The Yemen Crisis paper final project

Jeanette Harper

PS 615: Final Project

The Yemen Crisis

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Introduction

Currently, there are so many different conflicts in the Middle East between so many

different groups of people that it is sometimes difficult to keep up with which parties are fighting

and why. For the average person, understanding the different factions and what drives them to

fight each other can be such a difficult terrain to navigate that its often easier to see the whole

picture through a “them versus us” lens. The purpose of this paper is to narrow in on specific

conflicts in regards to the failing state of Yemen, what is happening there currently, who is

fighting whom, and how the situation has deteriorated since the Arab Spring revolts of 2011. To

navigate easier through this intricate and convoluted subject, this paper is broken into five large

sections with several sub-sections within each.

The first section of this paper will discuss the three major players that are central to the

Yemen crisis and what is motivating them. It will go further into both regional and global

politics to determine if the conflict is sectarian or if it is a proxy war and will discuss the threat as

well as the consequences that face the West and its allies, specifically the United States and

Israel, and for its neighbors, namely Saudi Arabia.

The following section of this paper outlines the current policy of the United States in

regards to Yemen, the role it is playing in the conflict, and its relationship with Yemen’s

government, Saudi Arabia, its international partners in the region, and the other allies that have

pledged their support to the coalition. This section will also address the issue of Yemen’s fallen

government and exiled president and what might happen to country if it does completely

destabilize.

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The third section of this paper discusses the countries that are concerned with this same

threat issue, how they came to form the Saudi-led coalition that launched the Decisive Storm

operation, why they pledged resources to the fight, and why they are so committed to the

stability and security of Yemen. This paper will explain why these coalition members perceive

the crisis in Yemen as a threat to themselves, what their policies are in regards to the country,

and why it is in their own best interests to help Saudi Arabia realize its goals.

In the fourth section of this paper, an analysis can be found of the current academic

research that exists on this particular threat problem. Since it is vital to first consider what

intellectual positions and theoretical explanations are being circulated about this threat issue

before one can determine the best course of action, this paper explores many different angles

such as whether this really is an attempt by Iran to upset the balance of power in the region, to

determine if this crisis is even sectarian, or whether there is truly a genuine threat from the

smaller players fighting amongst each other.

In the fifth section of this paper, there is a solid argument for a new, reformed U.S. policy

towards Yemen based on the needs of the different players fighting for control in the region. This

section outlines the steps the United States can take to ensure the best possible outcome for

Yemen while still protecting its own interests as well as the interests of their allies in the region.

The plan also includes a way to possibly keep Yemen from further destabilizing and even to shut

the door on any further terrorist activity.

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Section One

The Players

In order to understand Yemen, a very poor and unstable country, it is important to

examine the three major players within the country that are all fighting each other. First, there is

the Yemeni government, under the authority of President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi (who is

currently seeking sanctuary in Saudi Arabia) which enjoys the support of the United States,

Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Jordan. This government had been in place since 1990

when North Yemen and South Yemen merged to become a republic. Under President Ali abd

Allah Saleh’s corrupt government, Yemen experienced deteriorating economic conditions that

led to domestic unrest, taking a turn for the worst during the 2011 Arab Spring revolts when

thousands of Yemenis took to the streets demanding that Saleh, a president who “relies on social,

not political ties,” step down (Finn, 2011). President Saleh was replaced by President Hadi in

2012, but he is not any more popular than his predecessor because he is seen as an ally to the

U.S. in the fight against al-Qaeda (Obama, 2013).

Then there are the Shia Houthis, a group of rebels (named after the deceased Hussein al-

Houthi) made up mostly of the disenfranchised civilians in the north that want an equal share in

the country’s government and have been using military force to expand their territory in Yemen;

they currently control the capital of Sanaa and other key areas within the country (Avni, 2015).

Their campaign started in the early 2000s when they started revolting against President Saleh and

accused him of collaborating with the United States (Houthis Take Over, 2014). Things really

started heating up in 2004 when the Houthis clashed with the Yemeni government and their

leader was killed. Interestingly, it appears that these rebels have recently aligned with former

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President Saleh who is now helping them, possibly to take over the country as part of his plan to

return to power. Also, there is much suspicion that this group has been so successful in their

efforts because they are being backed by fellow Shia Iran (Schenker, 2010).

Finally, there is Sunni al-Qaeda – known as the AQAP in the Arabian Peninsula – that

has close links to al-Qaeda in Pakistan and subscribes to the same brand of terrorism that Osama

bin Laden became famous for (Who Runs al-Qaeda?, 2014). This group has been active and

quite successful for many years which may be due to using tribal division and the weakness of

the Yemeni state to their advantage. They control a large swath of territory in Yemen and, even

though they are facing massive competition from ISIL (who is also surfacing in Yemen), they

still continue to draw a steady stream of recruits from “disillusioned Muslims who are infuriated

by U.S. support for Israel or an intervention in the Muslim world” (Byman, 2010).

