“The Worst of all Worlds:” Oil Sanctions and Italy's Invasion of Abyssinia, 1935-1936

Diplomacy and Statecraft, 19: 210–235, 2008Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN 0959-2296 print/1557-301X onlineDOI: 10.1080/09592290802096257

FDPS0959-22961557-301XDiplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 19, No. 2, April 2008: pp. 1–42Diplomacy and Statecraft

“THE WORST OF ALL WORLDS:” OIL SANCTIONS AND ITALY’S INVASION OF ABYSSINIA, 1935–1936

Oil Sanctions and Italy’s Invasion of AbyssiniaG. Bruce Strang G. Bruce Strang

Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 caused a crisis for the League ofNations. League members imposed limited sanctions against Italy anddebated at length the imposition of an embargo on oil shipments to Italy,which came to stand as a symbol of the League’s determination to punishthe Italian aggressor. The British government conducted a detailedinvestigation to determine whether or not an oil sanction could compelItaly to abandon its invasion. Although Italy imported the vast majorityof its oil, British and League experts concluded that an oil embargowould not succeed. Even if the League instituted a comprehensiveembargo amongst its members, Italy could still have secured sufficientsupplies from non-members, particularly the United States, which couldnot legally prevent American companies from trading with Italy. Italycould also have secured additional supplies through third-party trans-shipments. An additional ban preventing Italy from using League tank-ers to carry its purchases would not have succeeded either, although thevarious sanctions together would have increased Italy’s costs to import oiland the amount of pressure on its gold reserves. In spite of the technicaldifficulties involved in implementing an embargo, the British Cabinetcontinued to support the idea for domestic political reasons; it needed toplacate the British public that considered it vitally important to put intopractice the League’s collective security rhetoric. The League’s unwilling-ness to impose an oil sanction and its evident failure to prevent Italy’sconquest of Abyssinia discredited the League and its collective securityprovisions.

Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia on 3 October 1935 created both a greatopportunity and a grave crisis for the League of Nations. Italy’s flagrantviolation of its obligations under the Covenant directly challenged theLeague and its collective security principles. Moving with rare speed, theLeague invoked economic sanctions in an effort to convince Benito Mus-solini, the Fascist Italian dictator, to abandon the invasion and to return tothe negotiating table in an effort to solve his dispute with Abyssinia.Based on decisions in 1921 that limited the stark application of military

Oil Sanctions and Italy’s Invasion of Abyssinia 211

sanctions provided for under Article 16 of the Covenant, the Leagueestablished a Coordination Committee of members concerned aboutapplying sanctions and chose a smaller and more manageable Committeeof Eighteen to determine an appropriate response. By 19 October, theLeague had resolved that it would recommend that members shouldimpose four sanctions against Italy: an arms embargo, a prohibition onloans, an embargo on imports from Italy, and an embargo on the export ofcertain materials to Italy that it could use to support its war effort, includ-ing horses, rubber, tin, and some ores. Proponents of these sanctionshoped that they would be strong enough to induce Mussolini to halthis invasion without being so damaging that they would provoke him towithdraw from the League or to resort to a wider war against Leaguemembers.

In light of these concerns, the Committee of Eighteen chose not toplace an embargo on oil shipments to Italy in this initial stage, andobservers then and historians since have sharply criticized the League forits timid failure to take the step that appeared to offer the best chance tocoerce Italian cooperation. A.J. Barker, for example, condemned theLeague for its failure to embargo coal and oil, measures that would havehad considerable effect if applied.1 Frank Hardie echoed these concerns.He qualified his criticism, recognizing that the United States would havehad to cooperate to some degree with a League oil embargo, but hebelieved that that cooperation would have been possible had the Leaguemoved more rapidly.2 Anthony Adamthwaite confidently asserted, “Wenow know that if the oil sanction had been imposed Mussolini, accordingto his own statement, would have made peace within 24 hours.” Adamth-waite also argued that, even if the United States continued to ship oil toItaly, “determined Anglo–French naval action could have cut off thosesupplies.”3 Of course, Mussolini’s comment was an off-hand remark andwas unknown to politicians and diplomats at the time; we have no evi-dence that would confirm that Mussolini actually meant what he said.One can only wonder what the Italian, and still less the American reactionwould have been to a naval blockade.

Cristiano Andrea Ristuccia recently assessed the effects of sanctionson the Italian economy. He worked with Italian records and League statis-tics, uncovering valuable new evidence. He concluded that sanctions thathad included oil and other raw materials would have succeeded, seriouslyimpinging the mobility of the Italian army and interfering with Italy’sroad transport system. Ultimately, Italy could only have staved off disas-ter for some four months. This argument is compelling within its ownlimits, but the article also does not discuss difficulties in securing compli-ance from League members and the practicality of League sanctions.Most importantly, Ristuccia predicated his analysis on the case that the

212 G. Bruce Strang

United States would agree to limit its exports to Italy to peacetime levels,which is an extremely problematic assumption to make. Ultimately, thisarticle considered what would have happened to Italy had the Leaguebeen able to implement an effective embargo, but it did not assess theLeague’s ability to control oil supplies heading to Italy.4 George Baer’sTest Case: Italy, Ethiopia, and the League of Nations presents the bestpublished discussion of the possible effectiveness of an oil sanction. Hecovers the British reaction to the experts’ report in February 1936 insome detail, for example, although his complaints about the League’s atti-tude toward American policy seem too harsh and too dismissive of theexperts’ legitimate concerns. Baer’s account does not cover the earlierdiscussions in November and December 1935 about the effectiveness ofan oil embargo in much detail, however, leaving a substantial hole in hisanalysis.5

The literature on the subject of collective security measures underLeague auspices does not include a systematic attempt to address a fun-damental question: did League governments have reason to believe thatan embargo on oil shipments to Italy would have compelled it to aban-don its invasion of Abyssinia? The answer to this question needs toassess four central issues. First, how much oil did Italy need? Second,what supplies could Italy secure from League and non-League mem-bers? Third, could the League secure compliance in imposing sanctionsfrom potential vendors? Fourth, could the League control Italy’s use offoreign tankers that could carry oil from non-compliant countries toItaly? In order to answer these questions, this study will focus on delib-erations within the British policy-making elite, for two reasons. Thefirst is practical. Owing to the nature of the decision-making and record-keeping in the British civil service, the best repository of records dis-cussing the relative merits of sanctions and their consequences ishoused in the British national archives. The second reason is that theBritish government had an enormously powerful, albeit equivocal, roleto play in the imposition of League sanctions. By virtue of its status as aGreat Power with an imperial reach, its public declarations of supportfor the League in 1935, its comparative military muscle, and its moralauthority, Britain could exercise enormous influence over League mem-bers. Had Britain firmly opposed sanctions, it is unlikely that theLeague would have gone as far as it did. Had Britain pushed for moresanctions with greater determination, then the smaller powers in theLeague would have been more likely to have imposed harsher measuresseeking to impede Italy’s invasion. An assessment of British policy for-mation on this issue will demonstrate the tremendous potential of sanc-tions but also indicate some of the difficulties in creating efficientcollective security measures.


