BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1967-1970

Candidate Number: 71817HY300 2008/2009

BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE

NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1967-1970

HY300 BA DISSERTATION

2008/2009

CANDIDATE NUMBER: 71817

Word Count – 9,969 words

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CONTENTS

Introduction p. 3

Map of the Secessionist State of the Republic of Biafra (1967 –

1970)

p. 6

July 1968 – April 1969

France’s Nigerian Policy under Charles de Gaulle

p. 7

April 1969 – September 1970

After General de Gaulle: ‘plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose’

p. 19

October 1969 – January 1970

The Failure of France’s Nigerian Policy

p. 27

Conclusions p. 36

Bibliography p. 39

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BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1967-1970

On 30 May 1967, after months of tensions in Nigeria, a separatist group dominated

by members of the Ibo tribe (one of the country’s three major tribes based primarily in the

eastern region), declared its secession from the state of Nigeria and established the

independent Republic of Biafra. The refusal of the Nigerian government to recognise

Biafra’s independence marked the beginning of a civil war that would last until January

1970. Despite global criticism of the suffering endured by the Biafran people, only a

handful of states in the developing world, including Tanzania, Gabon, the Ivory Coast,

Zambia and Haiti, offered formal recognition to Biafra. Most Western states chose to adopt

a neutral stance, believing that resolution of the conflict was the responsibility of Nigeria’s

former colonial ruler, Britain.1

France stood apart, declaring its support for Biafran self-determination in a

communiqué given by Joel Le Theule, the French Secretary of State for Information, on 31

July 1968.2 Paris’ position towards Biafra was confirmed a little over a month later when,

on 9 September, French President Charles de Gaulle, announced publically that France was

assisting Biafra and was not discounting future diplomatic recognition of the breakaway

state.3 From this point on France gave the Biafrans moral and diplomatic support and was

accused of aiding them with the supply of arms, flown in via Libreville (Gabon) and

Abidjan (Ivory Coast).4 The British government was frustrated by France’s involvement in

one of its former colonies. The conflict thus created tension in Anglo-French relations

1 J. De St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War (London, 1972), pp. 179-201.2 [T]he [N]ational [A]rchives/FCO/25/234_60, Everson to FO, 31/07/1968.3 S. Cronjé, The World and Nigeria: The Diplomatic History of the Biafran Civil War, 1967-1970 (London, 1972), pp. 194-195.4 J. J. Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970 (Princeton, 1977), pp. 230-231.

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already troubled by Charles de Gaulle’s rejection of Britain’s application for membership

of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1963 and 1967, as well as by

disagreements over transatlantic relations, Cold War alliances, Rhodesia and the Concorde

Project.5 In this context, British politicians questioned the French government’s motives for

supporting Biafra in an attempt to understand and decide how to respond to French policy

in Nigeria during the civil strife.

Historians of post-Independence Africa have often neglected analysis of French

involvement in the Nigerian Civil War. Interpretations of France’s support for Biafra are

mostly found in contemporary journalistic narratives of the war, by authors including

Suzanne Cronjé, Auberon Waugh and John De St. Jorre,6 or historical accounts such as

John Stremlau’s ‘The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War’. 7 French policy in

Nigeria is otherwise also briefly referenced in general historical accounts of French policy

in Sub-Saharan Africa. However these studies (for example by Anton Andereggen, Robert

Bourgi, Francis McNamara and Claude Wauthier)8 tend to concentrate on France’s

relations with its former African colonial dependencies, a preoccupation that has meant

French involvement in non-Francophone Africa, in this case in Nigeria, has been neglected.

This is with the exception of two contemporary articles published in 1979 and 1980

that do concentrate on French policy during the Nigerian Civil War. Daniel Bach’s ‘Le

Général de Gaulle et la Guerre Civile au Nigeria’ analyses the nature and motivations

5 J. W. Young, ‘Franco-British Relations during the Wilson Years’, A. Capet (ed.), Britain, France and the Entente Cordiale Since 1904 (Basingstoke, 2006), pp. 165-168.6 Cronjé, The World. De St. Jorre, Nigerian Civil War. A. Waugh & S. Cronjé, Biafra: Britain’s Shame (London, 1969).7 Stremlau, International Politics. 8 A. Andereggen, France’s Relationship with Subsaharan Africa (Westport, 1994).R. Bourgi, Le General de Gaulle et l’Afrique Noire, 1940-1969 (Paris, 1980).F. T. McNamara, France in Black Africa (Washington DC, 1989).C. Wauthier, Quatre Présidents et l’Afrique: De Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard d’Estaing, Mitterand - Quarante Ans de Politique Africaine, (Paris, 1995).

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behind Charles de Gaulle’s decision to support Biafra in the Nigerian Civil War, and is the

most comprehensive analysis of France’s support for the Biafran separatists currently

available.9 Kirsty Melville’s ‘The Involvement of France and Francophone Africa in the

Nigerian Civil War’ in turn is based primarily on the contemporary journalistic accounts of

the war discussed above, and consequently offers few new high-political insights on

France’s role in the Nigerian Civil War.10

Apart from the occasional reference to British discontent with French policy, none

of the historiography on the Nigerian Civil War discussed above has examined in detail

British reactions to France’s involvement in the war, a perspective that is particularly

illuminating given Britain’s imperial history in Nigeria. On the basis of British Foreign and

Commonwealth Office (FCO) documents, as well as records of British Parliamentary

Debates and memoirs of British politicians involved in Nigerian and French affairs, the aim

of this dissertation is therefore to examine British perceptions of French policy during the

Nigerian Civil War, following the French declaration of support for Biafra (July 1968), and

determine what Britain considered France’s aims in Nigeria to be. It will also explore

British attempts to alter French Nigerian policy and assess the success of these efforts.

Finally, by considering the extent to which French policy during the Nigerian Civil War

was an obstacle to good relations between Britain and France in this period, this

dissertation attempts to draw some wider conclusions on the impact of the Biafran affair on

Anglo-French relations more generally in the late 1960s.

9 D. Bach, ‘Le Général de Gaulle et la Guerre Civile au Nigeria’, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 14, 2 (1980).10 K. Melville. The Involvement of France and Francophone West Africa in the Nigerian Civil War (Perth, 1979).

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MAP OF THE SECESSIONIST STATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA (1967 –

1970) AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR (MAY 1967)

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian-Biafran_war)

BIAFRA

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July 1968 – April 1969

France’s Nigerian Policy under Charles de Gaulle

During its first year (May 1967 – June 1968) the French government gave minimal

attention to the Nigerian Civil War, except for declaring an embargo on arms sales to both

Nigeria and Biafra on 12 June 1968 and making plans to send aid to Biafra.11 However,

over the summer of 1968, the French position changed as increased media attention and

statements by politicians regarding the conflict mobilised French public opinion in favour

of the Biafran cause. This set France apart from Britain in what was to become ‘a war

between Great Powers in their own material and economic interests.’12 Official statements

of French intent, particularly the declaration made by President Charles de Gaulle on 9

September 1968, as well as reports of arms being flown into Biafra from the Ivory Coast

and Gabon in French aircraft (which according to British FCO sources amounted to

between 100 and 150 tons per week) increased British suspicion of French involvement in

the conflict.13 France repeatedly denied its role in this arms traffic, claiming their only

involvement in the conflict was as part of humanitarian relief operations including those

organised by the International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as plans to collaborate

the OCAM (Organization Commune Africaine et Malgache).14 However, the close relations

France maintained with the Ivory Coast and Gabon, as well as much circumstantial

evidence, such as reports of French officers overseeing the loading of military supplies onto

planes at airstrips in Libreville and Abidjan,15 led many British politicians to believe that

France was more involved than it claimed. 11 Bach, ‘Le Général’, p. 260.12 [H]ouse of [L]ords Debate, vol.304, c.742, 21/07/1969.13 TNA/FCO/65/266_18, Stewart to Paris, 28/10/1968.14 TNA/FCO/65/268_100a, Stewart to Paris, 29/01/1969.15 TNA/FCO/65/266_23a, Wilson to Tebbit, 30/10/1968.

