there? b. How many people were there sick?

Sick is strongly focused in both of these questions; since it is the focus of the sentence in each case, it is somewhat more natural at the end, as in (70b). In other words, according to the theory I have proposed, these examples are syntactically alike; where focus is concerned, the latter is more natural simply because the focus is in focus position.

The special focusing that attends postnominal APs may well also explain the oddness of the following coordinations:

(71) a. There are some people sick and some people healthy. b. ?There are some people sick and some healthy people.



THERE-INSERTION 147

(71b) is odd either because the second conjunct lacks a focus or because its focus is in a position not parallel to that of the focus in the first conjunct.

Clearly, more work is needed on this topic, and I do not consider the few remarks I have made here to have resolved the problems for the bare NP theory. I certainly do not think the problems are sufficient to warrant giving up that theory, though; in fact, if my remarks about (68) are at all correct, the bare NP theory may eventually provide insight into the study of these NPs. (68) tends to show that syntax must make these NPs available, whereas pragmatic factors sharply limit their distribution. In his 1975 study, Jenkins, I believe, unfortunately sacrificed the bare NP theory of his earlier work (Jenkins (1972)) in the face of such examples, deciding finally that such sentences as There are some people sick are after all examples not of there be NP, but of there be NP AP, via his rule of cleft reduction. I will maintain the bare NP theory in its strongest form, as the considerations given earlier necessitate, and hope that insight into the distribution of NCPMs will eventually explain why they occur so freely in TISs.

1.5. Deriving the Bare NP Analysis from the Minimal Analysis

Finally, I will examine the consequences for TISs of the claim that there is an NP. I will show that this claim (in conjunction with the fact that there is a scope marker, which I will examine in more detail in section 2) suffices to explain why the bare NP analysis is the only one possible.

First, it follows from the fact that there is an NP that it can occupy only NP positions-but why only the subject position, and why only the subject position of be? If there is a scope marker, as I have suggested above and will explore more thoroughly below, then it cannot occupy positions to which theta roles are assigned. Consequently, there must be the subject of a verb that does not assign a theta role to its subject. The copular be is one of the few such verbs; as we have seen, even MV be, if it does not assign a theta role to its subject, at least ascribes intentionality to it.

Furthermore, as a scope marker, there must be followed by an NP whose scope it marks. Thus, there must fit in the following structure, where V assigns no theta role to its subject:

(72) there V NP

But any verb that fits in (72) will assign Case to the postverbal NP, and by Burzio's (1982) generalization such a verb will assign a theta role to its subject. The auxiliary verbs, of which auxiliary be is one, seem the sole exception to this:

(73) John is a fool.

John receives a theta role from fool but not from be. Thus, auxiliary be qualifies as a verb that can appear in (72). Why not other auxiliary verbs, such as has?



148 EDWIN WILLIAMS

(74) a. *There [has]AUX a unicorn b. *John [has]AUX a fool c. John [15]Aux a fool

(74a) is ruled out because of the independent fact that has cannot take NPs in the XP position of S ((74b)); only be can ((74c)).

Burzio's generalization perhaps explains why MV be assigns intentionality to the subject. If only verbs in VPs were Case assigners, then only verbs in Aux would be exempt from Case assignment and thus from Burzio's generalization; the assignment of intentionality to the subject by MV be-if considered to be a token of theta role assignment-is therefore a consequence of its status as a main verb, via Burzio's generalization.

We must of course answer for the Case that does appear on post-auxiliary be NPs, as in (75a,b), since all NPs require Case.

(75) a. John [islAux [a fool]Np b. There [is]AUx [a God]Np

Although a full discussion would be well beyond the scope of this article, it seems reasonable to say that such NPs get their Case either directly from Tense, or perhaps by agreement with their subjects. Neither alternative requires attributing Case-assigning properties to the verb be itself.

By contrast, MV be is a Case assigner and therefore must assign a theta role (here, ascribe intentionality) to the subject.