Treasury Department and Foreign Office officials began to assess thepossibility of sanctions in the summer of 1935. Initial inquiries dealt ingeneralities. Neville Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer,argued for example that Italy was “peculiarly vulnerable” to economicsanctions, especially to a blockade of seaborne shipments. Chamberlainassumed that a blockade would lead to war, however, so he thought it bestto consider a trade boycott. He asked Treasury officials to prepare a reporton the likely effects of a League prohibition on trade with Italy. He sug-gested that the report should assume that neither Germany, for politicalreasons, nor the United States, for constitutional ones, would adhere tosuch a boycott.6 The resulting reports estimated that a comprehensiveLeague boycott would impinge so severely on Italy’s economy that itwould be forced to come to terms with the League within nine to fourteenmonths, as Italy’s foreign exchange reserves would dry up, and it wouldno longer be able to purchase goods from countries that chose not toadhere to the sanctions.7

By the end of August, the Cabinet ruled out any unilateral effort toimpose a boycott, but determined that Britain and France should explorethe practicability of League sanctions. Some Cabinet members thoughtthat any such sanctions would be doomed to failure by German andAmerican trade and that Britain would be able to inform the League thatsanctions would not work. Chamberlain for one hoped that the obviousfailure of the collective security provisions in Article 16 would allowBritain to reform the League and, more importantly, to create a politicalclimate in Britain more favourable to rearmament so that men such asMussolini would not be able to flout Britain’s will in the future.8

As Mussolini’s invasion force in Eritrea and Italian Somaliland pre-pared for war, Foreign Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare and French Premierand Foreign Minister Pierre Laval met in Geneva on 10 September 1935.They ruled out extreme measures that might lead to war with Italy, suchas military sanctions or the closure of the Suez Canal.9 The next day,Hoare addressed the League Assembly, affirming that “the League stands,and my country stands with it, for the collective maintenance of the Cove-nant in its entirety.” He indicated the depth of the British people’sresolve; support for the League was “no variable and unreliable senti-ment, but a principle of international conduct to which they and their gov-ernment hold with firm, enduring, and universal persistence.”10 To itsDominion representatives, His Majesty’s Government extolled the virtuesof collective security. Reiterating Hoare’s speech, it said that the UnitedKingdom would be “second to none” in fulfilling obligations to theLeague Covenant and would demonstrate its “unwavering fidelity” to col-lective security principles. The British public was united with its govern-ment in this staunch determination, and together they would show “steady

214 G. Bruce Strang

and collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression.”11 Ofcourse, this lofty rhetoric, designed for the consumption of the British andinternational publics, understated the government’s ambivalence andoverstated its resolve. Nevertheless, the dictates of public opinion and theimminent election compelled the Cabinet to pursue collective security, orat least to present to the British public that the National Government wassteadfast in its support of the League.12 Still, the threat that Italy mightresort to war when faced with potentially crippling sanctions suggestedcaution. The Committee of Imperial Defence warned that the inclusion ofitems such as coal and oil in any list of embargoed goods might provokeItaly to desperate action in light of its lack of vital raw materials. AfterMussolini’s troops invaded Abyssinia, therefore, the Cabinet decided thatit would support limited sanctions and would consider the issue of prohi-bition of coal and oil shipments to Italy in spite of the potential damage tothe Welsh coal industry and British oil companies.13

After having supported the initial stage of sanctions in October andNovember, British officials considered the possibility of an oil sanction inmore detail late in November and early in December 1935 after theLeague had raised the prospect of extending measures to cover that com-modity. On the surface, Italy was very vulnerable to a sanction that wouldprevent oil imports. Italy produced very little of its own oil, some 25,000tons per year. It could rely on supplies from Albania of little more than50,000 tons per year of poor quality oil.14 Obviously, given this paltrydomestic production, Italy had to import the vast majority of its supplies.Board of Trade officials assessed that Italy had some three to four monthsof oil supplies stockpiled in Italy and in Italian East Africa, so Italy wouldneed to find continued sources of new shipments in order to be able towithstand pressure that aimed to end the war and to compel it to negotiatea compromise peace. In order to build its stockpile within the strict limitsof its storage capacity, Italy had increased its imports in the months pre-ceding its invasion (see Table 1).

Much of the increase in oil shipments came from Rumania. Italy hadpurchased 280,000 tons of Rumanian oil from July to September 1934,but 727,000 tons in the same period in 1935. Rumania had become Italy’s

Table 1. Italian imports of oil products15

Year Total Imports (in metric tons)

1933 1,738,0001934 1,856,0001935 (January–June) 1,012,0001935 (January–September) 1,543,000


most important supplier, in part because its Black Sea ports were rela-tively close to Italy and to Italian East Africa. Italy also purchased sub-stantial supplies from Venezuela, which accounted for more than 12% ofItaly’s imports, and from the United States, which had increased ship-ments almost threefold when measured against an average of the usualshipments from prior years (see Tables 2 and 3).

The changed trade patterns showed Italy’s clear preferences: increasedpurchases from a Rumanian industry all too eager to sell, and increasedreliance on American and Venezuelan oil. Although those two countrieswere far from Italian ports, their attitudes toward the League of Nations

Table 2. Percentage of imports deriving from major suppliers16

Country 1933 1934 1935 (January–June)

1935 (August to

15 November)

Rumania 35.2 34.1 40.6 59.1USSR 29.6 21.7 16.0 10.0Iran 9.8 11.9 15.0 3.2US 9.0 11.2 7.1 8.5Dutch West Indies 7.5 8.2 10.7 not availableOthers 8.9 12.9 10.6 19.2

Table 3. Total Italian imports of oil products17

Country Italian Imports (in thousands of metric tons)

Jan.–Sept. 1935 Oct.–Dec. 1935* Jan.–Dec. 1935

France 10.7 17.1 27.8Rumania 706.3 389.6 1,095.9U.S.S.R. 199.7 128.9 328.6Netherlands Indies 20.2 0 20.2Iran 187.3 39.0 226.3Columbia 45.3 0 45.3Netherlands Antilles 169.9 112.7 282.6United States 95.3 157.1 252.4Venezuela 15.9 0† 15.9Others 62.1 37.6 99.7Totals 1,522.7 882.0 2,406.7

*No Italian statistics were available. Totals estimated from tankers’ arrivals in Italian ports.†Italy normally refined Venezuelan crude in the Netherlands Antilles, so the increase in the

October to December total for the Netherlands Antilles actually represents increased Italianpurchases of crude oil from Venezuela.

216 G. Bruce Strang

indicated that they would be more likely to continue to provide a steadysupply of oil in spite of any sanctions that might arise.

For British officials, three overwhelming obstacles to a successfulsanctions policy prohibiting oil shipments to Italy presented themselves.The first was a political and military issue rather than an economic one,but it bears mentioning. The most serious objections to implementingsanctions came not on economic grounds but on military ones. Mussolinirepeatedly threatened to go to war against Britain if the League imposedan oil embargo.18 Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Undersecretary ofState at the Foreign Office, strongly opposed extending sanctions, as hethought Britain woefully unprepared for a single-handed war againstItaly. He insisted that Britain would need active French cooperation,which was difficult to foresee in light of serious internal divisions andPierre Laval’s political problems. The lack of military measures taken byother League members meant that they were hiding “timorously” behindGreat Britain. The United Kingdom, he argued, should be “neither theLeague’s policeman nor its whipping-boy,” and he warned his politicalsuperiors that they pursued a “very dangerous course” if they sought toimpose an oil sanction.19 Vansittart was not alone. Although local Britishcommanders were confident that they could win a war against Italy, theChiefs of Staff and the Cabinet were loath to risk war with Italy.20 TheCabinet wanted to secure military support from French Foreign Ministerand Premier Pierre Laval, but he faced enormous problems of his own,and he was reluctant to grant military aid to Britain, especially when theBritish government refused to promise reciprocal support should Francefind itself in difficulties with Germany.21

The outlook for a successful oil embargo was not much rosier on eco-nomic grounds. The second difficulty was the approach of League export-ers to the crisis. Rumania was the largest single supplier of oil to Italy, soits attitude was of central importance. The Soviet Union was also a signif-icant supplier, although Italy had increased the percentage of its pur-chases coming from Rumanian exporters dramatically in the latter half of1935. Taken together, Rumania and the Soviet Union supplied close toseventy percent of Italy’s imports. Both countries’ governments indicatedthat they would comply with any League sanction on oil, but only in theevent that all other exporting countries also conformed to League policy.22

Such unanimity was unlikely. Venezuela indicated that it would notadhere to any sanctions, but the attitude of the Venezuelan governmentwas conditioned by the fact that Anglo–Dutch and American companiescontrolled almost all export Venezuelan production. If the League intro-duced sanctions, then Britain and the Netherlands would be able to con-strain these companies’ exports to Italy. The Roosevelt administration inthe United States could not comply with sanctions, however, as it lacked


the legal authority to restrict American companies’ ability to conductlegitimate trade. With this very notable gap in the sanctions front, couldthe League get agreement from the Soviet and Rumanian governments toblock oil shipments to Italy?23 Without Soviet and especially Rumanianagreement, an oil sanction would have no teeth whatsoever.

