The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 5 | Issue 6 | Article ID 2448 | Jun 04, 2007

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The Water Politics of China and Southeast Asia: Rivers, Dams,Cargo Boats and the Environment

Milton Osborne

The Water Politics of China andSoutheast Asia:Rivers, Dams, Cargo Boats and theEnvironment

Milton Osborne

When the Worldwide Fund for Nature(WWF) released its list of the world’s topten rivers at risk in late March, attentionin Australia naturally focused on the factthat the Murray-Darling River system waso n e o f t h o s e l i s t e d . [ 1 ](https://apjjf.org/#_edn1) Very littleattention was given in the Australianmedia to the other nine r ivers soidentified, which included the two longestrivers in the Southeast Asian region, theMekong and the Salween. Both theserivers rise in the Himalayas in Chineseterritory before flowing into SoutheastAsia, and play a vital role for thepopulations in their basin areas; for the60-70 million in the Mekong’s basin ofnearly 800,000 square kilometres, and forthe 6-7 million in the Salween’s basin of272,000 square kilometres. The WWF’sclaims about the risks facing the rivers itlists as ‘in danger’ are bound to generatecontroversy, with proponents ofhydroelectricity sourced from dams boundto express scepticism. Nevertheless,current and future developments

associated with both the Mekong and theSalween are certa in ly worthy ofexamination. For there is irrefutableevidence of the problems that can becaused by the construction of large-scaledams on previously free-flowing rivers.M o r e o v e r , a r e v i e w o f c u r r e n tdevelopments associated with theSalween and the Mekong rivers isdesirable at a time when environmentalissues are increasingly a concerninternationally. Such issues haveparticular relevance in Southeast Asia,both within individual countries and interms of relations between individualSoutheast Asian countries and their greatneighbour, China.

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Map 1: Proposed dams along the Nu (Salween)Source: International Rivers Network

http://www.irn.org/img/nu/nu_map_pol.gif

In two Lowy Institute Papers, River at risk:the Mekong and the water politics ofChina and Southeast Asia (2004), and,The paramount power: China and thecountries of Southeast Asia (2006), Idiscussed the many and complex range ofrelationships evolving between China andits Southeast Asian neighbours.[2](https://apj j f .org/#_edn2) Theserelationships are multifaceted, involvingpolitics, in the broadest sense, trade andeconomics, particularly as these relate toenergy, and increasingly, for the mainlandstates, present and future environmentalissues. A striking feature of all theserelationships is the rapid pace ofdevelopments, so that snapshots ofevents taken at a particular moment

rapidly become out-of-date. In this paper,and aga ins t that fas t -chang ingbackground, I concentrate on twoprominent current issues, principallyinvolving China, Burma (Myanmar), andThailand, and the Mekong and theSalween, as trans-national rivers.

The first of these issues relates to thecontroversies associated with plans forthe construction of dams on the SalweenRiver, the last free-flowing river inS o u t h e a s t A s i a ; t h e s e c o n d t odevelopments associated with the greatlyincreased navigation of the Mekong Rivernow taking place between southernYunnan and northern Thailand. In the caseof the Mekong, it is important to recognisethat the rapid changes that have takenplace in connection with navigation of theriver should be seen as part of the muchgreater prospective changes to the riveras a whole. These include the continuingprogram of dam construction beingundertaken in China and new proposalswhich are contemplated in studiesundertaken by the Mekong RiverCommission (MRC), the World Bank (WB)and Asian Development Bank (ADB).Additionally, developments associatedwith various tributaries of the Mekong area cause for concern. (These latter issuesassociated with the Mekong, and whichare separate from the navigationdevelopments, are discussed briefly in theAppendix to this paper.)

Long neglected outside the circles ofa d v o c a c y N o n - G o v e r n m e n t a lOrganisations (NGOs), the environmenthas increasingly become an issue ofpolitical importance in Southeast Asia

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a n d , n o w , i n C h i n a . [ 3 ](https://apjjf.org/#_edn3) While it wouldbe an exaggeration to suggest thatenvironmental concerns can, bythemselves, determine governmentpolicy, there is no doubt that they havean importance that plays a part indecision-making, as demonstrated in theaccounts that follow. The salience of thisobservation is given weight by theemphasis placed on environmental issuesby the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, in hisrecent address to the National People’sCongress on 5 March 2007, when he said,‘We must make conserving energy,decreasing energy consumption,protecting the environment and usingland intensively the breakthrough pointand main fulcrum for changing thepattern of economic growth. ’ [4](https://apjjf.org/#_edn4) And in Thailand,a country which receives detailedattention in this paper, the environmentalmovement has played an increasinglyactive and politically important role forwell over a decade, particularly inconstraining the government fromdeveloping further dams to producehydroelectr ic power with in Thaiterritory.[5] (https://apjjf.org/#_edn5)

The Salween

Like the Mekong, the Salween River risesin Eastern Tibet at a height above 4,000metres, where for several hundredkilometres it runs parallel to both theMekong and the Yangtze, forming part ofwhat is known as the ‘Three ParallelRivers’ region. After passing throughYunnan, where it is known as the Nu Jiang,or ‘Angry River’, a reflection on the speed

of its flow, it enters and flows throughBurma. For a distance of some 120kilometres during its passage throughBurma it forms the national boundarybetween Burma and Thailand. It thenresumes its course through Burma alone,finally emptying into the Gulf of Martabanat Moulmein. (For the purposes of thispaper, I refer to the river under discussionas the ‘Salween’, when discussing itsentire length and that section which flowsthrough Burma and beside Thailand. I usethe name ‘Nu’, or ‘Nu J iang’ whendiscussing the river and its course inChina. The river is also known as the‘Thanlwin’ within Burma, a usagerestricted to that country, but sometimesappearing in news reports generated inBurma but carried elsewhere.)

Although the second longest river flowingthrough Southeast Asia, the Salween atan approximate total length of 2,800kilometres – this length is disputed, withsome estimates giving its length as 3,200kilometres – is much shorter than theMekong (4,900 k i lometres) . Thetopography of the regions through whichthe Salween flows is sharply differentfrom much of what exists along theMekong’s course, particularly after thelatter leaves China when it flows througha largely flat, immediately surroundinglandscape. Until it reaches its delta inBurma, the Salween flows almost entirelythrough sharply rising gorges on eitherside of its banks. In Tibet and westernYunnan some of these gorges rise to aheight of 3,000 metres above the river.Even in the region where the Salweenflows between Burma and Thailand,where the height of the surrounding

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gorges is much reduced, the topographyis such that it still provides an idealphysical setting for dam construction.(See Photograph 1 of the Salween takenat Ban Sam Laep, on the left [Thai] bank,where the river forms the boundarybetween Thailand and Burma.)

Photograph 1: Salween at Ban Sam Laep

Of great importance to any discussion ofthe Salween’s future as a prospective sitefor a series of dams is the rich biodiversityexisting along its entire course. Inaddition there is a remarkably diverse setof minority ethnic population groups inthe regions through which it flows, both inChina and Burma. Indeed, the presence ofethnic minorities along the Salween inBurma has been the touchstone for thevigorous opposition to the plans for theconstruction of dams on the river from avaried range of advocacy NGOs, mostparticularly in Thailand. Both in Burmaand in China there is concern amonghuman rights advocates that dam buildingwi l l lead to the d isp lacement o fpopulations. And this prospect, asdiscussed later, is seen by critics of theBurmese regime as yet another example

of that government’s efforts to imposecontrol over dissident minorities.

