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THE ROLE OF LABOUR INSPECTION IN LABOUR DISPUTES SETTLEMENT
FRAMEWORK IN MALAWI
MASTERS IN BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION THESIS
KALANI GEONE FUNGAMEZA MBEYE MALEMA
UNIVERSITY OF MALAWI
THE POLYTECHNIC
ii
THE ROLE OF LABOUR INSPECTION IN LABOUR DISPUTES SETTLEMENT
FRAMEWORK IN MALAWI
MASTERS IN BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION THESIS
KALANI GEONE FUNGAMEZA MBEYE MALEMA
UNIVERSITY OF MALAWI
THE POLYTECHNIC
MARCH 2013
THE ROLE OF LABOUR INSPECTION IN LABOUR DISPUTES SETTLEMENT
FRAMEWORK IN MALAWI
KALANI GEONE FUNGAMEZA MBEYE MALEMA
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF COMMERCE, THE MALAWI
POLYTECHNIC, UNIVERSITY OF MALAWI, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTERS IN BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION (MBA).
MARCH 2013
iii
DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY
I declare that this study report is my own, original work. It is being submitted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of masters in Business Administration (MBA) in
the University of Malawi. It has never been submitted before for any degree or other
examinations in any other university. Acknowledgements have been made according to the rules
and guiding principles.
Candidate: _____________________ ___________________________
Kalani Geone Fungameza Mbeye Malema
Date: _________________________________________________________________________
iv
CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL
We declare that this dissertation is from the student’s own work and effort. Where he has used
other sources of information, it has been acknowledged. This dissertation is being submitted with
our approval.
First Supervisor: ________________________________________________________________
Dr. R. Bakuwa
Date: _________________________________________________________________________
Second Supervisor: _____________________________________________________________
Mr. W.L. Dambuleni
Date: _________________________________________________________________________
Head of Department: ____________________________________________________________
Dr. E. J. Sankhulani
Date: _________________________________________________________________________
v
DEDICATION
I dedicate this thesis to my parents, Mr & Mrs Mbeye Malema; to my uncle, Jockely General
Mbeye who inspired me to strive for greater achievements in life despite many obstacles and also
to my beloved wife, Modesta who instilled in me a sense of patience, encouragements and focus
in times of great challenges. And not forgetting my lovely three year first born daughter, Brenda.
vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
In the first place, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my academic supervisors, Dr.
Rhoda Bakuwa and Mr W.L. Dambuleni for their expert guidance and constructive criticisms.
Thank you for your comments and feedback which turned this process into a meaningful learning
experience. You gave me the confidence and required support for this work to be completed.
Secondly, I would like to thank and acknowledge other various contributors, who rendered their
assistance in various capacities to me in the course of pursuing my study programme. In this
respect, special thanks should go to Kenwell Khumbanyiwa and Lovemore Mophiha, my fellow
classmates at the Malawi Polytechnic – constituent college of the University of Malawi for their
miscellaneous support rendered to me while at school in Blantyre. Thanks also to Austin Sibale,
my cousin; Francis Malema, my uncle and Dyton Indeem for providing me with upkeep. Special
thanks to all the study respondents for answering my questions and to Mr W. Msukwa, the
Deputy Labour Commissioner for the trouble he went through in providing additional study
information as well as helping me get relevant reference materials and Mrs Leah Mhone (Nee
Silungwe) for her service rendered to type part of my thesis draft report.
Finally, sincere gratitude and thanks to my beloved wife, Modesta, for your perseverance and
endurance during my multiple absence during this study, my wonderful first born daughter,
Brenda and my sister, Selina. You were always there supporting me. Thanks to my own father
and mother. Thanks to Jockely General Mbeye, my uncle as well as my work role model and to
all other relatives and friends too numerous to mention individually – for your support and
encouragement. May God bless you all!
vii
ABSTRACT
Labour inspection is a mandatory function of every government. This function is important in the world
of work because it can contribute to peace and harmony among workplace parties. However, most labour
inspectors in Malawi seem not to understand the importance of labour inspection in labour dispute
settlement process. Hence the purpose of this study was to provide empirical evidence of the contribution
of labour inspection to the settlement of labour disputes in Malawi.
To accomplish the stated purpose, the study addressed the following four questions: (1) How is
labour dispute settlement process between employers and employees eased as a result of labour
inspection activities? (2) Do the workplace disputing parties observe labour inspectors’
strategies? (3) How do enforcement notices and orders by labour inspectors contribute towards
the settlement of labour disputes? (4) Which labour inspection role (s) would most likely lead to
compliance?
The study used 3 sets of questionnaires to collect data. The respondents in this study were 57
labour inspectors, 3 head labour inspectors and 3 key informants. Data analysis was done using
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) and Microsoft Excel Software.
The main finding of this study is that labour inspection in Malawi through its activities and
strategies contributes towards the settlement of labour disputes. Therefore from the study
finding, the overall conclusion is that labour inspection plays a role, in aiding the process of
labour dispute settlement, within the labour disputes settlement framework in Malawi. Based on
this conclusion, the study has recommended the need to recruit and train more labour inspectors;
the need to prioritize labour inspectorate services in Malawi and to formulate and adopt labour
inspection policy for Malawi.
viii
Table of Contents
Declaration of Originality ……………………………………………………………………..…iii
Certificate of Approval ……………………………………………………………………….….iv
Dedication ………………………………………………………………………………….……..v
Acknowledgement …………………………………………………………………………….....vi
Abstract ………………………………………………………………………………………….vii
Table of Contents….………………………………………………………………………….....viii
List of Tables………………………………………………………………………………….….xi
List of Figures………………………………………………………………………………....…xii
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations…………………………………………………………....xiii
Chapter 1 – Introduction ……………………………………………………………………….1
1.0. Introduction……………………………………………………………...…………....…..1
1.1. Background Information ………………………………………………...……………….1
1.2. The Framework of Labour Disputes Settlement in Malawi………...……...…………..…4
1.3. Problem Statement…………...……………………………………………...……………6
1.4. Research Questions …………………………………………………………...……….…7
1.5. Research Objectives ……………………………………………………………...……....8
1.6. Significance of the Study…………………………………………………………….…...8
1.7. Delimitations of the Study………………………………………………………………..9
1.8. Organisation of the Thesis…………………………………………………………….…10
1.9. Chapter Summary……………………………………………………………...…………11
Chapter 2 – Literature Review …………………………………………………………..……12
2.0. Introduction……………………………………………………..……………………….12
2.1. Origin and Development of Labour Inspection………………………………………….12
2.2. Roles of Labour Inspection …………………………………………….……………… 14
2.2.1. Preventive Role …………………………………………………………………15
2.2.2. Enforcement Role………………………………………………….………….… 16
2.2.3. Advisory Role ………………………………………………………………...… 17
2.3. Labour Inspection Activities……………………………………………………………18
2.3.1. Compliance Promotion ……………………………………………….………...18
ix
2.3.2. Assistance to Employers and Employees to Resolve their Disputes……………19
2.3.3. Advice to Employers and Employees Regarding their Entitlements…………...20
2.3.4. Enforcement of Notices and/or Orders……………………………………….....21
2.4. Malawi Labour Inspection and Enforcement Draft Policy….…………………………...22
2.5. Labour Disputes Settlement Framework …………………………………………..……23
2.5.1. Alternative Disputes Resolution (ADR)……………………………………….....24
2.5.2. Labour Disputes…………………………………………………………………..25
2.5.3. Nature of Labour Disputes……………………………………….........................26
2.6. Labour Disputes Settlement Processes …………………………..……………………...27
2.6.1. Conciliation and/or Mediation of Labour Disputes…………………………….28
2.6.2. Conciliation and/or Mediation of Labour Disputes through Inspection…..……29
2.6.3. Conciliation and/or Mediation of Labour Disputes in Malawi……………..…..32
2.7. Attributes…….…………………………………………………………………………..34
2.7.1. Experience………………………………..…………………………..………...34
2.7.2. Skills and Qualification……………………………………….…………….….35
2.8. Chapter Summary ……………………………………………………………………...35
Chapter 3 – Research Methodology …………………………………..………………………36
3.0. Introduction…………………………………………………….…………….………… 36
3.1. Nature of the Study and the Research Method …….…………………...……………… 36
3.2. Study Respondents ……………………………………………….…………………… 37
3.3. Data Collection Tools and Techniques ………………………………………………… 38
3.3.1. Study Questionnaires……………………………………………….…………… 38
3.3.2. Pilot Testing…………………………………………………………….……..… 40
3.4. Data Analysis and Presentation ………………………………………….………..…… 41
3.5. Measuring Instruments, Validity and Reliability…………………………………….… 42
3.6. Chapter Summary ………………………………………………………………...……43
Chapter 4 – Research Results and Discussion ……………………..………………………...44
4.0. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………...44
4.1. Study Response Rate………………………………………………………………..…...44
4.2. Experience and Professionalism of Labour Inspectors……………………………....…..45
x
4.3. Labour Inspection Activities…………………………………………………………......45
4.4. Role of Labour Inspection Activities in Labour Disputes Settlement………………..….47
4.5. The Compliance with Inspectors’ Strategies……. ……………………………………...50
4.6. The Value of Enforcement Notices and /or Orders in Settlement of Labour Disputes….54
4.7. The Relationship Between Labour Disputes Reported and Labour Inspection Visits…..58
4.8. Appropriate Labour Inspection Role (s) in Labour Disputes Settlement…….. ………...61
4.9. Chapter Summary…………………………………………………………….………….64
Chapter 5 – Conclusions and Recommendations ………………………………………..…..65
5.0. Introduction………………………………………………………………………….…...65
5.1. Summary of Findings and Conclusions ………………………………………..…...…...65
5.2. Recommendations………………………………………………………………..……....68
5.2.1. Recruitment and Training of More Labour Inspectors…………………..….…..68
5.2.2. Prioritizing Labour Inspectorate Services in Malawi………………..…..……...69
5.2.3. Formulation and Adoption of Labour Inspection Policy…………………..……69
5.3. Suggested Areas of Further Studies…………………………………………….....…… 70
5.4. Conclusion……………………………………….……………………..……………….71
5.4. References………………………………………………………………...…………..…73
5.5. Appendices…………………………………………………………………...……….…80
Appendix A: The Questionnaires ………………………………………………...…….80
Appendix B: Selected Reasons and Comments of Respondents ………………...…….88
Appendix C: Raw Data Collected and Organised …………………………………...…89
xi
List of tables
Table 4.1: Response Rate of the Study………………………………………………………...44
Table 4.2: Labour Inspection Activities………………………………………………………..46
Table 4.3: Role of Labour Inspection Activities in Labour Disputes Settlement……………...47
Table 4.4: Compliance with Inspectors’ Strategies……………………………………………51
Table 4.5: Value of Enforcement Notices and/or Orders in Settlement of Labour Disputes….55
Table 4.6: Appropriate Labour Inspection Role (s) in Settlement of Labour Disputes………..61
xii
List of figures
Figure 1.1: Labour Dispute Resolution Structure in Malawi………………………………..5
Figure 4.1: Line Graphs of Labour Inspections Conducted and Disputes Reported……….59
xiii
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
ADS Alternative Dispute Settlement
ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution
AIDS Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome
BCHI Body of Case Handling Institution
C150 ILO Convention 150
C005 ILO Convention 005
C147 ILO Convention 147
C169 ILO Convention 169
DHRMD Department of Human Resources Management and Development
GOM Government of Malawi
GONZ Government of New Zealand
IRC Industrial Relations Courts
ILO International Labour Organisation
LRA Labour Relations Act
MBA Master of Business Administration
MGDS Malawi Growth and Development Strategy
MA Master of Arts
MoL Ministry of Labour
OSH Occupational Safety and Health
OPC Office of the President and Cabinet
PhD Doctor of Philosophy
R158 ILO Recommendation 158
SPSS Statistical Package for Social Sciences
UN United Nations
1
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.0 Introduction
This first chapter presents the general background information to this study. The chapter
describes the framework of labour disputes settlement in Malawi. It also presents the problem
statement, states research questions and objectives. Finally, the chapter presents the study
significance and provides an outline of the whole thesis chapters.
1.1. Background Information
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations (UN)
established in 1919 to seek the promotion of social justice and internationally recognized human
and labour rights (UN, 2000). ILO, among other issues, formulates international policies and
programmes to help improve working and living conditions. It also creates international labour
standards to serve as guidelines for national authorities to adopt and put them into action (ILO,
2006). The international labour policies and standards are the recommendations, protocols and
conventions which are usually adopted and ratified by several countries worldwide.
The Labour Administration Convention No. 150 of 1978 is one of the ILO`s conventions. It
provides for a system of labour administration which is defined as all public administration
activities in the field of national labour policy (C150, 1978). The national labour policy
comprises four major fields namely: employment promotion; labour protection; industrial
relations and labour policy research (ILO, 1996). Labour inspection services are within the fields
2
of labour protection and industrial relations. According to Richthofen (2002, p. 14), ‘the concept
of labour inspection, as developed by the ILO’s constituents, is that of a subsystem embedded in
the larger system of national labour administration’. Labour Administration Convention thus,
entrusts member states with the obligation to establish a system of labour administration
encompassing all aspects and institutions of national labour policy (Richthofen, 2002).
Richthofen (2002) states that a ratifying member state must organize an effective system of
labour administration, whose functions and responsibilities must be properly coordinated. In its
explicit terms, the Labour Administration Convention sets out the functions of labour
administration as to include the following: preparation of legal instruments; administration and
coordination of labour matters; checking and reviewing national labour policy; preparing and
implementing laws and regulations; undertaking tasks relating to national employment policy
and to conditions of work and working life; providing services and advice to employers and
workers and their organizations; as well as representing the state in international affairs
(Richthofen, 2002, ILO, 1996). The functions of conditions of work and working life and of
advising employers and workers, relate to issues of labour inspection. Furthermore, in the Labour
Inspection Convention No. 81 of 1947 and Labour Administration Recommendation No. 158 of
1978, members are urged to set up a system of labour inspection integrated into the national
labour administration structures (Richthofen, 2002).
Labour inspection, therefore, is defined as a service within the labour administration functions
that is carried out in workplace establishments with employees by any appointed or designated
official who is an expert in labour laws. This is done in order to check compliance with labour
3
laws in terms of working conditions set by governments as minimum legal standards of
employment (ILO, 2005). Compliance checking in relation to working conditions suggests that
labour inspection is related to industrial relations and specifically to industrial disputes which are
termed labour disputes in this study.