A Proxy War?

Since the Arab Spring revolts of 2011, Yemen has seen a lot of action. In addition to the

replacement of their former president and the fleeing of their current one, the country has seen

many more violent protests, police brutality, civilian casualties, terrorist attacks, an indecisive

government, U.S. airstrikes against al-Qaeda, and a Saudi-led coalition of airstrikes against the

Houthis in an attempt to reinstall the president (Alley, 2013). This last move has been publicly

condemned by Iran.

Speaking of Iran, in regards to the Houthi movement, the conflict has been described as a

“proxy war between Sunni Arab nations and Shia Iran” (Yemen Crisis, 2015). Iran has never

attempted to hide its desire to assert hegemony over its neighbors nor its contempt for Saudi

Arabia, its position of leadership, and its alignment with the United States (Amiri, 2011).

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According to retired Navy Commander Kirk Lippold, “Iran is taking strategic advantage of

tactical positions that are being made. Initially with the proxy Hezbollah in Lebanon, recently

propping up the government of Assad in Syria, and now, look at what is happening in Iraq”

(Snyder, 2015). If Iran is indeed backing the Houthi movement, a full-scale sectarian war could

very well break out that may lead to greater conflicts among the major regional players. The

global community may even be forced to deal with a nuclear arms race between Iran and Saudi

Arabia (Usher, 2015). This issue is especially sensitive at the present time because Iran has

already been negotiating with six global powers over the right to continue their nuclear weapons

program. If Iran is able to secure nuclear weapons, there is no doubt that Saudi Arabia will start

working with Pakistan in order to get one for themselves (Hayward, 2015). It is also important to

consider that the threat to Israel becomes more glaring. In the past, Iran has loudly and publicly

proclaimed its desire to destroy Israel by any means necessary while simultaneously bringing

about their Messiah (the Mahdi) through chaos and destruction, even if it means sacrificing

millions of Iranians. A nuclear bomb would be a choice weapon for such an undertaking.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

In addition to the threat posed by Iran and the Houthi movement, al-Qaeda remains a

major threat to U.S. interests. Al-Qaeda, the organization responsible for the attack on the USS

Cole in October 2000, has global reach and excellent technical skill. It has the capability and the

intent to conduct attacks against American interests abroad. It has already conducted attacks on

Yemeni military sites and personnel and “has benefited from political fallout over civilian deaths

by American drone strikes” (Zimmerman, 2014). Since the Arab Spring, which ultimately made

things much worse for the country, al-Qaeda has grown in strength due to the fact that President

Saleh’s exit created a power vacuum that helped the group further establish themselves. The

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largest threat posed by al-Qaeda at the moment may be that they have control over one of the

most important naval straits in the world – the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb – which is located

between Yemen and the Horn of Africa. “Commercial liners and oil tankers pass through the

strait on their way to and from the Suez Canal” and “international stakeholders are concerned

that al-Qaeda will take advantage of the current transitional conditions in Yemen to threat

shipping and international trade” (Yemen Terror Threat, 2013). Further, according to the Council

on Foreign Relations (2015), “the group’s threats have disrupted operations in dozens of U.S.

diplomatic facilities in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, and it has inspired or directed

attacks in the United States and Europe.”

Recently, due to these very serious threats, the United States has closed its embassy in

Yemen and evacuated its personnel; Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Arab

Emirates have followed suit. If Yemen is anything like Libya, it could be plunged into a full-

blown civil war that could continue to produce terrorists while opening its doors even wider to

foreign militants. According to Kepel (2002), a number of these militants are jihadists from

Pakistan that ended up in Yemen – the country of origin of Osama’s family – “which was well

placed to provide a springboard on the peninsula for destabilizing its vast neighbor, Saudi

Arabia” (pp. 316-317). A powerful Islamist movement has been present in Yemen since before

Osama bin Laden was a household name. Not much has changed since then.

Section Two

United States Policy towards Yemen

The United States has plenty of experience dealing with countries that experience high

levels of “unemployment, a rapidly growing population, weak state institutions, declining

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government revenues, growing natural resource scarcity, and violent extremism” (Sanderson,

2011). Yemen fits this profile perfectly and due to its serious political, economic, social,

security, and governance problems, the United States has accepted the role of helping to keep the

country together and assisting in its democratic transition. The U.S. believes this transition would

be great for the people of Yemen, great for its neighbors, and would keep in line with its own

national interests. Before the Arab Spring revolts of 2011 even started, President Obama was in

Cairo talking about the pro-democracy stance Washington has taken towards the Middle East.