To recapitulate the reasoning from the minimal analysis to the bare NP theory: for the reasons given in the preceding paragraph, if there is a scope marker, then the verb must be an auxiliary verb and not a main verb, because only auxiliary verbs escape Burzio's generalization. Since be is the only auxiliary verb that subcategorizes for NP, and since there must govern an NP, that auxiliary verb must be be. Furthermore, the subcategorized NP must be present in the sentence, because there must govern an NP; thus, if there is to appear in a sentence at all, it must appear in a sentence of the form (76):

(76) there [. . . be]Aux NP

But that is precisely the bare NP theory. None of this follows if there is a variable bound by the existentially quantified NP,

as some recent analyses (notably Safir (1982)) have suggested:

(77) [Someonei [therei is ti sick]s]s

The reason the bare NP theory does not follow is that variables are not incompatible with ascriptions of intentionality, provided they are bound by appropriate operators. That is exactly what is happening in the following example:

(78) Whoi do you think [ti is being obnoxious]



THERE-INSERTION 149

Hence, if there is a variable, there is no way to exclude analyses of TISs with MV be and the following complement structure:

(79) there [be NP AP]vp

To the extent that the arguments against this analysis are correct, we will want to resist the suggestion that there is a variable.

2. There as a Scope Marker

In this section I will show that the rest of the properties of TISs follow from the fact that there is a scope marker. I will develop the idea that the notion "scope marker" has a fixed universal characterization and is a category of lexical item that cuts across the parts of speech; the fact that this notion is fixed universally means that a language learner need learn only that a "scope marker" is a scope marker, and its logical properties will thereby be completely determined. This notion of "scope marker" is essentially the one discussed in Van Riemsdijk and Williams (1982).

Let us begin with a discussion of the French scope marker ne. I follow Kayne (1981) in calling ne a particle that marks the scope of an associated quantifier, such as personne 'no one', rien 'nothing', etc. The role ne plays can be seen in the following examples:

(80) a. Je ne exige que Pierre parle a personne. I demand that Pierre talk to no one 'There is no one that I demand that Pierre talk to.'

b. Je exige que Pierre ne parle a personne. I demand that Pierre talk to no one 'I demand that there be no one that Pierre talk to.'

As these examples show, the position of ne determines the scope of the quantifier personne: when ne is in the top clause, the quantifier has wide scope; when ne is in the bottom clause, the quantifier's scope is limited to the bottom clause.

We may effect this by requiring that ne "govern" the operator in LF that corresponds to personne, where "govern" means 'c-command and be vertically adjacent to'. This was the proposal made in Van Riemsdijk and Williams (1982). Let us suppose also that QR adjoins a quantifier to the domain that is the scope of that quantifier, and that any maximal projection can serve as such a domain. Then some possible results of applying QR to (80) are as follows:

(81) a. i. %Je ne exige que [personnei [Pierre parle a xi]s]s ii. Je ne [personnei [exige que Pierre parle a xi]vp]vp

b. i. Je exige que [Pierre ne [personnei [parle a Xi]vplvp]s ii. %Je exige que [personnei [Pierre ne parle a xi]s]s

iii. %Je [personnei [exige que Pierre ne parle a xi]vp]vp

(81a) corresponds to (80a), and (81b) to (80b). In (81a) it is only in (81aii) that ne governs personne; thus, the narrow scope reading represented in (81ai) is not allowed, and (80a)



150 EDWIN WILLIAMS

is correctly predicted to have only the wide scope reading. In (81b) it is only in (81bi) that ne governs personne; this corresponds to the narrow scope reading, which (80b) is correctly predicted to have. (82bii) is also a narrow scope reading, indistinguishable from (81bi), but ruled out because ne does not govern personne.

Given this analysis, a French child need only learn that ne is a scope marker, which quantifier's scope it marks, and that it is a clitic.

Now suppose that there is a scope marker, that it marks the scope of existential quantifiers, and that it is an NP. Given this assumption, there must govern an existential quantifier in LF. Since there occupies subject position, this restricts the operation of QR. Consider structures (82b-d), all derived from (82a):

(82) a. John thinks that - there - is - someone - in his house b. %John thinks that [someonei [there is xi in his house]] c. %John [someonei [thinks that there is xi in his house]] d. %[someonei [John thinks that there is xi in his house]]

The representations in (82b-d) are not well-formed, since there does not govern an operator; in fact, only in the input structure (82a) does there govern an operator (someone). In the case of (82c,d), this is a welcome result, since they surely do not represent possible meanings of (82a). However, (82b), which is ruled ungrammatical, seems to represent the meaning of (82a), while (82a) itself, the only LF that satisfies the restriction on the scope marker there, seems to represent no meaning at all, since it has an unmoved quantifier.

Abstracting from this example, we see that in no TIS can QR apply to the postcopular quantifier, since this will always result in a sentence in which there does not govern the quantifier in LF:

(83) a. there be NP b. *[NPi [there be xi]s]s

Next we will see that in fact (82b) cannot be the LF of (82a). (82a) is close to the representation defended by Safir (1982); Safir argues further that there itself is a variable, the variable bound by the indefinite that has undergone QR:

(84) [someonei [therei was [xi in his house]]]

In Safir's representation, there acts as the variable, and the x in postcopular position is not a variable, since it is A-bound by there.

