The Second Afghan War, 1878-79-80 (1880)

8/10/2019 The Second Afghan War, 1878-79-80 (1880)

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THE

SBCOND

-^

i/

AFGHAN

W

A

Ri

1878-79-80

^

ITS

CAUSES,

ITS CONDUCT

AND

^

^

^^

.

ITS

CONSEQUENCES

\

'

^

^:'BY

COLONE:^.

H.

B.

HANNA

Formerly belonging

to

the

Punjab

frontier

Force and

late

Commanding

at

Delhi

The maintenance

of

an

inviolable

character

for

moderation,

good

faith,

and

scrupulous

regard

for

Treaty,

ought

to

have been the

simple

grounds

on

'

which

the

British

Government

should

have endeavoured to

establish

an

influence,superior

to

that

of other

Europeans,

over

the

Native

powers

of

India;

and

the

danger

and

discredit

'

arising

from

the

forfeiture

of

this

p tS '^- fience,

ould

not

be

compensated

for

by

the

temporary

success

of

any

plan

of

violence

and

injustice.

Resolution

of

the

House

of

Comnio72S in

17,82.

WESTMINSTER

AllCHIBALD

CONSTABLE

Co

j2

Whitehall

Gardens

:f^

'

1899

/ -


8/401

J/.

7-

V


9/401

J

,

TO

myVife

I

DEDICATE

A

BOOK

WHIpH

BUT

FOR HER

ENCOURAGEMENT

AND

AID

WOULD

NEVER

HAVE BEEN

WRITTEN


10/401

*/

/

/

V

^


11/401

1

PREFACE

^When'

fii-st

the

idea

of

writing

a

History

of

the

Second

Afghan

War

began

to

occupy

my

/hind,

my

ambition

went

no

farther

than the

proauction

of

a

faithful

record

of

events

in

which

I

had borne

a

small

part,

ond

of

which,

so

far

as

they

had

come

under

my

observation,

I

had

taken

careful

note.

The

kindness

of

many

of the chief

actors

in

those

events

soon

placed

me

in

a

position

^^o

realize

this

object,

and I

sat

down

to

Avrite

the

introductory

chapter

which

was

to

explain

to

my

future,

readers

why

the

Indian

Government

had invaded

a

country

with

which

it

earnestly

desired

to

live

in

peace

and

amity,

little

suspecting

whither it

would

lead

me.

To

ensure

that the

sketch which

I

had

in

my

mind,

should

be

thoroughly

accurate,

I

pro(pured

every official and

non-

official

publication

bearing

upon

Afghan

and

Central

Asian

affairs,

and

in

studying

these

I,

or

rather

we

rfor frohi

the

first,

my

wife

was

my

fellow-student

and co-worker

soon

had the

convicti ii

^jrced

upon

us

that

the

war

of

1878

had

sprung

out of

no

change

of

attitude

on

the

part

of the

Amir

of

Afghanistan,

but

out

of

a

change

of

policy

on

the

part

of

the

British Government

a

change

due

to

fears

which

experience

of

the

country

beyond

the

Indus had


12/401

Vin

I'UEFACK

shown

nic

to

be

ill-foundcci

nd

that,

instead

of

having

1)een

reluctantly

nderljaken

y

an

insulted

and

endang-red

Stata

for the

vindication

of

its

honour and

the

protection

of

its

frontiers,'

t

had

been

deliberately

d

up

to

by

a

series of

steps,

some

di^^)loniatic,

ome

military,

^vhich,

in

theênd,

rad

left

Sliere

Ali

no

choice

but

to

consent

to

tho

diminution

of

his

own

authority

and

hi?

countr/s

indep^d

ence,

or

to

accept

a

coutest

if

which

his

fortunes,

at

least,

were

certain

to

suffer

shipwreck.

/

But

these

unpleasi^^t

ruths

once

admitted,

we

had

to

recognize

that

the

scope

of

our

book

must

be

enlarged.

o

present

a

faithful

picture

of

the

war

itself

and

to

draw

the

right

military

lessoîs

from

its

experiences,

a^s

no

less

im-

pm-tant

than

before;

but

to

lay

bare

the

errors

of

judgment

'

which

had

brought

it

about,

w^fnow

of

infinitely

reater

moment,

since

those

erroi-s,

crystallized

nto

a

iK licy,

till

persisted,

nd

might

any

day

involve

India

in

hostilities

with

neighbours

who,

powerless

to

harm

her

whilst

she

confined

hei-self

within

her

natural

limits,

must

become for-idable

as soon

as

those

liniits

were

overstept.

The

new

title

of

our

book The

History

of the

Second

Afghkn

AVa %

its

Causes,

its

Conduct

and

its

Consequences-

reflected

the

change

which

had

taken

place

in

our

point

of

view,

and

the

amount

of

additional

k

boLr

entailed

upon

us

by-

that

change

may

be

gathered

rom the

fact

that

two-thiMs

of the

preiênt

olume deal

exclbsively

ith

the

fii-st

branch

of

our

subject-the

Causes

of the

War.

For

this

lal)our,

however,

there

was

ample

reward

in

th^

growing

bope

that


13/401

PREFACE IX

^

'the

History,

hen

completed,

would de^l

a

jdeadly

low

to

th^

Forward

Policy.

Unfortunately,

owever,

our

progress

was

slow,

whilst the

danger

that

it

had

bev^ome

my

dearest

desire

lo

avert,

was

drawing

rapidly

nearer; so,

feeling

hat

*

this

wao

a

case

where

private

m)Ust

give

place

to

public

d-^y,

I

turned,

in

the

spring

of

1894,

frorfi

the work

to

whit^,

by accepting

the

papers

so

generously

confided

to

me,

I

had

pledged

mysqjf

to

try,

before

it

was

too

late,

to

show

Englishmen

the

rocks

towards

which

they

were

drifting,

nd

to

clear

their

minds of

a

delusion,

by

encour-ging

which

it

had

become^

possible

or

the

military

party

in

India

to

(dominate

her

Government,

and

to

give

a

fatal

turn

to

her

relations with

the

border tribes.

The

field

of

controversy

once

entered

upon,

I

found

great

difficulty

n

withdrawing

from it.

The

resistance

of the

Waziris

to

the

delimitation of their

country;

the Chitral

revolt

and

the

subsequent

Chitral

expedition;

the Tochi

outbreak,

and

the

border

troubles

that

culminated

in

the,

Tirah

campaign

events

following

rapidly

on

each

other,

and

one

and alL

confirming

he soundness

of

my

opinions

and

the

accuracy

of

my

forecasts

obliged

me,

again

and

ai^ain,

to

return to

the

charge

in

the

hope

that,

by constantly

re-stating

my

arguments,

and

multiplying

the

proofs

on

which

they

were

based,

I

might

drive

the truth

about

a

*

i

. .

.

Russian invasion

of

India

into

men's

heads.