However, when it comes to Yemen, the United States has been caught between fighting al-Qaeda

(a short-term security concern) and helping to bring about the stability the country needs in order

to become secure, democratic, and prosperous (the long-term vision). This strategy was outlined

by Janet Sanderson, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in

summer of 2011 when she said, “consistent with U.S. national interests, we have adopted a two-

pronged strategy for Yemen; helping the government confront the immediate security threat

represented by al-Qaeda, and mitigating serious political, economic and governance issues that

the country faces over the long terms, the drivers of instability” (Sanderson, 2011). This is a very

ambitious goal that will require “the deep and ongoing coordination with the Yemeni

government and the international partners” and once the “Yemeni government initiates the

political transition and identifies its way forward,” the United States will be able to more

effectively engage in Yemen (ibid. 2011).

An Ambitious Goal

Unfortunately, the goal may indeed be too ambitious. So far and not surprisingly, this

broad U.S. policy goal of stability has not been very effective. With the Yemeni government in

shambles, the Houthi rebels seizing more territory, and the threat of al-Qaeda still very much a

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reality, it is easy to see why the Obama Administration recently came under fire for claiming that

its counterterrorism campaign in Yemen has been successful. While the comments made by

President Obama were in regards to how the effort in Yemen is different from the wars in Iraq

and Afghanistan in that it will not “involve American combat troops fighting on foreign soil,”

they were not widely embraced (Zimmerman, 2014). While it is certainly a relief to hear the

United States will not suffer as many casualties, Washington has not addressed the problem of

how its heavy reliability on air and drone strikes has had significant drawbacks in that “errant

missiles and civilian casualties have helped radicalize a new generation of fighters and

convinced many that Yemen – like Iraq and Afghanistan – is now a legitimate theater of jihad”

(Johnson, 2011).

Since it is strongly in the interests of the United States to deny safe havens to terrorists,

the superpower has to continuously apply greater pressure on terrorist organizations and their

host countries in order to “disable their financial, human, and planning networks” and “disrupt

their operations before they mature,” by focusing on “information-sharing, law enforcement

cooperation, and establishing new practices to counter evolving adversaries” (Denying Terrorists

Safe Havens, 2011). But in Yemen, where the government has fallen and the president has fled,

to whom does the United States turn? If there is no responsible government and security forces in

which to apply pressure, how is the United States supposed to deliver its promises to help bring

about security, democracy, and prosperity in Yemen?

The Gulf Cooperation Council

This is likely where the United States’ international partners come in. The GCC (Gulf

Cooperation Council), whose members include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,

and the United Arab Emirates, has already pledged to take “all necessary steps to protect its

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interests” (GCC Urges UN, 2015). To protect its interests (which align with those of the United

States), it knows it must reinstall President Hadi and bring order back to the country (Saudis

Enter the Fray, 2015). The GCC, responding to a call for help from the Yemeni government, led

by Saudi Arabia, and supported by the United States, has been bombing the Houthi rebels in

order to halt their progress. While some of the attacks have been “successful” in that they

destroyed specific targets (weapons and aircraft on the ground), it appears that the entire

campaign may be doomed to failure (Saudi War on Yemen.., 2015). Unless the GCC can

somehow assure the Yemeni people that the intervention is “designed to support rather than

suppress public uprisings” and that the country’s “lingering economic and political problems”

will be addressed, this campaign will only serve to fuel Yemen’s internal strife (Gasim, 2015).

Too Late for Yemen?

But is it already too late for Yemen? Will it join the list of failing states in the Middle

East? Is it destined to end up like Libya, past the point of hope after President Obama and its

allies hastily put together a coalition to intervene, only to end up facing a new civil war and

further destabilization (Tumulty, 2011)? Does the United States just have too many irons in the

fire to properly deal with this situation; that is, dealing with Iran, ISIL in Iraq and Syria, the

Israeli/Palestinian crisis, repression and authoritarianism in Egypt, civil war in Libya, the failure

of Southern Sudan, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and the Russian/Ukrainian debacle (Guéhenno,

2015)? Did the GCC wait too long to do something? Did they sit back and ignore the warning

signs, waiting to act when it may have already been too late? Have the Saudis already lost the

“battle for hearts and minds in the north due to the destruction wrought by their bombs?”