The Director General of the International Labour Organisation emphasized that problems facing
the world of work, would be greatly minimized if the work of governments` competent
authorities were efficiently and effectively undertaken (ILO, 1996). The Director General,
specifically, asserted that the efficiency and effectiveness of labour inspection services contribute
greatly to the implementation and observance of labour laws and regulations and also to
improved compliance thereby helping to minimize workplace disputes. He, however, noted that
the capacity of many labour administrations to operate labour inspection services of the
necessary level is still quite limited and that their scope is often confined only to the formal
sector. This might be because of several factors some of them would be resource constraints and
lack of understanding on the important role of the labour administration functions amongst some
key implementers like the labour inspectors (ILO, 2006, Weil, 2009).
A country becomes a member state of International Labour Organisation through the process of
application and approval. Through the process of ratification, a country that is already a member
state makes a formal commitment to give effect to the provisions of such ILO`s ratified
Conventions, Recommendations and Protocols (Richthofen, 2002).
4
According to Ministry of Labour (2011), Malawi joined ILO in 1964. She ratified the ILO`s
Labour Inspection Convention No. 81 of 1947 and its associated Recommendations Nos. 81, 82
and 85 on 22nd
March 1965; ratified the ILO`s Labour Inspection (Agriculture) Convention No.
129 of 1969 in 1971 and also the ILO`s Labour Administration Convention No. 150 of 1978 in
1999. This implies that Malawi is one member state that recognizes and strives to implement
ILO’s principles of labour inspection.
1.2. The Framework of Labour Disputes Settlement in Malawi.
Labour dispute settlement process starts with the disputants privately attempting to sort out their
disputes by themselves. It continues with the intervention by the Ministry of Labour at the time
of conducting labour inspection or at the time of processing the settlement of the reported labour
disputes. However, the High Courts with their unlimited original jurisdiction to hear and
determine any dispute as provided for under section 108 (1) of the Malawi Constitution may be
the first to handle a labour dispute. The process continues through the Malawi Supreme Court of
Appeal which is the final stage in the dispute settlement process in Malawi. The following chart
depicts the process of labour dispute settlement in Malawi (Banda, 2008a, p. 23).
5
Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal
High Court
Industrial Relations Court / Chief Resident Magistrate Court
Labour Office
Privately Between Parties in Dispute
Figure 1.1: Labour Dispute Resolution Structure in Malawi
This chart of labour dispute settlement process contains a level of ‘labour office’. This implies
that labour officers who are the labour inspectors have a role to play within the structural
settlement framework. Secondly, the arrow pointing both upwards and downwards between the
two lower levels of ‘privately between parties in disputes’ and of ‘labour office’ in the dispute
settlement framework indicates that labour officers do not only work on the reported labour
disputes but also on those labour disputes that may be encountered by them during their
workplace inspection visits. Hence investigating how labour inspection helps in the process of
labour disputes settlement is of great value towards understanding of the importance of the
inspection roles in labour dispute settlement framework in Malawi.
6
Banda (2005), Tambala (2007) and Tambala (2008) remarked that it is only the Ministry of
Labour that has the authority to provide Alternative Disputes Resolution (ADR) in labour
disputes before matters can commence in a court of law. Labour dispute settlement framework in
Malawi as shown in the chart above has ‘privately between workplace disputing parties’ as a
lowest level and ‘Malawi supreme court of appeal’ as its highest level. The three levels above the
level of labour office are the courts and that each court level can receive and handle a labour
dispute by way of a referral from lower level or by way of summon origination to it by any
labour dispute grieved party. Courts, unlike labour office, do not have a mandate to conduct
labour inspections. Hence the scope of labour inspection within the context of labour dispute
settlement framework applies only within the two lower levels of ‘labour office’ and that of
‘privately between workplace disputing parties’. Dispute settlement operations within these two
lower levels constitute the main processes of ADR in Malawi.
1.3. Problem Statement
According to the International Labour Organisation (2006), a great number of problems relating
to the protection of workers are solved at the workplace through dialogue and consultation
between employers and workers and with the advice of the labour inspector, in respect to
compliance with legislation, minimum standards and the terms of any collective agreements that
contain relevant standards of employment. The use of dialogue and consultation when it involves
the intervention of a labour inspector seems to suggest that inspectors need to understand the
contribution of labour inspection towards the process of labour dispute settlement for them to
effectively and purposively discharge the inspection services.
7
The Malawi government, according to main aims of both the Labour Relations Act No. 16 of
1996 and of Employment Act No. 6 of 2000, recognises the need to have employment work
places free from labour disputes through the work of the Ministry of Labour. To this end, the
Government, through Labour Ministry, strive to achieve all desired output in all its core
functions of the Ministry that includes the work of conducting labour inspections. (Ministry`s
Annual Report, 2009). The positive relationship between labour inspection and labour disputes
settlement processes need to be understood by labour inspectors for them to work towards
achieving the inspection intended outcome (Ministry`s Code of Conduct for labour inspectors,
2008).
However, Tambala (2008) and Sikwese (2010) observed that most of the labour inspectors do
not have the required understanding of the importance of labour inspection in the labour dispute
resolution process. Hence the main purpose of this study was to provide empirical evidence of
the contribution of labour inspection to the settlement of labour disputes in Malawi.
1.4. Research Questions
To address the main purpose of this study, the following specific questions were formulated:
1. How is labour dispute settlement process between employers and employees eased as a
result of labour inspection activities?
2. Do the workplace disputing parties observe labour inspectors’ strategies?
3. How do enforcement notices and/or orders by labour inspectors contribute towards the
settlement of labour disputes?
4. Which labour inspection role (s) would most likely lead to compliance?
8
1.5. Research Objectives
The study formulated the following five specific objectives to address the research questions:
1. Identify labour inspection activities performed during labour inspection visits;
2. Assess the extent to which labour inspection activities are instrumental in easing the
settlement of labour disputes;
3. Examine the observance of labour inspection strategies by the workplace disputants;
4. Examine the contribution of enforcement notices and/or orders in the settlement of labour
disputes; and,
5. Identify the most appropriate labour inspection role (s) in aiding the process of labour
dispute settlement in Malawi.
1.6. Significance of the Study
In Malawi, there has been no research study that has been conducted specifically in the area of
the role of labour inspection in respect of settlement of labour disputes. Of course, there have
been studies in Asia specifically in China and also in some other parts of the world on the role of
labour inspection in general (Courdouan, 2005) and in labour disputes settlement framework in
particular (Masayuki, 2008) but all these studies have less bearing on Malawi or have little
significance and relevance to Malawi.
Malawi is one of the member states of the International Labour Organization (ILO). In late 2006,
all ILO member states were called by ILO to adopt a series of policies to strengthen and
modernize their labour inspectorates as a means of assuring implementation of fundamental
workplace policies (Weil, 2009). These policies are geared to improve the service delivery of
9
labour inspectorates. However, Malawi just like some other countries, still shares the most
difficult challenge which according to Weil (2009) is the lack of understanding of the importance
of labour inspection amongst government officials charged with the function. Furthermore,
Malawi has not yet adopted any labour inspection policy to date.
This study is therefore significant to the policy makers and implementers of the labour
inspectorate services in the sense that it will help generate relevant information on the
importance of labour inspection in labour dispute settlement process. This will enable labour
inspectors to comprehend how labour disputes settlement process can be facilitated by labour
inspection. The study findings will be a reference point for the Ministry of Labour to strategise
how best to improve the delivery of its labour inspectorate services.
Finally, the findings will also provide an opportunity for other researchers interested in the field
of labour inspection to plan and undertake more studies within the context of Malawi. The
study’s suggested possible areas for further research will be a possible research topic
identification source for interested researchers.
1.7. Delimitations of the Study
In Malawi, there are currently two separate inspection functional areas in the Ministry of Labour.
First, is the labour inspection which is done by the Ministry`s labour inspectors who check and
enforce the compliance of workplace terms and conditions of employment such as hours of
work, wages, holidays, child labour issues, annual leave, overtime, etc (Employment Act, 2000).
Second, the factory inspection which is done by the Ministry`s factory inspectors who check and
enforce the compliance with the required working environment such as occupational safety,
10
health and welfare (Occupational Safety, Health and Welfare Act, 1996). The factory inspectors
are the Occupational, Safety and Health (OSH) inspectors (Occupational Safety, Health and
Welfare Act, 1996).
This study has covered the functional area of labour inspection and not the factory inspection.
This is because of two reasons. First, the study respondents are currently restricted to conducting
labour inspection and not the factory inspection (Occupational Safety, Health and Welfare Act,
1996, Employment Act, 2000). Second, it is labour inspection that mostly relates to basic labour
relations at work (MGDS II, 2011).
Furthermore, within the area of labour inspection, the study focuses on the advisory, prevention
and enforcement roles of labour inspection. This is because according to Courdouan (2005),
these three inspection roles are inclusive of every other role of labour inspection defined in the
Labour Inspection Conventions.
1.8. Organisation of the Thesis
This thesis is divided into five main chapters. Chapter one presents the background information
to this study including the problem statement, research questions, objectives, and significance of
the study. Chapter two presents literature review with a focus on the origin and development of
labour inspection; on the roles of labour inspection and its associated concepts and variables. It
also presents a review of labour disputes settlement process in Malawi. Chapter three presents
the methodology that was used in this study. In particular, issues of study population, data
collection instruments and data analysis and presentation among others are presented in this
11
chapter. Chapter four presents and discusses research results. Chapter five, the final chapter,
presents study conclusions and recommendations.
1.9. Chapter Summary
This chapter has presented the background information to this study. The chapter has also
described the framework of labour disputes settlement in Malawi by showing the scope of labour
inspection within the settlement framework. Finally, the chapter has also stated the research
questions and objectives formulated for this study and provided an outline of the whole thesis.
The next chapter presents a review of related studies and works within the fields of labour
inspection and dispute settlement process.
12
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.0. Introduction
This chapter reviews the available literature on labour inspection. It starts with a review
presentation on the origin and development of labour inspection. The chapter also presents a
review on issues involved within the labour disputes settlement framework and processes.
Finally, the chapter presents a review on two study attributes of experience and qualification.
2.1. Origin and Development of Labour Inspection
Labour inspection started in Britain, in 1802, when the parliament passed an Act on the
preservation of the health and morals of apprentices in textile and other factories (Richthofen,
2002). At that time, enforcement and compliance with the Act was being supervised by a
country`s set up voluntary committees. However, due to appalling conditions which prevailed as
a result of industrialization and mass labour, labour inspection came to be considered as a
responsibility of a state as well as a function of the constitutional obligation of government in
order to protect the integrity of its working population (Richthofen, 2002).
Development of labour inspection continued spreading into many other European countries such
as France and German. By the beginning of the twentieth century (1900), foundation of a modern
labour inspection system with general inspectors, technical and medical specialists had been laid
in a number of European countries (Richthofen, 2002).
In 1919, after the end of the First World War, ILO was created through Article XIII of the Treaty
of Versailles (Richthofen, 2002). ILO’s constitution contains a requirement for all its member
13
states to set up a system of labour inspection (R158, 1978, ILO, 1996). In policy terms, this
requirement was supported by ILO`s developed and adopted international instruments of labour
inspection such as the Conventions, Recommendations and Protocols on labour inspection of
which the first one was the Labour Inspection Recommendation in Health Services, No. 5 of
1919 (R005, 1919).
After the Second World War in 1945, Labour Inspection Convention No. 81 of 1947 and its three
associated Recommendations Nos. 81, 82 and 85 were set to guide member states (ILO, 1994).
These ILO`s international instruments, the Convention and Recommendations, set forth five
principles of labour inspections which are still valid and entirely relevant today. The five
principles, as outlined in (Richthofen, 2002, pp. 11-12), are as follows:
1. labour inspection is a public function, a responsibility of government, best organized as a
system, within the larger context of state system, in order to administer social and labour
policy and to supervise compliance with legislation and standards;
2. the concerns for close cooperation between labour inspection and employers and workers;
3. the need for effective cooperation with other institutions such as research institutes,
universities, the prevention services of social security authorities and with experts, and the
need to coordinate their activities;
4. the principle, that relates to labour inspection`s increasing orientation and emphasis on
prevention; and,
5. the requirement to drive for universal coverage, the need to extend labour protective and
preventive action to the largest possible number of working people in all areas of activity.
14
The 4th
and 5th
principles are both emphasizing on protection and prevention. Richthofen (2002)
contends that to speak of prevention in the context of labour protection implies a determined
effort to avoid incidents, disputes, accidents, conflicts and occupational diseases by assuring
compliance with existing legislation. Richthofen further observed that a preventive orientation
today has, as its ultimate objective, the development of a culture of prevention in a social and
labour policy paradigm which will later reduce exponentially the growing costs of non-
prevention or loss caused by all manner of accidents to individual, enterprises and society as a
whole. In context of a workplace, the dispute to be avoided would be a labour dispute and the
assurance of compliance with existing legislation entails the work of labour inspection.
2.2. Roles of Labour Inspection.
Richthofen (2002) summarises six major labour inspection roles namely: prevention,
enforcement, advisory, educative, information and collaboration. These roles collectively define
the role of labour inspectors which is crucial in industrial relations (Richthofen, 2002, Dzimbiri,
2005). In particular, labour inspectors undertake these roles during their participation in
collective bargaining procedures and conciliation processes with employers and employees
(Richthofen, 2002). Courdouan (2005) however, recognized only three of these inspection roles -
prevention, enforcement and advisory. He argued that all other labour inspection roles that may
be named are inclusive in each of these three major roles. This is true because the roles of
informing and educating, for example, are included within the advisory and prevention roles. The
role of collaborating workers’ and employers’ organizations is inclusive in each of Courdouan’s
three recognized roles because as labour inspectors facilitate the interactions between workplace
15
parties, collaboration is automatically involved. It is based on this reason that this study
attempted to explore only three major roles of prevention, advisory and enforcement in respect to
labour disputes settlement.
2.2.1. Prevention Role
Prevention in the world of work is defined to mean putting in place deliberate efforts towards
having all workplaces in compliance with agreed standards, to the effect that employers and
workers regard such compliance as the norm as well as a social responsibility (MoL, 2008).
