The Social Fallout: Safety Nets and Recrafting the Social Contract
33
183 5 The Social Fallout: Safety Nets and Recrafting the Social Contract with NANCY BIRDSALL Before the spread of democratic rule in developing East Asia, governments denied citizens effective political voice and offered only limited social insurance. 1 But they pursued policies that increased household incomes and minimized or prevented the increasing inequality frequently associ- ated with the development process. East Asia’s growth lifted millions of households out of poverty and generated not only a class of the newly rich, but upwardly mobile urban middle and working classes that might be called the ‘‘striving class.’’ Even before the economic crisis of 1997-98, this approach to social issues was coming under pressure. Secular changes, including aging popula- tions, urbanization, greater openness to trade and investment, and demands arising out of the democratization process in a number of coun- tries called into question the adequacy of informal social insurance mecha- nisms. However, the financial crisis of 1997-98 demonstrated clearly that reliance on growth and informal mechanisms to provide social insurance had left governments badly equipped to respond to large-scale social distress. The problem was not just one of the poor, although they too were adversely affected by the crisis. The crisis struck hardest precisely Nancy Birdsall is senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and director of the Economic Reform Project in the Global Policy Program. She was formerly the executive vice- president of the Inter-American Development Bank. 1. A more extended version of the arguments presented here can be found in Birdsall and Haggard (2000). Institute for International Economics | http://www.iie.com
The Social Fallout: Safety Nets and Recrafting the Social Contract
The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis183
5 The Social Fallout: Safety Nets and Recrafting the Social
Contract
with NANCY BIRDSALL
Before the spread of democratic rule in developing East Asia,
governments denied citizens effective political voice and offered
only limited social insurance.1 But they pursued policies that
increased household incomes and minimized or prevented the
increasing inequality frequently associ- ated with the development
process. East Asia’s growth lifted millions of households out of
poverty and generated not only a class of the newly rich, but
upwardly mobile urban middle and working classes that might be
called the ‘‘striving class.’’
Even before the economic crisis of 1997-98, this approach to social
issues was coming under pressure. Secular changes, including aging
popula- tions, urbanization, greater openness to trade and
investment, and demands arising out of the democratization process
in a number of coun- tries called into question the adequacy of
informal social insurance mecha- nisms. However, the financial
crisis of 1997-98 demonstrated clearly that reliance on growth and
informal mechanisms to provide social insurance had left
governments badly equipped to respond to large-scale social
distress. The problem was not just one of the poor, although they
too were adversely affected by the crisis. The crisis struck
hardest precisely
Nancy Birdsall is senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace and director of the Economic Reform Project in
the Global Policy Program. She was formerly the executive vice-
president of the Inter-American Development Bank.
1. A more extended version of the arguments presented here can be
found in Birdsall and Haggard (2000).
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184 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
at the urban ‘‘striving class,’’ thus calling into question the
social mobility of the past.
The first response of governments and the international financial
institu- tions to the social dimensions of the crisis was to relax
fiscal policies that were initially too tight and to protect public
spending on education, health, and other social investment
programs. The second was more direct: To craft policies and
programs that would protect the poor and vulnerable groups through
targeted transfers and public employment, and to create or
substantially upgrade social insurance for the working and middle
classes.
Each of the four countries in the region instituted short-term
social safety net programs: food, emergency employment, and in some
cases income supplements to ensure minimum consumption levels among
the poor. These efforts helped alleviate the social costs of the
crisis, even if they were limited in varying degrees by the
institutional weakness of the government in the social policy area,
and in some cases by corruption.
But governments proved resistant to suggestions for targeted
transfers and institutionalized social insurance. Their doubts
stemmed in part from weaknesses in administrative capacity,
particularly in the ability to target the poor, and legitimate
concerns about the fiscal burden on the state and corruption.
But the nature of the response to the social fallout from the
crisis also had its politics. On the one hand, conservatives both
inside and outside the government harbored a deep-seated political
resistance to Western models of the welfare state. They argued that
such measures were not only ill-timed and expensive, but would fit
poorly with long-standing cultural traditions of work, discipline,
and family responsibility—tradi- tions and values they view as
central to the region’s past achievements. Whatever the merits of
these arguments, they also masked material con- cerns: that private
sectors operating in increasingly competitive environ- ments, both
in international markets and at home, not be burdened with
additional costs.
On the other hand, the countervailing political forces that have
histori- cally been the carriers of a widened social
agenda—organized labor and social democratic parties
(Esping-Anderson 1990)—have generally been weak throughout the
region (Goodman, White, and Kwon 1998). The poor are rarely
well-represented politically, but the configuration of political
parties and interest groups did not provide strong representation
for the urban ‘‘strivers’’ either. The backlash that was visible in
the region was less a result of organized social resistance to
reform than of the weakness of affected groups and of their lack of
institutionalized, organized channels of representation.
Opportunities for national debate on social insurance and the
broader social contract were greatest where such forces had managed
to gain
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THE SOCIAL FALLOUT 185
greater political voice. The conditions for this occurring were
partly struc- tural; for example, South Korea is more urbanized and
industrialized than its Southeast Asian counterparts and thus
better able to institute more formal social insurance mechanisms.
But the conditions were also more purely political and paralleled
in important ways an important condition for reform already noted
in chapters 1-3. New social contracts were more likely from
governments less beholden to business interests and conserva- tive
social groups and more attentive to broader publics and those most
seriously exposed to the uncertainties of the market.
The Economics and Politics of Growth with Equity
Before the crisis, countries in East and Southeast Asia did have a
strategy of social protection, but it was highly implicit.2 Its
central component was healthy rates of per capita GDP growth that
were broadly shared through rapid expansion of employment,
increasing participation in the formal labor market, and rising
real wages. Even if East Asian growth was primarily the result of
sheer factor accumulation, that is, high rates of savings and
investment rather than growth of total factor productivity (Young
1995; Krugman 1994), households nonetheless enjoyed steady and
reliable increases in real annual income.
What was behind this growth-with-equity model? First, the East
Asian approach did not solely emphasize labor-intensive
manufacturing for exports, although that was certainly a
distinctive feature. Rather, it was a relatively balanced
development model that avoided the implicit and explicit taxes on
agriculture seen in other regions and addressed rural poverty
through land reform (in South Korea and Taiwan) and substantial
public investments in rural infrastructure and agricultural
technologies.
Second, public spending on human development increased with rising
GDP per capita, and was generally concentrated on programs that
bene- fited the poor, such as primary and secondary education and
basic curative and preventive healthcare. Education policy was
particularly important. The combination of a greater supply of
basic education with the greater demand for educated workers
associated with the export-led growth strategy created a virtuous
cycle: Rapid growth and good returns to education made it rational
for households and individuals to invest in it. The result was a
dramatic increase in average levels of schooling, and equally
impressive, a rapid decline in the inequality of schooling.3
Public
2. This discussion is based on Birdsall, Ross, and Sabot (1995),
and World Bank (1993).
3. Birdsall and Londono (1998) compare East Asia and Latin America.
The coefficient of variation of schooling in East Asia declined
from over 1.6 to above 0.9 between 1960 and 1990.
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and private investment in education, particularly primary
education, also had the effect of lowering inequality by minimizing
the wage premiums scarce educated labor captured in other
regions.
A third component of the growth with equity strategy was a minimal
government role in providing a social safety net (Goodman, White,
and Kwon 1998; Tyabji 1993). Governments invested in people but did
not necessarily protect them directly against risk. Outside of some
protections extended to civil servants, public-sector workers and
the military (e.g., in Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand),
social insurance was generally private and informal and rested on
high levels of household savings, strong traditions of family
support, and private transfers (e.g., from urban workers to rural
households; between generations). In some countries, notably South
Korea, larger enterprises had begun to provide social insur- ance,
but this was the exception rather than the rule.
The fourth and final component of the East Asian model was
political— the prevalence of authoritarian governments that served
to dampen social demands. A number of commentaries have emphasized
the ‘‘shared’’ nature of East Asia’s growth or emphasized the fact
that high growth itself served to limit political pressures for
formal safety net programs (Campos and Root 1996, chapter 3; World
Bank 1993). But this language is subtly misleading. Such
‘‘agreements’’ were not achieved through dem- ocratic political
processes—and indeed were not ‘‘agreements’’ at all. Before the
democratic transitions of the 1980s and 1990s, they resulted from
authoritarian or semi-democratic paternalism. Social democratic
political parties were weak; labor movements were weak, repressed,
or both; and interest groups and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) had only the narrowest space in which to operate.
These political features of the Asian model had several
second-order consequences for the nature of the social contract.
The truncated nature of the political spectrum, limitations on
interest groups, and outright repression meant that any nascent
political demand for state-run social safety nets was attenuated.