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During late 1968 and early 1969 British journalists and politicians speculated about

France’s motivations for this seemingly bizarre policy that allowed the conflict in Nigeria

to continue. The Guardian hypothesised that oil was the primary determinant in French

policy,16 while a report in the Daily Mirror suggested that France’s decision to support

Biafra was rooted in de Gaulle’s ‘obsessive’ hatred of the British.17 France maintained

throughout the course of the war that its principal concern was the well-being of the Ibo

people. This profession of humanitarian concern was however incomprehensible to British

FCO officials who interpreted increased French moral and military support for the

separatists as a significant factor contributing to the Biafran will and ability to fight, and the

consequent prolongation of the conflict. French policy therefore ran contrary to their

humanitarian rationale as it maintained a civil war that prolonged the ‘appalling suffering

of the Ibo people’.18

Paris’ humanitarian position was further distorted by the apparent divergence

between the concerns of the French population and those of certain members of the French

government, particularly Charles de Gaulle’s entourage. This internal division of opinion

was particularly apparent in March 1969, when the French national “Aid Biafra Week”

sparked controversy within circles sympathetic to the Biafran cause. During the week

fundraising was carried out in aid of Biafra with the support of the French government, the

Biafra Action Committee, formed by Raymond Offroy (French ambassador to Nigeria until

his expulsion from Nigeria in 1961), and publicised across the media, particularly in the

Gaullist newspaper, La Nation. However, various religious groups and trade unions that

supported the Biafran cause were opposed to the French government’s involvement in these

16 TNA/FCO/65/266_47, ‘Oil Bait’, The Guardian, 03/12/1968.17 TNA/FCO/65/269_121, W. Wilson, ‘Blood Oil and Hate’ Daily Mirror, 07/03/1969.18 TNA/FCO/65/267_66a, Brief for Anglo-French talks, 31/10/1968.

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fundraising efforts and what they perceived as the consequent debasement of the pro-

Biafran campaign.19 This opposition to French governmental policy in Biafra from within

France itself led the British government to question further French motives and their claim

to be acting solely on humanitarian grounds.

A commonly held assumption was that French policy was shaped by commercial

concerns, particularly the desire to exploit Biafra’s oil and mineral resources. The close

relationship between the Elysée (the office of the French President) and the Société

Anonyme Française de Recherches et d’Exploration Pétrolières (SAFRAP), as well as

France’s need to secure new oil reserves due to the reduction of supplies from Algeria,20 led

the Oil Department of the British government to assert that there was ‘an important “oily”

element’ to French policy in Nigeria.21 Moreover, the fact that at the outset of the war the

majority of SAFRAP’s Nigerian oil reserves lay in Ibo-dominated territory suggests that oil

was a determining factor in France’s decision to support Biafra.22 Nevertheless, the

commercial explanation for French policy was largely discounted. France had greater

investment and trading links in Federal Nigeria than in Biafra,23 and French support for the

Biafrans continued even after Biafra’s oil fields fell into Federal hands.24 Furthermore, the

amount of oil France obtained from Nigeria was minimal, with only 3% of French oil

purchases in 1966 coming from Nigeria.25 In any case, Charles de Gaulle’s foreign policy

was rarely shaped by economic considerations and it was left to the more commercially

minded to worry about the possible damage to France’s business interests in Nigeria.26 For

19 TNA/FCO /65/269_130, Simpson-Orlebar to Moberly, 01/04/1969.20 TNA/FCO/65/267_47, Wilson to Campbell, 04/12/1969.21 TNA/FCO 65/269_126, Wilson to Monson, 17/03/1969. 22 ‘Nigeria: France’s Biafra Bombshell’, Africa Confidential, 16 (9/08/1968), cited in C. Uche, ‘Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War’, Journal of African History, 49 (2008), p. 129.23 [H]ouse of [C]ommons Debate, vol.769, c.1462, 27/08/1968.24 Stremlau, International Politics, p. 225. 25 Z. Cervenka, A History of the Nigerian Civil War (Ibadan, 1972), p. 103. 26 TNA/FCO/65/267_78, Anderson to Wilson, 02/01/1969.

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de Gaulle commercial factors came into play only when potential economic gain was linked

with geopolitical concerns.27 In the context of the Nigerian Civil War, France was keen to

take control of British oil concessions in Nigeria. This desire to obtain oil was, however,

less to do with the oil itself and more to do with gaining the upper hand over Britain in

West Africa.

For France, Nigeria was a large and successful Anglophone federation that posed a

threat to France’s position in West Africa and the stability of Francophone Africa. The

friendly and liberal relations enjoyed by Nigeria with its former colonial ruler contrasted

sharply with the relations between France and its former African dependencies. Nigeria was

thus ‘un pôle d’attraction’ to its weaker Francophone neighbours, and its existence posed a

grave danger to Francophonie.28 These worries were, according to British politicians,

shaped by the ‘absurd historical analogies’29 of Charles de Gaulle and France’s memory of

Anglo-French rivalry in Africa in the late nineteenth century, as well as recent upheavals in

French Africa, particularly in Algeria.30 French policy in Nigeria during the civil war was a

remnant of ‘the old days – of Fashoda and the rival parties of French and British officers

going round Borgu planting the Tricoleur [sic] and the Union Jack at each village they

came to’ and dictated largely by the desire to frustrate Britain in Africa.31 Cynicism about

France’s ‘specifically anti-British operation’32 shaped by de Gaulle’s obsessive desire ‘to

give a knock to the Anglo-Saxons’33 permeated the British media and political world.

27 Bach, ‘Le Général’, p. 272.28 TNA/FCO/65/266_26, P. Decraene, ‘Les grandes puissances interviennent de plus en plus ouvertement dans la guerre civile du Nigeria’, Le Monde, 01/11/1968. 29 HC Debate, vol.775, c.664, 12/12/1968.30 TNA/FCO/65/267_48, Campbell to W. Wilson, 28/11/1968.31 TNA/FCO/65/266_23, Wilson to Tebbit, 31/10/1968. 32 HC Debate, vol.779, c.1668, 13/03/1969.33 D. Hunt, On the Spot: An Ambassador Remembers (London, 1975), p. 196.

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Interpretations such as these suggest deep-rooted tensions underpinning Anglo-French

contacts in Nigeria in this period.

The centrality of Charles de Gaulle to French policy was acknowledged by British

journalists and politicians alike, who emphasised the shift in the French position towards

the Biafran separatists following de Gaulle’s increased involvement in the Nigerian affair.34

France’s African policy was becoming ever more the domaine réservé of the Elysée, with

Jacques Foccart, Charles de Gaulle’s chief advisor on Africa from 1960 until de Gaulle’s

resignation in 1969, ‘master-minding the operation’ in Nigeria, with the Quai d’Orsay

allegedly uninvolved.35 British politicians did acknowledge that certain members of the

Quai were more closely associated with Biafra than others, such as Michel Debré (Foreign

Minister, 30 May 1968 - 22 June 1969) who took the Gaullist line, adopting a ‘mystic’

attitude towards the Ibos.36 However, despite the presence Biafran sympathisers at the Quai,

as well as apparent awareness of the extent and nature of French involvement in Biafra, the

French foreign ministry did not appear to be in a position to influence French policy in

Nigeria.

