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THE RISE OF ISLAMIC RELIGIO-POLITICAL MOVEMENTIN INDONESIA

(Its background, present situation and future)

Hamid Fahmy Zarkasyi PhDDirector of Institute for the Study of

Islamic Thought and CivilizationJakarta

A paper presented at the Symposium on “Asia and Islam” Organized by the Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs (JIIA) and the Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia (IKIM),

October 15th – 16th, Tokyo

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Abstract: This paper will trace the roots of the emergence of Islamic religious and political movement inIndonesia after longstanding experience of two oppressive regimes. During these periods Muslims weredepoliticized as if they have no interest to form political parties. Nurcholish Madjid depicted the situation ina slogan “Islam Yes, Islamic Party No”. The trace alludes the factor of global situation but the focus is thepolitical situation during Suharto regime, during which the Muslim political activities were heldunderground. There were two important impacts of Suharto’s strategy to depoliticized Muslim organization,first that various study groups and student organizations mushroomed in the university campuses. Thestudent activities moved from student center to mosques, where the student of secular universities couldlearn more about Islam. Second is the emergence of Islamic political parties, the most phenomenal of whichis the emergence of Justice and Welfare Party (PKS) and other Islam based parties or parties established byMuslim intellectuals. The phenomena suggested that Madjid pronouncement was no more tenable. TheNew Order strategy to depoliticize the Muslims movement and organization was not effective. However,the freedom after long oppression was not without risk. Apart from political movement there are alsoreligious movements of radical groups on the one hand and liberal group on the other. However, the liberalgroup targeted the radical and extremist group, but in reality they attacked non-radical and moderate groupwhich is the majority of Indonesian Muslims. The radical groups are not interested in such kind of liberaldiscourse, and liberalization seems ineffective to reduce their radical approach. Moreover, the liberal is notonly intellectual movement but also social and political, therefore to a certain extent they tend to have thesame decree of extremism as the radical groups. The present confrontation between the liberal and themoderate Muslim could lead to serious conflict in the future and would risk the democratic atmosphere.

Introduction

The rise of Islamic political parties and Islamic religious movements after the fall ofSuharto was not in abrupt manner. There were gradual processes involving numbers ofnational and global factors. Under the two regimes, Sukarno and Suharto, Muslimstudents and political movement were suffered from political oppressions, but the impactbecame effective for Muslims to mobilize themselves through underground organizationsand movements. The resignation of President Suharto and the succession of his VicePresident, BJ.Habibie in 1998 marked the end of four decade of authoritarian rule and thebeginning of democratization in Indonesian politic. The era of authoritative rule withconsiderable restriction and repression in socio-political life was subsequently replacedby reformation era with extravagant euphoria of freedom. Repression against Muslim andother groups decreased somewhat under the Habibie regime and dramatically under theregime of Abdurrahman Wahid. Habibie started with lifting the existing ban on thenumber of political parties and announce general election would be held within a year. Healso abolished the rule and regulation of media publication like news paper and magazine.Wahid, who was later known as pluralist figure, started with the abolishing the ban of ex-communist party members to participate in social and political activities.1 The situation isconsiderably conducive for the rise of diverse movements of numerous ideologies. Two

1 After he steps down from his power Wahid appreciate the launching the publication of the translated KarlMark book Das Capitalist. The students who present at the event commented that Islam should learn fromcommunism.

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most interesting phenomena are the rise of Islamic political parties, and the emergence ofMuslim groups which are regarded as taking extreme positions either radical extremistgroup or extreme liberal groups. This paper will analyze the rise of those movementsfrom its background, the present situation as well as its future.

