“Then it's clear who owns the trees”: Common Property and Private Control in the Social Forest in a Zimbabwean Resettlement Area

Rural Sociology 64(4), 1999, pp. 624-640 Copylight 0 1999 by the Rural Sociological Society

“Then it’s clear who owns the trees”: Common Property and Private Control in the Social Forest in a Zimbabwean Resettlement Area’

Allison Goebel Women’s Studies Program, Trent University, Peterborongh, Ontario, Canada K9L l Z 6

ABSTRACT The woodlands in the Resettlement Areas of post-Independence Zimbabwe are under severe stress. The recent Land Tenure Commission (Rukuni 1994), identified the problem as the common property management system in the woodlands, and recommended a change to private tenure. The government of Zimbabwe has accepted this recommendation. This paper explores the common property woodland management system in a case study of a Model A resettlement scheme in order to consider this policy shift. Key institutional inadequacies and widespread “poaching” of resources by neighboring communities emerge as the major micro causes for deforestation in common property areas. In addition, private control in some areas of the woodlands appears to have positive effects. While these dynamics at first appear to support the shift to private tenure, doubts emerge when the woodland management system is placed in historical cultural context, and the poaching problem is seen as an aspect of the macro context of overall inequity in land and resource distribution.

Introduction

An increasing rate of deforestation has emerged as a serious social and environmental problem in Zimbabwe’s Resettlement Areas (Campbell et al. 1991; Elliott 1995; Fortmann and Bruce 1993; Goebel 1997; Grundy 1995). Most of the woodlands in Resettle- ment Areas are governed by common property regimes,Z the system

1 The International Development Research Centre of Canada (IDRC) supported this research through the Value of Trees Project, and the Young Canadian Re- searchers Award. This research was also supported by the Social Sciences and Hu- manities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), and the University of Alberta. Ear- lier versions of this paper were presented at “The Zimbabwean Economy 1930-1990 Conference at the University of Zimbabwe, Harare, August 4-7 1997, and the Amer- ican Sociological Association Annual Conference, Toronto, Ontario, August 10 1997. Thanks are given to Marc Epprecht, Amy Kaler, Alois Mandondo, Guy Thompson and the reviewers for Rural Sociology who gave advice on earlier drafts, and Nyaradzo Dzobo, Mujeyi Tizora, Solomon Chirere, Charles Shayanewako and Moses Goto who provided invaluable interpretive and research assistance in the field site.

2 I use common property regime to mean a collective “claim to a benefit (or in- come) stream” (Bromley 1992:4) from a defined area of land and set of natural resources, upheld by a “higher body,” in this case, the state. Common property regimes are not to be confused with ”open access” regimes, which are characterized by no rules of use and no limitations on user membership. Rather, common prop erty regimes have a clearly identified user group, a set of user rules, and institutions that are entrusted with property management.

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inherited from the predominant model in pre-independence Afri- can Areas of what was then known as Southern Rhodesia. In 1997 the Government of Zimbabwe accepted an analysis that identified the root of the crisis in the woodlands in Resettlement Areas (RAs) in the common property tenure system.3 Under the recommendations of the 1993 Land Tenure Commission (LTC) (Rukuni 1994), new and some existing RAs will follow a new model in which tenure in the woodlands (and grazing areas) will be heId as private property.

