Forest Policy and Economics 26 (2013) 131–137

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Forest Policy and Economics

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The Swedish forest sector's approach to a formalized forest policy within the EU

Therese Bjärstig ⁎Department of Geography and Economic History, Umeå University, 901 87 Umeå, Sweden

⁎ Tel.: +46 90 7866682; fax: +46 702161268.E-mail address: therese.bjarstig@geography.umu.se.

1 This paper builds on partly translated, revised and uthesis En gemensam europeisk skogspolitik? En integpolicyområde på tillväxt. Andersson (2007).

1389-9341/$ – see front matter © 2012 Elsevier B.V. Allhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2012.08.005

a b s t r a c t

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 20 April 2012Received in revised form 6 August 2012Accepted 17 August 2012Available online 25 September 2012

Keywords:Forest policyEuropean UnionSwedenNon-governmental actorsNeo-functionalismCultivated spillover

This paper analyzes the Swedish forest sector's approach to a formalized forest policy within the EU; utilizing arevisited neo-functional framework focusing on cultivated spillover and non-governmental forest stakeholders'preferences and strategies. The study is based on in-depth interviews with central non-governmental represen-tatives divided into four categories: forest owners, forest industry, environmental representatives and otherrepresentatives. The paper shows that, in spite of lacking interest and engagement in this issue on the Swedishgovernment's side, the Swedish forest owners and the forest industry have made a U-turn and now welcomesome form of formalized forest policy in the EU, as it would benefit their interests. They also believe they caninfluence the content of the integration process. This confirms the theoretical premise that organized interests,in this case non-governmental forestry stakeholders in Sweden, can act as pressure groups for further coordina-tion and integration. National and transnational elites and their work in transnational networks and associationsseem particularly important in this context.

© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction1

Forest is not a formal, integrated policy area in the European Union(EU). There is currently no community legislation or legal foundationfor a common forest policy in the treaty. It is only possible to talkabout a “forest policy” based on the EU Forest Strategy (now underrevision, to be updated in 2012) and the Forest Action Plan, as well asseveral other initiatives that directly or indirectly affect forestry (for amore comprehensive overview of these initiatives see Pülzl, 2005).Some of the Member States support further integration, and adminis-trative units, structures and methods within the EU have been createdto promote such a development (Pülzl and Lazdinis, 2011; Lazdiniset al., 2009; Andersson, 2007). On the other hand, there are a fewMember States that oppose attempts to integrate forest policy, ofwhich Sweden stands out as the most reluctant. The Swedishgovernment holds the position that forest and forestry should remaina national interest and competence (Regeringskansliet, 2012).

Reasonably, one could think that this is a position shared by mostSwedish forest stakeholders. Initially, when Sweden became a memberof the EU in 1995, this was the case. But something has happened overthe years, and several of the non-governmental forest stakeholders arenow calling for some form of formalized forest policy for the EU.

From a theoretical perspective this disagreement constitutesan interesting situation, as classical integration theories, such as

pdated material from the PhDrationsteoretisk studie av ett

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neo-functionalism, see integration as something desirable (Haas,1958; 1964). In addition, in many applications of the theory, integra-tion tends to happen almost automatically (in terms of spillover) andwithout any great difficulty. This seems not to be the case when itcomes to forest, however. Thus, this paper will go back to the founda-tion of neo-functional thinking, more precisely to the concept ofspillover, and look at how it has been elaborated on over the yearsand whether it still is a useful tool for explaining and understandingthe progress (or non-progress) of the integration process regardingforestry.

The overall purpose of this paper is to analyze the Swedish forestsector's approach to the attempts to establish a formalized forest policywithin the EU.Whyhave some forest stakeholders changed their prefer-ences and strategies over time (1995–2012)? And what implicationswill this have on the forest stakeholders' perceived influence when itcomes to their possibilities to affect the integration process in one wayor another?

The Swedish forest sector is broadly defined here to includeforest owners, the forest industry (the sectors of woodworking,pulp and paper production and packaging, printing and publishing,interlinked through a common use of forest raw material), forestworkers, entrepreneurs and foresters, as well as the Saami peopleand environmental representatives with an interest in forest (seeSection 3 for a more detailed description of the actors included inthis study).

2. Analytical framework

Haas, the founder of neo-functionalism, defines integration as aprocess whereby “political actors in several distinct national settings

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are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activ-ities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demandjurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Haas, 1958: 16).This is a broad definition that includes both a social process (shiftingof loyalties) and a political process (negotiation and decision-makingregarding how the supranational institutions should be designed).Collaboration emerged, according to Haas, as a result of negotiationsbetween political authorities and interest groups at the nationallevel and between international and national organizations at theinternational level. In this study, integration is perceived as a process(steered by interest-driven actors) whereby the level and scope ofcollaboration on the supranational level (EU) increase.

