The Samurai’s Rebirth – Japan’s

Increasing “Offensive” Security

Capabilities

Patrick Bright

Bemidji State University

Paper prepared for

18th Annual Midwest Political Science

Undergraduate Research Conference

Dr. Patrick Donnay, Advisor

March 20-21, 2009

Abstract

This thesis studies the increasing “offensive” nature of Japanese security capabilities in a

nation which has major restrictions on military capability. There are regional tensions in East

Asia that have the potential to escalate to armed conflict. Other countries in the region have

increased their levels of armament but how has Japan reacted? I look at three major acquisitions

by Japan that have created controversy, then examine the role public opinion has towards issues

of defense, including external and domestic considerations. Two major data sets on public

opinion, the Global Attitudes Project and the Asia Barometer, are used. I find that external

factors are a part of the reasoning for increased diversity in re-armament and levels of trust in

domestic institutions are critical to an understanding of Japanese defense issues.

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Introduction

December 15, 2006 marked a significant event in the nation of Japan's history. On this date the

Japanese Parliament Upper House voted to upgrade the nation's defense agency to a full government

ministry. This was part of then Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's1 goals of relieving diplomatic pressure on

Japan, and to re-think Japan's post World War II role in today's strategically sensitive world.2 Japan is

located in an area with high levels of tension between its neighbors. To its west is the Korean

Peninsula where North and South Korea maintain the world's most heavily defended border. In the

south, China and Taiwan are in a state of diplomatic tension since the defeat of the Chinese Nationalists

in 1949. Russia is still in diplomatic conflict with Japan over World War II and the occupation of the

Kuril Islands which Japan still claims to this day. Even its ally and protector, the United States has

occasional griefs and complaints ranging from trade deficits, economics, the burden-sharing of defense

responsibilities, to placement of military forces on Japanese soil.

Japan's neighbors in recent years have been increasing their military and defensive capabilities.

As a preeminent economic power in the region, Japan for the most part has not followed suit in terms

of overall defense buildup. This has put pressure on Japan both domestically and internationally to

respond equivalently. But one must remember Japan's past, the upgrade of the defense agency

mentioned above has created renewed tensions and debate about the role of Japan not only in East Asia

but the world. Many still remember the militaristic past of Japan. This has made Japan unique

concerning issues of militarism, nationalism, and re-armament. Japanese security concerns are

illustrated in Figure 1.

(Figure 1 about here)

At the end of the Second World War, Japan found itself with over 2 million people killed during

1 All Japanese names in traditional surname/given name format.

2 BBC News – Japan Upgrades Defense Status - http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6182087.stm 15 December, 2006

Retrieved: 7 February, 2008

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the war. While this pales in comparison to the losses of Russia and Germany, Japan has the unique

distinction of being the only nation in history to suffer a nuclear attack. History has seen the Japanese

people defeated, and their homeland occupied. The nation of Japan has been rebuilt from the ashes of

war into one of the most prosperous nations of the world. One legacy of this history is that Japan as

part of its constitution, drafted by the victorious Allies, has lived with Article 9 or the “peace clause,”

which states:

“The Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or

use of force as a means of settling international disputes.”

Since the acceptance of the constitution in 1947, actions taken by Japan on matters of defense

have followed this regulation. However, due to a number of factors, Japan has been re-arming in

increments since the 1950's with their defensive capabilities becoming more “offensive” in nature in

the past two decades.3 Under the general understanding of the constitution, Article 9 does not ban

Japan from being able to defend itself, but weapons that are for pure “offensive” purposes are banned

under Article 9.4 Yet Japan has been able to acquire more of these weapons in what appears to some to

be a wanton disregard of the constitution. Various factors are at play here ranging from a revival in

nationalism to external pressure from its American ally. Other factors include the economic rise and

status of Japan, and the nature and role of the Japanese political system in security and defense issues.

Various studies have been conducted throughout the latter half of the 20th

century that have focused on

the rebirth of nationalism and the reasons for Japanese re-armament, but most of these studies are at

least a decade old as of this report. (Berger 1993, Hook 1988, Wilborn 1994) Other studies have failed

to examine major issues of re-armament including the definition of “offensive” weapons, and how the

government determines what is in the nations “best interest.” (Corning 1989, Johnson 1986, Frühstück

2002)

3 Hook p.390

4 Japanese Ministry of Defense 2008 p.109

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With the actions of the Abe government and previous Japanese governments, significant issues

have been raised. A 2004 report by Shimoyachi Nao of The Japan Times indicates that revising the

constitution is seen as a possibility, but there is no consensus on revisions of Article 9 that would allow

for more flexibility towards defense issues. Since the early 1990's a number of new “defensive”

systems have been acquired by the Japanese Defense Forces; all have faced some degree of

controversy.

Recent Japanese Defense Acquisitions and Article Nine

Kongo Class Destroyer

To help understand the situation that Japan faces towards defense acquisitions, I examine three

cases of defense acquisitions that have created an amount of controversy, but each for different reasons.

The first case is the acquisition of the Kongo class destroyer, a derivative from the U.S. Arleigh Burke

class destroyers of the U.S. Navy. Kongo class destroyers form a major part of Japan's four primary

flotillas of the JMSDF.5 Each is equipped with AEGIS radar technology that provides these ships with

incredible detection and coordination abilities. The AEGIS system was the first point of controversy

concerning this class of destroyers; Japan was the first nation outside the United States to acquire such

technology. With this, the Kongo class can increase its detection distance, the number of targets it can

acquire, reaction time and its own missile range. Concerns were high in giving Japan this technology

due to an incident in the 1980's where the Toshiba Corporation sold computer guided propulsion

systems to the Soviet Union.6 Concerns were also high that Japan may attempt to “reverse engineer”

the AEGIS system, modify it or potentially sell it to other nations. After the U.S. Congress put the

purchase under review in 1988, eventually the purchase of the system was cleared. Japanese

shipbuilders, however, had to modify certain systems in order to be compliant with the advanced U.S.

