The Struggle Against Shiism in Hamidian Iraq a Study in Ottoman Counter Propaganda

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The Struggle against Shiism in Hamidian Iraq: A Study in Ottoman Counter-Ṗropaganda

Author(s): Selim DeringilReviewed work(s):Source: Die Welt des Islams, New Series, Bd. 30, Nr. 1/4 (1990), pp. 45-62Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1571045 .

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Die Welt des Islams XXX (1990)

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SHIISM INHAMIDIAN IRAQ

A STUDY IN OTTOMAN COUNTER-PROPAGANDA

BY

SELIM DERINGIL

Istanbul, Bogazifi University

I. Introduction

Propaganda and counter-propaganda are essentially conceptswhich gained currency at the time of the two world wars and as

such are quintessentially modern and Western concepts. Yet, the

Ottoman state during the reign of Abdiilhamid II (1876-1909) had

made great use of this weapon, particularly as part of its newemphasis on unity based on the claim of the Ottoman Sultan to

universal Islamic leadership as the Caliph of Islam or Commander

of the Faithful (Emir-el-Muminin). With the loss of most of its

remaining Balkan possessions and their Christian populations as

the result of the disastrous war with Russia in 1877-78, the Empireunder Abdilhamid II retrenched ideologically on the basis of its

Islamic identity.' This, however, brought new

problems,because

now, any challenge to Ottoman legitimacy arising from an Islamic

context acquired new immediacy.

II. The OttomanIranian Rivalryfor theLoyalty of Arab Subjects

The claim of the Sultan to caesaropapist domination both as tem-

poral ruler and religious leader was founded on Sunni legitimation

through the Emir-el-Muminin's claim to being the

rightfulsuc-

cessor to the last Abbasid Caliph, who had allegedly transferred his

office to Sultan Selim I after the Egyptian campaign of the latter

(1517).

1Stephen Duguid, "The Hamidian Politics of Unity", Middle Eastern Studies,

Vol. IX, No. 2 (May 1973), pp. 139-155.



46 SELiM DERiNGiL

The one major Islamic state which had never recognized this

claim was Shiite Iran. Both Safavid and Qajar rulers stand out as

unrelenting opponents of Ottoman legitimacy. As put by Lambton:

"In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the outbreak of conflictbetween the Safawidsand Ottomans the Ottoman Sultan and the SafawidShah each referred to himself as the sovereign of Islam. The conflictbetween them was expressedin terms of Shici-Sunnistrife. Polemic ragedbetween the two sides."2

The bone of contention were the Arab lands where the Ottomans

clearlyestablished an

early ascendancy.Yet in certain Shii-Sunni

frontier zones and in enclaves where Shiis or Sunnis lived as

minorities, the Iranian challenge continued. Salibi writes:

"The Ottoman Sultanate ... claimed legitimacy as the universal SunniteMoslem State and was recognized as such in the area wherever SunniteIslam predominated. The Persian monarchy ... was more of a Persiannational state; nevertheless, it also happened to be the principal ShiiteMoslem State in the world, and hence along with Shiites and other unor-thodox Moslems in the

region, challengedin

principlethe claim of the

Ottoman State to universal Moslem dominion."3

A major frontier zone between Sunni Ottoman influence and

Safavi/Qajar Shiism was Iraq. Traditionally the crucible of

Twelver Shiism from the ninth century onwards, it was from Iraqthat Shah Ismail Safavi invited major Shiite ulema after he made

Twelver Shiism the official state religion of Iran in 1501. As

indicated by Arjomand:"Shah Ismail invited Shaykh All al-Karaki al-CAmili .. to his empire to

propagateTwelver Shicism. al-Karakisettled in Arab Iraq and paid inter-mittent visits to the court of Ismail. He continued to supervisethe conver-sion of Iran to Shicism under Tahmasp." 4

With the increasing predominance of Twelver Shiism in Iran

from the 16th century onwards and the securing of Ottoman con-

trol overmajor

Shii centers oflearning

such asBagdad, Najaf,

2 Ann K. S. Lambton, StateandGovernmentnMedieval slam(Oxford UniversityPress, 1981), pp. 212-213.

3 Kamal Salibi, "Middle Eastern Parallels: Syria-Iraq-Arabia in Ottoman

times," MiddleEasternStudies15 (1979), p. 72.4 Said Amir Arjomand, TheShadowof Godand theHidden mam(University of

Chicago Press, 1984), p. 107.





SELiM DERINGiL

Although Istanbul's power was greater from mid-centuryonwards as a result of the Tanzimat reforms and increased cen-

tralization, the area always remained a potential trouble spot.