The third problem, therefore, was potential sanctions busting by UnitedStates oil companies. The United States produced more than fifty percentof the world’s production, so American adhesion to sanctions was of fun-damental importance, even though American trade comprised only asmall percentage of Italy’s total imports in normal conditions. If Americancompanies increased shipments to Italy in response to sanctions, theycould supply more than enough oil to meet Italy’s relatively modestneeds. In certain sectors, moreover, the United States dominated tradewith Italy. American companies supplied almost eighty percent of Italy’slubricating oils prior to the outbreak of war in 1935, for example, andalthough Italy also began to produce larger quantities of lubricating oilsfrom Rumania and the Soviet Union late in 1935, America still supplied aclear majority of Italy’s imports. Obviously, during wartime, lubricatingoils were a vital commodity.24 Given American dominance in the worldmarket, the attitude of American political and business leaders could havea decisive influence on the effectiveness of any sanction.

Given the possibility of League sanctions, Italy had dramaticallyincreased its purchases of American oil and petroleum products, andAmerican companies seemed all too eager to sell whatever Italy couldafford to buy. From July to September 1934, Italy had imported 34,885tons of American oil. The total for the same time period in 1935 was96,245 tons, and the totals were higher still for the following months.25

The Roosevelt administration had reacted to increased American tradewith Italy with alarm, however, and the President and Secretary of StateCordell had called on American businessmen not to seek profits byexploiting the state of war. In President Roosevelt’s words, “in the courseof war, tempting trade opportunities may be offered to our people to sup-ply materials which would prolong the war. I do not believe that theAmerican people will wish for abnormally increased profits that tempo-rarily might be secured by greatly extending our trade in such materials;nor would they wish the struggles on the battlefield to be prolongedbecause of profits accruing to a comparatively small number of Americancitizens.”26 Cordell Hull echoed this call for a moral embargo, callingincreased American trade with Italy “directly contrary to the policy of thisgovernment.”27 Had the United States government followed these horta-tory exhortations with effective action, actually limiting exports to Italy tonormal levels, it would have caused Italy potentially severe difficulties.Considering the month of September 1935 alone, Italy imported 9,500

218 G. Bruce Strang

tons of crude oil. Had a comprehensive League embargo been in placeplus a voluntary limit to normal levels of American exports, Italy wouldhave been able to secure only 2,000 tons of crude oil from the UnitedStates to replace supplies lost from League exporters (see Table 4).

Italy would have faced serious shortfalls in all categories of oil prod-ucts, including lubricating oils, petroleum, motor fuel, and oil residuals.These shortfalls would have been chronic, and Italy would have had tohave drawn down its stockpiles very rapidly.

In spite of Roosevelt’s strong statements, however, the administrationfound itself constrained by the August 1935 neutrality legislation fromtaking any direct action to limit exports, and it declined to take any seri-ous actions to prohibit trade. Hull insisted that American policy remainedentirely independent of the League’s.29 In one limited initiative, theadministration did consult with the major American oil companies andsought assurances that they would not expand oil shipments to Italy.While the executive heads of the largest American oil companies indi-cated that they would comply with an official request, they complainedthat one hundred smaller companies would not do so. Any such measureby the administration would serve merely to curtail the trade of largercompanies to the benefit of their smaller competitors.30 Italy only neededto import 8,000 tons of oil per day in order to supply the domestic marketand to keep military operations running, and American independent com-panies could ship 80,000 tons per day. Even if the large companies volun-tarily limited their exports to normal levels, independent companies couldmore than make up the difference. Larger companies could also appear tolimit public shipments to normal levels in order to placate the Rooseveltadministration and isolationist public opinion while actually concealing

Table 4. Actual and estimated Italian imports, September 193528

Country Crude Lubricating Petroleum Motor Spirit Oil Residuals

A B A B A B A B A B

Rumania 6.1 – 1.3 – 15.4 – 24.9 – 64.3 –U.S.S.R. – – 4.2 – 1.6 – 2.8 – 6.4 –Colombia 3.4 – – – – – – – – –US – 2.0 7.4 4.3 .3 1.9 1.3 1.9 5.0 5.6Dutch Indies – – – – .2 – 3.2 – .1 –Iran – – – – 2.3 – 6.3 – 5.2 –Venezuela – – – – .1 – .1 – – –Others – – – – 1.1 – 4.7 – 10.9 –Total 9.5 2.0 13.3 4.3 21.0 1.9 43.3 1.9 91.9 5.6

Column A reflects the actual imports and column B the estimated potential United Statesexports given previous years’ levels (in tons).


their trade by sending transshipments through third-party countries, suchas Japan, or more likely, Austria. American firms could export oil toAustria through the free port of Trieste, for example, but once the oil wasin territory under Italian control, the League would be unable to preventthe Italians from taking delivery.31 Accordingly, the success of a sanctionprohibiting Italian oil imports depended largely on the attitude and actionsof the Roosevelt administration and American companies. The Board ofTrade concluded that without the participation of the United States,“petroleum sanctions would surely fail,” as Italy would be able to securesupplies from smaller companies in the United States, even if Rumaniaand the Soviet Union departed from their declared policy and joined asanctions regime in spite of the lack of American adhesion.32

Ultimately, officials in the Foreign Office and at the Board of Tradeconcluded that constitutional and political difficulties meant that theRoosevelt administration would be unable to limit United States ship-ments to normal levels.33 Even if this estimate proved incorrect and theadministration somehow had pulled off this sleight of hand, limiting ship-ments to normal levels would still not constrain Italy sufficiently toinduce it to cease its invasion immediately, as Italy had stocks availableand could be able to secure some supplies through third-party transship-ments.34 For Foreign Office officials, the only tangible result of a sanctionintroduced in these conditions would be to make Italian imports more dif-ficult, as transshipment through third countries would be more time-consuming, complicated, and costly. The real benefit, therefore, would beto increase the stress on Italy’s foreign currency reserves, as it would needhard currency to purchase oil in the United States rather than relying onits current trade arrangements with countries such as the Soviet Union andRumania.35

In addition to considering an embargo on oil shipments to Italy, Britishofficials also pondered the possibility of limiting trade with Italy by con-trolling the tankers that could deliver oil. The initial report delivered tothe Cabinet dismissed the possibility, as it contended that Italy had suffi-cient tanker capacity in its own fleet to handle all of its imports. This esti-mate came from the Petroleum Department, however, and it wasinaccurate, as subsequent information from the Mercantile MarineDepartment clearly showed.36 In fact, a more detailed study by theMercantile Marine Department of the Board of Trade indicated that Italyhad slightly more than 400,000 tons in its fleet, plus another 38,000 tonsof capacity in laid-up tankers. If Italy had been able to use all of thatcapacity for trade, it would have been able to supply its needs only if theships had been bringing oil from ports in Rumania and the Soviet Unionon the Black Sea, roughly 2,800 miles away from Italian ports and littlefurther away from Eritrean ports. Had Italy needed to bring oil from the

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United States, its fleet would have been capable of carrying only Italy’snormal requirements, not the increased needs of the war effort, as thejourney from the Gulf coast to Italy covered 10,000 miles, while the dis-tance to Eritrea was 15,000 miles. If bringing the bulk of its oil from theUnited States, according to officials at the Board of Trade, the most opti-mistic estimate would be that Italy would be able to import 2,250,000 tonsof oil and petroleum products, short of the 2,950,000 required. In thesecircumstances, Italy would need to charter tankers from companies inother countries.37 Substantial excess tanker capacity existed in the UnitedStates, Scandinavia, and Britain, so the League would potentially needcooperation from League members, especially the Scandinavian countriesthat had the largest usable laid-up capacity outside of Great Britain(see Table 5).

Most of the United States fleet was involved in coastal trade, and thosevessels were unsuitable for trans-Atlantic crossings, so Italy would beunlikely to be able to charter much capacity there. Still, provided that theCommittee of Eighteen did secure members’ compliance, then a sanctionpreventing League members from carrying Italian oil in their nations’hulls would have increased the pressure on Italy. Nevertheless, Board ofTrade officials considered an embargo on foreign tanker trade as espe-cially provocative to Italy, and they feared Mussolini’s reaction if theLeague attempted to implement an embargo. Accordingly, they recom-mended caution in implementing an embargo on shipments in Leaguemembers’ vessels.39

The Mercantile Marine Department also considered the possibility oflimiting Italian refueling in foreign ports. This measure would cause fur-ther complications for Italy, as it would increase the total amount of oilthat Italy would need to purchase abroad from 2,950,000 to 3,543,000tons (see Table 6).

