The role of Great Britain in the American Civil War

“Recognition of the Confederacy meant war with the Union.”

Robert FoussatHistory 4990

November 8, 2012

This paper is about British involvement in the American Civil war, and will argue

that the Confederate diplomacy considered only one element of the position of Great

Britain when seeking recognition of the newly formed Confederate States of America.

The one element that the Confederates emphasized was the effect that an absence of

cotton in the British textile industry would have on the British economy. This paper will

also argue that the United States, (the Union), was more aware of the greater needs of the

British, which were a beneficial trade with the Union, and a good financial relationship,

and that the British decided to stay out of the American Civil War. This paper will

demonstrate what the objectives of both the Confederacy and the Union with regard to

Britain were. It will also argue why British recognition of the Confederacy was so

important to the Southerners. Additionally, it will show the nature of the British position

regarding the American conflict, and it will examine the issue of slavery in relation to

diplomacy amongst Britain, the Union and the Confederacy. Lastly, it will demonstrate

the effects of the war on the British economy, primarily by “King Cotton Diplomacy”,

and explore why in the end did Britain took the position it did in the American Civil War.

This paper will demonstrate that it was not, however, in the best interests of Great Britain

to become openly involved in the conflict.

With the onset of the American Civil War in 1861 the newly formed Confederate

States of America, comprising eleven seceded states, representing the southern half of the

United States, began a major effort to enlist British sympathies, aid and, if possible,

military support against the North to force the government of Union President Abraham

Lincoln to stop the war and formally recognize the Confederacy. On October 10, 1861,

Union Secretary of State William Seward stated “it is never to be forgotten that although

2

the sympathy of other nations is eminently desirable, yet foreign sympathy or even

foreign support never did and never can create or maintain any state.” 1 However, if it

were not for the intervention of France, that the American colonies might not have been

able to successfully win their war of independence from Britain in 1783. The major hole

in Seward’s argument is that foreign intervention would not have made a difference in

1861, when French involvement was a major factor in the successful American

Revolution eighty years earlier. For Seward to say in 1861 that foreign involvement

would not have any lasting effect was strongly contradictory by the standards of

American history. In that were it not for the intervention of the French the revolting

American colonies could have very well have been overwhelmed and subjugated once

again to British rule.

There have been many attempts to explain the British position in the US Civil

War. Most of the early commentaries by nineteenth century authors had a stronger bias in

favor of a particular argument or theory. For example, the majority of public opinion

written in the South during, and for most of the next generation after the war, took a very

hostile position towards Britain. There were many instances of Southern accusations of

various motives towards the British, suggesting that Britain was looking to profit from

the war.2 On May 11, 1864, The Richmond Daily Dispatch also went on to say that,

“Britain’s ‘malignant’ policy was aimed at ‘helping both the belligerents utterly to devour

and destroy each other.’”3 This mentality was prevalent in the former Confederacy

through the early twentieth century. This comment reinforced my view that in the face of

1 Seward to Carl Schurz, Oct. 10 1861, Frederic Bancroft Speeches, Correspondence and Political papers of Carl Schurz (New York, NY 1913), 1922 Blumenthal, Henry, Confederate Diplomacy: Popular notions and international realities, (GA: Journal of Southern History, vol. 32, no. 2, 1966) 1593 Richmond Daily Dispatch, (Richmond) May 11, 1864

3

defeat that the South was unable to see any other position than their own. Yet when the

Confederacy was seeking British diplomatic and perhaps even military aid, no

consideration for British interests was ever discussed.

On May 16, 1861, Her Majesty’s Government issued a formal proclamation that

stated that Britain would “maintain a strict and partial neutrality in the contest between

the said contending parties.”4 Initially, this official statement should have ended any

Confederate hopes for British intervention. This, however, did not lessen Confederate

resolve to pursue British assistance and recognition.

In 1861, the position of the Confederate States of America was to seek

international recognition as a means of securing its position as an independent nation.

The position of the United States of America was to put down the rebellion of the

Southern states in order to preserve the Union. The South strongly appealed to Great

Britain to aid them in their bid for independence, believing that cotton would be the only

factor that would quickly and eagerly bring the British into the war, without considering

the broad needs and situation of Britain. The Confederacy pressed the issue of National

Sovereignty, yet the British still only formally recognized the government in Washington

as the official governing body in the United States. In that cotton was indeed a necessary

resource that had been provided by the American South, yet it was not the only resource

required by Britain.

Great Britain was heavily dependent upon Southern cotton for its large textile

industry. The Confederates believed that cotton was such an important import to the

British that they would need to intervene in the war for the sake of their workers

4 The Times, (London) Civil War in America, May 14, 1861

4

livelihoods. The question has been presented as to why not the British could be neutral

and trade with the Confederacy? From the onset of the war, President Lincoln enacted the

“Anaconda Plan” where the Federal navy would blockade all Confederate ports and

prevent all outside trade. Had the British attempted to continue the cotton trade with the

south as they had before the war there would have undoubtedly been confrontations with

the Union Navy, and there very well could have been an international incident that could

have easily harmed all maritime trade between Britain and the Union. While yes, the

British required cotton for its textile industry, the risks heavily outweighed the need to

keep the Lancashire textile mills full of southern cotton.

