Embed Size (px)
DESCRIPTION
The Will
Citation preview
1
THE WILL
Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2014.
The Existence and Nature of the Will
Like the intellect, the will is a spiritual operative power (faculty) of man. It is spiritual,
supra-organic, for it is an appetite consequent upon the intellect and therefore must belong to the
same level as the supra-organic intellect itself. Concerning the existence of man’s rational
appetite (the will), H. D. Gardeil explains that “the existence of a spiritual faculty of appetition
distinct from sensory faculties of appetition is an immediate deduction from the principle that
every form gives rise to an inclination. Since there are two basic kinds of faculties of knowledge,
sense and intellect, there are, in consequence, two basic kinds of appetitive potencies, the one
sensory, following upon sense knowledge, the other spiritual, which is the will and follows upon
intellectual knowledge.”1
In the fourth book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, St. Thomas Aquinas states that “in
every intellectual nature there is a will. For, the intellect is actuated by an intelligible form,
inasmuch as it actually understands, even as a natural thing acquires the actuality of natural being
by its own form. Now, a natural thing, by the form that perfects it in its species, has an
inclination to its proper operations, and to the proper end to which it attains by its operation,
since such a thing is, such is its operation, and such the end to which it tends. Hence from the
intelligible form there results in the intelligent being an inclination to its proper operations and
end. This inclination of the intellectual nature is the will, which is the principle of those
operations that are in our power, and whereby the intellect operates for the sake of an end,
because the end and the good are the object of the will. Consequently in every intelligent being
there is a will.”2
The will is a rational appetite. It is man’s rational appetency; it is the power to strive for
an intellectually perceived good and to shun an intellectually perceived evil. Not only can one
prove a priori the existence of intellectual appetencies or acts of appetite from the proof that
cognition is followed by appetite, but the existence of intellectual appetencies or acts of will is
also a datum of experience. Freedom, justice, magnanimity, and honor, for example, cannot be
apprehended by the senses but are objects of intellectual cognition. Such intellectual knowledge
gives rise to a desire for the possession of freedom, justice, magnanimity and honor. Thus,
experience shows that there are appetencies (acts of will) based upon intellectual cognition. Acts
of will occur intermittently. When a person is asleep or unconscious his will does not act, so we
must admit the existence of an operative faculty or potency of intellectual or rational appetency.
This faculty or potency is called the will.
1 H. D. GARDEIL, Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, vol. 3 (Psychology), B. Herder, St. Louis,
1956, p. 198. 2 Summa Contra Gentiles, IV, 19.
2
Henri Renard observes that “‘some inclination is consequent upon every form.’3 Now,
since man through intellectual knowledge acquires the forms (species) of things, without matter
and without the conditions of matter, there must be present within his nature an inclination
surpassing the inclination of the sense appetites, which have for their object the sensible forms.
This superior inclination we call the intellectual appetite, or will.
“Moreover, from our own experience, we know that we desire some goods that are in no
way material, such as honor, virtue, peace, happiness. We are able also to choose objects which
are universal, for example, to be always kind to all. Then, too, even particular material goods can
be loved precisely under the aspect of good, rather than under the restricted aspect of
pleasurableness; we can, for example, desire to take an unpleasant medicine because we see in
the unpleasant object a goodness with reference to an end, health. We conclude that, since
distinct formal objects diversify operative potencies, there must be a superior appetite in man, an
appetite above the sensory level, proportioned to intellectual knowledge – the will.”4
How the Will is Really Distinct from Its Subject, from the Intellect, and from the
Sense Appetite
The Will is Really Distinct From Its Subject. Man’s rational appetite (will) is really
distinct from its subject for in creatural beings supposit and operative faculty (an accident) are
always really distinct. Only in God is will identified with His essence.
The Will is Really Distinct from the Intellect. Man’s rational appetite (will) is also really
distinct from its fellow operative potency the intellect, for both have specifically different formal
objects. Concerning the real distinction between intellect and will Paul J. Glenn writes:
“Between the intellect and the will there is a real distinction. Both are faculties of the soul, but
they are faculties for essentially different services, and so are said to be really distinct. They are
two faculties, not two phases of one.
“We have seen the faculty of intellect serves man in a variety of ways, as understanding,
memory, consciousness, conscience, intelligence, reason. Yet the intellect is one faculty. For the
services it renders are all in the realm of supra-organic knowing. There is indeed a distinction
between intelligence and reason, but it is not based on an essential divergence of these powers,
and hence we do not assert that intelligence (which recognizes truth as self-evident) is a distinct
faculty from reason (which recognizes truth by study or by accepting reliable authority).
Intelligence and reason are but two functions of one intellect.
“Between the intellect and will, however, there is an essential real distinction. For
faculties are specified, – determined as essentially of this or that kind or character, – by their
operations and by their objects. Two faculties that differ on these essential points are in no wise
to be identified. Now, we have seen that the operation of the intellect is a knowing-operation, and
the operation of will is an appetizing-operation. On this score, intellect and will are seen to be
two distinct faculties. Further, the object of the intellect is the true, while the object of the will is
the good. And truth and goodness are not achievable by a single creatural faculty, but by
3 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 80, a. 1, c. 4 H. RENARD, The Philosophy of Man, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1956, pp. 228-229.