In this article, I attempt to contextualize this proposed solution to rapid rates of deforestation through a case study of the social dynamics in the woodlands in an RA in Wedza District, Mashonaland East. Two interrelated aspects emerge as important in the common property failure: 1) certain institutional characteristics of the RA and 2) a major conflict over the definition of user groups. Areas of woodlands that are under more individualized control do appear to be better managed than common areas. This surface picture lends support to the LTC analysis and its proposal to privatize tenure. However, when the micro dynamics of tenure in the woodland system are understood as containing historical and social values, and the crisis is placed in the context of continuing inequities in land and resource distribution, doubts emerge. This study lends support to a theoretical position that common property relations are not inherently destructive of the environment, as Hardin stated with his “tragedy of the commons” thesis (Hardin 1968; Hardin and Baden 197’7). Rather, since there are many cases where common property regimes have functioned effectively to maintain socially and environmentally sustainable relations, failure is not an inevitability, but a problem to be analyzed (Bromley 1992; Feeny et al. 1990; Ostrom 1990). In cases of failure, a host of historical, economic, political, and institutional factors, rather than simple declining efficiency or resource scarcity, are often at work (Baker 1997; Matthews 1993; McGranahan 1991). Finally, the relationship of common property regimes to equity is addressed. As Quiggen points out (Quiggen 1993), critics of Hardin’s thesis have claimed that common property regimes are inherently egalitarian, without necessarily provid- ing evidence or the analytical tools needed to prove this claim. This case study suggests that while there are inherent inequalities of access to common resources in some systems (particularly those based on a hierarchy of lineage groups), the existing regime does offer far more egalitarianism than the proposed shift to privatized tenure. Private property regimes narrow access to resources (Brom- ley 1992), and in the context of a life in which subsistence agricui-

3 K Kangai, Minster of Lands and Water Development, speaking at the Consulta- tive Conference on Land in Zimbabwe, Harare, May 27-28 1997. The Minister’s speech was made on May 28 1997.

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ture and foraging activities remain key to household economies, this narrowing of access will lead to increased inequality in the community (Quiggen 1993).

Background After Independence in 1980, RAs were created to begin a process of redistribution of land in favor of the black majority. Zimbabwe’s new government stated that 6,000 white commercial farmers owned 44 percent of the total land, mostly in the best ago-ecological zones, while 700,000 African families occupied 42 percent, mostly in poor zones (GoZ 1982:64). The African areas, earlier known as Tribal Trust Lands or “Reserves,” were renamed Communal Areas (CAs). CAs take up about 41.5 percent of the total land area in the country (Nkala 1996:55) and are home to nearly 49 percent of the total population (Central Statistic Office 1994:27). C A s generally are characterized by severe deforestation and soil erosion and are unable to provide all entitled families with adequate land for household food production.

RAs were quickly established on unused or abandoned land to provide for the settlement of landless or destitute peasants from African areas. However, for reasons I have discussed at length elsewhere (Goebel 1997, 1998b), redistribution has been slow, and as of the most recent census less than five percent of Zimbabwe’s population lived on RAs (Central Statistics Office 1994:27). In addition, RAs take up only around 8.5 percent of the total land area of the country (Nkala 1996:55). The insignificance of RAs as a land category, however, is misleading. These schemes are central to the whole project of land redistribution in a post-colonial context and, hence, are of interest worldwide. More importantly for this discussion, RAs characteristically contain the most abundant Zimbabwean woodlands available to African farmers. Given the importance of woodlands to rural economies in Zimbabwe and elsewhere on the conti- nent, the dynamics of woodland use in RAs can provide useful insights into cases of relative abundance.

The RA program originally followed four main models, none based on private property regimes. Model A, Normal Intensive Re- settlement, still is the most common: families are settled in nucle- ated villages and given permits to reside, cultivate, and graze livestock. Grazing and bush areas are treated as the common property of all who live within the village boundaries. The permits grant settlers usufruct rights only, while the land belongs to the state. Break- ing of resettlement rules can lead to eviction. This model later included the Accelerated Intensive Resettlement model, designed to deal with the problem of squatters on former commercial farms. The model followed model A structures. but with limited infrastruc-

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ture and service development in order to formalize squatters’ land use quickly. Both Model A schemes are similar to the pre-independence African areas, now known as CAs, in that woodlands and grazing areas are managed through common property regimes, while fields and homestead areas are under more individualized household control. However, the institutions of woodland management, particularly the role of traditional authorities, in RAs are quite different from those in CAs. Also, the recruitment process in RAs has produced very different social groupings than are found in CAs. These differences affect the dynamics of woodland use and the relationships among people.

In Model B resettlement, groups of between 50 and 200 members live and farm cooperatively. Model C settles farmers through a lease system on state owned estates, producing such commercial crops as tobacco, coffee, or dairy, and farmers benefit from state in- frastructure, such as processing or marketing facilities. Model D is a grazing scheme rather than a resettlement model. In all cases, ulti- mate land ownership resides with the state. Of these models, Model A has dominated, and Model B has been declared a failure.