The central idea of neo-functionalism is that integration in onesector will spread to other sectors, and this expansive integration isexplained in terms of spillover. Lindberg defines spillover as “a situationin which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation inwhich the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions,which in turn create conditions and need for more action and soforth” (Lindberg, 1963: 10). Functional spillovermeans that the integra-tion in an economic sector creates an immediate push to integrate othersectors, because the modern economy is a functional entity (Haas,1958: 297).

The second form of spillover, political spillover, is largely a result ofeconomic integration. The idea behind political spillover is that theeconomic integration process leads to a buildup of political pressurefor further integration in the Member States and within the bureau-cracy. Interest groups are linked to the integrated sector, and act aspressure groups for further coordination, by influence groups outsidethe process. Such political mechanisms can also be used by theadministrative unit, whose duties and prestige are associated withstronger integration (Nugent, 1999: 491–519; Lindberg, 1963:49–93). Haas and Lindberg therefore place special emphasis on theemergence of transnational elites, as they see them as an instrumentfor the continued development of the integration process. Accordingto Haas, these actors call for further integration because it promotestheir economic and ideological interests. This study will examinewhether there is any evidence of a Swedish non-governmental forestelite (here defined as people in leading positions who intermingleand engage in transnational associations and policy processes in theEU, and who take the lead and/or promote further integrationvis-à-vis their colleagues and members nationally).

The third form of spillover, cultivated spillover, distances itselfmarkedly from the automatic and inevitable processes usually associatedwithneo-functionalism, and instead focuses on the interest-driven actors'role in the process. An example of this is Lindberg and Scheingold, whoadded the impact of political leadership, or a lack thereof, to their theoret-ical assumptions (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970). Cultivated spilloverimplies that someactors consciously shape coalitions and linkdifferent is-sues with each other, making the integration process highly dependenton the political will of various institutions and actors (Niemann, 1998).According to Haas, there is a separate process towards enhanced cooper-ation, but also strategic and interest-driven actors. The relationshipbetween them can almost be described as dialectical. Thus, spillovercould be turned into spill-back or spill-around, depending on how theplayers choose to act (Haas, 1976).

Functional spillover will not be explicitly studied in this paper;neither is political spillover studied to any great extent except asregards the potential emergence of transnational elites. Cultivatedspillover is the main focus of this paper, since it emphasizes theinterest-driven actors and their possibilities to affect the integrationprocess in different ways. Earlier neo-functional research has tendedto focus on structures and institutions rather than actors. Whenactors have been studied, the emphasis has been primarily on themovement of loyalties, common ideals and identity rather than oninterest-driven actors as central to the progress (or non-progress)of the integration process (Schmitter, 2005; Tranholm-Mikkelsen,

1991). How actors can affect the integration process in differentways will be discussed next.

Schmitter (1969) takes a process-oriented approach to spilloverand places an explicit focus on the actors (mainly governments)involved in the integration process. However, spillover is seen bySchmitter as only one of several possible strategies that can beapplied to the process. According to Schmitter, spillover is the strate-gy an actor uses when it is most strategic to increase both the scopeand level of the supranational cooperation. Spill-around is the strategyto choose if an actor wants to maintain the level of the decision-making but increase the scope of the cooperation. Buildup is a strategythat leads to increased supranational cooperation, through which thecommon institutions will be strengthened (level) but will not begiven competence in any new areas (scope). Another actor strategyis retrench, which is used when an actor wants to increase the com-mon institutions' decision-making competence (level) but decreasethe areas the institutions can decide on (scope). Muddle-about givesregional bureaucrats the opportunity to debate and make suggestionsto a greater extent than previously since the supranational impactdecreases, but at the same time the areas for this improved regionalinfluence are limited to the same extent as the areas for supranationaldeliberation increase. Spill-back is the opposite of spillover: this is astrategy the actors select if they want to decrease both the level andscope of the cooperation and return to how things were before thecooperation started (i.e. disintegration). The last, and according toSchmitter also the most likely, strategy for an actor to adopt is theencapsulate strategy, whereby the actors choose to react to changesonly through marginal adjustments or non-action (Schmitter, 1971:242).

These different actor strategies are developed on a general level,and apply to the overall EU cooperation rather than distinct attemptsto establish a common policy, which is the focus of this paper.Further, Schmitter only has the formal integration process in mindwhereas policy areas like forest that have not been formally integrat-ed into the EU (at least not yet) are harder to fit into his model. None-theless, Schmitter's model is an interesting and useful starting pointto build on since a central aspect of the model is how the system gen-erates strategies of national actors. He bases these strategies on arational actor model: “The model assumes that integration is basically(but not exclusively) a rational process whereby actors calculateanticipated returns from various alternative strategies of participa-tion in joint decision making structures” (Schmitter, 1971: 238).