5 Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force

6 Corning p.284

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technology.

The primary debates surrounding the Kongo class centered primarily around the advanced

technology present from the United States, as well as why the Japanese just didn't buy the whole ship

from the U.S. instead of only certain systems. The first ship of the class, the JDS Kongo was launched

on 25 March, 1993 and at the time became one of the most advanced warships afloat.7 It has the

capability to detect and attack submarines, conduct surface combat, and serve as an air defense

platform. In keeping with the constitutional restrictions, the ships are not equipped to carry the

Tomahawk cruise missile, carried by the Arleigh Burke class, as this weapon is considered beyond the

minimum for self defense. Without this capability, this ship falls within the limits of the constitution.

Today the Kongo class has been upgraded for ballistic missile defense, in light of North Korea's missile

testing over the Sea of Japan in 2006. Concerns are still present over increasing the capabilities of

these ships, in that they can be outfitted for more offensive purposes, and could be called upon to

support U.S. actions throughout the world.

Hyuga Class Helicopter “Destroyer”

While the Kongo class destroyer had controversy surrounding its acquisition, overall the ship

fell within the restrictions of the constitution. The Hyuga class helicopter destroyer presents a case

where this is not as clear cut. As it has been stated, Japan is forbidden to posses any weapon that

exceeds the minimum for self-defense. The Defense White Paper of Japan clearly states this, that

possession of systems such as ICBM's, long-range bombers, and “attack” aircraft carriers are banned.8

However the Hyuga class seems to violate this ban. Funding was approved in 2001 for 2 helicopter

destroyers to replace the Haruna class currently in service. The first ship, the JDS Hyuga was

launched 23 August, 2007 and is expected to be in service with the JMSDF in March 2009. Even

7 DDG Kongo Class – Globalsecurity.org http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/kongo.htm Retrieved: 20

Jan. 2009

8 Defense of Japan 2008 p.109

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though the Japanese Defense Agency has labeled these ships as destroyers, many top defense analysts

including Jane's Information Group label the ship as a carrier.9

The contradictions to the idea of this ship being a destroyer begin right with the ship's

construction. Physically these ships resemble an aircraft carrier, including a flush landing deck and a

starboard island structure. At over 13,500 tons, with a displacement of 20,000 tons loaded, the Hyuga

class matches in size to smaller conventional aircraft carriers such as Italy's Giuseppe Garibaldi

(10,100 tons) and Spain's Principe de Asturia (17,188 tons). Loaded, Japan's new vessels compare

with Britain's Invincible class at 20,600 tons.10

However the Defense Agency labels these ships as

helicopter carrying destroyers dedicated to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and humanitarian/logistic

support. The ships are designated as destroyers to avoid the restriction on the possession of “aircraft”

carriers, although they are not purely a destroyer either. Defense News (2008) cites the decision to

pursue the construction of these “helicopter carriers,” as a response to the growing of China's

submarine force, but notes that before the construction of these carriers, Japan already had an effective

ASW capability since the Soviet era. Others cite that these ships will give Japan more flexibility for

supporting U.S. and U.N. missions, a sign that Japan may be more willing to participate in international

affairs. Japan has previously wanted to obtain an aircraft carrier, but was opposed by the U.S. and

others. Some believe that through the construction of these ships, Japan is rehearsing carrier-building

technology and taking the first step towards building a large aircraft carrier. This is in contrast to the

belief in many Japanese that any aircraft carrier is considered an “offensive” weapon.

Another part of the controversy surrounding the Hyuga class is the potential for strike capability

that any warship of its type could posses. Attack helicopters such as the AH-64 Apache and the AH-1

Cobra could easily be brought aboard and launched from the deck of the Hyuga class, giving Japan

9 Jane's Fighting Ships – 2008

10 DDH Hyuga/ DDH “13,500 ton” class – Globalsecurity.org http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/ddh-

x.htm Retrieved: 20 Jan. 2009

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enhanced and expanded strike capability. Some analysts have suggested that the launch of these ships

is eventually targeted at the acquisition of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter; currently in development by

the U.S.11

This multi-role fighter easily has strike capabilities which would be in defiance to the

Japanese constitution. Others however have discounted this as purely a rumor.

KC-767 Tanker

In February 2008, Japan received delivery of a KC-767 Tanker for air refueling purposes for the

JASDF.12

This airplane is the first of its kind for Japan, having never before possessed this ability. The

Japanese Defense Agency placed the order for this aircraft back in 2003 in order to provide the JASDF

with air refueling capability along with the ability for troop transport.13

This aircraft can offload 20%

more fuel than its predecessor the KC-135. It also has the capability to refuel all types of aircraft from

all services including those of the U.S. The aircraft is also interoperability compliant with NATO and

the European Union standards. Built by the Boeing Aerospace Company in the United States, 4 of

these aircraft have been ordered with 2 already constructed.

This acquisition has also faced concern and controversy. Globalsecurity.org (2008) details

major concerns by Japan's neighbors that the JASDF having air refueling capability might signal a

renaissance of militarism. However, the JASDF states that this is incorrect, in that refueling does not

infringe upon Japan's “exclusive defense” policy and is not a threat to neighboring countries.14

Further

the JASDF insists that the air refuel capability allows their planes to stay in the air longer, not to travel

further distances which would increase their strike capability. Still the fact that Japan possesses this

capability is controversial. Their F-15's and F-2's would have the reach necessary to strike at both

11 Minnick, Wendell. Defense News. “Japan's New Ship: Destroyer or Carrier?” http://www.defensenews.com 30 June,

2007 Retrieved: 20 Jan. 2009

12 Japanese Air Self Defense Force

13 Boeing, Japan Sign 767 Tanker Transport Contract

http://www.boeing.com/ids/globaltanker/news/2003/q2/nr_030404m.html Retrieved: 22 January, 2009

14 KC-767 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/kc-767-int.htm Retrieved: 22 January, 2009

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China and Korea if they desired. Further development of the ATD-X, a stealth superiority fighter

combined with air refueling capability gives Japan the tools to become a greater power in regional

security.