This

is

not

the

place

to

consider'

whether

those

endeavours

met

with

any

measure

of

success,

but,

at

least,

the

History,

at

which

we

continued

to

work

in

the intervals

between

one

pamphlet


14/401

PRiVFACE

and

another,

Jias

been

no

loser

by

the

study

and

thought

giy^n

to

its

temporary

rivals,

and

I

fnay

venture

'to

hupe

that

^kat

thobe

fugitive

controvei-sial

writings

failed

to

effect,

may

be

attained

by

the

more

enuring kistorical

in4ictmept

of

the^

Forward

Policy

presented

jri

the

Work

of

which this'

volume

is

the

first

instalment.^^

\

/

^

c

H.

B.

Hanna.

Ashcroft,

Petersfield,

May

1899.


15/401

CONTENTS

CkAPTER

I.

III.

,

PAGE

BRITISH RELATIONS

AVITH

'aFGH^NIS'/aN

FROM

J 855

TO

1869

1

THE

NEGOTIATIONS

WITH

RUSSIA;

THE

SEISTAN

AWARD;

AND

THE SIMLA CONFER-NCE

...

25

SIR BARTLE

FRERE^S

5IEM0RANDUM

AND

ITS

CONSEQUENCES

^

53

INAUGURATION OF THE

NEW POLICY

...

65

'GENESIS

AND

GROWTH OF

THE FORWARD

POLICY

100

THE PESHAWAR

CONFERENCE

121

THE

VICERO't's

LETTER

148

THE

RUSSIAN MISSION

172

THE

BRITISH

MISSION

AND THE

VICEROy's

MINUTE

196

AT THE GATES

OF THE KHYBER

211

MOBILIZATION

228

THE ULTIMATUM

^.

240

THE RUSSO-AFGHAN

CORRESPONDENCE

...

255

INDIA IN

1878

.,

...

-263

THE

THEATRE

OF

OPERATIONS AND

THE

PLAN -.OF CAMPAIGN

/

285

THE

QUETTA

REINFORCEMENTS

AND THE

MULTAN

P,IP:LD FORCE

300

TH^

KURAM

VALLEY

FIELD

FORCE

....

...

326

THE

PESHAWAR

VALLEY

FIELD FORCE

...

335

...' 355


16/401

c

^

ERRATA

(

Page 48,

3rd

para.,

second

line,

after

^-Afghanistan ,

a

seuii-

colon;

and'

fourth

line,

after

himself ,

a

comma.

83,

2nd

para.,Mast

line

'but

one,

for

voluntaiy ,

read

voluntarily .

^

c

108,

line

18,

after

light , a

semi-colon.

127,

2nd

para.,

fifth

line

froip

bottom,

foi-

Simla ,

read

Peshawar .

295,

eleventh

1

jne

of

note,

for

remarkably

,

read

remark-ble

.

*

2,^^,

third

line,

for

planw

as ,

read

plan

was .

c

V.


17/401

7

*

Fjio^

1855

TO

1869.

When in

1842

the

aripies

of

Pollock and

Nott

quitted

Afghanistan,

victorious in

tlie

field,

but unsuccessful

in

every

object

for

which

a

three

years'

war

haa

been

waged

a

war

in

which

our

troops

had

^e^fperienced

every

vicissitude

of

fortune

and

endured

every

hardship

which

nature

or

man

could

inflict

a

veil

of

impenetrable

darktiess

fell,

for

a

time,

between

India and

that

neighbour

whose

friendship

and

alliance

she

so

-eagerly

covgted

that,

to

gain

them,

she

had

spent

seventeen

millions

of

money,

given

the lives of thou-ands

of her

bravest

troops,

and carried

fire and

sword

from

Quetta

to

Kabul,

and

from

the

mouth

of

the

Khyber

to

distant

Turkestan.

^

^

Extract from

^Report

of

the

Ekst

India

Committee

on

the

causes

and

consequences

of the

First

Afghan

war,

written

during

its

progress

:

This

war

of

robbery

is

waged

by

athe

English

Government

through

the

intervention

of

the

Government of

India

(without

the

knowledge

of

England,

or

of

Parliameift and

the

Court

of

Directors)

thereby

evading

the checks

placed

by

the

^Constitution

on

the

exercise

of

the

prerogative

of

the

Crowfi

in

declaring

war.

It

presents,

therefore,

a new

crime

in

the

annals

of

nations

a

secret war

It has

been made

by

a

people

without

their

knowledge,

against

another

people

who

had

com-itted

no

oifence.

Effects

on

India.

The exhaustion

of

her

/

^..

^

I


18/401

2

THE

SECOND

AFGHANoWi^R

Behind

that

,

veil,

the

authority

of

Dost

^Mahomed,

th,^

ruler

whom

We

had

driven

from

his throne

and,

subsequently,

sent

a

captive

\o

India,

was

restored,

and the

anarchy

which

we

had

created reduced

to

order

by

his

strong

and

skilful hand

;

but

no

British

Envoy

stood

now

at

his

side,

as

Sir

Alp.xander

r

Burncs had stood

in the

dfiys

before

tbe

war,

to

exercise

an

influence

on

his

policy

and

to

JceepEng-and

informed

as

to

tjje

doings

and fnt^ntions of her

di ^aded

rival

Russia. It

was

lifted

for

a

brief

space

in

1848,

when

Dost

Mahomed^

temptedby

the

lu)pe

of

recovering

Peshawar,

despatched

Afghan

troops

to

aid

his

old

enemies,

the

Sikhs,

against

his

more

recent

enemies,

the

English;

but

it fell

again

when the battle of

Gujrat

had

dissipated

hat

hope

and

made

of

the

Punjab

an

Indian

Province.

^

flourishing

reasuiy ;

complete

stop

to

internal

improvement

;

loss

of the lives

of fifteen thousand

men

(loss

of

camp-followers

not

known)

;

destruction of

fifty

thousand camels

;

abstraction of

the

circulating

medium

of the

country;

loss

of

at

least

13,000,000

(now

estimated

from

17,000,000

to

. 20,000,000);ermanent

increase

of the

chargec

on

India of

4,500,000

;

paralization

of

commerce

;

diminution

of

thfc

means

of

culture,

of

transport

and

of

revenue;

chilling

the affections

of

the

native

army,

and the

disposition

^o

enlist

;

loss of

England's

character for

fair-dealing

loss

of

her character

of

success

;

the

Mussulman

population

is

rendered

hostile

;

causes

of

rebellion

developed

by

the

pressure

of

taxes

and

the

withdrawal

of

troops

;

and

finally,

he other

political

party

in

England

is

committed

to

the

continuation

of

such

deeds,

after

^hey

are

recognised

by

the

people

of ;hese

islands

to

be

criminal,

and

after

they

had

brought

upon

our

heads

disaster and

retribution.

^

At

the battle

of

Gujrat

4,000

of

the

very

best

men

of

Afghanistan,

the

elite of Dost

Mahomqi's

army,

splendid

rafen.


19/401

BRITISH

.REl^ATIONS

WITH

AFGHANISTAN

3

,

In

1855,

However,

the iVmir

drew it

aside with

a

more

*

*

friendly

aifd,

and

sent

'his

son

and

heir,

(jholab

Hyder

IQian,

to

Jamrud

to

'

negotiate treaty

with

Mr.

John

Lawrepce

and

Colonel

Herbert

Edwardes,

who

had

l/een

dejAited

by

Lord

Daljiousie

o

meet

him.