But the interaction of modals and quantified subjects shows that it is unlikely that there is a variable bound by a quantifier adjoined to S. In general, a modal can either have scope over a quantified subject, or not:

(85) a. Someone must leave. b. [must [someonei [xi leave]]] c. [someonei [must [xi leave]]]



THERE-INSERTION 151

(85a) can have the meaning (85b) or the meaning (85c). Why is this so? Note first that the modal can have scope only over the immediately adjacent subject, not over higher subjects. (86a) does not mean (86b):

(86) a. Someone thinks John must leave. b. must [someonei [xi thinks John leaves]]

Part of the empirical content of QR is that whenever a scope ambiguity arises, it can be accounted for by ambiguous application of the rule. So too in this case, but with the following wrinkle: modals do not undergo QR. This is not to say that they do not have scope, only that they do not undergo QR.

Suppose that we interpret the scope of a modal to be the entire S that immediately dominates it. We might suppose more generally that the head of a phrase always has scope over anything in that phrase. Thus, if Modal is the head of S, it has scope over S; if V is the head of VP, then it has scope over VP; and so on.

Returning to (85), we must now account for the ambiguity in terms of whether QR movement of the subject takes place at all. If it takes place, as in (87b), the interpretation results in which the subject has scope over the modal; if it does not, as in (87c), the interpretation results in which the modal has scope over the modal:

(87) a. Someone must leave. b. [someonei [xi must leave]5]s c. [someone must leave]s

In (87b) must has scope over the variable x, but not over the operator someone; in (87c) must has scope over the operator.

This description has the advantage that must itself is never assigned scope by QR (if anything, it is assigned scope by the base rules). This accounts for the lack of ambiguity in a sentence like (86a). It also has the advantage that the scope of must can be derived from a general property of heads, if modals are the head of S.3

I Further evidence that a head has scope over its projection comes from the fact that a verb induces opaque interpretations in its complements (which are contained in the projection) but not in its subject (which is outside the maximal projection of the verb):

(i) A man [wants a fish] (specific man, nonspecific fish)

We may assume that this is the interpretation in which wants has scope over a fish. This interpretation corresponds to the nonmovement of a fish; that is, the LF of (i) is its surface structure. Wants has scope over a fish because a fish is contained in the projection of wants. A man is not contained in the VP, and thus strictly has scope over wants. In general, then, the V can have scope over any complement, but not over the subject.

The exception to this occurs when NP movement has moved a complement to subject position: (ii) A hammer is [needed t]Np

(nonspecific hammer) The nonspecific interpretation corresponds to the interpretation in which needed has scope over a hammer.

This cannot be the LF in which QR has not moved a hammer, since in this LF (identical to S-structure (ii)) a hammer has scope over needed. But, since VP is a scope domain, and since QR can assign an NP to any



152 EDWIN WILLIAMS

Let us now return to the question of whether the indefinite NP has undergone QR, and whether there is a variable. In contrast to (87a), (88a) is unambiguous:

(88) a. There must be someone in his house. b. %[someonei [there must be xi in his house]] c. [must [someonei [xi be in his house]]] d. [There - must be - someone - in his house]

(88a) cannot have the interpretation represented in (88b), where the quantifier has scope over the modal; it has only the interpretation represented in (88c), where the modal has scope over the quantifier. But the theory proposed here does not allow a representation such as (88c); instead, it specifies (88d) as the correct representation of the meaning (88c). In (88d) must has scope over everything, including the operator someone; furthermore, there governs the operator someone, as it must, since there is a scope marker.

The scope marker analysis of there thus predicts the lack of ambiguity in (88a), a prediction not made by theories in which QR applies in TISs. There prevents the ambiguity by preventing the application of QR.

These considerations are sufficient to rule out the "reasonable" interpretation of (82a) (namely, (82b)), since they support the view that QR does not apply in TISs. (82c,d) are ruled out similarly, as noted earlier. This leaves (82a) itself as the only possible LF of (82a). The problem with (82a) as an LF is that textbook logic does not tell us how to interpret it, since the quantifier is unmoved.