What factors are allowing Japan to acquire weapon systems that seem to strain the definition of

being for “purely for defensive purposes?” What role do the people of Japan have in their government

towards issues of defense? Is there a political elite that is behind the increasing diversity of defense

acquisitions?

Literature Review

Previous Research

A number of scholars have done research into issues concerning the defense of Japan ranging

from matters of policy and alliances, to the cultural fabric and sentiment of the people. Thomas Berger

(1993) provides an excellent analysis of the anti-militaristic culture that has taken hold in post-war

Japan. His study focuses on the prospect of Japan re-arming itself to a pre-World War II state, which

has caused many of its neighbors and its own people to worry. Berger argues that these fears are

largely misplaced and that in the short term, it is unlikely Japan will seek to become a major military

power. But his study is over a decade old; many new developments have taken place such as the

upgrade of the Defense Agency, renewed tensions with North Korea following that country's ballistic

missile testing, increased tensions with China, and the development of new, advanced weapon systems.

Others such as Glenn Hook (1988) have asked the same question but have argued that Japanese anti-

militarism has eroded due to a combination of internal and external factors, and that public opinion is

more inclined to accept re-armament.

Thomas Wilborn (1994) takes a different approach by examining defense policy to determine

the potential of Japan becoming a major military power in the Asia-Pacific region. His analysis also

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includes examining the capabilities of Japan's defense forces as well as the attitudes of Japan's political

elites. Wilborn presents one of the major dilemmas that Japan has faced since the end of World War II

towards re-armament; that of defining “exclusively offensive” weapons which was noted are banned

under the constitution. Generally this has included long-range ballistic missiles, long range strategic

bombers, and offensive aircraft carriers. This last item is of current concern with the Defense

Ministry's building of the Hyuga class “helicopter carrier.”15

Also he presents a set of “never again”

policies, which the governments of Japan in the post war period internalized in order not to repeat

history. One of the most relevant to the continuing advancement of defense technology is:

“Never again slight the importance of superior technology and the capacity to produce large

quantities of advanced weapons with high quality control.”

In his analysis of Japanese and American security cooperation, Gregory Corning (1989)

examined the role the security treaty between the United States and Japan has had towards Japanese

defense policy and acquisitions. Corning explains that much of Japan's defense policy has been shaped

in part by pressure from the U.S. on matters of burden-sharing and by revisionist governments in the

last two decades that have sought to raise Japan's status in the alliance. He also states that cooperation

via defense technology will make the alliance stronger and cites examples of this, notably by having

Japanese firms conduct research and development for the U.S. and by Japan buying advanced defense

systems from the U.S. In this way, both sides gain what they want. This is not without its share of

problems either. Corning also cites concerns by both parties on being reliant upon one another for

defense issues. But to conduct further research into the matter, an understanding of the background of

militarism and nationalism in Japan is necessary.

Explaining Increased Security Capability Under Constitutional Constraints

15 Hutchison, Harold C. Naval Air: Japan's Secret Aircraft Carriers -

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htnavai/articles/20070825.aspx 25 August, 2007. Retrieved: 10 February, 2008

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External Considerations

China – The Dragon vs. The Samurai

External factors towards Japanese re-armament, militarism, and nationalism have been

examined thoroughly by various individuals. A common theme in the various reports is the effect of

China. Sino-Japanese relations have been stressed throughout the history of both countries. McClain

(2002) gives examples of a number of incidents and affairs that have strained relations from early in

their histories, through World War II and beyond. He makes clear that these incidents are not forgotten

by China, whereas Japan seems to gloss over a number of these issues by choice. Visits by various

prime ministers including Nakasone, and Koizumi Junichiro, to the Yasukuni Shrine which is said to

house the spirits of Japan's war dead, have sparked massive protests and debate. More recently, a series

of new conflicts between the two nations have come to light. Matthews (2003) in his study of Japan's

increased nationalism, notes that the rise of China, economically and politically in the region has

usurped Japan's traditional post-war position. China's GDP growth rate of 8% in 2002 has made it the

worlds highest. Japan, being heavily invested in the economies of many Southeast Asian nations, has

seen those nations turn to China as their most important future economic partner. Many domestic

Japanese companies as well as American companies are heavily investing in China. Again Japan's

traditional “hammer” has been threatened; this raises the question of how the Japanese will respond.

The resentment towards this shift combined with strategic tensions such as the Senkaku Islands, which

may hold potential oil reserves, has strengthened the hand of many Japanese nationalists who believe

that their nation should have the military power to rival its neighbors.

Roy (2004) gives detail to the strategic concerns and the political opinion of the Chinese. In a

2002 opinion poll, half of the Chinese respondents believed that relations with Japan were “not good”

and only 22% believed relations were “good.” The Chinese have become alarmed at what they

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perceive as Japanese security policy becoming more assertive through increased defense spending,

closer ties with the United States military through combined exercises, technology and personal

exchanges. The overall feeling of displeasure by the Chinese as a result of World War II has not faded

as well, contributing to continued tensions between the two nations. The Institute of National Strategic

Studies (2007) has implied that Sino-Japanese tensions have the potential to intensify due to pressures

inciting them, including the issue of Taiwan.