Before the Civil War was a certainty, Senator James Henry Hammond (South

Carolina) made precisely this argument before Congress on 4 March 1858. This came to

be known throughout the nation as the “Cotton is King” speech. In this oratory, Senator

Hammond, stated that if there were a three year famine of Southern cotton, “England

would topple headlong and would carry the whole civilized world with her… Cotton is

King.” 5 This was the birth of what would be known to the world as “King Cotton

Mentality.”

Notwithstanding the British textile industry’s heavy dependence upon Southern

cotton, it will be demonstrated that, outside of the need for cotton, the Confederacy did

not consider the broad needs or best interests of the very nation whom they were

attempting to persuade to come to their aid.

The Confederate position was highly presumptuous and extremely one-

dimensional in its approach towards international relations, whereas the war and the

5 Selections from the Letters and Speeches of the Hon. James H. Hammond, of South Carolina (New York: John F. Trow & Co., 1866), 311-322.

5

needs of the British and their empire were treated very differently in the British presses.

At the beginning of the war London Times correspondent William Howard Russell toured

the new Confederacy, and “was clearly irritated by the assumption, repeatedly expressed

to him during his visit, that material considerations alone would determine British policy

towards the South. ‘It is astonishing how positive all these people are that England is in

absolute dependence on cotton for her national existence.’”6

While it was true that Southern cotton greatly affected the Lancashire textile

region, it was only one region of a very vast and complex empire. While the absence of

cotton did have a tremendous effect on the region during the war, it was not the sole

deciding element that would persuade the British parliament that intervention was best

and only option to restore this resource. I have found little evidence that the Confederates

had ever considered the broad economic needs of the British Empire outside of the textile

industry.

Historian James M. McPherson stated in 1988 that the Confederates were well

aware of the position that the absence of cotton in the Lancashire textile district would

place Britain in, and that cotton was to be the main element of Confederate diplomacy

with Great Britain. McPherson estimated that: “Britain imported three-fourths of its

cotton from the American South.” 7 In addition, Ford Risley in 2004 elaborated on this

point, quoting the Charleston Mercury in how it was the position of the paper that it was

6 Crawford, Martin, William Howard Russell and the Confederacy, Journal of American Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2, 19817 McPherson, James M. The Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1988) 383

6

best for the Confederacy to push for “bankruptcy of every cotton factory in Great Britain

and France or the acknowledgement of our independence.”8

In the historiography of the topic of cotton there is little in the way of varying

viewpoints in the South regarding its absolute position that cotton was the only factor that

would determine British policy regarding the Confederacy. Both those who were alive to

witness it and those who have studied it 150 years later share the same views, that the

Confederates gave little thought to the long term needs of Britain.

The two very different positions taken by the British and the Confederate

newspapers demonstrates that there was indeed little in common between the ideas and

temperaments of the government and citizens of the Confederacy and government of

Great Britain. The Charleston Mercury took the absolute position that the Confederates

held an absolute strangle-hold on the British, and that British assistance was a certainty.

The London Times correspondent observed the problem of the absence of Southern cotton

as one, but not the only issue facing Great Britain.

In 1959, historian Frank Lawrence Owsley expanded upon the view point of The

Charleston Mercury, stating that the Union was “carrying on two sets of hostilities” in

that not only was the North attacking the South literally, but was also continually

attacking the British with high tariffs. 9 While it was true that the British did not care for

the high American tariffs, it was hardly a reason to go to war over. To the dismay of the

Confederates there was nothing officially said by the British that they had any intention

of deviating from their announced position of neutrality. The only open deviation by a

8 Risley, Ford, The Civil War: Primary Documents from 1860 to 1865. Westport, Connecticut, (London: Greenwood Press, 2004) 163

9 Frank L. Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy (Chicago, 1959), 192.

7

member of parliament to the contrary was by J. A. Roebuck, who in May of 1863 called

for a motion for the recognition of the Confederacy. By this point in the war, with the

Emancipation Proclamation becoming official on January 1 and with as tide of the war

began to turn against the Confederates, “it was rather clear that the cause of the South

would not command the support of any British party.”10

Henry Blumenthal, writing for the Journal of Southern History in 1966 explored

another avenue as to why, in addition to cotton, the South believed that the British would

come to aid the Confederates. This was the belief that there was a deep kinship between

the Southern planter class and the British landowners.11 Yet, while there were some

similarities between the Southern Planter class and the British country landowners in

terms of manners, traditions and so forth, there was little similarity on the subject of

slavery. In 1861 the South proved it was willing to fight for the institution, while British

landowners were well known abolitionists at this point, Britain having ended the Slave

Trade in 1807 and having legally abolished slavery throughout the British Empire in

1833. This was another failed attempt by the Confederates to bring the British and the

Southerners into a sense of kinship.

In the writings of Owsley and Blumenthal, Owsley in 1959 tended to focus more

on the various elements of the war, from the tariffs and the various attempts of the

Confederates to persuade the British to enter the war on their behalf. Blumenthal in 1966

pointed out how the Confederates took it a step beyond that and tried to appeal to the

hearts of the British by attempting to list some of the ways that their very different lives

10 Jones, Wilbur Devereux, The British conservatives and the American Civil War. (The American Historical review. Vol. 58, No. 3, 1953) IL: The University of Chicago Press, 535.11 Blumenthal, Henry, Confederate Diplomacy: Popular notions and international realities, (GA: Journal of Southern History, vol. 32, no. 2, 1966) 156

8

and lifestyles were actually very similar. Owsley’s book went from the position that the

Confederates were using many arguments that had British attention, but did not persuade

them to action in their behalf. Wilbur Jones, in 1953, added arguments such as if the

North were to lose the South permanently that the North would possibly look to moving

into Canada to compensate for its lost territory.12 Where the thought of American

intervention in Canada was an ever looming concern for the British, there was little to

back up the idea that the Union army moving north was a viable threat. It was readily

viewed as little more than a scare tactic to attempt to move the British towards

involvement in the war. Where Blumenthal presented his point that it was the

Confederate desire to persuade the British by an appeal to heart and home, and that the

North was attacking countries, lands and homesteads in the South that were kin to the

British in every way.