The plan to privatize holdings in RAs is as follows. All current resettlement villages of both Model A family farms and Model B co- operatives are to be reorganized into private holdings that include a homestead, fields, and grazing areas (with settler agreement). All new resettlement schemes are to follow this pattern. The permit system will be abandoned, and settlers will be given a 99 year lease with an option to purchase after an initial ten year “trial” period, during which settlers must demonstrate serious farming intentions and good practices.

Methodology This paper is based on field work undertaken during 1995-1997 in Sengezi Resettlement Area, Wedza District, Zimbabwe. Sengezi RA, established in 1981, was one of the first of the original Normal In- tensive type in the country. It is characterized by the woodland management problems observed in other RAs around the country and, hence, serves as a case for the study of more general issues. The research was qualitative in nature, including Participatory Rural Appraisal workshops (PRA), formal interview schedules for a sample4 of villagers from four villages in the scheme, and field as- sistant diaries. Numerous key informant interviews with local offi-

The sample was selected to include roughly equal numbers of men and women, a number of widows equal to overall rates of widowhood in the area, and respondents from the different wealth categories identified by villagers in a wealth ranking exercise.

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cials and leaders were also carried out, along with documentary research and newspaper analysis.

The qualitative approach proved useful for exploratory research. No study of comparable depth had been done in RAs on the topics investigated, and it was important to allow the research process to grow organically, with new questions and tools being developed along the way. PRA was used to start the process and introduce the researcher to the area, gather preliminary data on the types of resources in the RA, and observe a “public performance” of people’s positions on what was happening in their woodlands. PRA also provided clues to what people might be hiding or distorting, such as il- legal practices, and hence gave direction for the research using more private methods, such as individual interviews and research assistants’ field diaries (see Goebel 1998a). The individual interviews clarified such issues as the effectiveness of existing institutions and the conflict between traditional and new institutions, the nature of tree tenure in homestead areas, people’s attitudes about tenure security and their relationship to the land, tree planting practices, the extent of commercialization of natural resources, and the nature of the conflict with residents of neighboring CA areas over natural resources in the RA. The documentary research fo- cused on the LTC’s report, earlier commissions of inquiry, and government development plans and statistics to establish official government policy and analysis of the relevant issues of land distribution and woodland management. Newspaper analysis provided a sense of the ideological climate surrounding resettlement policies and practices. Particular attention was given to the ways that resettlement farmers were discussed in the local press in relation to environmental destruction.

The exploratory nature of the research, and the fact that it is a case study mean that conclusions are tentative. I offer them more as questions that might be asked rather than as definitive claims concerning the problem of deforestation in the RAs throughout Zimbabwe.

Dejining the problem: Is it c o m m n property regimes?

The LTC identified weak local institutions and tenure insecurity as the underlying causes of the apparent failure of the common property regimes and proposed privatizing tenure. The reasons for the government’s adoption of the LTC’s position are complex, but are related to the government’s abandonment of all commitment to a ‘‘socialist’’ development process in Zimbabwe and its acceptance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) program of Economic Structural Adjustment (ESAP) in the early 1990s (Lopes 1996). Private property regimes are central to capitalist development, and within a capitalist paradigm good conserva-

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tion is linked to freehold tenure and market valuation of land. This view is clearly reflected in the “Technical Reports” volume of the LTC’s Report: “In the absence of these two conditions, as is the case in communal and resettlement areas, farmers have no incen- tive to invest for the future” (Rukuni 1994, Volume 2533).

In order to consider the appropriateness of private tenure for the woodlands in RAs, it is crucial first to scrutinize the LTC’s analysis of the failure of the existing regime. Elsewhere in the world, there are many cases of common property regimes functioning as socially and environmentally sustainable systems (Bromley 1992; Feeny et al. 1990; Ostrom 1990). In rural Zimbabwe common property has important historical and cultural roots, and equitable access to resources is both an historical and a stated contemporary goal. Al- though RA communities are new and members come from different original villages, settlers share a common understanding of traditional rules and culture of woodland management, an understanding that includes common property (Goebel 1997, 1998a). Thus, one must consider carefully the dynamics of woodland management and the nature of the crisis within this social context before supporting private tenure as a solution.