Cultivated spillover may thus not merely be an expression of thepolitical leadership's role in the process; the role of national andtransnational non-governmental stakeholders is also to be takeninto account. Following Schmitter, is it the actors' preferences andtheir choice of different strategies rather than movement of loyalties,common ideals and identity that are assumed to be the driving forceof the integration process (or disintegration process).

The starting point for this study is that interest-driven actors willrank their preferences, in this specific case concerning how forestissues should be handled within the framework of the EU. Dependingon what room for maneuvering the actors have, they try in variousways to realize their preferences. The actors have to take into accountthe context—that is, other actors and their expected behavior, theavailable information and knowledge, and power relations. Giventhis context, strategies are to be seen as a tool for the actors in theirefforts to realize or get as close to fulfillment of their preferences aspossible. Strategies are realized through a deliberate action (or adeliberate non-action) by the stakeholders to realize their preferences.

Further, strategies are not perceived as the day-to-day strategiesthe forest stakeholders use when trying to influence the political pro-cesses (for approaches that explicitly look at such influencing strate-gies, see Opedal et al., 2012; Binderkrantz, 2008). Rather, strategiesimply a more general and long-term activity that focuses on howthe actors choose to pursue their preferences when it comes to the

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level and scope of the cooperation regarding forest in the EU. Theconcept of strategy as used in international relations (Riker andOrdeshook, 1973; Schellinger, 1960) can be used here to provide abridge between preferences (overall objectives) on the one handand concrete action (or non-action) on the other. A strategy providesa general guide for the actors' behavior in order to realize their pref-erences. The concept of strategy must therefore be linked to the pref-erences to make some sense. Strategies and preferences combinedmake an overall approach.

Schmitter presents seven types of actor strategies, which aremerged here into four approaches after being combined with a poten-tial set of preferences on how forest issues should be handled(according to prevailing forms of cooperation in the EU) .

The national approach would apply to the actors with the prefer-ence that forest remains solely a national competence; they will prob-ably not act at all on the European level, which is a conscious choice.Their view that forest and forestry issues are best handled nationallyalso means that they concentrate their activities and strategies solelyto the national arena (e.g. spill-back).

The pragmatic approachwould apply to the actors with the prefer-ence that some form of intergovernmental cooperation within the EUis desirable, or at least acceptable. Forest is not put in the treaty, andall Member States have the right to veto. These actors would primar-ily be reactive in their activities and interactions (e. g. encapsulate,muddle-about).

The tactical approach would apply to the actors with the prefer-ence that forest should be a shared competence between the MemberStates and the EU, and that it should be regulated in the treaty. Theseactors deliberately try to influence developments in the desired direc-tion (regardless of whether it implies strategies of spill-around, build-up, retrench, etc.) and are proactive in their actions, both nationallyand toward the EU.

The supranational approachwould apply to the actors with the prefer-ence that a common forest policy, whereby the EU has exclusive compe-tence, is desirable. Forest is regulated as an explicit policy area in thetreaty. These actors would concentrate their activities and strategies sole-ly to the supranational arena and the EU's institutions (e.g. spillover).

The four approaches above should be perceived as an analyticaltool for sorting and analyzing the Swedish forest stakeholders'approaches, depending on their preferences and how active theychoose to be in their work (the strategies they apply).

3. Material and method

Sweden's democratic system has a long tradition of involving dif-ferent stakeholders and organizations in the political process. Interestgroups and organizations play an important role in both policy for-mulation and its implementation. The well-established Swedishconsensus-oriented approach in policy is the result of an ongoing pro-cess through which discussions and shared experiences will result(at best) in shared values and attitudes (Shartau, 2010; Lijphart,1998). Such a dialogue is possible in the forest sector: private forestowners are organized into a national association and forestry workersinto trade unions; the forest industry collaborates in the SwedishForest Industries Federation; people with an interest in nature con-servation and environment, recreation, hunting and so on work in avariety of interest groups; and the Saami people have their own orga-nization. These various interest groups act as more or less permanentconsultation bodies or points of reference in the development andimplementation of Swedish forest policy (Ekelund and Hamilton,2001). The Swedish case is thus interesting since one could assumethat the same would apply to the forest-related issues in the EU,which however seems not to be the situation since the governmentand some of the forest stakeholders are of different opinionsconcerning this issue. Among the Member States in general, and themajor forest nations in particular, Sweden stands out as one of the

most reluctant and outspoken when it comes to negotiating someform of legally binding agreement in the area. Altogether, thismakes the study of the Swedish non-governmental forest stake-holders' approach and perceived influence on the integrations pro-cess an exciting case.