III. Differences n Sunni and Shii Views of Kingship and Caliphate

The major doctrinal cleavages between Sunni and Shii state

theory are far too complex to be discussed here. But for the pur-

poses of understanding the basis of the legitimating ideology that

informed Ottoman counter-propaganda it is useful to mention

some of the salient differences, particularly as these are often men-

tioned in the documents which will be referred to below.

At the very heart of the understanding of the position of the

supreme head of State, the Caliph/Sultan or the Shah, lies the

union of political and religious authority in the former, and the

divorce of religious and temporal rule in the latter. As put by

Arjomand:

"It was not unusual for Sunni rulers to claim legitimacy by styling them-selves caliphsand imams. This was so because in Sunnism unlike Shicism,the de-facto depoliticization of the conception of imamate neveroccured. "9

The result of this was that the position of the Sunni and Shii ulema

in relation to the state also differed radically:

"In marked contrast to the Ottoman Empire, where the hierocracy was

firmly incorporated into the caesaropapist state while religious domina-tion over the masses rested largely with the Sufi shaykhs and dervishes,the Shi'ite hierocracy of Iran had somewhat tenuous and informal tieswith a weak central government while it firmly dominated the masses byits exclusive religious authority."

10

Thus the Ottoman ulema, even when in opposition to central

authority, generally remained a 'loyal opposition' whereas Shii

miuctehids ould and did pose a serious threat to central power. Thiswas a fact which was often noted by Abdilhamid II's officials.

9Ibid., p. 179.

10Ibid., p. 219.

48



STRUGGLE AGAINST SHIISM

IV. The Hamidian Officials and the Struggleagainst Shiism in Iraq

Throughout the late 1890's and early 1900's we find repeatedreferences in the Ottoman archival documentation to the spread of

Shiism in Iraq. The emphasis on the importance of the danger

posed by this development indicated that just as Abdiilhamid II was

attempting to revitalize the credibility of his claim to supreme

religious leadership in his dominions, he perceived a threat to the

very basis of his rule. His officials clearly reflected this anxiety.In a report by the former ?ehbenderConsul) of Hoy and Selmas,

Ali Rlza Bey, an extensive history of the rise of Shiism and its useby the Safavids served as an introduction to the proposed measures

to counter the threat. The Consul stated that Shiism had become

a barrier between the Caliphate and the Muslims of the Far East,thus causing them to fall into Christian hands. The Safavids and

Qajars were said to have grafted pre-Islamic Persian practices onto

Shiism and to have forcibly converted the Iranian people:

"Whilethe Sublime Sultanate worked to devastate and throw back theangry flood of Christianity, and always tried to attach the Muslims of

India and China to the Supreme Caliphate, Shiism intervened like a vastuncrossable sea. This caused the Muslims of Khiva and Buharato fall intoRussian hands as it caused the Kashgar Muslims to come under the

Chinese, and the Indian Muslims under the English yoke. Thus millionsof Muslims are enslaved by the infidels. The memory of this treacherywillendure as long as human kind ..." 11

The root of the problem in Iraq was the

ignoranceof the local

population of nomads and bedouins (urban-i asair ve bedeviye),who

easily fell under the influence of Iranian ulema. The latter came to

the sacred shrines of Najaf, Kerbela, Kazlmiye, and Baghdad in

such great numbers that Sunni ulemaremained in the minority. Ali

Riza Bey then proceeded to underline the prestige of the mullahs

and their financial and institutional independence of the state:

"The easiest thing in Iran is to become rich by joining the ranks of the

mullahs ... Once a poor man has joined the learned profession and per-

1 Basbakanlik Arsivi, Yildlz Esas Evrakl: Klslm 14/Evrak 212/Zarf126/Karton 7 (hereafter referred to as BBA. Y.E.E.), "A report by Major AliRiza Bey. Officer attached to the Imperial General Staff and former Consul toHoy and Selmas" (no date). (Hoy and Selmas were north Iranian towns.)