The Quai’s apparent lack of weight in France’s African policy-making created

many problems for the British government as they attempted to contend with France’s

involvement in the Nigerian Civil War. In late 1968 the British Embassy in Paris proposed

taking advantage of the Quai d’Orsay’s anxieties about French policy in the hope that they

might influence the Elysée to alter its position and use its influence in Biafra to help bring

about a settlement.37 However as the months passed it became increasingly apparent that,

despite some positive contacts between the Quai and British diplomats in Paris, Quai

34 TNA/FCO/65/267_48, Campbell to W. Wilson, 28/11/1968.35 H. Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-1970: A Personal Record (London, 1971), p. 560.36 TNA/FCO/65/267_58, Fielding to West African Department, 10/12/1968. 37 TNA/FCO/33/536_11, Soames to FCO, 04/10/1968.

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statements on the Nigerian conflict were little more than an ‘echo’ of Jacques Foccart

himself.38 De Gaulle and Foccart’s control over France’s African policy was paramount,

and there was not a single British politician or diplomat, in London or Paris, who could

break this Elysée monopoly over French involvement in the Nigerian Civil War.

Whilst the FCO did not hold out much hope that they themselves could influence de

Gaulle or Foccart, they did believe that African states might be able to have an impact on

French policy in Nigeria. French support for the Biafran separatists contributed to anti-

French sentiment in Nigeria created by French nuclear testing in the Sahara Desert in 1960.

The FCO hoped that this discontent might be translated into a coherent Nigerian attack on

French policy. The Nigerians however were far from enthusiastic about confronting France

and made few public declarations against the French. They were fearful of provoking

France, and particularly de Gaulle, into increasing support for Biafra and thus prolonging

the war. They also, perceptively perhaps, believed that de Gaulle was backing the Biafrans

in an attempt to reduce Anglo-Saxon influence in West Africa, and that the civil conflict

was a result of great power rivalries being acted out in Africa. Thus Britain had to approach

Nigeria with caution to avoid confirming fears that the Nigerian Civil War was developing

into an Anglo-French conflict.39

British politicians also discussed working through other African leaders, particularly

those from Francophone Africa such as the President of the Ivory Coast, Félix Houphouët-

Boigny (1960-1993) and Léopold Sédar Senghor, the Senegalese President (1960-1980),

both of whom maintained close relations with de Gaulle and Foccart. It was hoped that an

African approach would be more successful than a direct British approach as it would play

on de Gaulle’s sensitivities about Africa and possibly act to counterbalance the influence of

38 TNA/FCO/65/266_36, Soames to FCO, 14/11/1968. 39 TNA/FCO/65/266_7, Willan to Wilson, 19/10/1968.

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Houphouët-Boigny on the Elysée.40 Nigeria’s reluctance to discuss matters directly with the

French prompted a further suggestion that the Federal government could raise the issue

with the Consultative Committee of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and persuade

them in turn to approach de Gaulle. The OAU however failed to make an impact on the

situation.41 And while the Emperor of Ethiopia, President Kenyatta of Kenya and several

other African leaders were also considered as possible intermediaries, none of these plans

made it further than the drawing board.42

One African approach discussed at length was the suggestion that President Senghor

could be induced to encourage the French to reduce their support for Biafra. Senghor

supported the concept of “One Nigeria”, but was within the Francophone sphere and thus

believed to be in a position to influence Paris’ policy. However, relations between de

Gaulle and Senghor were plagued with difficulties which reduced the Senegalese weight in

French policy. Matters were further complicated by the French political and economic

support that was keeping the Senghor regime afloat. Moreover, Senghor’s desire to avoid

criticism left him unwilling to approach France on Britain’s behalf. Although Senghor did

make some statements indicating his opposition to French policy, his allegiance remained

firmly rooted in Francophonie.43

The problem that faced the British government was that, although an African

approach was a good idea in theory, in reality there were few Africans leaders who would

not only agree to act on behalf of the UK government, but were also in a position to

influence French politicians. The potentially influential leaders of France’s former African

colonies were, according to one FCO official, like schoolboys who hero-worshipped their

40 TNA/FCO/65/300_2, Soames to FCO, 08/10/1969.41 TNA/FCO/65/347_2, Wilson to Tebbit, 06/11/1968.42 TNA/FCO/65/300_3, Correspondence on France and Nigeria, 09/10/1969.43 TNA/FCO/65/300.

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‘Head-Boy’ de Gaulle and were thus unlikely to make a stand against France.44 Despite

various tactics being adopted, British attempts at working through African leaders yielded

few positive results. The issue here is not perhaps the success or failure of these efforts but

the fact that the British government were resorting to indirect means of dealing with

France. That British politicians felt they needed to make use of such oblique methods is

indicative of the height and depth of the barriers that existed between France and Britain,

effectively blocking direct Anglo-French discussion of the Nigerian problem. Anglo-French

disagreement over the civil war in Nigeria was part of a broader and more fundamental

Anglo-French divide rooted in a century of rivalry on the African continent.

This is not to say that the British government did not make some attempts to

establish a dialogue with French politicians on Nigeria. But such approaches were

extremely cautious, particularly in the light of Anglo-French disagreements over Europe,

exacerbated further in the wake of the ‘Soames Affair’ (February 1969) when the British

Foreign Office leaked details of a private conversation between de Gaulle and Christopher

Soames (British Ambassador to France, 1968-1972) about the EEC 45 Moreover, the

absence of any tangible evidence of French military involvement also created obstacles to

discussion with the French.46 ‘The joy of it all’, according to one journalist, ‘is that France

is not directly involved – or at least no one so far can prove that Paris is.’47

To overcome this predicament the FCO initially avoided ministerial approaches,

favouring high-level bilateral discussions. The first opportunity for such a dialogue was at

the annual Anglo-French talks on Africa which began on 17 December 1968. The main

objective at these talks with regard to the Nigerian situation was to persuade the French

44 TNA/FCO/65/300_3, Correspondence on France and Nigeria, 09/10/1969.45 TNA/FCO/65/266_38a, Brief for meeting with Soames, 19/11/1968. 46 TNA/FCO/65/347_11, Moberly to Fielding, 22/11/1968. 47 TNA/FCO/65/267_55, J. Wilde, ‘Keeping Biafra Alive’, Time, 06/12/1968.

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government to alter its position and stop encouraging the Biafrans to continue fighting. It

was hoped that France would agree to the necessity of an early ceasefire and negotiations,

and that they convince Lieutenant-Colonel Ojukwu (leader of Biafra, 1967-1970) of the

same thing. In order to achieve these objectives the FCO planned to emphasise the potential

dangers of France’s policy, particularly the possibility of Communist infiltration of Nigeria

that could pose a threat to Francophone West Africa. They also proposed to highlight the

potential tensions between Francophone and Anglophone Africa as a result of France’s

support for Biafra, underlining the possibility of Anglo-French conflict over the Nigerian

issue. British emphasis on the shared concerns of Britain and France, particularly their

common interest in preventing USSR penetration and maintaining African stability, reveals

the British hope that France could be induced to share their point of view, thus averting

serious Anglo-French disagreement over Nigeria.48 In the event these talks were

unsuccessful and the British government was unable to convince France to alter its policy.