Masayuki (2008) conducted a study whose purpose was to examine the role of labour inspection
in the framework of labour dispute settlement system in China. The role was measured by
determining the actual number of settled labour disputes through the work of labour inspection.
Masayuki found that a relatively greater percentage of labour disputes are settled by labour
inspectors through their inspection work and that labour inspection, not only prevent violations
of law by enterprises, but also have the function of providing relief to labourers and hence he
recommended the need to strengthen the labour inspection system in order to reduce the rise in
labour disputes.
Labour Inspection Convention of 1947 under its Article 3 notes that prevention is one of the
primary duties of every practical modern system of labour inspection. This notable emphasis is
reflected by Richthofen who argued that it is, today, generally considered better to prevent than
merely to sanction or punish. This idea of prevention is further replicated in the more recent
Labour Inspection (Agriculture) Convention No. 129 of 1969 which states that inspectorates
16
must be associated with the preventive control methods (Hall, n.d.). Thus, Masayuki (2008)
study findings with respect to preventive role of labour inspection agree with the argument
advanced by Richthofen (2002) and with the prevention provisions of the ILO`s Labour
Inspection Conventions. One may therefore be tempted to conclude that Masayuki`s findings
could also be applicable in Malawi, since Malawi as ILO`s member state ratified the two Labour
Inspection Conventions like China and follows the same principles and standards of
implementing workplace labour inspections. However, this cannot be concluded as such unless a
similar study is done in Malawi.
Bendeman (n.d.) argued that, ‘by the time the dispute gets to conciliation a lot of irreversible
damage will have been done to the relationship making reinstatement very difficult’. This
emphasizes the importance of preventive role of labour inspection in respect to labour disputes
settlement because it is normally the inspection that comes first before the conciliation of labour
disputes by labour inspectors (Body of Case Handling Institutions Handbook (BCHI), n.d.).
2.2.2. Enforcement Role
The enforcement role is another vital inspection role played by labour inspectors. This role,
according to Richthofen (2002), contributes substantially to the prevention of accidents, labour
disputes, conflicts and health hazards if accompanied by advice and comments to employers and
workers. However, studies have shown that the enforcement role measures vary significantly
from one country to another. For instance, enforcement measures are bit general and applicable
to all labour and social legislation in Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Spain, in French-
Speaking African countries and in most Latin American countries (Richthofen, 2002). These
17
measures are restricted to certain fields of safety and health and to certain aspects of working
conditions of women`s work and those of children in the Nordic countries and in the United
Kingdom. Whereas in the Federal Republic of Germany, certain matters of wages are expressly
excluded from the inspectorate`s tasks (Becker, 1968; Stigler, 1971; Ehrlich, 1972; Tullock,
1974; Reiss, 1984 cited in Pires, 2008).
Courdouan (2005) observed that labour inspection plays a great role in transition economies
through its work of enforcing labour laws. This makes enterprises free from labour disputes
hence productive. Courdouan`s observation is supported by findings of Masayuki (2008)
regarding the enforcement role where reduced workplace disputes were reported following the
enforcement work of labour inspection. However, since Masayuki’s study took place in China, a
middle developed country and Courdouan`s observation was a general one for developing
countries with varying economic positions, there is need for a similar study to that of Masayuki
to be conducted in Malawi.
2.2.3. Advisory Role
Piore and Schrank (2006) cited in Pires, (2008), argued that instead of deploying sanctions,
inspectors are expected to understand the spirit of the law and seek to attain its objectives by
adapting legal requirements to different types of firms, prioritizing persuasion and advice over
adversarial and punitive means of labour law enforcement. The mention of the word `advice` by
Piore and Schrank, refers to the advisory role as another vital role of labour inspection system.
Richthofen (2002) observed that advice, information and publicity provided by labour inspectors
18
in most inspection systems today go far beyond the mere supply of technical counsel on legal
terms and conditions of employment.
In times of economic difficulties, there is the temptation, often backed by public policy, to rely
too much on advice and information and refrain from `unpopular` enforcement measures
(Richthofen, 2002, MoL, 2008). This seems to suggest that advisory role can be the preferred
inspection role as compared to others. However its confirmation is subject to research, otherwise
from these observations, it can be seen that labour inspection with its advisory role can indeed
have a bearing towards the labour disputes resolution process.
2.3. Labour Inspection Activities.
2.3.1. Compliance Promotion.
Compliance promotion is defined as the continuous process of acting in accordance with the
requirements of the relevant legislation (Sivananthiram, 2006). Relevant legislation could be any
parliament enacted piece of law for any given area of application. In this study, compliance shall
mean acting in accordance to the minimum legal conditions of employment, as contained in
Malawian labour legislation. Compliance promotion fosters the growth of high quality,
productive workplaces free from labour disputes (Sivananthiram, 2006; Hall, n.d.).
Hall (n.d.) measured compliance promotion in the environmental sector by considering the
number of responsive parents and the presentation format whether written or video. The number
of responsive parents taking their children for screening within a given period of time in order to
assess impact of prevention (Hall, n.d.) indicated compliance with required regulations.
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According to the New Zealand government, compliance promotion is being undertaken during
labour inspection using various compliance tools described as the inspection strategies
(Sivananthiram, 2006). Such compliance tools, the inspection strategies, are also recognized in
the Labour Inspection Convention No. 81 of 1947 and its associated Recommendation. These
include: (1) enforcement notices and/or orders; (2) improvement notices; (3) facilitation
approach; (4) demand notices; (5) enforceable actions; (6) inspectors’ formed opinions and (7)
compliance actions. Malawi, like New Zealand, ratified such a convention and hence uses these
inspection strategies. As a result, this study used these inspection strategies as variables to
investigate the extent to which each strategy can be observed by the workplace parties.
2.3.2. Assistance to Employers and Employees to Resolve their Disputes.
Pires (2008) found that labour inspection practices associated with compliance promotion have
positive outcomes that lead into workplace parties improve their working conditions among other
things. This is true because the promotion process assists employers and employees with actions
to take within the requirement of labour laws. The study by Pires (2008) conducted in Brazil
involved inspectors to draw employers` attention to the legal consequences of their action (or
lack of it) before contemplating prosecution. The result was improved compliance and
minimized occurrence of labour disputes amongst workplace employers and their employees in
some piloted workplaces in Brazil.
20
2.3.3. Advice to Employers and Employees regarding their entitlements.
Firstly, labour inspectors need to have knowledge command on labour laws when advising
employers and employees regarding their entitlements. Richthofen (2002) clearly stated that a
modern inspectorate must command high technical expertise to be accepted as a partner by
industry and the trade unions. In this context, the word industry refers to employers or
employers` organizations. The command on high technical expertise must be the case because
trade unions, the workers, and employers or their organizations often ask the experts of the
labour inspectorate that include labour inspectors for assistance, advice and guidance.
Unfortunately, this is not the case with the Malawi Labour Inspectorate Service Authorities and
inspectors who according to Kantsemo (1995), Tambala (2008), Banda (2008a) and Sikwese
(2010) are practically not performing as expected in their noble work of inspection. This
suggests that labour inspectors in Malawi seem not to have the required understanding and
appreciation on the importance of their inspection work towards their dispute settlement work.
Secondly, labour inspectors need to have good advisory skills when advising employers and
employees regarding their entitlements. Dzimbiri (1995) observed that apart from the
enforcement of statutory conditions of employment and minimum wages to protect employees,
inspectors with good advisory skills tend to serve as source of advice for both the employers and
employees. In the case for employees, inspectors sometimes provide direct advisory services to
individual workers to know their entitlements at work (Richthofen, 2002). This is important
because, according to Richthofen (2002), rights at work if not fulfilled to each other by either
party, are bound to be a major source of rights labour disputes. Furthermore, labour inspection
serves the purpose of ‘nipping problems in the bud’, since it is a way of forestalling the outbreak
21
of major disputes resulting from the cumulative effect of unresolved grievances (Dzimbiri, 2005;
Dzimbiri, 2008).
In summary, Masayuki (2008) in respect to knowledge command on labour laws and advisory
skills, recommends that labour inspectors, to ensure that workplace violations are minimized
and/or prevented, need to be knowledgeable in labour laws with good advisory skills coupled
with clear understanding of how important is their inspection work regarding the settlement of
labour disputes. This clearly shows how the two, advisory skills and knowledge command on
labour laws, are interdependent as labour inspectors’ important qualities required for their
success in the work of inspection and of labour disputes settlement.
2.3.4. Enforcement of Notices and/or Orders.
Enforcement notices and/or orders are the inspection tools/strategies with which a labour
inspector prepares a written note for the concerned workplace parties to act as prescribed, if the
inspector believes that such a concerned party has failed to comply with any strategy or
provision of the required labour laws (Sivananthiram, 2006). These notices and/or orders, unlike
other inspection strategies, are written directive or persuasive instructions following the non-
compliant act because they usually quote references to labour laws to inform on what ought to
happen with continued non-compliance (Pires, 2008). The improvement and demand notices are
inclusive as alternative forms within the enforcement notices and/or orders.
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2.4. Malawi Labour Inspection and Enforcement Draft Policy
Oxford dictionary defines the term policy as a plan of action, statement of ideals proposed or
adopted by a government to guide [such government`s activities] in specific areas. The Malawi
2008 Labour Inspection and Enforcement policy is a proposed draft document not yet adopted.
In brief, the draft policy`s contained key issues are summarised as follows:
First, the policy aim is to provide the best labour inspection services in Malawi that will ensure
full compliance with labour legislation so that workplace risks/disputes and conditions of
employment are properly controlled and productivity enhanced. It is a guiding document for
labour inspectors to perform their activities. It is based on the fact that labour inspection in
Malawi contributes to the promotion of industrial peace and harmony.
Second, the draft policy`s strategic objectives, among others, are: (1) to provide information and
advice on all labour legislation, (2) to promote sound, productive and harmonious labour
relations, particularly, the promotion of collective bargaining and the reaction to, (3) to deal with
labour disputes in a timely and fair manner while preventing or helping solve disputes through
social dialogue.
Finally, in terms of coverage, the policy will cover all issues with regard to the provision of
information, advisory services and enforcement of worker protection in employment and
provision of conducive environment for employers to operate their businesses. This is reflected
in the proportionality principle of the draft policy that requires inspectors to consider the
compliance capacity of the enterprise, on whether the advantages of any enforcement measures
outweigh the disadvantages while exploring more appropriate way (s) of achieving the same
compliance goal.
23
From these highlighted issues contained in the draft policy, it is clear that labour inspection in
Malawi has a role to play in the settlement of labour disputes. How such works, is worth
studying for the benefit of labour inspectors and the government policy makers in general.
2.5. Labour Disputes Settlement Framework.
Labour disputes settlement framework is inclusively defined to mean all the structural
institutions with mandates or no mandates together with their performed activities in processes of
settling various kinds of labour disputes (Haron & Noord, 2004, Banda, 2008b). These
institutions range from those of traditional in nature through to the formal ones of government
departments and then the competent or mandated courts at the top. This study concerns labour
inspection and labour disputes settlement which are mandatory functions of the Malawi
government – Ministry of Labour (Malawi government website; Sikwese, 2010). In this respect,
the study covers only labour disputes settlement processes undertaken by labour inspectors
within the alternative disputes resolution (ADR) as a subset of the overall labour disputes
settlement framework in Malawi.
Section 64 (1) of the Employment Act, 2000 provides that any person having a question,
difference or dispute as to the rights or liabilities of any person, employer or employee under this
Act or a contract of employment may bring the matter to the attention of a labour
officer/inspector who shall attempt to resolve the matter. However, despite this, there is no legal
provision in the same Act or elsewhere as to the method that a labour officer should employ in
settling the matter (Sikwese, 2010).
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Sikwese (2010) further stated that: ‘it is assumed that the labour officer shall attempt to settle the
dispute through mechanisms that aim at resolving the matter out of court. These mechanisms,
collectively referred to as ADR, are the preferred method of settling disputes. These dispute
resolution mechanisms may take the form of negotiation, conciliation/facilitation and mediation.
It seems, of these methods, conciliation/facilitation is the most ideal because it is referred to in
the legislation in relation to labour officers’. This is besides the fact that ADR is also used at
times within the court system itself.
2.5.1. Alternative Disputes Resolution (ADR).
Bendeman (n.d.) defined ADR essentially to mean any conciliatory process outside the judicial
system. He, however, indicated that ADR means more than conciliation, mediation and
arbitration. This is true because the process of ADR includes all processes such as third party
intervention in problem solving where the third party must be seen as impartial and credible.
ADR has gained wide spread acceptance among both the general public and the legal profession
in recent years to the extent that most commercial courts nowadays require disputing parties to
resort to ADR of some type which include the mandatory mediation before permitting the
parties’ cases to be heard and tried in courts of law (Tambala, 2008; Sikwese, 2010). ADR is
sometimes referred to as ADS which means Alternative Dispute Settlement. Hence the two
abbreviations will be interchangeably used in this study to mean one thing.
In Malawi, the Industrial Relations Court (IRC) established under section 110 (2) of the 1994
Republican Constitution with an original jurisdiction to hear and determine all labour disputes,
requires that every party to a labour dispute interested to seek the court intervention should first
25
report his / her case to labour office (IRC Series, 2005). This is further reflected in most of the
determinations by Zibelo Banda, the IRC Judge, where she rules by referring some fresh reported
labour cases to her court back to labour offices for first attempt in the settlement process (IRC
Series, 2005 and Banda, Chinangwa & Nielson, 2007). This arrangement confirms two important
things: one, the significance Courts place on the ADR structure in Malawi and two, the important
role labour inspectors have in respect to labour disputes settlement.
2.5.2. Labour Disputes.
A dispute is defined as a difference between an employer or employers’ organization and
employees or a trade union, as to the employment or non-employment, or the terms of
employment, or the conditions of labour or the work done or to be done, of any person, or
generally regarding the social or economic interests of employees (LRA, 1996). Selwyn (1991,
p. 452) defined a trade dispute to mean a difference between workers and their employers which
relates wholly or mainly to one or more of the following:
terms and conditions of employment, or the physical conditions in which any workers are
required to work;
the engagement or non-engagement or termination or suspension of employment or the
duties of employment, of one or more workers;
the allocation of work or the duties of employment between workers or groups of
workers;
matters of discipline;
membership or non-membership of a trade union on the part of a worker;
facilities for officials of trade unions;
26
machinery for negotiation or consultation, and other matters relating to the above
mentioned points including recognition by employers or employers` associations of the
right of a trade union to represent workers in any such negotiations or consultation or in
the carrying out of such procedures.