49



SELIM DERINGIL

formed the pilgrimage to the holy shrines on foot, there receiving a

diploma (icazet), n a few years he will be the owner of villages and farms' 12

Where preventive measures were concerned, the writer stressedthat because forty percent of Iraq was of the Shii persuasion it was

impossible to use force as this would incur the odium of the world

Islamic community. The one panacea therefore was education. The

state should send specially trained teachers and ulema to Iraq and

instill the virtues of Sunni Islam in primary schools. These instruc-

tors should be paid in full and should be graduates of the highest

schools in Istanbul, as locals were not to be trusted. Instruction inthe greatness of Islam and the great deeds of the three rightly

guided Caliphs would eventually cause an erosion of the differences

between Sunnism and Shiism. Thus, quietly and without drawing

attention, "His Imperial Majesty will accomplish more by educa-

tion than his illustrous ancestor Selim I did by the sword ...." 13

Though full of historical inaccuracies and at times naive in the

extreme, this report did define the difficulties facing the Ottoman

administration in Iraq, as well as take note of Iran as the only com-

petitor for universal Islamic leadership.

In another report (laiha) prepared by a former Shaikh-ul-Islam,

Huiseyin Hfisnui Efendi, the emphasis was on the crucial role of the

Sunni medresesn Bagdad and the appointment of competent ulema

to Iraq to debate with their Shii counterparts. These men would

also be trained in the art of "explaining the doctrinal fragility of

Shiism to thepeople." Interestingly enough, however, they

were to

avoid getting drawn into polemic by the Shiis and "secretly report

to the authorities those among them whose activities were harmful

to the interests of the state." This was, according to Hiiseyin

Hiisnui, the "moral duty of the ulema," who would under no cir-

cumstances disclose their official nature but pose as simple

travellers. What seems to have been proposed, therefore, was a sort

of religious secret service. The "moral duty of the ulema" also

clearly indicates in this case the closely interwoven nature of stateulema relations in this particular context.14

12 Ibid.13 Ibid.14 B.B.A., Y.E.E., 14/454/126/9 (no date): "Views on the preservation of Sun-

nism and forbidding of Shiism in Bagdad. By former Shaikh-ul-Islam HiiseyinHusnui."

50




By contrast, the independence of the Shii mictehid was the focal

point of an unsigned and undated memorandum. This writer gave

a remarkably accurate (and this time not at all naive) descriptionof the strategic importance of the mictehid in Iranian society,

stating:

"(Because) they seek no official appointment (mansab) nd have no fearof dismissal (azl), [(they are difficult to control).] They have great influ-

ence among the people and as the common folk see them as the

viceregents of the Imamtheir influence is a thousand times greater thanthat of the Shah .... Within twenty-four hours and with their merest

gesture they can cause the people to rise against the Shah ....'15

The Ottoman official was obviously well informed; in his recent

work, Arjomand cites a French traveller as saying that a powerful

miictehid ould "gather the people behind him like another Orpheus.... "16 The anonymous author then went into great detail about

how the Ottoman state should 'turn' the influence exercised bythese men, and how this should be possible as most of them were

Arabs and Ottomansubjects.

The other measures heproposedwere the granting of munificent largesse to the holy shrines of

Kerbela and Najaf, "as had been done in the time of Sultan

Abdiilmecid. ' 17

The Ottoman-Qajar struggle for credibility in the eyes of the

Iraqi population was very evident in a report compiled by the

Ottoman Ambassador to Tehran, Ali Galip Bey, dated 15 August1894. The Ambassador proposed the following measures: First, the

controlling of the movements of various Iranian pilgrims to the holyshrines and the prevention of their circulation among the popula-tion as well as the restriction of the time they should be allowed to

spend in the holy places. Second, the appointment of official ulema

to counter Shii propaganda by inculcating Sunnism and obedience

to the Caliph. Third, the expulsion of Shii mictehidsand students,

ahunds, who spread seditious ideas. Fourth, the inculcation of the

idea that it wasowing

to the OttomanCaliph

that Shii men of

learning could come to the holy shrines of Najaf, Kerbela and

15B.B.A., Y.E.E., 14/88-1lb/88/12 (no date).

16Arjomand, op. cit., p. 186; Arjomand is citing from Rafael Du Mans, Estat

de la Perse en 1660, ed. Schefer (Paris, 1890).17 B.B.A., Y.E.E., 14/88-116/88/12 (no date).

51



SELiM DERiNGIL

Kazimiye and that Shii Ottoman subjects could flourish and

prosper. Fifth, the making redundant of the Iranian middlemen

who supposedly expedited the business of Shii merchants inOttoman dominions by speeding up the bureaucratic process, thus

undermining the credibility of Iranian propaganda which claimed

that the Shah was the sole protector of Shii interests.18

It is interesting that none of the documents dealing with

measures to stop the spread of Shiism among the Iraqi populationmake any reference to military action.