The article has three main sections. In the first section I consider the two main elements of the LTCs analysis of the problem: tenure insecurity and institutional weakness. I describe the rules, institutions, and key social relations operating in the woodlands in the case study site, and evaluate these in terms of the characteristics of successful common property regimes identified by Ostrom (Ostrom 1990:88-102). In the second section I address the nature of the problem from the point of view of the residents of the RA, and con- tinue to apply Ostrom’s characteristics. In this section I also discuss villagers’ views of the plan to privatize holdings in the RA and the current role of individualized control in the woodland management system. The third and final section places the micro dynamics of the case study in its historical and macro context and raises questions about tenure change as an adequate response to the woodland crisis.

The Land Tenure Commission’s analysis Tenure insecurity

The LTC expressed concern about the lack of tenure security felt by residents of RAs (Rukuni 1994, Volume 1:63). Recent evalua- tions of land tenure systems also suggest that security of tenure appears to be more important than form (i.e., common or private) in defining the sustainability of the system and willingness of users to invest in long term improvement (Fortmann and Bruce 1988:3).


The permit system in Model A resettlement schemes grants farmers usufruct rights to settle, plough, and graze livestock. The permits, while having no expiration date, have tended to be renewed every five years, and in theory can be revoked if a settler is unproductive. On paper, insecurity of tenure appears fairly high, and some studies have so argued (Cliffe 1986 cited in Fortmann and Bruce 1993). Other scholars have found that people living under the system are secure enough to build houses and plant fruit trees (Cusworth and Walker 1988 cited in Fortmann and Bruce 1993).

In the study site, there is some indication that the permit system did give settlers a feeling of insecurity, which they connect with reckless cutting of trees in the early years. There was also early and extensive confusion about the purpose of resettlement in the RA. Many reportedly were “chosen” by their headmen and did not come by choice. They feared they were being sent to do forced la- bor, as happened before Independence, when people were often forced to work if their cattle strayed onto neighboring white-owned farms. Yet, settlers are currently treated as permanent residents, and permits are not generally revoked. According to the resettlement officer it is nearly impossible to evict “unproductive” farmers once they are established.

In spite of the tenure insecurity suggested by resettlement policy, therefore, settlers do feel reasonably secure. Such security is expressed through high participation rates in tree-planting and other conservation measures. Settlers have also invested in buildings, home improvements, and garden construction.

The whole question of tenure security may in fact be a “red her- ring” in the Zimbabwean context. All tenure is insecure in a country where government can and does appropriate communal and private lands when it feels the need. Arguably, tenure insecurity is not a central problem in RAs, nor does it appear to be linked to problems in woodland management. It is also important to question whether privatization will moderate what insecurity exists. In Kenya, for example, where a complex social history involving common property regimes exists, an ambitious land titling exercise has not resulted in better tenure security (Bassett and Jacobs 1997:217).

I turn now to the second element of the LTC analysis: a consid- eration of the institutions involved in woodland management in the RAs, where evidence of the case study supports the concerns raised by the LTC.

Institutional failure The woodland management system in the case study RA has three basic aspects, or layers, similar to those found in CAs in Zimbabwe (Bruce et al. 1993). The first is a spectrum of control ranging from private to communal. People collect a wide variety of products from

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a large number of different resource areas. Many of these areas fall under common property management regimes, including grazing areas, hills and mountains, riverine areas, and bush. Households have semi-private control of other areas, such as fields, while oth- ers, such as homestead areas, are considered private. This spectrum of control is dealt with in more detail in section three.