This trade dispute definition is a labour dispute definition because all its involved conditionality
relate to employment issues that arise out of labour being offered by someone (employee) for
someone (employer) in exchange for some monetary wage benefits. Furthermore, the definition
is encompassing as it includes both the individual and collective disputes. In this study, Selwyn`s
definition shall be adopted as it directly refers to all conditionalities that are mainly the issues to
be checked by labour inspectors during labour inspection.
2.5.3. Nature of Labour Disputes.
Two groups of labour disputes are identified as Rights and Interests labour disputes (ILO-Labour
Inspection Training Manual, 1994; Ministry of Labour Devolution Guidelines, 2010).
Rights labour disputes are disputes over the existing terms and conditions of employment (ILO-
Labour Inspection Training Manual, 1994; Ministry of Labour Devolution Guidelines, 2010;
Malema, 2009). The Rights disputes can be resolved formally or informally by labour inspectors
because they concern the existing terms and conditions of employment which are directly
enforced during the work of labour inspection (Malema, 2009). In other words, it is because the
disputes entail a violation of legal provisions that must be complied with. According to the
Employment Act (2000) and Labour Relations Act (1996), disputes over claim of notice pay;
27
claim of underpayments of wages; claim of non-payments of overtime wages; claim of severance
allowance and claims of dismissals among others are some of the commonly rights labour
disputes that are handled by labour inspectors in Malawi.
Interests labour disputes are disputes over the future terms and conditions of employment (ILO-
Labour Inspection Training Manual, 1994; Ministry of Labour Devolution Guidelines, 2010;
Malema, 2009). These disputes are also handled by labour inspectors as is the case in Malawi
and in other developing countries where the settlement of labour disputes is not yet specialized
(Malema, 2009). However, according to the ILO-Labour Inspection Training Manual (1994),
Interests labour disputes are better handled by specialist Industrial Relations officers because
they concern the future terms and conditions of employment. In other words, it is because the
disputes entail no violation of any legal provisions to be complied with but involve just a
difference of interests that may be best solved through interactions of bargaining. This is the
case in some developed and middle developed countries such as United Kingdom, Federal
Republic of Germany, Japan, India, South Africa, Pakistan, Cambodia and Brazil (Richthofen,
2002) where the settlement of labour disputes is specialized.
2.6. Labour Disputes Settlement Process.
The process of settling labour disputes by labour inspectors within the ADS framework is
through the use of conciliation and/or mediation processes.
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2.6.1 Conciliation and/ or Mediation of Labour Disputes
Sikwese (2010) defines conciliation as a process of bringing disputing parties together with a
view to facilitating their reaching agreement between themselves. The product of conciliation is
the settlement agreement (Pitt, 2000; Sikwese, 2010) which is defined as a joint decision reached
by the disputing parties after a conciliation meeting, usually recorded in writing, dated and
signed by both parties and the conciliator. It should be noted that, in conciliation, the settlement
of the dispute is a product of the parties to the dispute and not that of the conciliator. This is
because the conciliator only facilitates the process leading to a settlement agreement.
Finnemore (1998) and Kochan (1980) define mediation as a dispute settlement process whereby
negotiating parties make use of a neutral third party, the labour inspector for example, to assist
them in reconciling differences and in coming to an agreement. Finnemore further argued that
the term conciliation may be used synonymously with mediation. He stated that a mediator may
facilitate the process of negotiation by encouraging better communication and helping the parties
to understand each other`s position more clearly through his / her contributions made to the
negotiation content by way of suggesting possible alternatives and trade-offs. Consequently, the
mediator leaves the parties entirely free to settle on such terms as they see fit (Selywn, 1991,
Finnemore, 1998).
Many scholars have argued that conciliation and/ or mediation are more advantageous over any
other methods of disputes settlement within the ADR framework. In their arguments, these
scholars state that, with conciliation or mediation, disputes are resolved as they occur at the
source thereby preventing labour disputes from precipitating out of control and disrupting
29
industrial relations and production. They facilitate dialogue and joint problem solving between
disputants, a situation that leads into improved communication which in turn leads into more
harmonious workplace relations (Sikwese, 2010). Finally, it is also because, according to
Sikwese (2010), conciliation / mediation take place in the districts, in case of Malawi, in which
the disputes arise and in which the cost of the process is cheaper to both parties while being
handled by laypersons, the labour inspectors, thereby making the whole process more user
friendly, simple, flexible, expedient and cost effective.
2.6.2. Conciliation and/ or Mediation of Labour Disputes through Labour Inspection
Richthofen (2002) observed that opinion is divided on the role of labour inspectors in industrial
relations, particularly their participation in collective bargaining procedures and the settlement of
industrial disputes. In this respect, Richthofen noted that negotiation of agreements in countries
following the British system is entirely left to labour and management whereas in those countries
influenced by the French tradition and also in most Latin American countries; collective
bargaining procedures often require labour inspectors to attend and even to chair relevant
meetings. This implies that labour inspection, in countries following British system has no role to
play in the settlement of labour disputes by negotiations and mediations since such countries’
labour inspectors are not involved in the settlement of industrial disputes which is the work of
the workplace labour force and its management. On the other hand, it would imply that labour
inspection has a role in settlement of industrial disputes in all those countries following the
French tradition and those of Latin American countries which include Chile and Brazil just to
mention a few. This is so because their labour inspectors are required to attend or to chair labour
negotiation meetings so that they can contribute to the improvement of industrial relations.
30
Labour Inspection Recommendation No. 81 of 1947 under part III – labour disputes – states that
the functions of labour inspectors should not include that of acting as conciliator or mediator in
proceedings concerning labour disputes. This Recommendation is totally followed by the British
system countries including Malawi but it is not the case by those French system countries that
take conciliation as one of the major functions of labour inspectors.
Labour Inspection (Agriculture) Recommendation No. 133 of 1969, paragraph 3- subparagraph 1
provides that normally, the functions of labour inspections in Agriculture should not include that
of acting as conciliator or mediator in proceedings concerning labour disputes. However, the
same Recommendation paragraph 3-subparagraph 2 provides that where no special bodies for the
conciliation and mediation purpose exist, labour inspectors in Agriculture may be called upon as
a temporary measure to act as conciliators or mediators. By such provision, of subparagraph 2, it
shows that labour inspection (Agriculture) Recommendation partly contradicts with the labour
inspection Recommendation No. 81 of 1947 which totally restricts labour inspectors to act as
conciliators even on a temporary basis.
Furthermore, subparagraph 3 of the Labour Inspection (Agriculture) Recommendation paragraph
3 states that: ‘in the case provided for by subparagraph 2 of this paragraph, the competent
authority should take measures in harmony with national law and compatible with the resources
of the labour department of the country concerned with a view to relieving labour inspectors
progressively of such functions, so that they are able to devote themselves to a greater extent to
the actual inspection of undertakings’. The content of this subparagraph of the said
Recommendation suggests that it is proper and appropriate for labour inspectors to work as
31
conciliators or mediators in those countries without separate competent authorities and resources
within their labour departments, to deal with the function of conciliation.
Haron & Noord, (2004) argued that only those countries with labour departments that have
sufficient resources can effectively separate labour inspection functions and conciliation /
mediation functions as part of industrial or labour relations and not those with inadequate
resources which include most developing countries. In this regard, ILO advises those other
countries to combine the two functions of labour inspection and industrial relations and appoint
generalist labour officers as inspectors. Malawi is not an exception under this latter case.
Furthermore, Haron & Noord argued that until the restructuring is fully implemented, however,
and additional resources are mobilized, it is not possible to fully separate conciliation and labour
inspection functions and thus labour inspectors will continue to be involved in conciliation cases
as well.
In Cambodia, labour inspectors are also allowed to work as labour conciliators (Heron & Noord,
2004). This according to Heron & Noord, is because the government of Cambodia`s labour
inspectorate department in the Ministry of Labour has no capacity or has little resources to
undertake such duties of inspection and conciliation as separate functions. Heron & Noord
further wrote that such situation is also because of a research`s finding that revealed that labour
inspectors can contribute to the improvement of industrial relations quite great – a situation that
is potential towards prevention of labour disputes.
32
However, Haron & Noord (2004) observed that the practice of some conciliated cases being
handled by a labour inspector, taints the conciliation process and adds an element of confusion to
the disputing parties who receive a mixture of conciliation and law enforcement. This
observation suggests that either, the labour inspectors do not know their role to play in
conciliation which is labour dispute settlement or it suggests that the work of labour inspection
and that of labour disputes settlement are mixed up within the understanding of labour
inspectors. Therefore, Malawi who has labour inspectors who are also labour dispute conciliators
is bound to face this problem of adding an element of confusion to the disputing parties. Hence it
is necessary that the role of labour inspection in labour dispute settlement in Malawi be
researched so that its findings can help labour inspectors to understand and perform their role in
labour dispute settlement diligently without confusions.
2.6.3. Conciliation and/ or Mediation of Labour Disputes in Malawi
Section 13 (1) of the 1994 Malawi Republican Constitution provides that the state shall actively
promote the welfare and development of the people of Malawi by progressively adopting and
implementing policies and legislation aimed at achieving peaceful settlement of disputes by
adopting mechanisms by which differences are settled through negotiation, good offices,
mediation, conciliation and arbitration. The disputes referred to here are disputes of all types and
categories that may arise involving human beings in various settings including the workplace
labour disputes which are disputes of concern in this study.
The Malawi Employment Act No. 6 of 2000 (CAP. 55:01) is an Act established to reinforce and
regulate minimum standards of employment with the purpose of ensuring equity necessary for
enhancing industrial peace, accelerated economic growth and social justice and for matters
33
connected therewith and incidental thereto. This is the Act’s overall aim. The work of labour
inspection by labour inspectors is instrumental for Malawi government to achieve this aim of the
Employment Act. It is clear that for the industrial peace to be enhanced there must be workplaces
which are free from labour disputes among others. This can be realised partly through the work
of labour inspectors.
Section 8 (1) & (2) of the Employment Act (2000) provides that a labour commissioner and his
/ her subordinates – the labour officers – shall be appointed public officers in the public service
to be responsible for the effective administration and application of the Employment Act
whereby among other duties, these labour officers shall be responsible for inspecting places of
work as often and as thoroughly as is necessary and to supply relevant technical information and
advice to employers, employees and other persons on labour matters. Section 8 (5) of the same
Act provides that the Act shall be enforced by labour officers, acting subject to the direction of
the commissioner and for which respect, they (labour officers), as provided for in section 9 (1)
(a), shall have powers to enter any workplace freely and without prior notice at any hour of the
day or night in order for them to do their inspection work. This is one of the legal powers of
labour officers as labour inspectors. From these legal provisions and from other reviews already
presented above, it is clear that Malawi labour officers are employed to work as labour inspectors
mandated to conduct labour inspections in workplaces as well as conciliators / mediators to settle
labour disputes. The fact that a labour inspector is also a labour conciliator in Malawi tells that
labour inspection play a role in labour dispute settlement in Malawi.
34
2.7. Attributes.
According to Adams & Schvaneveldt (1991), attributes that characterize the research population
need to be reviewed as well. Four of such mentioned attributes are the experience, size of
organizations, trainings and qualifications. In this study, only experience and qualifications have
been reviewed because the study used professional labour inspectors who are experienced and
well qualified as respondents.
2.7.1. Experience.
Hartmann and Lau (1978) observed that worker experience on the job, in industrial conflict, and
in the stages preparatory to their entry into the world of work, is one of the selected subjects for
thorough investigation. The importance of experience as a variable had been demonstrated
conclusively in studies on employee attitudes towards the wage structure and managerial
controls, towards unemployment and trade union organization (Hartmann and Lau, 1978). In this
technical study, the variable, experience in terms of length of service by labour inspectors matter
most because it has an implication towards the type of data to be collected. The need for
experienced labour inspectors has been reflected in the Malawi draft labour inspection policy
where it is explicitly stated that any newly appointed labour inspectors must work under the
guidance and supervision of experienced colleagues during when they should gain the required
practical work skills while being formally introduced to the workplace employers and
employees. This requirement underscores the importance of experience as a variable in the world
of work.
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2.7.2. Skills and Qualification
Oxford dictionary defines the term qualification as a quality or skill that makes somebody
suitable for a particular job. Islamabad (2006) prescribes the required qualification for the
Pakistan Labour Inspectors, in the 2006 Pakistan labour inspection policy, to a minimum of
diploma level. Likewise, the Malawi 2008 labour inspection draft policy principle of
accreditation stresses that labour inspectorate shall ensure that admission of labour practitioners
is limited to those who have requisite having passed a professional examination of Malawi
labour laws. Furthermore, this principle is being supported by the country`s code of conduct for
labour inspectors that provides that the staff of the labour administration system shall be
composed of persons who are suitably qualified for the activities to which they are assigned, who
have access to trainings that are necessary for such activities as well as those who are
independent of improper influences. This emphasizes the importance of qualification in issues of
research.
2.8. Chapter Summary
This chapter has reviewed the available literature on the roles of labour inspection and its
associated concepts of prevention, enforcement, advisory and compliance promotion among
others. The chapter has also presented reviews on various issues involved within the labour
disputes settlement framework and processes followed by a review on two study attributes of
experience and professional qualification of the study respondents. Having reviewed the relevant
literature that has provided the theoretical and conceptual framework of the study, the next
chapter presents the methods used to conduct this study.
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.0. Introduction
This chapter presents an outline of methodology that was used to conduct this study. The chapter
outlines nature of the research and method; study respondents; data collection tools and
techniques. Furthermore, the chapter outlines data analysis and presentation. Finally, the chapter
presents how issues of validity and reliability were dealt with in this study.
3.1. Nature of the Study and the Research Method.
This study sets to investigate how labour inspection roles help in aiding labour disputes
settlement. The study describes ways for which the settlement process of disputes can be
facilitated through the undertaking of such roles by labour inspectors. Furthermore, the study
explains how the described ways actually aid in the disputes settlement process. Hence the study
is both descriptive and explanatory in order to help provide a thorough understanding of the
relationship of the variables under study.