Together with the realisation that the necessary military muscle

did not exist, the issue was seen clearly as one which was beyond

simple police repression. This attitude is very evident in an exten-

sive report prepared by a member of a well known Iraqi ulema

family, Alusizade Ahmet ?akir, and dated 26 August 1907. Ahmet

?akir stressed that the Shii ahundswho circulated among the tribal

population were financed by rich Iranians and the British, both of

whom had an interest in the extension of their influence in Iraq, so

the issue was "much more political than religious." Alusizade alsocalled for the institution of mobile medresesconsisting of trustworthySunni ulema who would travel with the Sunni nomads and preachthe Sunni word, reporting to the authorities any untoward events

that came to their attention. These mobile medreses hould be rein-

forced with mobile primary and secondary schools, thus ensuringthat the local population "would have the full benefit of the official

belief at an early age." As to the settled population, the emphasiswas again on the medreses.Specially selected Sunni pupils should be

sent to the major medresesn Iraq; Imam-i Azam, Seyyid Sultan Ali,

Shaikh Sandal, and Miinevvere-i Hatun should each receive

twenty such pupils, "while the special importance of Necef-i Esref

and Kerbela-i Mualla made it necessary to send them each twenty-five students. " The upgrading of Sunni learning would increase the

prestige of Sunnism in general among the population, "thus deal-

ing a terrible blow to Shiism." Alusizade also stressed that the banon Sunni-Shii marriage should be strictly enforced, and the Shii

passion plays should be banned as they "heightened the excitement

of the population."19

18 B.B.A., Y.E.E., 14/1623/126/10.11 Safer 1312-15 August 1894.19 B.B.A., Y.E.E., 14/257/126/8, 13 August 1323/26 August 1907.

52




Religious uniformity was thus seen as a means by which nor-

mative standards of behaviour could be imposed on the population.

A particularly striking example of this line of thought is the docu-ment giving the views of Sfileyman Hiisnii Pasa, a distinguishedexile in Bagdad. Siileyman Pasa proposed that the state sponsor the

writing of a "Book of Beliefs" (Kitab-ul-Akdid)devoted specificallyto the rebuttal of the "heretical sects" (firak-i dalle) of Islam. The

ideas in this tract would then be used "to correct the beliefs of

heretics" through a "missionary society" consisting of highlytrained ulema who, after two to three years training, would be

awarded the title ddi-ul-hak-misyoner.This was especially necessaryas those adhering to the approved Sunni Hanefi branch were in a

minority even among the Sunnis of Iraq, and the population as a

whole consisted of twenty mezhebsspeaking one or more of four

languages (Kurdish, Turkish, Arabic, and Armenian). Twelver

Shiism was particularly rampant and the most influential mictehid

was the mictehid of Samarra, Mirza Hasan, the chief mictehid of the

Usuli, who according to the writer, "has more influence and powerthan the Shah of Iran ...." Siileyman Pasa then went into great

detail on Mirza Hasan's role in the abolition of the tobacco

monopoly in Iran and likened his position to that of the Pope as a

supragovernmental authority:

"As these men see all governments as usurpers, the restriction of theirinfluence is an inevitable necessity for the Sublime State. They are a bar-rier to

progressand

very dangerous.... 20

Silleyman Pasa's cure for the state's problems as regards

religious unorthodoxy was, as with other writers, 'proper' educa-

tion. If primary and secondary schooling could be brought back

into the Sunni Hanefi fold all would be saved:

"The spread of education will instill the love of religion (din), country(vatan), and nationality (milliyet),as well as strengthening the salutary

allegiance of the people to our Master the Caliph of all Muslims. Whilethe persistanceof ignorance will only increase and intensify disunity and

disintegration. 21

20B.B.A., Y.E.E., 14/1188/126/9, 9 Ramazan 1309/8 April 1892.

21 Ibid.

53



SELiM DERiNGiL

In the passage above, one clearly hears a meshing of classical

Islamic and novel ideas of loyalty, loyalty to the "country" and

loyalty to the "Caliph" being mentioned in one breath. It is alsoworth noting that in an age when missionary activity was justanother facet of political power, an Ottoman official clearly

appreciated this potential. This was all the more remarkable as

Islam does not proseletyze, and Siileyman Pasa's vision of a 'mis-

sionary society' was clearly a borrowed concept.While Siileyman Pasa was concerned with the ideological

implications of the spread of Shiism, the defterdarof Bagdad,Mehmed Rifat Menemenlizade, was anxious to stress the

administrative difficulties. His appraisal of how the spread of

Shiism affected the Ottoman administrative apparatus in Iraqamounted to a description of how the Sublime State was having the

rug pulled out from under its feet. Menemenlizade stated that the

Iranian inspired ahunds and mictehids were very active among the

ranks of the Ottoman Sixth Army and the police force, "among

whom they spread the idea that it was condemnable by God to drawarms against the Shiis ...." Many members of these units had con-

verted to Shiism, which made them unreliable. In fact, the

behaviour of the converted Shii police force was "more like [thatof] a gang of brigands" as they harassed and robbed the Sunni

population; "the nomads fear the security forces more than theyfear the brigands."