Korea – An Uneasy Past

The two Koreas are also a source of tension for Japan. During the early part of the 20th

century,

Korea was a Japanese colony; with the end of the war, Korea was split into two nations, one allied with

the west, the other a communist state. Relations with South Korea have been considerably better than

with North Korea but strained never the less. Memories of the Second World War that still run strong

in South Korea along with a sense of economic competition contribute to these tensions. North Korea

has been an even more troubled story. The government of Kim-Jong Il has been a thorn in Japan's side

for many years. Provocative threats and actions by North Korea have caused the Japanese to not only

strengthen their ties with the United States for security, but to take certain measures into their own

hands. Matthews cites an incident in 2001 where a North Korean spy ship gathering intelligence,

disguised as Chinese fishing vessel was spotted in Japanese territorial waters was fired upon by the

JMSDF and Japanese Coast Guard. (2001) This response was a significant event. For the first time

since World War II, Japanese naval forces sank a foreign vessel. Only a decade ago such actions by

Japan would have been unimaginable. This event combined with more provocative actions by North

Korea had lifted tensions to the point where then defense minister, Ishiba Shigeru, warned that Japan

could potentially launch a preemptive strike to defend its self if necessary. A clear shift in Japanese

attitudes about their country and defense became present at least within the military and factions of the

government. The question remains however, what is the public's perception of such events and threats?

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Also do these tensions give policy makers and defense officials the reasons they need towards

continued advanced defense acquisitions?

The United States – An Alliance of Convenience

The pressure of the Japanese-United States military alliance is critical to any move towards full

re-armament. Initially, the U.S. in the post-war world had placed itself as Japan's protector, making

Japan reliant on the U.S. for all matters of security. The Korean War and the Cold War changed that

whole plan. The U.S. put pressure on Japan to fill the security vacuum resulting from the partial U.S.

withdrawal from Japan following the Korean War. Japan faced pressure from the United States to

further re-arm during the 1950's and 60's but stood firm in opposing it. Even if the government had

wished to re-arm to the level desired by the U.S., there was little public support for re-armament.

Masswood (1990) makes clear that the Self-Defense Forces of Japan were seen by both the U.S. and

Japan as secondary members in the alliance. Sentiment towards the alliance initially was poor, but with

the advent of the Cold War and tensions with the Soviet Union, the alliance became accepted. Now,

however, without the threat of the Cold War, many have once again questioned the need for the level of

foreign troops stationed in Japan.

There have always been concerns about whether the U.S. was firmly committed to the defense

of Japan, and in 1960 the Japanese and the U.S. revised their security treaty, making Japan a more

equal partner in defense. Since then, Japan has made enormous steps in re-arming the nation; despite

this some in the United States as well as Japan still see this as inadequate. Hook (1988) notes the

erosion of impediments to militarization that took place in Japan, which gave agencies such as the JDF

more legitimacy and rising public support, which allowed for their moderate growth. The purchase of

F-15 fighters in 1982, a more offensive oriented weapon, illustrates the changing mood towards

defense. Wilborn (1994) describes the JDF attempting to emulate the U.S. military in various aspects

such as structure, technology, and culture. Through cooperation with the United States, Japanese

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defense has risen to a point where some see it as potentially no longer needing to rely on the U.S. for

protection. To reach this point would entail even further re-armament and public acceptance of it.

There are those who stress the costs of the alliance for both Japan and the U.S. Some American

politicians would like to see further re-armament in Japan in order to relieve defense costs in the

region, notably the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea and the U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet at Yokosuka. Public

perception is once again critical. From Japan's side, the presence of the U.S. military by some is seen

as a remnant of a piece of history they wish to forget, along with the troubles a military force brings to

a community; noise, pollution, and social problems.

Domestic Considerations

The Yoshida Era

Traditionally the Japanese had found their source of national pride in such establishments as the

emperor, the army, and the navy. Post-war, things changed; the emperor was no longer the working

head of state, merely a ceremonial figurehead. The army and navy were disbanded and no forces for

war were to be maintained. In 1953 under Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru with assistance and intense

pressure from the United States, a domestic police force, then a full fledged defense force was

developed. The Yoshida Doctrine, which Neary (2002), McClain (2002) and Maswood (1990) all note,

was developed by Yoshida to begin the full restoration of the nation, but not through militarism. He

stressed that by focusing on economic growth and political passivity, Japan could recover from the war

more easily and hopefully regain its stature in the world. Yoshida saw the need for Japan to not be

drawn into Cold War rivalries which could potentially drain Japan's resources; this included any

potential re-armament. Neary (2002) tells of the Japanese refusal to fully re-arm under pressure from

the United States. However, Yoshida relented with limited re-armament following the Korean War, but

only the bare minimum for self-defense, which is still a base principle in Japanese defense policy

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today. External defense was the task of the United States.

All of this came to a climax at the San Francisco Treaty summit in 1951 which gave sovereignty

back to Japan; Yoshida considered this his greatest triumph. The Japanese people responded to Yoshida

however by remaining ambivalent towards his moves. A 1952 public opinion poll conducted by the

Asahi Shimbun newspaper revealed that only 18% of Japanese people thought their country had truly

become independent. Yoshida's popularity rating also plummeted to 20% from a high of 58% the year

before. (McClain 2002) McClain argues that by consenting to allow overall national defense to be in

the hands of the Americans, the Japanese people saw this as a slight against them by Yoshida. Even

though he kept the radical elements that had brought war to Japan out of the new system and brought

the foundation for economic recovery, public opinion was that he had sold out to the U.S., thus

resulting in his downfall.

However the Yoshida Doctrine did give Japan the start it needed after the war. The economic

growth and prosperity that Japan underwent is a source of national pride for the Japanese, even with the

recessions of the latter part of the 20th

century. In the post-war world, Japan's “hammer” in its foreign

relations has been the tremendous economic power that the nation built in the post-war era.

The Nakasone Era

Much research has been done in the review of the rebirth of Japan as a nation. The work of

Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro was critical towards the expansion of the defense forces of Japan.