Map 2: Potential dam sites of the Salween River

Among advocacy NGOs concerned withenvironmental issues there has beenconsiderable focus on the Three ParallelRivers region already mentioned. Thisarea was inscribed on the list of WorldHeritage sites in 2003 for its identity asthe ‘epicentre of Chinese biodiversity’which is ‘a lso one of the r ichesttemperate regions of the world in terms ofbiodiversity’.[6] (https://apjjf.org/#_edn6)On the basis of a map published by theInternational Rivers Network, thedesignated Heritage area does not includethe Nu itself, but rather is located close tothe river’s right, or western bank, as wellas taking in areas further east, close tothe Mekong and the Yangtze. (See Map 1entitled ‘Proposed dams along the Nu

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(Salween)’, showing the course of the Nuand the sites of proposed dams in China.)

In both Burma and Thailand, areasbordering the Salween are rich in reservesof teak. And as is the case with theMekong, the Salween is a major source offish -- many of which are migratory -- forthe populations living by or close to it,particularly in the rich agricultural regionof its delta.[7] (https://apjjf.org/#_edn7)

What is planned, and why?

The possibility of constructing dams onthe Sa lween R i ve r t o gene ra tehydroelectric power has been underdiscussion for some time, certainly forwell over a decade. The plans underdiscussion fall into two categories: thosefor dams to be constructed in China, andthose to be constructed either withinBurma or on that section of the Thai-Burma border formed by the river. For themoment, and as deta i led below,substantial uncertainty remains as to justhow many of the dams will actually bebuilt. What is more clear are the reasonswhy there are plans to build them, andwhy these plans have excited opposition.In the case of the dams projected for theNu in China, the available evidencesuggests that these have been conceivedin the planners’ minds essentially for theprovision of power to industry withinY u n n a n p r o v i n c e . [ 8 ](https://apjjf.org/#_edn8)

While Yunnan province, with its highconcentration of minority peoples, wasneglected by the Chinese centralgovernment for many years, it is nowseen as an important region in Beijing’s

‘Develop the West’ strategy. And in thisregard, it is now targeted for industrialdevelopment, particularly around theprovincial capital, Kunming. Developingdams on the Nu for hydropower accordswith the reasons behind the constructionof the dams that have already been builtor are under construction on the Mekong.(The dam currently under construction atJinghong, in southeastern Yunnan, will bean exception to this general rule since it isdesignated to supply power to Thailandwhen completed.)

Among the dams planned for Burma, oron the Thai-Burma border, two are to belocated in the Shan State. One will be atTasang — which may consist of two linkedreservoirs — while another, so far simplydesignated as the ‘Upper Thanlwinhydropower project,’ will be constructedfurther north on the river. Its exactlocation has not been given in newsreports. Both are projected to beconnected to the Mekong Power Grid, aproject promoted as one of the programsdeveloped within the Greater MekongSubregion (GMS) forum, with the backingof the ADB. Under this program, powergenerated by dams in Burma, China andLaos will supply electricity to Thailand andV ietnam. The dams p lanned fo rconstruction on the Thai-Burma border, atWei Gyi and Dagwin, and possibly Hutgyi(also transliterated as Hut Gyi andHatgyi), are projected to supply power toan even larger grid, the ASEAN PowerGrid, a plan embraced by ASEAN with thegoal of supplying electric power from agrid serving all ten member countries by2011.[9] (https://apjjf.org/#_edn9)

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China

Details of China’s current plans for damson the Nu Jiang are not readily accessible,and the status of these plans is mademore uncertain because of the lack ofpublic information about the extent towhich they are under reconsideration. Thefact that there is this lack of informationand uncertainty about Chinese plans isnot surprising and conforms to a similarstate of affairs in the early stages of theplanning for dams on the Mekong. In thecase of the Chinese dams on that river,very little was known about them outsideof China until more than a decade afterconstruction began on the first dam in the1980s. This state of affairs reflects aChinese view that it has no obligation tomake pub l i c s ta tements abou tdevelopments within its own territory untila time of its own choosing. The accountthat fo l lows is therefore open toqualification if and when new informationbecomes available.

It appears that a detailed proposal tobuild 13 dams on the upper section of theNu was first put forward in 1999, by theState Deve lopment and ReformCommission. This were then elaborated inAugust 2003, when officials in Yunnan putforward plans which were subsequentlyapproved by the central government.[10](https://apjjf.org/#_edn10) The absence ofinformation about the dams outside Chinawas made strikingly clear when formerThai Prime Minister Thaksin admitted inDecember 2003, at a time when therewas much public discussion about China’splans for 13 dams on the Nu, that he hadno knowledge of China’s intentions.[11]

(https://apjjf.org/#_edn11) With theannouncement of the plans it becameclear that several of the dams would belocated close to the Three Parallel Riversheritage region, and their constructionwas set to involve the relocation of some50,000 people.

To the considerable surprise of outsideobservers, the announcement that damswould be built on the Nu brought anunprecedented series of protests fromwithin China itself, including from theChinese Academy of the Sciences, twoprominent Chinese NGOs, the ChinaEnvironmental Culture Association andGreen Watershed, as well as someprominent individuals. And an evengreater surprise followed, given China’spoor record on showing concern forenvironmental issues, when the Chinesepremier, Wen Jiabao, announced at thebeginning of April 2004 that the plans tobuild 13 dams would not proceed and thatthe project was to be reconsidered.[12](https://apjjf.org/#_edn12) Nevertheless,and without any further officialstatements having been made, a range ofreports suggested that plans remained forfour dams to be built on the Nu. In theabsence of official statements it isnecessary to rely on press reports in aneffort to identify which dams were stilllikely to be built. And it may be that five,rather than four dams, will still be built.

So, despite the unavailability of firminformation about China’s plans, it wouldcertainly be wrong to assume that theyhave been completely shelved. There isevidence that officials in Yunnan were notreconciled to the announcement by

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Premier Wen, at least in the period shortlyafter he made it . According to anAssociated Press report from 9 April 2004,the director of the Nu River Power Bureauin Yunnan, Li Yunfei, stated that he hadnot heard of any changes to the plans toconstruct dams. While this may onlysuggest that decisions taken in Beijingsometimes reach outlying provinces veryslowly, there are other indications thatpreliminary preparations, at least,continue along the course of the river.

A detailed report of a journey along thecourse of the Nu in China in 2006 makesclear that preparations of various kinds,apparent ly l inked to future damconstruction, continue to be made.Published in the online journal, TheIrrawaddy, of 28 February 2007, RudyThomas gives an account of visiting 12 ofthe 13 sites originally designated as damsites.[13] (https://apjjf.org/#_edn13)Despite his reference to having visited 12sites, Thomas in his article only refersspecifically to activities at five sites as hetravelled upstream from just above theBurmese border with China: these siteswere at Yan San Shu, Saige, Abilou (thistoponym is clearly a misprint for Yabilou),Maji and Songta. At none of these siteswas actual dam construction taking place,in the sense that dam walls were beingerected. Rather, what Thomas describesappears to be work preliminary toconstruction, such as core sampling, roadconstruction and tunnelling.