Meanwhile the mictehids and ahunds

"work to furtherthe darkest ignorance of the population in order to roband milk them as is their custom, because (they know) that forthe popula-tion to be enlightened means that they will obey no other than their

rightful ruler .... 22

As a result of all the Iranian money being poured into Najaf,

Kerbela, Kazlmiye and Samarra, these "had become virtually Ira-

nian towns."

As to preventive measures, Menemenlizade also placed the onuson education, particularly primary schooling. These had increas-

ingly fallen into the hands of Shiis. This situation was to be

22 B.B.A. trade Meclis-i Mahsus, No. 5537; Gurre-i Recep 1309/31 January1892, Mehmed Rifat Menemenlizade to Palace Secretariat.

54




amended by the appointment of teachers from Istanbul. Similarly,Sunni students in prestigious medresesike Kerbela should have their

scholarships increased. Many Sunni mosques were without prayerleaders (Imam) and Qur'an readers (vaciz) because of lack of funds.

The necessary funding for these institutions was to come from the

tax levied on Shii burials at the holy places. This "funerary tax"

(defniyerisumu) should be left for local use to improve the condition

of Sunni centres of learning. Also, a Sunni preacher should be

attached to each batallion of the Sixth Army in order to work

toward the return of Ottoman effectives to Sunnism.23

The lack of concrete power to enforce policy is evident through-out the Ottoman documentation. The minutes of the Ottoman

Cabinet meeting dated 1June 1891 openly stated that it was impos-sible to use force to prevent the nomads from drifting over to

Iranian territory and that they should be encouraged to remain in

Ottoman lands by just treatment.24

Those ulema that did get sent out to Iraq were afflicted with the

classic complaint of the Hamidian official: non-payment of salaries.A memorandum by a former Shaikh-ul-Islam, Mehmed Cemaled-

din Efendi, dated 3 August 1905, gave a summary of the perform-ance of specially appointed Sunni teachers. Five such teachers had

been sent out in 1905 from Istanbul with monthly salaries of 2,000kurus. They had failed in their mission because they were not giventhe necessary support by local officials and had failed to receive

their salaries regularly. The new teachers to be sent out should

receive at least 5,000 kurussalary each, should speak fluent Arabic

and be familiar with the customs and habits of the local population.Most importantly, they should be of a very high standard of learn-

ing as they would be expected to inspect schools and medreseswhile

submitting their teachers to examination. Mehmed Cemaleddin

implied throughout his memo that those previously sent had been

thoroughly lacking on this score.25

Money, or lack of it, was the major obstacle to the proposedreforms in Iraq as elsewhere. The Ottoman centre was reluctant to

23 Ibid.24 B.B.A. Irade Meclis-i Mahsus, 5441, 22 ?evval 1308/1 June 1891.25 B.B.A. Bab-i Ali Evrak Odasi, 272681, 1 Cemaziyelahir 1323/3 August

1905; Bab-i Fetva, No. 56.

55



SELIM DERiNGIL

relinquish its hold on the tax on Shii funerals, as this was farmed

out to tax farmers (miiltezim)and yielded revenue. The figure givenin the Cabinet minutes of 1 June 1891 was 200,000 kurusyearly,after the cost of collection had been deducted.26 A telegram received

directly at the Ylldlz Palace on 10 November 1891 spoke of a

Seyyid Mahmud from Najaf, who was offering to bid 1000 liras

more than the present rate for the right to collect this tax.27

On the other hand there seemed to be no shortage of money at

the Shii end. The report of the Ottoman Commission for the

reform of Iraq dated 23 January 1907 stated that money sent from

Shiis in foreign lands to the holy shrines and religious institutionshad made them rich while the Sunni equivalents languished in vari-

ous states of disrepair. Pious donations from foreign Shii sources

were being spent lavishly on the local poor and on Shii students, of

whom there were five to six thousand who were thus able to studyin great material comfort. In contrast, the Sunni medreseswere full

of evaders of military service who had no interest in learning, and

those who did have, numbered no more than two to three hundred.