Brief Historical Background

Studies on the rise of political Islam in Indonesia in present days, presupposes the studyof the longstanding historical process of Muslim struggle in building nation state prior toand after the independence. Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim nation and isthe world’s fourth most populated nation overall. It embraces within its territorialboundaries the largest concentration of Muslim in the world. From its total population ofabout 210 million, 87% are listed as Muslim.2 However, as the religion of majority, Islamand its institution have historically played a pivotal role in mobilizing and organizing themasses against the colonialist power. Prior to its independence Islamic organizations inIndonesia were also among those who spearheaded the Indonesian nationalist movements.Countless Muslim politicians, educators, social and religious leaders and others took partin struggle for Indonesian independent. The establishment of Syarikat Islam in early1920s comprising Muslim traders from Java and Sumatera was ample evidence of suchsocial mobilization. In addition, traditional education institution, like pesantren with itsreligious scholars (ulama) also displayed a remarkable potentiality to mobilize the armiesagainst Dutch colonialists. The formation and collaboration of PETA (National Defender)and Hizbullah (The Army of God) during Japanese occupation is another evidence.3

After independence Muslims had been the key actors in the formation of state and even inthe building of the nation as a whole. However, Islamic social movements, like Islamitself, are not monolithic. Rather, the movements are comprised of a diverse array ofMuslim actors with different goals and myriad means by which they seek to achieve theirobjectives. Some social movements may seek an Islamic state by winning elections, someother attempts to implement Islamic laws among Muslim community, others may seek toimprove the system of Islamic education through establishing schools, universities, ortraining centers, another group may seek to create their own economic systems and thelikes. In short, Islam became the major impetus and the unifying factor of Indonesiannation that formed Indonesian state. However, after long debate among the foundingfathers of Indonesia the idea of Islamic state brought by Muslim leaders was rejected andsubstituted with unitary state.

By the early twentieth century two important organizations were established. First isMuhammadiyah, which is formed in 1912 to assert reformist or “modern” Islamic ideals.Now, it becomes the second largest Islamic organization in the country that have 9,527educational institutions of various types, and 3,775 health and welfare-related centers.

2 Biro Pusat Statistik Indonesia3 For the history of PETA and Hizbullah formation, see Harry J Benda, The Crescent on the Rising Sun,Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945, W. Van Hoeve, The Hague, 1958.

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Second organization reflecting the traditionalist outlook counterweight to it wasestablished in 1926 under the name Nahdatul Ulama (literally, "revival of the religiousteachers," but commonly referred to as the Muslim Scholars' League). Now it becomesthe largest Islamic organization in Indonesia, that claims to have hundreds of traditionalschool (pesantren) with 30 million supporters. It runs schools and communityassociations throughout the country. However, the founder of both NU andMuhammadiyah were graduated from Saudi Arabia in 19th century, during which Meccaand Medina were the centers of traditional learning. They were known to be holding andpracticing fundamental teaching of Islam but not necessarily became “fundamentalist” inWestern sense of the term. During the struggle for Indonesian independence which finallydeclared in 1945, the prominent figure of these two organizations became committeemembers for the preparation of Indonesia Independence (PPKI).

After the proclamation of Indonesian independence in 1945, a large number of competingparties emerged. Among these parties Masyumi (Indonesian Muslim ConsultativeCouncil) was in a strong position. Masyumi was a federation of Islamic parties andorganization including Muhammadiyah, Syarekat Islam and Nahdatul Ulama. Its leaderwas Mohammad Natsir who during the earlier period of parliamentary democracy (1950 -1957) became Prime Minister (from September 1950 to March 1951). No later than adecade the strains among the party members begun to show. Syarekat Islam party (in1948) and Nahdtul Ulama (in 1950) withdrew from Masyumi. Nonetheless, in 1955election Masyumi won 22 percent of parliamentary vote equal to forty four seats.However, due to the hostility of the party member against Sukarno the party was thenbanned in 1960.4

During the New Order regime under the leadership of Suharto the Muslim parties wereoppressed. Pancasila was placed as state ideology and stated to abolish parties based onreligion. He then decided to reduce the number of political parties. In 1971 generalelection there were nine parties four of which are Muslim parties (PMI, NU, PSII,Tarbiyah). In 1973 the government merged these four parties into a single body identifiedby a name that had nothing to do with Islamic aspiration, United Development Party(PPP). At the same time it merged five minority parties including Catholic party, theProtestant party and the remnant of the former Indonesian Nationalist Party to formIndonesian Democratic Party (PDI). The party that supports the government calledGolkar. Thus, the number of parties at a single stroke was reduced to three parties whichbecame the mark of the end of party based on religious ideology. Islamic political partiesand organizations had been oppressed and almost lost their chance to compete indemocratic system.

