Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843

8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 1/33

The Past and Present Society

Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq: The Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843Author(s): Juan R. I. Cole and Moojan MomenSource: Past and Present, No. 112 (Aug., 1986), pp. 112-143Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Past and Present Society

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/651000Accessed: 25/02/2009 17:53

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oup.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the

scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that

promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Oxford University Press and The Past and Present Society are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve

and extend access to Past and Present.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/stable/651000?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oup

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oup

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/stable/651000?origin=JSTOR-pdf



MAFIA, MOB AND

SHIISMIN IRAQ:

THE REBELLIONOF OTTOMAN

KARBALA

1824-1843*

A virtualrebellionof the Iraqicity

of Karbala gainst entral overn-

ment rule broughtabout a

catastrophicnvasionby Baghdad-based

OttomanTurkishforces in January1843. Because he urbansocial

historyof the nineteenth-century ttoman mpireremains ompara-

tively little known, the formsof

socialorganization nd local culture

that led to the revoltdeservedetailed reatment.

The followinganalysis xamines he role of urbangangs n leading

the rebellion, n coalitionwith

other socialgroups. Neighbourhood

vigilantebands had long existedin Islamic cities. But in the first

decadesof the nineteenth entury,

paralleling decline n government

control, "mafia"-gangs that ran

protection acketsand actedas a

parallel overnment grewup in Karbala.Even n this "antisocial"

form, it will be shown, the urban

gangscould makeallianceswithin

the city to emergeas popular

eadersagainstan alien hreat, herefore

actingas more than mere exploiters.

The toughshad severalallies n

the fighting.They were employed

by the city's ndigenous anded

notablesas bodyguards nd hit men.

They forged inks with Shiite

Arab nomadsoutsidethe town walls.

Another group, the "mob" small artisansand shopkeepers

participatedn the revolt under

the rhetoricof (Shiite)religionand

(Iranian) thnicityversus he TurkishSunnioutsiderswho sought o

subduethem. Finally, the Muslim

religious cholars'ulama') occu-

pied a specialposition n the

shrinecity, and also allied themselves

to the urbangangs.1

* The authors re grateful or comments n earlierdraftsof this paper romHanna

Batatu,GeoffEley and HalaFattah noneof whom s in anywayresponsibleorwhat

follows).

Diacriticalmarks n Arabicand Persian ransliterationave been omitted n this

paper, which is aimed at a general

readership.Specialistswill be able mentally o

supplythese in any case.

1 The role of the Shiite religious

cholars n the rebellion s discussedbrieflyby

HamidAlgar n his

Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906: The Role of the Ulama in the

Qajar Penod

(Berkeley nd Los Angeles, 1969),pp. 114-16.See also MangolBayat,

Mysticism and Dissent: Socioreligious

Thought n QajarIran

(Syracuse,1982), p. 42;

and Denis A1. MacEoin, "FromShaykhism o Babism:A Study of Charismatic

Renewal n Shi'i Islam" Univ. of Cambridge h.D. thesis, 1979), pp. 112-13.



113

AFIA,

MOB

AND

SHIISM

IN

IRAQ

This

study

will

employ

several

echniques

o

evoke

the

meaning

of

gang

rule

and

popular

evolt

n

Shiite

Karbala.

First,

a

synchronic

analysisof the city'svarioussocialgroupsandtheirrelationshipso

one

another

will

be

undertaken.

Secondly,

a

diachronic

historical

narrative

f

the

processes

whereby

he

town

became

virtually

uton-

omous,

and

how

t

resisted

onquest,

will

be

presented

o

demonstrate

how

those

sociological

roups

acted

towards

one

another

over

time.

Attention

will

be

paid

to

the

mentalite

of

the

major

ocial

actors

and,

as

noted,

to

the

crucial

role

of

religion

and

the

religious

cholars.

The

cleavages

mong

he

rebellious

roups

n

Karbala

were

bridged

in

an

important

manner

by

Imami

Shiite Islam, a branchof thereligionhat

believed

he

Prophet

Muhammad's

on-in-law

Ali

and

his

eleven

lineal

descendants

termed

"Imams")

hould

have

held

power

n

the

nascent

Islamic

empire

after

his

passing.

Imamis

hold

that

until

the

supernatural

eappearance

f

the

Twelfth

Imam

(who

went

nto

occultation

n

the

ninth

century)

all

government

s

less

than

perfect.

Most

did,

however,

accept

the

interim

egitimacy

of

Shiite

monarchies

uch

as

the

Safavids

nd

Qajars

n

Iran.

Shiism

n

Karbala

encompassed

oth

the

wealthy

and

the

indigent,

both

Arab

and

Iranian.

The

ruling

elite

in

Ottoman

raq

adhered

o

Sunnism

the

majority

branch

f

Islam

except

n

post-sixteenth-century

ran

and

contempor-

ary

raq),

which

held

that

after

the

Prophet's

passing

political

ead-

ership

ell

to

an

oligarchically

lected

caliph.

After

our

early

"rightly

guided"

aliphs,

the

last

being

'Ali,

political

power

passed

to

less

revered

ereditary

monarchies,

uch

as

the

Umayyad

and

Abbasid

caliphates.

unnis

in

the

Ottoman

empire

owed

allegiance

o

the

Turkishmperor,but ShiisexecratedheOttoman ulerasa heretic

and

usurper

of

an

office

that

should

by

right

belong

only

to

the

Twelfth

mam.

SOCIAL

STRUCTURE:

RELIGION,

STATE

AND

THE

CROWD

As

anna

Batatu

has

pointed

out,

the

ethnic

and

religious

cleavages

in

raq

produced

hree

demographic

ones.

South

of

Baghdad,

Shiite

Arabs

argely

made

up

the

population.

Sunni

Arabs

populated

most

of

Baghdadnditsnorthernhinterland.Finally,north-east f Baghdad

Kurds

redominated,

dhering

o

a

form

of

Sunnism

heavily

nflu-

enced

y

Sufi

mysticism.2

Strong

ocial

and

economic

cleavages

lso

2

Hanna

Batatu,

The

Old

Social

Classes

nd

the

Revolutionary

ovements

f

Iraq

(Princeton,

978),

pp.

37-9.



114

NUMBER 1 12AST AND PRESENT

divided the people. Town dwellers often came into conflict with

pastoralnomads. Of an estimatedpopulation f 1,290,000 n 1850,

fully 35 per cent consistedof pastoralnomads.Another41 per cent

was ruraland only 24 per cent was urban.3Circassian nd Turkish

Sunnis illedthe upperechelonsof the government.Mostof the local

controllersof large ruralestateswere Sunni Arabs. Sunni notables

often predominated ven in the largely Shiite south, except in the

vicinity of the shrine cities.4

For nearly a century, from 1750 to 1831, the weak Ottoman

government n Istanbulallowed a corps of Mamluk slave-soldier)

vassals o rule fromBaghdad.sEven this localgovernment ftenhad

difficultyasserting ts authorityover the factiouspopulation.From

1831 he Ottomans gainruleddirectly,attemptingo imposeprogres-

sively greatercontrol hrough heir standingarmyand the bureauc-

racy in Baghdad. Mamluks and Ottomansengaged in perpetual

conflictwiththe ShiiteArabpastoral omadsof the southas refractory

taxpayersand frequentraidersof sedentary ettlements or booty.

Nestled in the territorydominatedby Shiite tribespeoplewere the

shrine cities of Karbalaand Najaf, burial sites of Imams whose

remainswere sacred o adherents f that branchof Islam.

The city of Karbala ies about45 miles south-west f Baghdad. t

owes its inceptionand continuedprosperity o its possessionof the

shrineof the ImamHusayn,a grandson f the ProphetMuhammad,

who died in a revolt againstthe Umayyadstate in 680. Religious

visits to its shrines(often combinedwith trade)and the influx into

the city of wealth in the form of pious offeringsand endowments

combined o lend it economic,religiousand political mportance. t

also served in a secularcapacityas a desert port for long-distance

3 Tom Nieuwenhuis,Politicsand Society n EarlyModern raq:MamlukPashas,

TnbalShayksandLocalRule between 802 and 1831 (The Hague, 1982),p. 10.

4 Batatu,Old SocialClasses,pp. 44-50.

S Primary ources or early modernIraq nclude Sayyid Abdu'r-Rahmans-Su-

waydi,Ta'nthhawadithBaghdada'l-Basrah186-1192/1772-1780AChronicleofthe

Events n Baghdad ndBasra1772-1780], d. 'ImadA. Ra'uf Baghdad, 978);Shaykh

Rasulal-Kirkukli,Dawhatal-wuzara'i ta'rikhwaqa'i'Baghdadz-zawra' (Family?)

Treesof the Ministers n the Historyof Occurrencesn Baghdad],Arabic rans.M.

K. Nawras Baghdad,n.d.); and SulaymanFa'iq Bey, Ta'nkhBaghdad Historyof

Baghdad],Arabic rans.M. K. Nawras Baghdad, 962).Forrecentanalyticaltudies,

see Nieuwenhuis,Politics ndSocietyn EarlyModernraq;andM. K. Nawras,Hutm

al-mamalik

i

al-'Iraq, 1750-1831 The Rule ofthe Mamluks n Iraq, 1750-1831]

(Baghdad,1975). Still useful are ClementHuart,HistoiredeBagdaddans es temps

modetnesParis, 1901); and Stephen H. Longrigg,Four Centunes f Modern raq

(Oxford,1925).



115

AFIA, MOB AND SHIISM IN IRAQ

trade. The shrineof the ImamHusaynparticularlyttracted ilgrims

of the Shiitebranchof Islam.After1501Iran'spopulationwas largely

converted o Shiism rom Sunnismby the Shiiterulersof the Safavid

dynasty, who bestowed avish gifts on the city's shrines. Although

the Safavidsand their Sunni Ottoman oes contestedmuch of Iraq,

Karbala emainedmostly in the handsof the Turks.

The city's population,partlydrawn romthe ShiiteArab ribesof

southern raq,oftenchafedunderOttoman ule.The political urmoil

of eighteenth-centuryran, with its Afghan nvasionsand the fall of

the Safavids,also encouraged arge numbersof Iranianrefugees o

settle in Najaf and Karbala. n the nineteenth enturyIranianmer-

chants and noblemenresided there out of a pious wish to be near

the shrines or because Iran turned politicallydangerous or them.

AlthoughIranian mmigrantsover time assimilated o Iraq, many

maintained heir distinctivenational ostume,knowledgeof Persian

and underground llegiance o Iran. Becauseof its prevailing hiism

and the large Iranian thnic element, Ottoman fficials aw Karbala

as a potential ifth column.

In the eighteenthand early nineteenthcenturies he city govern-

ment, staffedat the top by Mamluk-appointedunnis romBaghdad,

controlledmanyof Karbala's ourcesof wealth, ncluding he shrines

and rightsto tax. But this Sunni structurewas superimposed ver a

local ShiiteArabelite of property-holders. rominentArab amilies

owed their ocalpower o controlovergreateconomic esources.For

instance,one local magnate, he chief of the city's powerfulSayyid

families (asserting their descent from the Prophet Muhammad),

owned one-thirdof the cultivated ands and gardens n the vicinity

of Karbala. n the 1820sand 1830s ocalnotables,by processes o be

discussedbelow, moved nto actualrulership f the town as a virtual

city-state.Sayyid Abdu'l-Wahhab, ead of Karbala's lite families,

becamegovernor f the city in the late 1830sby orderof the Ottoman

viceroyAli Riza Pasha.7

The majority f Karbala'snhabitants onsistedof labourers, emi-

skilled tradesmen,pedlars and small-timeshopkeepers.Many of

them ethnic Iranians, hey resembled n cultureand socialsituation

theirIranian ounterparts, alledpishih-varanr tradespeople.8 he

6

E. Honigman,"Karbala",n Encyclopaediaf Islam,2nd edn.

' PublicRecordOfISce, ondon,ForeignOffice hereafter .R.O., F.O.) 195/204,

"Translation f a PersianAccountof Karbala", pring1843.