Actually, though, I have already hinted what the interpretation might be: unmoved quantifiers have the narrowest possible scope-in fact, just the scope one might expect

domain, including a lower one (as long as it still binds an A-chain), the following LF can also be derived: (iii) [e] is [needed [a hammer]NP]Vp

In this example, needed has scope over a hammer, since a hammer is contained in the projection of needed. In (iii) the empty subject is not a theta position and thus is not part of the chain connected to the object.

This is why the subject position need not be in the scope of the quantifier-it has no theta role (an idea adapted from May (1977)). Thus, it is only under the restricted circumstance that a verb assigns no theta role to its subject (as is the case with verbal passives in general) that the verb can have scope over the subject.

This theory of the relation between scope and theta role assignment can be used to explain a curious observation of Williams (1975), that a quantifier in the subject position of a gerund must take scope wider than the gerund:

(iv) a. [Everyone's seeming [t to leave]] was surprising b. [Everyonei [xi's seeming to leave was surprising]] c. *[[e]'s (seeming [everyone to leave]] was surprising] d. Everyone [seems to to leave] e. [Everyonei [seems ti to leave]] f. [[e] [seems everyone to leave]]

(iva) has only the reading with wide scope for everyone; this reading is represented by LF (ivb). The reading in which seem has scope over everyone, represented by LF (ivc), seems to be excluded. The corresponding sentence (ivd) has both interpretations (ive) and (ivf).

The reason for this is that in order to derive the narrow scope reading, it is necessary to leave an unbound empty element in the possessive slot of (ivc) and the subject slot of (ive). There is nothing wrong with (ive), since no theta role is assigned to the subject position. However, (ivc) is ungrammatical, since the empty element bearing the possessive marker is assigned no theta role and thus is a dummy, to which the possessive marker cannot apply.



THERE-INSERTION 153

if c-command determines scope. An unmoved quantifier c-commands very little, and this is the correct interpretation for (88a). Montague Grammar provides just such an interpretation for "unmoved" quantifiers (see, for example, Partee (1975) or Montague (1974)), and it is also not difficult to provide a model-theoretic interpretation of LFs with unmoved quantifiers.

References

Akmajian, A., S. Steele, and T. Wasow (1979) "The Category AUX in Universal Grammar," Linguistic Inquiry 10, 1-64.

Akmajian, A. and T. Wasow (1975) "The Constituent Structure of VP and AUX and the Position of the Verb BE," Linguistic Analysis 1, 205-245.

Burzio, L. (1982) Intransitive Verbs and Italian Auxiliaries, Doctoral dissertation, MIT, Cam- bridge, Massachusetts.

Gueron, J. (1978) "The Grammar of PP Extraposition," Linguistic Inquiry 11, 637-678. Jenkins, L. (1972) Modality in English Syntax, Doctoral dissertation, MIT, Cambridge, Massa-

chusetts. Jenkins, L. (1975) The English Existential, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tubingen. Kayne, R. (1981) "ECP Extensions," Linguistic Inquiry 12, 93-133. May, R. (1977) The Grammar of Quantification, Doctoral dissertation, MIT, Cambridge, Mas-

sachusetts. Milsark, G. (1974) Existential Sentences in English, Doctoral dissertation, MIT, Cambridge, Mas-

sachusetts. Montague, R. (1974) "The Proper Treatment of Quantifiers," in Formal Philosophy (ed. R. Thom-

ason), Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut. Partee, B. (1975) "Montague Grammar and Transformational Grammar," Linguistic Inquiry 6,

203-300. Riemsdijk, H. van and E. Williams (1982) "NP Structure," The Linguistic Review 1.3. Rouveret, A. and J.-R. Vergnaud (1980) "Specifying Reference to the Subject," Linguistic Inquiry

11, 97-202. Safir, K. (1982) Syntactic Chains and the Definiteness Effect, Doctoral dissertation, MIT, Cam-

bridge, Massachusetts. Stowell, T. (1981) Origins of Phrase Structure, Doctoral dissertation, MIT, Cambridge, Massa-

chusetts. Wiliams, E. (1975) "Small Clauses in English," in J. Kimball, ed., Syntax and Semantics, Vol.

4, Academic Press, New York. Williams, E. (1977) "Discourse and Logical Form," Linguistic Inquiry 8, 101-139. Williams, E. (1980) "Predication," Linguistic Inquiry 11, 203-238. Williams, E. (1981) "On the Notions 'Lexically Related' and 'Head of a Word'," Linguistic Inquiry

12, 245-274. Williams, E. (1983) "Against Small Clauses," Linguistic Inquiry 14, 287-308.

Department of Linguistics South College University of Massachusetts Amherst, Massachusetts 01003



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