3
different faculties. The question has nothing to do with the metaphysical identification of the true
and the good, but with the fact that, in the faculties which seek truth and goodness, the quest
demands a real distinction of effort and approach. Hence we are justified in saying that the
faculty which has truth for its object is a faculty really distinct from that which has goodness for
its object.”5
Explaining how the will is a power distinct from the intellect, St. Thomas writes in the
tenth article of question 22 of De Veritate: “The will and the intellect are distinct powers, even
belonging to different genera of powers. That this may be clearly understood it should be noted
that, since the distinction of powers is taken from the acts and objects, not just any difference at
all among the objects reveals the distinctness of the powers but a difference in the objects
precisely inasmuch as they are objects; and this will not be an accidental difference – I mean one
which merely happens to be connected with the object taken specifically as object. It merely
happens to the object of sense, for instance, inasmuch as it is sensible, to be animate or
inanimate, though these differences are essential for the things which are sensed. It is
accordingly not from these differences that the sense powers are diversified, but according as
their objects are audible, visible, or tangible (for these are differences in the sensible inasmuch as
it is sensible); that is to say, according to whether the objects are sensible through a medium or
without a medium.
“Now when essential differences of objects as objects are taken as dividing some specific
object of the soul of themselves, by this fact powers are diversified but not genera of powers.
Thus the sensible designates, not the object of the soul without qualification, but an object which
of itself is divided by the aforesaid differences. Hence sight, hearing, and touch are distinct
specific powers belonging to the same genus of powers of the soul, i.e., to sense. But when the
differences considered divide the object taken in general, then from such a difference distinct
genera of powers become known.
“Something is said to be an object of the soul according as it has some relation to the
soul. Hence, where we find different aspects of relatedness to the soul, there we find an essential
difference in the object of the soul, and this indicates a distinct genus of the soul’s powers. Now
a thing is found to have a twofold relationship to the soul: one by which the thing itself is in the
soul in the soul’s manner and not in its own, the other by which the soul is referred to the thing in
its own existence. Thus something is an object of the soul in two ways. (1) It is so inasmuch as it
is capable of being in the soul, not according to its own act of being, but according to the manner
of the soul – spiritually. This is the essential constituent of the knowable, in so far as it is
knowable. (2) Something is the object of the soul according as the soul is inclined and oriented to
it after the manner of the thing itself as it is in itself. This is the essential constituent of the
appetible in so far as it is appetible.
“The cognitive and appetitive principles in the soul accordingly constitute distinct genera
of powers. Hence, since the intellect is included in the cognitive, and the will in the appetitive,
the will and the intellect must be powers that are distinct even generically.”6
5 P. J. GLENN, Psychology, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1955, pp. 346-347. 6 De Veritate, q. 22, a. 10, c.
4
The Will is Really Distinct From the Sense Appetite. “This distinction,” explains Koren,
“follows from the fact that the intellect is really distinct from the senses. An elicited appetite is a
passive operative potency and needs to be actuated by an object apprehended by the cognitive
potency from which it flows. But the objects apprehended by the intellect and the senses are
formally different.”7
St. Thomas, in the fourth article of the twenty-second question of the De Veritate,
explains how the will is different from the sense appetite as follows: “The will is a power distinct
from sense appetite. It should be noted in this connection that rational appetite is distinguished
from that of sense in just the same way as sensitive appetite is distinguished from that of nature –
because of a more perfect way of tending. The closer a nature is to God, the more pronounced is
the likeness of the divine excellence which is found in it. Now it belongs to the divine excellence
to move and incline and direct all things while not being moved, inclined, or directed by any
other. Hence the nearer a nature is to God, the less it is inclined by another and the more it is
capable of inclining itself.
“An insensible nature, therefore, being by reason of its materiality the farthest removed
from God, is inclined to an end, to be sure, but has within it nothing which inclines, but only a
principle of inclination, as was explained above.
“A sensitive nature, however, being closer to God, has within itself something which
inclines, i.e., the apprehended object of appetite. Yet this inclination is not within the control of
the animal which is inclined but is determined by something else. An animal is not able at the
sight of something attractive not to crave it, because animals do not themselves have the mastery
over their own inclination. Hence ‘they do not act but are rather acted upon,’ as Damascene says.
This is because the sensuous appetitive power has a bodily organ and so is nearly in the
condition of matter and of corporeal things so as rather to be moved than to move.
“But a rational nature, being closest to God, not merely, like inanimate things, has an
inclination to something, and, like a sentient nature, a mover of this inclination determined as it
were extrinsically, but further so has its inclination within its own power that it does not
necessarily incline to anything appetible which is apprehended, but can incline or not incline.
And so its inclination is not determined for it by anything else but by itself. This belongs to it
inasmuch as it does not use a bodily organ; and so, getting farther away from the nature of what
is moved, it approaches that of what moves and acts. It can come about that something
determines for itself its inclination to an end only if it knows the end and the bearing of the end
upon the means to it. But this belongs to reason alone. Thus such an appetite, which is not
determined of necessity by something else, follows the apprehension of reason. Hence, rational
appetite, called will, is a power distinct from sense appetite.”8
The Object of the Will
The object of the rational appetite or operative power or faculty of will is the good as
apprehended by the intellect. Since the operative faculty or power of the intellect is not limited to
7 H. J. KOREN, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animate Nature, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1957, p. 216. 8 De Veritate, q. 22, a. 4, c.
5
the apprehension of the particular and concrete, it knows the good in general. Therefore, we
affirm that the formal object of the rational appetite (will), that is, the aspect under which the
rational appetite (will) tends to anything, is the good in general. “Any appetite is a tendency
towards a good. As an appetite following the intellect, the will tends to objects apprehended as
‘good’ by the intellect. Because of its immaterial nature the intellect is not limited to the
cognition of the concrete and particular, but apprehends things in their universal nature.
