T h e U n p r e d i c t a b l e P a s t

How was Italy Unified?Alan Farmer examines the process which led to the unification of Italy.

Italian troops advance during the battle of Solferino, near Mantua, in June 1859. Austrian dominance in Italywas destroyed here and at Magenta.

'Gary Baldy united Italy with the helpof his Victory Manual'. Can anythingpositive be said about this apocryphalA-level answer? Certainly during themid-19'** century Italy was united. Theacquisition of Rome in 1870 was thefinal phase of the unificationmovement or Risorgimento. But justhow important were the roles ofGaribaldi and King Victor Emmanuel IIof Piedmont in the unificationprocess?

Italy in the Early 19̂ *̂ CenturyBy the late 18'" century there wereeleven states in the Italian peninsula.In the 1790s France conquered mostof the peninsula, remaining in controluntil 1814. Some Italians preferred

French occupation to the anciensregimes. However, opposition toaspects of French rule - conscription,heavy taxes, repressive anti-clericalmeasures - provoked hostility andmay have helped promote nationalistsentiment. The Vienna peacemakers,anxious to suppress revolutionarymovements and to prevent Franceregaining control of Italy at a futuredate, tried to ensure that Austriadominated the peninsula. Lombardyand Venetia were placed under directAustrian rule, while members of theHabsburg family were installed as theruling sovereigns of most other Italianstates. There was no suggestion ofestablishing a Confederation underAustrian control as was done with

Germany. Italy, in Metternich's view,was no more than a 'geographicalexpression'. Given the strength oflocal loyalties and bitter regionalantagonisms, the notion of a unitedItaly seemed a political fantasy in1815.

Secret societies, like the Carbonari,became the focal point for individualswith gnevances against the restoredmonarchies. Most society membersdid not agree about the means toachieve their ends or even about theends themselves. A few dreamt of Italybecoming a single nation with ademocratically elected parliament.Most simply wished for localconstitutional reform. The only thingthey had in common was a desire to

HistoryReview Murd 2006 1 5

'To defeat cannon and soldiers,

cannon and soldiers are

needed. Arms are needed and

not Mazzinian pratings.

Piedmont has soldiers and

cannons. Therefore I am

Piedmontese'.

kick out the absolute monarchs andfree Italy from Austria's grasp.Revolutions in 1820-1 and 1831 wereunsuccessful. Austrian troops quicklyrestored order. The secret societiesfailed to generate mass support andwere not up to the task of directing agreat national revival.

Mazzini, Gioberti and BalboIn 1831 Giuseppe Mazzini launched'Young Italy'. Those who joined thesociety had to swear to dedicatethemselves to the endeavour to makeItaly 'one free, independentrepublican nation'. Believing thatItalians must achieve unity by theirown efforts, Mazzini envisaged'Young Italy' inciting a war of nationalliberation against Austria and thepetty despots. Pinning his hopes onthe educated middle class and urbanartisans, he had little faith in thepeasantry and thus little interest inland reform which might havebrought the rural masses to his side.

Mazzini's efforts to spark a war ofliberation failed miserably and in 1836he was forced to disband 'YoungItaly'. His movement was too idealisticto be a practical blueprint forrevolution. However, his writingshelped put the idea of a united Italyfirmly on the political agenda and hisinfluence on a section of patriots, notleast Garibaldi, was huge. In the1830s and 1840s the idea of anindependent Italy captured the mindsof writers, historians and composersand a host of poems, books andoperas emphasised Italy's gloriouspast.

Mazzini was not the only Italianideologist. Gioberti in the early 1840sdismissed total Italian unity as'madness', rejected revolutionarymethods and saw no future forrepublicanism. Instead he placed hishopes in the Pope, whom heenvisaged as leader of a federation ofexisting Italian states. Balbo had a

Victor Emmanuel II, Cavour and Napoleon III clip the claws of Austria.

different vision. While acceptingGioberti's idea of an Italian federation,he saw no specific role for the Pope.He claimed that Piedmont was theonly Italian state capable of expellingAustria from Italy - the first step topolitical change. He thus advocatedthat its king should lead thefederation. In 1846, when Pius IXbecame Pope, it seemed as thoughGioberti's ideas, rather than Balbo's,might come to fruition. While far froma wholehearted liberal, Pius was not&n out-and-out reactionary. A series ofreforms in the Papal States wasimitated elsewhere. Popularenthusiasm for the papacy rose togreat heights.