Attention therefore shifted towards lower-level approaches, in the hope that discussion with

French ministers at the Quai would spread upward though the French foreign office and

produce more positive results.49

A “prise de contacte” between British diplomats and Claude Lebel and Jean Gueury

(Director and Deputy Director respectively for African Affairs at the Quai) on 20

December 1968 was interpreted as a positive development in Anglo-French discussions on

Nigeria. The British politicians sensed a ‘germ of a possible compromise’ on the French

side due to Quai unease about French support for Biafra. However, Debré’s loyalty to the

Biafran cause, as well as tight Elysée control over Nigerian affairs, limited the scope within

which Britain could work. A shift in high level opinion was necessary if the British

48 TNA/FCO/65/267_66a, Brief for Anglo-French Talks, 17/12/1968.49 TNA/FCO/65/267_68a, Tebbit to Monson, 23/12/1968.

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government could have any hope of altering French policy in Nigeria.50 The possibility of

approaching Jacques Foccart was briefly discussed, but the West Africa Department of

FCO had reservations from the outset and the proposed meeting failed to materialise.51

As the months passed Britain failed to make any sort of impact on France’s policy

and French support for the Biafrans continued unabated. Attempts to bridge the divide

between Britain and France over Nigeria were brought to a standstill as French politicians

became distracted by internal affairs, particularly the Constitutional Referendum that took

place on 27 April 1969. Because of the repeated failure of direct communication with the

French government, Britain was left to pursue other methods to alter France’s policy. It was

hoped the division in French public opinion on Biafra might be exploited, particularly

following the problems of the French national “Aid Biafra week” in March 1969. However

British politicians remained unconvinced about how deep this rift actually was, reducing

the potential impact such an approach might have.52 The suggestion to use unattributable

propaganda to sway French public opinion was treated with reserve due to concern that the

information might be traced back to the British government, leading to further difficulties

in Anglo-French relations.

The British government seemed to have run out of ideas on how to deal with France

and their policy in Nigeria. The minimal possibility of direct high level approaches shows

how far apart the British FCO was from its French counterpart and prompted the adoption

of alternative lower level approaches as well as indirect methods. These efforts however

had little effect on French policy. The cul-de-sac in which Britain found itself was the result

of a divergence in Anglo-French aims and interpretations of the Nigerian situation as a

50 TNA/FCO/65/267_68a, Tebbit to Monson, 23/12/1968.51 TNA/FCO/65/268_93, Wilson to Campbell, 22/01/1960. 52 TNA/FCO/65/269_130, Simpson-Orlebar to Moberly, 01/04/1969.

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whole. French assessments of the Biafran military position and the role of guerrilla warfare

were markedly different to Britain’s, as was their interpretation of the psychology of the

Ibos and the flexibility of the Federal government.53 Nigerian students who arrived in

France in November 1968 on French government scholarships were described by the

British government as ‘hostages’, whilst the French government saw them as part of a

friendly Franco-Nigerian cultural exchange. The British government made the distinction

between funds raised for humanitarian causes and military causes. France did not.54

Furthermore, Britain and France had different definitions of certain key terms

relating to the conflict including “federation”, “confederation” and “self-determination”.

France favoured a confederal solution to a federal solution (de Gaulle was notoriously

opposed to federations, particularly those of Anglo-Saxon origin). Britain however did not

believe it was possible to differentiate between a federation and a confederation as both

terms could be applied equally to several different situations. Similarly, France claimed that

its belief in the right of the Ibo people to disposer d’eux-mêmes did not necessarily imply

support for Biafran independence, a similar stance to that adopted by de Gaulle towards the

Québécois separatists in his infamous ‘Vive Québec Libre’ speech of July 1967. Britain

however associated self-determination with independence, and thus made no distinction

between the two terms. Disagreement also arose over whether or not the killings of the Ibo

people should be classified as genocide.55 France and Britain were on a different page when

it came to Nigeria. They repeatedly misinterpreted and misunderstood each other’s actions

and intentions, revealing deeply rooted differences which placed severe limitations on the

extent to which Britain and France could enjoy positive relations. As such, the Nigerian

53 TNA/FCO/33/536_36, Fielding to Wilson, 03/02/1969.54 TNA/FCO/65/266_34, Anderson to Minister, 08/11/1968.55 TNA/FCO/65/266_12, Moberly to Fielding, 24/10/1968

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affair was to affect other areas of Anglo-French contact and undermine potential

cooperation between the two nations in Africa, Europe and elsewhere.

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April 1969 – September 1970

After General de Gaulle: ‘ plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose’

On 27 April 1969 France went to the polls to vote in a Constitutional Referendum

that would decide whether de Gaulle’s proposals to increase regional powers and reform

the Senate would be brought into legislation. De Gaulle had declared his intention to resign

if he was defeated. Despite early suggestions that de Gaulle would win, only 47% of the

population voted in favour of the reforms. The remaining 53% voted ‘non’ and

consequently, on 28 April 1969, after more than ten years as the President of the French

Republic, Charles de Gaulle resigned.56 The British government hoped his resignation

would lead to a shift in French Nigerian policy and mark the beginning of a new era in

Anglo-French relations.

In the second half of April reports that the quantity of French military supplies

reaching Biafra was diminishing began to appear, suggesting a possible modification in the

French attitude towards the Nigerian situation. Distracted by internal affairs and influenced

by French industrialists and businessmen fearful for future French investments in Nigeria,

France appeared to be experiencing ‘a distinct cooling off’ in their enthusiasm for the

Biafran cause.57 Although scepticism remained about the extent to which French interest

and involvement was actually decreasing, some, including Christopher Soames, were

hopeful of a French policy review following the referendum.58 There was further cause for

optimism when, on 2 May, the interim President, Alain Poher, replaced Jacques Foccart

with Daniel Pepy.

56 R. Kedward, La Vie en Bleu: France and the French since 1900 (London, 2006), p. 430-431.57 TNA/FCO/65/269_139a, BBC World Service Broadcast, 24/04/1969.58 TNA/FCO/65/269_141, Soames to FCO, 25/04/1969.

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The French media offered additional evidence of a possible shift in France’s

position towards Biafra. French commentators’ interpretations of the conflict were

increasingly rational and subjective, with some alluding to the need for Biafra to

surrender.59 One French journalist discussed the inevitability of a modification of French

policy if de Gaulle were to resign. He also acknowledged the cynical, anti-British nature of

France’s role in the Nigerian Civil War, a movement away from the media’s former

justification of French action on moral grounds.60 This perceived movement in French

intellectual thinking increased British hope that the French government would alter its

position on Biafra. The appointment of Georges Pompidou as the new President of the

French Republic on 15 June further buoyed British optimism. Even before his election

British diplomats based in Paris reported that, if elected, Pompidou would not continue de

Gaulle’s ‘emmerdements africains’.61 The removal of the dedicated Gaullist and supporter

of the Biafran people, Michel Debré, as foreign minister, and his replacement with Maurice

Schumann on 22 June was seen as further evidence of a possible departure from de

Gaulle’s Nigerian policy.

Whilst British government officials in Paris were heralding the end of Gaullism,

British diplomats and politicians outside of France interpreted events differently. The West

Africa Department of the FCO responded to de Gaulle’s resignation with reserve, uncertain

if the ‘new situation in relation to the French attitude to Biafra’ would actually lead to a

policy review by the French.62 Maurice Foley (Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the FCO)

predicted that Gaullist policies would survive the demise of de Gaulle himself.63 Moreover,

59 TNA/FCO/65/269_162, Moberly to Collins, 22/05/1969.60 TNA/FCO/65/269_158, Conversation with Decraene, 16/05/1969.61 TNA/FCO/65/269_164, Simpson-Orlebar to Millington, 04/06/1969.62 TNA/FCO/65/269_142, Wilson to Tebbit, 29/04/1969.63 TNA/FCO/65/269_151, Wilson to Hunt, 05/05/1969.