Accordingly, the formal object of the will, or the aspect under which the will tends to anything,
is the good in general. The good is realized concretely in existing things, although not to the
same extent, and these things constitute the material objects of the will. Unlike sense appetite,
which of itself is limited to the particular sensible good, the will can tend to anything which in
any respect is apprehended as good by the intellect, whether univeral or particular, material or
immaterial. Experience confirms this assertion; for the will can tend to the particular and
material, such as this piece of meat or that work of art, as well as to the universal, such as ‘liberty
and justice for all.’”9
The Will of Necessity Desires Happiness (or the Good as Such)
Though man’s rational appetite or will cannot be coerced, i.e., necessitated in the order of
exercise (in the order of exercise the will is free from coercion and constraint), nevertheless, the
will is necessitated to the good in general or good as such in the order of specification. The
rational appetite (will) is necessitated in its tendency towards the good in general, good in its
common aspects (the bonum secundum communem boni rationem10
), but it is not necessitated
with respect to particular things presented by the intellect as desirable. The rational appetite
(will) is not necesitated in its particular acts.
The absolutely ultimate subjective last end of the human person is happiness, which he
wills necessarily. Man is free to will or not will any particular good, but he is not free as regards
happiness. All men, regardless of race, creed, or nationality, desire to be happy. Even the robber
who robs a bank does so because he thinks that by doing such an act he will in the end be happy
in possessing his ill-gotten riches. Even the man who commits suicide thinks that by
accomplishing that act he will be happy as death will end all his troubles and anxieties. The
hedonist seeks pleasure for he thinks that he will be happy. The scholar seeks intellectual
knowledge for he or she thinks that he or she will be happy.
Now, man’s absolutely ultimate objective last end is God the Supreme Good who gives
us true happiness. True happiness is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all good things.
Three things are necessary for human beatitude or perfect happiness, namely, 1. the actual
possession of all good consonant with human nature ; 2. the exclusion of all evil ; and 3. the
eternal duration of the state of beatitude and the certainty of this eternal duration. As was said, all
men seek happiness. Though all necessarily desire this, nevertheless, they disagree among
themselves on just what the object of true happiness ultimately consists in. True happiness
cannot be found, as many erroneously believe, in sensual pleasure, power, fame, or even in sheer
intellectual knowledge, since they cannot perfectly satisfy us, but rather in the beatific vision of
God.
9 H. J. KOREN, op. cit., p. 217. 10
Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 59, a. 4.
6
Concerning the natural necessity of will to the last end, which is perfect happiness,
Renard writes that “‘…Natural necessity is not repugnant to the will. Indeed, just as the intellect
of necessity adheres to first principles, so the will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which
is happiness; for the end is in practical matters what the principle is in speculative matters. …For
what befits a thing naturally and immovably must be the root and principle of all else pertaining
thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first in everything, and every movement arises from
something immovable [all italics added].’11
In other words, the last end – perfect happiness – to
which the will tends naturally, ‘…stands in the same relation to things appetible as the first
principles of demonstration to things intelligible…’12
Just as the first principles are necessarily
known, and just as the intellect knows secondary principles and conclusions demonstrably in the
light of first principles, so is the last end necessarily and primarily sought; so too, whatever else
besides the last end is sought by the will is sought secondarily, that is, as a means to the last end.
For this end, although the last in attainment, is the first in intention; and the primary and constant
natural tendency of the will to this end is the first principle or starting point of all human
operations concerned with the attainment of immediate (proximate) ends; for these are but means
to the last end, which is primarily and necessarily sought whenever the will acts.
“Moreover, it is by virtue of this primary and necessary volition of the last end, which is
the first principle of human operation, that the will is able freely to move itself as regards the
means, which are proximate ends. For ‘;…the end is in the order of appetibles what a principle is
in the order of intelligibles. But it is evident that the intellect, through its knowledge of a
principle, reduces itself from potency to act as to its knowledge of conclusions; and thus it moves
itself. And, in like manner, the will, because it [necessarily] wills the [last] end, moves itself
[freely] to will the means.’13
“In summary: the will is a nature necessarily inclined to the good absolutely;
consequently, it can be necessitated in the order of object only by a good which is itself absolute,
unqualified, unlimited; the possession of this good is man’s last end – perfect happiness; this end
is sought primarily and implicitly in man’s free acts.”14
In the fifth article of the twenty-second question of De Veritate St. Thomas writes: “As
can be gathered from the words of Augustine, necessity is of two kinds: (1) the necessity of
force; and this can by no means apply to the will; and (2) the necessity of natural inclination, as
we say that God necessarily lives; and with such necessity the will necessarily wills something.
“For an understanding of this it should be noted that among things arranged in an order
the first must be included in the second, and in the second must be found not only what belongs
to it by its own nature but also what belongs to it according to the nature of the first. Thus it is
the lot of man not only to make use of reason, as belongs to him in accordance with his specific
difference, rational; but also to make use of senses and food, as belongs to him in accordance
with his genus, animal or living being. In like manner we see among the senses that the sense of
touch is a sort of foundation for the other senses and that in the organ of each sense there is
11 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 82, a. 1, c. 12
Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 10, a. 1, c. Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 60, a. 2, c. 13 Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 9, a. 3, c. Cf. De Malo, VI. 14
H. RENARD, op. cit., pp. 236-237.
7
found not only the distinctive characteristic of the sense whose proper organ it is, but also the
characteristics of touch. Thus the eye not only senses white and black as the organ of sight, but
also as the organ of touch senses heat and cold and is destroyed by an excess in them.