During periodic political or economic crises, such as the ethnic
riots in Malaysia in 1970 or the oil shocks of the 1970s,
governments responded to social pressures by instituting new
programs. But they did so as Bismarck had over a century before:
preemptively and on terms set by the government and its
conservative political allies. The result was formal mechanisms
that limited direct state expenditure, relied on schemes funded by
business and labor, and, with the exception of Malaysia’s ethnic
affirmative action policies, shunned redistributive objec-
tives.
The effect of authoritarian politics on industrial relations was
also important (Deyo 1989; Frenkel 1993; Frenkel and Harrod 1995).
By allow- ing labor markets to clear relatively freely, East Asian
economies avoided the labor-market dualism visible in Latin America
and Africa. This may
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THE SOCIAL FALLOUT 187
have had positive implications for efficiency and equity, but at
the cost of direct and indirect controls over the labor movement.
Governments could not push wages below market-clearing levels; they
could, however, guarantee that labor had little say either in the
wage-setting process or in the rules governing the shop-floor. In
some cases, government paternal- ism did introduce some rigidities.
For example, in South Korea, the system of industrial relations
established under Park Chung Hee made it difficult for firms to
fire workers in larger enterprises, and all governments typi- cally
faced pressures from workers in state-owned enterprises. On the
whole, however, labor markets in East Asia were relatively
flexible.
The Limits of the Model in the 1990s
A number of secular trends posed new challenges to the implicit
social policy of the high growth period, even before the onset of
the crisis. First, long-term demographic changes were altering the
age composition of countries in the region. Between 1995 and 2025,
the share of the economi- cally active working-age population in
northeast Asia is projected to edge down from 61.6 to 59.3 percent,
while the share of those over 65 will more than double from 7.2 to
17.6 percent of the population (Asian Development Bank 1998). The
implication is not only slower overall rates of per capita growth,
but new questions about the adequacy of the pension and health-
care systems.
A second demographic trend with important implications for the
social contract is the continuing process of urbanization. South
Korea is the most urbanized of the group (81 percent urbanization
rate in 1998), and not surprisingly has moved farthest in extending
unemployment insurance to its urban workforce, although as we will
see below, coverage and benefits are far from generous. Malaysia
was also more than half urban: 57 percent in 1998; projected to
increase to 70 percent by 2025. Urbanization rates in 1998 were
only 31 percent in Thailand and 37 percent in Indonesia, in
comparison with rates above 50 and even 60 percent in countries of
comparable per capita income in Latin America (United Nations
1999). But by 2025, urbanization rates will increase to a still-low
36 percent in Thailand and 58 percent in Indonesia. The inexorable
trend of urbanization and a relative decline in agricultural
employment implies the weakening of the informal social insurance
that exists as a result of mobility between the urban and rural
sectors.
A third concern is rising inequality of income and wealth. The much
touted ‘‘growth-with-equity’’ model was not in fact based on
substantial reductions in inequality; in the 1970s and 1980s,
Indonesia, South Korea, and Malaysia saw modest reductions but by
international standards inequality in Malaysia and Thailand
remained high. Rather, the character- ization was based on the
region’s success in achieving rapid growth
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Table 5.1 Gini coefficients, for selected countries of East Asia,
1978-96
High-inequality countries Low-inequality countries
The South Malaysia Philippines Thailand Indonesia Korea
Taiwan
1978 1978 38.6 28.4 1979 51.0 1979 27.7 1980 1980 35.6 38.6 28.0
1981 43.1 1981 33.7 28.2 1982 1982 35.7 28.5 1983 1983 28.5 1984
48.0 1984 32.4 28.8 1985 46.1 1985 34.5 29.2 1986 47.4 1986 29.3
1987 1987 32.0 29.7 1988 45.7 47.4 1988 33.6 30.0 1989 48.4 1989
30.4 1990 48.8 1990 33.1 30.1 1991 45.0 1991 30.5 1992 51.5 1992
30.8 1993 1993 31.7 31.0 30.8 1994 1994 1995 48.5 1995
1996 36.5 29.5 Average 48.9 45.6 47.6 Average 34.2 33.8 29.3
Note: Ginis are based on household distributions of income per
capita, except for Indonesia, where Ginis are based on hosehold
distribution of expenditure per capita.
Source: Deininger and Squire (1996).
without the increases in inequality hypothesized by Kuznets (1955;
Bird- sall, Ross, and Sabot 1995). Yet new evidence suggests that
may be chang- ing. Even before the crisis, increases in inequality
were marked in Thailand and were visible in Indonesia as well (see
table 5.1 and figure 5.1). In South Korea, the Gini coefficient of
inequality of urban wage income rose between 1993 and 1996 from
26.3 to 28.2, a substantial increase, though from a very low
level.4 Although East Asia in the 1980s and 1990s was much more
equal than Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, it was no more
equal than the Middle East and North Africa and less equal than
South Asia or the advanced industrial states (Ahuja et al. 1997,
table 3.1).
Even where inequality of income has not increased dramatically, the
potential for conflict over the distribution of wealth is high.
Before the crisis, booms in the stock and property markets in the
1990s generated large and visible gains for the very top of the
income distribution, creating
4. Based on the data made available by Nicholas Prescott of the
World Bank, calculated from the household income and expenditure
survey reported monthly by the Korean National Statistical Office,
which covers household and urban wage and salary workers
only.
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Figure 5.1 Gini coefficients in high- and low-inequality East Asian
countries, 1978-96
Gini coefficient
190 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
a class of the newly rich. As argued in chapter 1, the subsequent
collapse revealed that some of these gains were the result of
insider dealing, cronyism, and corruption. The steep losses imposed
on urban workers and their households, the efforts of corporate
owners and managers to secure bailouts, and the high fiscal costs
of the crisis are all potential sources of political
resentment.
A fourth concern is related to the process of globalization.
Whatever the advantages of an outward-oriented growth strategy,
continued reliance on exports coupled with increased openness to
trade and investment have also produced a new set of insecurities.
As the middle-income countries of the region developed, light,
labor-intensive manufacturing activities are coming under pressure
at home, or are shifting offshore, creating new adjustment
problems. In Thailand, for example (where export growth collapsed
completely in 1995-96), the demand for the skilled labor required
to adjust to shifting comparative advantage is outstripping supply
because of lagging secondary enrollment rates, complicating the
adjustment pro- cess and contributing to that country’s trend of
increasing inequality.
Finally, as we have seen, the political context was also becoming
more contentious. South Korea and Thailand underwent democratic
transitions beginning in the late 1980s. These political
transitions were not spear- headed by populist forces and typically
had a quite conservative cast (Haggard and Kaufman 1995). In South
Korea, the first transitional elec- tion was won by a protege of
the outgoing dictator. In Thailand, gradual democratization in the
1980s occurred under military auspices and was interrupted by a
coup and brief military interregnum. Yet in both coun- tries,
political changes reinforced incentives for politicians to address
social issues in some form, and encouraged mobilization of new
social groups. Nor, as we have seen in chapters 2 and 3, were the
nondemocratic systems of Indonesia and Malaysia immune from these
pressures.
Who Got Hit?
The capital flight and devaluations with which the crisis began
combined with the initial policy response of tight monetary and
fiscal policy brought layoffs, declining demand for new entrants
into the labor market, real wage declines, and a resultant squeeze
on the informal sector.5 Real incomes were also affected by price
increases associated with devaluation,
5. We would expect that labor markets would respond differently to
such shocks, depending on institutions. Labor markets characterized
by wage rigidities would experience the effects primarily in the
form of layoffs, while more flexible labor markets would see less
unemploy- ment but declines in real wages, potentially to very low
levels. Although countries do in fact vary in the mix of these two
effects, most combined both, suggesting that concerns about labor
market rigidities in countries such as South Korea were, at least
in the aggre- gate, exaggerated.
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Table 5.2 Indicators of economic activity and social welfare pre-
and post-crisis
Indonesia Thailand Malaysia South Korea
Annual per capita GDP growth 1990-96 5.7 7.0 7.0 6.3 1998 14.4 10.8
9.3 6.6
Annual inflation (consumer price index)
1990-96 8.8 5.0 4.2 6.0 1998 57.6 8.1 5.3 7.5
Annual per capita growth of private consumption
1990-96 6.8 6.4 5.4 6.5 1998 4.7 15.1 12.6 10.2
Unemployment 1996 1998 4.9 1.8 2.5 2.0
5.5 4.5 3.2 6.8
20.3 13.0 n.a. 19.2 Percentage change 79.6 14.0 100
n.a. not available
Source: World Bank (2000b), 116. World Bank staff estimates based
on household surveys, national accounts, and labor force surveys.
Poverty incidence is derived from national poverty lines, which are
based on consumption in Indonesia and Korea and income for Malaysia
and Thailand. Data for Korea are urban areas only. Data for
Malaysia are for 1997.
particularly in Indonesia, where inflation for 1998 exceeded 50
percent. Table 5.2 shows the effect of the crisis on several
indicators of aggregate economic activity and household
welfare.