In the North there was a growing concern as to what position Britain would take

in its conflict with the South. McPherson mentioned a conversation with British Prime

Minister Palmerston and Lord Russell in May 1861, where Russell expressed his desire to

keep Britain out of the war. Palmerston, in response, made the comment “They who in

quarrels interpose, will often get a bloody nose.”13 This suggests that Palmerston had the

foresight to know that the British would not be able to leave the American Civil War

unscathed should it choose to enter in any form. While there were many reasons, such as

trade, the stability of the empire, and, quite frankly, Britain’s complete lack of

preparedness for armed intervention, Palmerston and Parliament had the foresight to

12 Jones, Wilbur Devereux, The British conservatives and the American Civil War. (The American Historical review. Vol. 58, No. 3, 1953) IL: The University of Chicago Press, 528.13 McPherson, James M. The Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1988) 384

9

know that there was no version of events that involved intervention that proved entirely

favorable to the British, and that the wisest course of action in the face of the situation

was to simply do nothing.

However, complete non-involvement would change when President Lincoln

authorized the aforementioned “Anaconda Plan,” whereby the Federal navy blockaded all

Confederate ports. This change directly affected British interests, in that the British were

no longer able to receive Southern cotton, save by sporadic and inconsistent blockade

running, and the only way Britain would be able reestablish the free trade of cotton would

to be to run the blockade and risk open provocation of the Federal Navy. In January 1862

the Confederate Congress enacted a formal “Cotton Embargo,” where no cotton would be

sent by any means to Britain in the hopes of coercing the British into breaking the

blockade.14 However, notwithstanding the strain that the Anaconda Plan placed upon

British-Union relations, the British were willing to respect the Union blockade and not to

risk open conflict with the North by trying to break it. McPherson explained the position

from the point of view that there were many factors affecting British policies and

decisions, none of which had entertained the idea of going to war. Owsley reaffirmed my

argument that the South was not considering the broad British decisions with regard to

their decisions on Confederate policy, in that the Confederates myopically viewed cotton

as the only factor that would be required to move the British towards intervention.

British neutrality came very close to being undermined in October 1861. Two

Confederate officials, James Mason and John Slidell embarked on a diplomatic mission

from Charleston, South Carolina to Havana, Cuba, and booked passage to England via

the British Steamer Trent. The purpose of Mason and Slidell’s journey was to persuade

14 Frank L. Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy (Chicago, 1959), 19

10

Britain and France to intercede in the war on behalf of the Confederacy. On November 8,

the U.S.S. San Jacinto fired a shot across the bow of the Trent, came alongside, inspected

the ship and had the two Confederate diplomats removed.15

This event helped to bolster Confederate hopes that Britain would enter the

conflict. Shortly after The Trent Affair became public knowledge Confederate Secretary

of State and Confederate General Robert Toombs “…asserted four weeks later that these

‘very friendly’ powers will acknowledge us formally as soon as either time or our

decided success gives assurance of our power to maintain ourselves.”16

Kenneth Bourne wrote in 1961 that while Britain was not going to back down

from a confrontation and to any threat to their commerce trading, that Britain was very

concerned about the ramifications of open conflict with the United States. For

notwithstanding the strength of the British Royal Navy, Great Britain was not prepared

for war, and parliament was especially concerned about being able to hold Canada should

the Union turn its army northward, which is why they sent nine thousand troops to

Canada almost immediately after The Trent Affair.17 In 2010, historian Howard Jones

pointed out that what did not help the situation during this very precarious time in Anglo-

American relations was in “Seward’s ominous directive authorizing (US Ambassador to

the UK) Adams to put the Palmerston ministry on notice that recognition of the

Confederacy meant war with the Union.18 Historian Charles M. Hubbard pointed out in

1998 that another factor in British history just before the Civil War was the Crimean War,

15 Adams, Charles Francis, The Trent Affair, an historical retrospect, (Boston, MA, 1912), 816 Toombs to Stephens, June 21, 1861, in Myrta Lockett Avary, Recollections of Alexander H. Stephens (New York, 1910), 67-68.17 Bourne, Kenneth, British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-1862, The English Historical Review, Vol. 76, No. 301 (London, 1961), 60118 Jones, Howard, Blue & Grey diplomacy: a history of Union and Confederate foreign relations. (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2010) 103

11

where loss of life for the British Army created a reluctance to charge headlong into

another potentially costly war.19 There is a similar undertone in the writings of Bourne,

Jones and Hubbard, in that all three agree that Britain was not desiring war with the

United States, or with anyone for that matter.