In his article Thomas provides informationon the planned size of two of the dams,those at Maj i and Songta, that isconsistent with the details provided by

the International Rivers Network, by farthe most active of all internationaladvocacy NGOs in relation to river issues(see Table 1). At Maji, located ‘north ofthe riverside town of Fugong’, the planneddam will have a 300 metre high wall andwill displace 20,000 people. While atSongta, ‘just north of the border thatseparates the Nu River Prefecture and theTibetan Autonomous Region’, the planneddam’s wall will be 307 metres high, with areservoir stretching back 80 kilometres. Ifthese details are correct, the twoproposed dams are very large, with damwalls roughly the same height as theX i o a w a n d a m c u r r e n t l y u n d e rconstruction on the Mekong. The dam atXioawan is frequently spoken of as set tobe the second largest dam in China afterthe Three Gorges dam on the Yangtze.Another very recent reference to theChinese dams on the Nu, in Asia Sentinel,states that Chinese construction crews‘began the first efforts to dam the riverthis week’, that is, in the last week ofF e b r u a r y 2 0 0 7 . [ 1 4 ](https://apjjf.org/#_edn14) Without furtherinformation, it remains unclear whetherthis report adds to the informationprovided by Thomas, or whether thereference is essentially to continuingpreliminary construction works.

In contrast to the sizeable body ofliterature that exists discussing, andfrequently condemning, the Chinese damsbuilt on the Mekong for their predictedlong-term detrimental environmentaleffects on the countries downstream ofChina, there has so far been little materialpublished that analyses what dams builton the Nu will mean for the countries

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downstream of China: Burma andThailand. The suggestion in the AsiaSentinel article cited above that theChinese dams ‘are expected to raisegovernment hackles in Rangoon’, is notborne out by other similar information orjudgments. Given Burma’s extremelyclose relations with China, on which it isdependent in so many ways, it seemsunlikely that the Burmese governmentwould express a critical view of Chineseintentions, even if it did, indeed, holdconcerns about the dams. At the sametime, while NGOs which take an activerole in relation to the proposed dams forBurma and Thailand make passingreference to possible developments inChina, they have not developedarguments dealing with the possibleeffects of the Chinese dams in thedownstream regions in the same manneras has been done in relation to theMekong, and the effects on the countriesdownstream of China. Nevertheless, andwhen, as seems most likely, at least fourdams wi l l be bui l t on the Nu, i t isreasonable to expect that there will bemore vocal and developed criticism fromadvocacy NGOs, particularly in Thailand.This criticism is likely to be directed bothat the possibility that Chinese dams willaffect fish stocks in the river and at thehuman r ights issues involved inpopulation displacement.

There is little basis on which to assessChina’s likely reaction to the protests thathave been lodged in relation to thedangers to the heritage status of theproposed dams to be built in the ThreeParallel Rivers region. As already noted,these protests have come from within

China as well as from external bodies. Theconcerns expressed by the WorldConservation Union were probably themost important of those coming fromorganisations outside China and whichwere considered at the twenty-ninthmeeting of the World Heritage Committeemeeting in Durban, in 2005. At thatmeeting the World Heritage Committeeagreed to send ‘a reactive monitoringmission’ to evaluate the ‘progress madeon the conservation of the property’, andto ‘assess the impact of planned dams onthe outstanding universal values of thesite, its integrity and downstreamc o m m u n i t i e s ’ . [ 1 5 ](https://apjjf.org/#_edn15)

Before the monitoring mission made itsvisit to the Three Parallel Rivers region,China submitted a statement to the WorldHeritage Committee, in January 2006,which stated that there were no plans fordams in the eight areas that make up theWorld Heritage site. The statement noted,however, that plans had been developedfor hydropower stations (dams) adjacentto the site. Of these hydropower stations,to a total of 17, three were beingconsidered for the Nu, with the othersunder study for the Jinsha (the upperreaches of the Yangtze) and the Lancang( M e k o n g ) R i v e r s . [ 1 6 ](https://apjjf.org/#_edn16)

Following their visit to the Three ParallelRivers region, the two-person monitoringteam, composed of a representative eachfrom UNESCO and the World ConservationUnion, reported that the Chineseauthorities with whom they consultedindicated an intention to reduce the area

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of the heritage area that had beeninscribed on the World Heritage List in2003 by approximately 20%, and moreparticularly that:

While the Mission notedthe repeated commitmentof accompanying officialsto applying str ingentChinese laws and policiestowards protection of theWorld Heritage Site, theevidence of intrusionsfrom mining, tourism andproposed changes toinscribed boundaries andthe lagging release ofhydrodevelopment plans,c o n t i n u e s t o r a i s econcerns about the futureintegrity of the inscribedproperty. The existingmining operations withinsome of the inscribedproperties also suggestthe possibility of listing theproperty on the List ofW o r l d H e r i t a g e i nD a n g e r . [ 1 7 ](https://apjjf.org/#_edn17)

At the Thirtieth Session of the UNESCOWorld Heritage Committee, in July 2006,and in the l ight of the monitoringmission’s report, the committee notedthat although Chinese officials had givenassurances that any future dams wouldnot affect the World Heritage Site, thiscould not be corroborated since themission’s members were not given anyEnvironmental Impact Assessments or

maps relating to the proposed dams thatChina intends to build. In addition,‘evidence from maps, the inspection ofhydro-power development exploratoryworks, unclear boundaries and advice onproposed dams in the vicinity of the WorldHeritage property suggest that direct andindirect impacts of dam construction onthe property may be considerable’.Concluding that China’s posit iveconservation measures ‘are regrettablyovershadowed by grave concerns aboutthe, as-yet unreleased, plans for hydro-development’, the Committee called onChina to submit a report by 1 February2007 giving details on its plans for damsw i t h i n t h e S i t e a r e a . [ 1 8 ](https://apjjf.org/#_edn18)

To date, I have not been able to findevidence that China has submitted thereport the UNESCO committee requested.A lengthy report in the China Youth Dailyof 17 July 2006 suggested that there wasdisagreement between national and localauthorities about the possibility ofbuilding dams in the Three Parallel Riversregion, and that no ‘national approval’had been given for the construction ofd a m s o n t h e N u . [ 1 9 ](https://apjjf.org/#_edn19) If reports suchas those already noted suggesting, at thevery least, that preparatory work for damconstruction is already taking place arecorrect, this could be taken to mean thatconcerns to develop hydropower havetrumped conservation considerations. Ifso, there is the likelihood that China willendeavour to retain the Three ParallelRivers region’s heritage classification byexcising the areas closest to the Nu, andother rivers from it. Whether this will be

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acceptable to the UNESCO Committee isdifficult to assess, as is the degree ofBei j ing’s concern not to al ienateinternational feeling as the 2008 Olympicsdraw ever nearer. The China Youth Dailyreporter chose to be optimistic inconcluding his article cited above with thecomment that:

In the end the Wor ldHeritage Convention (sic)did not use its ‘yellowcard,’ giving everyone achance to rest a l itt leeasier, though we hopet h a t a t t h e n e x tconvention we will hearsome good news about theThree Paral lel RiversRegion.