When the crisis hit, countries also undertook highly controversial
fiscal adjustments.6 The resulting fiscal stance, in addition to
compounding the demand contraction, had the potential to directly
affect those households most reliant on public spending for basic
social services. In fact, as the depth of the recession became
apparent, fiscal targets in the three countries with IMF programs
were adjusted to allow for larger deficits (Lane et al. 1999).
Malaysia’s tight fiscal stance was also reversed in the
summer
6. From previous plans of modest fiscal surpluses (less than 0.5
percent of GDP in Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand), the
initial IMF-supported programs called for increases in the
surpluses of 2.1 percent of GDP in Thailand in the first full
fiscal year of the program; 1.1 percent in Indonesia, and 0.6
percent in Korea (all including bank restructuring carrying costs)
(Lane et al. 1999). In Malaysia, the government also undertook a
controversial fiscal tightening in late 1997.
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192 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
of 1998. In addition, fiscal spending was augmented by a relatively
rapid increase in lending from the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank and major donors, including particularly Japan.
The new loan packages typically included agreements by governments
to maintain spending for social programs, including education,
health, and emergency employ- ment, and to encourage better
allocation of such spending to the most effective programs.
Although debate about the appropriateness of the IMF’s adjustment
strategy is likely to continue for some time, we can now see with
the benefit of hindsight that the crisis did not generate the
degree of social distress initially feared. Nonetheless, for
affected households the crisis was a wrenching event, calling into
question the more-or-less sustained income growth and upward
mobility of the recent past. How effectively did governments
respond to the social dimensions of the crisis? To what extent were
the new policies and programs short term, and to what extent did
they constitute the core of a new social contract?
Before we can address these questions, we need to know more about
who was affected. Across the four countries, the poor—and
especially the urban working poor—were of course particularly
vulnerable. But a much broader group, not easily distinguished at
the bottom from the working poor, was also hit very hard: the class
of urban strivers with reasonably good jobs or thriving small
businesses but with relatively limited education and accumulated
physical assets.
This group is more easily defined in terms of absolute income and
education than in terms of their relative income or education
status within each country. Figure 5.2 compares absolute income by
quintiles of the population for Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea,
and Thailand. Note that in absolute terms, the average income per
capita of the richest quintile of households in Indonesia, at about
$7,000, is slightly below the average of the middle quintile in
South Korea. All households except the richest in Indonesia have
income per capita below $5,000; that is more or less the income
level of the second poorest quintile of households in South Korea
and the middle quintile in Thailand. It is around this income
level, of about $5,000, that households are likely to be in the new
urban striver class, although in Indonesia this group is near the
top of the distribution, in Thailand in the middle, and in South
Korea near the bottom.
Indonesia
The social risk of the crisis was greatest in Indonesia, because
about 11 percent of the population, or about 22 million people,
were living in poverty when the crisis struck. During the first
half of 1998, poverty projections became highly politicized.
Initial World Bank estimates sug- gested that poverty would rise to
17 percent (Poppele, Sumarto, and Pritchett 1999, 5-6). But
government estimates in June put the number of
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THE SOCIAL FALLOUT 193
Figure 5.2 Average per capita income (1997 PPP dollars) by
quintile: Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
Richest quintile
Poorest quintile
PPP purchasing power parity Source: Pettinato (1999).
people living in poverty at 40 percent, and the international media
ran stories suggesting the possibility of widespread malnutrition
and even starvation (see, e.g., Washington Post, 1 September 1998,
A1). Subsequent studies have shown convincingly that these initial
projections were wildly out of line and that the World Bank
estimates were surprisingly accurate (Poppele, Sumarto, and
Pritchett 1999; Suryahadi et al. 1999).
Who was affected? The crisis—initially an urban one, concentrated
in the formal economy—did not generate a substantial increase in
aggregate unemployment. But certain sectors, particularly
construction and indus- try, were very hard hit. Given that
unemployment in such an economy
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194 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
is not an option, the number of self-employed expanded rapidly, as
did employment in agriculture; the informal and rural sectors
played the role of shock absorbers, but with an increase in
underemployment.
That people were working does not mean they were necessarily doing
well. Household per capita expenditures fell an alarming 33.9
percent in urban areas, in comparison with 17 percent in rural
areas (Poppele, Sumarto, and Pritchett 1999, 6).7 Increases in
poverty were also more marked in urban areas.8 When we look at the
decline in median expendi- tures (5.0 for urban households and 1.6
for rural ones), they are much more modest, suggesting that
expenditures of the better off fell most sharply.9 In contrast to
the other crisis countries, the less well educated also fared
better than the educated, and by a substantial margin.10 These
findings suggest why the effects of the crisis on poverty and other
key social indicators, such as school dropout rates, were somewhat
less than anticipated. Many of those most seriously affected by the
crisis were among the relatively well off to begin with.
Another way of capturing the highly uneven nature of the social
crisis is to look at the regional picture (Poppele, Sumarto, and
Pritchett 1999, 9-11; Suryahadi et al. 1999, 34-38). Those parts of
Java with closer links to the formal economy—and therefore higher
incomes to begin with— were the hardest hit. The effort of the
government to dampen rice prices meant that farmers did not
initially reap the advantages that should have accrued from their
rise; in any case, many small-producer households are net consumers
of rice. But the Maluccas, Sulawesi, and Sumatra have been
minimally affected or have actually gained because of the effect
of
7. Wage data show a similar ‘‘urban bias’’ in the Indonesian
crisis. For rural men (22-65 years old), real daily wages decreased
about 6 percent from 1997 to 1998, but urban daily wages fell by 20
percent (Beegle, Frankenburg, and Thomas 1999, 52; see also
Suryahadi et al. 1999, chap. 3).
8. The urban headcount index increased from 9.7 percent in February
1996 to 15.4 percent in December 1998, while the rural headcount
increased from 12.3 percent to 17.6 percent (Manuelyn-Atinc
1999).
9. Real per capita expenditures of the top quintile fell much more
dramatically (from February 1996 to February 1999) than for the
lower two quintiles (-23.3 percent vs. -9.2 for the first quintile,
and -11.4 for the second; Suryahadi et al. 1999, 8; Poppele,
Sumarto, and Pritchett 1999, 12-13), although the fall in
expenditures at the very bottom of the income distribution
contributed to the increase in the poverty rate (Thomas,
Frankenberg, and Beegle 1999, 10, and fig. 2).
10. Other data also point to the conclusion that relatively better
off households in urban areas were hard hit. Enrollment in junior
secondary school in 1998 relative to 1997 fell more in urban (6.3
percent down) than rural areas (1.3 percent down); urban enrollment
declines at this level were very high for girls (19 percent). Use
of both public and private health care fell most among
middle-income households. Spending on food rose for all households,
but rose most for the poorest and, controlling for income, the
best-educated (Thomas, Frankenberg, and Beegle 1999).
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the depreciation on export crop earnings. Subsequently rice prices
also rose, and rice was in any case protected.11
Thailand
Thailand shows a number of differences from Indonesia, most notably
in how the poor fared (Brooker Group 1999; World Bank Thailand
Office 1999a, 1999b). Unemployment doubled from just under 2
percent in 1997 to a peak of about 5 percent in May 1998, before
the seasonal demand for labor lowered unemployment in August 1998
to 3.4 percent (although a year earlier, August unemployment was
under 1 percent). The greatest losses in the year following the
onset of the crisis were in the construction sector (-32 percent),
where the boom had been concentrated, and to a much lesser degree
in commerce (-3 percent) and manufacturing (-2.4 percent); by
contrast, employment in the service sector grew by 5.6 per- cent,
suggesting again the role of the informal sector in absorbing the
unemployed. Small and medium-sized firms were responsible for the
bulk of unemployment.
Real wages fell 6 percent from February 1997 to February 1998, with
the fall greater in urban areas (8.3 percent) than in rural areas
(4.7 percent). But again, differences across sectors were
pronounced; for example, men working in urban construction saw real
wages fall 24 percent, and women in urban manufacturing also saw
larger-than-average losses. In sharp contrast to Indonesia, the
declines in both employment and welfare were heavily concentrated
among those whose education did not go beyond the primary level
(World Bank Thailand Office 1999a, 8-9).
The role of the rural sector in the Thai crisis appears to be
somewhat different than in Indonesia, because unemployment was
concentrated in the rural areas of the Northeast, where poverty is
also highest; of the total unemployed in February 1998, more than
40 percent were in the Northeast. However, this is probably an
artifact of a significant migration out of the cities to the
countryside. In general, agricultural households fared somewhat
better than the average household if we compare 1996 and 1998.
Urban-rural migration was later reversed when agricultural wages
fell and it became apparent that rural areas offered fewer
opportunities than urban ones (Brooker Group 1999, chaps. 2,
6).