The 1848-9 RevolutionsThe 1848-9 revolutions changedeverything. Poor harvests in 1846 and1847 created a potential revolutionarysituation even before news of theFebruary 1848 revolution in Paris and

the March revolution in Viennareached the peninsula. While the1848 revolutions can be seen asevidence of growing nationalconsciousness, local grievances weremore important than Italiannationalism in sparking off risings. The'alliance' of Italians never amountedto much. Pope Pius dissociated himselffrom war against Austria and called onItalians to remain loyal to their presentrulers.

The creation of a Roman Republic,headed by Mazzini, cemented Pius'sconservatism. Fleeing to Naples, heappealed to France, Austria and Spainfor help. The decisive campaign wasundertaken by 20,000 French troops.Garibaldi fed a gallant defence ofRome before the city fell in July1849. Returning to Rome, Pius setup a reactionary government.Henceforward, the Catholic Churchwas to be a major stumbling btock inthe way of unification.

1 6 History Review Murch 2006

Seen by some as a cautious conservative and by others as a cautious liberal, inreality he was just cautious.

Piedmont, unlike the papacy, gavesome hope to Italian nationalists in1848-9. King Charles Albert (1831-49) began his reign as a reactionary.However, in the 1840s liberalisinginfluences crept into Piedmont. InMarch 1848 Charles Albert,apparently throwing in his lot with theliberal nationalists, granted aconstitution {the Statuto) and went towar with Austria. It should be said thathe was more concerned to annexLombardy and Venetia than to pursuethe goal of a united Italy. Defeated atCustoza (July 1848), Charles Albert re-entered the war against Austria in1849. Crushed at Novara (April 1849),he abdicated in favour of his sonVictor Emmanuel II.

By 1849 the hopes of liberals andnationalists had collapsed. Austrianmilitary strength, lack of cooperationbetween the revolutionary groups,and failure to appeal to the peasantmasses ensured the failure of the1848-9 revolutions. Apart from theStatuto, none of the constitutionsobtained from their rulers by therevolutionaries survived. The Statutowas far from democratic: it created animpotent parliament, elected by lessthan 3 per cent of Piedmont'spopulation. Nevertheless, it did offer afew, wealthy, citizens opportunitiesfor political participationopportunities not possible elsewherein Italy once the old guard returned.

The lesson of 1848-9 appeared tobe that romantic idealism could notsucceed against the existing orderunless supported by force. Lombardrevolutionary Pallavinco said: 'Todefeat cannon and soldiers, cannonand soldiers are needed. Arms areneeded and not Mazzinian pratings.Piedmont has soldiers and cannons.Therefore I am Piedmontese'.Nationalists of various hues, includingGaribaldi, reached a similarconclusion: if Italy was to be liberatedand united it would be by the militarystrength of Piedmont. The NationalSociety, which emerged in 1857,promoted this view. It had only a fewthousand members but substantial

influence.

Victor Emmanuel and CavourKing Victor Emmanuel was 29 yearsold in 1849. Likeable and courageous,he was also shrewd and politicallyskilful. Seen by some as a cautiousconservative and by others as acautious liberal, in reality he was justcautious. His main aim was to speed

up Piedmont's recovery so that it wasable to fight Austria again. He hopedto marry a policy of extendingPiedmontese influence in Italy with theidea of nationalism.

In 1852 Count Camiilo di Cavourbecame Piedmont's prime minister. Inhis journal // Risorgimento Cavour hadclaimed that Italian rulers shouldcooperate to throw out Austrian

TI RREN 0

In this caricature from 1866, Italian figures trying to complete unificationare prevented by a symbol representing the papacy. It took the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 to remove the obstacle.

History Review March Z006 1 7

For many southerners it was hard to distinguish

between unification and colonisation by Piedmont.

Pope Pius IX, King Victor Emmanueland Garibaldi - three key figures in

the Risorgimento.

influence. But he was no revolutionaryand his hopes for unification weretempered by his loyalty to thePiedmontese monarchy. While hebelieved in parliamentary institutions,he had no faith in full democracy andwas vehemently opposed to Mazzini'srepublicanism. A cunning opportunist,Cavour was to play a major roie inItalian unification. However,unification did not come aboutaccording to any carefully conceivedplan on his part. Indeed, pre-1860 hedid not conceive of the possibility ofItaly as a unitary state. In most respectsCavour supported traditionalPiedmontese aims - to free Italy fromAustrian influence and to strengthenPiedmont by annexing territory innorth and central Italy,