The second aspect is that some controls are species-specific and some are area-specific. Species-specific rules include, for example, a ban on cutting certain types of trees (such as mobola plum, or muhacha in Shona) and prohibitions against using particularly species for firewood (“plantation” trees-eucalyptus) . Area-specific rules are of two main types: the first includes special controls in ecologically fragile areas, such as river banks, wetlands and hills, or mountains; the second is linked to the identification of certain users with certain areas depending on the type of tenure relations in force. For example, people are not to cut trees in other people’s fields (cutting in one’s own field is allowed), and only village members are allowed to use the resources in common areas, such as bushy areas, hills, grazing areas, river areas, wetlands and plantations. Both species- and area-specific rules can be either state imposed or traditional in nature. Thus the third layer of the system is the institutional layer.

The rules are made and enforced by a number of different institutions. State institutions at the local level include the Village De- velopment Committee (VIDCO) , the village level elected leadership group, the village chairman (elected village head), the resettlement officer (a government officer who lives on site in the RA and oversees rule compliance), the agricultural extension worker (AGRITEX), who is the local representative of the Ministry of Agriculture and advises on and enforces state rules in agricultural production and resource use, the Natural Resources Board (NRB), the main government department in charge of rule cre- ation and enforcement in natural resources in the country at large, and the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRF’). Spirit mediums, the chief, and village elders are “traditional” institutions claiming legit- imacy through lineage, special connection to ancestors, or special knowledge through experience. The local chief lives in a nearby CA, and has no official authority in the RA. Nevertheless, some people have carried their allegiance to the chief into the RA and, hence, attribute some authority to him. Traditional institutions and rules form a large topic, which I have addressed elsewhere (see Goebel 1997; 1998a). In general, traditional institutions are poorly formed in RAS because people are not settled according to lineage, and have not named headmen. It also does not appear that traditional rules are any better followed than those imposed by state bodies. The new state institutions, the resettlement officer and the


VIDCOs, have the bulk of local administrative power, unlike the CAs where traditional authorities often maintain extensive local control despite the establishment of VIDCOs. In the RA the major institutions are, in fact, part of the state. The Natural Resources Board (NRB) is the main rule making body, and it works with the Forestry Commission to enforce government legislation (see Nkala 1996 for relevant legislation). VIDCOs and village chairmen, the village neighborhood watch (appointed by the NRB representatives at the district level), the AGRITEX worker, and the resettlement officer work together to monitor the situation for the NRB. The Zim- babwe Republic Police (ZRP) is called in for enforcement, and has the power to levy fines.

People’s views on the nature of the rules and the institutions involved are fairly consistent. However, there are strong indications that many of the rules are not followed well and that the institutional context is a key aspect of failure in this common property regime. In both the general literature (Bromley 1992; Ostrom 1990) and the Zimbabwean based literature (Murombedzi 1990; Murphree 1991; Nhira 1995), local institutions are seen as key to sustainable management practices in common property areas. How- ever, local institutions are not necessarily indigenous and are not al- ways thought by local people to represent their interests or per- spectives. In the RA study site, as in other RAs, the rules of resource management are not developed by, or in consultation with, RA residents, but are imposed by state bodies. The main rule makers are the NRB and the ministry governing resettlement. Enforcement is in the form of the NRB and the state police (ZRP). The elected 10- cal leadership (the VIDCOs and village chairmen) are “watchdogs” for these rule-making bodies, not active participants in the formula- tion of the rules. Hence, while VIDCOs may look like decentralized democratic institutions, giving local people a voice in government, their actual function maintains centralized control (Alexander 1994:330). As such, then, while management practices in the RA in- volve local institutions, they are not technically “communally-based resource management regimes” (Murphree 1991:5). In Ostrom’s terms, they are not institutions with the right to establish rules, the power to monitor, and the right to some autonomy vis-a-vis the state (Ostrom 1990:90). People interpret the rules as imposed, and there is a resulting oppositional dynamic in the management of resources. These findings suggest that resettlement is “still based on the colonial model of centralised bureaucratic control with as- sumptions about appropriate technology strategies for resource use,” which marginalize rather than reinforce any collective control or “locally-evolved ecological knowledge” (Grundy 1995: 112).