4 Since then Natsir change his activity into social movement. He established the Dewan Dakwah IslamiyahIndonesia (Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation). It is an organization for the propagation of Islam,set up in 1968. Under the leadership of Natsir, who was also appointment as vice-president of the WorldMuslim Congress, the Council received financial support from the Saudi Arabia government. However,after his death the council receives no more financial support from Saudi. The explication of politicaldevelopment in these years see H.Faith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, Ithaca,N.Y. Cornel University Press, 1962, esp. chapter 9 & 10.

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Apart from the above situation in 1970s there were gradually massive religiousphenomena, particularly among the Indonesian Muslims and generally among the youthin the Muslim world. The phenomena, in Indonesia could be called the ‘santri-ization’,5which means the increase of religious consciousness in Muslim society. Increased publicpractice of their Islamic faith like the consciousness to attend Friday prayers at themosque, for women to wear the jilbab/tudung (Muslim head dress) and for Muslims to eatseparately from non-Muslim colleagues has also characterized Malaysian and SingaporeMuslims. Although this could be on the level of religious practice and not necessarily onreligious thought or the substance of religious belief, it marked the rise of the greaterawareness of Islam's global identity. Therefore, it should not be surprising that thesephenomena occurred simultaneously with the growing support for the Palestinian cause,and commitment to support the struggles of Muslims in Afghanistan (during the Sovietoccupation), Bosnia, Kosovo and Chechnya. Thus, the increased of religious practicesgrow simultaneously with global political awareness.

However, the phenomena suggest only religious identification, and cannot be generalizedas the emergence of transnational terrorist networks nor the desire to establishexclusionist Islamic states in Southeast Asia. Usually observers correlate the phenomenawith the Iranian Revolution of 1979 or Wahhabi’s school of thought. Indeed, there arefacts that Wahhabi-inspired ideas have been promoted in Pakistan, Afghanistan andCentral Asia in the last thirty years through a variety of semi-official and official actors isundeniable. One would assume that the Taliban was “the final and the most formidableproduct of this long term strategy of Wahhabism,6 but so far Muslims in these arearemained Hanafi adherent and in Southeast Asia are Shafii strong holders. In SoutheastAsia the Wahhabi influence can also be seen in the emergence of the group called Salafi,but it is nothing to do with the rise of religious movement, let alone the current politicalmovement, since the school forbids its members to join any political activity. The spreadof Shiah school of thought from Iran to South and Southeast Asia is also the irrefutablefact, but Muslims in these areas are predominantly Sunni and not Shii like the Iranians. Sothe phenomena can hardly be traced from single factor, or be inferred as the rise ofextremism and radicalism. John L Esposito regards it as Islamic revivalism and a globalreassertion of Islam that had already been under way and that extended from Libya toMalaysia.7

5 The santri refer to students of religious education institution named pesantren, seen as devout Muslimscompared to the abangan nominal Muslims. In reality, this Clifford Geertz’s old divisions are not so starkfor there is a continuum that reflects the diverse practice of religious faith in Muslim society. Thediscussion of this term, however, refers to Koentjaraningrat, Javanese Culture (Singapore, OxfordUniversity Press, 1985).6 Shireen T. Hunter, “Religion, Politics and Security in Central Asia”, SAIS Review, 21, No. 2 (Summer-Fall 2001), p. 72-81.7 John L Esposito, “Political Islam: Beyond the Green Menace” The journal Current History, January1994.