Cavour realised the importance offoreign assistance if Piedmont was todefeat Austria. In 1855 Piedmontjoined Britain and France in theCrimean War, Cavour returned homeempty-handed from the 1855 ParisPeace Conference but at least he hadmade important contacts, especiallywith Napoleon III, The Crimean Warhelped Cavour's cause in another way.It left Austria isolated. Britain, Franceand Russia were angry she had nothelped them in the war. In 1856Cavour committed himself to the goalof securing an alliance with France.Napoleon 111, who had maintained along interest in Italian affairs, toldCavour he wanted 'to do somethingfor Italy'. Keen to champion liberalcauses and to support the principle ofnationality, his wish to help the Italianswas sincere. However, his policy wasshaped by other motives, not least hisdesire to secure a revision of the 1815settlement. While not anxious tocreate a strong unified Italy whichmight represent a threat to France, afederation of Italian states with anenlarged Piedmont acting as a Frenchsatellite was an attractive proposition.

In July 1858 Napoleon and Cavourmet at Plombieres to discuss the Italianquestion. After iengthy negotiations adeal was struck. Essentially Cavourwould provoke Austria into war.France would then send troops to helpPiedmont evict the Austrians fromLombardy and Venetia. Theseprovinces would be added toPiedmont, In return France would takeSavoy and Nice from Piedmont. Aformal - and secret - treaty, largelyincorporating this deal, was signed inJanuary 1859. Napoleon and Cavourdid not agree about everything.Whereas Cavour hoped to annex thecentra! Italian states. Napoleon aimedto form a separate central Italiankingdom, to be ruled by his cousinwho was to marry Victor Emmanuel'sdaughter.

The First War of Italian LiberationThings did not go quite to plan.Cavour's efforts to provoke Austriainto war failed. Diplomaticintervention from Russia and Britainresulted in Napoleon losing his nerve,and in April 1859 he joined the otherpowers in asking Piedmont todemobilise its army. Ironically, Austria

now came to Piedmont's rescue.Determined to humiliate Piedmontfurther. Emperor Franz Josephdemanded that Piedmont's army bereturned to a peacetime footing. Theultimatum was rejected. Thus, on 29April Austna declared war. VictorEmmanuel immediately issued aproclamation: 'People of Italy! Austriaassails Piedmont... I fight for the rightof the whole nation .,, I have no otherambition than to be the first soldier ofItalian independence'. The

proclamation had only a limited effect-Few Italians outside Piedmont ralliedto his cause. However, Napoleon kepthis word and declared war. Over100,000 French troops crossed theAlps, defeating Austrian forces in twobrutal battles at Magenta andSolferino. These French victoriesdecided the first war of Italianunification.

The war provoked populardisturbances across central Italy. Therulers of Tuscany, Parma and Modenawere forced to quit their states andPapal authority was challenged in theRomagna. Rebels in these regionsestablished provisional governmentsand sought fusion with Piedmont,

1 8 Hisioiy Review Morcit 2006

Piedmontese expansionism, rather than Italian nationalism, was the

real driving force behind unification.

Events were moving too fast forNapoleon. Concerned about theinternational situation anddevelopments in Italy, he concludedan armistice with Austria atVillefranca. Lombardy was to betransferred to Piedmont, Venetiawould remain Austrian and the rulersof Tuscany and Modena were to berestored, Cavour, furious at thearrangements, tned to persuadeVictor Emmanuel to fight on alone.When the King sensibly refused,Cavour resigned.

That Villefranca did not end theprocess of unification was largely dueto the work of nationalists in centralItaly. The provisional governments inTuscany, Parma, Modena and theRomagna, all strongly influenced bythe National Society, arranged for theelection of assemblies. Theseproceeded to vote for union withPiedmont, Victor Emmanuel, aware ofNapoleon's opposition, did not annexcentra! Italy immediately. The Treaty ofZurich, signed by France, Piedmontand Austria in November 1859,upheld the rights of the old rulers inprinciple but contained no practicaprovisions for their reinstatement.

This was the situation whenCavour returned to power in January1860. Fortunately for him. Napoleonwas now ready to accept Piedmonteseexpansion in central Italy, providedSavoy and Nice were ceded to France.Plebiscites across central Italy, inMarch 1860, resulted in hugemajorities in favour of annexation toPiedmont, Savoy and Nice werehanded over to France. Northern andcentral Italy, Venetia apart, was nowunited under Victor Emmanuel.Cavour wanted to stop there.Garibaldi had other ideas.