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contrary to the assumption of the British Embassy in Paris that Foccart would never

return,64 those based in Whitehall were not surprised by Foccart’s reappointment on 26

June.65 His return was seen as proof of the new regime’s intention to continue de Gaulle’s

African policies, dashing hopes for a modification of France’s Nigerian policy. The British

Embassy in Paris continued to put a positive spin on ‘Foccart’s reincarnation’, emphasising

Pompidou’s attempts to disassociate himself from Foccart.66 Christopher Soames made

much of the relocation of Foccart’s office away from the Elysée, as well as the change in

Foccart’s title, which no longer made reference to responsibility to the President.67 That

France’s African policy no longer seemed to be the domaine réservé of the Elysée was

interpreted as an early indication of the French government’s intention to change its

position on the Nigerian Civil War.

Yet ‘plus ça change, plus c’est la meme chose’.68 The replacement of Debré with

Schumann and Pompidou’s election as de Gaulle’s successor produced continuity more

than change. Although considered better disposed to Britain than his predecessor,69 it did

not take long for comparisons between Schumann and Debré to be drawn.70 Furthermore,

Schumann’s reference to “Biafra” on 9 July71 contrasted with efforts immediately after de

Gaulle’s resignation to speak of “the Ibos”, rather than “the Biafrans”,72 suggesting

renewed French commitment to the Biafran cause. Similarly, the expectation that

Pompidou would make a decisive break with Gaullism quickly disappeared when

64 TNA/FCO/65/269_164, Simpson-Orlebar to Millington, 04/06/1969.65 TNA/FCO/65/270_177, McEntee to Simpson-Orlebar, 04/07/1969.66 TNA/FCO/65/270_174, Simpson-Orlebar to Moberly, 27/06/1969.67 TNA/FCO/65/270_172, Soames to FCO, 26/06/1969.68 Alphonse Karr, Les Guêpes, January 1849, cited in The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Quotations (Oxford, 1964), p. 119. The English translation of this quotation is ‘the more things change, the more they are the same.’69 TNA/FCO/65/271_240, Wilson to Tebbit, 08/10/1969.70 TNA/FCO/65/270_210, Simpson-Orlebar to Watts, 22/08/1969.71 TNA/FCO/65/270_179, Soames to FCO, 09/07/1969.72 TNA/FCO/65/269_154, Soames to FCO, 08/05/1969.

21


Pompidou met one of Biafra’s most loyal supporters, Omar Bongo (President of Gabon,

1967-present day) to discuss the conflict, indicating the new French President’s intention to

continue supporting Biafra.73

As France stubbornly remained champions of the Biafran cause, the British

government began to question their refusal, despite mounting pressure, to alter their

position. Many of the familiar explanations of French action were repeated. The

geopolitical, commercial and humanitarian concerns that continued to shape French policy

were cited, as was the anti-British element of French policy-making. The absence of any

fresh insight indicates the British government’s struggle to comprehend French actions and

motives. Correspondence from all departments of the FCO was increasingly concentrated

on the paradoxical nature of France’s support for Biafra. The incompatibility of France’s

sponsorship of the Biafran cause with the maintenance of normal diplomatic relations with

Nigeria was highlighted,74 as was the contradiction between French support for Biafra and

France’s general policy objectives in West Africa.75 An inconsistency was also noted in the

continued vigour of Franco-Nigerian trade, which contributed more to the Federal Nigerian

economy than France gave to Biafra in the form of military support.76 That France was

prolonging the conflict, whilst at the same time being a position to help end the war, was

also difficult for British diplomats and politicians to comprehend.77

United in their incomprehension of French policy, the British government

increasingly denounced French motives. France’s intentions for support Biafra were viewed

as dishonourable, particularly their desire to exploit Nigerian oil and frustrate Britain in

73 TNA/FCO/65/270_181, BBC Report, 21/07/196974 TNA/FCO/65/270_182, Wilson to Glass, 29/07/1969.TNA/FCO/65/270_184, Stewart to Lagos, 30/07/1969.75 TNA/FCO/65/270_196, Soames to FCO, 07/08/1969.76 Stremlau, International Politics, p. 233.77 TNA/FCO/65/271_221, Brief for meeting with Schumann, 17/09/1969.

22


West Africa. Paris was condemned for allowing the conflict to continue and, as a result,

damaging British interests in Nigeria. Such criticism shows how France’s Nigerian policy

was no longer seen as a minor irritant, but part of a direct attack on Britain. Sir Leslie Glass

(British High Commissioner to Nigeria, 1969-1971) was particularly open in his criticism,

stressing the ‘malice and greed which originally inspired’ the French support for Biafra. He

advocated publicising France’s role in the war in an attempt to turn opinion against the

French government both inside and outside France. The British Embassy in Paris however

had reservations about Glass’ plan due to fears that exposing French activities could

‘stiffen Gaullist determination’78 and prompt an upsurge in approval of France’s support for

‘“gallant little Biafra” against the threat of… Federal Nigerians armed to the teeth by the

wicked British and the Russians!’79 Fears for their reputation, which was particularly at risk

if they became associated with the USSR, deterred British politicians from being too overt

in their attacks on France. The British Embassy in Paris was more reluctant than British

government officials elsewhere, perhaps due to its close proximity to the French

government and its Cold War policies of non-alignment.

The British Embassy in Paris also opposed suggestions made by John Wilson (Head

of the West African Department of the FCO, 1968-1973) and others that Britain should try

to persuade Nigeria to take firm action against France, particularly targeting French

commercial concessions in Federal territory.80 This previously discarded idea for a Nigerian

approach was resurrected in the hope that Nigeria might be more willing to tackle Paris

now de Gaulle was no longer in power.81 Nigeria however remained unwilling to criticise

France due to its persistent worries about provoking France to intensify its support for

78 TNA/FCO/65/270_204, Johnston to Palliser, 14/08/1969.79 TNA/FCO/65/270_202, Palliser to Johnston, 8/08/1969.80 TNA/FCO/65/270_182, Wilson to Glass, 29/07/1969.81 TNA/FCO/65/269_145, Stewart to Paris, 29/04/1969.

23


Biafra, which could in turn lead to Biafran victory. This was a scenario which British

politicians were also anxious to avoid.82 The possibility of working through Senegal was

once again explored due to the close relationship between Senghor and Pompidou.