The basis for this paper is 22 in-depth interviews with represen-tatives (in leading positions) of the most influential business andinterest groups in the Swedish forest sector and their transnationalnetworks on a European level (using the Commission of Inquiry onForestry 2004 reference group, the Swedish Forest Agency's nationalsector council, to identify and contact the respondents nationally andJanse, 2005, to identify transnational networks). The interviewswere done face-to-face and lasted approximately 60 min each, andwere conducted during the period 2004–2007 (following Kvale,1996). The interviewed have been anonymized and are not referredto by name or title in the text, to allow for as open and straightfor-ward a dialogue as possible. Instead, I refer to four categories ofstakeholders in the text: (1) industry representatives, i.e. representa-tives of Holmen Skog AB, Sveaskog, SCA, Setra Group, Stora EnsoForest Products, the Swedish Forest Industries Federation, theConfederation of European Paper Industries (CEPI) and the EuropeanConfederation of Woodworking Industries (CEI-Bois); (2) forestowners, i.e. representatives of the Federation of Swedish Farmers(LRF) Forestry, the Nordic Forest Owners' Associations, the HeadForester for the Swedish Church, private forest owners, the EuropeanLandowners Organisation (ELO) and the Confederation of EuropeanForest Owners (CEPF); (3) environmental representatives, i.e. repre-sentatives of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) nationally, the WWFEuropean Policy Office, the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation(SSNC) and the European Environmental Bureau (EEB); (4) otherforest stakeholders, i.e. the National Union of the Swedish Saamipeople and the Swedish Union of Forestry, Wood and GraphicWorkers. All interviews were recorded and transcribed in full.

To validate, and determine whether changes had occurred since2007, six additional in-depth interviews (with leading representa-tives from Categories 1–3, on both national and European level)were conducted at the beginning of 2012. These interviews are fairlyrepresentative, and indicate that there have not been any majorchanges in the stakeholders' positions and strategies since the timeof the study (2004–2007). A review of the different stakeholders'internal material and websites also confirms this inference, which isof particular importance when it comes to Category 4, for which noadditional interviews have been conducted.

Content analysis, more specifically computer-supported contentanalysis, has been used to sort and systematize the empirical material.The tool used was Hyperresearch, a program that helps to minimizesystematic errors and identify deviations in the material. It also allowsfor other researchers to access and verify the material in an open andeasy way. The coding manual is based on the operationalization of theanalytical framework and the interview manual, which was translatedinto different themes (such as the pros and cons of a common forestpolicy, changes over time in positions, strong vs. weak actors in the pro-cess, interactions on national/European/international level, differentforms of cooperation, etc.) that capture the level and scope of the actors'activities (strategies) to protect and promote their preferences. Theinterviewmanual contained open-ended questions. What the differentactors said and how they perceived themselves and other actors is anessential part of the study, since this indicates the extent of cultivatedspillover in the forest area.

4. Swedish forest stakeholders and their preferences

4.1. Changing preferences—why a U-turn?

The attitudes of the Swedish forest stakeholders on how forest canand should be handled within the EU differ, in terms of whether the

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policy should be formalized and introduced in the text of the Treatyand the level at which the decision-making for a formalized forestpolicy should be, as well as what form of cooperation there should be.

In the beginning (when Sweden became a member of the EU in1995) all Swedish forest stakeholders were decidedly opposed tothe establishment of any form of formal forest policy within theframework of the EU. The forest owners and the industry fearedthat a forest policy would imply forestry grants that would distortthe competition, since forestry is not perceived as a potentially viableeconomic industry in many of the Member States in the south. Butthis position has gradually changed.

When asked whether a common European forest policy should beestablished, all of those interviewed answeredwith a resounding No—and pointed to the importance of using the correct concepts whentalking about a possible forest policy in the EU:

“It will definitely not be! Definitely not! This is a conceptual question,common forest policy, common policies [i.e. supranational EC law]should not exist, but rather a forest policy in Europe. They're two dif-ferent things” (Forest owner).

“… a forest policy on the lowest level of cooperation” (Industryrepresentative).

“… I would like a forest policy similar to the environment, I don'twant a forest policy resembling the EU's agricultural policy” (Otherforest stakeholder).

Both the forest owners and the forest industry call for forest policyon a lower level than a common forest policy implies. A forest policyin terms of “supporting and coordinating actions” is suggested as anappropriate level and shape of forest policy in the EU, which is thelowest level of formal cooperation in the EU.