Both poor rural and urban households witnessed real income
declines; fully 18 percent for poor rural households and 14 percent
for poor urban households. However, increases in poverty between
1996 and 1998 were relatively contained, rising from 14.9 to 16.9
percent in rural areas (but a worrisome 19.3 to 22.7 percent in the
Northeast) and from 3.8 to 4.4
11. In a number of rural areas outside Java that did poorly, it is
difficult to disentangle the effects of droughts and fires
unrelated to the crisis.
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percent in urban areas. Inequality also remained constant (World
Bank Thailand Office 1999a, 12-13).
As in Indonesia, region also mattered. One of the reasons the
crisis was not more severe was the differential effects of rising
prices across households. Net producers of agricultural
products—fully 25 percent of Thai households—saw an increase in
earnings due to the effect of the El Nino drought on rice prices
(World Bank Thailand Office 1999a, 10). Nonetheless, at an income
level below the average and closer to our $5,000 marker, household
welfare almost certainly declined, and took the form of employment
and wage losses in urban sectors such as construction.
Malaysia
Of the Southeast Asian countries, Malaysia was least hard hit by
the crisis (see Haflah, Johan, and Abubakar 1999; Jomo and Lee
1999). Unemploy- ment was more modest, although the increases were
large, going from 2.7 percent in 1997 to 3.9 percent in 1998, and
4.5 percent in March 1999. Nominal wages grew 4 percent in
1998—well below past trend and just a bit below the increase in the
consumer price index for the year (5.3 percent). As we will show
below, labor market flexibility was an important explanation for
this outcome. However, a second reason for the modest effects is
that many of the workers in the hardest hit sectors, most notably
construction, were foreign and simply left the country; in effect,
Malaysia exported a substantial part of its unemployment.
Data on retrenched workers show that 54 percent were in manufactur-
ing (concentrated overwhelmingly in production workers), followed
by 27 percent in services and 11 percent in construction (despite
the fact that the construction sector contracted by nearly 25
percent in 1998). More detailed information on who was affected by
the crisis is still unavailable, but what we know suggests the
importance of the groups we have high- lighted in Indonesia and
Thailand: the urban working class as well as the poor.12 Using
Malaysia’s poverty line, poverty edged up from 6.1 to 7.0 percent
from 1997 to 1998 (Jomo and Lee 1999, 27). But the urban- rural
income imbalance and overall income inequality may have improved
slightly in 1998 in comparison with the widening gap experienced
during 1996-97, again suggesting the concentration of the effects
of the crisis in the urban areas.
South Korea
South Korea, the richest, most urbanized, and most industrialized
of the four countries examined here presents an apparent contrast
to Indonesia,
12. The mean income of urban and top 20 percent of households fell
slightly in 1998, while the mean income of the bottom 40 percent of
households, especially in the rural areas, remained stable owing in
part to higher agricultural prices.
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THE SOCIAL FALLOUT 197
Malaysia, and Thailand. In fact, somewhat similar groups were at
risk, but they occupied different positions in the economic and
social structure.
The most striking difference with the Southeast Asian countries is
the sharp rise in overall unemployment, from 2.1 percent in October
1997 to 8.7 percent in February 1999, near its peak. The loss of
employment was concentrated in manufacturing (13.3 percent) and
particularly construc- tion (21.3 percent); as in the other Asian
countries, agricultural and fishing picked up some of the slack
(4.2 percent growth) although informal sector growth did not to the
same extent (Park 1998). Contrary to the argument that the South
Korean labor market showed major rigidities, rising unem- ployment
was accompanied by sharply falling real wages, 12.5 percent from
mid-1997 until the end of 1998 (Manuelyn-Atinc 1999).
Employment losses were heavily concentrated in semi-skilled workers
and laborers, and initially came overwhelmingly from small and
medium- sized firms, many of which relied heavily on temporary and
day laborers (Park 1998). Professional, managerial, technical, and
administrative work- ers saw no declines in employment through
1998; the numbers employed in these categories actually rose.
Workers at large firms initially saw only slight declines. Data on
education are also revealing; as in Thailand, those with less than
secondary schooling bore the brunt of employment losses (Moon, Lee,
and Yoo 1999).
In contrast to Indonesia, the fall in income in South Korea was
most serious for the poorest 20 percent (-23.7 percent versus -2.5
for the top 10 percent), with corresponding consequences for
poverty (Park 1998).13
Again, this group in South Korea corresponds quite closely to
similar groups affected by the crisis in the other countries, even
though their relative economic status in South Korea is
lower.
In sum, the financial crisis cut across broad swaths of the
population in each country; its effects were by no means limited to
the poor. These findings are consistent with a broader analyses of
financial crises by Diwan (1999). Examining 53 financial crises
from 1975 to the mid-1990s, Diwan finds that the share of labor in
GDP falls sharply following a crisis—5.5 percentage points—and only
partly recovers after. We have seen that in addition to the poor,
the newly vulnerable included workers in the formal urban sector,
particularly in construction and to a lesser extent manufacturing,
and those with less than secondary education. Workers and owners of
small and medium-sized enterprises were hit particularly
hard.
13. As with all countries, poverty measures are always arbitrary,
but the Korean headcount measure among urban workers doubled from 3
percent in the fourth quarter of 1997 to 7.5 percent in the third
quarter of 1998, and this measure excludes the unemployed (Moon,
Lee, and Yoo 1999, table 4-3). More differentiated analysis
suggests that the ranks of the poorest of the poor—those with
incomes less than 80 percent of the poverty line—increased more
rapidly than the poor as a whole or the near poor (Manuelyn-Atinc
1999).
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198 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
The crisis, in short, affected precisely those emergent,
transitional, weakly organized ‘‘striving classes’’ to which the
growth-with-equity model had historically granted social mobility,
pushing them back, at least temporarily, into the urban informal
sector or the countryside. The social consequences of the crisis
were partly mitigated because this group was able to draw on
personal savings, rely on intrafamily transfers, shift employment,
work longer hours, migrate, and reallocate expenditures to protect
investments, including in human capital. In this sense, the outcome
could be seen as vindicating the region’s reliance on informal
mechanisms and a relatively limited government role. However, it
could also be inter- preted as revealing the severe limitations of
the formal social contract in East Asia.
The Policy Response: The Political Economy of Social Policy
If governments were not immediately aware of all the details just
outlined, the social response to the crisis—including strikes,
demonstrations, riots, and deeper social violence—signaled the
depth of the problem. Given their lack of experience with social
safety nets and the acute need for external financial support,
governments turned to international financial institutions, which
subsequently played a major role in the definition of the social
policy agenda.
Table 5.3 summarizes the main outlines of government policy in the
most seriously affected countries. In some areas, such as
maintaining levels of health and education expenditure in the short
run or launching public works programs, outside intervention
supported governments’ own inclinations and buttressed fundamental
components of the growth- with-equity model. However, in varying
degrees across countries and programs, ideas for a broadening of
the policy response beyond temporary measures to a reconsideration
of the social contract ran into institutional and political
difficulties.
The problems facing the East Asian governments were in the first
instance administrative. In all cases, and particularly in
Indonesia, the large size of the informal and self-employed sectors
posed daunting administrative problems for reaching the poor and
even more so for constructing a broader system of social insurance.
However, the very reliance on informal social safety nets also
meant that lines of bureaucratic responsibility were not clear.
Agencies with responsibilities for social issues lacked detailed
information on the poor and vulnerable. Bureaucra- cies not only
lacked the capacity to respond in a timely fashion, but were poorly
positioned to act as political advocates for those affected as
well. As a result, delays in responding to the social dimensions of
the crisis were a common feature of all cases.
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Table 5.3 Social safety net programs in East Asia during the
crisis
Unemployment Active labor Food Cash Social Workfare assistance,
insurance, market
Country security transfers funds Health and education programs and
severance pay policies
Indonesia New Community Back-to-School Program Existing padat karya
program based launched (provided programs expanded of programs
scholarships for the poorest and subsequently targeted students and
school grants redesigned cheap for schools in the poorest rice
communities) distribution
Subsidies to maintain prices of essential drugs
Thailand Social Community Low-income healthcare for Public
Severance payments Training for pensions for based the poor and
voluntary workfare increased skills the elderly programs health
insurance for the scheme (new) development
New Employee Welfare and cash (new) near poor expanded for
Fund set up to partially transfers to unemployed
Scholarships and finance unpaid needy expanded
educational loan program severance claims for families
expanded workers from bankrupt Self- expanded
firms employment Allowing fees to be paid in
loans installments; fee waivers; provisions for free uniforms to
students
School lunch program expanded
ics | http://w w
Table 5.3 Social safety net programs in East Asia during the crisis
(continued)
Unemployment Active labor Food Cash Social Workfare assistance,
insurance, market
Country security transfers funds Health and education programs and
severance pay policies
Malaysia Training for unemployed expanded
South Temporary Public Unemployment Active labor Korea non-
workfare insurance program market
contributory scheme (new) expanded programs means- (vocational
tested training, livelihood wage protection subsidies, program job
(new) placement)
expanded Social pension for the elderly (new)
Source: World Bank (2000b).
ics | http://w w
Ratio of social security coverage
Severance pay to total Unemployment (months of employment
Country insurance salary) (percent)
Indonesia No 4 12 Thailand No 6 16 Malaysia No n.a. 48 South Korea
Yes n.a. 38
n.a. not available Source: Lee, E. (1998), table 3.1.