Although critical of the France’s support for Biafra and its nurturing of a ‘cold war in

Nigeria’,83 Senghor preferred to maintain a more neutral stance.84 In any case, Senghor’s

influence over the French President was counterbalanced by the ardent Biafran supporter,

Houphouët-Boigny, and his connections to Pompidou.85

Whilst the different departments of the British FCO debated the merits of these

indirect attacks, British politicians and diplomats discussed possible direct approaches to

the French. The renewed interest in direct contacts shows the increased anxiety amongst

British politicians and diplomats about the Nigerian situation and the resulting negative

consequences for Anglo-French relations. However, once again the British FCO struggled

to agree on the exact line to take with the French. Whilst those in Whitehall favoured

dealing with low level Quai officials, the British Embassy in Paris believed that only a top

level directive would allow ‘a “real wind of change” to blow ‘through the corridors of the

Quai’.86 France’s repeated denial of involvement in the arms traffic to Biafra continued to

act as a barrier to any high or low level contacts,87 as did Britain’s desire to avoid being

accused of reviving old colonial rivalries.88 Fears of making the situation worse on the

ground in Nigeria, and, above all else, concerns about risking Britain’s EEC membership

82 TNA/FCO/65/270_183, Johnston to Foley, 30/04/1969.83 TNA/FCO/65/300_26, Report of Senghor interview with Figaro, 05/08/1969.84 TNA/FCO/65/300_23, Davidson to Moberly, 10/06/1969.85 TNA/FCO/65/270_200, Talks between Simpson-Orlebar and Ogunsulire, 06/08/1969.86 TNA/FCO/65/270_211, Palliser to Johnston, 20/08/1969.87 TNA/FCO/65/270_206, Freeman to FCO, 15/08/1969.88 TNA/FCO/65/271_217a, Glass to Johnston, 03/09/1969.

24


and permanently damaging Anglo-French relations, led the British government to be

extremely cautious in their approaches to Paris.89

It did appear however that, given the failure of indirect methods and the escalation

of the problems in Nigeria, discussion with Paris was necessary if Britain was ever to

bridge the widening channel that separated British and French interpretations of the

Nigerian Civil War. This incongruity was patent in the different views Britain and France

held about Biafra’s secession. France believed Biafra’s declaration of independence from

Nigeria was a legitimate attempt to gain self-determination. Britain on the other hand,

characterised it as a rebellion. The British government attributed this different reading of

events to the contrasting styles of colonial and post-colonial policy the two countries

adopted,90 differences that meant France failed to understand Britain’s African policy as

well as the history and ambitions of the Ibo people.91 Here it is apparent that the Anglo-

French divide over Nigeria stemmed, not from the situation in Nigeria itself, but from a

century of disagreement and dispute over African and imperial policy.

Yet, although British politicians did not agree with France’s assessments of the war,

such as their description of the Nigerian Civil War as a religious war and their

concentration on the ‘Islamic bogey’ over the threat of Communist infiltration, they did

hope that, by presenting an accurate picture of the hostile influences in Nigeria, at least

some elements of French policy might be brought into line with that of Britain. As such the

possibility of Anglo-French cooperation in Nigeria became an item on the agenda in this

period.92 The ‘somewhat easier atmosphere of the post-de Gaulle period’ contributed to

rising British expectation that Britain and France might be able to collaborate on peace

89 TNA/FCO/65/271_232, Soames to FCO, 30/09/1969.90 TNA/FCO/65/270_205, Johnston to Wilson, 14/08/1969.91 TNA/FCO/65/270_204, Johnston to Palliser, 14/08/1969.92 TNA/FCO/65/270_205, Johnston to Wilson, 14/08/1969.

25


efforts.93 Furthermore, the French pro-Biafran campaign was now seen as part of an internal

feud between the moderate majority and a hard-line Gaullist minority, with Jacques Foccart

and the Union des jeunes pour le progrès (UJP) mobilising public opinion about Biafra to

attack Pompidou and the new regime. The FCO questioned whether Britain was really the

main target of France’s Nigerian policy, raising hopes that the Anglo-French breach could

be repaired.94

As optimism grew among British politicians and diplomats, Anglo-French

differences were increasingly regarded as insignificant in comparison with the shared

threats that were created by the Nigerian Civil War, particularly the risk of Soviet

expansion in Africa.95 In discussions with the French, British politicians placed emphasis

on the shared desire for African stability, in the hope that France might be persuaded to

cooperate in a peace plan where both Britain and France would use their respective

influences to help bring about a settlement.96 It appears therefore that British politicians and

diplomats believed the only way to bring the conflict to a close was to overlook the impasse

that divided Britain and France. The need to stabilise Anglo-French relations was not only

essential for ending the Nigerian Civil War, but also for resolving tensions between Britain

and France in Africa and elsewhere.

93 TNA/FCO/65/271_221, Brief for meeting with Schumann, 17/09/1969.94 TNA/FCO/65/270_210, Simpson-Orlebar to Watts, 22/08/1969.95 TNA/FCO/65/271_220, Soames to FCO, 11/09/1969.96 TNA/FCO/65/271_231, Conversation between Stewart and Schumann, 20/09/1969.

26


October 1969 – January 1970

The Failure of France’s Nigerian Policy

In October 1969 the Nigerian government began preparing for a final assault against

Biafra which was intended to defeat the breakaway state and bring it back under the Federal

rule.97 Alongside hopes that the war might end soon, a modification of France’s Nigerian

policy was also anticipated. The British media reported a transformation of the French

attitude towards the war. According to one British journalist reporting from Paris

‘unofficial French support for Biafra’ was to be ‘discouraged’, with a guarantee from

Pompidou himself ‘that there should be no further French involvement, official or

otherwise, in internal Nigerian affairs.’98 The British government however largely

discounted such reports as speculative and based upon tenuous evidence, recognising that a

major shift in France’s position, as predicted by the British press, was extremely

improbable.99 The best anyone could hope for was a minor modification that might bring

the war to a speedier conclusion, thus reducing the threats posed by the continuance of the

conflict and removing the obstacle that stood in the way of constructive Anglo-French

relations.

Those within the British government most hopeful of a small change on the French

side could be found at the British Embassy in Paris. They believed discussions between the

French and British foreign ministers in New York in late September had prompted top level

Quai officials to reconsider France’s Nigerian policy and, as a result, propose talks on the

issue with the British government. Although Nigeria was to be discussed under the veil of

97 De St. Jorre, Nigerian Civil War, p. 368.98 TNA/FCO/65/272_259, J. Smalldon, ‘French support for Biafra relief ‘will be discouraged’’, The Daily Telegraph, 30/10/1969.99 TNA/FCO/65/272_264, Simpson-Orlebar to Wilson, 07/11/1969.

27


talks on the Middle East, the fact that the French government had proposed the meeting at

all was interpreted as an indication of a possible change in their policy and an alignment of

Anglo-French objectives in Nigeria.100 Optimism about a shift in France’s position was

heightened further when Claude Lebel (Director for African Affairs at the Quai) contacted

the British Embassy in Paris to arrange talks with London sooner than expected.101

Schumann’s speech to the French National Assembly on 4 November, in which he repeated

many elements of de Gaulle’s speech of 9 September 1968, but omitted the passage in

which de Gaulle had acknowledged the possibility of future diplomatic recognition of the

breakaway state, was also perceived as a signal that France would soon give up the idea of

Biafran self-determination.102 The replacement, in December 1969, of Lebel with Bruno de

Leusse de Syon, who lacked an ‘emotional or irrational commitment to “Biafra”’, was seen

as another positive development in France’s Nigerian policy.103

British government officials in London and Lagos did not share however the

British Embassy’s optimism that a change would take place in France’s position towards

the Nigerian Civil War, proof perhaps that a little more perspective was needed to obtain an

accurate interpretation of events. Assessments of French policy from outside of the

Embassy were increasingly cynical, focusing on the dishonourable and irrational

motivations that shaped France’s continued support for Biafra, revealing the growing

British disillusion with French policy. British diplomats disregarded the French

government’s declaration of commitment to the right of the Ibos to disposer d’eux-mêmes,

citing as evidence France’s opposition to self-determination in Indochina and Algeria, as

well as the support they had given to the governments of Cameroon and Chad respectively

100 TNA/FCO/65/271_235, Palliser to Tebbit, 03/10/1969.101 TNA/FCO/65/271_237, Palliser to Arthur, 06/10/1969.102 TNA/FCO/65/272_266, Simpson-Orlebar to Watts, 14/11/1969.103 TNA/FCO/65/751_1, Palliser to Tebbit, 31/12/1969.