Nakasone took steps that his predecessors were either unwilling or unable to make. He was also a

contributing force to renewed nationalism beginning in the 1980's. Berger (1993) and Neary (2002)

both note that Nakasone's energetic leadership was considered unusual in post-war Japan. Before

becoming Prime Minister, Nakasone was the former director general of the Defense Agency and quite

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proud of his service.16

He was also the Chairman of the Executive Council of the Liberal Democratic

Party where he stressed the need for constitutional reform to allow for necessary defense potential.

Masswood (1990) and Johnson (1986) point out that under Nakasone, interpretation of the constitution

was considered flexible, thus preventing the need for any major constitutional revision. Johnson also

notes that Nakasone however had to negotiate between the two views of Japanese defense, the first

being “revived Japanese militarism,” and the second being the view of a “free ride on defense,” a view

taken by Japan's American allies. Hook (1988) also notes the Diet of Japan was also under pressure

from the U.S. during the 1980's to increase levels of defense spending in an effort to help reduce the

amount of U.S. capital and involvement needed.

Nakasone responded with a series of political actions that were meant to kill two birds with one

stone, to appease the U.S. and to allay fears of revived militarism. Nakasone's defense policy consisted

of a steady increase in defense expenditures, close cooperation with the U.S., and a major effort at

public education. Throughout the 1980's, defense expenditures rose slowly but steadily. But when

Nakasone attempted to abolish the 1% GDP Defense Spending Limit, he met with near-universal

opposition from the political and social realms. Different authors have argued that in both Yoshida and

Nakasone's cases, while public sentiment and social culture have worked against them, eventually their

policies and ideas towards defense and other issues have found acceptance with time. In Nakasone's

dilemma, he was forced to change tactics. Nakasone was forced to divide the increases throughout a

number of years eventually getting his victory when the Diet approved his plan for the period of 1986-

90 on 18 September, 1985.17

The Japanese Defense Force

The Japanese Defense Force (JDF) is another critical part of understanding the process of re-

16 Johnson p.557

17 Johnson p.568

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armament in Japan. Frühstück (2002) provides a comprehensive report concerning many issues of the

JDF. His study encompasses the various social, political, and cultural aspects of Japan in relation to the

JDF. In contrast to Berger's study which focuses primarily on the link between Japan's violent past and

the potential for future aggression, Frühstück suggests a shift in focus. His study is concerned with the

question of how the armed forces handle their “problematic existence” in anti-militaristic contemporary

Japan.18

Many consider the JDF a pure violation of Article 9, while others see the need for a defense

force, but with the limitations laid out from the constitution. Other problems noted by Wilborn (1994),

Masswood (1990), and by Globalsecurity.org (2007) that the JDF face include: an irritation at their role

in society, lack of a sense of effectiveness, and low public approval. Just recently, a spike in suicides

has been noted in JDF personnel. The suicide rate is close to double that of civil servants in other

ministries and agencies.19

In pure numbers, the JDF is considered small. It also suffers from the restrictions from Article

9, but some of these restrictions have been circumvented through creative ways. While not directly

written in the constitution, military spending was to be minimal to conform to the ideal of a purely

defensive nation. Most significant was the scrapping of the 1% GNP ceiling on military spending put

in place by Prime Minister Takeo Miki. In 1985 this ceiling was scrapped by the Nakasone

government, enabling a boost in military spending. Hook (1998) notes that the following the removal

of the ceiling, military expenditures which had been rising throughout the 1980's, now shot up to 3700

billion yen, about 1.013% of the nation's GNP. However in the 1990’s according to Table 2, defense

spending has leveled out in the last several years. According to the Ministry of Defense (2008) defense

spending for FY 2008 was calculated at approximately 47 billion dollars, down from highs near 50

billion dollars in 1996.

18 Frühstück p.2

19 Asahi Shimbun. 2008. Sept. 27. “Motive unknown in half of SDF suicides”

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(Figures 2-4 about here)

Public perceptions on matters such as this are a focal point for research. The perception of not

only the JDF, but the government's actions towards matters of defense policy is vital towards

determining Japan's future moves in re-armament. Higher opinions of the JDF, its people, missions,

effectiveness, and of policy moves, plus overall satisfaction with the nation, may indicate an increased

likelihood of acceptance of further and more diversified re-armament.

Since the studies of the last decade, many new developments have taken place that have

contributed to the acquisition of advanced defensive technology and re-armament in Japan. This as

stated has not come without debate and controversy. Many ask why a nation that has forbidden the use

of war as means of settling disputes is acquiring technology that may give it the potential to repeat

history in the region. A combination of all of the factors listed: culture, political, economic, social,

domestic and external affairs, must be analyzed in order to explain the reasons for this re-armament and

to come to an updated conclusion on the future re-armament of Japan.

Methods and Analysis

To analyze the increasing diversity of Japanese defense acquisitions, a variety of subjects must

be covered. To begin, I analyze Japanese public opinion on various issues related to defense including:

views on the defense establishment, perception of threats, cultural superiority, and perception of the

government. By analyzing public opinion, I hope to identify current views of how the Japanese

perceive their nation's role towards defense. If the public identifies threats, and has trust in both the

defense establishment and the government, they may be less vocal in opposition to more diversified re-

armament, which allows the government the freedom and justification to acquire these systems. Also if

the people feel that their culture and status is superior, they may feel that it deserves protection. To do

this I've used the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project, most recently compiled in 2006.

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This 15 nation survey asks questions on world and domestic issues, some specific to certain countries.

Japan is one of the nations included in this survey, and specific questions relating to the perception of

threats, revision of Article 9, and cultural superiority are included. However this data set has some

limitations, primarily that for Japan, there were a low number of respondents, n = 500. Due to this I

have also used the Asia Barometer Survey 2004 to reinforce any findings from the Global Attitudes

Project. The Asia Barometer Survey is much like the Global Attitudes project, but asks more

generalized questions relating to public opinion on political values, governance, and perception of

government and social issues. This survey was larger than the the Global Attitudes Project, but still

relatively low number of respondents, n < 1000. By utilizing both of these data sets, I hope to identify

current Japanese views on the defense of their nation, and how these views, good or bad, allow the

Japanese government to continue acquiring advanced defense systems.