Table 5. Oil tanker carrying capacity38

Country Carrying Capacity–Active

(in tons)

Carrying Capacity–Laid-up

(in tons)

Great Britain 2,869,010 437,956US 3,462,195 97,345Scandinavia 2,033,911 128,649Holland 455,902 6,174Japan 176,187 noneFrance 345,750 19,767Italy 404,076 38,502Others 1,112,054 42,198Total 10,859,085 770,591


This figure would rise by as much as 500,000 tons if one included for-eign refueling by ships of the Italian navy, the Regia Marina. Italian shipsheading to the United States would be able to refuel there, for example,but then would deplete their bunkers on the return trip and would have torefuel in Italy, decreasing the amount of oil that Italy would have avail-able for other purposes. In spite of the stresses that this measure wouldcause for Italy, civil servants in the Mercantile Marine Department con-sidered a ban on Italian refueling extremely provocative, and theystrongly opposed the idea that the League should impose such a measure.They considered a ban on Italian refueling to be the equivalent of a blockade,which Italy could interpret as a casus belli.41

Taken together, Treasury Department, Board of Trade, and ForeignOffice officials thought oil sanctions impractical, as the likely lack ofcompliance from the United States meant that Italy would be able to pur-chase sufficient amounts of oil unless the Roosevelt administration wentmuch further than it had indicated it was prepared to go. The best that theLeague could do on its own would be to embargo the oil trade, providedthat Rumania and the Soviet Union agreed, and to prevent the shipment ofoil to Italy in League hulls. These measures would impede Italy’s abilityto carry out its war on Ethiopia, although it would be able to continue forseveral months.

In spite of the seemingly overwhelming objections raised by his staff,however, Samuel Hoare continued to hope that the United States mightsomehow limit its exports to Italy, either through the President’s moralembargo or, more likely, through a change of the neutrality legislationthat Congress could enact in January or February 1936. Hoare believedthat oil companies were unpopular with the American public and thatRoosevelt gained popularity by putting pressure on them. If this publicpressure compelled Congress to change its attitude toward neutralitylegislation, Hoare thought, a sanction could become effective. In the

Table 6. Italian merchant tanker refueling inleague-controlled ports40

Port or Region Amount (in metric tons)

Constanta, Istanbul, & Batum 172,000Port Said 134,000Suez 16,300Alexandria & Port Sudan 63,000Algiers 120,000Other 37,700Total 593,000

222 G. Bruce Strang

meantime, however, American oil shipments to Italy continued to rise, sohe thought it wise to delay making a decision while pursuing negotiationsunder League auspices to seek a mediated end to the war—the negotiationsthat eventually led to the ill-fated Hoare-Laval plan and ultimately toHoare’s resignation.42 The Cabinet essentially endorsed these conclu-sions, arguing that an oil sanction would be ineffective without Americanadhesion; in those circumstances, it was better to pursue a peace dealimmediately rather than to wait for possible changes in American policy.During the Cabinet debates in December, Prime Minister Baldwin intro-duced a further proviso; the League of Nations would need to conduct athorough investigation of the effectiveness of an oil sanction beforeBritain would agree to implement one.43 In the latter part of 1935, therefore,the British government determined that it would seek to delay the exten-sion of sanctions to include oil products while carrying out further negoti-ations. Of course, those negotiations failed to settle the conflict, requiringthe League and the British government to revisit the issue in theNew Year.

The failure of the Hoare-Laval plan meant that sanctions would continueto be part of the League’s deliberations in 1936, and British officials con-tinued to discuss the practicality of various approaches early in 1936.Officials at the Board of Trade continued to oppose the idea of controllingthe ships delivering oil to Italy. If the United States did embargo oil, theyargued, a tanker ban was not necessary. If the Roosevelt administrationfailed to do so, then a tanker ban would not prevent Italy from importingsufficient oil. While they admitted that a ban would make it more difficultand expensive for Italy to import oil, they thought the measure needlesslyprovocative and therefore dangerous. Board of Trade officials also wor-ried that a sanction controlling the use of tankers could lead other countries tochange their policies. Rather than chartering British or Scandinavianvessels, which could in the future be subject to League sanctions, manycountries might argue that their security required building their owndomestic tanker fleets. In the long run, such a development would seri-ously damage Britain’s ship building and shipping industries that servedforeign customers and foreign charters.44

Board of Trade officials also raised a further complication. The Leaguewould need to prevent Italy from chartering vessels from its members.Presumably, provided various signatories to the Covenant agreed, thatprohibition would be possible to implement. Many countries would notdo so, however, including Japan and Germany, both opponents of theLeague, and the United States, which was unlikely to seek to control itsshipping companies through measures that exceeded the Rooseveltadministration’s legal authority. In these circumstances, what was to pre-vent companies barred from carrying Italian oil shipments from selling


their ships to firms in non-compliant countries that would then be able tocharter the ships to Italy? Not only would the League need to ban sales ofshipping to Italy, it would also need to prevent the sales of ships or thechartering of ships to all countries that refused to comply with the embargo.Obviously, these measures would ruffle American feathers. The onlyalternative to this kind of embargo would be to create an elaborate vesseland voyage licensing system, entailing the creation of a large bureaucracyto police the activities of shipping companies based in League nations.45

Foreign Office officials did not entirely agree with the Board ofTrade’s point of view. Gladwyn Jebb argued that it was the ForeignOffice’s job to estimate the relative level of provocation that sanctionsmight pose for Italy, not the Board of Trade’s. Nevertheless, he acceptedthat a tanker ban would carry with it potential risks, and Jebb agreed that avoyage licensing system might prove less inflammatory. He disagreedwith other elements of the Board’s analysis. He argued that it would takeconsiderable time for entrepôt trade to develop through, say, Americantransshipments through Germany or Austria that ultimately would end upin Italian hands. Germany would be unlikely to accord Italy sufficienttrade credits to purchase oil supplies through increased Italian exports, soItaly would need to draw on its already dwindling gold reserves. Finally,Jebb thought that while Japan might seek to build up its tanker fleet inorder to evade the possibility of future sanctions, this issue was hardly amajor concern. He discounted the idea that Germany would do so, as itwould be more likely to rely on purchases of Rumanian oil rather thanseeking large-scale overseas imports. Given the political and diplomaticimperatives at stake, Jebb thought a tanker ban in combination with aLeague embargo was well worth consideration, as it would increaseItaly’s difficulties and costs in securing adequate oil supplies and couldinduce Italy to modify its course of action in Abyssinia.46 Jebb’s views,however, did not win favour with one of his superiors. Vansittart thoughtthe dismal state of Italy’s campaign in Abyssinia, where Italian forceswere bogged down and fighting defensive battles, made increasing thepressure through an oil sanction an academic issue; it would increaseBritain’s risk without significantly changing the outcome. Vansittartbelieved that the sanctions already in place would eventually compelMussolini to the bargaining table long before Italian troops had vanquishedAbyssinian resistance.47

In spite of these concerns, however, Anthony Eden, Hoare’s replacementas the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, thought the idea of a tankerban had merit as a further impetus for Italy to abandon its invasion, and hebrought the issue of sanctions to the Cabinet on 15 January 1936.48 TheCabinet decided that it would agree to the League’s explicit examinationof the effectiveness of an oil sanction in spite of the difficulties Board of

224 G. Bruce Strang

Trade and Foreign Office officials saw in the implementation of any plan.In order to overcome the resistance to sanctions inherent in the Board ofTrade’s position, the Cabinet instructed British members of the committeeof experts that the League appointed to investigate the issue had to beabsolutely impartial in their deliberations.49