Thus Twelver Shiism had "spread to the point where one can talk

of invasion." 28

The lack of financial support for Sunni students and institutions

was also the central theme of a memorandum prepared by former

Shaikh-ul-Islam Mehmed Cemaleddin, dated 4 February 1908.

The writer stated that the reason for the delapidation of Sunni

medreses nd primary schools was that the vakf revenues which were

supposed to support them had been expropriated. Stipends paid toSunni students were insufficient and forced them to seek work in

order to pay for food, thus detracting time from study.29

V. Examples of Propagandaand Counter-propaganda

Apart from the examples above, which give the views of

Ottoman officials, it is possible to infer from the documentation

26 B.B.A. Irade Meclis-i Mahsus, 5441, 22 Sevval 1308/1 June 1891.27 B.B.A. Irade Dahiliye, 98190, 6 Rebiyiilahir 1309/10 November 1891;

YllddzPalace Imperial Secretariat, No. 1624.28 B.B.A. Bab-i Ali EvrakOdasl, 272681; Report of the Ottoman Commission

for the reform of Iraq, 10 Kanun-i Sani 1323/23 January 1907.29 Ibid. Memorandum from former Shaikh-ul-Islam, Mehmed Cemaleddin

Efendi to Prime-Minister, 23 Muharrem 1326/4 February 1908; Bab-i Fetva,Daire-i Mesihat Mektubi Kalemi, aded 142.

56




concrete events which give an idea of the Ottoman-Iranian tug-of-war for credibility (or maybe even just visibility) in the eyes of the

localpopulation.

Animperial

irade dated 3 December 1891 noted

that the leader of the Caf tribe, an Osman Bey, had been awarded

a ceremonial sword by the Iranians. The vilayetof Mosul was asked

for its views on this issue, and it replied that although the personin question was known as untrustworthy, there was no harm in his

being allowed to accept the gift.30 That such a small event should

have been passed on directly to the Palace suggests that anyencroachment by Iran, real or imagined, on the sympathies of the

Ottoman population was being watched very closely.There were also instances where Sunnis from Iran took refuge in

Ottoman dominions. An iradedated 2 October 1891 noted that two

representatives of a Sunni village in Iran had secretly crossed over

to Ottoman territory and had presented themselves to the mutasarrnfof Hakkari. They complained that the Iranian government was

interfering with their religious beliefs and requested to be allowed

to settle in thevilayets

of Bitlis orDiyarbekir.

It isinteresting

that

the governor of Van, who forwarded the request, recommended

that they be accepted as they were sedentary farmers and Sunnis

(presumably as opposed to nomadic Shiis, which would have made

them less desirable).3'The Ottomans were also careful to maintain the shrines of the

leading Shii Imams. An iradedated 8 February 1890 noted that the

shrine of Imam Hiiseyin in Kerbela was in need of repair as "the

present state (of disrepair) is not in keeping with the glory and

prestige of the Caliph .... 32

Ottoman sensitivity regarding the defence of their claim to pro-tect the holy centres of Shiism is observable in an event which was

registered at the Sublime Porte on 10 March 1907. The death of the

Shah of Iran was announced from the minarets of the mosque at

the Shrine of Imam Musa-el-Kazlm at Kazlmiye by the Shii

30 B.B.A. irade Dahiliye, 98330, 29 Rebiyiilahir 1309/3 December 1891; YlldlzPalace Imperial Secretariat, No. 2429.

31 B.B.A. irade Dahiliye, 97596, 26 Safer 1309/2 October 1891; Yildiz Palace

Imperial Secretariat, No. 460.32 B.B.A. trade Meclis-i Mahsus, 4687, 26 Cemaziyelahir 1307/8 February

1890. Examples of the granting of moneys for the repairof this or that Shii shrineoccur frequently in the Ottoman documents.

57



SELiM DERiNGIL

religious officials of the Ottoman State. The Ministry of the

Interior took a very serious view of this and asked that they be

severely punished. The Sultan, however, no doubt wisely orderedthat "the matter be closed with a scolding."33

The shrine of Musa-el-Kazlm seems to have gotten more than its

share of attention. It was reported in an irade dated 9 September1893 that Yahya Nusret Pasa, Imperial ADC and Chief Inspectorof the Sixth Army, had forbidden the recital of ceremonial prayersto the Sultan at the Shrine of Musa-el-Kazlm. The keeper of the

keys of the Shrine (kiliddar)had reported the event to the Governor

of Bagdad, recording his profound dismay, "as an Ottoman son of

an Ottoman" ("Osmanli oglu Osmanli bulundugumuz iCin ...").The Governor of Bagdad, Hasan Refik Pasa, protested Nusret