Public Opinion – Global Attitudes Project

The Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project offers a wide variety of variables to

examine in terms of views towards security and defense. My dependent variable from this data set is

Revision of Article 9 (ART9REV), a dichotomous variable asking whether a respondent supports or

opposes revision of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. Remember that Article 9 is the clause that

prevents Japan from having a full fledged military force. If a desire to revise this is present, this could

translate into more freedom for the defense ministry to acquire more advanced and powerful systems.

A number of independent variable can be identified from this data set, however due to the low

numbers of the sample; I created a series of indexes to account for the low cell sizes that would be

present during the analysis. The first is Cultural View/Protection (CULTURAL) which is an ordinal

measure of Japanese views towards their culture and whether they feel it should be protected.

Nationalism Levels (NATINDEX) is an index of the level of nationalism the respondents identified

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with, from least nationalistic to very nationalistic. These two variables are measure domestic factors

towards defense. To account for the external influences, I created a number of indexes measuring

perceptions and feelings towards nations that have influence or are situated close to Japan. Perceptions

of North Korea, (NKORINDEX), the United States (USINDEX), and China (CHINDEX) are all

measures of the general perception, good or bad towards each of these nations. Bad perceptions may

give strength to the idea of defending the nation from a potential threat. The effect of China is one that

may be more influential than the others due to the continued tensions and history between the two

nations. To account for this I created a Chinese Military Index (CHINMIL2) and a Chinese Economic

Index (CHINAECO) which measure perceptions towards China's increasing military capacity and their

growing economic status. I also included, as a control variable, Age (AGE4) to see if there was a

generational gap between the World War II generation and the younger generation who would not have

memories of the war. Of note, this age variable did not prove itself significant, even when layered with

the other variables, but is included for reference and thought.

Public Opinion – Asia Barometer Survey 2004

The Asia Barometer Survey, last conducted in 2004, is a survey of public opinion on political

values, governance, and social issues. Of concern for this study is the dependent variable, More or

Less Government Spending – Military and Defense. This is an ordinal level variable coded 1=More

spending, to 3=Spend Less. If public opinion trends towards spending more on defense, the

government may have justification in acquiring more advanced defense technology.

The independent variables include both domestic and external issues concerning defense, much

like the Global Attitudes Project. Trust in Institutions – The Military, is an ordinal level variable

measuring the level of trust in the military institution present in the nation, ranging from 1=trust a lot,

to 4=Don't trust at all. Other variables that are similar include, Trust in Parliament and Trust in the

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Central Government, both coded the same as Trust in the Military. External factors are covered

through three ordinal level variables describing whether China, the United States, and North Korea are

considered good or bad influences upon Japan. (1=good influence, 3=bad influence) All of the

independent variables are measures of trust and confidence in how the Japanese perceive defense

issues, which in turn relates to how defense acquisitions are made.

Results

The Global Attitudes Project revealed a number of interesting results concerning Japanese

views of the issues at question. Perception of Culture was found to not have a significant relationship

upon desire to revise Article 9. Of the 350 people that responded that their culture was superior, 69.2%

opposed revision. Overall 71.6% opposed revision out of 472 respondents to this question. In contrast,

Nationalism was found to have a significant effect, although this relationship was weak (Cramer's

V=.286). As to be expected, those who had identified themselves as more nationalistic were in favor of

revision of Article 9. However those who favored revision were in a clear minority, only 28.2% of 461

people. The external factors also revealed interesting results. Surprising was the test of Perception of

North Korea by revision of Article 9. While over half of the respondents indicated that they felt North

Korea was a threat to their nation, only 28.8% were in favor of revision of Article 9. The relationship

was not significant (Cramer's V=.088), yet it seems North Korea is recognized as a threat to Japan.

Perception of the United States was also found not to have a significant relationship with revision of

Article 9 (Cramer's V=.121). Perceptions of China however were found to have significance towards

revision of Article 9, but this relationship was again weak (Cramer's V=.240). Over half of the

respondents felt China represented a threat, yet only 29.2% were in favor of revision.

(Tables 1–5, about here)

The recognizing of China as an overall threat makes looking at whether the Japanese view

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China's two main assets; its military and its economy as a threat. Significance wise, military power

was found not to have a significant effect (Phi=-.026). Economics on the other hand were found to

have a significant relationship towards Article 9 revision. A weak relationship was found between the

two (Phi=.-.101) with those who felt those who felt China's economy was a good thing numbering 331

compared to a bad thing, only 128 people. In both cases, good and bad, a majority of the respondents

were opposed to revision of Article 9.

(Tables 6-7 about here)

The Asia Barometer data also revealed a number of interesting results towards the issues

concerning security and defense. When tested against the dependent variable of More or Less

Government Spending on the Military, the first independent variable tested, Trust in the Military

Institution, a significant yet weak relationship was present (Cramer's V=.163). Those that had high

trust in the military were found to support higher levels of spending on the military. Regardless of

level of trust, 49% of the respondents indicated that they would like to see spending continue at the

same levels and 43% said spend less amounts. Trust in Parliament was also found to have a significant

relationship with military spending (Cramer's V=.135). A large majority of 73%, (571 of 777

respondents) responded either didn't really trust or didn't trust the Japanese Parliament at all. This

translated into 531 people indicating wishes to spend the same or less on the military. Trust in the

Central Government was also found to have a significant yet weak relationship, (Cramer's V=.123). A

small majority were found to not trust the central government. Similar to the numbers for the

Parliament, trust in the central government resulted in a close margin in the total number between those

who supported spending the same and those who supported spending less (Same amount=48.5%,

Less=43.9%).