(Jansen, 2015). It certainly seems that way. If this is the case, there will most certainly be both

short-term and long-term complications. In the short-term, “the Houthis will most certainly react

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forcefully to any further GCC military intervention,” and use it as a “recruiting and mobilization

tool to justify a call for increased Iranian financial support” (Gasim, 2015). They may also try to

provoke a border conflict with Saudi Arabia, threatening to weaken the Kingdom’s hold on the

Middle East (leaving it more vulnerable to a major attack by Iran). In the long-term, Yemen

could face an all-out civil war and/or the splitting up of the country, resulting in the complete

loss of the country’s sovereignty. This could give al-Qaeda an even greater foothold in the region

and open the door to other terrorist groups, including those funded and supported by Iran.

With the United States’ unimpressive track-record of tackling the world’s problems –

from poverty to inequality to weak governance – the world is probably not confident in its ability

to handle the situation in Yemen either. While many would argue the world is definitely better

off with the United States’ involvement, others would advise the United States to back off and let

the regional powers handle this problem. After all, al-Qaeda has made it quite clear that it is their

intention to continue their campaign of terror until the Western ‘occupier’ has left the Kingdom

of Saudi Arabia, which they refer to as the Land of the Two Holy Places.

Either way, Saudi Arabia and the United States have managed to attract several allies to

assist in the fight; Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, and Sudan are among the members of the ‘coalition’

that have dedicated supplies and troops to the operation. As long as U.S. policy remains the

same, along with its tendency to neglect key areas in the region while it bounces from one crisis

to another without any sort of central structure, the world can most likely continue to expect to

see the same kinds of problems manifest. To say the United States must be more realistic about

what it can accomplish in the future is an understatement.

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Section Three

The Coalition and Other Allies

Recently, the Saudi-led coalition announced that its Decisive Storm operation has

achieved its military goals, has officially ended, and that a new campaign has begun. The goal of

this new campaign is to protect Yemeni citizens and prevent the Houthi rebels from continuing

their offensive. But how did this coalition come together, why did they pledge their resources

(fighter jets, soldiers, navy units, etc.) to the fight, and why are they so committed to the stability

and security of the country of Yemen? Why do they perceive the crisis in Yemen as a threat to

themselves and what is their policy towards this particular region of the world? This section will

answer those questions, clarifying how this alliance came to be. It will also examine each

member of the coalition to determine why it is in their own best interests to help Saudi Arabia

reinstall Yemen’s deposed president and restore its government.

Obviously, the place to start would be Saudi Arabia since it is the one most concerned

with the threat and has taken on the leadership role in the military campaign against the Shiite

rebels in Yemen. Saudi Arabia was a major financial backer of the transitional government that

was set up in Yemen to oversee the writing of a new constitution and hold elections for a new

permanent government (Abi-Habib & Almasmari, 2015). The Saudi monarchy insisted on doing

so because it was afraid that if Yemen collapsed, the threats posed by the AQAP would be

exacerbated and the Iranian-backed Houthis would help Iran (Riyadh’s top geopolitical rival) get

a foothold in the region so they could expand their territory (Desai, 2012). This especially

includes the two holy places within Saudi Arabia’s borders: Mecca and Medina. With all the

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problems Saudi Arabia faces to the north and the threat it perceives from its own Shiite

community in its Eastern province, the last thing it needs is to have to deal with more problems

to the south (Cross-Border Attack, 2015). This is why Saudi Arabia’s policy towards Yemen has

been built around the need to stabilize the government in Sanaa while strengthening its 1000-

mile long border it shares with the country (Rosen, 2015). Because Saudi Arabia sees itself as the

vanguard for stability and conservatism in the Middle East, it has no desire to see a shift in the

balance of power, especially in favor of Iran. The fact that Iran officially backs terrorist groups

such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine has not been lost on Saudi Arabia. And

now Iran’s involvement in Iraq and the other cases of Shiite uprisings in the Middle East –

including those within Saudi Arabia and inspired by the Arab Spring revolts – is causing further

alarm. Saudi Arabia understands how serious this threat is to their stability and is the reason it

reached out to the GCC countries and other coalition members for help. Due to the fact that

Yemen’s political actors are “more numerous, autonomous, fractious, and militarized than they

are in other countries in the Arabian Peninsula,” they know that the country cannot be stabilized

with demonstrations of force, backing one faction over another, or throwing money at the

problem (Haykel, 2011). Therefore, it is their sincere hope, with the help of their coalition, to

find a political solution that will replace violence with security and stability.

Bahrain, a member of the GCC, has experienced unrest among its significant Shiite

population since the Arab Spring revolts started. Like Saudi Arabia’s monarchy, its Sunni ruling

al-Khalifa family has blamed Iran for inciting the rebellious protests that have been ongoing

since the “Day of Rage” inspired by the fall of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt (Bahrain Politics, 2014).