“Now nature and the will stand in such an order that the will itself is a nature, because
whatever is found in reality is called a nature. There must accordingly be found in the will not
only what is proper to the will but also what is proper to nature. It belongs to any created nature,
however, to be ordained by God for good, naturally tending to it. Hence even in the will there is
a certain natural appetite for the good corresponding to it. And it has, moreover, the tendency to
something according to its own determination and not from necessity. This belongs to it
inasmuch as it is the will.
“Just as there is an ordination of nature to the will, there is, moreover, a parallel
ordination of the things which the will naturally wills to those in regard to which it is determined
of itself and not by nature. Thus, just as nature is the foundation of will, similarly the object of
natural appetite is the principle and foundation of the other objects of appetite. Now among the
objects of appetite the end is the foundation and principle of the means to the end, because the
latter, being for the sake of the end, are not desired except: by reason of the end. Accordingly
what the will necessarily wills, determined to it by a natural inclination, is the last end,
happiness, and whatever is included in it: to be, knowledge of truth, and the like. But it is
determined to other things, not by a natural inclination, but by so disposing itself without any
necessity.
“Although the will wills the last end by a certain necessary inclination, it is nevertheless
in no way to be granted that it is forced to will it. For force is nothing else but the infliction of
some violence. According to the Philosopher that is violent ‘whose principle is outside it with the
being which suffers the violence contributing nothing.’ The throwing of a stone upward would
be an example, because the stone of itself is not at all inclined to that motion. But seeing that the
will is an inclination by the fact of its being an appetite, it cannot happen that the will should will
anything without having an inclination to it. Thus it is impossible for the will to will anything by
force or violently even though it does will something by a natural inclination. It is therefore
evident that the will does not will anything necessarily with the necessity of force, yet it does
will something necessarily with the necessity of natural inclination.”15
The Will, However, Does Not Desire Any Particular Good Necessarily
Regarding how the will is not necessitated (is free) as regards particular goods, Renard
explains that “no individual good less perfect than that which is universally good can necessitate
his will in the order of specification. Although man’s will can be inclined to any object which the
intellect can apprehend as good, still the will need not be inclined to such an object if the
intellect can discern in it some lack of good, some limitation. It follows that the will is not
necessitated, is free, to accept or reject limited goods. Hence, although man is necessitated to his
last end, the possession of absolute good, he can choose the means which are the immediate
(proximate) ends of action.
15
De Veritate, q. 22, a. 5, c.
8
“‘Man does not choose of necessity…The reason for this is to be found in the very power
of the reason. For the will can tend to whatever the reason can apprehend as good…In all
particular goods, the reason can consider the nature of some good, and the lack of some good,
which has the nature of an evil; and in this way, it can apprehend any single one of such goods as
to be chosen or to be avoided. The perfect good alone, which is happiness, cannot be
apprehended by the reason as an evil, or as lacking in any way. Consequently, man wills
happiness of necessity, nor can he will not to be happy, or to be unhappy. Now since choice is
not of the end, but of the means…it is not of the perfect good, which is happiness, but of other
and particular goods. Therefore, man chooses, not of necessity, but freely.’16
“No Necessitation to Particular Goods Necessarily Connected with Happiness. Besides
the last end (perfect happiness), which man must necessarily will, there are certain particular
goods ‘…which have a necessary connection with happiness, namely, those by means of which
man adheres to God, in whom alone true happiness consists.’17
But the connection between these
particular goods and the attainment of happiness is not realized with absolute certitude in this
life.18
Consequently, ‘…until through the certitude produced by the vision of God the necessity
of such a connection be shown, the will does not adhere to God of necessity, nor to those things
which are of God.’19
As regards those particular goods which do not have a necessary connection
with happiness, it is obvious that man is in no way necessitated to will them, for he can be happy
without them.
“We conclude that since the will can be necessitated in the order of specification only by
universal (unqualified or absolute) good, it is free as regards any particular (qualified or limited)
good.”20
Three Modes of Freedom: Freedom of Exercise, Freedom of Specification, and
Freedom of Contrareity
Free choice can either refer to the act of the will, to the object of the will, or to the
relation of the means (particular good) to the last end. In the first we have freedom of exercise, in
the second freedom of specification, and in the third freedom of contrareity.
Freedom of Exercise. As regards the act of willing, the will may be free to act or not to
act. This freedom is called freedom of exercise. It is the power to perform or to omit an act. It is
the freedom of the will between acting and not acting. “Freedom of exercise,” Brennan explains,
“means that will is at liberty to choose or not to choose, to operate or not to operate. The point to
be emphasized here is not the mere absence of action on the part of the will, but the fact that it is
not compelled to act.”21
16 Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 13, a. 6, c. 17
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 82, a. 2, c. 18
The problem as to whether those saints who were confirmed in grace saw this connection during their earthly life
is transmitted to theology. 19
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 82, a. 2, c. Although God is the absolute good, and although we know that He is the
absolute good, the will, nevertheless, is not necessitated to love Him in this life precisely because the knowledge we