Yet to conclude in this Panglossian fashionthat ‘all is for the best in this best of allpossible worlds’ may neither be justified,nor a reliable index of central governmentthinking on environmental issues. TheWorld Heritage Committee appears to actin an essentially apolitical fashion inplacing sites on its endangered list, andthere is no certainty that it will not beready to act in the same way in relation tothe Three Parallel Rivers region. At thesame time, and just as Wen Jiabao’sdecision in 2004 to halt plans for theconstruction of 13 dams on the Nu was asurprise to many observers, the emphasisplaced by the Chinese premier onenvironmental questions in his recentaddress to the National People’s Congresson 5 March suggests that it cannot nowbe assumed that the central government

will simply disregard the World HeritageCommittee’s concerns.

Thailand

Until the overthrow of the Thaksingovernment in September 2006, Thailandwas deeply involved in planning for theconstruction of five dams on the Salween-- three in Burma and two on the borderbetween the two countries -- after theriver flowed out of China. Thisinvolvement reflected Thailand’s growingenergy needs and concerns on the part ofits Electricity Generating Authority (EGAT)to avoid building dams in Thailand itself,where they had become a h ighlycontroversial issue. Discussions aboutthese dams began in 1994 when Thailandsigned a preliminary agreement topurchase electricity from dams on theSalween that would be built in Burma.(Prospective sites for dams on theSalween are shown in Map 2.)

It was not until December 2005 that EGATand the Burmese Ministry of ElectricPower s igned a Memorandum ofAgreement for the construction of a damat Hutgyi, in Burma, as the first of fiveplanned dams on the Salween, either inBurma or on the Thai-Burma border.Later, in September 2006, EGAT wasreported as finally formalising plans forthe five dams, and as having stated thatprevious plans were being discarded sincethey could have been regarded as Thaiinterference in Burma’s domestic affairs.Under the December 2005 agreementsbetween Thailand and Burma, preliminaryplans were drawn up for dams that wouldbe constructed at Hutgyi, Tasang, and a

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further unnamed location in Shan State, inBurma, and at Weigyi and Dagwin, wherethe river runs between Burma andThailand. With an estimated total cost ofUS$10 billion, the dams were projected tobe able to produce 10-15,000 MW ofpower, with Thailand receiving up to 90%of the energy produced. The remaining10% generated was to be provided free toBurma. As of August 2006 an agreementwas in place for the first dam to be builta t Hutgy i by the ma jo r Ch ineseconstruction firm, Sinohydro, partly withChinese funding, with work set to begin inD e c e m b e r 2 0 0 7 . [ 2 0 ](https://apjjf.org/#_edn20)

The plans for the Salween dams, as theystood before the overthrow of the Thaksingovernment in September 2006, attractedvigorous criticism from advocacy NGOs,particularly those concerned with humanr i g h t s , b u t a l s o i n r e l a t i o n t oenvironmental issues. Prominentopposition political figures, such as formerchairman of the Thai Senate ForeignRe la t i ons Commi t tee , K ra i sakChoonhavan, were also act ive incondemning the planned dams.[21](https://apjjf.org/#_edn21) The Tasangdam will, when constructed, be thelargest dam in Southeast Asia, with a wallrising 228 metres and the capacity togenerate 7,100 MW. During 2006preliminary roadworks for access to thedam site at Tasang were carried out by aThai real estate and construction firm,MDX. Now, in April 2007, reports haveemerged s ta t ing tha t work hascommenced on the dam proper. Thisn e w s h a s c o i n c i d e d w i t h t h eannouncement of the signature of a

Memorandum of Understanding betweenthe Burmese government and twoChinese firms for the construction of theUpper Thanlwin dam mentioned earlier inthis paper, and which wi l l have agenerating capacity of 2,400 MW.[22](https://apjjf.org/#_edn22)

Both the Tasang and Upper Thanlwin damsites are in Burma’s Shan State, a regionwhich has already experienced large-scale forced population relocation as partof the Burmese government’s concern toexercise control over dissident, andpotent ia l ly d i ss ident , minor i typopulations. A variety of NGO reportsestimate that up to 300,000 people havebeen forcibly relocated in Shan State overt h e p a s t d e c a d e . [ 2 3 ](https://apjjf.org/#_edn23)

Human rights issues, as these relate toethnic minority dissidents, have also beenraised in the case of the planned Hutgyidam. The area in which the dam is to bebuilt is home to members of the Karenminority, who have long opposedBurmese control, and there have beenre l iab le reports o f the Burmesegovernment engaging in forced relocationof the population in the area as roads arebuilt and villages are destroyed to makeway for large-scale agriculture. Oneindication of the problems in the generalHutgyi area has been the increased flowof refugees across the border intoT h a i l a n d . A n d a s a s i g n o f t h emilitarisation of the area an EGATemployee engaged in survey work for theHutgyi dam was killed by a landmine inMay 2006.[24] (https://apjjf.org/#_edn24)

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Following the military coup that oustedformer Prime Minister Thaksin, the EnergyMinister in the new inter im Thaigovernment, Piyasvasti Amranand,announced in October 2006 that he didnot intend to go forward with theagreements reached between Thailandand Burma for the construction of fivedams on the Salween. This announcementwas greeted with surprise, but appears toaccord with Piyasvasti’s reputation as anindependent-thinking technocrat withwell-established qualifications in theenergy field. His independence wasunderlined by his decision to resign fromhis position as a deputy permanentsecretary in the Prime Minister’s Office, in2003, following policy disagreements thatincluded energy issues, particularly asthese related to Thaksin’s hopes top r i v a t i s e E G A T . I n m a k i n g h i sannouncement, Piyasvasti mapped out hisown view of how Thailand should meet itsfuture energy needs, placing greateremphasis that had previously been thecase on purchasing energy from Laos andsourcing gas supplies from the MiddleEast and from Cambodia, Indonesia andVietnam. Nevertheless, and despitePiyasvasti’s announced decision not toproceed with the agreements Thailandhad previously reached with Burma inrelation to the suite of dams on theSalween, it has become clear that hisgovernment is still committed to theHutgyi dam on the Salween.[25](https://apjjf.org/#_edn25) And as alreadynoted, construction of a dam at Tasangw i th the i nvo lvement o f a Tha iconstruction company has apparentlybegun.

Beyond the fact that this commitment willcontinue to be contested by human rightsgroups, and recently formed the basis of amajor protest by advocacy NGOs on 28February, the policies being followed bythe interim Thai government that hasreplaced the Thaksin regime are clearlyless accommodating to Burma than thoseof i t s predecessor . Th is po l i cy ,characterised by Thaksin as ‘forwardengagement’, looked to Thailand’s closerassociation with the Burmese regime in arange of economic activities, of whichdams on the Mekong was one of the mostimportant. Other areas in which ‘forwardengagement’ was to define policiesincluded the proposed involvement ofThailand in the exploitation of gasreserves in the Bay of Bengal and also inprojected mining and logging ventures.Given the increasing readiness of someASEAN members to criticise the StatePeace and Development Committee(SPDC) regime in Burma, it will be ofconsiderable interest to see whether thischange in Thailand’s policies, with thedecision to draw back in relation to theSalween dams as a key element, resultsin further pressure on Burma to make atleast some gestures towards reform.There are few signs that this is likely.