Because the Shiite majority population is seen as a threat that could lead to Iranian dominance in

the region, the House of Khalifa has not made any compromise with the demonstrators and has

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continued to crush the resistance (Friedman, 2012). The ruling family’s attitude towards the

Shiite community and their fear of losing control over Bahrain explains its involvement in the

Saudi Arabia’s coalition and their desire to help stabilize Yemen.

Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE, members of the GCC, also have a Sunni majority

population with a considerable Shiite population. While these three countries share a lot of the

same concerns with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, they have their own individual problems and

varying degrees with which they handle them. Because they do share some degree of legitimacy

due to their “shared religion and years of distributing oil wealth and patronage to the population

through extensive bonds of kinship while at the same time forcefully repressing dissent,” they

understand that uniting together is the best option they have if they wish to prevent “Iranian

incitement and collusion to defend and sustain their jurisdiction in their own countries”

(Friedman, 2012).

The one GCC member who has not joined the coalition, Oman, has a warm relationship

with Iran and has shown no desire to cooperate with Saudi Arabia due to their fear of its quest

for dominance in the council (Iran/Oman Politics, 2014). Historically, Saudi Arabia has had

intolerant views towards Oman’s religious establishment, the Ibadis, and has often described

them as “heretics” by “hard-line Wahhabi clerics in the conservative Sunni kingdom” (Cafiero,

2015).

The other members of the coalition and non-GCC members, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, and

Sudan, have joined for different reasons. Egypt, who has a floundering economy, is a close ally

of and the recipient of billions from Saudi Arabia. Even though there are disagreements among

Egyptians concerning the depth of their involvement in Yemen, they have offered to send ground

troops in addition to the naval and air power they have already pledged (Roundup, 2015). Jordan,

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like Egypt, is a strong ally of the United States and a sworn enemy of both Iran and ISIL. For

them, joining the coalition and helping Saudi Arabia fight the Houthi rebels and ISIL is a battle

for survival. Morocco, who shares mutual foreign policy interests including a “joint investment

fund” and a direct shipping line with Saudi Arabia, has pledged fighter jets and its unwavering

support to its right to defend itself (Al-Awsat, 2013). Sudan’s surprise shift from being

supporters of Iran to helping Saudi Arabia fight the Houthis in Yemen has raised eyebrows

(Hussaini, 2015). It is believed that Sudan was motivated by a $4 billion dollar investment into

expanding Sudan’s agricultural investments to “meet the needs of the two countries” (Saudi

Arabia Denies…, 2015). Could Sudan’s support stem from a possible easing of its economic

difficulties in exchange for its loyalty?

Finally, there are Somalia and Pakistan. While neither country are officially members of

the coalition, they have voiced their support for Saudi Arabia’s struggle. Pakistan, who shares

deep ideological and historical ties with Saudi Arabia, is a recipient of Saudi aid and money and

in return provides the Kingdom with military aid and expertise (Pillalamarri, 2015). While

Pakistan has claimed neutrality in the conflict up to this point, future military involvement may

be a possibility. Somalia has not pledged any actual resources but has contributed to the fight by

“approving its use of its airspace, territorial waters, and land for Saudi-led air strikes” (Ahmed,

2015). Neither country has any desire to watch the spread of extremist militias. Understandably,

they both wish to continue their relationship with the Gulf States as they believe it is in their own

best interests economically.

Although it certainly seems that the crisis involving Yemen stems from sectarian issues,

it may not be just about the deep Sunni/Shia divide in the Middle East or even the daunting

possibility of an Iranian encirclement. While many of the Gulf States express anxiety from the

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threats posed by the Shiite uprisings in their countries, it is difficult to ignore the political and

economic incentives they stand to benefit from if they successfully continue to oppress any

challenges to their hegemony. While important and notable incremental social reform in many of

these states has been optimistic, political groups have become impatient from how slow the

progress has been. The “revival” of Iran’s revolutionary rhetoric may be wooing those impatient

groups and promises to bring about change at a more satisfying rate. This may be the reason we

are still seeing so much unrest in key areas of the Middle East. In sum, the coalition members are

aware of this and in order to protect their own interests, they know they must band together,

prevent Yemen from becoming another source of inspiration for extremists, and commit to being

a bulwark against this threat to world peace and security.

Section Four

Intellectual Positions

As can be expected, there are many different viewpoints on what is going on in Yemen,

along with contrasting ideas about what should be done about it. Some argue that the conflict is

sectarian and that Iran is really just trying to overthrow the regional powers in an attempt to

expand their territory. Others argue that the conflict is not sectarian at all and even if Iran does

support the Houthi movement, the Houthis are not necessarily their puppet. Questions have been

raised about the actual threat of the Houthi movement or whether it has been blown out of

proportion by the Gulf States and their allies. Do the Gulf States have just cause for military

aggression or is their campaign an illegal one according to International law? This section will

answer those questions, explore the prescriptions that have been made by these academics, and

will determine what some of their strengths or weaknesses are.