The experts’ committee, meeting in Geneva in early February 1936,carried out an intensive investigation of possible Italian use of oil sub-stitutes in order to limit its need for imported oil, ultimately concludingthat Italy would still need to import 2,950,000 tons of oil and petroleumproducts given the increased level of wartime demand. The Leaguecommittee worked with clear knowledge that neutrality legislation inthe United States would prevent the Roosevelt administration fromimposing any effective limits on American exports to Italy.50 In light ofthese considerations, the committee concentrated on determiningwhether or not Italy had the capacity to transport increased shipmentsfrom the United States to Italy, basing their assessment on the assump-tion that diplomatic pressure could induce Rumania and the SovietUnion to join a sanctions regime even without American and Venezue-lan compliance. As of January 1936, Italy’s effective merchant tankerfleet consisted of 356,000 gross tons. This number represented anincrease of more than 26,000 tons since the summer of 1935, as Italyhad purchased new tankers in order to limit the potential effectivenessof sanctions. In addition, the Regia Marina had 70,000 tons of availabletanker capacity that could carry oil products. The League committeedeparted from earlier British estimates in one central way. In the com-mittee’s calculations, not all of Italy’s tankers could make the trans-Atlantic voyage to the United States or Venezuela, limiting the totalavailable tonnage to 270,000; the remainder was too old or too slow tomake the journey safely, although it could carry shipments from Italy toItalian East Africa, lessening the distance that the more modern shipswould need to travel. Other ships lay idle, or served as storage facilitiesin Mogadishu, which lacked adequate port facilities. In an emergency,Italy could likely devote as much as 320,000 tons to trade with theAmericas. Modern ships would be able to make 5 to 6 return trips fromItaly to the United States, but given the age of the Italian fleet, theexperts argued that the average Italian tanker would only be able tomake 4.75 return trips in a year, as the journey from Italy to the UnitedStates was roughly 10,000 miles, and the distance from the UnitedStates to Eritrea was 15,000 miles. Normally, ships could carry one-third more cargo than their rated tonnage. Based on these assumptions,the experts calculated that Italy could carry between 1,750,000 and2,000,000 tons per year, depending on the level of commitment of pre-viously laid-up tanker capacity. Obviously, both of these numbers fell


far short of the estimated 2,950,000 tons that Italy needed. In order tomeet its wartime needs, Italy would need to charter tankers with anadditional 225,000 tons of capacity.51

A ban on use of League tankers carried further complications. TheLeague would need to ensure not only that Italy could not charterLeague members’ vessels but also that it could not purchase them. Itwould be relatively easy to enact a ban on direct sales to Italy; providedthat League members accepted the concept of the ban in the first place,this additional step would not cause enormous new obligations. Whatwould stop League members from either chartering or selling ships tocompanies or governments in non-League countries that could thencharter them or re-sell them to Italy? In order to close this potentialloophole, the League would need to ban the sale or chartering of tankersby League members to any country that failed to implement Leaguesanctions.52

The League committee of experts presented a grim picture. It did allowthat in certain circumstances, an embargo could work. Based on a seriesof optimistic assumptions—that the Soviet Union and Rumania wouldimpose an embargo even without the cooperation of the United States andVenezuela, that the League could prevent Italy from procuring moretankers, that the League could control Italian chartering of vessels fromnon-League members, that the League could control entrepôt trade withthird party countries—then Italy would be unable to import sufficient oilsupplies in the long run. This series of events was unlikely, and the com-mittee of experts left outside observers to draw their own conclusions.Even if a universal embargo were imposed, which was of course impossibleto realize given American neutrality legislation, it would take at leastthree to three-and-a-half months for the embargo to become effective, asItaly had some 700,000 to 800,000 tons of oil stockpiled. If the UnitedStates limited shipping to normal levels and Rumania and the SovietUnion agreed to an embargo in spite of United States non-compliance,events that seemed unlikely in February 1936, the embargo would preventItaly from securing sufficient supplies and would make what purchasesItaly could make more difficult and expensive. An embargo on oil ship-ments and on the use of League tankers confined to League memberswould likely see enough leakage through American firms so that thetanker ban would similarly serve merely to make Italian purchases moreexpensive.53 In short, without complete American cooperation, “Italywould, despite a League embargo, be able to procure as much oil as sheneeds and can pay for.”54 The only real justification for an embargo wasthat it could increase the cost of oil that Italy could import, thus decreasing itsoverall purchases or increasing the rate of drain on Italy’s gold reserves.Was that goal worth the inherent risks?

226 G. Bruce Strang

Some hope did lie in the state of Italy’s gold and currency reserves,which had contracted dramatically as a result of the sanctions that Leaguemembers imposed. At the end of September 1935, the Bank of Italy heldreserves of 4.7 billion lire, with the total of reserves and liquidityexceeding 5 billion lire. By 1 January 1936, the Bank’s reserves had fallen to3.3 billion lire, with total reserves and liquidity of roughly 4 billion lire.The fall in reserves was not linear, however, as the steepest declines hadcome in 1935. After the turn of the year, the rate of decline leveled off,although the sanctions in place still meant that Italy was steadily hemor-rhaging its reserves. Italy had to sell gold in order to purchase foreign cur-rency so that it could pay for most of its imports, as its export markets inmany League countries had dried up.55 The League of Nations Coordinat-ing Committee noted that Italy had exported large amounts of gold fromNovember 1935 through to February 1936, totaling more than1,411,700,000 Italian lire. The possibility that Italy’s gold reserves haddecreased by half since the start of the war did indicate that Italy wouldeventually succumb to the effects of sanctions, as at some point it wouldno longer have a supply of gold available with which to purchase the foreigncurrency needed to buy foreign goods.56

Ultimately, the British Cabinet decided to override the experts’ reportand to continue to support the implementation of an oil sanction inGeneva. The major issues that the Cabinet discussed, however, indicatea high degree of ambivalence and its emphasis on domestic politicalconcerns rather than on any compelling economic case. As the UnitedStates and Venezuela would neither impose sanctions nor any effectivecontrol on shipments, little prospect existed that an oil sanction in and ofitself could induce Italy to abandon its invasion. An oil sanction did stillcarry the potential risk of war with Italy, but most members thought thatoutcome unlikely, as British defenses in the Mediterranean hadimproved since the previous year. Isolating Italy in this fashion couldprompt Italy to turn towards an alliance with Germany, although theCabinet minimized the risk, assuming incorrectly that Hitler held con-tempt for Italy. Nevertheless, more important issues took precedenceover these concerns. Even if an oil sanction would not be immediatelydecisive, it would increase the pressure on Italy, drawing heavily onItaly’s already strained gold reserves. Failure to apply further sanctionswould also carry great costs: alienating public opinion in the UnitedStates and the Dominions, limiting the possibility of Labour cooperationin carrying out industrial mobilization and rearmament in Britain, and,above all, damaging the credibility of the League and its collective secu-rity system. The imposition of an oil sanction, in effect, had become asymbol of the League’s determination to pursue collective security, andthe National Government’s electoral strategy had intimately tied its


credibility to the League’s. Accordingly, Prime Minister Baldwinargued that the position of the government depended on its public sup-port for the collective security principles of the Covenant. Given theseimperatives, the Cabinet approved the concept of a League sanction onoil shipments to Italy, in spite of clear evidence that the sanction had noreal prospect of success.57

In the end, of course, the League never did impose an oil embargo onItaly. Abyssinian resistance crumbled in April and May of 1936, and Ital-ian troops conquered Addis Ababa. Haile Selassie fled into exile. The cri-sis shattered the League’s credibility as an organization capable ofensuring collective security. The catastrophic failure of the League’sinadequate effort has helped to create the impression that imposition ofmore stringent measures, including an oil embargo, could proverbiallyhave saved the day. Certainly, Italy was extremely vulnerable to sanctionsprohibiting it from importing oil. It produced only a miniscule percentageof its needs and could rely only on small amounts from Albania. Leaguemembers, especially Rumania and to a lesser degree the Soviet Union,dominated the export trade to Italy. Had the League curtailed this tradeand found some way to secure the cooperation of the Roosevelt adminis-tration, the results would have been devastating for Italy’s economy, par-alyzing Italy’s domestic truck transport and limiting industrialproduction. Eventually, Mussolini’s forces in East Africa would have runout of fuel, immobilizing the troops and preventing their re-supply. Theinvasion would have ended in disaster. Even with the unhelpful attitude ofthe United States, imposing an oil embargo would have hastened the drainon Italy’s gold reserves, increasing the risk Mussolini ran while carryingthrough his campaign.