have of God is non-proper and analogous. 20 H. RENARD, op. cit., pp. 238-239. 21
R. E. BRENNAN, Thomistic Psychology, Macmillan, New York, 1963, p. 217.
9
Freedom of Specification. As regards the object, the will may be free to choose between
diverse objects, such as swimming, playing tennis, studying, and typing. This is called freedom
of specification. It is the power of choosing one of two or more alternative means to an end. It
“means that will, having established a particular goal, is at liberty to choose among the several
courses of action that can lead it to its goal. A man, for example, is free to walk or not to walk;
and after he has made up his mind to walk, he is still free to walk wherever he pleases.”22
“In an act of will, that which moves the will as to specification and object is the intellect,
since the intellect presents the will with the apprehended good which moves it to desire. In
respect to exercise, the will itself it its own moving principle, for the will as agent moves all the
powers of the soul, including itself.”23
Freedom of Contrareity. If faced with the choice of specifying between objects which are
opposed as morally good and morally evil, the possibility of choosing between them is called
freedom of contrareity. As regards the relation of means (particular good) to man’s subjective
last end, “which is perfect happiness, the will is not necessitated in as much as it can desire: (a)
that which disposes man’s nature to his last end, or (b) on the contrary, that which causes an
aversion from his true end, even though such an object is desired under the aspect of good. This
third mode of indetermination results from two things: first, from the indetermination regarding
the object, that is, regarding the means available; second, from the indetermination of the
knowledge, which can be right (recta) or wrong (non recta). Consequently, the will is not
determined as regards moral good and moral evil. Man, even though he necessarily desires his
last end (perfect happiness), is capable of freely choosing and freely performing a morally evil
action because of the pleasure entailed, or on account of the temporal gain obtained. Since, as is
shown in moral philosophy, moral good and moral evil are opposed as contraries,24
this mode of
indetermination is aptly called freedom of contrareity.
“This last mode of freedom implies a lack of perfect freedom, in so far as it supposes
some form of willful error. It is, therefore, better to say that to will evil is not true freedom, nor a
part of freedom, although it can be a manifestation of freedom.”25
Concerning the three modes of freedom, St. Thomas explains in De Veritate, q. 22, a. 6:
“Something is said to be necessary from the fact that it is unchangeably determined to one thing.
Since, therefore, the will stands undetermined in regard to many things, it is not under necessity
in regard to everything but only in regard to those things to which it is determined by a natural
inclination, as has been said. And because everything mobile is reduced to what is immobile as
its principle, and everything undetermined, to what is determined, that to which the will is
determined must be the principle of tending to the things to which it is not determined; and this is
the last end, as has been said. Now there is found to be indetermination of the will in regard to
three things: its object, its act, and its ordination to its end.
22 Ibid. 23
BRO. BENIGNUS, Nature, Knowledge, God, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1953, p. 251. 24 Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 18, a. 5. 25
H. RENARD, op. cit., p. 242.
10
“In regard to its object the will is undetermined as to the means to the end, not as to the
last end itself, as has been said. This is so because there are many ways of reaching the last end,
and for different people different ways prove suitable. The appetite of the will could not, then, be
determined to the means to the end as is the appetite in natural things, which have definite and
fixed ways of reaching a definite and fixed end. And so it is evident that natural things not only
desire the end necessarily, but also desire the means in the same way, so that there are among the
means none to which natural things can either tend or not. The will, however, necessarily desires
the last end in such a way that it is unable not to desire it, but it does not necessarily desire any of
the means. In their regard, then, it is within the Power of the will to desire this or that.
“In the second place the will is undetermined in regard to its act, because even
concerning a determined object it can perform its act or not perform it when it wishes. It can pass
or not pass into the act of willing with regard to anything at all. This is not true of natural things,
for something heavy always actually goes down unless something else prevents it. This is the
case because inanimate things do not move themselves but are moved by other things. There is in
them, then, no ability to be moved or not to be moved. But animate things are their own source
of movement. Hence it is that the will can will or not.
“A third indetermination of the will is found in regard to its ordination to its end
inasmuch as the will can desire what is in truth directed to its appointed end or what is so only in
appearance. This indetermination comes from two sources: from the indetermination in regard to
its object in the case of the means, and again from the indetermination of our apprehension,
which can be correct or not. From a given true principle a false conclusion does not follow unless
it is because of some falsity in the reasoning through a false subsumption or the false relating of
the principle to the conclusion. In the same way from a correct appetite for the last end the
inordinate desire for something could not follow unless reason were to take as referable to the
end something which is not so referable. Thus a person who naturally desires happiness with a
correct appetite would never be led to desire fornication except in so far as he apprehends it as a
good for man, seeing that it is something pleasurable, and as referable to happiness as a sort of
copy of it. From this there follows the indetermination of the will by which it can desire good or
evil.
“Since the will is said to be free inasmuch as it is not necessitated, the freedom of the will
can be viewed in three respects: (1) as regards its act, inasmuch as it can will or not will; (2) as
regards its object, inasmuch as it can will this or that, even if one is the opposite of the other; and
(3) as regards its ordination to the end, inasmuch as it can will good or evil.
“In regard to the first of these three there is freedom in the will in any state of nature with
reference to any object, for the act of any will is in its power as regards any object. The second of
these is had with reference to some objects, the means and not the end itself. This too holds for
any state of nature. The third is not with reference to all objects but only certain ones, the means
to the end, and not with reference to any state of nature but only that in which nature can fail.
Where there is no failure in apprehending and comparing, there can be no willing of evil even
when there is question of means, as is clear among the blessed. For this reason it is said that to
will evil is not freedom or any part of it, though it is a sign of freedom.”26
26
De Veritate, q. 22, a. 6, c.