The forest owners were the first to change their preferences(a shift that occurred during 2004–2005). This relatively abrupt shiftin the issue is confirmed by several of the interviewed stakeholders.Only a few, very central people in the organizations (an elite), aredescribed as a driving force when it came to reviewing and amendingthe previous statement of position. The industry's change is describedin the same manner by an industry representative:

“There were a few of us who internally agreed: now is the time tomake a U-turn!” (Forest owner).

“This was nothing that came from below, there were people at thesenior level who recognized and understood that we should changeour position” (Industry representative).

The reasons behind the change of preferences and the suddenU-turn are several. An industry representative gives the followingexplanation for why the industry changes its position:

“The realization that it was not as we thought it would be, it turnedout that even if we tried to keep the forest policy outside the EU itwould come in the back door, and we believe it's an inferior strategyor solution than if we had had a clear mandate at a certain level inEurope” (Industry representative).

There is now a recognition among the interviewed representativesof the forestry industry and forest owners that the forest policy issuesare affected both indirectly and directly by a range of other EU policies(a functional spillover that affects them whether they want it or not).Faced with the perceived threat that environmental interests wouldtake over and lead the discussion in the forest area, it is considered a

better strategy to treat the forest as an area of its own, focusing on theindustry (e.g. an expression of spill-around, buildup and/or retrench).

As forest issues have taken other routes in the EU and the stake-holders have not always been able to influence or slow down the pro-cess, several of those interviewed argue that it is better that forest bedealt with as a separate policy in the EU rather than be linked to otherrelated policies. Forest as its own area justifies a comprehensiveapproach, which should lead to better coordination of efforts andactivities within the forest sector. There are also hopes that the statusof the forest area will be raised and that the resources for implemen-tation will improve. It is also assumed that questions of how thestakeholders can target their efforts and who should be held account-able will be clearer if some form of formal forest policy is establishedwithin the EU.

Another argument asserted by the forest owners is that a formalforest policy in the EU would offer opportunities to promote theNordic forestry model, in which it is possible to combine an activeforest industry with environmental concerns as well as opportunitiesfor recreation, hunting, fishing and picking mushrooms and berries.The forest industry, on the other hand, argues that the competitive-ness of European industry in global terms would be strengthened ifa formal forest policy were established in the EU, since this wouldhopefully mean that similar rules would apply in all Member States.This would in turn facilitate the operations of the forest-based enter-prises operating in more than one of the Member States.

Interviewed representatives of the environmental movement andother forest stakeholders do not provide an entirely clear picture, butare generally skeptical regarding a formalization of forest policy with-in the EU (unlike their umbrella organizations at European level).However, they are open to some form of international cooperationin the field, provided that it aims high enough on environmentalpolicy issues.

All the interviewed forest stakeholders present arguments both infavor of and against a formal forest policy. The main argumentsagainst a formal forest policy are that forest is a national asset; Swe-den is a big forest nation but a small nation when it comes to votesin the EU; forest grants would distort the market; and many MemberStates in southern Europe have another view on forest and forestry.The main arguments for a formal forest policy is that forestry isimpacted by many other policy areas, which makes it hard to followthe decision processes and hold anyone accountable; forestry shouldbe treated as a viable economic sector; other actors have said yes to aformal forest policy; and the impact from environmental and energysectors would be easier to handle. It is clear that the stakeholderswho have come to change their position over time (the forest ownersand the forest industry) present a more comprehensive and nuancedpicture, discussing both the pros and cons connected to a formalforest policy in the EU and how global trends may affect the forestarea in the future (i.e. their economic and ideological interests).

5. Forest stakeholders' strategies at national and EU level

5.1. The work nationally—lack of knowledge

Most of the interviewed forest stakeholders see Sweden as thecentral arena for their work. They direct the main part of their efforts,which in most cases go through the different associations theyare members of, towards Swedish politicians and the overall forestadministration. The forest stakeholders direct much of their criticismat the politicians' and officials' knowledge and management of theforest issue. The overwhelming majority of those interviewed pointto the fact that the politicians are generally relatively ignorantabout, and in many cases also quite uninterested in, how forest issuesare handled in Brussels, and what impact the decisions in Brusselswill have on the various forest stakeholders' interests nationally:

135T. Bjärstig / Forest Policy and Economics 26 (2013) 131–137

“…political parties have very low competence when it comes to forestand forestry” (Forest owner).

“…we handle it in such a bad way, and as I said before, I think it's lackof both competence and knowledge on those issues in the Parliamentand Government” (Other forest stakeholder).

“…it feels sad that the authorities and the Parliament and theGovernment are so uninterested” (Environment representative).