Thus it has become clear that institutional problems are central to the crisis in the common property regime. In this sense, the


LTC’s analysis is supported by the case study. Institutional problems also emerge as key in the analysis of the resettlement villagers themselves. However, villagers emphasise one particular problem: their inability to exclude outside users of the resources. As outlined in the next section, this emphasis points to important aspects of the micro and macro context that are ultimately de-emphasized by the LTC report.

ViUagers ’ views

The crisis in the common property regime

The Sengezi RA is bordered on two sides by two CAs, both of which are extensively deforested. In the RA, by contrast, pockets of forest, plantations, and trees in grazing areas still stand. The most talked about problem in relation to deforestation in the study site was that of neighbors from CAs coming into the RA, stealing resources such as firewood, poles, and thatching grass, and bringing herds of cattle to graze. This problem has also been observed in a few other studies of RAs (Fortmann and Nabane 1992; Grundy 1995; Scoones and Matose 1993). In the study site, a fence erected to protect the area was stolen, and efforts to stop poachers through threats and vio- lence only drove the thieves to steal under cover of darkness.

People in the CAs both need the RA resources and feel entitled to them. CA neighbors base their claims on their role in helping the guerrillas during the war. The guerrillas chased out the white farmers resident on the land and made it available for resettlement, and villagers in the CAs suffered retribution attacks by the Rhode- sian army. In one of the study villages, settlers told how some nearby CA residents had started ploughing in the area before the settlers came. In another village, which lies right on the border with a CA, extensive woodland resource pillaging was allegedly undertaken before the resettlement village was founded, a pattern also found in Elliott’s study (Elliott 1995:ll).

The sense of historical entitlement to the resources among the CA people makes the lack of authority of local institutions all the more problematic. Without the power to monitor and enforce the rule that the resources belong to RA residents only, local institutions are helpless in the face of the onslaught on RA resources by residents of neighboring CAs. In Ostrom’s terms, there is an inability to define the user group. On the other side of the coin, there is no special body to deal with poaching problems. The district administrator for Wedza and the district representative of the Natural Resources Board said that they were well aware of the proh lem of poaching of resources but lacked the resources for the edu- cational campaigns, monitoring, and law enforcement that might


help the situation. In terms of Ostrom’s catalogue, a mechanism for conflict resolution is not in place.

Elliott (1994, 1995) found that RA settlers had difficulty protect- ing firewood and other resources from outsiders who, in many cases, were relatives of the settlers (See also Grundy 1995). Elliott’s study suggested that the RA residents felt very connected to their former homes, often maintaining graves, homes, and land there, and were very involved with members of their extended family still in the CA. In fact, the difficulty people feel in giving up rights in their former homes in CAs was recognized by the government in 1986: to give up traditional rights in CAs is an “alien if not impossible practice for many people for social and cultural reasons” (Min- istry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement 198624). The issue was mentioned again in the 1992 report.

In my case study, a somewhat different picture emerged. While villagers agreed in general village meetings that some of the resource poachers from the CAs were their relatives and that this made it more difficult to stop them, more detailed questioning in household interviews made it clear that this was hardly the general case. Most respondents said that their relatives did not collect resources from the RA because they lived too far away to make it an attractive option. Taking the whole sample from the four study villages (N=60), the overall average distance to RA settlers’ former homes is 57 km, about one to two hours by bus. Only 18 percent of the sample live within reasonable walking distance (that is 5 km or less) of their former homes. Settlers have remained connected to former homes, visiting relatives and receiving visits for funerals, traditional ceremonies, and to maintain contact, but distance has pre- cluded these relatives from making extensive use of the natural resources in the RA. In general, it should not be assumed that resource pillagers coming into RAs from CAs are close relatives of RA settlers or that kinship is the main reason for settlers’ difficulty in preventing these outsiders from using the resources.

Rather than familial connection between settlers and “poachers,” there may be another aspect to RA/CA social relationships at work. People were originally suspicious about the resettlement process, and recruitment of the first settlers was difficult. According to a key informant, the first settlers were not volunteers, but were chosen by their headmen in the CA villages. These settlers formed three main groups. The first were the “landless,” in the sense that they did not belong to lineage groups entitled to land in their village. The second group was made up of undesirable people, such as thieves and suspected witches. The third included individuals who had made leadership bids and were viewed as a threat to the incumbent head- man. All three groups were social outcasts. Although these settlers may have come from distant villages, their reputations followed


them through clan networks. Hence, there was a pre-existent an- tagonism between the settlers and the CA residents, which may have found expression in the conflict over resource use in the RA.