One of the central actors later rued the League’s apparent lack of una-nimity and resolve. When Mussolini fell from power in 1943, AnthonyEden mused about the League’s failure to prevent Italy’s conquest ofAbyssinia and its subsequent failure to prevent the outbreak of the Sec-ond World War: “Looking back the thought comes again. Should we nothave shown more determination in pressing through with sanctions in1935 and if we had could we not have called Mussolini’s bluff and atleast postponed this war? The answer, I am sure, is yes.”58 Whateverthe answer to Eden’s highly speculative question, though, one mustquestion whether or not an oil sanction was the best way to show thatresolve.

In the circumstances extant in 1935 and 1936, the possibility of a suc-cessful oil embargo against Italy was slim; too many conditions conspiredagainst the League and its collective security apparatus. Rumania was byfar the largest supplier of oil to Italy, but it predicated its adhesion to sanc-tions on the fundamental condition that all exporting countries would have

228 G. Bruce Strang

to join an embargo, as did the Soviet Union. Given that that condition wasimpossible to meet, was there any real hope that the League could rallyeven its own members to impose an embargo, especially given the extremereticence of France’s political leadership? With no American limits to its oilexports to Italy, a League embargo would simply serve to redirect trade tothe United States away from League exporters. While this move wouldhave increased Italy’s costs, it would have had no realistic chance of induc-ing Mussolini to abandon the invasion and would not have saved Abyssinia.Had the United States limited exports to so-called normal levels, then aLeague embargo and a comprehensive tanker ban could have increased thispressure much further, but this set of circumstances was unrealizable in late1935 or early 1936. Given sufficient time, the sanctions regime instituted inNovember 1935 would have depleted Italian currency reserves, and an oilembargo could have shortened that amount of time, but given the nature ofthe world oil business, the available evidence gives us no reason to believethat a League embargo could have been effective in time to prevent Italy’svictory. In essence, the absence of the world’s largest oil producer from anysanctions regime and the relatively rapid progress that Italy made in thespring of 1936 doomed Abyssinia, whether or not League members hadimplemented an oil embargo.

This examination of the practical aspects of an oil sanction suggeststhat common narratives of the road to war need some further revision.Did allegedly weak-kneed appeasers really miss an opportunity tothwart the aggressive will of the dictators, to provide a stern warningthat would have dissuaded Hitler from his path of aggression, or at leastto have given him pause for second thought? Such a scenario seemsunlikely. What is interesting about this issue is how persistently Britishpolitical leaders kept the issue alive, not because they had any reason-able hope that an oil sanction would prove effective, but because it hadbecome such a potent symbol. Critics of the British Cabinet, Board ofTrade, and Foreign Office officials should also consider anothercounter-factual argument: would not the imposition of an oil sanction,with all its attendant costs for League members, followed by the verystrong possibility of its failure to prevent Italy’s conquest, have dam-aged the League’s credibility equally as badly as did the unwillingnessto impose such a sanction in the first place? In spite of its symbolicvalue, an oil sanction was not practical in 1935 or 1936, and it shouldnot remain as part of our narrative about the alleged failure of the Brit-ish political leadership in the 1930s.

This analysis, nonetheless, does not suggest that British and Frenchpolicies somehow reached their objectives, nor does it exculpate Hoare orEden, or Laval or Flandin. As Robert Vansittart later wrote, they in factrealized “the worst of all worlds,” failing to save Abyssinia while alienating


Mussolini in the process. If one examines counterfactual approaches tothe issue, however, an oil sanction certainly could have worked had theseconditions been somewhat different. Italy was intensely vulnerable to anoil sanction, and had the United States, the world’s largest producer, beenwilling to join with League members, then Italy would have been in anextremely difficult position. Rumania and the Soviet Union had also com-mitted to ban exports provided other producers agreed, and Italy wouldhave had a difficult time securing sufficient supplies from countries suchas Venezuela and through transshipment from third countries. It is notthat an oil embargo could not have worked in ideal conditions; it is simplythat political conditions in America destroyed the League’s ability toimplement one effectively. The potential leakage in the sanctions frontundermined the case of those who wished to impose sanctions, howevertepid their advocacy, and gave comfort to those such as successive FrenchForeign Ministers Pierre Laval and Pierre Étienne Flandin who fearedalienating a potential Italian ally. The League of the 1930s was an incom-plete organization, missing centrally important Great Powers that oper-ated outside its mandate and Powers within that sought security (orexpansion, for that matter) through conventional diplomacy, regionalalliances, and military power rather than through collective security. Nev-ertheless, it would be unwise to assume from this one episode thateconomic sanctions cannot work. Mutatis mutandis; in other conditions,economic sanctions could prove to have powerful coercive effects,however ineffective their application may have been during the squalidepisode of Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia.

NOTES

I would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council ofCanada and the Lakehead University Senate Research Committee for funding partof the research for this article.

1. A. J. Barker, The Civilizing Mission: The Italo–Ethiopian War (London, 1968),pp. 199–200.

2. Frank Hardie, The Abyssinian Crisis (London, 1974), p. 205.3. Anthony Adamthwaite, Grandeur and Misery: France 1914–1940 (London,

1995), 199. Anthony Adamthwaite, France and the Coming of the Second WorldWar, 1936–1939 (London, 1977), p. 36. Richard Pankhurst, a specialist onEthiopia, used similar language. See, for example, his review of Brice Harris Jr.,The United States and the Italo–Ethiopian Crisis (Stanford, 1964), in the Journalof Modern African Studies, Vol. 3 (1965), p. 312–314. For more context onblockades and issues that would have arisen had the League followed Adamth-waite’s highly unusual advice, see Barry D. Hunt, “British Policy on the Issue ofBelligerent and Neutral Rights, 1919–1939,” in Craig L. Symonds et al., eds.,

230 G. Bruce Strang

New Aspects of Naval History: Selected Papers Presented at the Fourth Naval HistorySymposium, United States Naval Academy, 25–26 October 1979 (Annapolis, MD,1981), pp. 279–290; B. J. C. McKercher, “A British View of American Policy:The Settlement of Blockade Claims, 1924–1927,” International History Review,Vol. 3 (1981), pp. 368–384; and B. J. C. McKercher, “Belligerent Rights in1927–1929: Foreign Policy versus Naval Policy in the Second Baldwin Govern-ment,” Historical Journal, Vol. 29 (1986), pp. 963–974.

4. Cristiano Andrea Ristuccia, “The 1935 Sanctions against Italy: Would coal andoil have made a difference?” European Review of Economic History, Vol. 4 (2000),pp. 86, 107. Ristuccia’s assumption that the United States would have cooper-ated with the League sanctions lies within the dominant American historiogra-phy. See, for example, Brice Harris Jr., The United States and the Italo–EthiopianCrisis (Stanford, 1964), pp. 96, 102–103. For an account that takes issue withRistuccia’s and Harris’s assumptions about American policy, see Michael L.Roi, ‘“A Completely Immoral and Cowardly Attitude:’ The British ForeignOffice, American Neutrality, and the Hoare–Laval Plan,” Canadian Journal ofHistory, Vol. 29 (1994), p. 344–349. For a discussion of the effects of sanctionson Italian citizens, see Kate Ferris, ‘“Fare di ogni famiglia italiana un fortilizio:’The League of Nation’s Economic Sanctions and everyday life in Venice,” Jour-nal of Modern Italian History, Vol. 11 (2006), pp. 117–142.

5. George W. Baer, Test Case: Italy, Ethiopia, and the League of Nations (Stanford,CA, 1976), p. 207–208, 221–227. For a similar view based on similar evidence,see F.S. Northedge, The League of Nations: its life and times (New York,1986), p. 235.

6. Chamberlain memorandum, 26 August 1935, T [Treasury Archives, NationalArchives, Kew] 172/1838.

7. Treasury memorandum, 30 August 1935, S.D.W. to Sargent, 6 September 1935,T 172/1838.

8. Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 25 August 1935, in Robert Self, ed., The NevilleChamberlain Diary Letters, Volume 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940(Aldershot, UK, 2005), pp. 147–149.