GaribaldiImpetuous and charismatic. Garibaldiwas very different from the wilyCavour. Initially a supporter ofMazzini, he had now abandoned hisrepublican ideals but remaineddevoted to the cause of Italian unity.Scandal and gossip followed him

everywhere but could not obscure hisability as a guerrilla leader. He inspireddevotion among his men and a near-religious adoration among the masses.Unlike Mazzini, he was essentiallypractical: his achievements restedupon his actions rather than histhoughts.

In April 1860 a revolt broke out inSicily. It arose in part from theexcitement generated by the events inItaly in 1859-60. A more importantcause, however, was thedisappointment felt at theconservatism of the new King FrancisII. Garibaldi, who had been planningaction against France in Nice, now setabout raising a force to invade Sicily.Hoping to spark a nationalist uprisingthat would unite the whole of Italy, heasked Cavour for support. Thatsupport was not forthcoming, Cavourwas not convinced that the conquestof backward Sicily and Naples wasdesirable, even if it could be done.Moreover, foreign governments mightbe tempted to interfere if too muchwas done too quickly. He thus made itclear that Garibaldi did not havePiedmont's official backing. However,aware that Victor Emmanuesupported Garibaldi, he did notprevent his departure. Cavourreckoned there might be benefitswhatever happened: if Garibaldi failedPiedmont would be well rid of him; ifhe succeeded. Piedmont might derivesome advantage.

In May 1860, with 1,089 red-shirted volunteers. Garibaldi set sailfor Sicily in two old paddle steamers.His chances of success were remote.Francis II now had 25,000 troops inSicily and the revolt had been crushed.However, Garibaldi set about winningthe Sicilian peasants by promising landreform and tax reduction. Gatheringrecruits, he won a surpnse victory atCalatafimi, In July Neapolitan troopswithdrew to Naples. Sicily wasGaribaldi's. Appointing himself'dictator', he set about preparing toattack the mainland. Fearing -correctly - that Cavour might preventhim using the island as a base for an

attack on Naples, he did not hand overSicily to Piedmont,

In Naples King Francis accepted aconstitution and brought in liberalministers. Meanwhile, Cavour wasconcerned that Garibaldi might gettoo much credit for uniting Italy if hecontinued unchecked - credit whichshould go to Piedmont. An attempt byCavour to arrange a revolution inNaples in favour of Victor Emmanuelfailed. On the night of 18-19 August,Ganbaldi, dodging Piedmontese shipssent to prevent him crossing the Straitsof Messina, ferried 3,360 men to themainland. Winning the support ofpoor peasants, he headed north. KingFrancis fled from his capital and on 7September Garibaldi entered Naplesto a hero's welcome.

Garibaldi now aimed to advanceon Rome. However, Neapolitanmilitary resistance north of Napleshindered his plans and gave Cavourtime to regain the upper hand. Heknew that Garibaldi's march on Romecould provoke war with Napoleon,who considered himself the Pope'sprotector. Aware that the 'thousand'had swelled to over 50,000, Cavouralso feared that Garibaldi might takeover the whole of Italy, includingPiedmont, Determined to interceptGaribaldi before he reached Rome,Victor Emmanuel led the Piedmontarmy southwards. After defeating aPapal army, Piedmontese forcesreached Neapolitan territory. Garibaldinow had the choice of acknowledgingVictor Emmanuel or fighting him. On26 October Garibaldi saluted VictorEmmanuel as 'the first king of Italy'and handed over his conquests.Refusing titles and wealth, he retiredto Caprera with a year's supply ofmacaroni and little else.

Plebiscites were organised inNaples, Umbria and the PapalMarches. The voters had littlealternative: unite with Piedmont orcontinue the present state of nearanarchy. A huge majority in favour ofunion was returned. What those whovoted 'yes' thought they were votingfor is not clear. A united Italy could

History Review Murch 2006 19

The three musketeers of unification wereMazzini, Cavour and Garibaldi, it washardly a case of ail for one and one for all.

take several forms: it could be afederal state in which the regionsretained considerable autonomy or itcould become a centralised state,dominated by Piedmont. After 1860Piedmontese systems were imposedupon the rest of the country. The firstItalian parliament, elected in 1861,met in Turin, capital of Piedmont.Italy adopted the far fromdemocratic Piedmontese constitution.Piedmontese civil servants, politiciansand soldiers dominated the newkingdom - which was proclaimed inMarch 1861. Unification was almostbut not quite complete: the arearound Rome remained under papalcontrol and Venetia was still Austrian.