8 See MohammadReza Afshari,"The Pishivaran nd Merchantsn Precapitalist

IranianSociety",Internat. . MiddleEast Studies,xv (1983), pp. 133-55; or the

historical ote of this group n Iran,see also EvrandAbrahamian, TheCrowd n the

fcont. np. 116)



116

PAST

AND

PRESENT

NUMBER

1

12

equivalent

f

the

European

"little

people"

menu

peuple),

the

trades-

people

of

Karbala,

ike

the

great

merchants

nd

the

city

government,

exploitedthe pilgrimtrade.They expectedthe city's governor o

assure

them

of

a

livelihood

by

encouraging

he

pilgrims

and

by

ensuring

safety

or

Iranian

visitors

coming

to

Karbala.

Largely

Shi-

ites,

they

took

pride

in

living

in

Imam

Husayn's

city

and

in

having

easy

access

to

his

shrine.

Lavish

gifts

to

the

shrines

by

the

Iranian

monarchs

and

the

nawabs

of

Awadh

(Oudh)

n

India

lent

a

certain

splendour

o

the

shrinc

city,

in

which

the

little

people

basked.9

They

frequently

athered

n

public

assembly

o

celebrate

oly

days

associatedwith the Imams and particularlyo commemoratehe

martyrdom

f

Husayn.

The

social

networks

hey

developed

or

the

purpose

of

organizing

eligious

processions

ould

also

be

called

nto

play

at

times

of

political

crisis.

Karbala's

ittle

people

were

easily

stirred

o

defend

the

city

from

Baghdad's

ttempts

o

bring

t

under

firmer

ontrol

as

they

did

in

1824,

1835

and

1842-3.

Such

disturb-

ances

resembled

European

"church

and

king"

riots,

for

the

Shiite

tradespeople

eld

an

allegiance

o

the

shah

of

Iran

and

would

sacrifice

a

great

deal

to

exclude

alien

Sunni

troops.10

THE

KARBALA

"MAFIA"

The

1820s

and

1830s

saw a

growth

n

Karbala

f

the

power

of

local

elites

n

relation

o

the

centre.

As

will

be

shown

below,

urban

gang

leaders

running

protection

rackets

displaced

or

co-opted

the

old

landholding

nd

merchant

amilies

and

formed

links

with

nearby

Arab

tribes.

They

also

allied

themselves

with

the

city's

leading

religious

cholars.

In

this

manner

heycreateda coalitionof groups

interested

n

autonomy,

whether

for

financial

or

religious

reasons,

from

he

Ottomans.

Groups

of

young

men,

motivated

by

chivalric

deas

and

banding

(n. 8

cont.)

Persian

Revolution",

ranian

Studies,

ii

(1969),

pp.

128-50.

Cf.

E.

J.

Hobsbawm,

Primitive

Rebels:

Studies

in

Archaic

Forms

of

Social

Movement

in

the

19th

and

20th

Centu7*ies

New

York,

1965

edn.),

p.

115;

and

George

Rude,

Paris

and

London

n

the

Eighteenth

entury:

Studies

in

Popular

Protest

(New

York,

1973),

pp.

17-34.

Robere

J.

Holton,

"The

Crowd

n

History:

Some

Problems

f

Theory

and

Method",

Social

Hist.,

ii

(1978),

pp.

219-33,

points

out

that

crowds

gather

on a

continualbasis,andfor urposesotherthanprotest,suchas carnivals

nd

religious

vents.

9

For

the

huge

sums

that

lowed

nto

the

Shiite

hrine

ities

of

Iraq

rom

he

Shiite-

ruled

orth

Indian

kingdom

of

Awadh

or

Oudh,

see

Juan

R.

I.

Cole,

Roots

of

North

Indian

hi'ism

in

Iran

and

Iraq:

Religion

and

State

in

Awadh,

1722-1859

(Berkeley

nd

Los

Angeles,

forthcoming);

nd

the

same

author's

"'Indian

Money'

and

the

Shi'i

Shrine

ities

of

Iraq",

Middle

Eastern

Studies,

forthcoming.

10

Cf.

Hobsbawm,

Pnmitive

Rebels,

pp. 1

18-19.



117


together o defend their quarterof the city, commonlyappeared n

medieval raq.These youths, called ayyarun, probably erived rom

familiesof tradespeople nd abourers, ather han romelitefamilies.

Sometimes hey gainedgreatpower n their quarterand engaged n

fights with the youths of other quarters.At the marginsof urban

society these groups sometimeselided into the genuineunderworld

of vagabondsand thieves.1l

While the gangs that cameto dominateKarbalan the firsthalf of

the nineteenth century had a similar historicalbackground, hey

becamemore than merely lower-classneighbourhood outh clubs.

The Karbala angs were often headedby outsidersand included n

their numbers ugitivesand deserters rom the military.They grew

far more powerful han medievalchivalricorganizations, omingto

rule the city in alliancewith local nobles. In short, they underwent

a peculiarlyearly modern transformation, nd, refracted n this

modern lens, begin to look familiar o the comparative istorian.

They begin to look like "mafia".

All the elements of mafia, as defined by Hobsbawm,Hess and

others, appear n Karbala.12These include avoidanceof invoking

state aw anda preference or settlinggrudges hrough oughness nd

a codeof manlyhonour;a patronageystemwithbossesandretainers;

and control of the community's ife by an officiallyunrecognized

system of gangs. Such mafia must be clearly distinguished rom

randomurban criminalson the one hand, and from ruralpeasant

bandits on the other. The mafioso acks complete egitimacy,but

erectsa quasi-governmentaltructurewith the help of notable-class

bosses. Unlike gangsters n a region with a strong state, mafiosi

existed in a vacuumof state power, and thereforeperformed real

service n providingprotection,albeit coerciveand violent.

ll See Roy P. Mottahedeh,Loyaltyand Leadershipn an Early IslamicSociety

(Princeton,1980), pp. 157-8; for overviewsof the phenomenon utside Iraq, see

ClaudeCahen,Mouvementsopulairest autonomismerbain ans 'asiemusulmaneu

moyen ge (Leiden, 1959), and C. E. Bosworth,TheMediaeval slamicUnderworld:

TheBanuSasan in ArabicSociety ndLiterature, vols. (Leiden, 1976); ra Lapidus

notes in discussing uch groups n medievalSyria hat "fundamentallyntra-urban

organization as not in their hands": ee his MuslimCities n the LaterMiddleAges

(Cambridge,Mass., 1967), pp. 105-7.

12

Hobsbawm,PrimitiveRebels, pp. 30-40; see also Henner Hess, Mafia and

Mafiosi:TheStructuref Power,trans.EwaldOsers(Lexington,1973);AntonBlok,

TheMafiaof a SicilianVillage,1860-1960:A Studyof ViolentPeasantEntrepreneurs

(New York, 1975);and Pino Arlacchi,Mafia,Peasants nd GreatEstates: ociety n

Traditional alabna, rans.J. SteinbergCambridge, 983). We aregrateful o Geoff

Eley for drawing ur attention o the last-namedwork.)Ironically, s Hess notes, the

word "mafia"may derivefrom the Arabic"Ma'afir",he name of the Arabic ribe

thatruled Palermo n medieval imes.



118

PAST AND PRESENT

NUMBER 1 12

Mafia-like roups, commonplacen Iraqiand Iranian ities, went

by the generic name of luti or awbash.l3 n the Levantthey were

called qabadayat.The Karbalamafiosi,though differing rom their

Sicilian ontemporariesn beingurbanrather hanvillage-based, lso

erected a parallelstructureof authoritybased on extortionrackets

and the privateuse of force,and ed by the wealthy.The main actors

in Hobsbawm's ypologyof the Sicilianmafia the need to defend

an entiresocietyfromthreats o its way of life, the aspirations f the

various lasses t encompassed ndthe personal mbitions f vigorous

leaders all playeda part n Karbala'smafiaas well.

Mafias emain omparativelyittleknown,aside rom hat n Sicily,

but Hobsbawm nd Hess havedescribed he earlymodernhistorical

conditionsunderwhich they arise. First, they come into power n a

frontiersituationof weak state authority-in rural, remoteareas

like the islandof Sicily. Karbala its this suggestion s a Shiite,partly

Iranian,enclave. Both Sicily and southernIraq had for centuries

been colonially ruled by distant and shifting centres, so that in

neitherareadid the people nvestthe formalgovernmentwith much

legitimacy.

The emergence f a new elitewhere he previously owerful lasses

have ess access o traditional ourcesof authority lso contributeso

mafia ormation. n Sicilymafias ppearedn the wakeof the abolition

of feudalism and the rise of new rural middle classes. As Hess

suggested, the mafia arose as a parallelgovernmentafter the old

feudal order broke down, but before a modernstate emergedand

pressed ts claims o Weberianmonopoly ver he use of force.When

the modernstateasserts tself the statusof the mafioso hanges rom

subcultural olk-hero o criminal.

Karbala'soreign,government-appointedunnielite was expelled

from he city as Mamluk ulegrewweak n the 1820s. The indigenous

13

The word

luti

has connotations of homosexuality, among the deviant behaviours

attributed to this group. See Willem Floor, "The Political Role of the Lutis in Iran",

in Michael E. Bonine and Nikki R. Keddie (eds.),

Modern ran: TheDialectics f

Continuitynd Change

Albany, 1981), pp. 83-95; Willem Floor, "The Lut1s A

Social Phenomenon in Qajar Persia: A Reappraisal",

Die WeltdesIslams,xiii

(1971),

pp. 103-20; Reza Arasteh, "The Character, Organization and Social Role of the Lutis

(Javanmardan) in the Traditional Iranian Society of the Nineteenth Century", Xl.

Econ.andSocialHist. of theOnent, v

(1961), pp. 47-52; H. G. Migeod, "Die Lutls:

Ein Ferment des stadtischen Lebens in Persien", 71.

Econ. and SocialHist. of the

Orient,

i (1959), pp. 82-91. Floor has demonstrated the distinction between sporting

neighbourhood organizations of the popular classes, which he calls

lutigar,

nd the

gangs or

awbash;

oth are commonly referred to as

lutis.

The Turks in Iraq referred

to the

lutis

as

yaramaz

r good-for-nothings, and as

girami.



119


Shiite Arab notablesattempted o take their place in monopolizing

the city's resources,but lackeda disciplinedarmed orceand had no

tradition f legitimate ule. Karbala's ourcesof wealth pilgrimage

and trade requiredsecurity. The Shiite notablesthereforede-

pended on retainers ecruited rom among brigands.Unexpectedly

the neighbourhood uffiansand desperate ugitives hatthe notables

hired emerged as powers in their own right. Ibrahim Za'farani

provided protectionand gatheredtribute for the magnate Sayyid

'Abdu'l-Wahhab, rowingwealthyenoughthroughextortion, raud

and intimidation o enter the propertied lite himself. The sons of

petty shopkeepers nd minorclergybegan o rivalold landedSayyid

families n wealthand influenceby virtueof theircommand f armed

force. In the 1830s and 1840s the old Shiite elites made common

cause with the rising gang leaders o resist Ottoman eforms.

The city'sgangssplit nto a minority ranian actionanda majority

Arab grouping. The Iranianswere led by Mirza Salih, son of an

Iranian ather romShirazandan Arabmother roma familyof Shiite

jurisprudents ased n Karbala.MirzaSalih'smajorallycommanded

his own gang of 60-150 Baluchis rom Fars province n Iran.14

Sayyid IbrahimZa'faraniheaded the far largerArab faction of

gang members.His father,an Iranian rom Baku, marriedan Arab

woman n Karbala, ettling hereto sell his saffron.Europeanndus-

trially-made tuffs-in he 1830sdevastated raqitextilemanufactur-

iug. 15

It remains unknown whether Za'farani's amily suffered

business losses because of Europeancompetition.Sayyid Ibrahim

grewup to indigence,hung aboutwith toughsand finally oined he

gangs. He came to prominenceby killing one of their leaders.He

then formed a policy of liberallydistributingbooty from criminal

activities o his followers,which made him more popularwith the

rankand file thanothergang eaders.He also exhibiteda daring hat

elicited he admiration f his men, mastering he sortof intrigue hat

could removedangerous oes and puttingtogethera loose coalition

of Arab gangs within the city. Both majorgang bosses, Za'farani

and Salih, "men of the people", derived from lower-middle-class

backgrounds.Througha code of "honour"basedon courage,cun-

14

Informationn this and succeedingparagraphss basedon P.R.O., F.O. 195/

204, "Translation f a PersianAccount";and on F.O. 248/108,Lt.-Col.Farrant o

Sir StratfordCanning,datedBaghdad,15 May 1843. The Farrantetter s a detailed

report,basedon extensive nterviews, repared y the Britishafter he Ottoman iege

of Karbala.