,The Afghan

prince

was

empowered

to

ask

for

assistance

in

*

men,

money

and

arms,

in

case

Persia,

or

Russia,

or

both

combined,

were

to

'tlfreaten

Herat,

then

an

independent

state, but,

under the

Durani

and Sudazai

dynasties,

pro-ince

of

Afghanistan,

nd^^till

n

essential bulwark

of

that

Kingdom''sindependence.

But

Lawrehce had

neither

the

authority,

or

the wish

to

accede

tp

such

requests,

he

seems,

at

this

time,

to

have

been doubtful

of the

advantage

to

India of

entering

into

any

dealings

vith

Afghanistan

and

the draft

treaty

which he

prepared

nd

which

Hyder

Khan

finally

ccepted,

ontained

only

three

articles

:

the first of

which declared

that there

should

be

perpetual

eace

and

friend-hip

between

the Honourable

E'ast

India

Company

and his

Highness

Dost

Mahomed

Khan,

Wali

of

Kabul

and

those

coun-ries

now

in his

possession

the second

pledged

the

East

India

Company

to

respect

those

countries and

never

to

interfere

in

them

;

and

the

third

bound

the

Amir

and

his

heirs

not

only

to

respect

the

possessions

f

the

East

India

Company,

but

to

be

the friend

of its friends and

the

enemy

of its

enemies.

on

splendid

horses,

as

the^

were

described

by

the

officers

present,

.comjmanded

by

the

son

and

nephews

of

the

Amir in

person,

were

overthrown,

beaten

to

pieces

and driven from

the

field

with

tremendous

loss

by

243

Hindustanis of

the

Sind

Irregular

Horse,

leaving

their

leaders

slain

and

their standards

in

the

hitnds of

the

victors.

General John

Jacob,

C. B.

j

^

#


20/401

4

THE SECOND AFGHAN.

WAR

r

Two

years

later,

in

January

1857,

Dost

Iâhomed

him^

self

met

the

*same

tô

representatives

f

the

Gompai^y

at

th

same

place

4^*^^^^^?

^^^

both Governments

being

then

on

the

'eve

of

^Yar

with Persia

who,

in

defiance

of

alL

warn-ngs,

had

just

seized

Herat, a

fresh

treaty

was

/concluded

between

them,

by ^which*Dost

Mahomed,

in

excnahge

forâ

large

subsidy

given

to

enable

him

to

equip

and

iT\aintain

n

efficient army,

agreed^

o

receive

Br iti^h

fficers

at

Kabul,

Kandahar, Balkh,

or

wherever

an

Afghan

army

might

be

established

against

the

Persians,

'to

watch

over

the

applica-ion

of

the

money

to

the

purposes

for

which

it

was

intended

;

it

being strictly

aid down that those

officers

^

were

to

abstain

from all interference

in

the

internal affairs

of

the Amir's

Kingdom,

and

thatf

on

the

conclusion

of

peace,

between the

Allied

Powers

and

Persia,

when the

subsidy

would

cease

to

be

paid,

they

were

to

be

withdrajvn.

This

treaty

was

temporary

in its

character,

except

as

regards

the

seventh

clause,

which

was

to

come

into

force when

all the others

expired

and

which

gave

to

the Indian

Gov-rnment

the

right

to

maintain

a

Vakil,

or

Native

Envoy,

permanently

at

Kabfil,

and

to

the

Amir

a

like

right

to

send

an

Agent

to

Pesnawar for

the

purpose

of

keeping

each^

Government

well informed

as

to

the

position

and

wishes

of the

other. To

prevent

the

slightest

hance

of

this

provision's

ver

being

used

to

cover

larger

demands

on

the

part

of

India

than the

Amir

intended

to

concede,

it

r

1

Major

H, B.

Lumsden,

Lieutenant

P.

^.

Lumsden and Dr.

H.

W.

Bellew. Two

native

gentlemen,

both Durani

Afghans,

also

accompanied

the

mission.

^

*


21/401

p

BRITISH .RELATIONS WITH

AFGHANISTAN

5

^vas

expressly

tated

that her

Envoy

was

Twt

^,to

e

a

European

officer.

*

.

'

.

The

war

proved

of short

duration.

Persia

sued for

pe,^ce,

one

condition of which

was

her

immediate

^^withdraV^al

rom

Herat,

which

province

returned,

for

a

time,

to

a

state

of

^

anarchical

independence.

n

the teumination

of

hostilities

he

British

subsidy

ceased

to

be

paid

to

Dost

Mahomed,

the

British

officers left

^dhdahar,

and

a

Mahomedan

gentleman,

Gholam

Hussein

Khan,

went to

Kabul

as

the

East

India

Company's

first Native

Ag nt.

In

May

1863,

Dost

Mahomed

took

Herat

by

storm

the

Indian

Government

having

with-rawn

its

opposition

to

the

reunion,

of

that

city

with the

rest

of

Afghanistan

and there

he

died,

on

the

9th of

June

of the

same

year.

Before

his

death,

Gholab

Hyder

Klian

having

predeceased

him,

he

nominated

as

his

successor

his

favourite

son,

.Shere

Ali,

^

younger

brother

of the notorious

*

Akbar

Khan,

who

murdered

Sir

William

MacNaughten

at

Kabul

in

December

1841

;

but this

prince's

laim

was,

at

once,

contested

by

numerous

members

of his

family,

and

the

Indian

Government,

remembering

the

bitter

fruits

which

it

had

reaped

from

its

forn?er

attempt

to

force

a

ruler

on

the

Afghan

people,

'abstained,

or

a

time,

from

recognizing

Dost

Mahomed's

legal

heir.

It

was

not

till

December

that

Sir William

Denison,

the^

acting

as

Governor-General

pending

the

arrival

in

India

of

tjie

new

Viceroy,

Sir John

Lawrence,

wrote

a

courteous

letter

to

Sffere

Ali

expressing

is

sincere

hope

that

under

his

role

Afghanistan

might

possess

a

strong

and

united

Government,

and

that the

good

understanding

nd

friendship

hich

had

prevailed

etween

t^at

country

and India

in

his

father's

^


22/401

6

THE

SECOND AFGHAxN

WAil

time,

might gain

strength

and

stability

nder

his

own

administration.

^

'

,

t

For

more

than^,

hree

years

after the

despatch

of that

letter,

^here

Ak

continued

to

be

regarded

as

the

Ruler of

Afghanistan

by

the

Indian

Government,

which

recalled its

Vakil,

Gkqiam

Hi^sein

Khan,

from Kabul

on

*the

discovery

that

he had been

intriguingagainst

him;

but

when

in

1867

he

was

driven

to

take

refuge

in

Herat,

'

and

his

half-brother

Mahomed Afzul Khan could

anijounce

that

he

was

in

full

possession

of

the

provinces

of

'

Kabul

and Kandahar

it

accepted

the

latter

as

de

facto

sovereign

of the

territory

e

had

won.