9. For the published record of the meeting, see Documents on British Foreign Policy,Second Series, Volume 14 (London, 1976), #553, #554, Edmond (Geneva) toVansittart, 11 September 1935, pp. 595–601, 601–607; #564, Edmond toVansittart, 13 September 1935, pp. 615–620. Chamberlain wrote that Mussolini’sdecision to send so many troops south of the Suez Canal “tied a noose aroundhis neck and left the end hanging out for anyone with a navy to pull.” Chamberlaincould not discount Mussolini’s threats to go to war, however, and he thoughtthat the weakness of British defenses made it unwise to risk the possibility of awar while Britain was so unprepared. Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 8 December1935, Chamberlain Diary, pp. 164–165.

10. For the full text of the speech, see The Times, 12 September 1935, p. 7.11. The emphasis is in the original document. Thomas to Dominion High Commis-

sioners, Circular B. #96, 26 September 1935, CAB [Cabinet Archives, NationalArchives, Kew] 21/411, 6109A/345.

12. For more on British Public Opinion, see Daniel P. Waley, British Public Opinionand the Abyssinian War, 1935–6 (London, 1975). Soundings of opposition politi-


cians and leading backbenchers showed unanimous opinion that the govern-ment would have to explore collective action through the League. HoareMinutes, conversations with Austen Chamberlain, Winston Churchill, DavidLloyd George, George Lansbury, and Herbert Samuel, p. 20–21 August 1935, T172/1838.

13. CC 45(35), 9 September 1935, CAB 23/82; Committee of Imperial DefenceMemorandum [1188-B], “Economic Pressure on Italy,” 30 September 1935,CAB 4/23; CC 44(35), 2 October 1935, CC 45(35), 9 October 1935, both CAB23/82.

14. Waterlow (Athens) to Eden, 24 December 1936, FO [Foreign Office Archives,National Archives, Kew] 371/19221, J9789/5499/1. Given Albania’s status asan Italian protectorate, the League would have to treat that production as theequivalent to domestic Italian production.

15. C. P. 212(35), 27 November 1935, Annex I, Petroleum Department Memoran-dum, CAB 24/256.

16. Ibid.; “Oil Sanctions and Italy” Memorandum, 4 December 1935, T 172/1838. The “others” category indicates a substantial increase in supplies fromVenezuela.

17. Skrine-Stevenson (Geneva) to Ashton-Gwatkin, 8 February 1936, FO 371/20189, J1287/757/1. The League experts’ committee compiled these figuresfrom Italian statistics and estimates of tanker capacity unloading in Italianports.

18. See, for example, Vansittart conversation with Garibaldi, 25 November 1935,FO 371/19164, J8447/1/1; CC 50(35), 2 December 1935, CAB 23/82.

19. Vansittart memorandum, 23 November 1935, FO 371/19164, J8419/1/1; Vansit-tart minute, 26 November 1935, FO 371/19164, J8423/1/1. For his concerns aboutFrance, see Vansittart to Clerk (Paris), 18 November 1935, FO 371/19166,J8767/1/1; Vansittart Minute, 6 December 1935, FO 371/19167, J8911/1/1.For more discussion of Vansittart’s views, see Michael L. Roi, Alternative toAppeasement: Sir Robert Vansittart and Alliance Diplomacy, 1934–1937 (Westport,CT, 1997), pp. 91–108. For Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare’s concerns, seeC.P. 235(35), 8 December 1935, CAB 24/258. For the pivotal meeting that setthe stage for the Hoare-Laval Plan, see C. P. 233(35), Record of Meeting,7 December 1935, CAB 24/258. For the French version, see Documents Diplo-matiques Français, 1e Serie, Tome XIII (Paris, 1984), #352, Compte Rendu,7 December 1935, 512–524; #358, Compte Rendu, 8 December 1935, 528–541.Laval indicated that he based his policy in part on warnings from ItalianAmbassador Vittorio Cerruti that Mussolini would consider an oil embargo tobe the equivalent of a military sanction.

20. C. P. 220(35), Extracts from Committee of Imperial Defence, Defence, Policyand Requirements Sub-committee, 14th meeting, 26 November 1935, CAB 24/258.Chatfield to Vansittart, 8 August 1935, Vansittart to Vice-Admiral Little,9 August 1935, both CAB 21/411. Then see Arthur Marder, “The Royal Navyand the Ethiopian Crisis of 1935–1936,” The American Historical Review,Vol. 5.5 (1970), pp. 1347–1349; and Steven Morewood, “The Chiefs of Staff,the ‘men on the spot’ and the Anglo–Abyssinian Emergency, 1935–1936,” inDick Richardson and Glyn Stone, eds., Decisions and Diplomacy: Essays in

232 G. Bruce Strang

Twentieth Century International History (London, 1995), pp. 83–107. For Italianmilitary commanders’ assessments of their dismal chances in the event of warwith Britain, see Fortunato Minniti, “‘Il nemico vero:’ Gli obiettivi dei piani dioperazione contro la Gran Bretagna nel contesto etiopico (maggio 1935–mag-gio 1936),” Storia Contemporanea, Vol. 26 (1994), pp. 575–602; Robert Mallett,The Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism, 1935–1940 (London, 1998), pp. 23–37;and Robert Mallett, Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War (Houndmills,2003), pp. 44–47, 50.

21. CC 47(35), 16 October 1935, CAB 23/82. DCAS 424, Courtney to Wigram, 10January 1936, FO 371/20159, J515/15/1. For more on the Anglo–Frenchdimension of the crisis, see among others R.A.C. Parker, “Great Britain, Franceand the Ethiopian Crisis, 1935–1936,” English Historical Review, 89(1974), pp.293–332; Richard Davis, “Mésentente cordiale: The Failure of the Anglo–French Alliance. Anglo–French Relations during the Ethiopian and RhinelandCrises, 1934–1936,” European History Quarterly, 23(1993), 513–27; Robert J.Young, In Command of France: French Foreign Policy and Military Planning,1933–1940 (Cambridge, MA, 1978), 89–92; Martin S. Alexander, The Republicin danger: General Maurice Gamelin and the politics of French defence, 1933–1940(Cambridge, UK, 1992), pp. 72–76; Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, La décadence,1932–1939 (Paris, 1979), pp. 147–157; H. James Burgwyn, Italian foreign policyin the interwar period, 1918–1940 (Westport, CT, 1997), pp. 119–120, 127–129;Reynolds M. Salerno, Vital Crossroads: The Mediterranean Origins of the SecondWorld War, 1935–1940 (Ithaca, NY, 2002), pp. 11–12; Reynolds M. Salerno,“Britain, France and the Emerging Italian Threat, 1935–38,” in Martin Sr.Alexander and William J. Philpott, eds., Anglo–French Defence Relations betweenthe Wars (London, 2002), p. 74; William I. Shorrock, “The Italian Connection inthe Foreign/Colonial Policy of Pierre Laval, 1934–1936: A Reassessment,” Pro-ceedings of the Annual Meeting of the French Colonial Historical Society, Vol. 12(1988), p. 107–120; and Raphaële Ulrich-Pier, René Massigli (1888–1988),Tome I: Une vie de diplomatie (Brussels, 2006), pp. 309–310.

22. Ronald Hoare (Bucharest) to Samuel Hoare, 5 December 1935, with Edenminute, 7 December 1935, both FO 371/19219/5499/1.

23. C. P. 212(35), 27 November 1935, CAB 24/256. Skrine-Stevenson minute, 5December 1935, Vansittart minute, 5 December 1935, both FO 371/19219,J9232/5499/1.

24. Skrine-Stevenson to Ashton-Gwatkin, 28 November 1935, FO 371/19217,J8713/5499/1,

25. C. P. 212 (35), Annex I, Petroleum Department Memorandum, 27 November1935, CAB 24/256. In December 1934, for example, Italy had purchased$249,400 worth of oil and petroleum products from the United States. Thecorresponding figure for December 1935 was $1,363,300. League of NationsCoordinating Committee, #125, Dispute between Ethiopia and Italy: Statistics ofTrade with Italy and the Italian Colonies, Volume III, December 1935 to March 1936(Geneva: League of Nations, 1936), pp. 35, 43. The League experts’ committeelater estimated that total American shipments to Italy in the three months fromOctober to December 1935 comprised 157,100 tons. Skrine-Stevenson (Geneva)to Ashton-Gwatkin, 8 February 1936, NA, FO 371/20189, J1287/757/1.