A second problem was that a number of Asian policy makers, as well
as political oppositions and NGOs, were wary of the new social
agenda because of the potential for leakage not to the nonpoor
(always a legitimate technical concern with social welfare
subsidies) but to local politicians and corruption. These concerns
were present in Thailand but particularly acute in Indonesia, where
controversy about corruption in antipoverty programs engulfed
initial World Bank efforts.
In addition to these administrative problems, the design of social
pro- grams faced more fundamental political barriers, particularly
in efforts to institutionalize more explicit forms of social
insurance. Governments in Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand
expressed concern about taking on the spending and transfer
programs of the Western welfare state. As tables 5.4 and 5.5 show,
social insurance commitments are relatively mod- est in the
countries in question. Malaysia’s Employees’ Provident Fund is the
most comprehensive, but covers just under half of all employees and
involves no direct government commitments.
This skepticism combined legitimate doubts about the European model
with a traditionalist rhetoric that emphasized reliance on family
and community and past success in harnessing work, discipline, and
responsi- bility at the individual level. The idea of social
welfare programs that included entitlements to government transfers
faced strong resistance from conservative forces, who argued that
such programs were costly to business and undermined the roots of
past economic success.
Governments in Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand all faced
various forms of social protest. With the partial exception of
South Korea, how- ever, none of the political systems had strong
parties representing the interests of those most seriously affected
by the crisis in an ongoing, institutionalized way. European-style
social democratic parties are alto-
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Table 5.5 Compulsory contributions to social insurance schemes in
Asia (percent)
Old age, disability, Sickness and Work death maternity injury
Total
Indonesia Employees 2.0 of None None 2.0 earnings
Employers 4.0 of 3.0 percent or .24 to 1.74 7.24 to 11.74 payroll
6.0 of payrolla percent of
payroll Government None None None 0 Total 9.24 to 13.74
Thailandb Employees 1.0 of Included in 1st None 1 earnings
column
Employers 1.0 of Included in 1st 0.2 to 1.0 1.2 to 2.0 payroll
column of payroll
Government 1.0 of Included in 1st None 1 payroll column
Total 3.2 to 4.0
Malaysia Employees 11.5 of Included in 1st 0.5 12 percent earnings
column
Employers 12.5 of Included in 1st 1.75 of 14.25 payroll column
payroll
Government None Included in 1st None 0 column
Total 25.25
South Employees 3.0 to 4.5 1.0 to 4.0 None 4.0 to 8.5 Korea of
earnings (average) 1.64
Employers 4.5 of 1.0 to 4.0 0.3 to 7.15 to 10.15 payroll (Average)
1.64 31.9c
(Average) 1.65
Government Subsidy as Subsidy as Subsidy as needed needed
needed
Total 12.68 to 18.68d
a. Contribution for singles is 3 percent and married 6 percent. b.
Pension benefits payable starting in 1998 with an additional 3
percent contribution by employees and 3 percent contribution by
employers. c. Varies by industry and amount of predetermined risk
in that industry. d. The ‘‘Total’’ was calculated using the average
Work Injury contribution by the employer (1.68 percent). Source: US
Social Security Administration (1999).
gether absent in the region, and links between parties and civil
society are generally weak. Where opposition parties did seek to
exploit social issues, it was often through appeal to other
political identities, such as Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia or
region in Thailand (the Northeast) and South Korea (the Cholla
provinces before the Kim Dae Jung presidency).
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THE SOCIAL FALLOUT 203
The organized groups that are historically most associated with the
advance of the social agenda, namely labor, were either controlled
by the government (as in Malaysia), weak (in Indonesia) or
concentrated in sectors where they did not necessarily speak for
the interests of those most seriously affected by the crisis (e.g.,
state-owned enterprises in Thailand). South Korea, again, is a
partial exception. Kim Dae Jung’s presidency did allow organized
labor to influence the social agenda. Although divisions within the
labor movement and cross-cutting pressures on the government
ultimately led to the dissolution of his corporatist experiment,
the partisan orientation of the Kim Dae Jung presidency and the
inclusion of labor allowed a substantial broadening of the social
contract in South Korea.
Indonesia
We begin again with Indonesia, where the crisis was most severe and
the political problems most daunting. In January and early February
1998, the food supply seemed threatened by drought and an inability
to import due to difficulties securing letters of credit. The
combination of political uncertainty and the collapse of the rupiah
generated panic buying, hoard- ing of food, and riots in a number
of provinces, compounded by the initial hesitancy of the
government-controlled distribution system (BULOG) in releasing
adequate stocks. In early May, an ill-managed price increase in a
number of basic foodstuffs—whose design was wrongly attributed to
the IMF—generated another round of rioting and protest which, as we
have seen, contributed to the fall of the Suharto government.
Before the fall of Suharto, the government’s social policy efforts
were concentrated overwhelmingly on seeking to ensure supplies of
basic food- stuffs by stabilizing prices and by placing strong
pressure on suppliers and middlemen. This pressure had a political
dimension. Private rice distribution was largely in the hands of
Chinese merchants. The anti- Chinese rhetoric that periodically
tinged statements by government offi- cials and military officers
and the large-scale violence in Jakarta in May generated short-term
political uncertainties in the rice markets. This pres- sure
continued after the fall of Suharto as certain political forces,
grouped around the Ministry of Cooperatives, sought to expand their
role in the rice distribution system. The country faced another
spike in rice prices in August and September 1998, due once again
to BULOG’s reluctance to play its stabilization role and perhaps to
fears by large Chinese traders of further violence at the time of
Habibie’s Independence Day address.
The response of massive subsidization proved inefficient. Not only
did the subsidy flow to all consumers regardless of income level,
it also had the perverse effect of encouraging rice exports exactly
as the government was fearing shortage. After the price spike in
August-September, however, the international community developed a
more effective relationship with
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204 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
BULOG, and the more aggressive release of stocks contributed to an
easing of prices.
Only after Habibie assumed the presidency and the political
situation was temporarily stabilized could the government and the
donor commu- nity begin to formulate a more coherent social
strategy. The background to these new efforts was an important IMF
policy shift toward support for a more accommodative fiscal stance.
Again, a top priority was achiev- ing food security through a
targeted program of distribution of rice to poor families; this
program expanded rapidly from 150,000 families to nearly 10 million
by early 1999. Although considered reasonably success- ful, the
nature of the poverty data available to the government, inertial
pressures from rural districts, and the weak organization of labor
and— as always—the urban poor, limited the expansion of the program
to households in the cities. Only 5 percent of recipients were
urban (World Bank 1999c).
The two other core government programs for alleviating the effects
of the crisis were the effort to maintain education and health
spending and to generate public employment. With support from
external agencies, the new government quickly committed to
maintaining social expenditures at past levels and even increasing
them and re-allocating spending to focus on the poorest groups.14
But the World Bank was also stung in mid- 1998 by the
‘‘revelation’’ that some Bank-supported programs were subject to
political leakage, a fact that could hardly have been surprising
given the nature of the country’s political system and the ongoing
control of the bureaucratic apparatus by Golkar. A loan document
outlining a com- prehensive social safety net program approved in
mid-1999 refers to ‘‘implementation delays, fund leakage, budget
allocation issues, and inad- equate or inappropriate design’’
(World Bank 1999a, ii), euphemisms for corruption and the political
use of funds. Opposition groups also latched onto this critique,
claiming that the World Bank and donor community were effectively
supporting Habibie’s efforts to extend his stay in power.
These criticisms generally fail to distinguish between those
programs that worked relatively effectively given administrative
constraints, those that faced serious administrative problems, and
those that had more fundamental political flaws. In the first
category belong the ‘‘cheap rice’’ program and efforts in the
education area. In fiscal 1998-99, the govern- ment increased the
budget for primary education by more than 55 percent, primarily to
finance crisis-relief programs providing scholarships and school
block grants. A massive ‘‘back to school’’ program provided block
grants to the poorest schools and fellowships (direct transfers) to
the poorest students. Although this program no doubt suffered from
adminis-
14. These programs faced a number of problems in implementation,
some of them adminis- trative. Government expenditures for the
first 9 months of fiscal 1998-99 on social safety net programs were
only 37 percent of the annual budgeted amount (World Bank 1999c,
6).