Yet

Sir John

Lawrence,

whilst

congratulating

he

new

Amir,

did

not

conceal the

sympathy

he felt for the

misfortunes

of

Shere Ali

who had

given

him,

so

he

declared,

no

cause

of

offence

at

any

time ;

and

he

'dashed

to

the

ground

any

hope

of

matf^rial

countenance

and

aid

which

this

recognition

f

his

sovereignty

ight

have

awakened

in

AfzuPs

breast,

by

the firm

declaration

that,

should

hos-ilities

between

him and

his

brother be

renewed,

the

Indian

Covemment

would

observe

its

former

policy

of

strict

neutral-ty.

In

conclusion

Si^

John

Lawrence

proposed,

in

accoixl-

ance

with the

seventh clause'

of the

treaty

of

1857,

to

depute,

if

agreeable

to

the

Amir,

a

Mahomedan

gentleman

of rank

and

character

to

be

the British

Representative

t

his

court.

Afzul

J^^han

signified

is

willingness

o

receive

an

Envoy,

and

the

Viceroy

appointed

Atta Mahomed

Khan,

in whose

discre-ion

and

ability

e

reposed

full

confidence,

o

the

post,

but

the

VakiPs

departure

from

India

was

postponed

from time

to

time,

owing

to

the

unsettled

state

of

things

in

Afghanistan.

On

the 7th of

October,

1867,

AfzuJ

KhVn

died,

and

hi^


23/401
http://www.forgottenbooks.com/in.php?btn=6&pibn=1000434901&from=pdf


24/401

8 THE SECOND

AFGHAISi

WAH

This

gift

of six

lakhs

of

rupees

marks

a

discinct

departure

from

the

fortner

British

policy

of

fnon-intei'fer2nce

in

the

internal affairs of

Afghanistan

for

to*

subsidize

one

of

two

claimaUts

to

the throne of

Kabul,

was

to

espouse

that,

claim-nt's

cause,

and

virtually

o

decide

for tho

Afghan

people

the

question

of what

princethey

should

ack;:iowledge

nd

obey,

so

far

as

it

was

their

custom

to

render obedience

to

any

prince.

There

can

be little doubt

that similar

assistance

accorded

to

Azim

Khan

migdt

have

inclined

the

balance

in

his

favour. That

it

was

denied

to

him

and

granted

to

Shere

Ali,

indicates

^that

between

the

accession

of

the

one

brother and

his

supercession

j

the

other,

the

Viceroy

and

his

Council had been convinced

that,

in

the

interests

of

India,

tke

time

had

come

^

for

anarchy

to

cease

in

Afghanistan,

nd

that

they

believed

Shere Ali

to

be

more

likely

o

be

able

to

put

an

end

to

it than

any

of his

rivals.^

AVhether,

in

an'iving

at

these

conclusions,

they

were

influenced

by

Sir

Henry

Rawlinson's celebrated

Memorandum

on

the

Central

Asian

Question,

^

it

is

impossible

ither

to

assert

or

deny.

Rawlinson

himself claims for

his able

state

paper

the

credit

of

having

determined

^heir

policy

at

this

juncture,

nd, cer-ainly,

that

document

in

^*^hich he had

not

only

advocated

the

subsidizing

f

the

Amir

of

Kabul,

but

had named

Shere

Ali

as

the

Amir

to

be

so

subsidized,

reached Calcutta before

the

end

of

September

1868,

and

the

letter

recognizing

Shere

Ali's

resumption

of

the

Amirship

and

holding

out

hopes

of

British

assistance in

strengthening

im

in

his

re-overed

position,

as

not

written

till

tht;

2nd

of

October,

^

Afghanistan,

No.

1

(lH78),j)age

il.


25/401

BRITISH

RELATIONS

WITH

AFGHANISTAN

9

sa

that

there

was

time

for

the

Memorandum

to

have been

considered

b^'

the

Viceroy

n

Council before

the

determination

to

give

aid

to

Shere

Ali

was

arrived

at.

Probably

the

cours'e

adopted

was

the

one

which Sir

John

Lawrence

had

iiiready

decided

to

follow',

nd

the Memorandum's

chiming

in

with

his^

own

view*

led

him

to

put

th^m

into

execution

with

greater

promptitude

than

might

otherwise

have

been

the

case.

The

general

pJolfcy

f

the

Indian

Government

was,

however,

unchanged

by

it.

Tile

long

array

of facts which

it

brought

forward

to

prove*

the

rapidity

f Russia's

advance

in

Central

Asia,

awoke

no

alarm

in

the'

breasts of

men

who

had

long

been familiar

with*

them

ancj,

ho

believed

that,

whilst

that advance

was

inevitable and

likely

o

continue,

it

was

not,

necessarily,nspiredby

any

hostile

intentions

to-ards

Great

Britain

;

and

but

few

of the

remedial

measures

which it

advocated

with

the

object

of

hindering

r

delaying

it,

met

with their

approval.

They

were

willing

that the

Indian

Railway

System

should

be 'extended

so

as

to facilitate

the

concentration

of

troops

on

the North-

West

Frontier,

and that the

British

Embassy

at

Teheran should be

removed,

from the

control of the

Secretary

f

St^te

for

Foreign

Affairs

and

placed

under,

the

Secretary

c^

State

for

India,

but

they

passed

over,

in

silence,

the

specific

easures

by

which

Raw-

linson

proposed

to

counteract

Russia's

influence*

in

Persia,

and

they

openly

condemned

his

suggestions

hat

a

British

Mission

should be

re-established at

Kabul,

that the Amir's

autliority

hould be

upheld

by

a

Native

contingent

officered

by Englishmen,

ajid

that

Quetta

should be

occupied

and

fortified

suggestions

o

which,

it is fair

to

say,

their author

attached the

condition

that

they

should

only

be acted

on,

y

\


26/401

10

THE

SECOND

AFGHAN

WAR

if the

willing

onsent

of

the

Ruler

and

People

of

Afghanistan

could

fii-stbe

obfained.

The

Vicemy

and

his

''Council

sum-

ii;ied

p

their

objections

o

the

policy

of the

Memorandum

and

rormulat^^

and

justified

heir

own

in

wise

and

cou-ageous

words

:

*

Wq-

pbject,

o

they

declared;

to

an}?

acHve

interference

in the affairs

of

Afghanistan

by

the

deputation

f

a

high

British officer

with

or

without

a

contingent,

r

by

the

forcible

or

amicable

occupation

f

a'ny

post,

or

tract,

in that

country

beyond

our own

frontier,

inasmuch

as

we

think such

a

measure

would',

under

present

circumstances,

engender

irrita-ion,

defiance,

nd

hfitred

in

th? minds

of

the

Afghans,

without

in

the least

strengthening

ur

power

either for

attack

or

defence.

We

think it

impolitic

nd unwise

to

decrease

any

of

the

difficulties

which

would

be

entailed

on

Russia,

ifthat

power

seriously

hought

of

invading

India,

as

we

should

certainly

ecrease

them if

we

left

our

own

frontier,

nd

met

her

half

way

in

a

difficult

country,

and,

possibly,

n

the

midst of

a

hostile

or

exasperatedopulation.