11
The Interaction Between Intellect and Will in the Free Act
The Intellect is Absolutely More Perfect than the Will, though the Will is Relatively More
Perfect than the Intellect. The intellect in itself is a more excellent faculty than the will, for the
intellect attains its object by knowing it, while the will only tends towards its object. However,
under certain aspects, the will is superior to the intellect, for when a good is greater or nobler
than the soul itself, it is better to will it, that is, to love it, than merely to know it. For example, it
is better to love God than simply to know Him. But in the case wherein the good is less noble
than the soul, the intellect, with respect to this good, is superior to the will. For example,
knowledge of material things like diamonds, gold bars, and rubies, is better than loving these
things.
De Veritate, q. 22, a. 11: “A thing can be said to be more eminent than another either
simply or in a certain respect. For something to be shown to be simply better than another the
comparison must be made on the basis of what is essential to them and not on that of accidentals.
In the latter case one thing would be shown to stand out over another merely in a certain respect.
Thus if a man were to be compared to a lion on the basis of essential differences, he would be
found to be simply nobler inasmuch as the man is a rational animal, the lion irrational. But if a
lion is compared to a man on the basis of physical strength, he surpasses the man. But this is to
be nobler only in a certain respect. To see, then, which of these two powers, the will or the
intellect, is better without qualification, we must consider the matter from their essential
differences.
“The perfection and dignity of the intellect consists in this, that the species of the thing
which is understood is in the intellect itself, since in this way it actually understands, and from
this its whole dignity is seen. The nobility of the will and of its act, however, consists in this, that
the soul is directed to some noble thing in the very existence which that thing has in itself. Now
it is more perfect, simply and absolutely speaking, to have within oneself the nobility of another
thing than to be related to a noble thing outside oneself. Hence, if the will and the intellect are
considered absolutely, and not with reference to this or that particular thing, they have this order,
that the intellect is simply more excellent than the will.
“But it may happen that to be related in some way to some noble thing is more excellent
than to have its nobility within oneself. This is the case, for instance, when the nobility of that
thing is possessed in a way much inferior to that in which the thing has it within itself. But if the
nobility of one thing is in another just as nobly or more nobly than it is in the thing to which it
belongs, then without doubt that which has the nobility of that thing within itself is nobler than
that which is related in any way whatsoever to that noble thing. Now the intellect takes on the
forms or things superior to the soul in a way inferior to that which they have in the things
themselves; for the intellect receives things after its own fashion, as is said in The Causes. And
for the same reason the forms of things inferior to the soul, such as corporeal things, are more
noble in the soul than in the things themselves.
“The intellect can accordingly be compared to the will in three ways: (1) Absolutely and
in general, without any reference to this or that particular thing. In this way the intellect is more
excellent than the will, just as it is more perfect to possess what there is of dignity in a thing than
12
merely to be related to its nobility. (2) With regard to material and sensible things. In this way
again the intellect is simply nobler than the will. For example, to know a stone intellectually is
nobler than to will it, because the form of the stone is in the intellect, inasmuch as it is known by
the intellect, in a nobler way than it is in itself as desired by the will. (3) With reference to divine
things, which are superior to the soul. In this way to will is more excellent than to understand, as
to will God or to love Him is more excellent than to know Him. This is because the divine
goodness itself is more perfectly in God Himself as He is desired by the will than the participated
goodness is in us as known by the intellect.”27
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 82 , a. 3, c.: “The superiority of one thing over another can be
considered in two ways: ‘absolutely’ and ‘relatively.’ Now a thing is considered to be such
absolutely which is considered such in itself: but relatively as it is such with regard to something
else. If therefore the intellect and will be considered with regard to themselves, then the intellect
is the higher power. And this is clear if we compare their respective objects to one another. For
the object of the intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of the will ; since the
object of the intellect is the very idea of appetible good; and the appetible good, the idea of
which is in the intellect, is the object of the will. Now the more simple and the more abstract a
thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself ; and therefore the object of the intellect is higher than
the object of the will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in its order to its object, it
follows that the intellect in itself and absolutely is higher and nobler than the will. But relatively
and by comparison with something else, we find that the will is sometimes higher than the
intellect, from the fact that the object of the will occurs in something higher than that in which
occurs the object of the intellect. Thus, for instance, I might say that hearing is relatively nobler
than sight, inasmuch as something in which there is sound is nobler than something in which
there is color, though color is nobler and simpler than sound. For as we have said above (q. 16, a.
1 ; q. 27, a. 4), the action of the intellect consists in this – that the idea of the thing understood is
in the one who understands; while the act of the will consists in this – that the will is inclined to
the thing itself as existing in itself. And therefore the Philosopher says in Metaph. vi (Did. v, 2)
that ‘good and evil,’ which are objects of the will, ‘are in things,’ but ‘truth and error,’ which are
objects of the intellect, ‘are in the mind.’ When, therefore, the thing in which there is good is
nobler than the soul itself, in which is the idea understood; by comparison with such a thing, the
will is higher than the intellect. But when the thing which is good is less noble than the soul, then
even in comparison with that thing the intellect is higher than the will. Wherefore the love of
God is better than the knowledge of God; but, on the contrary, the knowledge of corporeal things
is better than the love thereof. Absolutely, however, the intellect is nobler than the will.”28
Henri Grenier states: “One power can be absolutely or relatively more perfect than
another. A power is absolutely more perfect than another, when it is such by its nature. A power
is relatively more perfect than another, when it is such in regard to something accidental. Thus,
in the order of beings, man is more perfect than the lion: he is more perfect in virtue of his
nature; but the lion is relatively more perfect than man, from the point of view of his physical
strength.
27 De Veritate, q. 22, a. 11, c. 28
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 82, a. 3, c.