Secondly, mixed method research approach, that is, use of both quantitative and qualitative
approaches, was adopted for this study. According to Babbie (2004) cited in Bakuwa (2009),
mixed method approach is said to be unlimitive on part of the researcher to ably understand
better on how two variables can relate. In this study, quantitative analysis was done to
understand the relationship between the labour inspection roles and the process of labour
disputes settlement. Qualitative analysis was done to analyse the reasons given and comments
made by key informants. Furthermore, some other statements given by the respondents were also
analysed qualitatively. The use of these two approaches complemented each other in this study.
37
3.2. Study Respondents.
In Malawi, there are 28 labour offices of which 7 are in the North, 9 in the Centre and 12 in the
South. There were 57 Malawi labour inspectors based at these labour offices as at 2nd
July 2012
(Ministry of Labour staff return, June 2012). These labour inspectors comprise all those
employed labour officers of the grade K, that is, an Executive Officer (EO) and above.
According to the Government Civil Service grading structure, there are 18 grades ranging from
grade A- the most superior grade to grade R- the lowest grade (Government DHRMD circular
letter 2004).
As at 31st July 2012, there were a total of 127 established posts of labour inspectors in Malawi of
which only 57 were filled at the time of conducting this research representing 45 % of these
established posts (Government circular letter, September 2010). 16 of the filled posts were from
the North; 20 from the Centre and 21 were from the South. The fact that the total number of
filled labour inspectors` posts was only 57, less than half of the total required number of 127,
prompted the researcher to target everyone to be a study respondent. This is because sampling
only few participants from the total population which is already a small number would have
compromised the reliability of the findings since reliability of the study findings can also be
demonstrated in terms of sample representativeness among other factors (Chikhwenda, 2005).
Therefore the total population for this study was 57 labour inspectors.
In addition, 3 labour officials from the Ministry of Labour headquarters were identified as key
informants. The 3 key informants were the Deputy Labour Commissioner and two other officers
from within the Ministry`s inspectorate section who were perceived to be experts with a great
38
deal of knowledge in the field of labour inspection. They were judgmentally selected based on
their professionalism in the field of labour administration particularly in the areas of disputes
settlement and of inspectorate services. This was done to ensure that only officials
knowledgeable and competent in the work of labour inspection and of disputes settlement were
selected to provide responses for this study. This study was technical in nature and hence
required the use of technical respondents as observed by Dallal (2001) and Saunders (2003) cited
in Dzonzi (2010).
Also, 3 head labour inspectors were asked to provide separate supporting data for this study.
These 3 head labour inspectors were those heading each of the 3 city labour offices of Mzuzu,
Lilongwe and Blantyre. These were to provide supporting data from their office reports and
registers maintained, as representative data of other district labour offices. This is based on the
fact that most of the district workplace activities are also done in city based workplaces in
addition to specific city workplace economic activities that are rarely done in the district based
workplaces.
3.3. Data Collection Tools and Techniques
3.3.1. Study Questionnaires
To collect data for this study, 3 separate sets of questionnaires were designed to target 3
categories of respondents. The first questionnaire (see appendix A 1) was designed to collect
data relating to the work of labour inspection and of labour disputes settlement. This
questionnaire was administered to the 57 labour inspectors. The second questionnaire (see
appendix A 2) was designed to collect raw data from office reports and registers maintained at 3
39
city labour offices. This was supporting data. This questionnaire was administered to 3 labour
inspectors heading each of the 3 city labour offices of Mzuzu, Lilongwe and Blantyre. These
provided supporting data. According to Thornhill et al. (2000), secondary supporting data
include both raw data and published summaries which can be collected from within or outside
the organization. The third questionnaire (see appendix A 3) was designed to collect both
quantitative and qualitative data from professional labour experts in the field of labour
inspections and of labour disputes settlement. This questionnaire was therefore administered to
the 3 key informants at the Ministry of Labour headquarters’ inspectorate section. The whole
data collection exercise was conducted between June, 2012 and September, 2012.
47 questionnaires for labour inspectors; 3 questionnaires for the head labour inspectors and 3
questionnaires for the three key informants were successfully administered directly to the
respondents by the researcher through a means of visiting their offices for direct contact. The
questionnaire deliverance and collection of the responded questionnaires at the same time of the
researcher`s visit ensured that only the targeted respondents were conveniently reached for their
responses. However for various reasons, ten of the labour inspectors were not reached during the
researcher`s direct visits to their offices. As a result, the remaining 10 questionnaires were
administered through the post with already stamped envelopes of which 3 of them were not
responded.
Thornhill, et al (2000) state that questionnaires are one of the most widely used data collection
techniques because they provide an efficient method of gathering data from a large sample prior
to analysis and that responses to questionnaires are easier to record as they are based on
40
predetermined and standardized set of questions. Related to these reasons, this study adopted the
use of questionnaires to efficiently collect data from 57 respondents, located at different distant
points across Malawi.
Most of the questions were closed questions with possible responses identified. They were
simple and clearly worded. This is in line with Oppenheim (1992) and Bell (1993) who argued
that it is far harder to produce a questionnaire that collects the data you need as well as to make
the questionnaire a reliable tool if questions are not clearly worded and defined.
3.3.2. Pilot Testing
Thornhill, et al. (2000) argued that a questionnaire, like any other data collection techniques,
need to be pilot-tested and amended as necessary. This is true not only because such piloting
process is of paramount importance to help avoid a possible second chance of collecting data but
also provides chances to do possible amendments to the data collection tools. The questionnaire
for this study was pilot tested to 5 randomly selected labour inspectors.
Carmines & Zeller (1991) reported that any questionnaire pretesting process that results into at
least a 75 % of the tried questionnaires being well and fully responded to, implies that the
designed questionnaire is well designed which can help the researcher collect the intended data
for a particular study. For the pilot-tested questionnaire, most of the questions were well
responded to by all the 5 randomly selected labour inspectors as had been expected. As a result,
the questionnaire was adopted with minor adjustments.
41
3.4. Data Analysis and Presentation.
The collected data from labour inspectors were cleaned and prepared for computer coding. The
data collected from head labour inspectors based on their office reports and registers were
reorganized and presented in tables.
Cleaned data were coded into the computer using SPSS computer software package (version
13.0). Statements of `any other`; statements of reasons and of explanations, given by labour
inspectors and key informants were manually organized on a commentary appendix B for
processing and interpretation, that is, text analysis.
Frequency tables were generated using SPSS. The generated frequency tables were reorganized
to form various combined tables with significant statistical information to address specific
research objectives. Furthermore, for the purpose of meaningful analyses, response categories of
categorical variables for some questions were collapsed into three or four response categories
depending on the similarities and nature of the data to be interpreted. Pallant (2009) defines
collapsing of response variables to mean reducing the number of response categories of a
categorical variable based on situational needs of the particular data analysis.
In order to establish whether the response differences for the 3 labour inspection roles were
statistically significant or not, further analysis was ran using t-test facility of the SPSS to
generate mean scores for comparisons.
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Finally, secondary data collected from the 3 head labour inspectors were first organized and
compiled into one table included in the appendix C. Some statistical information from this table
was entered into the computer using Microsoft excel sheet to produce graphs for explaining
further the study findings.
3.5. Measuring Instruments, Validity and Reliability.
Scales are some research instruments for measuring. Chikhwenda (2005) noted that a scale
should be tested for reliability, which is the accuracy of the scores of a measure and further
describes scaling as the measurement of a variable in such a way that it can be expressed on a
continuum. Reliability does not imply validity because a reliable measure is just measuring
something accurately but not necessarily what it is supposed to be measuring whereas validity
implies reliability because a valid measure is one which is measuring what it is supposed to
measure (Adams & Schvaneveldt, 1991, Chikhwenda, 2005).
In this study, scales were used as measuring instrument. Secondly, pilot testing and Cronbach`s
alpha statistic were the approaches used to assess the validity of questions and reliability of
scales used respectively. Wolf (1978) and Saunders et al. (2007) noted that checking validity of
research questions is important for the validation of the study findings.
The study`s questionnaire was pilot tested to some randomly selected respondents, the process
that helped the researcher assess the validity of the questions developed for the collection of the
required and reliable data. According to Saunders et al. (2007) as cited in Bakuwa (2009), pilot
43
testing enables the researcher to obtain some assessment of the questions’ validity and the likely
reliability of the data that will be collected.
Cronbach`s alpha statistic was used to assess reliability of some study variables. Pallant (2005)
established that Cronbach`s alpha values of above 0.7 are considered acceptable in terms of
demonstrating good internal consistency reliability for the scale used.
3.6. Chapter Summary
This chapter has presented a detailed outline of the study methodology by including the
processes that were used in gathering and analyzing data. The study collected data through the
use of 3 different sets of questionnaires. The chapter has also presented the data collection tools
as well as how data were analysed and presented among other things. The next chapter presents
the results, the analysis and interpretation of the data collected in this study.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.0. Introduction
This chapter presents and discusses the research results. The presentation and discussion is based
on the questionnaire responses under each of the following research thematic areas of labour
inspection activities and labour disputes settlement; compliance with inspectors’ work strategies;
value of enforcement notices or orders in disputes settlement and the appropriateness of labour
inspection roles in disputes settlement.
4.1. Study Response Rate
The total number of questionnaires that were administered and responses received from the study
respondents are shown in table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Response Rate of the Study.
Set of questionnaire Number of
administered
questionnaires
Number of
responded
questionnaires
Response rate
(%)
Labour inspectors’ questionnaire 57 54 95
Head labour inspectors’ questionnaire 3 3 100
Key informants’ questionnaire 3 3 100
Firstly, table 4.1 indicates that 54 labour inspectors out of 57 provided responses. This represents
a response rate of 95 %. All labour inspectors from the Northern and Southern regions responded
45
to the labour inspectors’ questionnaire. The 3 labour inspectors who did not respond to the labour
inspectors’ questionnaire were from the Central region. Secondly, table 4.1 also shows that all
the 3 head labour inspectors responded to their set of questionnaire. This represents a response
rate of 100 %. Thirdly, the same table 4.1 indicates that all 3 key informants responded to their
set of questionnaire, giving a response rate of 100 %.
4.2. Experience and Professionalism of Labour Inspectors
As indicated in chapter 3, this study was a technical study that needed technical respondents who
were professionals. To reflect this need, the questionnaire for labour inspectors, among other
areas, required respondents to indicate their work experiences as well as their professionalism so
as to validate the study`s findings. Responses on the work experience question revealed that over
81 % of the respondents had worked for 10 years and above as labour inspectors at the time of
this study. None of the respondents had less than 5 years of work experience as a labour
inspector. In terms of professionalism, the results showed that 87 % of the respondents were
labour inspectors who had undergone some form of labour inspection training to the extent that
some of them had acquired labour inspection certificates.
4.3. Labour Inspection Activities
Respondents were asked to indicate labour inspection activities that they perform during their
labour inspection work with a Yes or No as their response options. The activities’ list included
the following: (a) compliance promotion (encouraging workplace parties to comply with
required labour laws); (b) assisting employers and employees to resolve their disputes; (c)
46
enforcing orders or notices and (d) advising employers and employees regarding their
entitlements. The results are presented in table 4.2.
Table 4.2 : Labour Inspection Activities
Activity Responses, N = 54
YES Percent NO Percent
Compliance promotion (encourage
workplace parties to comply with required
labour laws)
53
98
1
2
Advise employers and employees regarding
their entitlements
51
94
3
6
Enforce orders or notices 49 91 5 9
Assist employers and employees to resolve
their disputes
48
89
6
11
Table 4.2 shows that all the four inspection activities are performed by the majority of the labour
inspectors during their inspection work as shown by percentages of YES responses against each
one of them that range from 89 % to 98 %. In addition to these four, some respondents also
mentioned some other activities that they perform during labour inspection. These include
investigating labour conditions for the information of the government and competent authority of
any defects not covered by legal provisions in force and settling labour complaints.
47
4.4. Role of Labour Inspection Activities in Labour Disputes Settlement.
Having identified labour inspection activities performed during labour inspection visits, the study
also attempted to establish whether these inspection activities are instrumental in easing the
labour disputes settlement or not. The measure was determined on a five-point scale with a 5
representing very instrumental and 1 representing not sure. Table 4.3 shows the results.
Table 4.3 : Role of Labour Inspection Activities in Labour Disputes Settlement.
Labour inspection activity Very
instrumental
Instrumental
/ Somewhat
instrumental
Not
instrumental
Not sure
Advise employers/employees
regarding their entitlements
79.6 %
16.7 %
0 %
3.7 %
Compliance promotion 60.3 % 34 % 1.9 % 3.8 %
Enforce orders or notices 50.9 % 47.2 % 1.9 % 0 %
Assist employers and employees to
resolve their disputes
39.7 %
39.6 %
11.3 %
9.4 %
N = 54
Table 4.3 shows that all the labour inspection activities are instrumental in easing the settlement
of labour disputes. Advising employers and employees regarding their entitlements is an activity
indicated with a relatively high percentage of 80 % followed by the activities of compliance
promotion (60 %), enforcement of orders or notices (51 %) and assisting employers and
employees to resolve their disputes (40 %). However, 11 % of the respondents indicated that
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assisting employers and employees to resolve their disputes is not instrumental in easing the
disputes settlement process.
On advising employers and employees regarding their entitlements, the results of this study
indicate a relatively high percentage of the respondents who agreed that this activity is very
instrumental in easing labour disputes settlement. This means that above two-thirds of labour
inspectors in Malawi hold a view that labour disputes settlement process is being eased to a
greater extent through the inspectors’ advisory services for the disputants. According to
Richthofen (2002), rights at work if not fulfilled to each other by either party are bound to be a
major source of rights labour disputes. This suggests that there would be more unsettled
workplace rights disputes whenever such rights at work are violated. Rights at work are
entitlements (Labour Relations Act, 1996, Employment Act, 2000). These can mainly be
fulfilled once they are identified and known by either party otherwise, it may be difficult for
either party to know what is right to be done to the other party hence disputes. The fact that these
entitlements are mostly known to employers and employees through advisory services by labour
inspectors, explains why the majority of the respondents in this study subscribed to the view that
advising employers and employees regarding their entitlements is very instrumental in labour
disputes settlement.