15Nieuwenhuis,

Politics ndSocietyn EarlyModetnraq,p. 86.



120

NUMBER 1 12

AST AND PRESENT

ning andviolence,theygained he respectand fearof the littlepeople

fromwhom they sprangby risingto a positionof wealthand power.

The fourteenmajorgangs, including hosegroupedaroundMirza

Salih, ranged n size from 50 or 60 men to 400. Some specialized n

particular inds of extortion; ne gang, for instance, armed he city

marketor bazaar.Many gangsterscame as fugitivesfrom outside

Karbala.In addition to the gangs, Za'farani mployed his Arab

relatives n his mother's ide to buildan alliancewith the neighbour-

ing Arab pastoralnomads. He brought he leaderof one tribe into

the city with 300 men to bolsterhis own position. Five other Arab

tribal eadersoutside the city allied themselveswith Za'farani.All

Shiites, they had frequentlycome into conflict with the Ottoman

government.

Although t lay well within Iraq's borders, Karbalahad the air

of a frontiertown. The populationshowed hostility to the Sunni

governmentn Baghdad,whichcouldseldomstation ts Sunni roops

therewithoutendlesstrouble.The city becamean idealhide-out or

all the murderers, hieves,embezzlers ndarmydesertersn Iranand

Iraq. These underworld lements (mostly Arab) mingled with the

often Iranian abourers, mall-timepedlarsand shopkeepers f Kar-

bala'smarkets,and built up protection acketsaimedat milking he

retailers,merchantsand pilgrims. The rough, desperateand well-

armed oughs organized hemselves nto largegangs, so that in the

absenceof a strongcentralgovernment ilgrimsand inhabitants ad

little choice but to pay a "godfather"or his protection.

Gangchiefs accumulated nough capital n this manner o begin

buying land, the most importantasset in the nineteenth-century

Middle East, and to live in the best houses in the city. A group of

about2,500

utis

ruledand nspireddread n the citywhosepopulation

averaged 0,000, for even though he inhabitants reasedgangmem-

bers'palmswell, they oftenstoleor rapedanyway.6 Members f the

old elite, like 'Abdu'l-Wahhab, elpedcreate he corrupt ystemby

actingas patronsof the thugs, gladlypayingoff one gang to protect

themselves rom the others.

THE SH1ITE ESTABLISHMENTAND THE MAFIA

The variousgroups within Karbalawere united by a religiouscon-

sciousnessof being Shiites and by a perceptionof the Ottomansas

16 P.R.O., F.O. 248/108, Farrant o Canning,15 May 1843. There were 3,400

houses n Karbala nd the populationluctuated etween20,000normally nd 80,000

at pilgrimage imes. Estimatesas high as 10,000 for the lutis are given, but this

probably esults romconfusing he gangswiththe owerclasses n general: ee 'Abbas

al'-Azzawi,Ta'nkh l- Iraqbayn htilalaynHistory f IraqbetweenTwoOccupations],

8 vols. (Baghdad,1955), vii, p. 65.



121

AFIA

MOB

AND

SHIISM

IN

IRAQ

the

same

Sunni

enemy

that

had

persecuted

he

Imams

and

all

their

partisans

down

the

ages.

The

gang

leaders

offered

these

diverse

elementsan alternativeo SunniOttomancontrolof the town.

The

Shiite

scholars

iewed

he

Hidden

Imam

as

the

only

ultimately

just

ruler,

although

most

of

them

in

this

period

accepted,

as

the

best

they

could

achieve,

a

temporal

power

that

established

order

and

allowed

them

to

enforce

their

version

of

the

holy

law.17

While

the

religious

scholars

(and

indeed

many

other

sectors

of

the

town's

population)

no

doubt

deplored

he

uglier

aspects

of

gang

rule,

they

probably

onsidered

t

no

more

evil

or

illegitimate

han

they

did

the

prospectof Sunnicontrol.

The

Shiite

religious

cholars

aw

major

advantages

n

keeping

he

city

out

of

Ottoman

ontrol.

If

the

Turks

re-established

heir

hold

on

the

town,

they

would

put

the

lucrative

shrine

endowments

and

income

under

he

charge

of

Ottoman

fficials.

They

would

refer

cases

to

the

Ottoman-appointed

eligious

court

judge

qadi)

rather

han

to

the

Shiite

jurisprudents,

nd

would

prescribe

he

mention

of

the

Ottoman

mperor's

ame

n

the

Friday

prayer

ermons.

Finally

they

would

mpose

restrictions

n

the

openperformancef theShiite orm

of

Islamic

rituals.

8

Moreover

he

Shiite

establishment

tself

suffered

deep

and

bitter

divisions

and

therefore

he

leading

scholars

hemselves

became

em-

broiled

n

the

factious

urbulence

f

Karbala's

ang-dominated

oli-

tics.

This

conflict

ranged

he

rationalist

Usuli

jurisprudents

gainst

the

more

ntuitional

Shaykhis,

ollowers

of

Shaykh

Ahmad

al-Ahsa'i

(d.

1826).19

The

struggle

between

the

two

parties,

which

led

many

Usuli

scholarso excommunicatehe Shaykhandhis followers, entredon

al-Ahsa'is

metaphorical

xplanations

f

key

doctrines

such

as

the

Resurrection,

he

ascension

of

Muhammad

nd

the

continued

ife

of

the

Twelfth

Imam.

The

Usuli

scholars

urther

eared

that

Shaykh

17

See

Said

Amir

Ariomand,

'The

Shi'ite

Hierocracy

nd

the

State

n

Pre-Modern

Iran:

785-1890?',

Archives

aropeenes

e

soeiologie,

x

(1981))

pp.

45-60;

and

Mooian

Momen,

ntroduction

o

Shi'i

Islam

New

Haven

and

Oxford,

1985)

pp.

191-6.

18

In

1803

Sunni

officials

had

been

n

control

of

many

Shiite

hrines: eeAbuTalibKhan sfahani,Masir-iTalibi TalibiTravels],ed.

Husayn

Khadivju

Tehran,

A.Hj

1352),

pp.

406-7,

418;

trans.

Charles

Stewart

as

Travels

f

Mirza

Abu

Taleb

Khan,

2nd

edn.,

3

vols.

(London,

1814),

ii,

pp.

190-1.

19

On

Shaykhism,

ee

Bayat,

Mysticism

nd

Dissent;

and

Henry

Corbin,

En

islam

iranien,

vols.

(Paris,

1972),

iv.

The

movement

developeda

millenarian

wing)

discussed

elow,

that

ed

to

the

messianic

Babi

movement

hat

shook

mid-nineteenth-

century

raq

and

Iran.



122

NUMBER

1

12

AST

AND

PRESENT

Ahmad's

preference

or

intuitive

knowledge

which

he

said

he

ob-

tained

by

inspiration

irectly

rom

he

Imams)

would

seriously

under-

mine the authorityof their position, based on technical legal

knowledge

derived

from

the

principle

of

reasoned

ndeavour.

In

Karbala

he

Shaykhis

were

ed

by

Sayyid

Kazim

Rashti,

Shaykh

Ahmad's

uccessor,

and

the

Usulis

by

the

jurisprudent

ayyid

Ibra-

ham

Qazvini.

This

division

of

the

Shiite

religious

establishment

played

directly

nto

the

hands

of

the

gang

leaders.

Once

one

of

the

leading

clergy

had

offered

patronage

o

a

gang

leader,

his

rival

had

to

seek

the

protection

of

one

of

the

other

gangs

or

risk

violence

and

intimidation.Majorreligiousscholars raditionallystablishedinks

with

gangs

n

most

Iranian

ities.

This

mutually

eneficial

elationship

provided

the

cleric

with

a

force

that

could

enforce

his

decisions,

collect

his

religious

axes

and

agitate

n

his

favour,

often

n

opposition

to

the

local

governor.

The

gangs,

on

the

other

hand,

had

a

protector

with

whom

they

could

take

refuge

if

the

governor

moved

against

them.

In

Karbala

Za'farani

robbed

Qazvini

of

4,000

qirans.

Qazvini

sought

the

protection

of

Mirza

Salih

and

his

faction,

andZa'faraniannouncedhimself

a

disciple

of

Rashti.

Mirza

Salih

even

appears

listed

among

Qazvini's

tudents,

showing

hat

more

than

one

sort

of

bond

linked

the

two.20

It

appears

hat

Rashti

did

not

relish

being

protected

by

Za'farani,

or

as

soon

as

the

Shaykhi

eader

sensed

the

Ottoman

determination

o

reassert

control,

he

broke

his

links

with

the

gang

leader

n

order

to

assume

a

mediatory

ole.

THE

RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF OTTOMAN RULE IN IRAQ

Now

let

us

turn

to

the

temporal

dimension.

In

the

course

of

the

eighteenth

entury

he

Ottoman

mpire

ost

control

over

many

of

its

outlying

provinces,

accepting

vassal

states

of

sometimes

dubious

loyalty.

The

most

successful

uch

states

were

headed

by

adventurous

members

f

the

Ottoman

r

Mamluk

military

lasses

as

in

Egypt,

Palestine

nd

Iraq.

The

weakened

mpire

also

faced

tribal

revolts

n

Arabia

nd

Kurdistan.

The

valley-lords

f

Anatolia,

who

had

much

more

rganic

oots

n

the

local

power

tructurehandidtheMamluks,likewise

made

a

bid

for

more

autonomy.

Karbala

n

the

1820s

was

twice-removed

rom

Istanbul's

rasp,

a

city-state

n

a

vassal

realm

of

20

P.R.O.,

F.O.

248/108,

Farrant

to

Canning,

15

May

1843.

For

Mirza

Salih

as

Qazvini's

tudent,

see

Muhammad

Tunikabuni,

Qisas

l-'ulama'

Stories

of

the

Reli-

gious

Scholars]

(Tehran,

n.d.),

p.

4,

where

an

'CAqa

Mirza

Salih

'Arab"

is

listed.



123

MAFIA, MOB AND SHIISM IN IRAQ

tenuousallegiance.The gang eadersof Karbala, houghurban ather

than rural,most resembled he valley-lords,who also often came as

close to banditryas to government.21

In the lateeighteenth enturyandthe firstdecadeof the nineteenth

the Mamlukskept a quite strong hold over Karbala.Relationsbe-

tweenthe town and Baghdadwere at leastcorrect.Moreover he city

desperatelyneeded the centralgovernment.In April 1801 12,000

tribesmen rom Najd in Arabia,adherents f the puritanical unni

reformist ect foundedby Ibn 'Abdu'l-Wahhab, illagedKarbalaor

booty and as an act of iconoclasm.22n 1801 the Mamlukgovernor

of the city fled before he Wahhabiadvance, aterbeing executedby

the Mamluk ruler for not having defended Karbala.This act of

retribution imed at emphasizing he solidarityof the urban-based

governmentwith the citizens. It may also have been a sop to Irann

which threatened o annex he shrinecities f the Mamluks ouldnot

protectthem.23

WhileKarbala'smerchantseft the city temporarily fter he attack,

and one Indian raveller ound t falling nto decay n 1803,no major

problemsthen existed between the Sunni Mamlukadministration

andthe Shiitepopulation.The traveller aid he considerableevenue

yielded to the state by pilgrims ed Sunniofficials o tolerateShiites

in the shrinecities, even though hey spaton themelsewhere.24With

the Egyptians'assertionof controlover much of Arabiar nd their

quelling of Wahhabirevivalism,Karbala's ecurityon its Arabian

flank improved.

RelationsbetweenBaghdadand Karbaladeteriorated fter 1820,

partlybecauseof poorerpolitical elationsbetween ranand Iraq.In

1821 war broke out between the two and the Qajargovernorof

Kirmanshahed Iranian roops nto Iraqiterritory, eachingalmost

to Baghdadbeforea plagueoutbreak orcedhim to makepeaceand

withdraw.The war set the stage for Mamlukruler Da'ud Pasha's

1824 siege of Karbala.The governmentacted out of a desire to

21 BernardLewis, TheEmergencef ModernTurkey, nd edn. (Oxford,1975),pp.

37-9;A. G. Gould,"Lordsor Bandits?The Derebeys f Cilicia", nternat. 1. Middle

East Studies,vii (1976), pp. 485-506.