External effects were found to have an interesting effect compared to the previous data set.

North Korean Influence was found not to be a significant factor towards military spending (Cramer's

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V=.037). However, nearly 90% of the respondents (total n=777) believed North Korea to be a bad

influence regardless of indication of military spending. U.S. influence however was found to be

significant in this data set (Cramer's v=.137), although weak. Respondents were found to be very even

in distribution of perception of U.S. influence, while similar numbers were found for the total that

responded either spend the same or spend less. Lastly, Chinese influence was found not to have a

significant effect upon perception of military spending in stark contrast to the Global Attitudes project

(Cramer's V=.075). A small majority were found to be neutral on whether they believed China was a

good or bad influence, while in general all groups only had support for more spending in very low

levels (high=12%, low=6.5%).

(Tables 8-13 about here)

The overall findings from the tests of these two datasets revealed that the Japanese do recognize

certain external threats such as North Korea and China, yet this was statistically insignificant.

Interestingly, China's economic power was considered more of a threat than China's military power

according to the Global Attitudes Project. However in the Asia Barometer, China overall was not

considered enough of a threat to warrant more military spending. The U.S. was also considered a

threat but a weak one. Domestic factors seemed to exert similar effect levels. Protection of culture

was not a major factor towards revision of Article 9, but levels of trust towards Parliament and the

central government were statistically significant. Levels of trust in the government bodies along with

recognition of some aspects of their neighbors do seem to influence views towards Article 9 revision

and potential increases in military spending.

Conclusions

After analyzing public opinion and examining the case studies, a number of answers appear to

the question of Japan's increasing “offensive” defense acquisitions. Yet more questions also arise.

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Public opinion has shown that while there is recognition of external threats to their nation such as

North Korea and China, these alone are not enough to support revision of Article 9, giving more

freedom to defense acquisitions. Domestic perceptions are even more blatant, low levels of trust in

both the central government and the Japanese Parliament reveal the gap in perception between law

makers and the general public. There may be a political and defense elite within the Japanese political

system that is driving the push for more advanced defense technology, but it is currently unclear from

this research whether this is so. Nationalism is a factor that must be considered as well as the

perception of competition from China. Increases in either of these may lend themselves to the prospect

of a more “offensively” armed Japan. As illustrated by Japanese political history, those that have been

more nationalistic such as Nakasone have steered Japan to a greater position concerning defense and

security. Souring of relations with any of the major powers could also lead to changes for Japanese

defense. Most concerning would be deteriorating of relations with either China or the United States,

the former as its rival and the latter as its protector.

Future studies of this subject would be helpful in continuing the understanding of the mentality

of defense in Japan. A study with many more subjects I believe would be the most helpful, as during

my research, low numbers in categories became a problem during my analysis. Questions concerning

the more recent moves by the Ministry of Defense and a more current survey would shed new light

upon the current public perception of the issues relating to the defense of Japan. Also of interest would

be a study examining the effect of a political and military elite within the Japanese political system.

In regards to the more advanced defense technology Japan has either acquired or is looking to

acquire, some of this can be explained through the government creating unique loopholes to the

constitution. While public opinion has revealed distaste for revision of Article 9 and the Japanese

constitution, the government uses different means of justification to acquire certain pieces of

technology. Simple labeling has been one way of circumventing the restrictions as illustrated by the

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Hyuga class “helicopter carrier.” Others include using the reason that certain pieces will increase the

reliability, efficiency, and interoperability with allies. Seeing that the public does recognize threats, the

government may still use this to provoke fear, thereby gaining the reasons for more “offensive”

technology. The question remains however, will this pattern continue? Culturally and socially

differences are clear in comparison to the government, yet the government has remained in power.

Japan is still a major regional player in East Asia, and while it cannot achieve the numbers its

neighbors and allies have in terms of defense, Japan is still able to compete technologically and remain

one of the most advanced technological powers in the region. Japan seems to be building for the future

but what kind of future is unknown. Issues of defense will remain a controversial subject in Japan due

to history and long ingrained beliefs about the defense establishment which will continue to hamper

those who wish to see a more fully armed and independent Japan.

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Figure 1: Military Situation – East Asia

Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense: Japanese Defense “White Paper” 2008

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Figure 2: Japanese GDP Levels – 1992-2006

Source: CIA Factbook 1992-2006

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Figure 3: Japanese Defense Expenditures – 1992-2006

Source: CIA Factbook 1992-2006

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Figure 4: Japanese Defense Expenditures as % of GDP

Source: CIA Factbook 1992-2006

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Table 1: Japanese Public Opinion Results – Perception of Culture

Japanese Perception of Culture

Agree - Culture is

superior and needs

to be protected Neutral

Disagree - Culture

is not superior and

doesn't need to be

protected Total

Revision of Article 9 Favor 110 13 11 134

30.8% 18.8% 23.9% 28.4%

Oppose 247 56 35 338

69.2% 81.2% 76.1% 71.6%

Total 357 69 46 472

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Chi Square = 4.579

Cramer’s V = .098

*Significance at .05 level

Table 2: Japanese Public Opinion – Nationalism Index

Japanese Nationalistic Index

Least

Nationalistic

Somewhat

Nationalistic Nationalistic Very Nationalistic Total

Revision of Article 9 Favor Count 14 43 54 19 130

9.7% 33.3% 37.8% 43.2% 28.2%

Oppose Count 131 86 89 25 331

90.3% 66.7% 62.2% 56.8% 71.8%

Total Count 145 129 143 44 461

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Chi Square = 37.643

Cramer’s V= .286*

*Significance at .05 level

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Table 3: Japanese Public Opinion – North Korea

Chi Square = 3.594

Cramer’s V = .088

*Significance at .05 level

Table 4: Japanese Public Opinion – United States

Chi Square = 6.723

Cramer’s V= .121

*Significance at .05 level

Japanese Perception - North Korea

No Threat At

All Not a Threat

Somewhat not

a Threat

Somewhat a

Threat A Threat

An Extreme

Threat Total

Revision of Article 9 Favor 0 4 10 19 42 60 135

.0% 25.0% 19.2% 27.9% 30.0% 31.4% 28.8%

Oppose 1 12 42 49 98 131 333

100.0% 75.0% 80.8% 72.1% 70.0% 68.6% 71.2%

Total 1 16 52 68 140 191 468

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Japanese Perception - U.S.