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against movements striving for increased autonomy.104 Yet, as has previously been

discussed, British and French conceptions of “self-determination” (and other important

terms relating to the conflict) were quite dissimilar, posing serious problems for Anglo-

French contacts in Nigeria. This difference in interpretation was symptomatic of the

fundamental misunderstandings that existed between Britain and France which created

insurmountable obstacles to improving Anglo-French relations.

Avowed champions of the Biafran cause continued to dictate France’s Nigerian

policy, a dominance that British politicians remained unable to destroy. Charles de Gaulle

continued to exercise a significant influence over the French political scene in the months

since his resignation, making a reduction in France’s support for Biafra seem unlikely.

Foccart also maintained his near absolute control over French African policy, with Nigerian

policy remaining the domaine réservé of the Elysée, despite earlier hopes that the Quai

control was increasing.105 Moreover, Houphouët-Boigny, a dedicated Biafran supporter,

continued to act as a valued advisor on African affairs to high-ranking French decision-

makers, including President Pompidou himself.106 His ability to influence French actions in

Nigeria stemmed from the great significance that French politicians attached to their

relations with Francophone African leaders in their pursuit of West African hegemony.107

The desire to avoid falling out with their African friends, a legacy of France’s imperial

policy in Africa, created an obstacle to any real change in France’s attitude towards the

Nigerian conflict. As long as Houphouët-Boigny continued to support Biafra, so too would

France.

104 TNA/FCO/65/272_256, Edden to Barder, 01/10/1969.105 TNA/FCO/65/271_240, Wilson to Tebbit, 08/10/1969.106 TNA/FCO/65/271_235, Palliser to Tebbit, 03/10/1969.107 Bach, ‘Le Général’, p. 271.

29


Other legacies of colonialism were perceived to have an impact on France’s

Nigerian policy, acting as a barrier to any possible alteration of France’s position. The

British High Commissioner in Lagos, Sir Leslie Glass, expressed serious doubts that there

would be a modification in French policy, emphasising the role of Foccart in running what

he described as ‘an autonomous empire which seems to have inherited some of the

frustrated mystique of Frenchmen embittered by events in Indo-China and Algeria’.108 This

association between France’s imperial failures and their support for Biafra shows the deep-

rooted forces that British politicians and diplomats believed to be at work in France’s

African policy-making. France’s determination to support Biafra was rooted in its imperial

past, undermining any British hopes that France might alter its Nigerian policy in any

significant way.

Alongside these analyses of French motives ran pessimistic British assessments of

France’s role in the war which concentrated on the negative consequences of France’s

involvement. France was identified as being at the heart of the problem in Nigeria, and was

accused by the FCO of pursuing a policy in direct opposition to Britain, as well as being

‘mainly responsible for keeping Biafra alive and for keeping the war going.’ As a result the

British government was more and more convinced that it was necessary to take a firm

stance with France, rejecting ‘the fiction’ that France was a neutral bystander in the

conflict. It was vital that Britain ‘do everything possible to try to induce the French to

change their policy.’109

It was not only France’s perceived responsibility in maintaining the conflict in

Nigeria that determined the decision by British politicians and diplomats to adopt a firmer

line with France. The recognition that France’s role in the conflict was having a detrimental

108 TNA/FCO/65/272_262, Glass to Johnston, 06/12/1969.109 TNA/FCO/65/271_240, Wilson to Tebbit, 08/10/1969.

30


impact on Britain’s interests in Nigeria contributed to a hardening British attitude towards

France over the Nigerian problem. In the earlier months of the conflict the British

government had been willing to disregard the fact that France were pursuing a policy which

endangered British material interests in the region to avoid upsetting Anglo-French

relations or damaging Britain’s position in Europe. However, as evidence mounted of the

damage to British commerce in Nigeria as a result of France’s support for Biafra, the need

for a frank approach to the French to persuade them to alter their policy was advocated as

essential.110

In mid-November 1969 arguably the most damning reports of French involvement

in the war hitherto available were brought to the British government’s attention. There was

now concrete evidence that the Biafran Air Force was using weapons of French

manufacture against British oil installations in Nigeria. Moreover, British businessmen

working in Nigeria began to raise concerns about the potential threat posed to British

property and citizens as a result of French involvement in the war. Although some of the

reports were subsequently deemed false, the British government was becoming increasingly

anxious about the adverse publicity it would receive if it was seen to be neglecting the

safety of British nationals, emphasising its concern to preserve its own reputation.111 This,

combined with the threat to British commerce and the persistence of fighting in Nigeria,

prompted British politicians to discuss plans to approach Paris immediately and insist that

they ‘put matters right.’112 The French government needed to be aware that in supporting

Biafra they were not only fuelling serious problems in Nigeria, but also creating a ‘major

irritant’ in Anglo-French relations.113 The urgency of this rhetoric illustrates the intensifying

110 TNA/FCO/65/272_246, Tebbit from Bendall, 14/10/1969.111 TNA/FCO/65/272_270, Soames to FCO, 27/11/1969.112 TNA/FCO/65/272_268, Stewart to Paris, 26/11/1969.113 TNA/FCO/65/272_277, Brief on France’s attitude to Nigeria and Biafra, 09/12/1969.

31


need to resolve Anglo-French tensions for the sake of Nigeria, but also for Britain itself.

Despite being quick to criticise France for acting in its own self-interest, British politicians

and diplomats were slow to recognise that they were in fact doing the same.

In order to persuade France to change its position, British politicians once again

underlined again the threat of instability in Francophone Africa if the Soviet Union was

allowed to penetrate Nigeria and religious and ethnic tensions in the region were left to

multiply as a result of the continuance of the conflict.114 Alongside these arguments, the

potential irreversible damage to Franco-Nigerian relations was emphasised, as was the risk

that Nigerian antagonism towards France might be extended to Francophone West

Africa.115 Both of these outcomes would create serious problems for France if it wished to

maintain its treasured position in the region and, as such, it was hoped that by highlighting

these threats, France might be persuaded to alter its position. The fact that Britain was able

to identify correctly the connection France felt to Africa demonstrates Britain’s own

attachment to the continent, and a shared Anglo-French bond that could perhaps act as a

foundation for compromise in Nigeria.

Tactics for approaching France continued to be a matter of contention within British

diplomatic circles. Whilst in agreement about the necessity of ‘a personal approach’, exact

tactical details continued to be debated, with tensions once again arising between Whitehall

and the British Embassy in Paris. Christopher Soames suggested that Michael Stewart

(Foreign Secretary, 1968-1970) should tackle Schumann about Nigeria at the NATO

Summit (4-5 December) which both British and French foreign ministers would be

attending. Stewart was however far from enamoured with such a plan, proposing instead

that Soames should discuss Nigeria with Schumann in more private surroundings. Soames

114 TNA/FCO/65/272_256, Edden to Barder, 01/10/1969.115 TNA/FCO/65/272_283, Letter from Wilson to Palliser, 19/12/1969.

32


planned to warn Schumann’s officials of the British intention to raise the issue with them.