Navigating the Mekong

When River at risk was published in 2004,clearance of obstacles to navigation in theMekong River between southern Yunnanand northern Thailand had just beencompleted. This operation followed thesignature, by China, Burma, Laos andThailand, in April 2000, of the Agreementon Commercial Navigation on the

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Mekong-Lancang River, which envisagedthe eventual clearance of the river as faras the former Lao royal city of LuangPrabang. Despite the EnvironmentalImpact Statement for the clearanceprogram delivered in 2001 -- in whichChina had a major input -- being sharplycriticised by outside observers, clearancebegan the following year. Financedentirely by China, and with the worklargely undertaken by Chinese workcrews, 23 separate rapids, reefs and otherobstacles were removed from the riverbed to make possible year-roundnavigation of the Mekong by vessels up to150 Dead Weight Tons (DWT) as far asC h i a n g S a e n . [ 2 6 ](https://apjjf.org/#_edn26)

Although the original plan for this firststage of the clearance operationenvisaged obstacles being removed fromthe river as far as the Thai river port atChiang Khong (and its Lao neighbourlocated directly across the Mekong, HuayXai), unresolved boundary issues havemeant that a final, major set of obstaclesjust upstream from Chiang Khong remain― the boundary issues involved appearto relate to concerns on the part of Thaiauthorities that the removal of theseobstacles might affect the thalweg, whichis the national boundary betweenThailand and Laos, as well as affecting theterritorial status of sandbanks thatregularly appear in the river duringperiods of low water. For the moment,with these obstacles still in place, ChiangKong effectively functions as a terminalfor Lao river vessels, but it is notaccessible to large Chinese vessels thatberth at Chiang Saen.

It also seems likely that no action hasbeen taken to clear this remainingobstacle since there is a recognition thatChiang Khong will relatively soon becomean important link in the road system thatis being developed to run from Kunming,the capital of Yunnan province in China, toBangkok. This highway will pass throughLaos and will eventually cross the Mekongover a bridge at Chiang Khong. Approvalfor the construction of this bridge hasa l ready been g iven by the Tha ig o v e r n m e n t . [ 2 7 ](https://apjjf.org/#_edn27) As for the restof the river clearance plan that was thesubject of the agreement concludedbetween China, Burma, Laos and Thailandin 2000, and which would have seenclearance extend into Laos as far asLuang Prabang, there are no current signsthat any of the parties are pressing forthis to take place.

In terms of the parts played by the fourparties to the 2000 navigation agreementsince the clearances were completed, theroles of China and Thailand have beenmuch more important than those ofBurma and Laos. Burma’s interest in theMekong, despite the river’s forming anational boundary, is limited by the fact ofsparse settlement in the region pastwhich the river flows. For the Burmeseauthorities the Irrawaddy River is ofgreater importance as a navigablewaterway, a fact that is important to theChinese, also, who see it as a future linkin a road/river transport system thatwould give it access from Yunnan to theBay of Bengal. As for Laos, as noted belowits vessels appear unable to compete withChinese cargo boats over the cleared

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section of the river.

In terms of the expansion of navigation onthe Mekong since 2004, what hasoccurred is remarkable, even thoughthere is a dearth of accurate and fully up-t o - d a t e s t a t i s t i c s t o q u a n t i f ydevelopments. In China there are now twofully functioning river ports capable ofhandling cargo vessels throughout theyear. These are at Jinghong, the lastmajor settlement in southern Yunnan, andGuan Lei, an almost entirely new townon ly recent ly carved out o f thesurrounding jungle. Major dockworks werestill being built when I visited Guan Lei, inFebruary 2003, to board a cargo boat fort rave l down the Mekong. Thesedockworks have now been completed.And in Thailand substantial developmentsat Chiang Saen have made that river port,and current terminal for vessels comingdownriver from China, both an importanttrade link and a settlement in the processof demographic transformation.[28](https://apjjf.org/#_edn28)

As recently as 2006, most Chinese vesselscoming to Chiang Saen were still loadingand unloading their cargo a l i tt leupstream of the town. They did this bymooring next to a section of the river’sbank that had been concreted forstability. There, with gangs of labourersemployed to shift the cargo, it was carriedover planks stretched between the boatsand the shore. This very basic method ofshifting cargo was apparently designed tocircumvent paying port charges. This wasdespite the existence of port facilitiesconstructed by the Thai authorities aslong ago as 2004. These facilities are now

in full use, as I witnessed them in Januaryof this year. They consist of two coveredpontoon docks equipped with conveyorbelts and ramps suitable for truck traffic.At the time I observed the port in action,the pontoon docks were servicing eightvessels. Despite the presence of theconveyor belts linked to each dock, muchof the cargo handling was still beingcarried out by labour gangs, with the bulkof the cargo being unloaded from Chinaconsisting of fresh fruit and vegetables.

Some heavier goods were being loadedon to trucks on the docks and trucks werealso being used to bring Thai palm oil andsacks of soybean meal as backloading ofthe Chinese vessels for their return trip. Amobile crane was also in use for evenheavier items than those picked up ordelivered by truck. In the light of thecurrent activity around this existing port,there are plans to build a further facilitydownstream from Chiang Saen, which willbe capable of servicing vessels up to 500DWT.[29] (https://apjjf.org/#_edn29)Although some of my informants spoke ofwork already being under way for thisnew port, with feasibility studies supposedto have been completed by 2006, I did notsee any indication of this during my visitto Chiang Saen. (See Photograph 2 ofChinese vessels moored at the existingChiang Saen facilities in January 2007.)

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Photograph 2: Chinese vessels at Chiang Saen

As a reflection of the Chinese dominancein this river trade, when I was in ChiangSaen, there were no fewer than 24Chinese vessels in port and strung outover a distance of some kilometres alongthe river. This was in contrast to the threeLao vessels I observed, and the totalabsence of Thai vessels. Anecdotalaccounts from Thai informants to whom Ispoke in both Chiang Saen and ChiangKhong suggest that the imbalancebetween Chinese and Thai vesselstravelling on the river is of the order of90% to 10%. In general, Thai vessels aresmaller and less powerful than theirChinese counterparts; this fact was thecause for some controversy andresentment during the 2003-04 dryseason, when the Mekong fell to unusuallylow levels. Although this fall was certainlyconnected to an unusually short wetseason and subsequent drought, there isno doubt that the low levels also reflectedthe fact that the Chinese authorities wereholding back water discharges from theirdams on the Mekong, at Manwan andDaochaoshan. They did this so that theycould then release water in sufficient

quantity for Chinese vessels to travel toand from Chiang Saen. The less powerfulThai vessels were unable to make thesame transits in the relatively short periodthe river’s water levels remainednavigable.[30] (https://apjjf.org/#_edn30)

There are no reliable statistics for thenumber of Chinese vessels using the porton an annual basis, though it is certainthat the figure of 3,000 vessels claimedfor 2004 -- an increase from 1,000 theyear before -- has most certainly beenexceeded. As for the figures for the tradethat passes through Chiang Saen,unofficial figures compiled by researchersfor the Indochina Media MemorialFoundation, in Chiang Mai, for 2006, showa balance heavily in Thai favour, withi m p o r t s f r o m C h i n a t o t a l l i n gapproximately US$36 million, whileexports to China were approximatelythree times larger at US$115 million.[31](https://apjjf.org/#_edn31) These figurestake little account of the impact China’simports are having in northern Thailand, apoint emphasised by former senatorKraisak Choonhavan, in conversations Ihad with him in both 2005 and 2007. Hedraws attention to the fact that the bulkof Chinese goods shipped into northernThai land is made up of f ru i t andvegetables. These are often landed atprices against which local farmers cannotcompete. This is particularly the case withgarlic and onions, though there have beenperiods when poor growing conditions inChina reversed this situation.