The Risorgimento CompletedIn 1861 Italian politician d'Azeglioremarked to Victor Emmanuel: 'Sir, wehave made itaiy. Now we must makeItalians'. The governments of the1860s, led by a succession ofundistinguished conservatives (Cavourdied in June 1861), struggled to makea united Italy a reality. They faced hugedifficulties. Strong local loyaltiesremained. As Cavour had recognised,the rivalry between north and southwas a major problem. For manysoutherners it was hard to distinguishbetween unification and colonisationby Piedmont. Not surprisinglysouthern opinion soon turned againstVictor Emmanuel and law and orderbroke down. By 1863 90,000 Italiantroops were committed topeacekeeping operations in the south.The government emerged victoriousbut more lives were lost in the'brigands' war' than were lost in allthe battles for unification. The Pope'shostility to the new state was anadded problem. So was Garibaldi,who was determined to bring Romeand Venice into the new state. In 1862and 1867 he raised volunteer forces toconquer Rome, only to be stopped bygovernment troops. The Italiangovernment had no wish to damagerelations with France, whose forcesstill guarded Rome.

The international situation led to

the addition of Venetia and Rome tothe new kingdom. In a secret treatywith Prussia in 1866, Italy agreed thatif Prussia went to war with Austriawithin two months, she would followher in declaring war on Austria,receiving Venetia for her pains. Whilethe war was a disaster for Italianforces, Prussian victory led to Italy'stake-over of Venetia. Then the Franco-Prussian war in 1870 led to Frenchforces being withdrawn from Rome.Italian troops were thus able to occupythe city. Pope Pius IX shut himself inthe Vatican and refused to negotiate.In a plebiscite in October 1870 Romevoted overwhelmingly for union withItaly and became the capital.

ConclusionMazzini had wanted Italy to 'makeitself. This is not quite whathappened. Without the favourableinternational situation, unificationwould not have come about when itdid. Piedmontese expansionism,rather than Italian nationalism, wasthe real driving force behindunification. Moreover the Italy thatwas created by 1861 was not the Italythat nationalists like Mazzini hadenvisaged. Nevertheless, nationalismwas a vital element in theRisorgimento, not least in 1859-60when the National Society persuadedItalians they should support Piedmont.Italian individuals also played keyroles.

The three musketeers ofunification were Mazzini, Cavour andGaribaldi- It was hardly a case of all forone and one for all The three hatedeach other's guts and opinions. Yettheir interaction was crucial. Mazziniprovided the intellectual basis for thenationalist movement and inspiredsome influential leaders, includingGaribaldi. Cavour was moreimportant. He was once seen as anItalian nationalist whose everydiplomatic manoeuvre was designedto promote unification. In reality, hischief concern was to extendPiedmontese power and to use theappeal of a united Italy as a means to

this end. Garibaldi's contribution tothe cause of Italian unity was vital. Hisexploits made him a focal point forpatriotic emotion. His conquest of thesouth in 1860, against all the odds,was a major element in the unificationprocess. He could have establishedhimself as dictator of southern Italybut believed national unity to be moreimportant than personal ambition.

Victor Emmanuel is often seen aslucky - a ruler who was simply in theright place at the right time. However,perhaps he made his own luck. Heappointed the right people (not leastCavour) who carried out his policies.His role in the unification process hasoften been under-estimated.Accordingly, while it is possible toargue that Garibaldi did unite Italywith Victor Emmanuel's help, astronger case - the case that reallytakes the Garibaldi biscuit (!) - is toclaim that Victor Emmanuel unitedItaly with the help of Garibaldi (andCavour).

Further ReadingD. Beales and E. Biagini, TheRisorgimento and the Unification of/fa/y {Longman, 2002)M. Clark, The Italian Risorgimento(Longman, 1998)J.Gooch, The Unification of Italy(Methuen, 1986)D. Mack Smith, Modern Italy: APolitical History (Yale UP, 1997)A. Stiles, The Unification of Italy 1815-70 (Hodder S< Stoughton, 2̂ ^̂ edition,2001)

Issues to Debateo What role did national feeling playin the unification of Italy?o How important a figure was LouisNapoleon in the Risorgimento?o Why did the new Italian state faceso many problems during its firstyears?

Alan Farmer is Head of History atSt Martin's College, Lancaster. Hehas written numerous books onmodern European, British andAmerican history.

2 0 History Review March 2006