22

For details, see Isfahani,Masir-i Talibi, pp. 407-9 (trans. Stewart,Travels f

MirzaAbu TalebKhan, iii, pp. 162-7);and for the reaction n neighbouringNajaf,

see Ja'farAl-Mahbubahn-Najafi,Madian-Najafwa hadiruhaThePastandPresent

of Najaf] Sidon, 1934), pp. 234-6.

23 'Abdu'l-'Aziz . Nawwar,Da'udBasha WaliBaghdad Da'udPasha,Governor

of Baghdad] Baghdad,1967), p. 114 and n. 2.

24 Isfahani,Masir-iTalibi,p. 401 (trans.Stewart,Travels f MirzaAbuTalebKhan,

iii, pp. 144-5).



124

NUMBER 1 12

AST AND PRESENT

reassert entral ontrolover the town n the wakeof conflictwith the

city's foreignpatron,Iran. But the siege was madenecessarypartly

because Karbalahad become dangerouslyautonomous rom the

Mamluks, falling into the hands of local notablesand their hired

protectors,unruly gangs. The siege, which forced many of the

inhabitants o flee to Kazimayn,ended in stalemate ather han in

occupation.

5

From 1826the reformingSultanMahmud I determinedo reinte-

grate hese provinces nto the centralized mpire.In 1830he sent an

envoyto Baghdadwith the aim of replacing he Mamluk ulerDa'ud

Pasha, who executed Istanbul'sman. In retaliation he emperor

sent an Ottomanarmy againstBaghdad n 1831 that subduedand

destroyed he Mamluks, eplacing hemwith a Turkishgovernor Ali

Riza Pasha)responsibledirectly o the centralgovernment.26While

reformsproceeded n Turkey, weakening ax-farmers s well as the

powerof intermediary ocialgroups ike military ordsand religious

scholars, he task of centralizing ower n Iraqbegan.

3ust as the independenceof the Kurdishand Arab tribespeople

stood n the wayof this process, o did the semi-autonomyf Karbala.

OttomanviceroyAli Riza Pasha,a memberof the Shiite-influenced

Bektashi rderwho mourned orthe ImamHusaynannually, ympa-

thized with the Shiites.27But he came nto conflictwith them when

he attempted o appointa governor or Karbala, or the powerful

gangsmurdered r droveaway he government'smanwhenhe proved

a threat o their interests.Such effrontery ed the Pasha o demand

the right to perform a pilgrimage o the shrine of Husayn, thus

reasserting he prerogatives f the centre. In this period, too, some

membersof the powerfulpropertied-class roups ike Sayyidsand

the clergyweredemanding hatthe governmentntervene gainst he

gangs.8

2s Al-Kirkukli,Dawhatal-wuzara'

i

ta'rikhwaqa'i'Baghdad z-zawra',

pp.298-

301; Longrigg,Four Centunes f Modern raq,

pp. 242-7;

Murtada l-AnsariAl-

Shaykh,Zindigani a Shakhsiyyat-ihaykhAnsan TheLifeandPersonalityf Shaykh

Ansari] Ahwaz, 1960-1),p. 64. Reports romKarbalan 1843repeatedlynsist that

Da'udPashadid not actually nter he city n the 1820s,but onlybesieged t foreleven

monthsbeforeacceptinga largebribeas a compromise: ee P.R.O., F.O. 195/204,

"Translation f a PersianAccount".

26 Fa'iq Bey, Tankh Baghdad,pp. 82-116; Nawras, Hukm al-mamalik, h. 5;

Nawwar,Daad Basha, ch. 7; and MuhammadGolam drisKhan,"BritishPolicy n

Iraq, 1828-43",Xl.AsiaticSoc. Bangladesh, viii (1973), pp. 173-94.

27

Ibrahimal-Haidari,Zur Soziologie er schiitischen hiliasmus: in Beitrag ur

Erforschunges rakischen assionspielsFreiburg m Breisgau,1975),p. 24.

28 P.R.O., F.O. 248/108, Farrant o Canning,15 May 1843;al-'Azzawi,Ta'nkh

al-'Iraq,vii, p. 65.



MAFIA, MOB

AND SHIISM IN IRAQ

125

In the summer

f 1835a show-down

ccurred

etween he Ottoman

governorand

the people of Karbala.The

Britishpolitical

agent in

Baghdadwrotethat the Pashawas planning o attack he townwith

3,000 regulars.29

As reports

from 1843 demonstrate, he

Ottoman

viceroy ound

himself oo weakto occupy he

town and struck

a deal

with the gangs.30He considered

a long-term

occupation f the city

to be unfeasibleand aftera

show of strength

ndicateda willingness

to compromise.

The Ottoman

iceroybroke

with traditionby appointing s

gover-

nor someone

neither Sunni

nor from Baghdad, acitly recognizing

the power of the new coalitionof local gangsand their patrons.He

put 'Abdu'l-Wahhab,cion

of an Arab landed

family with

strong

links with the

Arabgangs led

by Za'farani,n chargeof the

city. In

return for this

appointment

Abdu'l-Wahhab ledged to

increase

payments o

Baghdad o 70,000

qirans. The new governor ppropri-

ateda large

portionof municipal

evenues o himselfand robbed

he

city's two

majorshrinesof

some of their treasures.He used

partof

the money o

pay Za'faraniorprotection gainst

his foe, Mirza

Salih,

and gained influence over personages ike the Iranianconsul by

lending him

large sums of

money. He cultivated

he nearbyArab

chiefs, allowing hem to store

their booty in

the city.31The

govern-

ment of Karbala

ame directly nto the hands

of the gangs,

which

encouraged

urther mmigration

f toughs into the city.

Given he

reports hat reachedBritishears

n the 1830s hat

many

of the city's

elite members

wanted he Ottomans o overthrow

ang

rule, we must

ask how the

citizens were able to muster

enough

solidarity o

face down the Ottomanviceroy.

The answer s

surely

that, in additionto the armedgangs, Karbala's radespeople lso

played a crucial

role in ensuring

he relative ndependence

f their

city. Indeed

the issue of autonomy

arousedthem more than

any

other.The famous

ncidentsof Karbalamob

actionarenot food

riots

like the market trikesof northern

ran,but

politicalones.32As with

crowds lsewhere,

he Karbala

ittlepeoplerioted o achievea

specific

29

National

Archives f India,New Delhi, Foreign

Department roceedings

here-

afterN.A.I.,

For. Dept. Proc.), PoliticalConsultations,

Oct. 1835,file nos.

16-26,

politicalagentin TurkishArabia o secretary o the government f India,27 July

1835.

30

P.R.O.,

F.O. 195/204,"Translation

f a PersianAccount".

31 P.R.O.,

F.O. 248/108,Farrant

o

Canning,15 May

1843.See E. J. Hobsbawm,

Bandits New

York, 1969),pp. 73-4:bandits, ocialor

otherwise, eedurban

middle-

men to dispose

of their goods a

role into which Sayyid Abdu'l-Wahhab

lipped.

32 For bazaar

trikes, ee SirJohnMalcolm,TheHistory

f Persia,2 vols.

(London,

1829edn.), i,

pp. 443-4.



126

NUMBER 1 12

AST AND PRESENT

aim:they wished o proveby theirviolence hat o take he city street

by streetwould cost government roopstoo dearly.They sought to

keep the troopsof the "foreign" entralgovernment,whetherMam-

luk or Ottoman,outside the city walls as much as possible. They

often supported ocal familiesof wealthand poweragainstgenerals

sent from Baghdad.33

The crowdsoughtto preserve heirways of life and city rights n

the face of modern Ottomancentralization.Ottomanreforms, in

turn, constituteda response o the economicand politicalpowerof

industrializingEurope. The Turkishreformersmade an assaulton

tax-farming nd otherpre-modernnstitutions nd sought o centra-

lize power.Bothat the Ottoman entre,Istanbul, nd n the peripher-

ies of the empire uchreformsprovoked esistanceromsocialgroups

whose nterests hey threatened,ncluding killedartisans, ax-farm-

ing militarymen and the religiousscholars.In the Karbala iots of

the 1830sand 1840swe witnessa crowddefending tself fromrapid

social change.34

Meanwhile he prospects f the Ottoman mpire or the reassertion

of central control were improving. The 1840 Treaty of London,

backedby fourEuropean owers,put anend to the Egyptian iceroy's

bid to takeover the empire.The Ottoman mperor,havingregained

Syria,hoped also to take directcontrolof the Hijaz. Ali Riza Pasha

watched hese events closely from Baghdad,awareof their regional

implications.35 ut just as the proclamation f reformshelpedspark

a revolt n Rumelia n 1841by Christian easants ager or improve-

ment in their situation,so the centralizing endenciesof the empire

provokeda backlash rom the Shiitesof southern raq.36

In September1842 a new viceroy of Iraq arrived n Baghdad,

MuhammadNaXib MehmetNecip) Pasha. This official former

ministerof justice, a staunchconservative nd Ottomanchauvinist

with intimate ies to the new emperor,Abdulmecid had opposed

the reforms or giving too much awayto minorities.The reformers

thereforesent him away from Istanbulto serve as viceroy of the

Damascusprovince n January1841. In SyriaNaXibPashabecame

convincedof the need for greatercentralized ontrol.He attempted

33 Cf. Hobsbawm,PrimitiveRebels,

pp.110-13.

34 Rude, Paris andLondonn theEighteenth entury, p. 18-23.

35 R. Y. Ebied and M. J. L. Young, "An UnpublishedLetter rom 'All Pasha,

OttomanGovernor f Iraq, to the Sharlfof Mecca",Die WeltdesIslams,new ser.,

xviii (1976-7),pp. 58-71.

36 H. Inalcik, "Application f the Tanzlmatand its Social Effects",Archivam

ottomanicum,(1973), pp. 97-127.



127

AFIA,

MOB

AND

SHIISM

IN

IRAQ

to

subdue

he

bedouins,

treated

he

Christian

minority

everely,

and

succeeded

n

excluding

British

military

advisers

rom

the

province.

Indeedhe so antagonized he westernpowerswhile in Syriathat

Istanbul

inally

ransferred

im

to

Baghdad,

hough

he

retained

he

emperor's

confidence.37

Najib

Pasha

also

wanted

trong

control

of

Iraq,

which

meant

acing

down

the

Arab

tribes

and

the

urban

gangs

n

the

Shiite

south.

Only

about

orty

days

after

his

arrival

n

Baghdad

he

Pasha

set

off

on

23

October

or

Musayyib

on

the

Euphrates,

where

Serasker

Sadullah

Pasha

had

preceded

him

with

some

troops,

and

pitched

camp.

He

gave

t

out

that

he

intended

ooverseerepairsotheHindiyyah anal,forwhich

money

had

recently

been

donated

by

the

government

f

Awadh.

The

canal

would

help

drain

marsh

and

in

which

refractory

Arab

ribes

ook

refuge,

and

would

help

get

water

o

restive

peasants

in

Hillah.38

Rumours

began

to

circulate

hat

Najib

Pasha

ntended

to

march

on

Karbala.

The

Shaykhi

eader

Rashti

wrote

to

the

Iranian

onsul

in

Karbala

"that

many

Persians

were

daily

coming

o

him

for

advice,

and

begged

him

to

go

to

the

Pacha's

camp,

or

to

write

him

to

knowhisntentions".39 he consulwroteto the

Pasha

during

his

period,

but

is

letters

concerned

njuries

done

to

Iranian

itizens

by

the

gangs

rather

han

any

possible

advance

on

the

shrine

city.

Iranian

amilies

panicked

nd

began

leaving

for

Baghdad.

THE

DECISION

TO

INVADE

l\&eanwhile

ajib

Pasha

sent

to

Karbala

or

provisions

nd

sent

word

that

e

intended

to

visit

the

shrine

of

Imam

Husayn.Municipalauthoritieseplied coldly, offering

him

only

a

token

amount

of

provisions

nd

telling

him

that

he

could

come

into

the

city

for

the

visit

nly

if

he

left

his

main

force

outside

and

retained

only

four

or

five

odyguards.