In March 2006 a l i t t le-publ ic isedagreement was signed by Burma, China,Laos and Thailand to permit the transport

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of oil from Thailand to southern Yunnan.Under this agreement, the amount ofrefined oil to be shipped from ChiangSaen was set at 1,200 tons each month.Although a relatively small amount, theagreement immediately sparkedenvironmental concerns, not leastbecause the oil was to be shipped inbarre ls rather than in spec ia l lyconstructed vessels, so that a collision orgrounding of vessels carrying oil wouldpose a major risk to the Mekong and itsfish stocks. So far there has only been areport of one shipment having beenmade, of 300 tons -- with 150 tons of oilbeing loaded on each of two vessels. ButChinese officials have indicated that theyhave much bigger plans in mind and havespoken of future shipments of up to70,000 tons per year. In speaking in theseterms, a Chinese official linked theshipment of oil from Thailand to southernYunnan with his country’s concern aboutthe possibility of Middle Eastern oilshipments through the Straits of Malaccabeing blocked by the United States shouldthere be conflict between China andTaiwan. Leaving aside the likelihood ofsuch a development occurring, thesuggestion that 70,000 tons shipped upthe Mekong would represent a majoranswer to China’s energy securityconcerns appears to be a notable exercisein hyperbole. Today, even a moderatelysized tanker carries that amount of oil.Possibly more to the point is the fact thatThailand subsidises the cost of oil so thatshipments made by way of the Mekongwill be landed in Yunnan at a lower pricethan would otherwise be the case for oilbrought overland from Chinese coastalports.[32] (https://apjjf.org/#_edn32)

Of considerable interest is the impact thatthe Mekong River trade is having onChiang Saen town, and more generallywithin Chiang Rai province, within whichthe town is located. Until the early 1980sChiang Saen, which I visited several timesduring that decade, was little more thanan overgrown village beside the MekongRiver. Once the site of a small, fourteenthcentury kingdom, whose walls remain tothe present day, it and the river plainssurrounding the town were the site ofrepeated clashes between Thai andBurmese armies in the eighteenthcentury , to the po int where thesettlement had almost disappeared by thenineteenth century. Although, by the late1990s, Chiang Saen had grown in size andwas used in a l imited fashion as aterminal for trade between southernYunnan and northern Thailand, its statuswas transformed by the navigationclearances completed in 2004. Mostparticularly, its growth in size has beenaccompanied by what, for want of abetter word, may be described as its‘Sinification’.

Chinese immigration into Thailand has, ofcourse, a long history What is strikingabout developments at Chiang Saen, andin Chiang Rai province as a whole, is therapidity with which a new Chineseelement has become part o f thedemographic and commercial landscape.This change was well described by JoshuaKurlantzick, of the Carnegie Institute, inan article published in the Bangkok Postin October 2005, in which he wrote of thesudden burgeoning in the number ofChinese restaurants in Chiang Saen, signsin Chinese advertising cheap telephone

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calls to Yunnan and the apparentlydominant presence of Chinese nationalsi n t h e t o w n ’ s c o m m e r c e . [ 3 3 ](https://apjjf.org/#_edn33) The pictureKurlantzick offered appeared entirelyjustified in the course of my own visit inJanuary 2007. But, more to the point, it isalso the view of the range of Thaiinformants with whom I discussed theimpact of Chinese in-migration, both legaland otherwise, into Chiang Saen andChaing Rai province. These informants,who included a senior Thai politician,business figures in both Chiang Mai andC h i a n g K h o n g , a n d T h a i N G Orepresentatives, provided an anecdotalp ic ture o f unregu lated Ch ineseimmigration into Chiang Saen, with illegalimmigrants marrying Thai women in orderto regularise their status and becomeeligible to own land. In no case were myinformants able to quantify the number ofChinese immigrants who had settled inthe area around Chiang Saen, but thereseems no basis for doubting the basicvalidity of their accounts.

One reason this is so is the quite clearindication that illegal and undocumentedChinese immigration into Burma, Laosand Thailand has been taking place forsome time. It is now accepted that Lashioand Mandalay in Burma have Chinesepopulations exceeding 50% and 25%respect ively. As recorded in Theparamount power , i l legal Chineseimmigration into Laos is a real, i fundocumented, fact, with the new arrivalsranging from poor rural peasants to minorbusinessmen. Chinese settlement innorthern Thailand, in Chiang Rai province,is taking place at a time when there has

been a major increase in Chinesecommercial activity in the region, with themost active role being played by interestsb a s e d i n Y u n n a n . W h i l e t h eannouncement of plans, such as those foran industrial estate in Chiang Saen, maynot always proceed at the pace theirpromoters promise, the overall picture isone of Chinese corporations playing anincreasingly active role in the region.According to Dai Jie, deputy director ofYunnan Provincial Bureau of ForeignTrade and Economic Cooperation, a three-p h a s e p r o j e c t c o n s i s t i n g o f a‘commodities city, duty-free zone and asupplier’s centre,’ close to Chiang Saentown, is set to be completed in 2014.[34](https://apjjf.org/#_edn34)

As already noted in relation to theshipments of oil up the Mekong fromC h i a n g S a e n t o Y u n n a n , t h eenvironmental costs of the commercialactivity now centred around Chiang Saenare a subject for concern among theactive Thai advocacy NGOs that monitordevelopments linked to the Mekong River.More generally, these groups drawattention to the decline in fish catchesalong the course travelled by vesselsbetween Chiang Saen and Yunnan, andparticularly in relation to catches in thearea immediately around the town. Theyalso argue that as a result of changes inflow patterns along the river betweenChiang Saen and Chiang Khong riverbanks and sandbanks u sed f o rhorticulture in dry seasons continue to beadversely affected. These variations inflow patterns are, the NGOs argue, theproduct both of the dams that havealready been built in China and of the

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negative hydrological effects of theclearances that have been undertaken tof a c i l i t a t e n a v i g a t i o n . [ 3 5 ](https://apjjf.org/#_edn35)

Concluding Remarks

The developments discussed in this paperp o i n t t o t h e m a n n e r i n w h i c henvironmental issues, and frequentlythose issues combined with concernsrelating to human rights, are playing anincreasingly important part in the politicsof the Asian region. Concern for theenvironment is no longer a fringe issue,and there is no more striking illustrationof this fact than the domestic oppositionthat was mounted within China to theproposed dams on the Nu, and whichsparked the important but unexpectedreaction by the Chinese premier, WenJiabao, to step in and put plans for theconstruct ion of 13 dams on hold.Attention has also been drawn in thepaper to the important part played byThai environmental activists in relation totheir government’s policies, both towardsthe Salween and the Mekong.