We

foresee

c

no

limits

to

the

expenditure

which

such

a move

might

require,

and

we

pretest

against

the

necessity

f

having

to

impose

additional

taxation*

on

the

people

of

India,

who

are

unwilling,

s

it

is,

to

bear

such

pressure

for

measures

which

they

can

'ooth

understand

and

appreciate.

nd

we

think

that

_

the

objects

which

we

have

at

heart,

in

common

with

all

interested

in

India,

may

be attained

by

an

attitude

of

readiness

and firmness

on

our

frontier,

and

by

giving

all

our care

c

and

expending

all

our resources

for

the

attainment

of

practical

nd

sound ends

over

which

we

can

exercise

an

effective and

immediate control.

V


27/401

BRITISH

R^Li^TIONS WITH

AFGHANISTAN

11

^'Should

a

foreign

power,

such

as

Russia,

ever

seriously

think

of

invading

India

from

without,

or,

wiiat

is

more

probable,

of

stirring

up

the

elements

of

disaffection

or

anarchy

within

it,

our

true

policy,

ur

strongest

security,

would

then,

we

conceive,

be

found

to

lie in

previous

b-

stju'dnce

from

entanglements

t

either

Cabul,

Cand^har,

or

any

similar

outpost;

in

full reliance

on a

compact,

highly-

equipped,

and

discipKneU

rmy

stationed within

our

own

territories,

r

on

our own

border

;

in

the

contentment,

if

not

in

the

attachment,

of

the tnasses

;

in

the

sense

of

security

of

title

and

possession,

ith which

oiir

whole

policy

is

gradually

imbuing

the

minds

of

the

principal

hiefs

and

the

Native

aristocracy;

n

the construction

of

material

works

within British

India,

which enhance the comfort

of

the

people,

while

they

add

to

our

political

nd

military

trength

in

husbanding

cur

finances

/);nd

onsolidating

nd

multiplying

our

resources

;

in

quiet

preparation

for all

contingencies,

which

no

Indian

statesman

should

disregard;

nd

in

a

trust

in

the

rectitude

and

honesty

of

our

intentions,

coupled

with

the

avoidance

of

all

sources

of

complaint

which

either

invite

.

foreign

ggi'ession

r

stir

up

restless

spirit-s

o

domestic revolt.*

The

allusion

to

the

contingencies

hich

no

Indian

statesman

should

disregard

roves

that

though

unaffected

by

Rawlin-

son's

nervous

fear of

Russian

expansion,

he

Government

of

India

did

not

close

ij^s

yes

to

the

possibility

f

difficulties'

some

day,

resulting

from

it

both

to

Great Britain

and

to

India;

and

it

had

not

required

ny

warning

voice

to

direct

its

attention

to

the

matter.

A

year

before

the

memorandum

^

Afghanistan,

No.

1

(1878),

age

41.

^

)


28/401

12 THE

SECOND

AFGHAN WAR

on

the

Centrgil

sian

question

reached

Sir

John

Lawren/:e,

he

had

written to

Sir

Stafford

Northcote,

theA

Secretary

r

Sitate

for

India,

pointing

out

that

Russia's

influence

must

soon

4)e

as

]jaramount

at Samarkand

and Bokhaua

as

it

already

was

in

Khokand,

and

had

urged

her

Majesty's

Minister

to

determine^

ith those

of

the

Czf

r

a^line

up

to

which

the relations

of

the

respective

overnments

should

be

openly

acknowledged

and admitted

as

bringing

hem

into

necessary

contact

and

treaify

ith the tribes

and

natives

on

the

several

sides

of such

a

linei^7

This

suggestion

had found

no

acceptance

with Sir

Stafford

Northcote,

who

ws^

of

opinion

that Russia's

conquests

in

Central

Asia

were

the natural

result

of

the

circumstances

in

which she found herself

placed,

nd afforded

no

gi'ound

for

representations

ndicative

of

suspicion

r

alarm

on

the

part

of

Great

Britain.

Now,

in

this

letter of

the

4th

of

January,

1869,

the

Viceroy

nd

his

Council

returned

to

the

charge,

eet-ng

Sir

H. Rawlinson's

j^emedial

measures

directed

against

Russia

with the

counter

suggestion

that

endeavours

might

obe

made

to

come

to

some

clear

understanding

ith the

Court

of

St.

Petersburg

s

to

its

projects

nd

designs

in

Central

Asia,

and

that it

might

be

given

,

to

understand,

in

firm

but

courteous

language,

that it

could

not

be

permitted

to

interfere

in the

affaii*sof

Afghanistan,

r

in

those of

any

Stat^,

hich

lay

contiguous

to

our

frontier.

'^

This

proposal

found

favour with the Duke

of

Argyll,

ho

had

succeeded

Sir Stafford

Northcote

at

the

India Office

when

^

Afghanistan,

No.

1

(1878),

p.

20.

-

Ibid.,

page

45.

X


29/401

BRITISH

RELA TIONS

WITH

AFGHANISTAN

13

th$

Disraeli

Miiiistry

ave

place

to

that

of

Mr.

Gladstone

in

December

1868,

and,

in

due

time,

it

bore

'important

ruit.

With

his

father's

kingdom,

Shere

Ali

had

inherited

hi^

father's

.desire

to

have the British

Government

for

a

iHend

and

ally.

^We

ha\ê

seen

how,

in

the letter

announcing

his

vict9rious

^reti^rn to

his

capital,

ê

reminded

Si^'

John

I^wrence

of the

relations

of

friendship

nd

amity

subsisting

between

Dost

Mahoriied'

and

the

Indian

Government. Be-

)

fore

the

end

of

the

year,

whilst

he still

had hard work

to

maintain

his

position,

jfe

wrote to

Mr.

R.

H.

Davies,

Lieutenant-Governor

of the

Punjab,

that

' but'

for the

hostile

proceedings

f Mohamed

Azim,

Khan

an4

of

Abdur

Rahman

Khan,

which

diverted

his

attention

towards them

and

compelled

him

to

chastise

them,

he should

already

have

sought

a

personal

nterview with

the

Viceroy.

In

his

reply

,to

this

letter,

dated

9th

of

January,

1869,

Sir

John

Lawrence informed the

Amir that he

was

leaving

the

country,

and

handing

over

his*

high

office

to

his

successor,

but that

the

policy

e had

pursued

with

regard

to the

affaii-s

of

Afghanistan

commanded

the

assent

and

approval

of

her

Majesty,

the

Queen

of

England,

and

Ahat

as

long

as

he

the Amir

continued

by

his

acti ins

to

evince

a

real desire

for

the

alliance

of the British

Government

he

had

nothing

to

apprehend

in

the

way

of

a

change

of

policy

oli

its

part,

or

of its interference

in the

internal

affairs

of

his

kingdom,^

though

it would

lie

with

each

successive

administration

to

detei-mine,

ear

by

year,

what

practical

ssistance

in the

way

of

money

and

materials

of

war

should

be

made

over

to

him

^

Afglianisân,

o.