No Threat

Mostly Not a

Threat Netural

Somewhat a

Threat

An Extreme

Threat Total

Revision of Article 9 Favor 10 40 49 28 7 134

34.5% 33.3% 24.3% 28.9% 50.0% 29.0%

Oppose 19 80 153 69 7 328

65.5% 66.7% 75.7% 71.1% 50.0% 71.0%

Total 29 120 202 97 14 462

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5: Japanese Public Opinion – China

Japanese Perception - China

No Threat Neutral

Somewhat a

Threat

An Extreme

Threat Total

Revision of Article 9 Favor 8 25 56 39 128

16.3% 19.2% 31.1% 48.8% 29.2%

Oppose 41 105 124 41 311

83.7% 80.8% 68.9% 51.2% 70.8%

Total 49 130 180 80 439

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Chi Square = 25.31

Cramer’s V = .240*

*Significance at .01 level

Table 6: Public Opinion – Chinese Military Power

Chinese Military Power

Good Thing Bad Thing Total

Revision of Article 9 Favor 3 125 128

21.4% 28.3% 28.1%

Oppose 11 317 328

78.6% 71.7% 71.9%

Total 14 442 456

100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Chi Square = .316

Phi = -.026

*Significance at .05 level

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Table 7: Public Opinion – Chinese Economic Power

China Economy a Good Thing

Good Thing Bad Thing Total

Revision of Article 9 Favor 83 45 128

25.1% 35.2% 27.9%

Oppose 248 83 331

74.9% 64.8% 72.1%

Total 331 128 459

100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Chi Square = 4.664

Phi = -.101*

*Significance at .05 level

Table 8: Military Spending by Trust in the Military

Chi Square = 40.706

Cramer’s V = .163*

*Significance at .01 level

Level of Trust - Military

Trust a lot

Trust to a

degree

Don't really

trust

Don't trust at

all Total

More or Less Govt.

Spending - Military and

Defense

More Spending 13 40 7 1 61

20.6% 8.0% 4.0% 4.3% 8.0%

Spend the Same

Now

29 270 66 8 373

46.0% 54.0% 37.5% 34.8% 49.0%

Spend Less 21 190 103 14 328

33.3% 38.0% 58.5% 60.9% 43.0%

Total 63 500 176 23 762

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 9: Military Spending by Trust in Parliament

Chi Square = 28.194

Cramer’s V = .135*

*Significance at .01 level

Table 10: Military Spending by Trust in the Central Government

Chi Square = 22.763

Cramer’s V = .123*

*Significance at .05 level

Trust in Parliament

Trust a lot

Trust to a

degree

Don't really

trust

Don't trust at

all Total

More or Less Govt.

Spending - Military and

Defense

More Spending 0 21 31 9 61

.0% 10.4% 7.2% 6.3% 7.9%

Spend the Same

Now

3 123 193 57 376

75.0% 60.9% 45.0% 40.1% 48.4%

Spend Less 1 58 205 76 340

25.0% 28.7% 47.8% 53.5% 43.8%

Total 4 202 429 142 777

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Trust in the Central Government

Trust a lot

Trust to a

degree

Don't really

trust

Don't trust at

all Total

More or Less Govt.

Spending - Military and

Defense

More Spending 0 26 29 2 57

.0% 8.8% 7.7% 2.9% 7.6%

Spend the Same

Now

3 170 159 31 363

50.0% 57.4% 42.0% 45.6% 48.5%

Spend Less 3 100 191 35 329

50.0% 33.8% 50.4% 51.5% 43.9%

Total 6 296 379 68 749

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 11: Military Spending by Perception of North Korean Influence

North Korean Influence

Good Influence

Neither Good or

Bad Influence Bad Influence Total

More or Less Govt.

Spending - Military and

Defense

More Spending 0 6 55 61

.0% 8.7% 7.8% 7.9%

Spend the Same Now 3 36 341 380

50.0% 52.2% 48.6% 48.9%

Spend Less 3 27 306 336

50.0% 39.1% 43.6% 43.2%

Total 6 69 702 777

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Chi Square = 1.055

Cramer’s V = .026

*Significance at .05 level

Table 12: Military Spending by Perception of U.S. Influence

Chi Square = 14.413

Cramer’s V = .097*

*Significance at .05 level

U.S. Influence

Good Influence

Neither Good or

Bad Influence Bad Influence Total

More or Less Govt. Spending

- Military and Defense

More Spending 26 22 15 63

10.7% 8.5% 5.7% 8.2%

Spend the Same Now 125 135 112 372

51.7% 52.1% 42.4% 48.6%

Spend Less 91 102 137 330

37.6% 39.4% 51.9% 43.1%

Total 242 259 264 765

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 13: Military Spending by Perception of Chinese Influence

Chinese Influence

Good Influence

Neither Good or

Bad Influence Bad Influence Total

More or Less Govt. Spending

- Military and Defense

More Spending 14 24 23 61

7.4% 6.5% 12.0% 8.1%

Spend the Same Now 91 194 80 365

48.4% 52.2% 41.7% 48.5%

Spend Less 83 154 89 326

44.1% 41.4% 46.4% 43.4%

Total 188 372 192 752

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Chi Square = 8.530

Cramer’s V = .075

*Significance at .05 level

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