Historian R.J.M. Blackett writing in 2001 stated that the Trent Affair “pushed

many [British] into the ranks of Confederate supporters.” 20 It was Blackett’s argument

that many in Britain were ready to strike back at the Union. However, as the North had

already fielded over two hundred thousand troops for close to a year by the time of the

Trent Affair, it was doubtful that those nine thousand would have lasted long should it

have come to repelling a Union invasion. As Bourne stated, one of the key factors that

relieved the British, (before Lincoln formally apologized on Christmas Day), was the

coming of winter. Lord Palmerston stated that the Americans would not want “to repeat

all the terrors of Moscow,” speaking in reference to Napoleon’s disaster in the War of

1812. Where it was hoped by Palmerston that the Canadian winter in the 1860s could

have the same effect on a potential Union invasion force that the Russian winter of 1812

had on the French Grande Armee, where the French suffered enormous casualties and set

backs due to the weather.21

Senator Toombs honestly believed that the Trent Affair would be the final catalyst

for Great Britain to declare war on the United States. It demonstrates just how out of

touch the Confederates were, either by lack of information, (which was highly

improbable, as the Confederacy had diplomats in London), or by lack of interest, with 19 Hubbard, Charles M., The Burden of Confederate Diplomacy. (Tennessee: University of Tennessee Press, 1998) 1920 Blackett, R.J.M., Divided Hearts: Britain and the American Civil War. (Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 2001) 9221 Bourne, Kenneth, British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-1862, The English Historical Review, Vol. 76, No. 301 (London, 1961), 605

12

British interests. Toombs clearly had forgotten the lessons of the War of 1812 with

regards to ship seizure and searching and the enormous strain the war had brought on

commerce. Also that the United States and Britain had done much in the way of

negotiation and “mutual tolerance” in the name keeping the peace and maintaining the

flow of commerce. Acts of cooperation such as the Convention of 1818, which discussed

fishing and boundaries in the North Eastern United States and Canada, and the Treaty of

1846 which discussed the westward expansion of the American-Canadian border along

the 49th parallel, were two acts that demonstrated the desire for cooperation between

Washington and London. In addition to the two acts of cooperation listed, there would be

three more acts between the North and Britain that would come to fruition to the

detriment to the South during the war. They were The Lyons-Seward Treaty of 186222,

and Treaty between United States and Great Britain for the Suppression of the Slave

Trade; April 7,1862 23, and February 17, 186324 The British had reacted angrily to the

Trent Affair, but a declaration of war was not on the table in parliament.

Throughout most of the South there was hope that the Trent Affair would cause

Britain to enter the war. However, not all Southerners were of that opinion. Robert E.

Lee, in a letter to his wife, Mary Custiss Lee, on Christmas Day 1861 said, “You must

not build your hopes on peace on account of the United States going into a war with

England. [This was after the jubilation that increased hope of such after the Trent Affair].

22 Milne, A. Taylor, The Lyons-Seward Treaty of 1862, The American Historical Review, Vol. 38, No. 3. (IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1933)23 Avalon Project, Treaty between United States and Great Britain for the Suppression of the Slave Trade; April 7,1862, accessed March 24, 2012, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br1862.asp24 Avalon Project, Additional Article to the Treaty for the Suppression of the African Slave Trade; February 17, 1863, accessed March 24, 2012, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br1863.asp

13

She [the British], will be very loath to do that, notwithstanding the bluster of Northern

papers. Her rulers are not entirely mad.”25

Historian Kenneth Bourne better examined the greater picture of what Britain was

dealing with in the Trent Affair by examining the crisis from the perspective of the

British, the North and the South. It was his conclusion that while initially tempers were

heated with the incident, logic and reason soon replaced it after Lincoln’s apology on

Christmas Day 1861.26 While the issue of national honor was an issue for the Union and

the British, President Lincoln saw that there was little be gained by stubbornly holding

his position with regard to the Trent Affair.

Likewise, Blackett in 2001 stated that there was much talk in the British press and

in Parliament of how to respond and even retaliate against the North. On November 28,

1861, Lord Palmerston himself said, “You may stand for this, but damned if I will!”

Blackett then went to focus on the points that the British were not prepared in any degree

for war, especially against a fully mobilized field tested Union army. The first hand

account of Senator Toombs demonstrated a one-dimensional viewpoint of world affairs

that was commonplace in the Confederacy. It is only through the viewpoint of Robert E.

Lee that there seemed to be any sense of correct viewing of the situation. General Lee

was a man of war and understood the logistics of what went into the making of war, and

that the decision to go to war with a fully mobilized adversary was not something to be

done lightly. Yet, General Lee was a soldier and not a politician who actively voiced his

viewpoints during the war. Lee left the determination of policy to the policymakers.

25 Lee, Robert E., Recollections and letters of Robert E. Lee. (New York, Doubleday, Page & Company. 1904) 1026 McPherson, James M. The Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1988) 391

14

One of the largest issues facing Britain with regard to its interests in the Civil War

was the looming issue of Southern slavery. From the founding of the United States the

subject of slavery was a constant issue. The North was against it and the South defended

it, though it could be argued that the North was against it for a variety of reasons. While

there was a section of abolitionists who were strongly against the institution of slavery

based entirely on moralistic ideology, many in the north were not as concerned with the

moral issue as they were with the political power given to the southern states due to the

3/5 laws, and also how southern agriculture could easily out-produce northern farms due

to slave labor. The issue was brought forth in the proceedings of the Constitutional

Convention in 1787.27 In a speech before Congress on February 6, 1837 Senator John C.