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The first issue to address in regards to Yemen is whether this is a sectarian issue or not.

Many academics believe that sectarianism and Yemen’s alignment with Iran are the main things

that are shaping the country’s war. Jeff Colgan (2015), a writer for the Washington Post, writes,

“If we look at the broader Middle East to see how foreign governments are aligning and

intervening, it is impossible to miss the sectarian divide. Sunni governments, such as Egypt and

Saudi Arabia, are backing President Hadi, who is Sunni, whereas Shiite governments, such as

Iran and Iraq, as well as non-state groups, like Hezbollah, support the largely Shiite rebels.” The

idea here is that, regardless what is actually happening among Yemenis within their own borders,

Iran, in an attempt to further their own regional agenda, is using its Shia ties with the Houthis to

influence them to threaten Saudi Arabia’s southern border. The fact that Iran has funded the

Houthis in the past does help to bolster this argument.

On the flip side, many academics are becoming more vocal about their opposition to the

widespread belief that the Yemen crisis is a sectarian issue. Ishaan Tharoor (2015) also a writer

for the Washington Post, argues that Houthis are Shia but they belong to the Zaydi sect, which is

not the same as the “Twelver” Shiism found in Iran and parts of Iraq. In fact, according to Col.

Pat Lang, a former U.S. army officer, private intelligence analyst, and a commentator on the

Middle East, theologically, Zaydis are closer to Sunnism and “for a Zaydi to ‘convert’ to

Twelver Shiism is as big and alienating a step as ‘conversion’ to Sunnism. Such a change would

normally lead to family, clan and tribal ostracism” (Tharoor, 2015). Further, while the Houthis

may be receiving military, political, and financial support from Iran, it may not be fair to assume

they are a creation of or are being controlled by Iran. It is important to understand that the

actions of the Houthis are rooted in their own local issues by their own local leaders. The

strength in this argument lies in its assumption that the Houthis are independent and their fierce

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determination is enough to help them achieve their goals. However, the evidence suggests that,

without Iranian interference, the Houthi movement may have been crushed already.

In that case, are the Houthis really a threat and do they threaten the unity and sovereignty

of Yemen and the stability of the entire region? President Hadi certainly thinks so. A few months

ago, in response to the aggressive moves the Houthis have made (seizing the capital and the main

reins of power), he described the Houthi attacks as “unjust acts of aggression against the Yemeni

people and the constitutional legacy” of his government, as well as an “assault on Yemen’s

sovereignty and security.” He went on to say that if the Houthis are not stopped, “they are

destined to become the next Hezbollah, deployed by Iran to threaten the people in the region and

beyond. The oil shipments through the Red Sea that much of the world depends on will be in

jeopardy, and al-Qaeda and other radical groups will be allowed to flourish” (Hadi, 2015). To

hear him say it like this, it sounds like bad news for innocent Yemeni civilians, Saudi Arabia and

its allies, and the United States. However, the weakness in this argument lies in the fact that

President Hadi is naturally inclined to act in his own best interests and will most likely say

whatever he needs to in order to get the results he desires.

On the opposing side, there are many who are saying the Houthis aren’t quite the threat

they are being portrayed as. Zachary Laub (2015), a writer for the Council on Foreign Relations

argues that the Houthis are not compelled by a desire to destabilize the region and put Saudi

Arabia on the defense; rather, they are “driven by the need to protect themselves from what they

view as a state that has marginalized and attacked them in the past.” For example, the reason

they recently attacked Najran in southern Saudi Arabia is out of retaliation for the Saudi strikes

against them. However, what is weak about this argument is that it presents the Houthis as

victims that should be excused for their violent and extreme behavior.

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Justifications

Whether the Houthis are a genuine threat or not, the way the coalition has gone about

justifying their military aggression is questionable. Joe Dyke, a writer for IRIN, states that “they

have defended their actions on the claim that they were coming to the aid of a neighbor in need

after a specific request from its governing authority, which is legal under international law.”

President Hadi, whom they consider to be the legitimate ruler of Yemen, did request their

assistance for military intervention. He also invoked article 51 of the United Nations Charter,

interpreting it to mean that the coalition’s attack is legal on the basis of collective self-defense.

However, there are problems with these justifications. First, there is a dispute about the

legitimacy of President Hadi’s leadership, which places the coalition’s military action in “murky

legal territory” (Dyke, 2015). To begin with, President Hadi won the 2012 election in which he

was the only candidate. He also overstayed his term in office, resigned once, and even fled the

country. Therefore, did he really even have the authority to call for intervention?