Pasa's behaviour, saying that this performance had "even offended

the Iranians." The Governor also wrote to the kiliddar, pacifyingand complimenting him while instructing him to continue the

ceremonial prayers five times a day as was customary. The

Imperial irade determined that Yahya Nusret Pasa would berebuked for his behaviour.34

A very clear example of the conception of education as prop-

aganda is illustrated by the Sultan's move to bring Shii children to

Istanbul. Although it is well known that Abdiilhamid aimed to

assimilate the Arab elite through education in his famous mekteb-i

asiret or "tribal school", the attempt mentioned below involves

children of modest background. Thus, a letter from the Governor

of Bagdad dated 30 October 1891, stated that in keeping with the

Sultan's instructions, ten Shii children were being sent to Istanbul

from Bagdad and Kerbela. Yet the Governor had seen fit to include

two Sunni children, "to set the minds of the Shiis at rest and show

that these children were going to Istanbul to study as the result of

33 B.B.A. Bab-i Ali EvrakOdasi, 225715, 24 Muharrem 1325/10 March 1907.

Ministryof

Interior,No. 4886. See also Cole and

Momen, "Mafia, Mob andShiism in Iraq", p. 121: The authors point out that one of the reasons why Shii

religious scholarsfought against the establishment of Ottoman control in Karbalawas their objection to the Ottoman Sultan's name being mentioned in the Fridayprayer.

34 B.B.A. Irade Hususi, 162, 26 Safer 1311/9 September 1893. This remainsa puzzling episode; at the time of writing I had been unable as yet to determine

why Nusret Pasa acted as he did.

58




the Sultan's generosity ...." As the families who volunteered were

poor, six of the children had to have clothes made at the state's

expense and the Sultan paid for their transport and the fees of theirtravel chaperones. The Sultan's view of the matter was:

"Since so much money has been spent [on these children] it is importantthat the necessary benefits be derived from their education. The trainingof those among them who are Shii should ensure that they abandon thissect and become Hanefi, in order to enable them to convert their coun-

trymen to the Hanefi sect upon their return .... 35

VI. Some ConcludingComments

Just as Ottoman officials were proposing the curtailing of Shii

passion plays (tazieh) in Iraq, we read in a surprising source that

they were being performed in the very heart of the Ottoman capitalitself. What was in fact a guide book for the 19th century traveller

describes the ceremony in the typically lurid terms of the orien-

talist:

"On the 10th Muharrem the Persians at Constantinople commemoratethe martyrdom of Hussein, the son of Ali. The ceremony takes place inthe court of the ValidehKhanand commences soon after sunset. In thelurid glare of numberless torches pass by the mourners beating theirbreasts or chanting Persian dirges; the white robed martyrs; the whitehorse of Hussein with its blood spattered saddle, to which is attached awhite dove, emblematic of the martyr's pure soul; and the fanatics whoafter the manner of the priestsof Baal, shout and cut themselves until the

blood runs down and stains their white shirtsa crimson hue. It is a strangeweird spectacle, not to be witnessed by those who have weak nerves, ordread heat and a crush ... A special enclosure is reserved for the PersianAmbassador who represents the Shah .... 36

There was also a considerable Iranian community in Istanbul,

consisting mostly of merchants whose newspaper the "Ahtar" was

35 B.B.A. tradeDahiliye, 98525,

28Cemaziyelewel

1309/31 December 1891.The irade ncludes the list of names of the children. The two Sunnis are markedwith a sin which appears above their names. See also BBA trade Dahiliye 98993,19 Cemaziyelahir 1309/21January 1891: The Sultan gave 200 lirasout of his own

purse to pay for theirbedding when they got to Istanbul. He furtherallocated 5000kurusmonthly for their food, servants, and private tutors.

36Murray's Hand Book, Constantinople, Brusa and the Troad (John Murray,

London, 1893), Section 1, p. 13.