The

Pasha,

ivid

on

receiving

his

reply,

threatened

to

ake

the

city

by

force.

Before

he

began

his

advance,

on

18

Novem-

ber,

e

wrote

to

the

embassies

of

Britain,

France

and

Iran,

detailing

his

easons

or

contemplating

military

action.

The

previous

year

Ali

Riza

Pasha

had

made

the

same

request

and

alsoeceiveda replyfromcity leaders hattheywouldallowhimin

37

C.

E.

Farah,

"Necip

Pa,sa

and

the

British

in

Syria

1841-1842",

Archivam

ttoman-

cum,

i

(1970),

pp.

115-53.

38

P.R.O.,

F.O.

248/108,

NaXib

Pasha

to

political

agent

in

Turkish

Arabia

(n.d.)

autumn

842].

39

Ibid.,

Farrant

to

Canning,

15

May

1843.



128

NUMBER

1

12

AST

AND

PRESENT

with

only

ten

or

fifteen

persons

as

a

retinue.

He

finally

returned

o

Baghdad

without

performing

he

visit.

NaXib

Pasha

considered

his

predecessor o have erred in appointingcitizensof Karbala ax-

farmers

and

allowing

the

city

to

become

a

refuge

for

criminal

ele-

ments.

He

believed

that

excluding

he

Pasha

rom

his

own

territory

constituted

"a

final

demonstration

f

the

revolt

of

the

town".40

The

omission

of

the

Ottoman

mperor's

name

from

the

concluding

sermons

at

Friday

congregational

rayers

a

mention

made

else-

where

n

Iraq

further

ymbolized

Karbala's

ndependence.41

ere

the

city's

religious

scholars

again

demonstrated

heir

opposition

o

SunniOttomanrule.

Najib

Pasha

aid

that

the

violence

of

the

gangs

n

Karbala

larmed

him,

accusing

Za'farani

nd

his

men

of

murdering

nd

robbing

at

will.

The

Pasha

reported

hat

he

gang

chief

had

robbed

ven

eminent

Shiite

scholars

and

had

raped

and

murdered

lady

of

reputation.42

But

the

strategic

mplications

f

Karbala's

tatus

disturbed

him

even

more.

He

saw

it

as

an

Iranian-dominated

tronghold,

complaining

that

en

thousand

ranian

ub

ects

had

congregated

n

the

shrine

city,

but

no

such

concentration

f

Turks

existed

n

Iran.

He

insistedthatallMuslims

revered

he

shrines

n

Karbala,

hat

the

place

belonged

to

the

Ottoman

empire

and

that

Iranians

nly

had

the

right

to

visit

there

once

a

year.43

Such

an

Iranian

population

entre,

controlled

y

gangs,

lying

in

his

rear

with

powerful

Arab

tribes

in

the

vicinity,

represented

Troian

horse

for

his

government

were

hostilities

with

Iran

to

break

out.44

The

city

responded

o

the

Pasha's

threats

n

mid-November

by

holding

meetings

and

closing

ranks.

The

elite

at

first

reached

a

consensushattheyshouldrefuseentryto NaiibPasha's roopsand

defend

the

town,

proposing

o

buy

him

off

with

a

sum

of

money.

Gang

eaders

howed

particular

etermination

o

keep

the

Turks

out,

because

hey

would

threaten

heir

control

over

the

city.

The

flight

of

wealthy

and

influential

Iranian

families

to

Baghdad

alarmed

the

toughs,

who

put

pressure

on

them

to

stay,

with

all

their

extensive

resources.

5

The

gangs

argued

that

the

former

governor's

iege

of

1824

had

provedunsuccessful.Moreoverheyemphasizedheneedof Shiites

4o

Ibid.

41

Ibid.

42

Ibid.n

Naiib

Pasha

o

political

agent

(n.d.).

43

P.R.O.,

F.O.

60/96,

NaXib

asha

o

Lt.-Col.

Sheil

(n.d.).

44

P.R.O.,

F.O.

248/108,

Naiib

Pasha

o

political

agent

(n.d.).

45

P.R.O.,

F.O.

60/96,

Naiib

Pasha

o

French

consul

(n.d.).



hlAFIA, MOB

AND SHIISM IN

IRAQ

129

to defendthe

holy city from SunniTurkish ncursions.

Artisans

nd

shopkeepers

ad no choicebut to staybecause

heyfeared hey

would

lose what (largely immovable)propertythey owned should they

depart. That

eminent members

of the Qajarroyal family,

like the

Zillus-Sultan

then n political

exile), elected

o remaingaveheart o

the poor and

middle-class ranians.46

The Iranian

onsul in Baghdadattempted

o negotiatewith

Naiib

Pasha,requesting ix months

of graceto allow

Iranians o leave the

town. He later

said he wrote the Shaykhi eader

Rashti two

letters

warningthat

the new Ottomanviceroy was

deadly serious

in his

threat to occupy the city, but Rashti said he never receivedthe

missives.47Najib Pasha rejected

any suggestion

that he delay six

months n entering

he town.

Severalcity

leaders,not including he gang

leaders,attempted

o

negotiate irectly

withthe Ottoman

iceroy.

The exiledIranian rince

Zillu's-Sultan,Rashti, 'Abdu'l-Wahhab

nd

other membersof the

elitewenttogether

o the Pasha's

ampat Musayyib.NaXib emanded

the right to

station300-500troops nside the

city, insisting

hat the

gangsstopoperating heir racketsand thatZa'faraniometo him for

an audience. 'Abdu'l-Wahhab

eplied that

some troopsmight be

stationed n

Karbala,but that

the gangs wouldnever agree

to the

other erms.

The city's governor

offered o

have Za'faranimurdered

if only he were

given enough

time, and Rashtialso showeda

willing-

ness to abandon

Za'farani.

In the alliance

of nobles and bosses

that underpins

any mafia,the

nobles generally onsider he

mafiosi

expendable.

This and several urtherattempts

at negotiation

oun-

deredon the

intransigence f the gangsand

of Najib Pasha,

though

Rashtiand

Zillu's-Sultan ought

hardfor a compromise hat

would

allow Turkishtroops nto the

city.48

On 11 December 1842

Najib Pasha wrote

to Zillu's-Sultan nd

Rashti,asking

hem to warn he Iranians o separate

hemselves

rom

the gangs and

to leave the

town or take refuge in the shrines

of

Husaynor 'Abbas.

He cautioned

he two leaders hathe intended

o

use force against

the gangs

should they oppose him, but

offered

protection o

neutral ivilians.

He said, "whoever f all the people

of

46 Ibid.,

Farrant

to Canning, 22 Apr. 1843; F. O. 248/108,

Farrant to Canning,

15

May 1843.

47

P.R.O.,

F.O. 248/108, Farrant to Canning, 15

May 1843; F.O. 60/95,

Persian

agent at Baghdad

to Hajji Mirza

Aqasi (n.d.) [Jan. 1843].

48

The autumn negotiations are reported

in detail in

P.R.O., F.O. 248/106, Farrant

to Canning, 15 May 1843.



130

NUMBER 1 12

AST AND PRESENT

the Town takesrefugewith you, assureand satisfyhim of safety".49

Najib Pasha hus recognized hat they had negotiated n good faith,

but he also attemptedby safetypledges o drivea wedgebetween he

membersof the Karbala oalition.He failed to separate he Iranian

tradespeopleromthe gangs, however,because hey couldnot afford

the suddenlyastronomical rice of carriage ut of the city for their

familiesand so had to stay and make a stand.

THE ADVANCE ON KARBALA

Gang eadersmade everishpreparationso defend he city, arranging

for their allies from the Arab tribes to come there in force. The

Ottoman iceroy,alarmed,dispatchedSerasker adullahPashawith

three regimentsof infantry,one of cavalryand twentyguns. About

19 December1842he arrived t Imam-Nuk,a mile and a half south-

eastof Karbala.They received poradic niper irebut did not return

it. Their arrivalprovokedanotherattemptat negotiation,again ed

by Rashti and Zillu's-Sultan,which involved the giving of gang

hostages n exchange or the Turkishwithdrawal f all but 500 men.

This effortmet failurewhen NajibPasharejected ts termseven after

SadullahPashahad accepted t.50

The day after the viceroy'snegativemessagearrived,around22

December, SadullahPasha sent his soldiers out to occupy some

favourablepositions. Observerson the city walls informedArab

tribespeople nd Karbala's abourersand artisansof these strategic

troop movements.Fearingan attack,a mob gatheredand went out

to assault he soldiers,whom they droveback. The crowdcaptured

several artillerypieces and overturnedothers, retiring at sunset.

While the attackby the crowd appears o have had an element of

spontaneityn it, the peoplehad hardlyactedrandomly. t servedas

a further ndicationof the militanceof the little people and their

distrustof the Ottomans.51

The unyieldingmood of the crowd may have been reinforcedby

religious ivalries.Had Rashtisucceeded n his negotiationswith the

Ottomans,his positionwithin he city wouldhavebeen muchstreng-

49

P.R.O., F.O. 60/97, NajibPasha to Zillu's-Sultan r SayyidKazimRashti],11

Dec. 1842. Cf. Muhammad Nabil"Zarandi,TheDawnbreakersMatali'-i nvar],

partial rans. ShoghiEffendiRabbani Wilmette,1974), p. 36.

50 N.A.I., For. Dept. Proc., SecretConsultations, 0 May 1843, file nos. 5-10,

Persian onsul-general, aghdad, o Mirza Abdu'l-Husayn han,Dec. 1842;P.R.O.,

F.O. 248/10, Farrant o Canning, 15 May 1843; F.O. 195/204,"Translation f a

PersianAccount";Zarandi,Dawnbreakers,. 35.

51 P.R.O., F.O. 248/108,Farrant o Canning,15 May 1843.



MAFIA,

MOB AND

SHIISM IN

IRAQ

131

thened.

Rivals

ike thegang

eader

MirzaSalih

andthe Usuli

scholars

did

not wish

to see thishappen.

One

of Rashti's

disciples ater

wrote:

"Howevermuch the noble Sayyidendeavoured o dampen he fire

of this

rebellion hrough

conciliation

nd forbearance,

is opponents

declared

hat heywould

rather

eetheirwomen

andchildren

prisoners

in the

handsof the Turks

han

to havethis dispute

ettled

byhim".52

A pro-Shaykhi

ource

written n 1888

ndicates

hatUsuli

scholars

helped incite

tradespeople

o attack

the Ottoman

orces,partly

to

thwart

Rashti.

A rumourspread

that

one

of the clergy had

seen a

dream

of 'Abbas,the

brother

of Imam

Husayn, who

asked

him to

promulgateholy war against he Turksand promisedhim ultimate

success.53

n

a shrine

city such rumours

of

supernatural id

contri-

buted

to a feeling

hat

the holy places

were mpregnable,

nd

shaped

the militant

popular

mentalityof the

citizens.

But on the

practical

plane

the labourers

nd tradespeople

ad no choice

but to

stay and

fight.

Their action

without

doubt helped dishearten

he Ottomans,

as it aimedto

do. It

also demonstrated

hat

"the crowd"acted

n the

revolt ndependently

f the gangs.

THE SIEGE

OF KARBALA

After

the mob riot

against

the Turkish troops,

the

gangs made

extensivepreparations

o withstand

a siege,

drawingon the

military

and

technological

nowledge

f the army

deserters mong

heir

ranks.

They

preventedanyone

from

leavingthe city,

though

carriagewas

anyway

unavailable

by then.

For the

rest of December

he

Turks

fired

on or

over the town to

frighten

he inhabitants.

Towards

he

end of DecemberZillu's-Sultanwrotefromthe Serasker's amp to

Qazvini,

hen

in Baghdad,

hat the

thousands f shots

fired

nto the

city

had damaged ens

of buildings,

ncluding hrines.

He estimated

forty

inhabitantsof

Karbala

dead in the shelling

and put Turkish

casualties t

a thousand.