Second, since Article 51 governs international conflicts and not domestic disputes, its

invocation in this case may be inappropriate. Ashley Deeks, an academic from Virginia Law

School and blogger, argues that Article 51 is only relevant when “a state is using force either in

another state’s territory or in response to an attack from outside. This is not the case here”

(Deeks, 2015). Because the government of Yemen is involved in a conflict with a rebel group

inside Yemen’s border, Article 51 cannot be invoked in this case.

A General Consensus

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While there is much debate on what is behind the crisis in Yemen, almost every academic

agrees that Saudi Arabia and its coalition’s aggressive military action against the Houthi

movement is not effective. Their heavy-handed tactics have not had the desired effect and not

much has changed in Yemen since they started the campaign. Their methods are not expected to

be successful in the future either. Instead, many argue, Saudi Arabia and its allies should be

using their influence and resources to stabilize Yemen in non-aggressive and benign ways.

No matter what Saudi Arabia has claimed, the fact that they have been acting in such a

forceful manner has caused many to believe that the country may have a hidden agenda. While

not likely, it is possible that the Saudi monarchy has conspired to keep Yemen’s central

government weak and its political actors divided so they can maintain their influence. Maybe the

thought of having a very dense, united, heavily armed, tribal, and impoverished country like

Yemen as a neighbor is just too much of a risk. Maybe President Hadi even fabricated the

narrative that Iran is funding a proxy war against his allies and used this excuse to invoke Article

51 so he could once again seize control over Yemen. Regardless of what Saudi Arabia’s motives

are, the impression is that they – and their allies – will continue to be on the receiving end of

criticism on the way they are dealing with the crisis in Yemen as long as they continue on as they

have.

Section Five

A Policy Change

From Yemen’s weak government to the Houthi rebels in the north to the al-Qaeda threat,

the country is a complex patchwork of problems where, despite what it looks like on the surface,

the real issues stem from significant flaws in the structure of Yemen society. The country

21

consists of “different sects with distinct traditions and cultures, Sectarian differences, and a

tribal-based order that give rise to differing values in the country” (Yahiya, 2014). As a result,

there just isn’t enough cooperation among all the different factions to address specific grievances

such as high levels of unemployment, weak state institutions, and violent extremism. Some

progress was made when North and South Yemen merged to become a republic in 1990 but the

country has never really been stable. In fact, the South attempted to secede only a short four

years later. Yemen’s government has been fighting to keep the country unified ever since.

Unfortunately, due to the lack of cooperation among all the different groups, there was never an

agreement over who should be in charge; this in itself has been a major source of discontent for a

long time.

From the beginning of the Houthi rebellion, the rebels in the North were very clear that

what they wanted was freedom from cultural, religious, and political discrimination by their

government. And the sole purpose of al-Qaeda has always been to rid the Arabian Peninsula

from the influence of the West – which has been heavily involved with Yemen’s government.

Obviously, not much progress in restructuring the country can be expected to be made until these

grievances have been addressed. But who should be the one to address them? Who should be the

one to restructure the country? How can the United States change its policies in order to bring

about the best possible outcome for Yemen while still protecting its own interests as well as the

interests of their allies in the region? What could the United States do to help prevent Yemen

from further destabilizing? How can they shut the door on any further terrorist activity? Is there a

way to reverse the trend; one that has already seen the emergence of terrorist organizations like

ISIL, Islamic Jihad, and Ansar al-Sharia? This section will answer these questions and outline

22

the steps the United States can take to reform their policies towards Yemen so they can help keep

the country together to make a successful democratic transition.

The first objective is to address the Houthis who have made it clear that they will persist

in putting up a fight if the coalition continues to push the installment of President Hadi’s

government with military force. It’s not that they don’t want a government; they do. They know

it would bring security to the region. In fact, they have stated that being responsible for law and

order across the country’s capital is a burden and they desire a new government to take over the

responsibility (Murphy, 2015). They want an entirely new constitution and a reformed

government that would address the balance of power among the country’s “long fractious

regions,” assure “maximum autonomy in Shiite-majority areas,” and recognize their choice of

representation (Murphy, 2015). They want people in charge with integrity that will be able to

combat the chronic problems of corruption plaguing the Yemeni ruling establishment” to

represent them (al-Bukhaiti, 2014). As reasonable as this sounds, one of the issues with this is

that Ansar Allah, another name to describe the Houthi movement, appears to lack political

expertise. They are also very resistant to Western influence. Despite the United States attempts to

assure the leaders of Ansar Allah that they do not consider them enemies and in fact, want their

help defeating al-Qaeda, the U.S. may still not be the best choice when it comes to helping the

group smooth out its political issues (McManus, 2015).