Although the broader issue of climatechange has dominated global discussionof environmental issues, the politics ofwater, of its use and its availability arereceiving ever-greater attention. And thisis likely to be increasingly the case as thefuture use of r ivers in China andSoutheast Asia intersects with policieslinked to energy and increased irrigation.The central i ty of r ivers and theirexploitation to a broad range of politicalissues is strikingly illustrated in the twocases examined in this paper. In the case

of the Salween, energy resources inChina, Burma and Thailand, human rightsin Burma and intra-ASEAN relations are allissues that stem from the contestedfuture of a river. And for the Mekong,while attention has previously focusedchiefly on China’s dam-building activities,the new navigation regime has raisedenvironmental issues while playing a partin the increasing Chinese presence innorthern Thailand. That UNESCO shouldnow be involved in what is currently anunresolved issue over the heritage statusof the Three Parallel Rivers region,through which the Nu, Mekong andYangtze all flow, is a testimony toincreasingly broad reach of environmentalfactors.

Neither the Salween nor the Mekong areclose to the parlous state of China’sYellow River, which is suffering from thecombined effects of overuse, recurrentdroughts, and the decrease of snow-meltas Himalayan glaciers contract in size.The river’s dire condition has promptedconsideration within China of thepossibility of a transfer of water fromother rivers, including even one as fardistant as the Yangtze, in an effort toreturn its flow to a healthy state. So whilethe Mekong and the Salween are currentlyin a notably healthy state by comparisonwith the Yellow River, and indeed, thelower reaches of the Yangtze, theirfutures are not automatically assured. Thefact that both are vital to the well-being ofthe countries through which they flowmake the matters examined in this paperissues of real consequence.

At another level, the issues examined in

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this paper reinforce the judgments madein The paramount power, as China’sinvolvement with the countries ofSoutheast Asia continues to grow. So, atthe same time as China seeks to develophydropower on the Nu within its ownterritory, it is closely involved throughChinese-based commercial companies inthe developments taking place on theSalween beyond its borders. And, as isclear from the information provided ondevelopments associated with navigationof the Mekong, China is both integral tothe navigation process itself andbecoming ever more deeply involved inthe commercial life of Thailand’s ChiangRai province, in which the river port ofChiang Saen is located. All of thesedevelopments reinforce a judgment thatChina continues to build on its previoussuccesses in dealing with the countries ofSoutheast Asia — particularly those of themainland region — to project further itsinfluence on a peaceful basis and incooperation with those states.

APPENDIX

A brief overview of current, andcontroversial, issues associated with

the Mekong

The content of this paper has, in relationto the Mekong, been essent ia l lyconcerned with navigation and associateddevelopments. At a broader level, therelease of two key documents during2006 seems likely to spark furthercontroversy in relation to the uses madeof the river and the institutions that play arole in determining its future. Thesedocuments are : a Mekong R iverCommission (MRC) draft document,‘Integrated Basin Flow ManagementReport No. 8, Flow-regime assessment,’ ofFebruary 2006, and a joint World Bank(WB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB)working paper, ‘Future directions forwater resource management in theMekong basin, Mekong Water ResourcesAssistance Strategy’, released in June2006.

The first of these two documents hasbeen released at a time when there isvery active discussion about the futurerole of the MRC, in particular the extent towhich it can play a role in which its trans-national responsibilities can supersedethe interests of its four, individual nationalmembers.[36] (https://apjjf.org/#_edn36)And, most importantly, it bears on thequestion of the extent to which the MRCshou ld p lay a ro le in promot ingdevelopment (infrastructure such as damsand water diversion projects) as opposedto its role to date as, essentially, being arepository of knowledge about theMekong River and i ts bas in . [37](https://apjjf.org/#_edn37) The particularsalience of this latter issue is illustratedby the fact that the MRC document

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discusses in detail a range of predictedand costly effects that could occur inCambodia -- where fish form theoverwhelming source of the population’sprotein intake -- in the event of threedifferent ‘flow regimes’.[38](https://apjjf.org/#_edn38)

The WB/ADB Working Paper, which, mostusefully, should be read in conjunctionwith the MRC paper just discussed, statesin its ‘Executive Summary’ that the‘bottom line message of this MekongWater Resources Assistance Strategy isthat the analytical work on developmentscenarios has, for the first time, providedevidence that there remains considerablepotential for development of Mekongwater resources’. In the light of thisconclusion, and conceived in terms of theriver’s trans-national character, the paperurges a move away from ‘the moreprecautionary approach of the pastdecade that tended to avoid any riskassociated development, at the expenseof stifling investments’. While notdisregarding risks, the paper argues that‘balanced development’ should be ‘thedriving principle for the management anddevelopment of the Mekong River Waterresources in the coming years’.[39](https://apjjf.org/#_edn39)

The issues involved in these twodocuments go the heart of the Mekong’sfuture and that of the people of theMekong basin. As such they deserveextended analysis, which is beyond thecompass of this brief note. For themoment it is sufficient to observe thatshould the assumptions in the twodocuments prove to be incorrect the cost

in human terms could be high indeed.One of the reasons for this sombreconclusion is to be found in the problemsthat are already apparent in the case ofinfrastructure development on two riversthat are tributaries of the Mekong, the SeSan and the Sre Pok, which rise inVietnam but flow into the Mekong inCambodia.

As discussed in River at risk, Vietnam’sdecision to build dams on Mekongtributaries has resulted in substantial anddamaging effects on Cambodiancommunities living downstream.[40](https://apjjf.org/#_edn40) Despite thewarm pol it ical relations betweenCambodia and Vietnam, no solution hasbeen found to the problems caused by thepresence of these dams and theconsequences of water releases fromthem.[41] (https://apjjf.org/#_edn41) Withthe prospect of a very substantialincrease in the number of dam projectsbeing undertaken in Vietnam and Laos,some of which are on Mekong tributariesthat are trans-national in character, theneed to put in place a future, equitablegovernance of the Mekong system as awhole — an issue central to the MRC andWB/ADB documents — is clearly of greatimportance. The manner in which thisissue is resolved, or a failure to do so, willbe of the greatest importance for the 70million people who live in this great river’sbasin.

This article was originally published atLowy Institute for International Policy,Ausutra l ian Nat ional Univers i ty(http://www.lowyinstitute.org/), May 2007.Posted at Japan Focus, June 11, 2007.

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M i l t o n O s b o r n e(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milton_Osborne) is an Australian historian, author, andconsultant specializing in Southeast Asia.

[1] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref1) World’s top 10rivers at risk, Gland, Switzerland, WWFInternational, March 2007. The other riverslisted, in addition to the Murray-Darling, Mekongand Salween, were the Danube, La Plata, RioGrande-Rio Bravo, Ganges, Indus, Nile andYangtze.