On the promotion of compliance, the results indicate a relatively moderate percentage of the
respondents who agreed that the inspection activity of compliance promotion is very
instrumental in labour disputes settlement. This implies that if compliance promotion can be
intensified, it can also help to bring about positive impact on labour disputes settlement in
49
Malawi. This agrees with Pires (2008) who found that labour inspection practices associated with
compliance promotion have positive outcomes that lead into workplace parties improving their
working conditions. The possible explanation of why compliance promotion came second after
advice on entitlements could be because the effectiveness of compliance promotion seems to
depend on knowledge of work entitlements by workplace parties. This is true because only if
workplace parties or disputants know their entitlements probably through inspectors’ advice is
when they can find it easy to do as required hence compliance otherwise there would be nothing
to be complied with in respect to fair labour practices on their part.
On assisting employers and employees to resolve their disputes, the results indicate that a
relatively low percentage of the respondents agreed that this activity is very instrumental in
labour disputes settlement. On the other hand, 11 % of the respondents (a percentage relatively
high as compared to percentages of those respondents for each of the other 3 activities for the
same response option i.e. < 2 %), held a contrary view that this activity is not instrumental in
easing the settlement of labour disputes. This suggests that assisting employers and employees to
resolve their disputes, despite being shown to be very instrumental, is not really the immediate
activity to ease the settlement of labour disputes as compared to the other 3 activities. The
possible explanation for this result is that workplace disputants can at best manage to resolve a
dispute if, first, they know their entitlements probably through inspectors’ advisory services to
them and second, if they have adopted the behaviour of compliance with required fair labour
practices.
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In summary, the above analysis leads to a conclusion that the labour disputes settlement process
in Malawi can be more eased through labour inspectors’ advice to employers and employees
regarding their entitlements and compliance promotion as compared to performance of the other
two inspection activities of enforcing notices and/or orders and assisting employers and
employees to resolve their disputes.
4.5. The Compliance with Inspectors` Strategies
Labour inspectors use their advisory skills and command of knowledge on labour laws to employ
various inspection strategies in performing their inspection activities. In this study, respondents
were asked to indicate the extent to which the workplace disputants comply with the following
labour inspectors’ strategies: (a) labour inspectors’ formed opinions about compliance with
legislation while working with the parties during facilitation to resolve the problem based on
inspectors’ opinions; (b) enforcement notices; (c) labour inspectors’ facilitation for parties to
resolve a disagreement according to provisions of labour laws; (d) advised compliance actions;
(e) enforcement orders; (f) enforceable actions; (g) improvement notices and (h) demand notices.
Table 4.4 shows the results.
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Table 4.4 : Compliance with Inspectors’ Strategies
Labour inspectors’ work strategy A Great
deal
Very
little/Little
Not sure
Labour inspector’s facilitations 74.1 % 16.7 % 9.3 %
Labour inspector’s formed opinions 57.4 % 37 % 5.6 %
Advised compliance actions 43.1 % 45.1 % 11.8 %
Enforcement orders 37.7 % 49 % 13.2 %
Enforceable undertakings/ actions 33.3 % 53 % 13.7 %
Enforcement notices 32.1 % 60 % 7.5 %
Improvement notices 24.5 % 58.5 % 17 %
Demand notices 16.7 % 55.6 % 27.8 %
N = 54
Table 4.4 indicates that the inspection strategy of labour inspectors’ facilitations for parties to
resolve a disagreement according to provisions of labour laws is being indicated with a highest
response rate of 74 % followed by a strategy of labour inspectors` formed opinions about
compliance with legislation while working with the parties during facilitation to resolve the
problem based on inspectors’ opinions with a 57 %; strategy of advised compliance actions with
43 %; strategy of enforcement orders with 38 %; strategy of enforceable actions with 33 %;
strategy of enforcement notices with 32 %; strategy of improvement notices with 25 % and lastly
the strategy of demand notices with 17 %. However, 60 % of the respondents held a view that
enforcement notices are observed by the workplace parties on a very small scale.
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From table 4.4, it is shown that all the inspectors’ strategies are observed by workplace parties to
various degrees. This means that each of the strategies has certain influence on the activities of
the workplace parties. This finding agrees with Pires (2008) who observed that inspectors’ styles
of inspection have considerable impact on the activities of a workplace. However, what is worth
further discussing in this case is why the inspection strategies of facilitation and of informed
opinions have been shown to be observed under a great deal rating response option by more than
half of the respondents as compared to others. On the other hand, it is also of much interest to
discuss why only a few respondents indicated that the strategy of demand notice is complied
with.
First, facilitation uses conciliation procedures. According to Sikwese (2010), conciliation is
defined as a process of bringing disputing parties together with a view to facilitating the reaching
of an agreement between them. Pitt (2000) cited in Sikwese (2010) noted that the product of
facilitation is the settlement agreement. It is a fact that workplace in a dispute are usually in a
dire need to reach an agreement. Furthermore, the workplace disputants feel satisfied with any
settlement agreement that is being felt as their own realized product. In this case, labour
inspector only facilitates and does not own the parties’ product. This probably explains why
many respondents indicated that inspectors’ facilitation strategy is complied with by the parties
involved in a dispute.
Second, according to Finnemore (1998), inspectors’ formed opinions help the workplace parties
to understand each other’s position more clearly through the inspector’s contributions made by
way of suggesting possible alternatives and trade-offs. Like the facilitation, this strategy has an
53
effect of leaving the parties entirely free to settle on such terms as they see fit (Selywn, 1991)
hence its preference by the workplace parties.
In contrast, demand notices seem to have a connotation of force effects in the eyes of the
workplace parties, hence the failure to be observed by the parties involved in a dispute. This
seems to suggest that parties feel threatened with demand notice approach and therefore find
problems to observe such notices. This argument is further supported by Kantsemo (1995) and
Banda (2008a) who noted that labour inspectors’ demands are looked at as mere threats without
legal basis in the eyes of some employers and employees unless they are justified.
Finally, a relatively high percentage of the respondents with a view that enforcement notices are
observed by the workplace parties to a lesser extent could be explained as follows. As defined by
New Zealand- Department of Labour in Sivananthiram (2006), effective enforcement notices are
the ones which are persuasively written with references cited from relevant labour laws directing
the workplace parties to act according to the instructions contained in the notices. This implies
that enforcement notices that are not persuasively written are likely to give problems to some
workplace parties hence likely not to be observed. Therefore the respondents might have felt so
based on their experiences and the fact that Malawi Labour Inspectorate Service Authorities and
Inspectors are currently not seen to be practically performing in their noble inspection work
(Dzimbiri, 2008) hence possibility for them to use ineffective enforcement notices that cannot be
observed. Nevertheless, some studies have shown that effective enforcement notices are
respected and followed by workplace parties (Nyanda, 1989, Ludaka, 1997,).
54
In summary, the above analysis leads to a conclusion that the two inspectors’ strategies of
facilitation and formed opinions have rather a common feature of giving parties disputing the
freedom freedom to arrive at their desired settlement agreement hence the high probability of
being complied with than the other inspection strategies.
4.6. The Value of Enforcement Notices and/or Orders in Settlement of Labour Disputes.
Enforcement notices or orders are the inspection strategies with which a labour inspector
prepares a written note for the concerned workplace parties to act if the inspector believes that
such a concerned party has failed to comply with any strategy or provision of the required labour
laws (Sivananthiram, 2006). The other strategies are usually used without the involvement of any
written note and may not necessarily follow the non-compliant act except the improvement and
demand notices which are inclusive as alternative forms within the enforcement notices and
orders. This means that the enforcement notices or orders are quite inclusive. In this study,
respondents were therefore asked to indicate their opinions on the contribution of enforcement
notices and/ or orders towards the settlement of labour disputes on a five-point scale with 5
representing strongly agree and 1 representing strongly disagree. Table 4.5 shows results.
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Table 4.5 : Value of Enforcement Notices and/or Orders in Settlement of Labour Disputes.
Value Strongly
Agree/
Agree
Strongly
disagree/
Disagree
Don`t
know
Tools for compliance which can help to
avoid workplace parties` actions that may
lead into disputes
87 %
7.4 %
5.6 %
Allow parties to have time to evaluate
their actions in line with law
requirements
79.6 % 14.8 % 5.6 %
Contain improvement actions for
employers and employees to consider
thereby resulting into parties initiating
their own effort to settle their dispute
79.6 %
9.3 %
11.1 %
Force employers and employees to
resolve their disputes
68.5 % 22.2 % 9.3 %
N = 54
Table 4.5 indicates that 87 % of the respondents agree that notices and/ or orders are good tools
for compliance by workplace parties. They also allow parties to have time to evaluate their
actions in line with law requirements and they are also perceived to contain improvement actions
for the parties’ considerations during their attempt to handle their disputes (80 %). Finally these
notices and/ orders are viewed as having effects of forcing disputants to resolve their disputes
(69 %). All the views in agreement indicate that enforcement notices and/ or orders contribute
towards the settlement of labour disputes. However, 22 % of the respondents indicate that
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enforcement notices or orders do not contribute towards the settlement of labour disputes by way
of forcing employers and employees to resolve their disputes.
This study has shown that enforcement notices or orders contribute towards the settlement of
labour disputes in a number of ways. They act as good tools for compliance that is useful in
avoiding workplace parties’ actions that usually lead into disputes. They allow workplace parties
to have time to evaluate their actions in line with law requirements, the process that can help
parties meet their employment contract obligations without perpetuating disputes. These study
results are in line with (Courdouan, 2005) who observed that enforcement notices or orders are
usually applied as remedial measures when the inspector believes that a workplace/ business has
not complied with the relevant law and where the inspector`s facilitated discussions have failed
to resolve the dispute and that an investigation has been undertaken.
From the results, it is also shown that labour inspection through enforcement notices and/ or
orders not only allows parties to have time to evaluate their actions in line with law requirements
but also contain improvement actions for employers and employees to consider, thereby resulting
into parties initiating their own effort to settle their disputes. Such reported contributory ways are
further substantiated by key informants who indicated that the workplace labour disputes are
resolved through the work of labour inspectors, enforcing legal provisions relating to conditions
of work and protection of workers through notices and/ or orders in addition to informing and
advising employers and workers on how they can best comply with the law as well as to help
them understand how they might prevent a similar dispute arising in the future. This is why these
57
notices or orders have persuasive or directive effects for the workplace parties as they are well
backed by law once written professionally (Sivananthiram, 2006).
The agreement by a relatively high percentage of respondents that notices and/or orders contain
improvement actions for the parties’ consideration in an attempt to resolve their own dispute
confirms that the Malawi labour disputes settlement framework outlined in chapter one contains
‘privately between parties in disputes’ as one line level of labour dispute resolution (Banda,
Chinangwa & Nielsen, 2007; Banda, ed., 2008). However, the argument here is that even if it is
indeed possible for parties to initiate their own effort to settle their disputes, labour inspection
work still remain the main tool behind any initial settlement effort amongst the workplace parties
themselves. As per key informants’ remarks, this becomes possible because the inspection work
plays a role of informing and advising employers and workers on how they can best comply with
the laws in addition to enforcing legal provisions relating to conditions of work and protection of
workers. This therefore has effects on employers and employees to learn to act within the law
requirements hence avoid or resolve their labour disputes between themselves. Above all it can
be argued that the contribution by the employers’ and workers` organizations through their
workplace structures is still a labour inspectors’ implied contribution because the lack of
employers, for example, in the issue of responsibility realization, as remarked by key informants,
to wait for inspectors to police them could be further interpreted to mean that after being policed,
then the employers / workers through their organized structures end up resolving some of their
labour disputes.
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On the other hand, respondents with a view that notices and/or orders through their way of force
cannot contribute towards settlement of labour disputes could be a result of improper application
of such inspection tools amongst inspectors, the respondents themselves. Otherwise, the well
professionally written and served enforcement notices and/ or orders have proved to be very
contributive in respect of reversing some unlawful workplace parties’ decisions and actions
(Richthofen, 2002, Courdouan, 2005, Weil, 2009). However, as observed by Pires (2008), labour
inspectors who are ill-equiped and often unprepared at times while discharging their inspection
work make some workplace parties especially the employers not to be open to inspectors’ advice
as well as not willing to go by the inspectors’ enforcement notices or orders at the inspectors’
request or issue thereby concealing contributions by such notices and orders. This observation
seem to support those respondents who hold a view that enforcement orders or notices seem not
to contribute towards the settlement of labour disputes as earlier presented in subsection 4.5.
Nevertheless, enforcement notices or orders are quite inclusive and contribute in one way or the
other towards disputes settlement process. Hence it is concluded in this study that the
enforcement notices and/or orders are potential inspection tools for (a) the sustainable
compliance which is useful in avoiding workplace parties’ actions that may lead into labour
disputes, (b) they allow disputing parties to have time to evaluate their actions in accordance
with required labour laws and (c) they are directives with suitable improvement actions for
workplace parties to be properly directed in their self attempts to resolve their disputes on their
own.
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4.7. The Relationship of the Labour Disputes Reported and Labour Inspection Visits.
A graphical presentation has been adopted in this study in order to demonstrate how labour
disputes seem to relate to labour inspection work visits. This has provided further explanation to
support the argument being advanced in this study.
Line graphs, L1 and L2 in figure 4.1, have been plotted using information obtained from Mzuzu
city labour office which was organized and presented in a table that appear in appendix C. The
line graph, L1 represents the number of labour inspections conducted and the line graph, L2
represents the number of labour disputes reported at Mzuzu city labour office for a period of 7
years i.e. from 2005 to 2011.
Figure 4.1 : Line Graphs of Labour Inspections conducted and Disputes Reported.
60
The critical study finding depicted in figure 4.1 is that labour disputes reported to labour
inspectors for settlement, seem to decrease whenever the labour inspection visits increase and
vice versa thereby suggesting some relationships between the two. For example, in 2006, year
indicated by 2 in the figure, 126 disputes were reported and 303 inspections were conducted.
While in 2007, year indicated by 3 in the figure, 150 disputes were reported and 10 inspections
were conducted. And in 2008, year indicated by 4 in the figure, 146 disputes were reported and
116 inspections were conducted. This finding suggests some connective links existing between
labour inspections and labour disputes.
The decrease in the labour disputes reported whenever the number of labour inspections
conducted increases could be as a result of the following: either the occurrence of workplace
disputes are reduced which could have been reported to labour inspectors for settlement due to
preventive, enforcement or advisory effects of labour inspection work or it might be because
the disputants did not report their disputes to labour inspectors for settlement. The first reason
seems to be supported by Pires (2008) who argued that labour inspection work if thoroughly
conducted at a workplace leads into improved compliance and hence minimized occurrence of
labour disputes. On the other hand, if the latter reason is true then according to Sikwese (2010)
it means either of the disputants does not know to which office or officers to report their labour
dispute in the first instance as required by law. However this does not rule out the first given
reason but it just acts as another possible reason for having reduced reported labour disputes for
settlement by labour inspectors.