The second objective is to deal with Al-Qaeda, mortal enemies of the Houthis and who

also happen to have a seething hatred for the United States. The same is also true for the other

terrorist organizations that are forming in Yemen. Clearly, the United States should do

everything it can to avoid further offending any of these groups while not compromising its core

interests in the region. Unfortunately, the current plan being adopted by the U.S. does just the

23

opposite; it includes “combating AQAP in the short term, increasing development assistance in

the long term, and organization international support for stabilization efforts” (Sergie, 2015).

Since no one in the area agrees with this policy, the U.S. would be wise to change it. One of the

best solutions out there is one given by Robert Pape, the author of several books. His plan

outlines a new policy for the United States that calls for “off-shore balancing” which is a strategy

to build a “strong allegiance with key local states, while developing the capability to rapidly

deploy American combat forces into the region should a crisis emerge” (Pape, 2005, pg. 247).

Since having an American combat presence in the Persian Gulf provides “diminishing returns to

U.S. security” – the “mere presence of tens of thousands of U.S. troops in the region is likely to

fuel continued fear of foreign occupation that will encourage anti-American terrorism in the

future” – it is easy to see why withdrawing all “American combat forces from the region

expeditiously,” while working closely with the other Gulf States would be a very prudent change

to U.S. policy in regards to this issue (Pape, 2005, pg. 247).

Obviously, as previously mentioned in section two, the United States must still address

the issue of denying safe havens to terrorist, applying greater pressure on terrorist organizations

and their host countries, and disrupting terrorist operations before they mature (Denying

Terrorists Safe Havens, 2011). Also, they must still share information, cooperate with local law

enforcement, and help “establish new practices to counter evolving adversaries” in order to

defeat the “current pool of terrorists that are actively planning to kill Americans while preventing

a new, potentially larger generation from rising up” (Pape, 2005). However, heavy military force

is only making the problems worse and is most likely even the stimulus to the rise of the next

generation of fighters. Concessions aren’t working either. According to Pape (2005), the United

States can still play an important role in “facilitating democratic transitions at arm’s length just

24

as it did in Eastern Europe in the 1990s and just as it is doing in Egypt and on the West Bank

today” (pg. 248). However, seeking to impose democracy here is only triggering nationalist

sentiments that is encouraging anti-American terrorism and large-scale internal turmoil – which

will ultimately threaten America’s core interests. If the U.S. adopted the off-shore balancing

policy, it would send an unmistakable “signal that the United States is not in the business of

empire, and will thus suck the oxygen out of the atmosphere that breeds anti-American suicide

terrorism.” Energy independence, tightening border and immigration controls, and continuing to

use offensive military action against al-Qaeda when they are found is described as an even better

alternative to the off-shore balancing plan (ibid. pg. 249).

Keeping in mind that the United States has killed many civilians with its drone strikes, it

is easy to see how it has managed to alienate the very people it’s trying to help. It is also fueling

al-Qaeda with its continued presence in the region. By adopting Robert Pape’s off-shore

balancing plan, the United States can show Yemen that it respects its sovereignty but can still be

close enough to assist its allies should they face a crisis they cannot deal with without U.S.

military interference. While it is difficult to determine just who should step in and address the

Houthis directly, it is clear that neither the United States nor Saudi Arabia are good candidates

for the task.

Conclusion

As far as Iranian support and the sectarian issues go, it is important to remember that

“tribal affiliation and Arab nationalistic sentiments have more of an influence among Yemenis

than a sectarian identity” (al-Bukhaiti, 2014). While the Iranian proxy war against Saudi Arabia

is an interesting theory, the evidence simply does not support the idea that Yemen’s crisis has

25

anything to do with Iran seeking regional hegemony over Saudi Arabia. While that very well

may be Iran’s overall design, at the moment, it is Yemen’s internal strife that is most concerning.

It is not clear what the future holds for Yemen or who will step up to bring about security,

democracy, and prosperity in Yemen but one thing is for sure: as stated in section three, the

country cannot be stabilized with demonstrations of force, backing one faction over another, or

throwing money at the problem by foreigners. At this point, maybe the only thing the coalition

can do is band together and protect the region while allowing the Yemenis to come up with their

own political solution. With the West stepping back and keeping out of the picture as much as

they reasonably can, it is possible al-Qaeda and the other terrorist organizations would simmer

down enough to allow Ansar Allah to form a new government. When and if the people of Yemen

come to an agreement, the coalition and more specifically the United States with its experience

and resources, can still come in anytime and help if their assistance is requested.

26

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