26. Feis to Hull, 7 November 1935, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Presidential Library[FDRPL], President’s Secretary’s Files [PSF], Diplomatic, Italy: 1933–1948,Box 41.

27. Hull statement, 15 November 1935, Foreign Relations of the United States[FRUS], 1935, Volume I (Washington, 1953), 819. For more on American pol-icy, see, for example, Harris, Ethiopian Crisis, passim; Howard Jablon, Cross-roads of Decision: the State Department and foreign policy, 1933–1937 (Lexington,KY, 1983), pp. 102–105; Robert A. Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality (Chicago,1968), pp. 110–160; Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and American ForeignPolicy, 1932–1945 (New York, 1995), pp. 101–120; Baer, Test Case, pp. 66–74.

28. Stevenson to Ashton-Gwatkin, 28 November 1935, FO 371 19217 J8713/5499/1.29. Hull to Wilson (Geneva), 10 October, 26 October 1935, Wilson to Hull,

10 October 1935, FRUS, 1935, I, pp. 842, 843–44, 852–54.30. Phillips to Hull, 14 November 1935, FDRPL, PSF, Diplomatic, Italy: 1933–1948,

B. 41.31. C. P. 236(35), 9 December 1935, CAB 24/258.32. C. P. 236(35), 9 December 1935, CAB 24/258.33. Starling to Ashton-Gwatkin, 20 November 1935, J8527/5499/1; Lindsay

(Washington) to Hoare, 26 November 1935, FO 271/19217, J8506/5499/1;Lindsay to Hoare, 23 November 1935, with Oliphant Minute, 25 November1935, FO 371/19216, J8341/5499/1; Lindsay to Hoare, 4 December 1935, FO371/19218, J8871/5499/1; Lindsay to Hoare, 7 December 1935; FO 371/19219, J9066/5499/1; Lindsay to Eden, 10 December 1935, FO 371/19221,J9761/5499/1. The best account of the influence of American policy on Britishdecisions is Roi, ‘A Completely Immoral and Cowardly Attitude,’ pp. 333–351.

34. C. P. 236(35), 9 December 1935, CAB 24/258.35. Jebb Minute, 5 December 1935, Sargent Minute, 5 December 1935, Skrine-

Stevenson Minute, 6 December 1935, all FO 371/19220, J9232/5499/1,.36. C. P. 212(35), 27 November 1935, NA, CAB 24/256. Ashton-Gwatkin Minute,

1 January 1936, Eden Minute, 6 January 1936, FO 371/19221, J9814/5499/1.37. “Oil Sanctions and Italy,” 4 December 1935, T 172/1838; Mercantile Marine

Department Memorandum, December 1935, FO 371/19221, J9814/5499/1.38. “Oil Sanctions and Italy,” 4 December 1935, T 172/1838; Mercantile Marine



Department Memorandum, December 1935, FO 371/19221, J9814/5499/1.41. Mercantile Marine Department Memorandum, January 1936, FO 371/20180,

J455/216/1. Officials from both the Petroleum Departments and the MercantileMarine Department continued to oppose any ban on Italian refueling; theyargued that the League committee should not consider the question at all, as itconstituted a ban on shipping, not on the oil trade per se. They argued thereforethat the question lay outside the League committee’s remit. ForeignOffice Minute, 28 February 1936, FO 371/20180, J2121/216/1; Jebb Minute,18 February 1936, FO 371/20180, J1609/216/1. For a lengthy quotation fromand further discussion of Jebb’s minute, see Baer, Test Case, p. 207–208.

234 G. Bruce Strang

42. Hoare to Lindsay (Washington), 26 November 1935, FO 371/19216, J8341/5499/1; Hoare Minute, 6 December 1935, FO 371/19220, J9232/5499/1; CC50(35), 2 December 1935, CAB 23/82. For more on the ill-fated Hoare-Lavalplan, see, for example, W. N. Medlicott, “The Hoare-Laval Pact Reconsid-ered,” in David Dilks, ed., Retreat from Power: Studies in Britain’s Foreign Policyof the Twentieth Century, Volume I (London, 1981), pp. 118–138; J. C. Robert-son, “The Hoare-Laval Plan,” Journal of Contemporary History, 10(1975),pp. 433–464; and Roi, Alternative to Appeasement, pp. 91–104. For NevilleChamberlain’s hopes that Britain might be able to secure some level of coopera-tion from the Roosevelt administration, see Chamberlain Diary, 29 November1935, NC [Neville Chamberlain Papers, University of Birmingham Library, Bir-mingham] 2/23A.

43. CC 50(35), 2 December 1935, NA CAB 23/82; CC 53(35), 10 December 1935,CAB 23/82; CC 55(35), 17 December 1935, CAB 23/82.

44. Mercantile Marine Department Memorandum, January 1936, FO 371/20180,J455/216/1.

45. Ibid.46. Jebb Minute, 14 January 1936, FO 371/20180, J455/216/1. See also Jebb

Minute, 1 January 1936, Peterson Minute, 4 January 1936, FO 371/18221,J9814/5499/1. Jebb advocated the idea of a tanker ban. He weakened his case,however, by mistakenly assuming that the bulk of Italy’s fleet would still be car-rying oil from Rumania. In fact, the very point of the tanker ban was that theLeague would impose it as a further condition having already implemented aLeague embargo.

47. Jebb Minute, 14 January 1936, FO 371/20180, J455/216/1.48. Eden Minute, 6 January 1936, FO 371/20180, J9814/5499/1. For estimates

that Italy would be unable to conquer Abyssinia before the commencement ofthe rainy season, see Committee of Imperial Defense, Defence, Policy andRequirements Sub-committee, 14th meeting, 26 November 1935, FO 371/19165, J8655/1/1.

49. CC 1(36), 15 January 1936, 4(36), 5 February 1936, both CAB 23/83.50. Skrine-Stevenson (Geneva) to Ashton-Gwatkin, 5 February 1936, Skrine-

Stevenson to Ashton-Gwatkin, 7 February 1936, FO 371/20189, J1286/757/1.For the impossibility of any American limits on its oil exports to Italy, see Lindsey(Washington) to Eden, 21 February 1936, FO 371/20178, J1579/136/1. Lindsaythought it unwise even to approach the Roosevelt administration to ask for anylimitation on exports, because it would merely annoy American politicians andhad no chance of leading to a change in American policy. See also CC 6(36), 12February 1936, CC 8(36), 19 February 1936, both CAB 23/83; and CC 11(36),26 February 1936, CAB 23/83.

51. Skrine-Stevenson (Geneva) to Ashton-Gwatkin, 7 February 1936, FO 371/20189, J1286/757/1.

52. Ibid.53. Skrine-Stevenson (Geneva) to Ashton-Gwatkin, 12 February 1936, FO 371/

20189, J1376/757/1. See also Eden to Lindsay (Washington), 19 February1936, Lindsay (Washington) to Eden, 21 February 1936, FO 371/20178, J1579/136/1.


54. Skrine-Stevenson (Geneva) to Ashton-Gwatkin, 5 February 1936, FO 371/20189, J1165/757/1.

55. R. I. De Mattia, Bilanci degli Istituti di Emissione Italiani, 1845–1936: altre serieStoriche di Interesse Monetario e Fonti, Vol. I, No. II (Roma, 1967), pp. 804–05.When Badoglio’s column eventually entered Addis Ababa in May 1935, theBank’s reserves had dipped to 2.5 billion Lire, with total reserves and liquidityequally 3.7 billion Lire.

56. League of Nations Coordinating Committee Memorandum, 23 April 1935, FO371/19189, J3461/757/1.

57. CC 11(36), 26 February 1936, CAB 23/83. C.P. 53(36), Eden Memorandum,22 February 1936, CAB 24/260. The Cabinet decision was far from heroic,especially considering determined French opposition to an oil embargo meantthat Britain would be unlikely to have to face the potential ramifications of hav-ing implemented one. See Eden to the Foreign Office, 2 March 1936, FO 371/20189, J1971/757/1; CC 15(36), 5 March 1936, CAB 23/83. For more detail,see also Baer, Test Case, pp. 221–227.

58. Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators (London, 1962), p. 311.