61
4.8. Appropriate Labour Inspection Role (s) in Labour Disputes Settlement.
In order to establish the most appropriate role of labour inspection in aiding the process of labour
disputes settlement, respondents were asked to indicate their opinions regarding the usefulness of
advisory, enforcement and preventive roles in the settlement of labour disputes using a five-point
scale of 5 representing strongly agree and 1 representing strongly disagree. Table 4.6 gives the
results.
Table 4.6 : Appropriate Labour Inspection Role (s) in Labour Disputes Settlement.
Labour inspection role Strongly Agree/
Agree
Strongly disagree/
Disagree
Don`t know Mean
Scores
Advisory role 96.3 % 1.9 % 1.9 % 2.94
Enforcement role 88.9 % 9.3 % 1.9 % 2.79
Preventive role 77.8 % 11.1 % 11.1 % 2.67
N = 54
Table 4.6 reveals that 96 % of the respondents strongly agree/agree that advisory role is the most
appropriate labour inspection role that aids the process of dispute settlement followed by the
enforcement role (89 %) and then the preventive role (78 %). This means that advisory role is the
most appropriate of the three roles in aiding the settlement of labour disputes in Malawi.
Further assessment using paired samples t-test was done to determine whether the differences in
the mean scores were statistically significant. The results revealed that the differences in
62
advisory role and preventive role were statistically significant (P < 0.05) while those of advisory
role and enforcement role were not statistically significant (P > 0.05). This means that the
respondents perceive advisory role as more appropriate in aiding labour dispute settlement than
preventive role.
This finding disagrees with Richhofen (2002) and Masayuki (2008) who held that, it is the
preventive role which is considered as the best in aiding labour disputes settlement because it is
good to prevent than to merely sanction or punish. Furthermore, Bendeman (n.d) argued that ‘by
the time the dispute gets to conciliation, a lot of irreversible damage has been done to the
relationship making reinstatement very difficult’. This implies that prevention is better than
enforcement and advisory roles.
Respondents were further asked to indicate a reason as to why they viewed each of the three
inspection roles as useful in the settlement of labour disputes. Four reasons were given against
which each role was to be matched. These four reasons were: (1) plays a role of advancing
information to employers and employees which is useful for their dispute settlement or dispute
prevention; (2) leads into settlement of more labour disputes without difficulties; (3) instrumental
to avoid the increased occurrence of workplace labour disputes; and (4) good at eliminating
possible irreparable damages as a result of prevented disputes (Bendeman, n.d).
According to the respondents in this study, advisory role of labour inspection is perceived as the
most appropriate role in aiding the settlement of labour disputes because of three reasons: first, it
plays a role of advancing information to employers and employees which is useful for their
63
dispute settlement or dispute prevention (65 %). Second, it leads into settlement of more labour
disputes without difficulties (54 %). Finally, it is instrumental in the avoidance of increased or
continued occurrence and recurrence of workplace labour disputes (50 %). On the other hand,
preventive role was indicated by the respondents to be good at eliminating possible irreparable
damages as a result of prevented disputes when compared to the other two inspection roles.
Certain factors could possibly be connected to the differences in the study findings. First, this
study took place in Malawi, a developing country, whereas other studies were conducted in other
developed countries such as China (Masayuki, 2008). Second, the workplace parties in Malawi
could easily accommodate the advisory role which constitutes several pieces of advice being
given by the labour inspector without necessarily threatening or burdening them with a lot of
required actions to be done and followed as is the case with preventive roles. Third, an advice is
usually given following the request that might have been made by parties to a labour inspector
based on problem encountered unlike a preventive measure that does not usually follow any
workplace reported problem before it is issued. Hence the high likelihood for the advisory role in
resolving labour disputes as compared to preventive role. This is further substantiated by
Richthofen (2002) who stated that in times of economic difficulties, there is the temptation, often
backed by public policy, to rely too much on advice and information and refrain from
‘unpopular’ enforcement measures. This is true with the Malawi case. For instance, proprietors
of small scale businesses in Malawi with a capital of less than Mk100, 000, are just advised to
pay, by installments over time, huge arrears in wages accumulated due to underpayments of
wages, rather than enforcing the immediate pay of such wage arrears at once as may be required
by labour laws (MoL, 2008). This is based on the fact that a business with such a capital can be
64
put out of business if asked to pay huge amount of wage arrears at once, which is against the
desire of the Malawi government. Fourth, this study used degree of usefulness being determined
through use of point scale ratings as a measuring tool, whereas other studies used the actual
number of settled labour disputes through labour inspection as a measuring tool to establish the
most appropriate role of labour inspection (Masayuki, 2008 & ILO studies, 1994-1995). Finally,
this study used only professional labour inspectors as the study population, whereas Masayuki`s
study used some other selected officials from the employers’ and employees’ organizations in
addition to labour inspectors to constitute study sample.
In summary, the above analysis has shown that the advisory role is the most appropriate role in
aiding the process of labour disputes settlement in Malawi. Prevention role though important is
the least appropriate in Malawi. Among other factors, this is because prevention role is
performed as a routine function with an objective to arrest some future disputes hence rarely
undertaken and thus felt not appropriate role in labour disputes settlement unlike the advisory
role that is performed mainly as a direct response to a dispute and rarely done as a routine
function.
4.9. Chapter Summary.
This chapter has presented the research findings and discussed them with reference to the
available literature. The chapter has discussed labour inspection activities in settlement of labour
disputes, contribution of enforcement notices and/or orders in dispute settlement. It has also
discussed the most appropriate inspection roles in aiding labour dispute settlement process. The
next chapter presents the study conclusions and recommendations.
65
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.0. Introduction
This final chapter presents a summary of the findings of this study. It draws relevant conclusions
and makes some recommendations. The chapter also presents possible areas for further research.
5.1. Summary of Findings and Conclusions
This study set out to provide empirical evidence of the contribution of labour inspection to the
settlement of labour disputes in Malawi. In order to accomplish the stated purpose, the study
attempted to answer the following four research questions: (1) How is labour dispute settlement
process between employers and employees eased as a result of labour inspection activities? (2)
Do the workplace disputing parties observe labour inspectors’ strategies? (3) How do
enforcement notices and/ or orders used by labour inspectors contribute towards the settlement of
labour disputes? (4) Which labour inspection role (s) would most likely lead to compliance?
5.1.1 Question one: Labour dispute settlement process between employers and
employees eased as a result of labour inspection activities
In relation to research question one, the study found that labour inspection activities of advising
employers and employees regarding their entitlements; compliance promotion; enforcing notices
and/or orders and assisting employers and employees to resolve their disputes are all
instrumental in the settlement of labour disputes in Malawi. However, the study found that these
activities are different in their degree of instrumentalism. For instance, advising employers and
employees regarding their entitlements was found to be the most instrumental activity followed
66
by compliance promotion as compared to the other two inspection activities. This shows that the
labour disputes settlement process can be more eased if labour inspectors advise employers and
employees regarding their entitlements and promote compliance.
5.1.2 Question two: Workplace disputing parties observe labour inspectors’ strategies
In relation to the research question two, the study found that all the inspection strategies such as
the strategy of labour inspectors’ facilitations for parties to resolve a disagreement according to
provisions of labour laws; the strategy of labour inspectors’ formed opinions about compliance
with legislation while working with the parties during facilitation to resolve the problem based
on inspectors’ opinions; the strategy of advised compliance actions; the strategy of enforcement
orders; the strategy of enforceable actions; the strategy of enforcement notices; the strategy of
improvement notices; and lastly, the strategy of demand notices are observed by the workplace
parties in Malawi. The study results, however, showed that workplace parties in Malawi to a
larger extent observe the inspectors’ strategies of labour inspectors’ facilitations for parties to
resolve a disagreement according to provisions of labour laws; labour inspectors` formed
opinions about compliance with legislation while working with the parties during facilitation to
resolve the problem based on inspectors’ opinions; advised compliance actions; enforcement
orders; enforceable actions; enforcement notices; improvement notices more willingly as
compared to the strategy of demand notices.
67
5.1.3 Question three: Enforcement notices and/ or orders used by labour inspectors
contribute towards the settlement of labour disputes
In relation to the research question three, the study found that the enforcement notices and/ or
orders are useful inspection tools towards the settlement of labour disputes in Malawi. The study
results showed that these notices and/ or orders help in the settlement of disputes in four different
ways as follows: First, they are good tools for sustainable compliance which is useful in avoiding
workplace parties’ actions that may lead into labour disputes. Second, they allow disputing
parties to have time to evaluate their actions in accordance with required labour laws. Third, they
are directives with suitable improvement actions for workplace parties to be properly directed in
their self attempts to resolve their disputes on their own. Finally, they have effect to force
employers and employees to resolve their disputes. However, the study results showed that
forcing employers and employees to resolve their disputes was the least in terms of the
usefulness of enforcement notices/orders compared to the other three ways. This shows that
enforcement notices and/ or orders are useful inspection tools mainly because of their influence
on compliance that results into workplace disputants avoiding disputes; giving workplace parties
enough time to evaluate their actions and their potential to act as improvement actions for
employers and employees.
5.1.4 Question four: Labour inspection role (s) would most likely lead to compliance
In respect to the research question four, the study found that advisory role of labour inspection is
the most appropriate role aiding the process of labour disputes settlement in Malawi as compared
to the other two roles of enforcement and prevention. The study results, however, showed that
preventive role is the least appropriate role in aiding labour dispute settlement probably because
68
it is performed as a routine function with an objective to arrest some future disputes hence
perceived the least appropriate to address the settlement of labour disputes.
Therefore, the study findings demonstrate that labour inspection in Malawi through its activities
and strategies contributes towards the settlement of labour disputes. Furthermore, the advisory
role of labour inspection is regarded as the most appropriate role that aids the settlement of
labour disputes in Malawi. Based on the findings of this study, it can therefore be concluded that
labour inspection plays a role, in aiding the process of labour dispute settlement, within the
labour disputes settlement framework in Malawi.
5.2 Recommendations
The study, based on the above findings and conclusion, makes the following recommendations.
5.2.1. Recruitment and Training of More Labour Inspectors
This study has shown a decrease in the labour disputes reported whenever the number of labour
inspections conducted increases thereby suggesting some relationship between the inspection
visits carried out and the labour disputes reported to labour inspectors for settlement. However,
at the time of conducting this research, there were 127 established positions of labour inspectors
in Malawi. Of these positions, only 57 of them were filled and the rest were vacant giving a
vacancy rate of 55 %. This means that only 45 % of the required total number of labour
inspectors was working in Malawi. This has a great implication regarding the settlement of
workplace labour disputes in the country. Therefore, in terms of having the required staffing, it is
high time government took a keen interest to recruit and train more labour inspectors to work in
69
the country. These inspectors should be undergoing in-service trainings in form of both refresher
courses as well as full training courses to alert inspectors to the new challenges as well as giving
them the confidence and knowledge to efficiently and effectively discharge their inspection
activities.
5.2.2. Prioritising Labour Inspectorate Services in Malawi.
In order for Malawi government to derive the greatest benefit from the labour inspectorate
services particularly in terms of having minimal or reduced occurrence of workplace labour
disputes, government must consider making the labour inspectorate services as one more key
priority area and provide it with adequate resources in terms of required budgetary provisions in
addition to staffing. This study has revealed that not much is being done in terms of conducting
labour inspection visits in Malawi in order to attempt to improve workplace labour relations.
This when done, may result into settling, reducing or minimizing some workplace labour
disputes that are seen to be increasing in the country every year. For example, statistics collected
from 3 city labour offices, showed that during some years between 2005 and 2011, there were
relatively very few labour inspections conducted by some labour offices in the country. This
suggests that either labour inspection service is not a priority for the Malawi government or it
may be due to the inadequate resources available in terms of both human and financial resources.
Hence, the need for the inspectorate services to be a priority.
5.2.3. Formulation and Adoption of Labour Inspection Policy
The Malawi government must put in place labour inspection policy and formulate well defined
programmes through the process of thorough consultations with relevant stakeholders for the
70
effective implementation and coordination of inspection services in the country. Through the
literature review, it has been revealed that the work of labour inspection is well developed in
some countries in the world such as Brazil, Pakistan Republic and in South Africa just to
mention a few. One reason which is behind this success in those countries according to Pires
(2008) and Weil (2009) is that in these countries they have labour inspection policies that
provide direction in addition to providing all other guidelines necessary for the effective
implementation of the inspectorate services. In contrast, Malawi does not have a labour
inspection policy yet. This is despite the call by ILO (2006) for all its member states to have
series of policies to strengthen and modernize their labour inspectorates. Hence, the
recommendations for Malawi to formulate and put in place the labour inspection policy.
5.3 Suggested Areas for Further Research.
Firstly, this study has investigated the role of labour inspections in labour disputes settlement
framework. The study has mainly looked at the general views of labour inspectors regarding the
contribution of labour inspection towards the settlement of labour disputes. A review of literature
shows that a similar study to this one was done in China (Masayuki, 2008). Unlike this study,
Masayuki’s study measured the role of labour inspection in labour disputes settlement
framework by actually quantifying the actual number of labour disputes settled through labour
inspections. Masayuki’s study provided some statistics of actual numbers of settled labour
disputes through labour inspection which is far much required for a country’s policy direction.
However, this study has not provided such a required statistics for policy information. In this
regard, it is suggested that further studies are required that should attempt to investigate the
relationship between labour inspection visits and settled labour disputes.
71
Secondly, a review of the literature has also revealed the need for a developing country like
Malawi to have effective inspectorate services in order to manage the compliance with minimum
standards of employment which is usually violated in most of our developing business
workplaces. This calls for a study to look into the effectiveness of the inspectorate services in
Malawi. The need for such a study was also suggested by Dzimbiri (2008) who posed a possible
research question that: ‘How can the state – Ministry of Labour in particular- be made more
effective in regulating the relationships of employers and employees?’ This question can be
narrowed down to focus on the Ministry’s inspectorate services.
5.4. Conclusion.
In conclusion, this study investigated the contribution of labour inspection in labour disputes settlement in
Malawi. It has found that labour inspection through its activities contributes in aiding the settlement
of labour disputes in Malawi. The study also found that the three labour inspection roles of advisory
role, enforcement and prevention are all appropriate in aiding the settlement of labour disputes.