He saidof the

Ottomans,

whowerecomman-

deeringmuleteers

or

their ogistics,

hat: 4Their

amp oo is

in great

distress

almost

approaching

o a

famine, but in

Karbala

ood is

abundant

and cheap".54

On about

1 January 843

Qazvini

and he Iranian

onsul,represent-

52 Muhammad

KarimKhan Kirmani,

Hidayat

at-talibinGuide

to the

Seekers]

(Kirman,

A.H. 1380), p.

153.

53

Zarandi,Dawnbreakers,

p.

35-6.

54 N.A.I.,

For. Dept.

Proc., SecretConsultations,

0 May 1843, file

nos. 5-10,

Zillu's-Sultan

o Aqa Sayyid

Ibrahim,

Dhu'l-Qaidah

258/December

842;P.R.O.,

F.O.

248/108,Farrant o

Canning,

15 May 1843.



132


ing the Iranian actionwithinthe city, left Baghdad o beginanother

round of negotiationswith Najib Pasha.But, out of touch with the

determinedmoodof Karbala, heyreached erms e ectedby city ead-

ers. Rashtiwrote o the Iranian onsulurginghim to come o Karbala,

buthe retired nstead o the safetyof Baghdad.Tragically,hosewithin

the besieged own took his actionas a sign that no attackwas immi-

nent.55

Karbala's itizenryduring he siegeshoweda die-hard ommitment

acrossa rangeof social classes to maintainingocal autonomy.The

rootsof this stance ay in the popularmentality hatprevailed uring

the revolt. Although quixotic given the fire-power angedagainst

them, their underlyingattitudehad some basis in local experience.

First, the coalitionof urbangangs, mob and tribesmenhad already

averted wo occupationsn the previous wentyyears,one as recently

as 1835. The inhabitants f Karbalahad grownused to a weak and

corrupt overnmentn Baghdadwhich heycouldbribeor facedown.

They remained gnorantof the sea change he reformshad wrought

in Ottomanands,andas yet unreconciledo thegreater entralization

these entailed. Secondly,poor communications mongthe Karbala

leaders n andoutside he city ed to an underestimationf the danger.

Thirdly,rumourswere planted hatthe shahof Iranwoulddispatch

an armyof 20,000 men to aid the beleaguered ity, and Arab tribal

leaderspromisedanother 12,000 reinforcements.56 he myth that

outside assistancewas on the way shoredup moraleand made the

people less willing to compromise.

Finally,religious eelingsaffected he judgment f the crowd,with

gang and other city leadersstirringup hate for Sunnis. Tradesmen

and abourersinedthe city wallsto hurldown nvectiveon the Turks

and on Sunni holy figures. The clergy contributed o the sectarian

rancour,and though hey did not join n actual ighting heydid help

repairdamagedwalls. The religiousofficial n chargeof the shrine

of 'Abbas who therefore tood to lose a greatdeal shouldthe Turks

come in) thwartedone set of talks by standingup in the assembly,

dashinghis turban o the groundand excommunicatingnyonewho

spoke of giving up the town and theirwives to the "infidel"Turks.

Somepreachers oldlyproclaimedhat he city wasengaged n a holy

war. While classical Shiite thought held that during the Twelfth

Imam's absence believers could wage no holy war against Sunni

55 P.R.O., F.O. 60/95, Persian gentat Baghdad o HajjiMirzaAqasi n.d.) [Jan.

1843];F.O. 248/108,Farrant o Canning,15 May 1843.

56 P.R.O., F.O. 248/108, Farrant o Canning,15 May 1843.



MAFIA, MOB AND SHIISM IN IRAQ 133

Muslims, the clericsput such legal nicetiesaside during he siege.57

Classicaldoctrinewas one thing, the impassioned hetoric f desper-

ate clergymenanother.

The majordissentingview from the popularmentality ust des-

cribed originatedwith the Shaykhi eaderRashti. Lt.-Col. Farrant

reported that he "did all in his power to prevent hostilities, he

preachedagainst heir proceedings,he was abusedand threatened,

they would not listen to him".58AlthoughZa'farani ad announced

himself Rashti'sfollower, the Shaykhi eader'sactionsdemonstrate

that he much preferred conventional overnment f the Sunnisto

the semi-anarchy f even pro-Shaykhi ang rule.

The gang-led oalition n Karbala ased tselfprimarily n violence

and coercion, houghyearning or regionalautonomyplayeda part.

It therefore xhibitedweaknessesand could fall apart n the face of

strongerforces. The old landed elite also demonstrated certain

ambivalencen choosingbetween hegangsand he Ottomans, hough

they had not the courage o speakout as had Rashti.

The Shaykhis'minorityview of events also involvedmillennialist

ideas. Rashtitraditionally evoted he fastingmonthof Ramadan o

discussing the characteristics f the promisedMahdi, who would

restore ustice o the world. The fastingmonthfell in October1842,

when it increasingly ooked as if Naiib Pasha might invade. An

eyewitnesswritingsix or sevenyears atersaidthatRashtielucidated

the comingof this messianic igurewith particular etail hatyear.59

The siege took place in the closing months of A.H. 1258, and the

Shiiteworld in the nineteenthcenturywas pervadedby apocalyptic

speculations hat the promisedone (Mahdi)would appear n 1260/

1844, a little over a year later.60 n Shaykhicircles, where these

57 Ibid.;see NormanCalder,"TheStructuresf Authorityn ImamiShi'iJurisprud-

ence"(Schoolof Oriental ndAfricanStudies,Univ. of LondonPh.D. thesis, 1980),

pp. 147-51. This is a differentquestionfrom whether t was permissible o wage

defensiveholy war againstnon-Muslimsn the time of the Occultation f the Imam.

In the firstquarter f the nineteenth enturymilitantUsuli ulamarepeatedly rgued

that t waspermissible,withreferenceo Russia.SeeA. K. S. Lambton, ANineteenth

CenturyView of ihad", StudiaIslamica, xxii (1970), pp. 179-92;Algar,Religion

andState, pp. 79-80;Ariomand,"Shi'iteHierocracy", p. 52 ff.

58

P.R.O., F.O. 248/108,Farrant o Canning,15 May 1843.

59

Al-Qatil bn al-Karbala'i, Risalah",printed n Asadu'llahFadil Mazandarini,

Ta7ith-i uhural-haqq Historyof the Manifestationf Truth], ii (Tehran,n.d., c.

1944), pp. 506-7; AbbasAmanat,"The EarlyYearsof the Babl Movement:Back-

groundand Development" Univ. of OxfordD.Phil. thesis, 1981), pp. 44-5.

60

See, for example,Mrs. Meer HassanAli, Observationsn the Mussulmaunsf

India,firstpubl. 1832 Karachi,1978edn.), p. 76; Amanat,"EarlyYearsof the Bab

Movement",pp. 78 ff.



134


speculationsreceived particularemphasis, political quietism and

eschewingof holy war against he Sunnismayhavebeen linkedwith

expectations f the imminentadventof a supernatural eliverer.

The five days after he breakdown f the fourth et of negotiations

witnessedfrantic activity on both sides of the struggle.The gang

leaders n Karbala aced increasingdifficulties n provisioning nd

garrisoning he 5,000 Arabtribesmen hat had assembledwithin its

walls o aid the defenceeffort.Ammunition rewso scarce hatpeople

toreout the railsaround he shrineof 'Abbasand melted hemdown

for shot.61The Turkish troops also faced great hardship,because

the high Euphratespreventedprovisions rom reaching hem from

Baghdad,and they suffered rom the cold. Using Arab abourand

artilleryblasts, they cut through he date grove protecting he city

walls and finallyhad to fight a fiercebattlewith gangforces n order

to take up a new positionat a tomb just outsidethe city.62

THE OCCUPATION

Logisticalproblemsand a high desertion ateforcedSadullahPasha

to decide whether to act or withdrawaltogether,and around 10

January meetingof the officersdecided to take the city by force.

On 12 JanuaryTurkishartilleryblasteda breach n the wall between

the Najafand Khangates argeenough o allowan assault.One more

round of peace talks opened at this point and city leaderswere on

the verge of acceptingthe Serasker's erms when the chief of the

Iranian angs,MirzaSalih,madean impassioned leathatthey trust

in God and the Prophetand defy the Turksto the end. The Iranians

had emergedas the hard-liners, erhapsbecause hey most fervently

believedthe shah'sforceswere on the way to aid them.

The Ottomanenvoy returnedempty-handedo this camp, from

which artillerybarragesbegan againand went on till sunset, when

both sides settled down for a freezingnight. The Arab tribesmen,

now 8,000 strong, hreatenedo leavebecauseof poormealsandcold

nightswatching he city gates. The gangsthereforebilleted hem on

the civilian population, with whom they celebrated he Muslim

festivalof sacrificeuntil late. As all Muslimsobserved his holy day,

they assumed he Turkswould do the same, and remainedn homes

61

P.R.O., F.O. 195/204, "Translation f a PersianAccount";F.O. 248/108,

Farrant o Canning,15 May 1843.

62 P.R.O., F.O. 248/108,Farranto Canning,15 May 1843;F.O. 60/97, Dr. John

Ross to Lt.-Col.Taylor,22 Jan. 1843.



MAFIA,

MOB

AND SHIISM IN

IRAQ

135

rather

han

returning o their

posts.

The gangsters,

distrusting

he

Arabs'

steadfastness,

ailed

the gatesshut.63

The Ottomanofficersplannedout theirassault. Three divisions

commanded

by the

leaderof the lMosul

brigade

were to lead the

attack.

The

firstwouldhold

the breach,

he

secondwould enter

the

town and open

the

Najafgate and the

third

would commandeer

he

bastions

nearest them,

turning

the big guns

on the

city. As an

incentiveto

the disheartened

roops,

one officer

promised

o allow

them

o do

whatever hey pleased

once

nsideandpledged

150

iasters

for

every uti

head.64

Beforedawnon 13 January1843the advancedivisionsset out,

with

heavy

covering

irefrom he Ottoman

rtillery.

They had

almost

reachedthe

breach

unopposedwhen

the alarm

went out

that the

Turks were

approaching.

Both Arabs

and

citizens rushed

to the

defence,

commanded

by an

Arab

gang leader, but

they could

not

prevent

he Ottomans

rom

gainingthe breach.

The

Turks lost 200

men

in the

assault. The gang

forces

ran low on powder

and

were

forced

to retreat

o the cover

of neighbouring

houses,

where

they

keptup fire. One Ottomandivision sneakedalong the insideof the

wall

to the Najaf gate,

killing

the

sentinels and swinging

t open.

SadullahPasha

immediately

moved

the main

force

into the town,

while

another

officer

dispatcheddivisions

along

the walls to

secure

other

gates,

and one through

the centre

of the town

that

attracted

sniper

ire from

roof-tops.

Manymen

detached hemselves

rom

the

main

body

to raid houses for

booty.

The

forceadvancing

long

he walldrovea

crowdof

mixedcivilians

and

Arab tribesmen

before

t as they

frantically ought

egress

from

thesealedor jammed ity gates.At one partially pengatetheTurks

63 P.R.O.,

F.O. 248/108,

Farrant

o Canning,15May

1843;F.O.

195/201,"Trans-

lation

of a PersianAccount".

64 The substantive

ources

or the account

hat follows

of the occupation

nclude

P.R.O.,

F.O. 248/108,Farrant

o

Canning,15May 1843;

F.O. 195/201,

"Translation

of a

PersianAccount";F.O.

60/97,

Ross to Taylor,22

Jan. 1843;

N.A.I., For. Dept.

Proc.,

Secret

Consultations,

2 July1843, no.

41, deposition

madeby Mulla

Aqa of

Darband March

1843);

and Yusuf Astarabadi

o Sayyid

HusaynNasirabadi,

afar

1259/Mar. 843,

n Sayyid

MuhammadAbbas

Shushtari

ed.), "az-Zill l-mamdud"

[TheOutspread hadow],LucknowArabicMS in the ibraryf theRaja fMahmuda-

bad,

fos. 44a-Sla

(a collection f letters

between

he ulama n Iraq

and n north

ndia

compiled

n 1848).

Secondary ources

that

provide mportant

material

r insights

include

J. G.

Lorimer,

Gazetteerf the Persian

Gulf,

'Oman, ndCentral

Arabia,2

vols. (Calcutta,

1908-15,

reproducedLondon,

1970),

i, pp. 1348-58;al-'Azzawi,

Tanrzkhl- Iraq,

vii, pp.