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THE SOCIAL FALLOUT 205
trative problems and some leakage, it was consistent with the
broadly based approach to education of the growth-with-equity model
and appeared to have helped stem the dropout problem.
The political and administrative problems associated with the
variety of employment generation programs—labor-intensive public
works pro- grams, demand-driven community funds, and credit schemes
to small and medium-sized enterprises—were somewhat more acute. As
with the rice program, a common problem was the lack of
crisis-responsive geographical targeting. Provincial leaders from
better off areas were resis- tant to efforts to redirect spending
from past patterns. Many of the employ- ment creation programs
(padat karya) were to be carried out by ministries and agencies
with no experience in running social policy, and thus little means
of measuring whether or not they were effective in meeting social
objectives.
However, the continuities in the political system outlined in
chapter 3 also created strong incentives and opportunities for
abuse. Golkar contin- ued to exercise substantial influence over
provincial, local, and community institutions; subnational
elections did not take place until June 1999. After the fall of
Suharto, these governments became political battlefields as the
reformasi movement spread out from the cities to the provinces and
countryside (Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury 1999). The range of
social protest was wide, ranging from demonstrations against
corrupt officials, to strikes, land seizures, and outright looting
of various commodities (Indonesia Update, July 1998). In a
political setting characterized by a weak transitional government,
impending elections, and a proliferation of politi- cal challengers
from both inside and outside the government, the risk that funds
would be diverted to political and electoral uses or outright
corruption was high. The effort to rapidly increase social spending
and the emergence of strong populist pressures in the system
compounded these risks. Prominent among these were calls from
Minister of Coopera- tives Adi Sasono to use his patronage-laden
bureaucracy as the vehicle for an ethnic affirmative action
program.
The government’s self-assessment of earlier antipoverty efforts
recog- nized the importance of expanding consultation beyond
existing pro- vincial and local leaders, but the transitional
nature of the government made it difficult if not impossible to
institutionalize such checks. The $600 million World Bank Social
Safety Net Loan devised a complex gover- nance structure that
attempted to increase accountability, in part by engag- ing NGOs
directly in monitoring disbursements in the hope of ‘‘less misuse
of funds . . . better targeting and design, and less delay’’ (World
Bank 1999a, iii). Even with these controls, the World Bank chose to
tempo- rarily suspend some loan disbursements before the elections
of June 1999 to avoid charges by the opposition that they were
indirectly supporting the government (Asian Wall Street Journal, 13
April 1999). Little could be
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206 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
done with respect to a longer-term social agenda until the new
democratic government came into office in November 1999.
Thailand
In Thailand, the effort to respond to the social dimension of the
crisis was similarly delayed by politics. The social consequences
of the crisis were not fully apparent in the last months of the
Chavalit government, but even if they had been it is doubtful that
it could have responded effectively. After the Chuan government
came into office, it immediately faced a variety of social
pressures, particularly from the stronghold of the opposition NAP,
the rural Northeast, and to a lesser extent from organized labor
and other grass-roots organizations.
Before finalizing negotiations with the Asian Development Bank and
World Bank for social sector loans, a variety of ad hoc efforts
emerged that were driven in part by efforts of competing ministries
(and their ministers) to protect budget shares.15 By the summer of
1998, however, the overall context for the formulation and
implementation of social policy had changed. Thailand completed
negotiations with the Asian Develop- ment Bank for a large social
loan in March, and the negotiations over the fourth letter of
intent with the IMF in May codified a substantial relaxation of
fiscal policy, with some of the loosening explicitly directed to
social policy.16
Given the weakness of existing machinery for managing the social
safety net, the loans generally supported or expanded existing
programs rather than launching altogether new ones, and did so
relatively effectively (World Bank Thailand Office 1999a, 1999b).
For example, the health pro- gram expanded funding for the poor,
and the education component increased a student loan program to
keep children in school. The World Bank loan supported existing
government programs designed to provide jobs to the poor, as well
as core social services.
To what extent did the crisis generate longer-term changes in the
design of the social contract? The most innovative dimension of the
World Bank loan was its emphasis on decentralization and local
community develop- ment through the creation of a Social Investment
Fund (SIF), whose objec- tives were broadly in line with the new
constitution’s emphasis on devolu-
15. Many of these efforts ran into serious opposition, either from
management (such as repatriation of foreign workers who were
important in the milling industry) and labor (such as the
introduction of flexible work rules) or proved impractical (such as
encouraging workers with few rural connections to return to the
countryside or increasing the labor intensity of production by
discouraging the use of machinery).
16. Negotiations with the World Bank were more protracted but were
completed by November.
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THE SOCIAL FALLOUT 207
tion of power to lower levels of government.17 Both the Asian
Development Bank and World Bank loans also included decentralizing
initiatives, such as shifting Ministry of Health staff to rural
areas, granting universities greater autonomy, and encouraging both
provincial and local govern- ments to expand their capacity to
devise projects and monitor and track the poor in their
jurisdictions.
But the opportunity provided by the social funds for patronage,
particu- larly given the coalition nature of the cabinet, made both
the government and the international financial institutions (IFIs)
cautious in approving projects. Less than 10 percent of all project
money had been allocated by April 1999, in part because of concerns
on the part of the Democrat Party that the projects would be
diverted to political uses and corruption (Bangkok Post, 3 April
1999). Despite the constitutional changes, the devel- opment of
effective local government remained a long-term project that faced
resistance from within the central government bureaucracy.
The government also appeared reluctant to undertake new social
insur- ance commitments. When the crisis hit, Thailand had a social
security system that provided benefits to workers in the private
sector and self- employed professionals. But the program covered
only 6 million workers and its benefits were limited to sickness,
childbirth, death, and disability benefits; it did not provide
unemployment benefits (Sauwalak and Intara- vitak 1998). The
strongest safety net for urban workers has been severance pay.
Under pressure from labor, the government extended the length of
severance payments from 6 to 10 months, and launched a special
program to provide free health care to laid-off workers and their
families as well as job placement services. Not only were these
benefits temporary; they were limited to workers in the formal
sector.
The Chuan government was openly resistant to expanding the social
security program, including a prior government commitment to the
devel- opment of the pension system (The Nation, 5 August 1998),
arguing not only that it would have high fiscal cost but that
transfers raised issues of moral hazard and entitlement. In the
words of one government official, ‘‘the reason behind giving them
such a tiny amount of money is to create an incentive for them to
look for jobs; otherwise they may want to live on social security
for the rest of their lives and take advantage of others’’ (Bangkok
Post, 7 June 1998).
This reluctance can be traced in part to fiscal constraints, but
also to important features of Thai politics. Despite the
significance of greater Bangkok in the Thai economy, the country
remains largely rural. As a result, the urban-based parties such as
the Democrats need to accommo-
17. The SIF would provide grant support for small scale subprojects
proposed by local governments, NGOs, or community groups (which
requires a 10 percent counterpart contri- bution) and a Regional
Urban Development Fund to provide on-lending support to larger,
revenue-generating projects in selected municipalities (25 percent
counterpart contribution).
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208 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
date rural interests, as they did, for example in devising a rural
debt- forgiveness scheme and micro-lending programs that fell
outside the ambit of multilateral financing. At the same time, the
nature of organized labor interests reflected relatively privileged
segments of the working class, such as workers in the
state-owned-enterprise sector. As a result, the government has
resisted calls from both the IFIs and domestic political opponents
for a formal safety net. Rather, the Chuan administration has
favored temporary measures, such as increased attention to
education and training—which has lagged in Thailand—and various
forms of local self-help.
Malaysia
The politics of social policy in Malaysia initially had less to do
with an overt social reaction, as in Indonesia and Thailand, as it
did with the policy debates within the government outlined in
chapter 2. Anwar initially identified himself with a tough fiscal
stance; the announcement of the 1998 budget in October 1997
anticipated a surplus of 2.7 percent of GNP. As the work of the
National Economic Action Council unfolded in the spring of 1998,
and the depth of the crisis became apparent, Anwar’s position
became untenable. Fiscal targets were relaxed to a 0.5 percent
surplus in March 1998, and finally to a deficit of 3.7
percent.
One reason for the revised fiscal stance was to defend higher
social spending. The succession of UMNO-led governments in Malaysia
has had a strong record in providing education and health care,
motivated in part by their pro-bumiputra policies. Both primary and
secondary educa- tion are heavily subsidized in Malaysia, and
initial cuts in the education budget for these levels were quickly
restored, as was money for fellow- ships; as a result, the country
experienced no significant problem with respect to school dropouts
(World Bank 1999c, 8; Jomo and Lee 1999, 24). Health expenditure,
also in the public domain, was cut in 1998 but increased in 1999,
as were expenditures by ministries involved in agricul- ture and
rural development. Roughly half of Malaysia’s poor are concen-
trated in three states—Kelantan, Trengganu, and Sabah—that are more
predominantly rural and in the first two cases highly susceptible
to appeals from the PAS as well.