13
“The intellect is absolutely more perfect than the will; but the will is relatively more
perfect than the intellect.
“First part. The intellect is absolutely more perfect than the will. 1) It is absolutely more
perfect to have the perfection of a thing in oneself than to be inclined to the thing as it is in itself.
But the intellect knows in as much as it has in itself the perfection of the thing known; and the
will desires in as much as it tends to a thing as it is in itself. Therefore the intellect is absolutely
more perfect than the will.
“2) The nature of a faculty is determined by its formal object. But the formal object of the
intellect is absolutely more perfect than the formal object of the will. Therefore the nature of the
intellect is more perfect than the nature of the will, i.e., the intellect is absolutely more perfect
than the will.
“The major is evident, for the perfection of a faculty derives from the perfection of its
formal object.
“Minor. The more abstract and universal an object is, the more perfect it is: abstraction
results from remotion from matter or imperfection. But the object of the intellect is more abstract
than the object of the will; good, which is the object of the will, includes within itself a relation
of suitability to the appetite, but being, which is the object of the intellect, abstracts from this
relation of suitability. Therefore…
“Second part. The will is relatively more perfect than the intellect. One power is said to
be relatively more perfect than another power, if its perfection is considered as deriving, not
from its formal object, but from its relation to this or that thing. But the will, in its relation to
spiritual things which are superior to the soul, is more perfect than the intellect. Therefore the
will is relatively more perfect than the intellect.
“Major. It is accidental to a power that it attains this or that thing; v.g., it is by accident
that the power of sight attains this or that colored object.
“Minor. The perfection of a power is greater according as it attains a superior thing in a
more perfect manner. But the will attains spiritual things which are superior to the soul, i.e.,
things higher and nobler than the soul, in a more perfect manner than does the intellect: the will
attains them as they are in themselves; the intellect attains them as they exist in the intellect, that
is to say, it attains or knows them by analogy, i.e., by comparison to material things. Therefore
the will, in its relation to spiritual things which are superior to the soul, is more perfect than the
intellect.
“Corollaries. 1) In this life, it is more perfect to love God than to know Him; or, in other
words, in this life the love of God is better than the knowledge of Him ; 2) But, in Heaven, where
God is known as He is in Himself, the act of knowing God is more perfect than the act of loving
Him: This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God (John 17 : 3) ; 3) In this
14
life, the knowledge of things that are inferior to the soul, i.e., less noble than it, exist in the
intellect in a more perfect manner than in themselves.”29
Active Indetermination of the Will. The indetermination of the will is an active
indetermination, an active indifference: “This means that the will, being actuated by the Supreme
Mover in the order of exercise, is free to will or not will any object as means to the last end.
Unlike the possible intellect, it is not necessarily determined in the order of specification by the
object which may be presented through intellectual knowledge; rather, the will freely determines
the object willed, through its control of the intellect. As regards the order of exercise, we must
bear in mind that God’s motion of the will30
does not move the will to one determined particular
object; rather, this motion to the universal good makes possible the free act of the will. Indeed, it
is by virtue of this actuation of the will in the order of exercise that the will is able to determine
itself. ‘…The will is an active principle that is not determined to one thing, but having an
indifferent relation to many things…’31
”32
How the Intellect Moves the Will. The intellect moves the will by showing it what is
attractive. Therefore, the intellect moves the will in the manner of a final cause. “The question
now arises as to whether this active indeterminate principle, the will, can without any knowledge
from the intellect determine itself to this or to that operation. This, of course, is impossible, for
the will is an appetite, not a cognoscitive faculty; as such, it can love only the known good. In
order to determine itself to this or that object, to will or not to will, to will what is morally good
or evil, knowledge is required. This knowledge is proffered by the intellect, and gives the form,
the direction to the will-act. The intellect, therefore, moves the will not in the order of efficient
causality, but of specification and finality. The will does not receive a ‘push’ from the intellect;
rather, it is enticed, attracted, drawn by what the intellect proposes. To be more precise, we
should say that man by his practical33
intellect freely judges that to be good which he loves and
desires by his will. Furthermore, there is no priority except that of nature between the act of the
intellect and that of the will; their causality is mutual and simultaneous. Man wills what he freely
judges to be good.”34
How the Will Moves the Intellect. The will, in turn, moves the intellect in the manner of
an active, agent or efficient cause, for only the rational appetite (will) can apply the intellect to
the study of this or that particular thing. It can turn away the attention of the intellect from one
thing and fix it on another. It also exercises an active control over other natural faculties of man,
but it has no control over the vegetative powers in themselves.35
“The will is capable of a definite
29 H. GRENIER, Thomistic Philosophy, volume 2 (Philosophy of Nature), St. Dunstan’s University, Charlottetown,
Canada, pp. 253-255. 30 “God moves man’s will, as the Universal Mover, to the universal object of the will, which is the good. And
without this universal motion man cannot will anthing. But man determines himself by his reason to will this or that,
which is a true or apparent good”(Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 9, a. 6, ad 3). 31
Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 10, a. 4, c. 32
H. RENARD, op. cit., pp. 244-245. 33
“Just as the imagination of a form without estimation of fitness or harmfulness does not move the sensitive
appetite, so neither does the apprehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and desirability. Hence, it is not
the speculative intellect that moves, but the practical intellect”(Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 9, a. 1, ad 2). 34
H. RENARD, op. cit., p. 245. 35 “The operations of growth and nutrition can be influenced only in a very indirect way, such as by determining the
quantity and quality of food to be made available to them”(H. J. KOREN, op cit., p. 231). “The vegetative processes
15
control over the intellect. In the formation of the judgment of the good, the will is able to direct