Calhoun from South Carolina referred to African servitude as “a positive good,”28 arguing

that the Africans had flourished under servitude and that slavery was much more

beneficial than the factories in the North or the workhouses in Europe.

Another problem that faced the nation with regard to slavery was how to manage

the expansion of it. Was it to expand or was it to be contained within its current

boundaries of 1860? If the South had had its way then the boundaries of Slave and Free

states would have expanded all the way to California. Another problem particularly for

Southerners was during the Mexican War of 1847-1848, where the majority of the

soldiers and officers in the American army were from the South. It was known that over

two-thirds of the territory that was to be won in the war was to be unavailable for

expansion of slave territory. The South knew that it would not be able to expand, and the

27 The Problem of Slavery, Constitutional Topic: The Constitutional Convention 1787, accessed March 24, 2012, http://www.usconstitution.net/consttop_ccon.html#slavery28 John C. Calhoun Slavery a positive good. February 6, 1837. Library of Congress. http://www.archive.org/stream/remarksofmrcalho01calh#page/n5/mode/2up

15

balance of power would shift greatly between the Slave and Free states in favor of the

North.

Former President of the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis argued in his book The Rise

and Fall of the Confederate Government that had Northern and Abolitionists beliefs

about the cruelty of slavery been accurate then slaves would have had to have been

constantly watched over, and would have risen up against their masters en masse much

earlier than the Civil War.29 However, it is evident that President Davis was overlooking

the obvious slave revolt Turner Rebellion of 1831, where on the night of August 21,

Turner led over 40 slaves in the brutal killing of over 55 whites in Virginia. It could be

said that Former Vice President Calhoun and Confederate President Davis were men of

their times and circumstances, where each had spent their lives around slavery and had

been taught to think of the institution of slavery as being for the common good. Their

arguments, while eloquent, were formulated to do little more than support the institution,

rather than to speak openly about the subject. Little is said by either as to the

counterarguments against their points short of dismissal.

Yet with the onset of the war, there was a change of tone in the South and the

Confederates no longer made the argument that slavery was a good practice, but that the

war was being fought based on other issues such as states’ rights and self determination.

States Rights over Federal Rights became the standing argument in the South before and

during the war, and what was to be the main argument that was presented to Britain in the

hopes of gaining British support. McPherson emphasized that the immediate war aims of

29 Davis, Jefferson, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government. (Richmond, VA: Garrett and Massie, 1881) 262-263

16

both the North and the South had nothing to do with slavery, and it only became a formal

issue with the Emancipation Proclamation of January 1, 1863.30

However, in 1981 Philip S. Foner argued that in the Lancashire area of England,

where the majority of Britain’s textile mills were, and the viewpoint was very different.

In that in the minds of the British workingman there was no separation of the war and

slavery. At the height of the cotton famine in 1862, Marxist Ernest Jones spoke to several

meetings of the working class of Lancashire, who had been made unemployed by the

absence of Southern cotton due to the federal blockade about that he believed the root

cause of the war was slavery. Jones said “we [the Confederacy] have four million black

slaves here, but we have a million white slaves in Lancashire. Stop the cotton and they

will starve.”31

Due to the strain brought on the region by the absence of Southern cotton in the

Lancashire district of England there were many difficulties brought on by what was

commonly referred to as “the cotton famine of 1862.” Yet, much to the disappointment of

the Confederacy, the famine did not produce the violent revolution that Senator

Hammond and others in the South had predicted. In 1863 British politician W.E. Forster

stated to a large meeting of workingmen that, “no matter what the suffering we may

endure, no matter what the sacrifices we may have to undergo, we will not allow our

Government to depart from the strict principle of neutrality on behalf of the slave-holding

Confederacy.”32

As Foner and Forster pointed out, the strain put upon the British textile industry

was great, however, the British workers and people understood that a break in the Federal 30 McPherson, James M. The Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1988) 31231 Philip S. Foner British Labor and the American Civil War, (New York, NY, Holmes & Meier 1981) 7532 The London Times,(London) September 23, 1863

17

blockade to restore the trade of cotton would have been a de facto endorsement of

slavery. In examining the time of the two writings there was little change from the first

hand account of 1862 and the historiographical account of 1981 on this specific matter.

The British workers understood the bigger picture and pulled their resources to weather

the storm of the cotton famine33.

In the North it is widely believed that there was a general viewpoint that the

Union was to be preserved first and that all other pursuits were secondary. However, the

abolitionist movement wanted slavery gone by any means necessary, and was not

concerned how it was to be done or what would happen to the nation as a result of its

immediate ending. In 1977, Kinley Brauer took the position that Northern politicians

were unwilling to proceed with any aggressive approach towards slavery until it became

official policy after the Emancipation Proclamation went into effect on January 1, 1863.

34 Brauer also argued that the Confederate dignitaries in London were prepared to offer

emancipation in exchange for recognition. Foner pointed out that the British working

class scoffed at such an idea, in that there was little in place to ensure that the

Confederacy would not merely reinstate the slave trade once recognition was received35.