However, it was found that the advisory role was the most appropriate role in aiding the
settlement of labour disputes in Malawi.
In line with the findings above, the study has made some recommendations that can help to
improve the delivery of labour inspection services which can in turn improve the workplace
labour relations in Malawi. The study has recommended the recruitment and training of more
labour inspectors in Malawi. The study has also recommended the Malawi government to
prioritize labour inspectorate services to improve the country’s labour inspectorate services and
to formulate and adopt labour inspection policy. The study has also suggested the need for
72
further research to investigate and quantify the relationship between labour inspection and the
actual labour disputes that may be settled through the work of labour inspection in Malawi. It
has also been suggested in this study that a further research to investigate the effectiveness of
labour inspectorate services in Malawi may be necessary.
73
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APPENDIX A 1 : The Questionnaires
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR LABOUR INSPECTORS
Dear Respondent,
You are being invited to take part in providing responses to this questionnaire which is a tool for collecting
data to be used solely by Kalani Malema, University of Malawi – Polytechnic student, for his masters degree
research study titled: ``The role of labour inspection in labour disputes settlement process in Malawi``. The
aim of the study is to contribute to the understanding of the importance of labour inspection roles played, in
aiding the labour disputes settlement process in various ways.
Please answer the questions in this questionnaire as completely and honestly as possible. Your responses will
be treated with utmost confidentiality. The answering can approximately take 15 to 20 minutes of your time.
Your participation in this study is highly appreciated. Thank you.
________________________________________________________________________________
Please insert a tick in the appropriate box provided or write where appropriate.
Section A: General information.
Country region :
North Centre South
Location :
District Township City
Name of labour office:
………………………………………………...
Are you employed and working as a labour officer
and / or inspector?
1 Yes
2 No
Professional qualification / training:
1 Labour inspection training
2 Labour inspection certificate
3 Other professional certificate (s) /
training. (Please specify)
………………………………...
Work experience as labour officer and / or inspector:
1 Less than 5 years
2 From 5 to 9 years
3 From 10 to 14 years
4 From 15 to 20 years
5 Above 20 years
Section B :
1. Which of the following labour inspection activities do you perform during your inspecting work?
(Please tick all that apply).
1 Encourage workplace parties to comply with required labour laws.
2 Assist employers and employees to resolve their disputes.
3 Enforce orders or notices
4 Advise employers and employees regarding their entitlements.
5 Any other activities. (Specify). …………………………………………………………..
2. Rate the extent to which you find each of the activities YOU ticked in Q 1. above instrumental in
simplifying the process of Labour disputes settlement.
81
Activities
Not
Sure
Not
instrum
ental
Instrum
ental
Some
what
instru
ment
al
Very
instru
menta
l
1 2 3 4 5
1. Compliance promotion
2. Assist employers and employees to resolve disputes
3. Enforce orders or notices
4. Advise employers and employees regarding their
entitlements
5. Re-write your specified activity and tick
……………….. ……………………………………
……………………………………………………...
3. Please rate the extent to which the workplace disputing parties comply with each
of the following:
Very
little
Little Fairly
little
Not
sure
A great
deal
1 2 3 4 5
1 Enforcement notices
2 Enforcement orders
3 Improvement notice
4 Advised compliance action
5 Labour inspector’s formed opinions about
compliance with legislation and work with the
parties during facilitation to resolve the problem
based on inspector’s opinion
6 Labour inspector’s facilitation for parties to
resolve a disagreement in relation to a request for
flexible work arrangements according to
provisions of Labour laws.
7 Enforceable actions
8 Demand notices
4. Please tick the way (s) you find enforcement notices or orders contributive towards the
settlement of labour disputes.
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Don`t
know
Agree Strongl
y
Agree
1 2 3 4 5
1 Notices allow parties to have time to evaluate their
actions in line with law requirements.
2 Orders or notices are good tools for compliance which
can help to avoid workplace parties` actions that may
lead into disputes.
3 Notices or orders force employers and employees to
resolve their disputes
82
4 Notices or orders contain improvement actions for
employers and employees to consider thereby resulting
into parties initiating their own effort to settle their
dispute .
5. a. Overall, which of the following roles of labour inspection, do you find most useful in
aiding the settlement of labour disputes? (Please tick your optional answer against each role)
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Don`t
know
Agree Strongl
y
Agree
1 2 3 4 5
1 Enforcement role
2 Advisory role
3 Preventive role
b. What is the reason for your answer in Q 5. a. above. (Please tick answer (s) of your
choice).
Enforcement role Advisory Role Preventive Role
1 2 3
1. Instrumental to avoid the increased
occurrence of workplace labour
disputes.
2. Good at eliminating possible irreparable
damages as a result of prevented
disputes.
3. Leads into settlement of more labour
disputes without difficulties
4. Plays a role of advancing information to
employers and employees which is
useful for their dispute settlement or
dispute prevention.
5 Any other. (Specify).
……………………………………...
…………………………………… ..
6. How much time do you dedicate yourself to your work of labour inspecting as compared to your
other labour services / duties. (Please tick an answer of your choice).
1. Labour inspection time equal to that of other labour services / duties.
2. Labour inspection time less than that of other labour services / duties.
3. Labour inspection time more than that of other labour services / duties.
83
7. If your answer to Q. 6 above is 2 i.e. Labour inspection time less than that of other labour
services / duties, do you think that has impacted / influenced towards each of the following:
Relate / refer to your previous experience and to your work record if any.
YES Neutral NO.
1 2 3
1. Increased occurrence of workplace labour disputes
2. Decreased number of settled labour disputes
3. Increased number of disputes being reported to labour
office for settlement
4. Complicated dispute settlement process.
8. Apart from the work of labour inspection, what else contributes towards settlement of labour
disputes. (Please tick answer of your choice).
Strongl
y
disagree
Disagre
e
Don`t
know
Agree Strongly
Agree
1 2 3 4 5
1.
Trade Union`s work influence
2.
ECAM`s work influence.
3.
Own effort among workplace parties in disputes
4.
Court`s work.
5 Works by other Government`s stakeholders in disputes
resolution process
6 Influence of labour officers by their other works.
7 Any other. (Specify).
…………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………
END OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR LABOUR OFFICERS / INSPECTORS
Thank you very much for your responses provided.
84
APPENDIX A 2 : QUESTIONNAIRE FOR HEAD LABOUR INSPECTORS OR THEIR
REPRESENTATIVES.
Dear Respondent,
You are being invited to take part in providing responses to this questionnaire which is a tool for collecting
data to be used solely by Kalani Malema, University of Malawi – Polytechnic student, for his masters degree
research study titled: ``The role of labour inspection in labour disputes settlement process in Malawi``. The
aim of the study is to contribute to the understanding of the importance of labour inspection roles played, in
aiding the labour disputes settlement process in various ways.
Please answer the questions in this questionnaire as completely and honestly as possible. Your responses will
be treated with utmost confidentiality. The answering can approximately take less than two hours of your
time.
Your participation in this study is highly appreciated. Thank you.
________________________________________________________________________________
NAME OF LABOUR OFFICE : ……………………………………………………………………..
1. Please provide relevant information in the tables 11A, 11B & 11C below using your office
maintained records and reports. The information could be dated as far back as 2005.
Table 11 A
Year No. of labour
inspections
conducted
No. of labour
disputes settled by
labour officers /
inspectors
No. of disputes
referred to other
offices
No. of Non-
settled disputes
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
85
Table 11 B : Indicate the NUMBER of handled / reported disputes by type / nature as described in the table
Nature/ Type of handled
Labour disputes
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Claim of notice pay
Underpayments of wages
Non payments of overtime wages
Claim of severance allowance
Dismissals
Industrial disputes(strikes)
Others
Table 11C: TICK for each year the infringement that were reported.
Infringements reported
during labour inspection
visits
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Underpayments of wages
Non-payments of overtime
Absence of annual leave
Violations of labour
agreements
Employement of children
Others
END OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR HEAD LABOUR OFFICERS / INSPECTORS.
Thank you very much for your responses provided.
86
APPENDIX A 3 : QUESTIONNAIRE FOR KEY INFORMANTS.
Dear Respondent,
You are being invited to take part in providing responses to this questionnaire which is a tool for collecting
data to be used solely by Kalani Malema, University of Malawi – Polytechnic student, for his masters degree
research study titled: ``The role of labour inspection in labour disputes settlement process in Malawi``. The
aim of the study is to contribute to the understanding of the importance of labour inspection roles played, in
aiding the labour disputes settlement process in various ways.
Please answer the questions in this questionnaire as completely and honestly as possible. Your responses will
be treated with utmost confidentiality. The answering can approximately take 15 to 20 minutes of your time.
Your participation in this study is highly appreciated. Thank you.
________________________________________________________________________________
1. Please indicate which of the following functions of Labour inspection system are performed
during labour inspection visits by your labour inspectors. Rate them according to
their priority order.
Mostly
prioritised
Most
prioritised
Just
prioritised
priotised Least
prioritised
1 2 3 4 5
1. Enforce legal provisions relating to
conditions of work and protection of
workers.
2. Inform and advise employers and
workers on how they can best comply
with the Laws
3. Advise the competent authority of defects
or abuses not specifically covered by
existing legal provisions.
4. determine that the relevant law has been
complied with
5. Take all reasonable steps to ensure
compliance
6 Support employers, workers and other
people to comply through the provision
of information and education
7. Produce written determination that is
legally binding on parties.
8 Influence business workplaces to become
compliant with the law.
9. Ensure that employers and employees
understand their obligations and
entitlements.
10 Ensure that employers and employees
understand how they might prevent a
similar dispute arising in the future
2. There are some other stakeholders that may also be involved in labour disputes resolution in
Malawi apart from your Ministry, particularly your labour inspectorate services. In your own
opinion, how do you compare the contributions by labour inspection work and those of the rest
87
in as far as labour disputes settlement is concerned. (Please tick answer of your choice).
Most
contrib
utive
Contrib
utive
Equal Not
contri
butiv
e
Least
contri
butive
1 2 3 4 5
1. Labour inspection
2. Other labour services / duties
3. Other Stakeholders` work / services
3. Explain reasons for your answer in Q 2 above.:
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
END OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR KEY INFORMANTS.
Thank you very much for your responses provided.
88
APPENDIX B : Selected Reasons and Comments
Key Informants
1. Through the inspectorate services, we enforce minimum standards in the workplace which in turn
promotes industrial peace, social justice and an environment which is conducive to social economic
development.
2. Employers` and Employees` organisations have been invaluable in their contribution towards
industrial peace through structures in workplaces which are useful in resolving labour disputes.
3. The Industrial Relations Court (IRC) has been very instrumental in resolving disputes through
arbitration services
4. The services are complementary
5. Labour inspection is contributive because labour officers / inspectors are found in all the districts;
have the direct mandate to conduct inspections and hence have considerable impact.
6. Other stakeholders do not contribute much because their mandate is not clear. The policy on labour
inspections, which is not in place, would have helped to clarify their role.
7. Trade unions and NGOs lack the capacity for wider coverage.
8. Employers are yet to realize that it is their responsibility and for the good of their enterprises to
observe and respect labour laws and not wait for labour inspectors to do the policing on them.
9. Other labour services / duties do not contribute much because they focus on specific issues such as
following up on workers compensation cases and facilitating the public employment exchange
services.
Labour Inspectors.
1. Investigate labour conditions for the information of the government and competent authority of any
defects not covered by legal provision in force.
2. Advisory role played by traditional and religious leaders in advocating that the settlement of labour
disputes is the mandatory work for labour inspectors / officers.
3. Advisory role of labour inspection helps to import ingredients that would be used to avoid a dispute
from degenerating into strike.
89
APPENDIX C : Raw Data Collected and Organised
Raw Data for 2005 to 2011 Annual years.
Year Name of
labour
office
No.
CLI
No.
SLD
Nature / type of reported / handled labour
disputes
Totals
for A-
E
Totals
for A-
F A B C D E F
2005 Mzuzu 193 334 73 170 792 58 18 622 170 792
Lilongwe 94 1228 102 1104 1960 254 360 856 1104 1960
Blantyre 6 1302 150 1170 2217 366 260 1047 1170 2217
2006 Mzuzu 303 352 41 126 641 30 37 515 126 641
Lilongwe 78 1241 70 1100 2168 270 205 1068 1100 2168
Blantyre 21 1193 198 1417 2203 324 80 786 1417 2203
2007 Mzuzu 10 217 31 150 520 28 76 370 150 520
Lilongwe 23 1508 283 1390 2062 419 207 672 1390 2062
Blantyre 9 986 284 1511 1664 201 46 153 1511 1664
2008 Mzuzu 116 197 53 146 708 43 42 562 146 708
Lilongwe 8 2117 270 1602 2269 184 602 667 1602 2269
Blantyre 648 1024 180 1403 1520 410 160 117 1403 1520
2009 Mzuzu 42 221 126 281 919 99 35 638 281 919
Lilongwe 44 1364 343 1240 1956 106 142 716 1240 1956
Blantyre 104 1420 203 1120 2430 380 104 1310 1120 2430
2010 Mzuzu 2 385 124 313 1111 121 29 798 313 1111
Lilongwe 17 1614 103 1184 2295 82 277 1111 1184 2295
Blantyre 11 1006 310 1584 1737 659 118 153 1584 1737
2011 Mzuzu 50 744 122 266 1161 114 13 895 266 1161
Lilongwe 15 1402 314 1183 1941 120 155 758 1183 1941
Blantyre 43 1292 274 1086 2446 112 104 1360 1086 2446
Totals Mzuzu 716 2450 570 1452 5852 493 250 4400 1452 5852
Lilongwe 279 10474 1485 8803 14651 1435 1948 5848 8803 14651
Blantyre 837 8223 1599 9291 14217 2452 872 4926 9291 14217
Gran
totals
1,832 21147 3654 19546 34720 4380 3070 15174 19546 34720
Key/ No. CLI - No. of conducted labour inspections; No. SLD - No. of settled labour disputes s;
Claim of notice pay (A); Underpayments of overtime wages (B); Non-payment of overtime wages (C),
Claim of severance allowance (D); Dismissals (E); Others (F).
Data source: Organised and compiled raw data from unpublished office reports and registers
maintained at the Malawi three City Labour Offices of Mzuzu, Lilongwe and Blantyre.