The distinctive features of Malaysia’s approach to the social
dimensions of the crisis was in its strong emphasis on maintaining
labor market flexibility. One of the most important set of policies
had to do with guest workers. The Malaysian government was the
first in the region to announce plans to repatriate large numbers
of workers: approximately 200,000 migrant workers who were likely
to be laid off from the construc- tion sector and 700,000 migrant
workers whose permits would be denied renewal after expiry. The
plan generated heated political debate, and was
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THE SOCIAL FALLOUT 209
ultimately scaled back in part due to employer resistance (Haflah,
Johan, and Abubakar 1999, 43-45). Nonetheless, the Home Ministry
estimated that more than 200,000 illegal foreign workers returned
to their home countries between January and August 1998, and this
almost certainly underestimates the number returning: Approximately
80 percent of con- struction workers were migrants, and employment
in this sector was estimated to have dropped by as much as 600,000
workers in 1998 alone (Jomo and Lee 1999, 12, 15).
Maintaining a flexible labor market was also a key policy objective
with respect to domestic workers. Trade unions in Malaysia have
never been particularly influential political actors, in part
because of the low level of unionization (approximately 10 percent
of the workforce), in part because of various legal restrictions
and formal and informal government controls over their organization
and activities (Navamukundun 1998). In August 1998—after the party
congress of that year—the government undertook a number of labor
market reforms that included closer links between wage settlements
and productivity and encouraging management to use pay cuts,
reduced working hours, and temporary and voluntary layoffs rather
than outright retrenchment.18 Labor—in a weak bargaining position
both politically and economically—went along with these adjustments
and negotiated more modest wage settlements than in previous
years.
A second pillar of the government’s approach was the creation of a
variety of special loan funds designed to lift the income of
targeted groups; a number of these initiatives were announced by
Anwar at the UMNO general assembly in mid-1998. Yet the problem
with such funds paralleled the problems we have seen in Indonesia
and Thailand with government employment programs; the
administrative capacity to move funds effi- ciently was lacking,
substantially diminishing the programs’ short-term effects.19
A final feature of the government’s approach to the social contract
was particularly strong resistance to the use of transfers, despite
urging from the World Bank about the effects of the crisis on the
low-income urban self-employed. Malaysia’s Employees’ Provident
Fund is more compre- hensive in its coverage than similar schemes
in Indonesia, Thailand, and even South Korea, despite the fact that
it is yet to be extended effectively to the self-employed and
agricultural workers. But in line with the Asian
18. Worker exit was to be supported by both government and
firm-level retraining and search schemes, but extremely few
workers—in the hundreds—appear to have benefited from the
government training program (Jomo and Lee 1999, 17).
19. In 1998, the Fund for Food Program, which provides low-interest
loan to farmers and the Farmers’ Association, approved only RM199
million worth of loans out of a RM700 million allocation. The
Special Scheme for low- and medium-cost housing approved RM241
million out of the RM2,000 million allotted, and the Small-Scale
Entrepreneur Fund approved RM882 million out of RM1,500 million
approved (Haflah, Johan, and Abubakar 1999, 51).
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210 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
welfare model, the fund is financed entirely by mandated
contributions from employers and workers and direct transfers are
minimal. Only 1 poor household in 10 receives a government
transfer, and they account for only about 1 percent of the poor’s
gross income (World Bank 1999c, 4).
Comments made by Prime Minister Mahathir are worth citing at
length, because they summarize well a resistance to certain forms
of social insur- ance visible elsewhere in the region, including in
both Thailand and South Korea. Referring to social safety nets in
the form of unemployment benefits, Mahathir argued that
this method will only wreck the economy. When the unemployed is
[sic] paid an allowance, then many will choose not to work. The
Government will need to allocate money for dole which can only be
done through raising taxes on the employed . . . Of course the
production costs for goods will increase, so will the cost of
living. So each time dole is raised, taxes follow suit and the cost
for manufacturing goods will only reduce our competitiveness in the
world market. (New Straits Times, 11 June 1999)
South Korea
On coming into office, the Kim Dae Jung government faced a
particular dilemma: On the one hand, the unemployment problem in
South Korea was serious—the most serious of the four countries—with
fewer opportu- nities for the rural and informal sectors to absorb
displaced workers from small and medium-sized firms. On the other
hand, the high degree of concentration had resulted in fairly
strong and militant unions. Unions represented only 12-13 percent
of wage and salary workers, only margin- ally higher than the
unionization rate in Malaysia. But unions were domi- nant in large
firms and public enterprises that enjoyed greater bargaining power;
whereas 76 percent of workers in firms with 15,000 or more work-
ers are unionized, only 0.9 percent are unionized in small firms
with 10-29 workers. Moreover, South Korean unions operated in a
newly democratic context that provided them much wider freedom of
action than enjoyed by their Malaysian counterparts.
These differences in unionization had important effects on the
ability of firms to lay off workers. Large-scale firms maintained
long-term secure employment on a seniority-based wage and promotion
system and had difficulty firing workers.20 These factors meant
that while small firms faced little resistance to layoffs and could
adjust to redundancy illegally, large firms had to resort to early
retirement, voluntary leave, and, where possible, wage restraint.
Such measures were not likely to be adequate to encourage the
corporate restructuring envisioned by the government.
20. In principle, the legal framework concerning labor adjustment
was quite strict; only in the case of ‘‘emergency managerial
needs’’ would extensive layoffs be allowed, and the supreme court
had ruled that such layoffs required consultation with the
unions.
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THE SOCIAL FALLOUT 211
Moreover, remaining labor market rigidities could act as a
deterrent to foreign investment across a range of sectors.
To secure labor agreement to greater labor market flexibility, Kim
Dae Jung resorted to a mechanism not used in South Korea with any
success before (Kim and Lim 1999): the tripartite commission. The
purpose of forming the group was related in part to legislative
politics. The govern- ment called a special session of the National
Assembly (the 187th) to amend existing labor legislation to allow
layoffs, but the opposition in the legislature was reluctant to
cooperate because of the political price; the National Assembly
thus deferred to the tripartite commission.
The unions were aware from the beginning that the objective of the
commission was to extract labor concessions on the issue of
layoffs. Kim Dae Jung’s status with labor and the promise of
political as well as eco- nomic compensation allowed the government
to bring representatives from both labor federations (FKTU and
KCTU) to the table, in addition to the major business associations
(the Federation of Korean Industry and the Korean Employers’
Federation), government officials (the Ministry of Finance and
Economy and the Ministry of Labor), and representatives from each
of the four major parties. After weeks of intense debate, and
promises from the administration that it would also extract
concessions from the chaebol as well, a bargain was struck. In
return for agreement to permit layoffs when ‘‘urgently’’ needed or
in case of takeovers, and to allow the formation of a manpower
leasing system for both specialized professions and laborers, the
government made a number of political and policy concessions. These
included the establishment of a W5 trillion unemployment fund, but
many of the concessions to labor were political and procedural: the
right for public servants to form a labor consultative body, for
teachers to unionize, and the reversal of a long-standing prohibi-
tion on labor involvement in political activities. The agreement
also recog- nized the right of labor to participate both in the
policymaking process with respect to labor issues and in management
decision-making. More vaguely, ‘‘all parties’’ would work to
minimize layoffs and seek alternative solutions such as
work-sharing.
As Song (1999) has pointed out, the two sides saw the agreement
very differently. Management believed it had gained greater freedom
to retrench, whereas labor immediately believed that the terms of
the bargain were not being enforced. The first serious test of the
tripartite agreement with labor came on 31 July 1998, when the
Hyundai Motor Company laid off 1,538 workers for ‘‘emergency
managerial reasons,’’ becoming the first chaebol subsidiary to
undertake extensive layoffs. The union refused to accept
management’s layoff plan, and as the dispute dragged on, the
government decided to mediate it. After marathon talks, labor and
man- agement reached a compromise on 24 August (Korea Herald, 25
August 1998), which resulted in layoffs of only 277 workers (with
7- to 9-month
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severance payments), with another 1,261 placed on an 18-month
unpaid leave.
The Hyundai Motor labor dispute was widely regarded at the time as
a critical test of the tripartite agreement, and one that the
government had failed. Not only had the government become involved
in the dispute, but it appeared to broker a deal that signaled that
large-scale layoffs were impossible (Business Week, 7 September
1998, 48; Business Korea, September 1998, 12). In fact, the
government moved quickly to dispel this conclusion. In the banking
sector, the government stared down financial sector work- ers and
extracted large concessions on downsizing. In a series of
confronta- tions in the fall and spring, the government intervened
with force to break strikes (see, e.g., Korea Herald, 4 September
1998).