As was mentioned, the Confederacy was hopeful that the absence of cotton from

British textile mills would create a revolution in Britain. McPherson pointed out that

there were in fact “surplus stocks of raw cotton as well as of finished cloth piled up in

Lancashire warehouses…The cotton famine from which the South expected so much did

33 Park, Joseph H. The English Workingmen and the American Civil War (Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 3 September 1924) 438-43934 Kinley J. Brauer “The Slavery Problem in the Diplomacy of the American Civil War” Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Aug., 1977) 439-46935 Foner, Philip S. British Labor and the American Civil War, (New York, NY, Holmes & Meier Publishers, INC. 1981)

18

not really take hold until the summer of 1862.” 36McPherson also would go to state in

2002 that when the cotton famine began to be felt in Britain that the Confederates took

the position that the only way their businesses would survive would be to stop the war. 37

To supplement British need for cotton the British government began increasing

cotton production in Egypt and India, as well as importing from Russia, though the

Lancashire textile industry was not able to return to its pre 1861 production capacity until

after the wars end in 1865. On October 25, 1862, the London Times published an article

entitled “The Essex Conservatives” which discussed the annual gathering of the

Colchester Conservatives on October 23, where the subject of the Lancashire textile

district arose. The American Civil War, Confederate recognition and the abolition of

slavery were discussed, and “the time was not far distant when cotton would be grown in

our colonies by free labor, and that the ordinary competition of trade would extinguish

slavery without violence.38

In the winter of 1860 through the spring of 1861 the American South plunged

headlong into a very wide, very deep unknown chasm. The Confederacy greatly

overestimated its own resolve, its resources and ability to carry the war successfully and

quickly. What added to Southern beliefs was that “Cotton is King” and that with that the

South held the sole factor to determine the actions of two of the most powerful nations

(Great Britain and France), on the planet to come to its aid at will.

In June 1862, Confederate diplomat, and former United States ambassador to

Egypt, Edwin De Leon held a private meeting with Palmerston, and in that meeting De

36 McPherson, James M. The Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1988) 38637 McPherson, James M. Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam, the Battle that Changed the Course of the Civil War, (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2002) 5638 The London Times (London) The Essex Conservatives, October 25, 1862

19

Leon once again pressed the question of British intervention, and Palmerston refuted the

Confederate claims for British aide by saying, “you Southerners, as well as Northerners,

have always insisted that European Governments must not interfere in affairs on the

American Continent. We are adopting your Monroe Doctrine in our own non-

intervention.”39 In reading De Leon’s discussion with Palmerston, the Prime Minister

was careful not to be drawn in by De Leon’s passionate appeals to Palmerston’s sense of

“moral obligation” to aid the South in its rebellion. Palmerston was very careful not to do

any more than to deal courteously with the Confederates. De Leon’s account

demonstrated that Jefferson Davis failed in the area of international diplomacy when he

failed to send a fully trained ambassador to effectively persuade the British as to the

“righteousness” of the Southern cause. De Leon approached Prime Minister Palmerston

with a preconceived notion of what he would say, and did not effectively consider

Palmerston’s counterarguments. De Leon became frustrated by his inability to persuade

Palmerston when his arguments of why the South believed that it was in British interests

to recognize the South.

In April of 1861 the Confederacy jumped blindly into what was in effect, a very

deep chasm in order to win its independence, and the South’s possession of cotton led

Confederates to believe that the British Empire would quickly and eagerly jump into that

chasm with it to secure British cotton needs. Most believed that the war would be over

within a month, yet four years later would bring the complete destruction of most of what

the South held dear and stood for.

39 Davis, William C. Edwin De Leon The secret history of Confederate diplomacy abroad. (Kansas, University of Kansas Press, 2005) 115

20

In his memoirs, in 1881, Confederate President Jefferson Davis addressed the

issue of recognition of the South by the governments of Great Britain and France almost

from the onset of the war. However, Davis did not take a firm position in his book, The

Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, and merely stated the doings and actions

of the great European powers in his book. Davis began with listing Great Britain’s

original position of neutrality, Britain’s interactions with the North, the Alabama claims,

the British non movement towards the Federal blockade. Then Davis listed various

instances where the British did not adhere to the conditions of neutrality, and all but sided

with the North. Davis stated “the duty of neutral states to receive with respect any new

confederation that independent states may think proper to form, was too clear to admit

form of denial, but its postponement was equally beneficial to the United States and

detrimental to the Confederacy.” 40

When comparing De Leon’s discussion in 1862 with the statement made by

President Davis in 1881, it was concluded that it was not the calling of Britain out for her

varying forms of non-involvement in the war, as much as it was an attempt to strike back

at Britain for not heeding the Confederate call for aid. As was stated, the Southern press

charged the British with indifference, cruelty and of a desire to see the Northern and

Southern belligerents wear themselves out in a war so Britain could easily enter at the

end of the war and take the spoils of both nations. Davis noted that Britain did not adhere

to the conditions of neutrality, yet said nothing of the ships that were built for the

Confederate Navy in British shipyards. British-built Confederate commerce-raiders that

would be the catalyst for the Alabama Claims in which the United States would file

40 Davis, Jefferson, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government. (Richmond, VA: Garrett and Massie, 1881) 320

21

damage claims against Britain for damage done to Federal ships by ships built for the

Confederacy in Britain. This is a convenient omission of facts by the former president

when his country benefited from Britain’s willingness to do business with both

belligerents during the war.