66-8; and'Ali al-Wardi,

Lamahat

Ftima'iyyahin

a'rikh l-

'Iraqal-hadith

SocialGlimpses

rom

he Historyof Modern

raq],

2 vols. (Baghdad,

1969),

ii, pp. 116-24.



136

NUMBER

1

12

AST

AND

PRESENT

fired

nto

the

crowd

with

devastating

ffect.

Za'farani

nd

200

of

his

gangsters

led

from

the

al-Hurr

gate,

to

which

they

had

the

key.

The

Iranian angs,led by MirzaSalih,remainedorthefight,asdid the

governor,

Abdu'l-Wahhab.

Most

of

the

gang

leaders

had

already

sent

away

their

families.

Several

housand

Arabs

ollowed

Za'farani

in

his

flight

through

he

al-Hurr

gate.

A

Turkish

officer

sent

3,000

troops

in

pursuit

of

them

and

the

fleeing

Arabs

were

attacked

on

another

lank

by

the

Turkish

cavalry

amped

outside

he

city.

Arab

casualties

an

extremely

high.

The

crush

at

the

narrow

l-Hurr

ate

and

the

troops'

ndiscriminate

firingonthepeoplemassed here mpelledhundreds fcitizens oflee

back

nto

the

town

to

seek

shelter

n

the

shrines

or

in

the

houses

of

Zillu's-Sultan

nd

Rashti,

he

refuges

designated

y

Najib

Pasha.

Ra-

shti's

home

was

so

full

that

people

spilled

nto

his

courtyard,

where

some

sixty-six

persons

were

crushed

by

the

panicky

crowd.

By

this

time

the

greater

body

of

tribesmen

nd

gangs

had

fled

the

city.

Never-

theless,

he

Turkish

division

advancing

hrough

he

centre

of

the

town

suffered

heavy

sniper

ire,

the

intensity

of

which

ndicates

hat

many

tradespeople

oined

he

fray

on

their

own.

Manyoftheseweresightedintheir

ethnic

Iranian

ress

n

the

opposition

orces.

When

he

power

elite

had

fled,

the

little

people

remained

o

defend

heir

bazaar,

heir

holy

city.

This

opposition

rom

he

crowd

nfuriated

he

Turkish

old-

iers.

5

Turkish

troops

chased

retreating

Arabs

to

the

shrine

of

'Abbas,

where

nipers

ired

upon

them

rom

a

minaret.

The

berserk

Ottomans

let

oose

a

fearful

olley

nto

the

crowd

eeking

anctuary

here,

which

panicked,

causing

more

deaths

by

trampling.

The

Turks

took

the

offensive,robbingwomenof jewellery,sometimeschoppingoff a

limb

o

get

it.

Fighting

even

reached

he

precincts

f

the

holy

tomb,

where

he

Turks

killed

several

persons

hey

declared

were

utis.

The

streets

adjoining

Abbas's

shrine

were

filled

with

cadavers

hat

the

Ottomans

et

ablaze

with

naphtha

and

covered

with

blankets

o

help

them

burn.

Nearly

250

persons

probably

perished

n

the

incident.

Nearly

200

more

civilians

were

slaughtered

t

the

shrine

of

Imam

Husayn

before

Sadullah

Pasha

entered

he

city

at

about

10.30

a.m.

and orbade urtherbutchery.

The

troops

hen

fanned

out

to

plunder

he

city's

residences,

aping

and

killing.

Often

the

troops

pressed

the

owners

into

service

as

bearers

o

transport

he

stolen

goods

o

camp.

Mulla

Yusuf

Astarabadi

65

For

the

last

point,

see

P.R.O.,

F.O.

248/111,

Taylor

to

Sheil,

16

Feb.

1843;

and

F.O.

248/111,

letter

of

Ross

to

Baghdad,

17

Feb.

1843.



137


reported hat althoughhe suffereda head wound he was made to

carry oot to the camp. He wote:

The deadwere lying on top of one another o the extent hat I could not crossthe

streetexceptby walkingover the corpses.It was as if I walkedabout nvisibly,so

manyhadperished . . At the foundation f the mausoleum f our ordAbu'l-Fadl

'Abbas . . I descriedall about he illumined epulchremurdered oulsclinging o

it, beseeching, eekingshelterand refugewithin t. I saw most of the dead n the

lanes and bazaars.66

Only towards sunset did the Ottoman commander,who had

stoppedpaying or lutiears, beginreining n his plunderingminions.

After carefulenquiriesFarrant stimated he loss of life inside the

city at some 3,000 dead that day, with another2,000 Arabskilled

outsidethe walls.67The numberof deadwithin the city represented

15 per cent of its normalpopulation.The Turks lost 400 men.

THE REPRESSIONOF SHIISM

The religious lement n the struggle gain urfacedwhentheTurkish

troopsturnedthe courtof the shrineof 'Abbas nto a barrack ard,

where animalswere stabledand uncouthsoldierssang loose songs,

horrifying he dispiritedShiites.On 15Januaryhe Serasker eceived

wordthat Najib Pashawould shortlyvisit the conquered ity. Shiite

jurisprudentsndothernotableswereput in chargeof overseeing he

burial fthe oftenburnt,dog-eaten adaversn massgraves.On 16and

17 Januaryurtherplundering ccurred s troops earched omes or

arms.

On 18 JanuaryNajib Pashaarrived n the city and was greetedby

a partyof notables hat ncludedRashti.The viceroy aidhis prayers

at the shrine of Imam Husayn and paid respect o the holy tombs,

but he soon revealeda new administrative rder that ended Shiite

autonomy n the town. Najib Pashaappointeda Sunni governorof

Karbala, nd announced hatwith the concurrence f the Sunniqadi

in Baghdad, n assistantSunnijudgewouldbe appointedn Karbala.

Sunni judgeswould hear all court cases, even where they involved

two Shiiteparties romKarbala.Likewise, he government ppointed

a Sunni preacher o deliver sermons after Friday prayersand to

66 Astarabadio Nasirabadi,Safar1259/Mar. 843, n Shushtaried.), "az-Zillal-

mamdud".

67

P.R.O., F.O. 248/111, etterof Ross to Baghdad,17 Feb. 1843;F.O. 248/108,

Farranto Canning,15 May 1843.Cf. al-'Azzawi,Ta'rikh l-'Iraq, ii, pp. 66-7, who

gives 4,000. Iranians loated iguresas high as 22,000. According o Farrant,Sayyid

'Abdu'l-Wahhabstimated he city's populationat the time of the siege at about

20,000, including8,000 tribesmen nd 6,000 ethnic Iranians.



138

NUMBER

1

12

AST

AND

PRESENT

pronounce

lessings

on

the

Ottoman

mperor.

8

Thousands

f

Shiites

fled

Iraq

for

Iran.

The Shiiteclergy,alarmedby the disasterandthe new, hardline

Ottoman

government,

began

practising

dissimulation

taqiyyah)

f

their

aith

and

cancelled

urther

performance

f

Friday

ongregational

prayers.

Shiites

ceased

to

pray

with

their

arms

held

straight

down,

pretending

o

be

Sunnis

from

the

ritual

point

of

view.

Observances

of

the

month

of

mourning,

Muharram,

which

began

on

1

February,

were

extremely

ubdued

and

private,

and

news

of

the

attack

disheart-

ened

other

Shiites

n

Iraq.69

REACTIONSTO THE

DISASTER

Reactions

o

the

calamity

within

Karbala

aried

greatly.

By

late

April

a

semblance

of

normality

had

returned

to

the

town

and

Farrant

reported

hat

respectable

esidents

rejoiced

hat

the

gangs

had

been

expelled,

complaining

hat

"no

place

could

have

exceeded

Karbellah

in

debauchery

f

every

sort".

He

noted

that

many

religious

officials

considered

he

calamity

a

judgement

n

the

place.70

Wealthy

survi-

vors

of

the

occupation

were

happier

with

strong

state

control.

Theleadersoftherevolt romoldlanded amilies, uchas'Abdu'l-

Wahhab,

led

to

sanctuary

with

friendly

ribes

and

Najib

Pasha

ubse-

quently

pardoned

hem.

Mirza

Salih

uffered

mprisonment

n

Kirkuk

until

pardoned.

The

Arab

gangs

sought

refuge

n

the

Hindiyyah,

but

their

eader

Za'farani

was

apprehended

nd

taken

o

Baghdad,

where

he

fell

ill

with

hectic

fever

(tuberculosis)

nd

died.

The

major

Arab

tribal

eaders

scaped

afely

with

their

men.

Najib

Pasha's

ostly

mili-

tary

adventure

made

ittle

long-term

hange

n

the

social

structure

f

Karbala ndthegangorganizations,lthoughweakened, ontinued.

Better

dministration

eturned

rosperity

o

the

city

within

hree

years,

though

ranian

merchants

were

thenceforth

ubject

o

heavy

customs

duties

n

the

city

and

within

Turkish

erritory.7l

The

minor

Usuli

scholar

YusufAstarabadi

eacted

with

rage

against

the

ruling

classes.

2

In

a

candid

etter

Astarabadi

ave

full

vent

to

his

68

P.R.O.,

F.O.

60/96,

Naiib

Pasha

o

Persian

onsul,

22

Jan.

1843.

69

P.R.O.,

F.O.

195/201,

"Translation

f a

Persian

Account";

F.O.

60/95,

Persian

agent

t

Baghdad

o

Hajji

Mirza

Aqasi,

20

Dhu'l-Hijjah/22

an.

1843.

70

P.R.O., F.O. 60/70, Farranto Canning,Baghdad, 2 Apr.

1843.

71

N.A.I.,

For.

Dept.

Proc.,

Secret

Consultations,

8

Nov.

1846,

file

nos.

87-96,

H.

C.

Rawlinson

o

Canning,

29

Apr.

1846.

72

Astarabadi

ent

on

to

become

a

student

of

the

leading

urisprudent

Murtada

l-

Ansari

n

Najaf.

For

a

brief

biographical

otice,

see

Muhammad

Mihdi

Lakhnavi

Kashmiri,

udum

s-sama'.

ahmilah

Supplement

o

"Stars

f

the

Heavens"],

vols.

(Qumm,

.

1977),

,

p.

395.



139


griefandoutrage,angrily xclaiming,"Would hat herewereno king

(sultan) rulingoverus, andnoneoverIran

3

Astarabadilearlybla-

med the Ottoman mperorAbdulmecid or ordering he attack,and

Muhammad hahof Iran or ailing o come o theaidof thebeleagured

Shiites.He wenton to say that f therehadto be a monarch,he should

at least uphold the Qur'anand defend the Imam 'Ali. Astarabadi's

antipathyowardsmonarchy nddesire orthe enthronementf Shiite

valuesrepresent rudimentaryepublicanism, roviding videnceof

strong, if vague, anti-monarchicaleelings among some religious

scholars n the shrinecities in the mid-nineteenth entury.Solidevi-

dencefor such views is otherwise are.74

The Shaykhi eaderRashti nterpretedhe cataclysm s divineretri-

bution orthe failureof the inliabitantso accepthis millenarianeach-

ings. The following year, September-October 843, he refused to

expandon the sub ectof the comingpromised ne. He feared hatwere

he to repeathis discoursea similardisasterwould befall the town,

as the people were still unprepared o embracehis views about the

Mahdi.

5

Iranmet the news of the bloodycaptureof Karbalawith griefand

rage,thenwith clamour orwar. The leading urisprudentf Isfahan,

SayyidMuhammadBaqirShafti,attempted o pressureMuhammad

Shah nto declaringwar on the Ottomansby threatening o lead an

independentarmy of 20,000 men into Iraq.76MuhammadShah

mobilizedi is troops, but in the end took no belligerent teps.77

73

Astarabadio Nasirabadi, afar1259/March 843, n Shushtaried.), "az-Zill l-

mamdud", o. 49b.