The government’s policy shift was apparent to labor, and led the
more independent KCTU to pull out of the second tripartite process
in late February 1999 on the grounds that the government had failed
to imple- ment a number of the committee’s accords. Although the
KCTU’s hopes for forcing the government’s hand through the mounting
of a general strike proved misplaced, by the spring the tripartite
process had clearly broken down.
Despite the administration’s stormy relations with labor, the
govern- ment in fact moved quite vigorously to expand the social
safety net.21 As in other countries, some initiatives were
temporary. Because the majority of workers in the country were
uncovered by unemployment insurance, the government initiated a
workfare program in May 1998 that supported 437,000 workers by
February 1999 and was extended through the entire year by the
supplementary budget of May 1999. The government also expanded its
social assistance to the poor through a temporary livelihood
program that added 310,000 newly poor recipients in April 1998 and
increased this to 750,000 with the supplementary budget of May
1999.
But the distinctive aspect of South Korea’s response to the crisis
was the ability of the Kim Dae Jung government to move beyond
short-term measures to address the broader social contract. We have
noted above the efforts, albeit only partly successful, to remove a
range of political restrictions on labor’s freedom to organize and
participate in politics. With assistance from the World Bank and
the Asian Development Bank, the government entered into a series of
commitments to expand eligibility and coverage of its unemployment
insurance (Korea Labor Institute 1998). Such insurance was late in
coming to South Korea; introduced only in 1995 under Kim Young Sam,
it had initially covered only workers in firms of 30 or more
employees. Under Kim Dae Jung, this was expanded to firms with 5 or
more employees, as were mandatory contributions to
21. In 1998, the government budgeted 1.3 percent of GDP for social
safety net and unemploy- ment program spending; in 1999, the budget
allocation for these programs rose by 34 percent (Moon, Lee, and
Yoo 1999, 43).
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THE SOCIAL FALLOUT 213
training and wage subsidy schemes. The Kim Dae Jung government also
initiated a reform of the pension system, and offset the low
coverage and benefit levels by increasing the allocation for the
noncontributory means- tested social pension.
From the perspective of the advanced industrial states, these
efforts might be seen as little more than catch-up; moreover,
implementation was not without difficulties. As of June 1998, for
example, among the 1.5 million unemployed, only 7 percent had
received unemployment bene- fits. The extension of benefits to day
laborers, formerly set in October 1998, had not been implemented a
year later due to lack of administrative capacity (Park 1999, 205).
Minimum benefits are low: 70 percent of the minimum wage, which is
itself just 25 percent of average earnings. As in Malaysia and
Thailand, these benefit levels reflect concern with incentive
effects and the risks of ‘‘welfare disease’’ (Park 1999, 206).
Public assistance for the poor is less than 9 percent of average
earnings, probably not enough to cover basic expenses.
Nonetheless, the South Korean government, headed by a democrat and
outsider who appealed to and sought to incorporate labor, clearly
went farther than governments in the other crisis countries. Not
only did the government move quickly to provide a social safety
net, but it initiated broader reforms of the social contract that
expanded social insurance and improved labor’s participation in
both government and management decision-making.
Conclusion
The crisis made clear that the next generation of poor people could
not necessarily count on unremitting growth to lift them out of
poverty. However, despite the quite justified emphasis of the
multilateral organiza- tions on the poor, those vulnerable to the
social fallout from financial crises constitute a much larger group
that encompasses segments of the urban working and even middle
classes. This group includes precisely those who are the most
recent beneficiaries of the growth-with-equity model, but who are
also lacking in financial, physical, and often educa- tional assets
and are not far removed from poverty.
As the crisis unfolded, both governments and the IFIs quickly
acknowl- edged the need to deal with the social consequences of the
crisis. In all cases, governments instituted a variety of temporary
programs, but the speed with which they could move was limited
precisely by the lack of administrative experience in providing a
social safety net.
However, the problems of devising social policy are not limited to
the administrative; social policy also engages broader political
interests. We can see the contours of these political interests by
reviewing some of the
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214 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
potential risks that are believed to arise in recrafting the social
contract under democratic circumstances.
The first risk is that democratic politics would place demands on
gov- ernment that politicians would attempt to meet at the cost of
fiscal and macroeconomic stability. The East Asian cases provide
very little evidence for such an eventuality. Democratization has
been accompanied by changes in the composition of government
spending, but in no East Asian case—including, notably,
Indonesia—has political reform been accompa- nied by an
unsustainable expansion of government. The reasons for this are
multiple, but include not just the crisis or the involvement of the
IMF but the conservative nature of the democratic transitions and
the absence of the yawning social deficits and inequalities that
generate populist poli- tics.
Rather, the risk is almost exactly the opposite: changing tax and
expendi- ture patterns that are increasingly regressive in their
structure. A sound social contract would have at its core either
near-neutrality in the incidence of government or biases in favor
of the structurally poor rather than the middle classes or rich; by
and large, the countries in the region achieved this enviable feat
in the early years of their growth.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, however, the situation is
less pretty. As we saw in chapter 1, the opening of capital markets
in the 1990s led to collusion between the corporate and banking
sectors in which the rich used the banks to accumulate
debt-financed wealth. As was detailed in chapter 4, a substantial
portion of the resulting liabilities in the form of nonperforming
loans has now been assumed directly or indi- rectly by government.
This socialized debt will ultimately be paid off by the taxpayers,
as the increasing share of debt servicing in government
expenditures already demonstrates. In short, the risk to a new
social contract comes not from populist demands, but from the
threat that the cleanup of the financial crisis involves fiscal
commitments that will squeeze out social expenditures; this threat
is particularly real in Indone- sia, where the burden of the crisis
is heaviest.
A second, related risk is that democratization will allow newly
freed interest groups, and particularly labor and the ‘‘popular
sector,’’ to launch an assault on market-oriented policies. We have
already seen in chapter 3 that these risks were muted by parties
and movements that advanced market-oriented reforms as well as
social ones. But the review in this chapter suggests again that the
risks are very much the opposite, namely the weakness of
countervailing political forces. Outside of some isolated sectors,
labor is relatively weak in the region. Moreover, the most coherent
social response to the crisis came in the country, South Korea,
where labor was best organized and integrated into the policy
process. South Korea’s tripartite experience may not be applicable
in all other settings, and it had its own limitations. Nonetheless,
it did permit the government to
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THE SOCIAL FALLOUT 215
solve a number of thorny political problems and ultimately served
to advance the cause of a more coherent, comprehensive social
policy. Responses to the crisis in Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Thailand, by compari- son, appear relatively short-term and limited
by comparison.
A third, more troublesome risk stems from various forms of
corruption to which the programs we have outlined might be
subjected. These take a bewildering variety of forms, from the
expropriation of individual retire- ment accounts by unscrupulous
financial agents (as in Albania), to the political use of fiscal
resources to benefit cronies or advance narrow elec- toral aims. It
is important to recognize that such risks exist in any system, but
they appear more egregious in nondemocratic settings where the
closed, nontransparent nature of government provides ample, and in
some cases virtually unlimited, opportunities for political
manipulation of the budget.
A final risk is that the new democratic politics and the new social
contract would do little to protect the very poor. For their own
reasons, authoritarian governments in the region had incentives to
pursue policies from which the poor benefited, even if that was not
necessarily their initial design. Under democratic rule, however,
the poor are seldom well- represented politically, and their
interests may be pushed aside in the interests of business, the
middle class, or even the somewhat better off strivers on whom we
have placed so much emphasis.
Again, these fears appear misguided, and although it is not a
foregone conclusion, the prospects for social protection of the
poor seem more, rather than less secure under democratic rule,
which seeks to incorporate urban middle- and working-class
interests. First, political entrepreneurs do have incentives to
appeal to the poor wherever they can be counted on to vote; the
strong showing of Megawati in the Indonesian elections was based in
no small measure on her implicit appeals to the urban
disadvantaged. Second, where the poor have benefited from programs
of social protection, it is often because the middle or working
classes endorse program designs that in effect provide help to all
who face some risk of falling into poverty under well-defined
circumstances; South Korea under Kim Dae Jung provides evidence of
this fact.
These findings do not address the issue of what a new social
contract in Asia might actually look like; that issue, among
others, is taken up in the concluding chapter.
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The Economics and Politics of Growth with Equity
The Limits of the Model in the 1990s
Table 5.1 Gini coefficients, for selected countries of East Asia,
1978-96
Figure 5.1 Gini coefficients in high- and low-inequality East Asian
countries, 1978-96
Who Got Hit?
Table 5.2 Indicators of economic activity and social welfare
pre-and post-crisis
Indonesia
Figure 5.2 Average per capita income (1997 PPP dollars) by
quintile: Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand
Thailand
Malaysia
The Policy Response: The Political Economy of Social Policy
Table 5.3 Social safety net programs in East Asia during the
crisis
Table 5.4 Aspects of social protection, 1997
Table 5.5 Compulsory contributions to social insurance schemes in
Asia
Indonesia
Thailand
Malaysia