Efforts to exclude people who both need and feel entitled to resources are often fruitless, and can lead to further destruction of the resources as people resort to covert and even spiteful actions. An example can be found in the work of Matose (1994). Matose documents the retaliation of “poachers” in a state forest in Zim- babwe. Reacting to the Forestry Commission’s coercive efforts to end CA neighbors’ use of the woodland’s products, CA residents cut more and bigger poles than they needed, unnecessarily cut trees when gathering caterpillars, and felled trees to collect honey, all in order to spite the Forestry Commission (Matose 1994:Sl-85). There is some evidence from the study site that poachers’ practices have increased in destructiveness as RA residents have stepped up efforts to stop them. Informal interviews with CA residents revealed outrage that settlers tried to exclude them from the resources. Some admitted to purposefully destructive and “uncivil” behavior, such as telling their herdboys to let cattle graze in settlers’ fields during the growing season. Another of Ostrom’s characteristics, nested enterprises, is implicated here. There is no articulation of institutions at various levels to deal with such issues as the overall land and woodland resource shortage problem on the local, re- gional, and national levels.

Private control in the woodlands: views and practices Local officials, including the resettlement officer, the Agritex worker, the Natural Resources Board at the Rural District Council and the district administrator, echoed the thinking of the LTC in predicting that privatization would improve resource management in formerly common grazing and woodland areas in the RAs. The Resettlement officer felt poaching by CA neighbors would end, because people who now think of the woodlands and grazing areas as communal resources would not dare to poach from someone’s private property. The district administrator pointed out that when resources become private property, poaching becomes a private legal issue, and the owner can take poachers to court. Some settler views are similar. A former village chairman said that privatization would clarify the ownership of trees: “then it’s clear who owns the trees.” This clarity, he felt, would reduce deforestation. As it is now, he said, people just say the trees are there from God, so everyone can use them. A political leader and prominent farmer said that people felt the move would provide incentives for looking after natural resources.

There is also apparent support for privatization in the current functions of private control in the woodlands in the RA. Rules gov-


erning woodland resources in areas under the private control of farmers and their families, such as homestead areas and fields, are well followed. Tree planting can also indicate the potential for tenure systems to bring about sustainable woodland management. Tree planting (mostly fruit trees) occurs mainly in privately con- trolled homestead areas. People also often plant trees in arable fields, which are usually at some distance from the homestead. Few households are involved in planting trees in common areas because, they say, there is no use in planting trees for the benefit of their CA neighbors or, they argue, the CA people’s cattle will de- stroy them.

Historical and macro issues The lack of institutional support within the RA for common property management and the positive effects of private control in certain areas of the social forest appear to support the LTC plan for privatizing tenure in the woodlands in RAs. However, doubt emerges when the micro dynamics of tenure and conflict described in this case study are viewed historically and through the macro structural context of struggles over land and resources.

The contemporary success of private control in certain areas should be placed in historical and social context. Colonial records from the 1940s, for example, reveal very similar dynamics in African areas. People practiced extensive tree planting in homestead areas under private control, while common property regimes operated in the bush and grazing areas (Goebel 1997:109-14). As noted earlier, this same dynamic is found in contemporary CAs. Pri- vate control in certain areas clearly has historical and contemporary social and cultural support. The expectation, however, that the positive effects of private control can be extended to common property areas is problematic. The difficulty is especially apparent when the various layers of the woodland management system are recalled. Certain areas are under common property regimes because of the social and communal nature of people’s claims on them. Hilly areas, for example, have religious value as burial sites and resting places for ancestral spirits in addition to their economic value as sources of woodland products. It also may not be private tenure, as a legal right, but rather the social acceptance of private control by the community at large that leads to better management. The communal and social nature of the woodland resources in common areas, and the bitter conflict over those resources in the RA, make it unlikely that an extension of private control into such areas would be accepted or respected by CA neighbors. Without this acceptance, the projected benefits of privatization are unlikely to materialize. On a more practical note, the positive effects of private control may not be transferable to areas,