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Muslims under Oppression

The above phenomena could be traced back to the Suharto regime which can be appraisedin two periods: first, from the late 1960s until the late 1980s and second from 1980 until1990s. In the first period Suharto regime practiced highly indiscriminate repressivepolicies against Islamic organizations and sought to diffuse the Islamic threat by imposingideological conformity on the majority of Islamic groups permitted to act politically. Inthe second period Suharto permitted somewhat greater political openness inclusion andengaged in cosmetic competitive institution building. At the same time he alsocontinuously applies repressive policies against Islam and any groups that posed a threat.

In the first period, that is the first two decades of the New Order regime, Suharto imposedstrict controls on Islamic political organization, as part of a systematic effort todepoliticize society and weaken the party system. After crushing the communists in the1965, Islamic extremists became the military’s enemy number one. Since the military hadto suppress a series of Muslim revolts from 1948-1962, military officials had beenthoroughly indoctrinated in the threat of Islamic extremism.8 Outside of its officialcorporatist institutions, the Suharto regime was intensely suspicious of Islamic groups andas such, religious extremists and their views were crushed. Suharto’s policy towardsIslamic groups mirrored that of the Dutch colonial administration: it encouraged faith inIslam but ruthlessly repressing any political manifestations.9

In order to achieve these goals Suharto channeled Islamic group interests into nonpartynational peak associations by establishing for example the Indonesian Council of Ulama(MUI), the Indonesian Mosque Council (DMI) and the Indonesian Dakwah Council(MDI). The aim was to keep political participation and interest demands low bychanneling group interest into state-supervised structures and locking them out of powersharing agreements.10 It also to demobilize, depoliticize and to let the Muslim groups gounderground.

Towards the existing political parties Suharto regime applied the same strategy. Herealized that there had been numerous cleavages in the Islamic movement with someparties favoring an Islamic state, most notably Masyumi and its successor, Parmusi, whileother parties wanted Indonesia to remain Muslim country but not one governed undershariah law. Besides, Suharto also aware that Sukarno’s supporters and other nationalistparties were still dangerous to his power and should be marginalized. Therefore in 1974he only allowed three parties to compete in elections: four Islamic parties were forced tomerge in to the Unity Development Party (PPP), non-Islamic parties, like PNI, were fusedtogether as the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), and most significantly there was the

8 Vatikiotis, Michael, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto London: Routledge, 1994, 127.9 Hefner, Robert. Civil Islam Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000,121; Vatikiotis, Indonesian,120;Liddle, William. Leadership and Culture in Indonesian Politics Sydney: Allen and Unwin 1996, 621.10 Porter, Donald. Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia London: Routledge 2002, 4; Liddle,Leadership, 615

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party formed by the armed forces, the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (Golkar).Golkar was given primacy in rallying popular support for Suharto. Overall party influencewas also minimized by restricting the parties’ role in the newly established legislativebodies, the DPR, and the MPR. About 20% of members were directly appointed by thegovernment.

By merging some Islamic parties into one Partai Persatsuan Pembagunan (PPP), theSuharto regime forced to abandon its Islamic symbol on the electoral ballot, change thename of the parties into non-religious party name.11 The next step was to imposeideological conformity on Islamic political parties, organizations and state charteredreligious institutions; all had to make the Pancasila their operating and organizingprinciple.12 This strategy fairly contributed to the depoliticization of certain Islamicgroups that according to Donald Porter is effective in damaging religious organizations.13

This action was supposed to bring religious groups under state management and eliminateany unmediated Islamist tendencies.14 However, for those groups which refused to giveup their Islamic ideology and replace it by Pancasila went underground and operatedcovertly through informal networks, cell networks and through local mosques to avoidgovernment retaliation.