One of the more important issues for the stakeholders is thus toinform the politicians and officials of their organization's positionand the reasons behind the changing preferences, but also:

“Provide politicians with information in advance (…) they want toknow, they want contact. They want us to talk about what's importantand what's less important. That's how it is” (Industry representative).

In this respect, the industry and forest owners have a commoncause and cooperate in their efforts to influence and inform. If theforest owners and the industry are united, they believe, this willgive their message greater weight.

Many of the interviewed forest stakeholders, however, considerthat it is not sufficient to work only nationally:

“It's pretty naive to think that it's enough to lobby against Swedish pol-iticians in Sweden. We have to lobby more against Swedish politicianswho work in the EU” (Industry representative).

“We've gradually realized that we must direct more efforts againstthe EU and give European forest policy more time and resources,which obviously means that we've upgraded our engagement in Eu-ropean issues” (Forest owner).

5.2. The work at European level—transnational networks a key tosuccess?

Several of the interviewed representatives in the industrial cate-gory said they have been too nationally focused and that they mustchange their strategy and become more Europe-focused:

“I can only confirm that I've given priority to the EU and the way ofworking parallel in both Sweden and EU” (Industry representative).

They have now embraced a twin strategy; that is, they activelywork with forest issues both nationally and in the EU, work that isdone both independently and through various transnational associa-tions and networks. The dual approach becomes particularly clearwhen speaking with representatives of some of the larger forest com-panies operating in several Member States. They work through theirrepresentatives in relation to each country's politicians and authori-ties, as well through their membership in each country's forest indus-try organization. These national organizations are in turn members ofthe transnational networks (i.e. CEPI) that work closely with the EUinstitutions. The company can also indirectly have a relatively stronginfluence on the transnational network if the company is a member ofthe national forest industry associations in several Member States.This means that the company, provided it is influential in the nationalorganizations, will have several opportunities to influence the coop-eration in the transnational network. If a company is establishedin several countries, it has a chance to influence politicians andgovernment officials (civil servants) in several Member States,

which in turn increases its chances to have an impact on the issuesin the EU.

In the case of forest stakeholders' influence in the EU, much of thework is done informally through personal contacts and networks.Their more formal participation in the political process is limited pri-marily to the Advisory Group on Forestry and Cork, in which both theforest industry and the forest owners participate. In most cases theyare represented by their respective European Organizations (CEPIand CEPF) rather than by representatives of Sweden and/or a specificnational interest group.

Transnational networks, such as CEPI and CEPF, are highlighted bymost of the forest stakeholders as extremely important:

“…in our company we decided we would use the transnational associ-ations, and that we should rather spend time in them and pursue issuesthere instead of having our own staff down in Brussels” (Industryrepresentative).

“they [CEPI] have channels to and contacts with the Commission thatwe don't have” (Industry representative).

Among the stakeholders that are smaller in organizational terms,or have no transnational association to turn to, there is a frustrationfor not having knowledge of, or links to, the decision-making process-es in Brussels. The knowledge among the different non-governmentalactors varies as to how and where forest-related issues are dealt withwithin the EU. Some are well informed and familiar with the EUstructure, while others refer to their umbrella organizations at theEuropean level. For example, a respondent from the environmentalmovement says that such practical things are not something theyneed to consider in any significant way nationally, because the orga-nization is a member of a European umbrella organization located inBrussels that does all its work with the EU on this issues.

A representative in the industry category, however, raises a noteof caution that there is too great a belief in the transnational associa-tions and networks and what they can accomplish. There is a mental-ity among some of the Swedish forest actors that, according to theinterviewed representative, makes them believe that:

“We can sit back because we have our associations on the Europeanlevel and they take care of this, there's some kind of confidence thateverything's handled and provided via them [the transnationalnetwork] all the time without oneself actually being committed”(Industry representative).

There is a danger in relying too much on the transnational associ-ations, according to the industry representative, since the outcome ofthe work and the positions paper produced are based on the lowestcommon denominator among the different members in the network,and are thus not always optimal from a Swedish point of view.

However, this view is not shared by the overall group of industryand forest owner representatives; rather the opposite, since they toa great extent make a connection between their possibilities to influ-ence the process and a well-functioning cooperation in transnationalnetworks at the European level. The next section elaborates in moredetail on the actors' perceived influence on the process.

5.3. Perceived influence

Most of the interwoven forest stakeholders feel that the attemptsto establish some form of formal forest policy in the EU are initiatedand run in parallel on two levels, both nationally in the MemberStates and within the EU. Overall, the European forest owners' move-ment is perceived to be at the forefront, and is also seen as the groupthat drives the integration process and the establishment of someform of formal forest policy.

136 T. Bjärstig / Forest Policy and Economics 26 (2013) 131–137

“The forest owners are superbly updated all the time, which give usopportunities to influence the forest issues” (Forest owner).

