The Si'zjc;cance of the September I I , 2001 Terrorist Attacks for United States-Bound Miration in the Western Hemisphere

Christopher Mitchell New York University

The economic and political effects of the September 11 terrorist attacks weakened Latin American and Caribbean economies, reduced employ- ment among Western Hemisphere immigrants living in the United States, and hindered new migrants' access to U.S. territory. Thus, the 91 1 1 events probably increased long-term motivations for northward migration in the hemisphere, while discouraging and postponing inter- national population movement in the short run. In addition, the terror- ist assaults dealt a sharp setback to a promising dialogue on immigration policies between the United States and Mexico. Those discussions had appeared to herald constructive new policies towards migration into the U.S. from Mexico and possibly other nations in the hemisphere.

A series of significant international migrant flows in South and Cen- tral America and in the Caribbean, not involving the United States, are unfortunately beyond the scope of this brief essay. I will first describe the consequences of the September 11 assaults for U.S.-bound migration in the hemisphere, before turning to consider future social, economic and policy paths.

First, Western Hemisphere economies, already hampered by a U.S. reces- sion that began in March 200 1, were further slowed by the effects of 91 1 1. The Caribbean Hotel Association reported a 50 percent drop in occupancy for October 2001 in comparison with October 2000, and airlines, including Aeromtxico, Mexicana and Air Jamaica, lost millions of dollars in the weeks following early September 2001. Remittances from migrants in the United States were reported in decline by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and new security charges on Latin American exports to the U.S. were estimated to have the impact of a 10 percent tariff surcharge. In late October, the IADB reduced its estimate of economic growth in Latin Amer- ica and the Caribbean for 2001 from 4.5 percent to barely 1 percent. These factors tend to build long-term pressures for emigration.

Second, the effects of September 11 discouraged, and probably helped to

0 2002 by the Center for Migration Studies of New York. All rights reserved. 0198-91 83/02/360 1.0137

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slow down, current northward migration to the United States. In October 2001, for example, legal admissions to the U.S. from all countries dropped by fully 29 percent in comparison with October 2000, and apprehensions along the southwest border during the same month declined by fully 54 percent. Detailed inspections at the U.S. frontier with Mexico caused the time required for crossing to soar, for many migrants, from fifteen minutes to as much as three hours. The U.S. recession was already discouraging migration from Mexico and elsewhere. Travel-related industries in the U.S. that employ many migrants from the Western Hemisphere were especially hard-hit. Word of high U.S. unemployment quickly reached traditional migrant-sending regions, and outward migration declined still further.

Third, 9/11 deflected, in dramatic fashion, the development of a possi- ble consensus on major new policies towards northward migration in the Western Hemisphere. Both Mexico and the United States had entered 2001 with new chief executives, each of whom had strong motives to revise the 40- year-old status quo on immigration matters between their two nations. Mex- ico’s President Vicente Fox Quesada, elected in a stunning victory after 71 years of rule by a single official party, sought to benefit both an estimated three million unauthorized migrants from Mexico living in the U.S., and his nation’s economy as well, by bargaining with the United States over migra- tion. He called for a policy of “open borders” for population movement, to match the mobility of goods and capital under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). United States President George W. Bush, who lost in the popular-vote tally of 2000 but prevailed in the Electoral College, was receptive to a policy initiative that might improve his standing with the increasing number of Hispanic voters in the United States. While rejecting the idea of “open borders,” Bush stated that “the United States is destined to have a ‘special relationship’ with Mexico, as clear and strong as we have had with Canada and Great Britain.”

Following several rounds of negotiation involving the foreign and justice ministers of both nations, in July 2001 Secretary of State Colin Powell and Attorney General John Ashcrofi recommended a program under which between one and two million undocumented Mexicans in the United States could receive legal status. Mexico also sought additional visas for legal immi- gration, while U.S. policymakers showed interest in proposals to receive Mex- ican guest-workers. Fox paid a high-profile state visit to Washington less than a week before September 11, and it was expected that a formal draft agree- ment would be produced early in 2002. The dialogue was marred, to be sure,

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by persisting vagueness, and in formal terms it only involved Mexico. But the United States had never conducted such a high-level or potentially precedent- setting negotiation on migration in the Americas. A “new deal” for undocu- mented immigrants from the largest source of such migrants into the United States might well have set a pattern for more humane and orderly U.S. treat- ment of population flows from other Latin American and Caribbean nations.

This course of negotiation was powerfully slowed, if not wrenched off the tracks entirely, by the effects of 9/11. Any project to relax vigilance against unauthorized migration carried a severe political handicap within the U.S., following a terrorist attack by foreigners (albeit nonimmigrants), many of whom were asserted to have abused or overstayed their visas. The attention of U.S. policymakers was also pre-occupied by the worldwide anti-terrorist campaign, and though Latin American leaders including President Fox com- municated political support to the White House immediately following the attacks, Western Hemisphere governments were often viewed in Washington as lukewarm in their backing. Mexico’s government reiterated its support for increased legal access and formal status for Mexican migrants in the United States, asserting that such policies could bring Mexico within a North Amer- ican “security perimeter” that would actually assist counter-terrorist watch- fulness.

Looking to the future, 9/11 may well exert its greatest effect on govern- ment policies, rather than on deep-running social and economic aspects of U.S.-bound migration in the Western Hemisphere. Prior to the terrorist assaults, northward migrants in the Americas were more numerous than in any preceding two decades; they were more likely to set down roots in U.S. society than their predecessors, and more prone to seek citizenship and to play significant roles in supplying labor and (perhaps) influencing elections in the United States. These social patterns are likely to continue in coming years, and indeed the counter-terrorist government spending and counter- cyclical monetary policy following 9/11 may hasten an upturn in the U.S. business cycle that will benefit Latin America and encourage emigration once again.

What is not clear is what set of governmental policies, both domestic and diplomatic, will address these re-asserted social trends in migration. Factors that are likely to influence the predominant policy conceptions include: 1. How long the anti-terrorist war continues, whether it appears to find a

decisive conclusion, and whether more extensive Latin American links to 9/11 are discovered. Thus far, Washington’s use of the Guant6namo Bay

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Naval Base to detain suspected terrorists has caused few political reper- cussions in the Western Hemisphere, even within Cuba. The enlightened self-interest of political leaders, both in receiving and sending nations. Presidents Bush and Fox before 9/11 were both innov- ative and engaged with migration issues; Fox’s motives for continuing the revisionist dialogue are very strong, while those of a newly-popular Bush may not be so persuasive. (On the other hand, Congressional lead- ers of the rival Democratic Party made a conspicuous visit to Mexico’s Puebla State in November 2001, saying they hoped to provide access to U.S. citizenship for all Mexican migrants.) The degree of political skill and coordination among sending nations. Mexico sought to conclude a new immigration agreement for its own migrants alone, and the notion of a “security perimeter” is additionally exclusive. Effective joint action among sending nations could increase the chances for new immigration agreements covering varied national migrant streams. The political initiative and skill of Latino and Caribbean migrants in the U.S. in acting on behalf of their compatriots, probably in cooperation with governments in their societies of origin. In a possible portent for the future, Hispanic voters determined the outcome of New York City’s mayoral election in 2001, held while fires still smoldered at the World Trade Center site.

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