In the university level Suharto imposed this form of oppression through a “normalizationpolicy,” (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus-NKK) which sought to depoliticize campus lifeby restricting the activities of student organizations and requiring students to focusentirely on their studies. In order to sufficiently depoliticize campus life, the governmentintroduced the concept of the three duties of tertiary education institutions: expertise,responsibility and corporateness. Moreover, it replaced independent student bodies anduniversity student councils with administration-dominated “activity coordination bodies”and prohibited Islamic student organizations from conducting their activities on campus;only the coordination bodies were permitted to represent the students. This strategy wasalso applied to social organization and become an effective measure to exclude Islamicorganizations from political participation and an important mechanism of the state and themilitary’s management and supervision of society as well as vehicles for the controlledmobilization of Indonesian into state-guided political and economic projects.15

Besides “the normalization” policy of student life in university campuses anddepoliticizing the Muslims, the New Order of Suharto attempted to shape IndonesianIslam as supportive of government development programs. He utilized the Muslimintellectual to legitimize the program by quietly giving its approval to an Islamic Renewal

11 Liddle Leadership,611; Porter, Managing, 39.12 The five principles of the Pancasila are belief in one god, humanitarian justice, unity among Indonesians,democracy by deliberation and concensus, and social justice for all.13 Porter, Managing, 39.14 Ibid, 39.15 Porter, Managing, 33, 57.

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(Pembaruan) movement led by Nurcholish Madjid, the president of the NationalOrganization of Islamic Students (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam or HMI) and HarunNasution, the Rector of State Institute of Islamic Studies, IAIN). The most popularconcept in Madjid’s Islamic renewal was that of secularization,16 while in Nasution’s wasthat of rationalization. In consonant with his secularization concept, in 1970 the formerprovoked heated controversy when he called for Islam to be separated from politics withthe slogan “Islam Yes, Islamic Party No.”17 The Renewal movement emphasized theinterpretation of scripture in application to the modern world and the realization ofIslamic values in personal life rather than through political parties.

The slogan that Madjid claimed to be the real depiction of the Muslim society was moreimaginary than reality. In fact, the Islamic organizations responded to the Suhartoregime’s policies in a variety of ways. The Muslim thinkers adopted a flexible approachweaving between official suspicion of Islam and the conservative tendencies of ulama.Some key dakwah groups, most notably Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)chose to depoliticize and withdraw from politics to focus on education and social welfareconcerns. Other Islamists compromised their own beliefs to attain government sanction,but this didn’t diminish their popular support. Since they were unable to promote apolitical Islamist dogma, many Islamic scholars would hide their ideas in notions of socialwelfare. 18

On the other hand the Suharto regime, in the early 1990s, adopted a program to sendreligious teachers overseas to western centers of Islamic studies in Canada, the UnitedStates and the United Kingdom. This is to steer them away from the main centers in theMiddle East,19 at the same time to disseminate the liberal thought among the Muslimintellectuals. The program was quite instrumental in enhancing the rise liberalism in thefuture. This will be dealt with later.

The second period of Suharto regime was marked by a strategy of Political Openness.Suharto drew on support from incorporated Muslim interests, in order to seek to ward offchallenges to his rule. This led to a state-Islamic accommodation and a simultaneousregime initiated political opening through which Islamic groups remobilized, after twodecades of regime enforced depoliticization. With the Islamic revival, Suharto saw an

16 The idea was proclaimed after his short visit to United States, in the late 1960s. After a year or twoMadjid proclaimed that Islam is secular religion and offered the concept secularization (sekularisasi) in thereligious life of the Muslim. The concept that he claimed to be his own was duplicated from Harvey Cox’sconcept of secularization in his renowned work The Secular City, the most popular book in the US in thelate 60s. The book is Cox’s attempt to prove that Christianity is in line with modernity, a point that Madjidtook to support the government development program.17 Nurcholish Madjid’s speech was entitled, “Keharusan Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam dan MasalahIntegrasi Umat” [The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and the Problem of the Integration of theIslamic Community]. An English translation of the speech can be found in Charles Kurzman, ed., LiberalIslam: A Sourcebook (Oxford University Press, 1998: 284-9.18 Vatikiotis, Indonesian,129; Hefner, Civil Islam, 121; Vatikiotis, Indonesian,129..19 Vatikiotis, Indonesian,127