1

(1878),

age

83,

^

'

I


30/401

14

THE SECOxND

AFGHAJV

WAR

as a

testimony

of

its

goodwill

and

for

the furtherance

^of

his

legitima4:e

uthority

and influence. As

an

imi;nediato

f

roof

of

the

British

Government's

de*sire

to

see

him

establish

a

strfttfig,

ust

and

merciful

government

throughoutAfghan-stan,

Shere

Ali

was

informed that

a

further

^sum

of

six

lakhs

of

rupees,

in

addition

to

the six

lakh^

Svhich he had

already

received,would,

in

the

coui*se

of

the

next

three

months,

be

placed

at

his

disposal,

nd that for neither

gift

would

the

British

(ioveruKient

look

for

any

other

return

than in

abiding

confidence,

sincerity

nd

good-

will.

^

Lord

Mayo;

the'

successor

to

'

whom Sir John

Lawrence

alluded

in

this

letter,

arrivefj

at

Calcutta

on

the

12th

of

January,

1869,

and

proceeded

without

loss

of

time,

to arrange

for that

intervie^f

between

himself,

as

Head

of

the Indian

Government,

and

the

Amir,

which the latter had declared

himself

to

have

at

heart. Shere

Ali

respondedwarmly

to

the

suggestion

that he

should

visit

India,

and

though

anxious

on

account

of

the

critical

state

of

things

still

prevailing

n

his

kingdom,

that the

meeting

with the

Viceroy

should take

^place

at

some

point

within

easy

reach of his frontier

he

announced his

readiness

to

go

even as

far

as

Calcutta if

necessary.

He

suggested

Xahore

or

Deljii,

but

Ambala,

midway

between the

two,

was

the

city

finally

ecided

upon.

^here

Ali

started

from

Kabul

on

the 10th of

February,

leaving

his

son,

Yakub

Khan,

to

make head

against

his

enemies

in his

absence. On

the

J3rd

of March

he reached

Peshawar,

and Ambala

on

the 25th.

On

the

27th

'

the

Viceroy

also

arrived

in that

city

and,

,the

same

day,

in

1

Afghanistan,

No.

1

(1878),

page

83.


31/401


32/401

16

THE

SECOxND AFGHAN

WAR

as

they

were,

they

were

still

too

strong

and definite

for

\\u-

Duke

of

Argyll

\f^ho

thought

that ^certain

expressions

n tht-

Ticeroy's

etter

might

some

day

be construed

by

that

prince,

or

hfF

successors,

as

meaning

more

tlian

they

were

intended

to

convey,

and

was

anxious

that

use

should be

rpade

of

any

opportiyiity

hat

might

present

itself

to

dissipate

ny

^false

expectations

that

might

have

arisen

in

Shere

Ali's

mind.

Lord

Mayo

was

able

to

assure*'

the

Secretary

of

State

that

it

had

been

made cl^ar

to

the Amir in

conversation,

that

the

promise

to

view

with

severe

displeasure '

ny

attempts

that' his

Hvals

might

make

to

re-kindle

civil

war,

did

not

mean

that

Jthe

Indiai?

Government

would

ever

take

any armed action

against

his

enemies;

that the words

rightful

rule

vere

not to

be

construed

as

implying

any

recognition

of

his

^'de

jure''^

s

well

as

of

his

^^

de

facto''''

sovereignty;

nd that the

expression

of

the

wish

that he

might

be enabled

to

transmit

to

his

descendants

all

the

dignities

nd

honours of

\ 'hich he

was

the

lawful

possessor,

earned

with it

no

engagement

on

the

part

of

Great

Britain

^to

recognize

such

descendants,

and

he,

the

Viceroy,

herefore

deprecated

as

unneoessary

and

inexpedient

he

proposal

to

impress

these truths

upon*^him

again

in

wi^iting.

ord

Mayo

also assured his

Grace

that

during

the

Conference

he

had

never

contemplated

giving

the

Amir

annual

grants

of

money,

nor

pf

adding

to

the

amount

already

bestowed

upon

him

by

Sir

John

Lawrence,

and he

took credit

to

himself

for

*he firmness he

had

displayed

in

resisting

he

earnest*

en-reaties

nijade

o

him

by

many

persons

of

authority,

he

night

before

Shere

Ali left

Ambala,

that

he

would

promise

his

departing

guest

a

large

addition

to

the

subsidy.


33/401

BRITISH

RELiWIONS

WITH

AFGHANISTAN

17

g3f

t

the

reasons

by

which

that

request

had

]?een

supported

^t^ere

very

strong,

as

Lord

Mayo

hoiK^tly

dmitted.

Its

advocates

pointed

out

that

Azim

Khan

had levied

a

year'?

revenue

in

advance

;

that Shere AH

had, therf^fbre,

o

'raise,

at

once,

another

Half-year's

axes

which

would

cause

much

pov^y

an^

oppression;

hat

the

sixty

thousand

ppmids

of

Sir John Lawrence's

allowance,

not

yet

paid,

as

forestalled

that

immediate

supplies

ere

necessary

for the

commencement

of the Turkestan

campaign

that the

policy

of

support

and

countenance

would

not

be

bdieved

in unless

accompaniedy

a

large

gift

of

gold;

that the

Amir,

notwithstanding

he

present

of

arms

and

ammunition

which

be

had

received,

elt

that he

was

going

back

empty-handed;

and that

Yakub

Khan

and

the

Sirdars left

behind

at

Kabul^

would

laugh

and

say

that

he

had

gone

on

a

fruitlesserrand.

Much

of the

correspondence

hich

passed

between

the

Duke of

Argyll

and

Lord

Mayo,

whilst

the

one

was

Secretary

of

State

for

India and

the other

Viceroy

of

India,

as

of

a

semi-official

character

and,

therefore,

ithdrawn

from

public

cognizance,

xcept

in

so

far

as

the

former,

for his

own

purposes,

made

use

of

it

when

writing

his

book

entitled

The

Afghan

Question.

This

method

of

conducting

he

affairs

of

a

great Dependency

may

be

convenient

to

the

writers,

but

it has

great

inconveniences for

the British

People

whom

it

allow

o

know

only

so

much

of

their

awn

business

as

it

may

suit the

servants

they

employ

to

confide

to

them.

The

despatch

rom the

Government

of

India

to

the

Secretary

f

Stal:e,

ated

Simla,

1st

of

July,

1869,

which

has

just

been

dealt

with,

contains the

following

important

quotation

from

one

of

these confidential communications.

\


34/401

18 THE SECOND AFGHAN

WAR

What the

Amir

is not

to

have

:

No

treaty

;

no

fixed

subsidy

no

European

troops,

officers,

r

residents

;

no

dynastic

pledges.

hat he

is to

have

:

Warm

countenance

and

support,

disco

liragemeht

f his

rivals;

such

material assistance

as

we

may

consider

absolutely

ecessary

for

his''

immediate

wants;

and

co^a;stant

friendly

^

communication

through

otir

Confimis-

sioner

at

Peshawar

and

our

Native

Agent

in

Afghanistan;

he

on

his

part

undertaking

to

db kll he

can

to

maintain

peace

on

our

frontiei*s,

nd

to

comply

with

all

our

wishes in

the

matter

of

trade/'

^

Warm

countenance

and

support

which

began

and ended

in words

and

such,

except

for the

gift

of

arms

mentioned

above,

was

the

nature

of the favour

shown

to

Shere

Ali

by

Lord

Mayo

must

have

seemed

to

the

Amir of

very

little

practical

se;

but the above

passage

is

not

quoted

here for

the

sake

of

emphasizing

the

barenness of the

Ambala

Con-erence

so

far

as

Shere Ali

was

concerned,

but

to

call

attention

to

the

pledge

contained

in

it

that

no

European

officers,

r

residents,

should be stationed in

Afghanistan,

pledge

which,

by

some

curious

confusion of

thought,

is

placed

in

such

connection in the

text

as

to

make

it

appear

as

if

European

officers

were

among

thea

things

which

the

Amir

had desired

and

the

Indian

Government

had denied

to

him.