“…they [the forest owners] are better than ourselves when it comesto political lobbying” (Industry representative).

Several of those interviewed also mention the European forest in-dustry, or more specifically CEPI, as a driving force, as well as individ-ual Member States such as Austria and Finland. A representative ofthe environmental movement, however, states that:

“There is still an inherent power to put more and more policy areasunder the EU umbrella” (Environmental representative).

This is one of very few explicit expression of perceived functionalspillover. Instead, one can detect self-confidence among the foreststakeholders. They truly feel they have a chance to influence theintegration process. Their opportunity to control or steer the devel-opment themselves may be limited in some aspects, as several ofthe representatives of the forest owner and industry categoriesexpressed that they are more or less forced to act and engage in theprocess due to the pressure from related policies (mainly environ-ment and energy), which drives them to react to protect their inter-ests, all according to the logic of neo-functionalism's functionalspillover mechanism. But the content of the forest policy process andits form is highly dependent on the different actors' preferences andstrategies, they believe; i.e. an expression of cultivated spillover.

When it comes to Sweden's general influence, all those interviewedagree that Sweden (the former Social Democratic government) hasgenerally been too reactive and has had no major influence on theprocess:

“We're pretty weak in participation at all on the international sideand definitely in the EU” (Environment representative).

“…it [the government] has been absent from quite a few meetingsand hasn't made any proactive contributions” (Forest owner).

6. Concluding remarks

6.1. Which approaches?

The empirical material clearly illustrates how two of the fourapproaches – described here as the national, the pragmatic, the tacti-cal and the supranational – prevail over the others when it comes tothe forest stakeholders. The approaches are based on the actors' pref-erences and the associated strategies, and are used here to give anoverview of how the Swedish non-governmental forest stakeholderscan be sorted depending on their positions and how active theychoose to be in their work. Further, this is a description that fits thesituation today, after forest owner and forest industry have made aU-turn on the issue.

None of the interviewed actors represent the national approachanymore; they have all revisited their positions and now want tosee some form of formal forest policy in the EU. This implies thatthey have also come to change their strategies and become moreactive on the European level. However, as stated in the introductionof this paper, the Swedish government still promotes the nationalapproach (which is elaborated on more in Andersson, 2007: 186–188).

The majority of the interviewed forest stakeholders argue that ifyou do not have much to choose from, you have to make the best ofit. They see both the pros and cons of an establishment of a formalforest policy in the EU. They represent the pragmatic approach, and

are primarily reactive when it comes to their interactions with theEU, i.e. they choose marginal adjustments or non-action. This studythus seems to confirm Schmitter's assumption that the encapsulatestrategy is the most likely one for an actor to adopt. The interviewedrepresentatives of the environmental movement and other foreststakeholder categories, together with a few representatives of boththe forest owners and the forest industry, represent this approach.This approach makes the integration process slow and hard to cap-ture, since the changes often have an incremental character.

However, most of the representatives of the forest owners and theforest industry defend their interest in a more proactive way. Theyargue that it is all about winning or losing, and deliberately try toinfluence the policy processes and decisions that affect forest in oneway or another. These actors want to see a formalized forest policy,and perceive themselves as successful in their attempts to influencethe process. A forest elite, both transnational and national, in thecategories of forest owners and industry representatives expressesthis tactical approach. They hold the view that the national leveland the EU cannot and should not be separated anymore, since theyform an interlaced political system. Thus, they emphasize the impor-tance of transnational associations as an arena for cooperation anddeliberation in the multilevel environment the EU has now become.

None of the interviewed stakeholders represent the supranationalapproach. A common forest policy is not desirable, they believe, sinceit would prevent them from defending their specific interests.

In practice, it is difficult to say that a specific stakeholder and hisor her organization adhere to only one of these approaches, since inmost cases the actors express more than one of the above-mentionedapproaches.With regard to the issue of adopting a reactive or proactiveapproach –whether to promote or oppose the establishment of a formalEuropean forest policy – none of the forest stakeholders believe a reac-tive stance on EU issues will hold in the long run; a proactive approachprovides more opportunities. A key issue for Swedish forest stake-holders is thus whether or not they are prepared to appoint therequired resources to be able to work more efficiently with the issueson both the national and European level.

6.2. Theoretical implications and future research

According to Haas (1964; 2004), some policies have more spill-over potential than others. They are characterized by their economicimportance, the degree to which they affect people's daily lives andwhether there is a perceived need for some sort of supranationalcoordination. Forest seems to be such a policy. The empirical surveyshows that the development in the forest area in many respects canbe understood and explained in the light of neo-functional theory.The attempts to establish forest as a specific policy area are a clearexpression of spillover (functional and political as well as cultivated).