59



SELiM DERiNGiL

published in that city until its suspension by the Ottoman Govern-

ment in 1895.37

Thus it is difficult to talk in terms of Ottoman success in curtail-ing the activities of Shiis. But the whole issue of how the danger was

perceived and how reaction to it was conceived does highlight cer-

tain aspects of late Ottoman state/society relations. As Professor

Feroz Ahmad has rightly pointed out:

"The key to an understandingof the Ottoman state in the nineteenth cen-

tury seems to be its lack of a social base and its determination to createone."38

The conception of this 'social base' varied from time to time. The

Tanzimat conception of 'Osmanlilik' or the attempt to create

Ottoman citizens, Christian as well as Muslim, differed markedlyfrom the Hamidian conception of 'Osmanllllk', which put the

emphasis on Sunni Islam. The one continuous characteristic of

Ottoman statecraft which ran straight through the Tanzimat, the

Hamidian era, and the Young Turk period, however, was the

emphasis on social engineering. This was what set 19th centuryOttoman statecraft off from what had gone before:

"Thus state intervention was no longer designed to merely regulatesociety as in the past, its purpose was now broadly speaking social

engineering."39

In the previous conception of state/society relations, what had

been expected from the reayawas obedience. Now what seemed tobe expected was an active subscribing to a normative standard of

values. This normative standard was increasingly an amalgam of

old notions of loyalty to the Caliph and new migrant notions of

loyalty to the country (vatan) and/or nationality (milliyet), all of

which were given as cures to the state's ills by Siileyman Pasa.40

Also in the reference by an Ottoman religious functionary (a Shii

at that) to himself as "an Ottoman son of an Ottoman," the osten-

37 Hitoshi Suzuki, "Iranians in Istanbul and the Tobacco Protest," JournalofAsian andAfricanStudies(1986), pp. 143-175.

38 FerozAhmad, "The State and intervention in Turkey," TurcicaXVI (1984),p. 56.

39Ibid., p. 52.

40 See above, p. 53f.

60




sible recognition and acceptance of state legitimation was in

evidence.41

The vehicle for the propounding of the state's legitimatingideology and thus the chief tool for use in its social engineering was

education. The striking recurrence in nearly all the documents

mentioned above of the need to impose uniform religious values

through primary and other education is the best illustration of this.

It is also significant that nearly all the documents mentioned above

also propose extensive economic reforms in Iraq to alleviate suffer-

ing and poverty, but in all of the documents found by this author,

economic reform always takes second place after education.

Nowhere is there any hint of repression through physical force.

What must be made clear, however, is that the educational pro-cess referred to above was really propaganda and counter-

propaganda. The ulema sent out to Iraq were expected to educate

the population about the ills of Shiism, and they were expected to

report seditious Shii elements, which was seen as their "moral

duty". The normative ideology as expressed in the "Book ofBeliefs" was a far cry from the traditional Ottoman toleration of

religious diversity. The "social base" that Feroz Ahmad mentions

was expected to be created through education. After all, the Sultan

himself openly declared as much over the issue of the Shii children

who were to be 'educated' in Istanbul.

In the final instance, Ottoman attempts at social engineeringwere a failure. However they prepared the ground for the

republican Turkish nation-building process, which succeeded.

Indeed, the geopolitical reality of the Middle East today derives

largely from its historical heritage of past concepts and conflicts.

The Iran-Iraq war can be seen as a modern conflagration stemmingfrom late 19th century tensions which simmered beneath the sur-

face. One cannot escape the feeling of deja-vu as one reads the

reports of Ottoman officials who seem to be conjuring up Imam

Khomeini when they speak of the miictehidswho can mobilise theIranian populace "with their merest gesture." The same feeling is

experienced when we read in a modern Turkish newspaper that the

41 See above, p. 58; even if the functionary in question was trying to please,his statement (even if insincere) illustrates that he knew what would be pleasingto the Ottoman authorities.

61



SELIM DERINGiL

Turkish Ministry of Education is taking great pains to select and

train "reliable" teachers to be sent to educate Turkish children liv-

ing in western Europe. These teachers receive instructions to reportall "subversive elements" to their superiors, in haunting similarityto their ancestors in Iraq.42 Even more strikingly, approximatelythree weeks after the completion of the first draft of this article, the

bloody confrontation in the Kaaba occured on 10 August 1987, pit-

ting Sunni against Shii.

The historical continuity of the Sunni-Shii conflict in Turkey

emerged recentlyin a

telling episodewhen the Vice President of the

ruling Motherland Party (ANAP), Eyiip Aslk, revealed that he was

a Naksibendi and declared: "The best guarantee against Kho-

meinism in Turkey are the tarikats. The tarikats are traditionally

against Shiism." The same official also stated: "Our struggle

against Khomeinism should be on the religious plane."43

42 Milliyet, 27 September 1987.

43 Milliyet, 12 January 1988, Cumhuriyet,2 January 1988. The tarikatsareofficially banned in Turkey.

62

Documents

The Struggle Against Shiism in Hamidian Iraq a Study in Ottoman Counter Propaganda