the intellect to consider this object rather than another, to see the good rather than the limitation
in a given object, and thus to influence the judgment which will specify the act of choice. Why is
the will capable of exercising such an influence on the intellectual faculty? This is a very delicate
problem and its solution will be found in an analysis of the interaction between intellect and
will.”36
Intellect-Will Interaction. The intellect moves the will in the order of specification, while
the will can move the intellect to the exercise of its act. “The reason for this is that the good in
general (bonum in communi), universal good, is the object of the will; included in this object as a
particular good is the true, which is the object of the intellect. Consequently, the will as an
efficient cause is able to move the intellect as well as the other powers of the soul to their good –
operation. For the ends and perfections of every faculty are included under the object of the will
as particular goods, and the particular goods are contained in the universal, or general, good.37
”38
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 82, a. 4, c.: “A thing is said to move in two ways: First, as an
end, as when we say that the end moves the agent. In this way the intellect moves the will,
because the understood good is the object of the will, and moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing is
said to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is
impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect and all the powers of the soul. The reason is
that, wherever we have an order among a number of active potencies, that potency which is
related to the universal end moves the potencies which refere to particular ends…Now the object
of the will is the good and the end in general (in communi), whereas each power is directed to
some suitable good proper to it, as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the intellect to
the knowledge of truth (verum). Therefore, the will as an agent moves all the powers of the soul
to their respective acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to
our choice (arbitrio).”39
Will Moves the Intellect to Consider the Good or Lack of It: “Since the object about
which the will is to be determined is a particular good, the will is not necessitated to any
particular action. For every limited good may be viewed by the reason (moved by the will) not
only as a good, but also as non-good, since it lacks perfection; consequently, reasons may be
found for willing and for not willing such a good. ‘…The will can tend to whatever the reason
can apprehend as good…[Now] in all particular goods, the reason can consider the nature of
some good and the lack of some good, which has the nature of an evil; and in this way, it can
apprehend any single one of such goods as to be chosen or to be avoided.The perfect good alone,
which is happiness, cannot be apprehended by the reason as evil, or as lacking in any way.’40
can be influenced only indirectly; for example, growth by regulating the intake of food, or heartbeat by controlling
physical or emotional stimuli”(J. E. ROYCE, Man and His Nature: A Philosophical Psychology, McGraw-Hill, New
York, 1961, p. 182). 36
H. RENARD, op. cit., p. 246. 37 Cf. Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 9, a. 1, c. 38
H. RENARD, op. cit., p. 246. 39 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 82, a. 4, c. 40
Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 13, a. 6, c.
16
“We see, therefore, that the intellect moved by the will must consider either the good or
the evil of the object. The outcome of this is that the practical judgment which results from such
willful consideration determines the will to act or not to act, to will this or that in accordance
with the direction given to the intellect by the will. Accordingly, both intellect and will play an
important role in the free act.”41
De Veritate, q. 22, a. 12, c.: “In a way the intellect moves the will, and in a way the will
moves the intellect and the other powers. For the clarification of this it should be noted that both
an end and an efficient cause are said to move, but in different ways. Two things are to be taken
into account in any action, the agent and the reason for acting. In heating, the agent is fire and the
reason for acting is heat. Similarly in moving, the end is said to move as the reason for moving,
but the efficient cause, as the one producing the movement, that is, the one which brings the
subject of the motion from potency to act.
“The reason for acting is the form of the agent by which it acts. It must accordingly be in
the agent for it to act. It is not there, however, according to its perfect act of being; for when that
is had the motion comes to rest. But it is in the agent by way of an intention, for the end is prior
in intention but posterior in being. Thus the end preexists in the mover in a proper sense
intellectually (for it belongs to intellect to receive something by way of an intention) and not
according to its real existence. Hence the intellect moves the will in the way in which an end is
said to move – by conceiving beforehand the reason for acting and proposing it to the will.
“To move in the manner of an efficient cause, however, belongs to the will and not to the
intellect; for the will is referred to things as they are in themselves, whereas the intellect is
referred to them as existing spiritually in the soul. Now to act and to move pertain to things
according to their own act of being by which they subsist in themselves, not according as they
exist in the soul in the manner of an intention. It is not heat in the soul which heats, but that
which is in fire. Thus the will is referred to things as subject to motion, but not the intellect.
Furthermore the act of the will is an inclination to something, but not that of the intellect. But an
inclination is the disposition of something that moves other things as an efficient cause moves. It
is accordingly evident that the will has the function of moving in the manner of an agent cause;
not, however, the intellect.
“The higher powers of the soul, because immaterial, are capable of reflecting upon
themselves. Both the will and the intellect, therefore, reflect upon themselves, upon each other,
upon the essence of the soul, and upon all its powers. The intellect understands itself and the will
and the essence of the soul and all the soul’s powers. Similarly the will wills that it will, that the
intellect understand, that the soul be, and so of the other powers. Now when one power is
brought to bear upon another, it is referred to that other according to what is proper to itself.
When the intellect understands that the will is willing, it receives within itself the intelligible
character of willing. When the will is brought to bear upon the other powers of the soul, it is
directed to them as things to which motion and operation belong, and it inclines each to its own
operation. Thus the will moves in the manner of an efficient cause not only external things but
also the very powers of the soul.”42
41 H. RENARD, op. cit., p. 247. 42
De Veritate, q. 22, a. 12, c.