[2] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref2) River at risk:the Mekong and the water politics of China andSoutheast Asia, Lowy Institute Paper 02, TheLowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney,2004; and, The paramount power: China andthe countries of Southeast Asia, Lowy InstitutePaper 11, The Lowy Institute for InternationalPolicy, Sydney, 2006.

[3] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref3) China’s longhistory of pursuing policies without notableconcern for the physical environment is chartedin Mark Elvin’s, The retreat of the elephants: anenvironmental history of China, New Haven CT,Yale University Press, 2004. An importantsurvey of contemporary environmental issues inChina is Elizabeth C. Economy’s, The river runsblack: the environmental challenge to China’sfuture, Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press,2004.

[4] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref4) Jim Yardley,Chinese Premier focuses on pollution and thepoor, New York Times, 5 March 2007.

[5] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref5) See Osborne,River at risk, pp 31-2, in relation to the Pak Mundam and the subsequent policy shift by the Thaigovernment.

[6] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref6) UNESCO WorldHeritage, Three Parallel Rivers of YunnanP r o t e c t e d A r e a s .(http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1083)

[7] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref7) Backgroundinformation on the Salween is usefully providedin, The Salween under threat: damming thelongest free river in Southeast Asia, publishedby Salween Watch, Southeast Asia RiversNetwork (SEARIN), and the Center for SocialDevelopment Studies, Chulalongkorn University,Chiang Mai, 2004. Although quite clearly anadvocacy document, there is no reason toquestion the basic facts provided in it.

[8] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref8) Jim Yardley,Chinese project on the Nu-Salween River pitsenvironmentalists against development plans,New York Times, 3 January 2005. See, also,Yunnan hydropower expansion: update onChina’s power industry reforms & the Nu,Lancang & Jinsha dams, a paper prepared byChiang Mai University’s Unit for Social andEnvironmental Research and Green Watershed,Kunming, People’s Republic of China, February2004.

[9] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref9) For details oft h e A S E A N P o w e r G r i d , s e e h e r e(http://www.aseansec.org/10367.htm).

[10] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref10) Yardley, ascited in footnote 6.

[11] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref11) Bangkok Post,18 December 2003.

[12] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref12) Osborne,River at risk, pp 12-13, and footnote 17.

[13] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref13) Please visith e r e .(http://www.irrawaddy.org/aviewer.asp?a=6024&z=10)

[14] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref14) Nava

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Thakuria, India and Burma: such good friends,A s i a S e n t i n e l , 2 7 F e b r u a r y 2 0 0 7 .(http://www.asiasentinel.com)

[15] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref15) ExecutiveSummary, Report of a Joint Reactive MonitoringMission to the Three Parallel Rivers of YunnanProtected Areas, China, from 5 to 15 April 2006,pp 2-3.

[16] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref16) UNESCO,Convention Concerning the Protection of theWorld Cultural and Natural Heritage, WorldHeritage Committee, Thirtieth Session, Vilnius,Lithuania, Asia-Pacific, 8-16 July 2006, pp 5-6.

[17] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref17) Ibid, footnote15.

[18] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref18) UNESCO,Convention Concerning the Protection of theWorld Cultural and Natural Heritage, WorldHeritage Committee, Thirtieth Session, Vilnius,Lithuania, 8-16 July 2006, Asia Pacific, pp 7-8.

[19] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref19) Zhang Kejia,Three Parallel Rivers region focus on monitoringmission. China Youth Daily, 17 July 2006.

[20] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref20) Thesedevelopments are summarised in Will Baxter,Dam the Salween, damn its people, Asia TimesOnline, 15 September 2006. See, also, SalweenWatch Media Advisory, Press conference andsubmission of petition letter against theSalween Dams in Burma, 28 February 2007.

[21] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref21) Interviewwith Khun Kraisak Choonhavan, 9 January 2007,Bangkok.

[22] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref22) Myanmarsigns deal with Chinese firms to buildhydroelectric plant, International HeraldTribune, carrying an Associated Press report of7 April 2007. The Chinese firms involved are,Farsighted Investment Group Company Limitedand Gold Water Resources Company Limited.

[23] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref23) Shawn L.Nance, Unplugging Thailand, Myanmar energydeals, Asia Times Online, 14 November 2006.

[24] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref24) Will Baxter,Dam the Salween as cited in footnote 20.

[25] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref25) Will(http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/imf/burma/2006/1213salween_dams.html)Baxter,Thailand and Myanmar at odds over Salweendams, Burma, Archives of global protest, 13D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 6 .(https://apjjf.org/javascript:void(0);/*1181588163164*)

[26] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref26) This and theimmediately succeeding paragraph drawdirectly on River at risk, pp 25-9.

[27] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref27) The Nation,(Thailand), 9 March 2004.

[28] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref28) I visitedChiang Saen and Chiang Khong, most recently,over the period 15-17 January 2007. I firstvisited this region in 1979 and have continuedto visit it on an irregular basis since that time.

[29] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref29) Jason Gagliardi,China paves the way for big money to flow downthe Mekong, South China Morning Post, 19February 2004.

[30] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref30) See, River at risk,pp 19-20.

[31] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref31) VaudineEngland, Trade turns Mekong into river ofplenty, International Herald Tribune, 6 July2006.

[32] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref32) On the oilshipment, see, Marwaan Macan-Markar, Sparksfly as China moves oil up Mekong, Asia TimesOnline, 9 January 2007.

[33] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref33) JoshuaKurlantzick, China stepping into US vacuum,

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Bangkok Post, 31 October 2005.

[34] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref34) JasonGagliardi, China paves the way for big money toflow down the Mekong.

[35] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref35) MontreeChantawong, The Mekong’s changing currency,Watershed: People’s Forum on Ecology, Vol. 11,No. 2, November 2005 – June 2006, pp 12-25.

[36] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref36) Philip Hirsch,Kurt Morch Jensen, with Ben Boer, NaomiCarrard, Stephen FitzGerald and RosemaryLyster, Executive Summary, National interestsand transboundary water governance in theMekong, May 2006.

[37] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref37) For somevery recent discussion of this issue, see, RichardP. Cronin, Destructive Mekong dams: criticalneed for transparency,’ RSIS Commentaries, apublication of the S. Rajaratnam School ofInternational Studies, Singapore, 26 March2007.

[38] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref38) MekongRiver Commission, Water Utilisation Program,Integrated Basin Flow Management Report No.8,Flow-regime assessment, Draft 1 February2006, p 57.

[39] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref39) WB/ADB JointWorking Paper on ‘Future directions for waterresources management in the Mekong Riverbasin, Mekong Water Resources AssistanceStrategy,’ June 2006.

[40] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref40) River at risk,pp 32-4.

[41] (https://apjjf.org/#_ednref41) For recentdiscussion of the Vietnamese dams, see,Montree Chantawong, as cited in footnote 35,and, Sam Rith and Cat Barton, Vietnamesedams proposed for Cambodian river, PhnomPenh Post, 21 September-5 October 2006. (Inaddition to the discussion of Vietnamese dams,Montree Chantawong’s article also providesdetails on flow variations, and their effects, inthe section of the Mekong between Chiang Saenand Chiang Khong).