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opportunity to play the Islam card against members of the military and civilian elites whomight challenge his rule.20 The major action Suharto took during this period wassanctioning of the formation of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals(ICMI), in December 1990. This is an organization comprised of Muslim intellectuals,bureaucrats and activists, both pro-and anti-military, both pro-and anti-Suharto. Theassociation was chaired by Minister of Research and Technology B.J. Habibie withSoeharto as its patron. However, ICMI was never meant to be an autonomousorganization democratically representing the political interests of Indonesian Muslims totheir government. Instead, it was a state corporatist organization, dominated by highofficials closely allied with President Suharto, whose main policy slogan was one ofhuman resource development and whose chief political enemies were neither radicals norChristians, but market-oriented economists.21

Suharto’s political openness that drew on support from incorporated Muslim interests alsobrought about the increase of santri participation in Suharto administration. Thereforewhen Habibie’s ascent to the Presidency of Indonesia in May 1998, following Soeharto’sresignation in the aftermath of the anti-Chinese riots, the leading Muslim activists areappointed to key positions in Habibie’s administration.22

As a result of this brief period of political opening, roughly from 1990-1994, myriadIslamic groups remobilized and Islamic political leaders, such as Abdurrahman Wahid,began openly criticizing the state.23 This brief period of political openness followed by arepressive clampdown political activism had an unintended consequence: it raisedpeople’s expectations for change. Not surprisingly, Islamic student organizations were atthe forefront. Mosques served as the main organizing centers because the permittedstudents to organize activities out of the purview of the state and its corporatistinstitutions. In other words, the state could not control the Islamic organizations. By1996, the diverse array of Islamic organizations and oppositional activity had grownintolerable for the Suharto regime and they turned to repressive policies.24

In sum, the strategy to use indiscriminate repression and to targeting Suharto’s enemiesrather than dangerous groups initiating disturbances did not succeed in demobilizing theIslamic organizations. It even brought about the rise of Islamic political movement. Bylimiting participation policies the Muslims are driven to form underground organizations

20 Porter Managing, 4; Hefner Civil Islam, 12121 Liddle, Leadership, 625.22 For a discussion of the transition from Soeharto to Habibie, see Leo Suryadinata, “A Year of Upheavaland Uncertainty: The Fall of Soeharto and the Rise of Habibie”, Southeast Asian Affairs 1999 (Institute ofSoutheast Asian Studies, Singapore 1999), pp. 111-127. Soeharto’s overtures to the Muslim community iscovered in Robert W. Hefner, “Islam, State and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the IndonesianMiddle Class”, Indonesia No. 56 (1993), pp. 1-35 and R. William Liddle, “The Islamic turn in Indonesia: APolitical Explanation”, The Journal of Asian Studies, 55, no. 3 (August 1996), pp. 613-634.23 Hefner Civil Islam, 16224 Porter Managing, 172, 198-199

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having informal networks, employing cell structures to escape the watchful eyes of thestate. These organizations were widely formed in universities campuses throughoutIndonesia. Therefore, by 1998, when autocratic leader, President Suharto stepped downfrom power, some Muslim groups were at the forefront of demands for democracy.