Stewart, on the hand, did not want to allow the Quai time to prepare for the discussion and

thus favoured a more surprise approach to ‘shock’ Schumann ‘to call M. Foccart to

order.’116 Division amongst the British about the precise line to take with the French is

symptomatic perhaps of how much depended on Anglo-French discussions on Nigeria. The

fact that neither Soames nor Stewart were personally willing to take responsibility for

approaching France emphasises the difficulties involved in tackling France about their

support for Biafra and the way in which the disagreement over Nigeria troubled Anglo-

French communications overall.

The establishment of a dialogue on Nigeria was further frustrated by the continued

clash between British and French interpretations of the war. France believed an Ibo victory

was possible and that a united Nigeria would collapse. This contrasted with the British view

that the Biafrans could not win and that a “One Nigeria” could survive.117 France and

Britain also interpreted the USSR’s role in the conflict differently, with the French

maintaining that the USSR might reconsider its policy despite the fact Britain thought such

an occurrence would be unlikely. France continued to differentiate between “self-

determination” and “independence”, a distinction that British politicians had never

understood.118 Another contentious issue was whether genocide was taking place in Nigeria.

Britain insisted that the Federal government had no genocidal intentions.119 The French

government, on the other hand, reiterated the belief it had expressed throughout the

conflict, that genocide against the Ibo people was imminent.120

116 TNA/FCO/65/272_268-171, Correspondence between Stewart and Soames, 26-28/11/1969.117 TNA/FCO/65/272_256, Edden to Barder, 01/10/1969.118 TNA/FCO/65/272_258, Minutes of Anglo-French Talks, 21/10/1969.119 TNA/FCO/65/272_258, Minutes of Anglo-French Talks, 21/10/1969.120 TNA/FCO/65/751_8, Glass to FCO, 10/01/1970.

33


Pessimism also surrounded France’s humanitarian initiatives in the final weeks of

the war. French criticism of the Federal government and their attempts to mobilise

international opinion about the suffering of the Biafran people was seen as a desperate final

attempt by France to reverse the poor military situation in Biafra and save their Nigerian

policy. As a result the British government sought to disassociate itself from France to avoid

upsetting Nigeria, demonstrating how it was not only the French who felt an attachment to

their former colonial territories.121 Despite the British government’s desire to distance itself

from France’s Nigerian policy, Britain’s own commitment to its former imperial

dependencies mirrors France’s attachment to its ex-African empire. It is possible to suggest

therefore that, despite the appearance of hostility, underneath the surface Britain and France

understood each other better than has hitherto been suggested.

The fall of Biafra on 14 January 1970 signalled the collapse of France’s Nigerian

policy. Throughout the conflict Britain and France had consistently stood on different sides,

disagreeing over numerous issues and repeatedly failing to understand each other’s aims.

This Anglo-French mésentente in Nigeria was, according to John Wilson, the result of the

different styles of diplomacy that Britain and France adopted. France’s foreign policy-

making was ‘devoid of any moral content’ and based ‘on ruthless self-interest pursued with

determination and entire lack of scruple’. Such a ‘fundamental’ difference in outlooks,

which had endured despite the ‘passing of de Gaulle’, posed grave problems for the future

of Anglo-French relations.122

However France’s recognition that its Nigerian policy was ‘in ruins’ following the

fall of Biafra reignited hopes amongst British politicians and diplomats that past

disagreements could be put behind them and Anglo-French cooperation in Nigeria could be

121 TNA/FCO/65/751_12, Stewart to Lagos, 11/01/1970.122 TNA/FCO/65/751_2, Wilson to Burroughs, 07/01/1970.

34


achieved.123 Despite the differences between Britain and France during the Nigerian Civil

War, a flicker of hope about a future Anglo-French entente cordiale still glimmered

brightly on the British side of the channel.

123 TNA/FCO/65/751_25, Palliser to Wilson, 14/01/1970.

35


Conclusions

France’s support for the Biafran separatists during the Nigerian Civil War was a

major source of contention for Anglo-French relations in the late 1960s, particularly in the

final eighteen months of the Biafran war when French involvement directly opposed British

policy in the region. British politicians, diplomats and journalists offered various

interpretations of French participation, oscillating between optimism and pessimism

according to the location of the commentator. Those based in Paris, and thus closest to the

French government, generally adopted a positive perspective on French action, expressing

their hope throughout the conflict that France would modify its policy. In stark contrast

were the reports that came from on the ground in Nigeria. Here the experience of fighting

and a close association with the Federal government led journalists and diplomats alike to

respond negatively to French policy. A more balanced position was maintained by London-

based politicians, perhaps due to more ready access to both sides of the story.

Amongst these varying interpretations there was a degree of consensus. The British

government and media shared the view that France’s policy in Nigeria was shaped by

Charles de Gaulle himself, whose lasting influence on French African policy survived the

course of the conflict, despite his resignation in April 1969. The Gaullist conception of

France’s world role which stated that French grandeur was reliant on status in Africa was

significant. This notion was born in part from France’s colonial experience, the legacy of

which was entrenched in much of France’s Nigerian policy. The British government was to

discover to its cost this immovable rock on which French support for Biafra was founded.

As the conflict progressed, and French involvement persisted, British responses

became progressively pessimistic, focusing on the dishonourable motives for French policy

36


in Nigeria. According to this negative interpretation, France was supporting Biafra to

preserve its own standing in West Africa, an aim that they hoped to achieve by challenging

Britain’s position in the region. Cynicism about French intent grew as British material

interests in Nigeria, particularly the highly valuable oil concessions, fell under attack. Thus,

many questioned if it was Britain, and not Nigeria, which was the real target of French

policy, increasing British resentment towards France.

From July 1968, when France issued its first statement in support of Biafra, the

FCO repeatedly discussed ways and means of convincing the Quai to alter its position

towards the Nigerian Civil War, and thus influence those in Elysée to do the same. In spite

of this, the British government was reluctant to make a firm stand, preferring indirect

methods of communicating their concern to the French government. However, as the threat

to British interests in Nigeria grew ever more acute, British politicians and diplomats

increased their commitment to induce a change in France’s position. This suggests that

perhaps the British government’s concern for its own interests was greater than its distress

about the unravelling situation in Nigeria.

All attempts to alter French policy nevertheless resulted in disappointment, as can

be seen by the support France gave to Biafra until its collapse in January 1970. The failure

of these efforts can be attributed to numerous factors including the difficult personal

relations that existed between British and French politicians and Britain’s concern for its

position in Europe. The principal reason however for the FCO’s inability to persuade

France to alter its stance, as well as the main cause of the Anglo-French disagreement over

Nigeria, was the fundamental disparity between Paris and London’s attitudes. These

differences stemmed from centuries of rivalry across the globe which had created discord

between British and French conceptions of diplomatic conduct, foreign policy and

37


colonialism. The clash in Nigeria was just one manifestation of this inherent Anglo-French

divide which, in turn, created a significant obstacle to improving relations between Britain

and France. In the years since the end of the Nigerian Civil War this division has persisted

in Anglo-French interaction on the African continent. An examination of these contacts,

particularly in areas of Anglophone Africa such as South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)

where, as in Nigeria, France intervened outside of its traditional sphere of influence, is

necessary for a fuller understanding of the depth of this Anglo-French divide.

And yet, despite the deep gulf that existed between Britain and France, and their

failure to come to an agreement over the Nigerian issue, the collapse of France’s Biafran

policy in 1970 fostered a new hope of a future realignment of Anglo-French African policy.

Furthermore, beneath the surface, and perhaps unseen by British politicians and diplomats,

the shared Anglo-French concern for their former colonies created a foundation upon which

future cooperation could be built.

38


BIBLIOGRAPHY

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39



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Documents

BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1967-1970