JRrivate

lettere from Lord

Mayo

to

the

Duke

of

Argyll,

however,

put

this

matter

in

its

true

light.

In

one,

the

Viceroy

told

the

Secretary

of

State

for

India that

hb

had

promised

the Amir that

no

European

officers

should

be

Afghanistan,

No.

1

(IS'^S),

age

9^.


35/401

BRITISH

RELATIONS

WITH

AFGHANISTAN

19

p^ced

as

residents in

his

cities ;

in

another,

that the

t)nlypledges*iven

were*

that

we

would

rfot

interfere in

his

affairs

;

that

we

would?

not

force

European

officers

upon

hifh

against

his

wish ;'

whilst,

to

a

letter of

the* 4th

of*April,

he

appen^^d

ertain

notes

of

the

conferences

of

the

1st

and

*3rd^

f thtit*

vionth,

which showed the

extreme

je^ôusy

f

Shere

Ali

and his

minister,

Nur

Mahomed,

on

the

subject

of

European

agents

f the

British

Government.

These

promises

dded

nothing

to

the

engagements

entered

into

by

Sir John Lawrence

with

Dost

Mahomed,

but,

by

confirming

hem,

and still

more

by

offering'

hat confirma-ion

to

Shere

Ali

as

a

compensation

or

declining

o

give

him

that

on

which his heart

was

set

a

dynastic

uarantee

the

Viceroy'certainly

ade

them

doqjbly

inding

on

his

successors

in officeand

on

the British

Government.

For

this

dynasticuarantee

the Amir

strove

and

pleaded,

urging

that

merely

to

acknowledge

he

Ruler

pro

tern

and

de

Jâcto,

as

to

invite

competition

or

a

throne

and

excite

the

hopes

of

all

sorts

of

candidates.

'

It

was

against

he

rivals of his

own

house that he desired British assistance,

not

against

external attack.

The

fear,

of renewed civil

war

was ever

present

^^

î^

mind;

difead

of

Russian

aggi'ession

seems

not

yet

to

have

crossed

it

;

and Lord

Mayo

was care-

ful

not to

exhibit

the British

Government

as

sifffering

rom

nervous

alarms

about

proceedings

o

which the

Amjr

did

not

give

a

thought.

Nevertheless

the

desire

to

put

a

^

The

Afghan

Qisestion,

age

46.

^

Ibid?,

age

55.

*

3

Afghanistan,

No.

1

(1878),

age

9S.

*

^

The

Afghan

Question,

page

44 .

y


36/401

^0

THE

SECOiND

AFGHAiN

WAR

r

formidable obstacle

in

Russia's

path

did

underlie the

British

Government ** wish

to

see

in

Afghanistan

a

strong

ruler

wh6

should also be Great Britain's

friend

and

ally;

and if this

was

a

reasonable

and

legitimate

object

at

which

to

aim,

it

was

worth

incurring

some

expense

to

sôure.

Lord

Mayo

shrank

^'om

expending

a

single

rupee

for

thi^

ptirpose

\^

yet

in

a

private

letter

to

the

Duke

of

Argyll,

dated the

7th

of

July,

1871,^

he

seems

to

have

clahiicM

that

his

policy

was

identical

with that of Sir

Joân Lawrence

Lawrence

who

had

boldy

thrown

India's

purse

into the

balance

in

Shere

All's

favour.

What

is

there in

common

between

the

point

of

view

of

the

man

^ho

wrote^

''no

doubt

it is

correct

.

.

.

that

if

we

give

a

subsidy

to

the Amir he

will

employ

the

money

Jor

his

oim

purposes

arid

not

in

the

manner we

may

desire.

But,

after

all, our

object

inust

be

to

strengthen

is

position

and

to

secure

his

good

zoill,

s

tJie

Ruler,

.qftlieountry^''

and

that of him who

told

the

high

authorities

who

were

pleading

with

him

to treat

Shere

Ali

with

liberality,

'that

he wished

to

force

the

Amir

to

spend

tlie

sixty

thousand

pounds

stilldue

to

him

in

paying

his

troops

?

^

And

where

is the

likeness in

the

policy

of the

Viceroy

who

suggested

that

we

simply

engage^

to

give

the

Amir

a

certain

sum

annually,

so

long

as

we are

satisjkd

ivith his

bearing

and

conduct

toibards

us'''*and

who

thought

it

would

7wt

be

ex-edient

that

this

sum

should be

less

than

teî

or

twelve

laklis

of rupees^''

to

that of his

successor

who assured

the

Secre-

The

Afghan

Question,

pp.

6*0

6l.

Afghanistan,

No.

1

(1878),

page

63.

Ibid.,

page

96.

Ibid.,

page

66.

^


37/401

BRITISH

RELiVTIONS

WITH

AFGHANISTAN

21

tairy

of State

tnat

''it

iva^s

expected

that the

Gpmideratwn

of

an

annual

^'ant

of

money

might

he

postponed

or

the

present^

o

and that he and

his Council

raere not

zmthout

hope

thqt

*

.

.

f

the

Amir

might

be

able

to

maintain

his

posipori

rid

carry

on

his

Government

without

any

further

assistance

from

On

the other

hand,

Lord

Lawrence

was even

less

inclined

than Lord

Mayo

to

t)ind

the British Government

to

Shere

Ali

by

engagements,

writteji

or*

verbal,

explicit

r

implicit.

He

disliked

entanglements

*of

all

kinds,

and had doubts

whether it

were

possible

or

a

European

Government

so

to

word

its

benevolent

intentions

towards

an

Asiatic Prince

as

to

avoid

arousing

undue

expectations

n his

mind.

If

he

m

had been

the

Viceroy

to

meet

Shere

Ali

at

Ambala,

though

he

would

have

sent

him

away

with full

hands instead

of

empty

ones,

he

would

h^dly

have

written

him

a

letter

containing

friendly

phrases

about

his

the

Amir's

right-ul

rule,

the

severe

displeasure

with which the British

Government

would

view

the

intrigues

of

his

rivals,

and

its

determination

to

endeavour

to

enable

him

to

transmit^

to

his descendants all the

dignities

?nd

honours of

which

he

was

the

lawful

possessor,''

or

him

to

appeal

to

in

after

days;

he would

have

contented himself with

re-ewing

the

old

pledge

to

respect

the

independence

and

integrity

of

Afghanistan^

nd

for the

rest,

have

left both

sides

free,

trusting

to

the

ordinary

workings

of human

nature to

draw

them

together

in

the

face

of

a

commoif

danger.