such as bush and pasture, that are more spread out and difficult for individuals and families to monitor. Settlers agreed, in fact, that successful control of private holdings could only be achieved through fencing, an input they could not afford and the resettlement authority would not supply. Viewed through a social and historical lens, the LTC’s conception of the crisis as a problem of the “wrong” tenure seems to miss the point. In fact, the failure of the common property regime in RAs may simply be a way to describe the problem, not a way to explain it.

Secondly, the micro dynamics of the conflict over resources are symptomatic of the broader macro context of inequity in land and resource distribution. These macro dynamics are not altered by tenure changes in RAs. The LTC recognizes that CAs are under profound population and resource depletion pressure, and noted the problem of resource poaching by CA people in RAs (Rukuni 1994, Volume 1:63). The LTC recommends intensification of the resettlement program through the division of more large-scale farms (Rukuni 1994, Executive Summary: l) , encourages the government to plan resettlement with an awareness of conditions pre- vailing in neighboring CAs (Rukuni 1994, Volume 1:123), and seems less inclined to sidestep the question of land distribution than its predecessor, the Chavunduka Report (1982)s: “land distribution is highly skewed in Zimbabwe. The status quo is not politi- cally, socially or economically sustainable” (Rukuni 1994, Executive Summary: 3). In the final analysis, however, the LTC’s focus on tenure issues and its treatment of each land category in isolation al- lows continued avoidance of the question of large scale land redistribution. This conceptual slack is seen in the literature on resource depletion in RAs published after the LTC report. Nkala (1996), for example, writing with the benefit of the LTC’s findings, still attrib- utes resource degradation in RAs to a combination of tenure insecurity, poor land quality, and overall poverty. Poaching by neighbors from C A s is not even mentioned. The focus on tenure may act, like an earlier focus on peasant practices, to allow sidestepping of the basic problem of land access (see Beinart 1984; Drinkwater 1989). A plan that does not address the macro issues of inequity in land and resource distribution is unlikely to solve a problem rooted in people’s struggle over scarce resources.

Conclusions

This article has raised three main critiques of privatization as a solution to common property failure in woodland management in

5 The Chavunduka Report (Chavunduka 1982) warned against large-scale resettlement, arguing instead for improvement of peasant farming in Communal Lands (also see Drinkwater 1989).


Resettlement Areas in Zimbabwe. First, contrary to the LTC’s position, tenure insecurity does not appear to be a problem in the case study area, and therefore is a questionable justification for privatization. Second, local institutions lack most of the characteristics as- sociated with successful common property regimes, a finding that supports the LTC’s analysis. Understanding institutional weakness helps to detail the causes of failure, particularly the major problem in maintaining the boundaries of the legitimate user group. How- ever, institutional weakness and common property failure are more a description of the problem than an explanation. The conflict over RA resources between RA residents and their neighbors in the Communal Areas is not essentially a matter of tenure, rather it is an economic, social, and historical issue. Third, private control does appear to improve woodland management, as evidenced by tree planting and better compliance with rules in homesteads and fields, a finding that appears to support the change to private tenure. However, when the role of private control in the woodlands is read through its historical and contemporary place in the social relations of African woodland use, the effect of extending private control to other types of resource areas in the woodlands comes into question. Success may require a strategy of incorporating and extending private control in a way that is socially and culturally agreed upon by all parties involved in the conflict, in conjunction with conflict resolution and resource sharing. These moves would have to take into account, however, the very different institutional and social dynamics in RAs and CAs. Ultimately, a plan for sustainable management of the forests in RAs that does not take into account both the wider problem of land shortage and resource depletion in CAs, and the narrow problems surrounding local social relations, is unlikely to have the desired effect.

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Documents

“Then it's clear who owns the trees”: Common Property and Private Control in the Social Forest in a Zimbabwean Resettlement Area