British ambassador to the United States, Lord Lyons stated the position of the

British government from the stance of not making policy and decisions with regard to the

Civil War until the problems were laid out before them41. Lyons spoke of many instances

of meeting with Secretary of State William H. Seward and that he needed to be careful

not to arouse the suspicions of Seward as to the position of Britain towards Confederate

recognition. There were many instances of Seward being very forceful with Lyons with

regard to Federal interests, and Lyons repeatedly had to reassure Seward that Britain had

not moved from its officially declared position of neutrality of May 1861. 42

The United States Secretary of State William Seward did not bother with the

formalities extended to him and his country by Lord Lyons. On several occasions,

Secretary Seward took close to a threatening tone with the British43. Lyons noted that,

“Mr. Seward alluded to the eventual acquisition of Canada as compensation to the

Northern States for any loss… of the southern part of the Union. 44

British correspondent for the London Times, William Howard Russell, spoke of

his journey through the Confederacy in 1861, and of the many people and situations he

witnessed while there. Russell spoke of the great hospitality of most all of the

41 Kinley J. Brauer “The Slavery Problem in the Diplomacy of the American Civil War” Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Aug., 1977) 45842 Lord Newton Lord Lyons A Record of British Diplomacy Volume I (London: Edward Arnold 1913)43 McPherson, James M. The Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1988) 388-38944 Lyons to Russell, The American Civil War through British eyes; Dispatches from British Diplomats Vol. 1 (Kent State University Press 2005) 60

22

Southerners that he met, who almost all spoke very highly of Britain and often drank to

the good health of Queen Victoria. What astounded Russell was the common belief that

British recognition of the Confederacy was a certainty, and that the bulk of Britain’s

cotton was furnished by the American South was all that was necessary for Great Britain

to force mediation upon the Lincoln government. Yet, as one who was not involved with

the conflict, Russell was able to make an impartial observation on the war, the politics,

the diplomacy of the countries and their peoples.45

The United States preferred to keep relations with Great Britain as unchanged as

possible, yet as the war progressed and the “Anaconda Plan” went into effect, it

undoubtedly defeated that idea and put strain on Britain and on Anglo-American

relations. A major factor that would affect Confederate relations with Britain would be

the ever looming issue of slavery. Britain was strongly abolitionist, and while there were

some in Britain who voiced support of the Confederacy for reasons such as seeing the

American experiment of democracy fail, and the restoration of the cotton trade without

the high Union tariffs, the nation itself could not publicly support any nation who sought

to preserve the institution of slavery. The South tried by various means to persuade

Britain that the war was about states rights and not about the preservation of slavery, yet

that was taken seriously by few, if any, in parliament.

On the other hand, the argument of “King Cotton Diplomacy” manifested itself

early in the conflict, yet did not fully take effect until the autumn of 1862, due to a cotton

surplus in Britain at the time. The South did its utmost to pressure Britain to break the

blockade to resume the cotton trade and restore the livelihoods of those in the Lancashire

45 Russell, William Howard, My Diary North and South. (London: Bradbury and Evans, 1863.)

23

manufacturing districts. Yet, once again, the Confederates, who were certain that a cotton

embargo would bring the British economy to its knees, misjudged Britain’s resolve, its

resourcefulness and its dedication to abolitionism. The British workers proved Senator

Hammond’s words to be false and that there was more to the English working man than

money.

The Confederate approach to diplomacy towards Great Britain was one sided and

inconsiderate of the greater needs of the British islands and her commonwealth. When the

war began going poorly for the Confederates there were many in the South who laid

blame on the British, the way one would upon the failure of an ally with a pact of mutual

assistance, for their dilemma. The Confederates took a major gamble in believing that the

power of a cash crop would be the means of almost buying their independence. When

Britain did not draw the sword as was hoped, the Confederates laid many unjust claims

on the British government and its people. This is a case in point that the Confederates did

not entirely consider exactly what they were asking the British to do for them.

The only time during the Civil War where Britain came even close to drawing the

sword against the North really had nothing to do with the Confederacy, sovereignty or

cotton. The anger that arose from the Trent Affair was solely due to the Federal Navy’s

direct search and seizure of a British vessel in international waters. Its significance going

as far back as the War of 1812, and the uneasy peace with the British and American

navies ever since the war, in that both sides had agreed to not interfere with one another’s

merchant and civilian fleets as a condition of the peace. The Trent Affair had brought all

of the past struggles memories back to the forefront of British affairs and was not going

to be lightly overlooked. Yet when President Lincoln released the diplomats with a

24

formal apology to the British it demonstrated to the British that the United States was

indeed capable of diplomacy.

Yes, Great Britain was very dependent on the American South for its cotton for

the British textile industry, yet that was only one aspect of the economic affairs of the

United Kingdom. As was mentioned, the British actually had a cotton surplus in

Lancashire in the early months of the war, so the cotton famine was not felt as quickly in

Britain as Richmond would have hoped. Another factor that further strengthened the

British’s relations with the North was due to the crop failures in Britain in 1862 and it

was said that King Corn was more powerful than King Cotton, because food imports to

Britain from the United States rose greatly during that time of crisis.

An additional factor to build on was with the Lyons-Seward Treaty of 1862, with

the Union’s formal allowing the British Royal Navy to stop and search any ship flying

the American flag to search for and seize any slaves, would serve to strengthen relations

between London and Washington. This being that relations being strained between the

United States and Britain dating back to the War of 1812 regarding search and seizure of

American vessels, that the United States refused to allow the British to have any access to

their ships, and the trouble with this for the British was that while attempting to enforce

the abolition of the slave trade across the Atlantic, that there were many non-American

slave ships that would fly the American flag to keep the Royal Navy from stopping them.