74 But see J. Chardin,Voyages e monsieure chevalier hardinnPerse t autresieux

de l'onent,3 vols. (Amsterdam, 709), ii, pp. 207-8, 337; and A. K. S. Lambton,

StateandGovernmentnMediezal slam:An Introductiono theStudyofIslamic olitical

Theory:The3runstsOxford, 1981 , ch 15

75 Al-Qatil bn al-Karbala'i, Risalah", . 507. Astarabadiikewisereferredo the

apocalyptic ature f theoccupation,writing,"GreatGod,whata momentousalamity

We saw the realityof the Day on whicha manwill flee fromhis brother,his friend,

his son and the very clan that gives him shelter":Astarabadio Nasirabadi,Safar

1259/Mar.1843; cf. Qur'an 80:34-36. Later Shaykhis ike KarimKhan Kirmani

pointedout that SayyidKazim'shouse was respected s a sanctuary ven when the

shrineof Husaynwas desecrated, mphasizing he sanctityof the Shaykhi eader's

residence:Kirmani,Hidayat t-talabin, p. 153-4; f. Zarandi,Dawnbreakers,p. 36-

7; al-'Azzawi,Ta'nEh l-'Iraq,vii, p. 68.

76

AlphonseDenis, "Questionde Perse:affairedu Kerbela",Re7)ue e L'Onent,

(1843), p. 139.

77

The Iranianwar chest was depletedas a result of Muhammad hah'srecent

unsuccessfulampaigns gainstHerat; heanti-clericalirstminister eared he ncident

wouldallowa resurgencen the powerof the religious cholars; nd the Britishand

Russian governments xerted their considerable nfluenceagainstany hostilities:

P.R.O., F.O. 60/95, Sheil to earl of Aberdeen,14 Feb. 1843;N.A.I., For. Dept.

(cont. on p. 140)



140

PAST

AND

PRESENT

NUMBER

1

12

Given

he

widespread

millennial

peculations

bout

he

coming

of

the

promised

Mahdi

in

1260/1844,

he

Sunni

enemy's

unavenged

sackingof so holya Shiiteshrinesurelyheightened xpectationshat

the

Hidden

Imam

would

soon

appear

o

succour

he

Shiites.

In

May

1844

Sayyid

Ali

Muhammad,

young

merchant

f

Shiraz,

whe

had

associated

riefly

with

the

Shaykhis

n

Karbala,

ut

forward

is

claim

to

be

the

Bab

or

gate

of

the

Twelfth

Imam

and

caused

a

considerable

stir

in

the

shrine

cities

of

Iraq.78

A

large

number

of

Shaykhis

responded

avourably

o

the

Bab.

They

had

been

strengthened

n

their

millenarian

ervour,

as

we

notedabove,by the teachingsof SayyidKazimRashti.The initial

excitement

caused

by

the

Bab

and

the

following

he

gained

n

both

Iran

and

Iraq

derived,

at

least

n

part,

rom

he

millennial

xpectations

caused

by

the

anger

and

frustration

he

Karbala

pisode

provoked

among

devout

Shiites.

The

Babi

movement

spread

with

lightning

swiftness

in

Iran,

especially

attracting

lower-ranking

religious

scholars,

urban

merchants

nd

the

bazaar

lasses.

The

Bab's

message,

aside

from

his

own

messianic

laims,

included

he

abrogation

f

the

Islamic

prohibition

of

interest

on

loans

and

the

amelioration

f theconditionofwomen.The

opposition

he

new

religion

provoked

rom

the

government

nd

the

Usuli

religious

cholars

ed

to

its

persecution

and

n

turn

sparked

lashes

and

uprisings

n

several

ranian

owns

n

1

848-52

9

CONCLUSION

The

data

gleaned

rom

archival

nd

manuscript

ources

nd

presented

abovenot only give us a detailedpictureof gangorganizationnd

activities

n

Karbala,

hey

also

help

clarify

the

general

role

of

the

urban

angs

active

n

many

cities

in

south

Iraq

and

throughout

ran

during

he

nineteenth

entury.

Although

tronger

overnments

ould

suppress

he

toughs,

when

state

power

waned

n

the

first

half

of

the

nineteenth

entury

he

gangs

took

control

of

entire

owns.

Wars

with

modernizing

uropean

tates

ike

the

Russian

empire

enervated

he

Ottomans

nd

the

Qajars

n

the

late

eighteenth

nd

early

nineteenth

(n.

77cont.)

Proc., Secret Consultations, 22 July 1843, no. 41,

Justin

Sheil

to

secretary

to

the

government

of

India,

29

Mar.

1843;

R.

G.

Wilson,

A

Histowy

f

Persia

rom

the

Beginning

f

the

Nineteenth

entury

o

the

Year

1858

(London,

1866),

p.

341.

78

Moojan

Momen

(ed.

),

The

Babi

and

Baha'i

Religions,

844-1944:

ome

Contempor-

ary

Western

ccounts

Oxford,

198

1

,

pp.

87-8

79

See

Mooian

Momen,

"The

Social

Bases

of

the

Babi

Upheavals

in

Iran

(1848-53):

A

Preliminary

Analysis",

Internat.

.

Middle

East

Studies,

xv

(1983),

pp.

157-83.



141

AFIA, MOB AND SHI1SMIN IRAQ

centuries,andat first heyhadfewerresources o devote o controlling

.

their own remoterprovlnces.

In response, he Ottomans rom 1826sought o increase esources

throughthe abolitionof tax-farming nd privilegesand througha

rationalized nd centralizedbureaucracy. he manner n which the

governmentnitiallygrewweaker, hen attempted o imposegreater

centralizationhroughnew, European-influencedechniques,helped

provokeregionalclashes n Iraq, with urbanviolenceand gang-led

revoltsgrowingcommon. OutsideKarbala he strugglebetween he

Shumurdand Zuqurtfactions n Najaf, representingwealthierand

poorerquarters f the city, racked hat ownwithviolence hroughout

the nineteenthcentury.80

In Iran, as well, the Haydari and Ni'mati quarters originally

named or mysticalSufi brotherhoods)nto which many ownswere

dividedoften stagedstreet battles.GangsdominatedYazd for most

of the 1840sand for a time a gang leadereffectively uledthe city.81

Shirazwas, for much of the 1830sand early 1840s,torn by factional

rivalries n which allied groupsof notablesand gang bosses clashed

with such ferocity hat the local governoroften lost control.82

From he Euphrateso the Oxusnineteenth-centuryangsemerged

briefly as popular eaders with great power in a town for several

reasons.First, both the Mamlukand Qajar tates ackedthe ability

to project orce quickly and effectively hroughout heir territories,

owing in part to their small standingarmies.These statestherefore

hadto dependheavilyon appointed ocalgovernors, hemselves ften

weak or lacking full central governmentsupport. Large pastoral

nomadicpopulations,relatively arge urbanconcentrations, ugged

terrainand lack of maderoadsand transportationechnology,made

the provincesmoredifficult o control hanwasthe case n contempor-

ary Europe.

Secondly,the local notables,artisans, hopkeepers nd labourers

in Iraqi and Iranian owns had little or no allegiance o the central

government, nd so they sometimesperceivedgang rule as no more

illegitimate han rule by the state. This especiallyheld true for the

Shiite towns in Iraq, and often applied n Iran as well. Where the

government axed the tradespeoplewithout providingservices ike

80 Longrigg,Modernraq,p. 288;Nieuwenhuis, olitics ndSocietynEarlyModern

Iraq, pp. 31-2

81

Momen,Babi and Baha'iReligions, p. 106-7.

82 For the situation n Shiraz, ee HasanFasa'i,Histotyof PersiaunderQajarRule

[Farsnamih-'iasiri], rans.HeribertBusse New York, 1972),pp. 235-8,262-7,285-

7, 350-1;and Amanat,"EarlyYearsof the Babl Movement",pp. 382-7.



142

PAST AND PRESENT

NUMBER 1 12

security, t often drovethem to an alliancewith their ocalextortion-

ists. In short,nineteenth-centuryrbangangshada common nterest

with local elites and the local tradespeoplen keeping the central

government ut. Finally, factionaldivisionsamong ocal elites such

as landednotablesand religiousscholars,and amongcity quarters,

often so detracted rom urban corporate olidarityas to allow the

gangs to divide and rule.

Underthese circumstances, angs n mid-nineteenth-centuryraq

and Iran used their armed force in the service of revolts by local

notablesor by tradespeople gainst he centrally ppointed overnor.

They often becamepopular ocal eaders, ranscendingat leastfor a

time) their extortionistbackground.

In Karbala heir provisionof makeshift nd arbitraryecurityhad

the virtue,at least, of allowingmorewealth o remain n the city than

the Ottomanswould have, while assuring he uninterruptedlow of

pilgrimsand merchants.The city's inhabitantspaid the price of a

stateof roughsemi-anarchy. evertheless, he evidence ndicates hat

the little people and many Shiite religiousscholarspreferred ven

gangruleandprotection ackets o imperialOttoman ontrol. Indeed

the Ottoman attack served only to fuel anti-monarchicaleelings

amongsome Shiiteclerics.)Without he activesupportof the crowd,

Karbala ouldnot havewardedoff central overnmentroops or two

decades.The tradespeople, aughtbetween wo unpleasant lterna-

tives, chose to be exploitedby their local leadership.The prospect

of more centralized,bureaucraticOttomanrule in the 1830s and

1840s, tselfa response o the riseof Europeanndustrial ndpolitical

might, provoked he little people to defend their local autonomy.

The roleof"mafias" n defending provincial reaagainst distant

governmenthas long been recognized.But the specificallyurban

character f the Karbala

utis

does raisequestions.The urbangang

leadershipof these popularuprisingsmust strike anyone familiar

with the historiography f earlymodernEuropeas anomalous.The

gangsters n Paris, it has often been observed, saw the French

Revolutionas no morethanan opportunityor plunder.Hobsbawm

argued hat althoughpeasantbanditsare "social", n tune with the

needs and aspirations f the oppressedpeasantry rom which they

spring, urbanbanditsare asocial.83The widespreadnvolvement f

83

Hobsbawm,Bandits,pp. 84-5. Hobsbawm eserves ull credit or drawing ur

attention o these phenomena,and this criticism s meant to be constructive.For

anothercriticalview of Hobsbawm's pproach o ruralbandits, see P. O'Malley,

"SocialBandits,ModernCapitalism, nd the Traditional easantry:A Critiqueof

(cont. on p. 143)



MAFIA,

MOB

AND SHIISM IN

IRAQ

143

gangs

in urban movements

of social protest

in nineteenth-century

Iraq

and Iran challenges

his

paradigm.Indeed

it

should provoke

thoughtas to whether thereis reallyany such thing as an asocial

gang,urban

or otherwise.

As Anton

Blokhas

pointedout, all

banditry

is "social"

n

so far as it occurs

n a

socialcontext.84

Bandits

emerge rom

particular

lassesand,

when

successful,

heir

wealth

and means

of procuring

t

give them broader

nterests

and

alliances.

Bandits, rural

or

urban, engage in

anti-social

behaviour,

exploiting he

poor

as well as the rich,

and

will join in social

revolts

when they

perceive

t in their interests

o do.

Butluti rule,basedon a tenuouscoalitionof anarchicalangsand

upon

a vacuumof

more legitimate

power,

exhibited

nstabilityand

proveda transitional

henomenon.

t burgeoned

whenthe

old tax-

farming

Mamluk

government

declined

n the firstthird

of the

nine-

teenth

century,but

before

modern,centralized

tates

arose o

impose

strict ecurity.

Naiib

Pasha's

attackwasa harbinger

f

things o come;

but

they would come

very

gradually ver the

succeeding

entury.

XuanR.

I. Cole

MooVanMomen

(n. 83 cont.)

Hobsbawm",

Tl. PeasantStudies,

vi (1979),

pp. 489-502. For

other studies

and

conceptual

efinements

f

ruralbanditry,ee

L. Lewin,"TheOligarchicalimitations

of Social

Banditry n Brazil",

Past

andPresent,no. 82

(Feb. 1979),

pp. 116-47;

and

HenkDriessen,

"The 'Noble

Bandit'and the

Bandits

of the Nobles:Brigandage

nd

Local

Community

n Nineteenth

CenturyAndalusia",

rchivesuropeenese

sociologie,

xxiv

(1983) pp. 96-114.

84 Anton Blok,

"The

Peasantand the Brigand:

Social

BanditryReconsidered",

Documents

Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843