Attempts to formalize a forest policy in the EU can be compared toa “prisoner's dilemma” (Axelrod, 1984) by which the various actors,in their quest to avoid the “worst” outcome (a national forest policyaccording to some players, a common European forest policyaccording to others), yet to agree on a forest policy that lies some-where in between on a sliding scale, in this case as an area forsupporting, coordinating or complimentary action. This game andpower struggle between different groups of actors may explain whystakeholders who have previously been explicitly against the estab-lishment of a formal forest policy now welcome such a policy in theEU. Similarly, we can understand why actors who previously strivedfor a common forest policy (mainly Member States in southernEurope) may be content with a formal forest policy in the EU on alower level.

One can still ask whether the changed attitude towards some formof formalized forest policy within the EU is the result of cultivatedspillover or functional spillover, whereby decisions regarding relatedpolicies have “forced” forest stakeholders to revise their preferences

137T. Bjärstig / Forest Policy and Economics 26 (2013) 131–137

and strategies. This study illustrates that attempts to integrate forestpolicy in the EU are primarily an example of cultivated spillover where-as the functional spillover restricts, or constitutes, part of the room formaneuvering to which the interest-driven actors have to relate.

The fact that decisions in related policy areas (agriculture, envi-ronment, energy and rural development) both indirectly and directlyaffect forest cannot be ignored. But the presence of (only) a functionalspillover does not automatically result in the establishment of forestpolicy in the EU. If some form of forest policy is established, it willrather be at the initiative of interest-driven non-governmental actorswho consider it the best way to continue to defend their economicand ideological interests (which in itself might be motivated by func-tional spillover).

Interviewed representatives of the forest owner and industry cat-egories experience that they can influence the content of the process(despite lacking interest and engagement in this issue from the Swed-ish government). The study confirms the theoretical premise thatorganized interests, in this case non-governmental forestry stake-holders in Sweden, can act as pressure groups for further coordina-tion and integration. National and transnational elites and theirwork in transnational networks and associations seem particularlyimportant in this context, which in turn confirms Haas and Lindberg'searly assumptions (Lindberg, 1963). The role of national and transna-tional elites should thus be scrutinized more in-depth in future studies,more specifically the extent to which they influence the governmentwhen it comes to legally binding processes such as Forest Europe andthe prospect of a legally binding agreement within the EU (for a com-prehensive overview of the Forest Europe-initiated LBA process, seeEdwards and Kleinschmit, in press).

There is clear evidence of committed and experienced forest elite inSweden, but the majority of the Swedish forest stakeholders have onlylimited knowledge of how and where forestry issues are dealt withwithin the EU. The reason several of the forest stakeholders have insuf-ficient insight into and knowledge about the issue is, according to them-selves, that their European organizations are engaged in lobbyingagainst the EU institutions and bodies. This seems somewhat contradic-tory when one considers that the forest owners' insight into these issuesis motivated by the fact that they have good cooperation with transna-tional associations at the European level. The pattern that emerges isthat the more knowledge actors have about the EU systems' structureand the decision processes, the less critical they seem to be of the estab-lishment of some form of formalized forest policy.

The organized forestry interests (mainly forest owners and industry)have gone from sporadic, reactive actions (the pragmatic approach) tomore proactive strategies (the tactical approach) in order to protecttheir preferences. A concrete example of the non-governmental stake-holders changing strategies is that they now do not only work nationallyin their efforts to influence the process; they have increasingly come tofocus their efforts directly towards the EU institutions and the officialsthere, and cooperate with other actors in different kinds of transnationalassociations and networks. A well functioning cooperation in a transna-tional network seems to be a primary key to success when it comes tothe possibilities for the non-governmental forestry stakeholders toinfluence the integration process. The Swedish forest stakeholders'role and influence in different forms of transnational associations,such as CEPI and CEPF, would thus be of interest for future research.

Whether or not the forest stakeholders' efforts result in formalforest policy, forest-related questions have come to the EU to stay.The important question is therefore not whether there will be somekind of formal European policy on forest but rather what form theEU forest policy will take, and this is highly dependent on what pref-erences the involved actors hold, and the strategies they choose toadopt in the future.

Acknowledgements

I thank the five anonymous reviewers for their constructive andvaluable comments on earlier drafts. I also thank Judith RinkerÖhman for the language editing. The research was funded throughFuture Forests, a multi-disciplinary research program supported bythe Foundation for Strategic Environmental Research (MISTRA), theSwedish Forestry Industry, the Swedish University of Agricultural Sci-ences (SLU), Umeå University, and the Forestry Research Institute ofSweden (Skogforsk).

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