With the Lyons-Seward Treaty of 1862, it gave Britain the freedom it needed to further

suppress the slave trade and strengthened British relations with Washington. Needless to

say, this strengthening of relations between the Union and Britain did not serve to help in

the Confederate cause for independence with British aid.

25

Had the Confederacy been more considerate of the position of the British empire,

it is my opinion that they would have seen that it was not practical for the Confederates to

have the smallest hope that it would have been in the best interests of the British empire

to intervene in the American Civil War. The arrogant manner in which the position of

Great Britain was treated in the southern press did little to aid in the strengthening of the

southern cause to the British. Had the Confederates used a considerably greater amount

of diplomacy with the British, and not have vested all of their hopes in cotton being their

only requirement to ensure British aid, then maybe the British would have at least may

have been more willing to consider recognition. In 1864 President Davis offered

emancipation for recognition by the British, yet this was seen to have little relevance to

the British for by then the war had turned against the South and the British knew that the

war was not going to last much longer anyway. Had Richmond offered that to London

from the onset of the war, there was a much better possibility that the British would have

been more sympathetic to the Southern cause.

In the end, cotton was certainly a very valuable commodity, however, the

Confederacy offered very little to Great Britain for what it was asking in return. Had the

Richmond politicians considered that from the start, they would have known better than

to ask in the first place.

26

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Adams, Charles Francis, The Trent Affair, an historical retrospect, (Boston, MA, 1912)

Avalon Project, Treaty between United States and Great Britain for the Suppression of the Slave Trade; April 7,1862, accessed March 24, 2012, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br1862.asp

Avalon Project, Additional Article to the Treaty for the Suppression of the African Slave Trade; February 17, 1863, accessed March 24, 2012, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br1863.asp

Calhoun, John C. Slavery a positive good. February 6, 1837. Library of Congress. http://www.archive.org/stream/remarksofmrcalho01calh#page/n5/mode/2up

Davis, Jefferson, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government. (Richmond, VA: Garrett and Massie,1881)

Davis, William, C. Edwin De Leon The secret history of Confederate diplomacy abroad. (Kansas, University of Kansas Press, 2005)

Lee, Robert E., Recollections and letters of Robert E. Lee. (New York, Doubleday, Page & Company. 1904)

Lyons to Russell, The American Civil War through British eyes; Dispatches from British Diplomats Vol. 1 (Kent State University Press 2005)

Richmond Daily Dispatch, (Richmond) May 11, 1864

Risley, Ford, The Civil War: Primary Documents from 1860 to 1865. Westport, Connecticut, (London: Greenwood Press, 2004)

Russell, William Howard, My Diary North and South. (London: Bradbury and Evans, 1863)

Selections from the Letters and Speeches of the Hon. James H. Hammond, of South Carolina (New York: John F. Trow & Co., 1866)

Seward to Carl Schurz, Oct. 10 1861, Frederic Bancroft Speeches, Correspondence and Political papers of Carl Schurz (New York, NY 1913)

The Problem of Slavery, Constitutional Topic: The Constitutional Convention 1787, accessed March 24, 2012, http://www.usconstitution.net/consttop_ccon.html#slavery

27

Toombs to Stephens, June 21, 1861, in Myrta Lockett Avary, Recollections of Alexander H. Stephens (New York, 1910)

“Civil War in America,” The Times (London) May 14, 1861

“War in America” The Times (London) September 23, 1863

“The Essex Conservatives” The Times (London) October 25, 1862

28

Secondary Sources

Blackett, R.J.M., Divided Hearts: Britain and the American Civil War. (Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 2001)

Blumenthal, Henry, “Confederate Diplomacy: Popular notions and international realities” Journal of Southern History, vol. 32, no. 2, (1966) 151-171

Bourne, Kenneth, “British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-1862,” The English Historical Review, Vol. 76, No. 301 London, (1961) 600-632

Brauer, Kinley J. “The Slavery Problem in the Diplomacy of the American Civil War” Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Aug., 1977) 439-469

Crawford, Martin, “William Howard Russell and the Confederacy,” Journal of American Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2. MA: Cambridge University Press, (1981) 191-210

Foner, Philip S. “British Labor and the American Civil War,” New York, Holmes & Meier Publishers, INC. (1981)

Hubbard, Charles M., “The Burden of Confederate Diplomacy.” Tennessee: University of Tennessee Press, (1998)

Jones, Howard, “Blue & Grey diplomacy: a history of Union and Confederate foreign relations.” North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, (2010)

Jones, Wilbur Devereux, “The British conservatives and the American Civil War.” The American Historical review. Vol. 58, No. 3, IL: The University of Chicago Press (1953) 527-543

Lord Newton, “Lord Lyons A Record of British Diplomacy Volume I” London: Edward Arnold (1913)

McPherson, James M., “Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam, the Battle that Changed the Course of the Civil War,” Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, (2002)

McPherson, James M., “The Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era.” Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, (1988)

Milne, A. Taylor, “The Lyons-Seward Treaty of 1862,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 38, No. 3. IL: The University of Chicago Press, (1933) 511-525

Owsley, Frank L. King Cotton Diplomacy (Chicago, 1959),

Park, Joseph H., “The English Workingmen and the American Civil War” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 3 (September 1924) 432-457

29