1

Afghanistan,

o. 1

(1878),

page

99.


38/401

22

THE

SECOND

AFGHAN

WAR

But

though

(the

Conference

of Ambala

was'

in

many ways

a

disappointment

o

the

Amir,

it*,

ndoubtedly,

eft

upon

h}s

mind

the

conviction

that

he had in

the

British

Govern-ent

a

neighbour

who

honestly

ished

him well and whom

he could

trust not to

embarrass

him

with'

claims-

which

the

backward

condition

of,

his

subjects

ade

it'

impossible

for

him

to

grant;

and,

strong

in that

conviction he

was

able

to

set

himself

to

the

difficult task

of

re-establishing

is

authoritythroughout

the

provincesbequeathed

to

him

by

his

father,

with

a

mind

free *from

all

anxiety

as

to

the

course

of

events

beyond

their frontiers.

Indirectly,

lso,

the

Conference

did

strengthen

is

position,

for the

news

of the

magnificenteception

ccorded

to

him

by

the

Viceroy

soon

spread

far

and

wide,

accompaniedby

rumours

of the assistance he

was

to

receive

from

the

British

Government,

and

these

reports

powerfully

ided

no

doubt

by

the

able

generalship

f

Yakub Khan

sufficed

to

put

an

end

to

the civil

war.

The

army

of

Azim

Khan,

which

stillheld

Turkestan,

dispersed;

ts

leader,

Mohamed

Ishak

cKhan,

fled,

and

the chiefs

of

the

country

tendered their

submission to Shere Ali. Within his

tranquillized

ominions,

the restored

sovereignsought

to

put

in^to

practice

ome

of

the lessons

which his

journey

to

India had

taught

him.

Travelling

through

the

Punjab,

a

province

which

only

twenty

years before had been

i(\

that condition of semi-

barbarism

out

of

which

Afghanistan

still

showed

no

signs

6f

emerging

his

eyes

had been

opened

to

possibilities

f

prosperitjf,

eace

and

order,

such

as

lie

had

never

dreamed

of;

and the

desire

to

conduct

his

government

on

more

civilized

principles

nd

to

lift

his

people

to

a

higher

level

of

com-

/


39/401


40/401

24

THE

SECOND

AFGHAJ^

WAR

which he

was

the

mouth-piece;

and

the

pcssion

and

eq^r-

nestness

with

which

in

the

evil

days

that

werei

to

come,

he

appealed

to

the

promises

of

my

frie'iid,

Lord

Mayo,

were

t^e

measure

cf

the

confidence which he

had

reposed

in

that

Viceroy's

word.


41/401

'

CHAPTER

II

THE NEGOTIATIONS

WITH

RUSSIA

;

THE

SEl^TAN

AWARD

;

AND

tea

SIMLA

CONFERENCE.

Whilst

Shere Ali

was

i^triving

to

carry

out

the

wishes

of the Indian

Government*

in the

adininis^ration

of the

Kingdom

to

which he

was

gradually

restoring

the

limits

that

had

belonged

to

it

under*

Dost

Mahomed,

the

English

Cabinet had

approached

the Ministers of the

Czar

with

a

view

to

the

recognition

of

some

territory

as

neutral between

the

possessions

of

Great

Britain

and

Russia,

which should be

their

limits,

and

be

scrupulbusly

respected by

both

Powers.

^

To

the

form in

which the

proposal

was

first

clothed,

the

Imperial

Government took

exception,

but it

agreed

readily

to

recognize

Afghanistan

as

a

country

lying

entirely

outside

Russia's

influence,

and

promised

to

do

its

best

to

make

the'

Amir of

Bokhara

respect

his

nej^hbour's

borders,

on

con-ition

that

the

Indian

Government

should

keep

a

restraining

hand

on

Shere Ali and his

subjects.

But it

..took

m^uch

longer

to

determine

what

was

to

be understood

by

the

term

Afghanistan;

indeed,

it

^as

not

till

January

1873, that,

through

the

personal

intervention

of the

Emperor

of Russia.

his

Government

yielded

to

the

British

contention that

it

1

Afghanistj^n,

No.

1

(1878),

page

103.


42/401

26

THE

SECOND

AFGHAN

WAR

should

cover

all

provincesactuallycknowledging

Shere

AJ.i 's

sovereignty,

hus

abandoning

Bokhara's

claims

to

Badakshaii

^d Wakhan

Dufing

the* three

years

occupied

by

these

negotiations,

he

Indian

Government

lost

no

opportunity

if

commending

to

the

Anjir

a

pacific

policy

towards all

his

reigkbours,

nd

Shere

Ali

franklyaccepted

their

advice

and

loyally

acted

upon

it,

even

when

provoked

and

tempted

to

disregard

it.

Thus,

when the

Amir of

Bokhara

invaded Badakshan and

burned

the

town

of

Jungi

KiPa,

Shere Ali contented

him-elf

with

ordering

his

Lieutenant,

Mahomed Alum

Khan,

to

act

vigorously

on

the

defensive,

and forbade

him

to

make

any

counter

attack

on

Bokhara

;

and

he

also abstained

from

annexing

Kerki and

Charjui,

places

which

would

have

added

materially

o

the

strength

of his northern

frontier,

nd

which

he

ardently

desired

to

possess.

Again,

when,

as

not

un-

frequentlyhappened,

overtures

were

made

to

him

by

neigh-ouring

Khans

to

combine

with them

against

Russia,

he

firmly

declined all such

proposals,

eclaring

hat there

was

a

treaty

between

England

and

Russia,

and

that

so

long

as

the

latter

country

did

not

interfere

with

Afghanistan,

he

would neither

make

war

upon

her

himself,

nor

give

a

refuge

to

men

who had been

fighting

against

her

;

and

yet

the

very

raid

into

Badakshan

mentioned

above,

was

due

to

intrigues

of

membei-s

of

his

own

family,

who,

from

a

safe

asylum

in

Bokhara, a

country

under

Russfan

protection,

ere

hatching plots

to

drive

him

from

his

throne.

If

the conduct

of*Shere

Ali

gave

the

Indian

Goverament

no

cause

of

complaint,

neither

had

they

any

grounds

for

uneasiness

as

regarded

the

policy

of

Russia,

whilst the

delini-


43/401

THE

NEGOTIATIONS

WITH

RUSSIA

27

itation of

Afghanistan

was

under discussion

bet,ween

the

court

of

St.

James*

and

that

df

St.

Petersburg.

'

The*

influence

of

General

von

Kaufmann,

Governor-General

of Russian

Turkestan,

averted

'

a

repetition

of the Amir

of

Bol^fiara'*s

anton

invasion

of

Afghan

territory;

nd when

Abdur

Rahman

wrote to

the

Russian

commander

soliciting

ssistancjs

against

his

uncle,

Shere

Ali,

his

request

was

refused

with the

intimation that

Afghanistan

was

under the

protection

f

Great

Britain,

and that

Russiaf

would

neither

attack the

Amir

nor

suffer

Bokhara

to.

'do

so.

Documents

The Second Afghan War, 1878-79-80 (1880)