The Impact on Student movements

The global political situation and the oppressive as well as dipoliticization strategyapplied by Suharto regime explicated above brought about consequences. In Tilly’stheory repression could raise collective action of the contender,25 and such an action asriots, rebellion and revolution targeted the government agents.26 Tarrow even assumesthat the outcome of the repression in authoritarian systems can either demobilize orradicalize collective action.27 The theory of Tilly and Tarrow is proven in the emergingriots and protest of people power in the reformation era prior to the resignation of Suhartoin 1998 that later on become social and political movements. However, for the Muslimssocial and political movements were driven not only by political oppression but also byreligious obligation, that to study Islam and to teach it to others as well as to practice it indaily life are parts of Islamic dakwah. In addition, national and international situationplay a pivotal role in influencing student mind. Now, we shall trace the consequences ofboth international situation as well as Suharto oppressive policy on student life andthought.These activities were the embryo of Islamic movement that subsequently became the onemobilization vehicles of Islamic political parties.

The impact of "Normalization of Campus” policy was the shift of political activity todakwah movement. Muslim student movement did not depoliticized easily, many wentunderground and mosques became the new focus of politico-religious activities anddiscussion groups that helped to fuel the Islamic awakening.28 Student center had beendead and all the activity channeled to the mosque.29 “People need a channel for theirpolitical aspirations and they will find it where they can” says Rizal Ramly, formerstudent of ITB, Bandung.30 All activities in the mosque were operated underground orwith a low profile. In the late 1970s the study on Islam was influenced by the spirit of the

25 Tilly, Charles. From Mobilization to Revolution Reading Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing,1978, 100.26 Tilly, Charles. Politics of Collective Violence Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 28.27 Tarrow, Sidney, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Collective Action in PoliticsCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 9228 Porter, Managing, 2; Liddle, Leadership, 157, 624.29 Salman at ITB Bandung, Salahuddin at Gajah Mada, Arif Rahman Hakim at University of Indonesia, arefew examples of university mosques.30 This refers to the statement of the economist Rizal Ramli when he was student of ITB Bandung, asquoted by Elizabeth Fuller Collins, Fulbright Visiting Fellow Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullahin his unpublished paper Dakwah and Democracy The Significance of Partai Keadilan and Hizbut Tharir.

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Iranian Revolution,31 but not on the Shiite school of thought. The spirit of Islamic revivalwas so great that student were so curious to learn about Islam. In Salman Mosque, forexample, students were inspired by the fiery sermons of Imaddudin. At Salahuddin GajahMada University Amin Rais, Syaifullah Mahyuddin and others were important figures ofstudent dakwah activities, at University of Airlangga Surabaya Dr.Fuad Amsyari wastheir prominent figure. The dakwah movement quickly spread to the mosques of otheruniversities, where Qur’an study groups were established. Therefore, the terms employedfor naming their study group were usroh (nuclear family), halaqah (a circle of studentsand their teacher), and tarbiyah (education under a teacher who provides moral guidance).The subject matter is more about inculcating religious morality, for those who had nobackground of Islamic studies. However, it developed into politic and civilization studies.

In 1980s university mosques or mosque around the universities became the centre ofIslamic learning of secular universities.32 Although the groups that are part of thismovement do not relate themselves with political activities, they are mostly in the opinionthat the present government is corrupt and unjust. Internationally they also share the viewthat westernization and secularism are going on throughout the Muslims world and itshould be prevented. Nevertheless, their spirit to learn and practice Islam was so greatthat prone to be influenced by any idea, school of thought, brought by their tutors.

While university students were actively involved in studying Islam from whateversources they can find, students returning to Indonesia after studying in the Middle Eastprovided new leadership to the dakwah movement. There were various ideas and thoughtbrought by the graduate Middle East Universities that can be categorized into at least fourstreams.

The first stream was the thought of the Muslim Brothers (Ikhwan al-Muslimun). It is themost well known political movement in Egypt. The works Hassan Al Banna, MustafaMasyhur, and Sa’id Hawwa were translated into Bahasa Indonesia and became the coretexts of dakwah activists.

31 Ali Syariati (1933-1977) was the most influential intellectual leader of the Iranian Revolution. He hadstudied in Paris and was influenced by Third World and Left intellectuals such as Jean-Paul Sartre, CheGuevara, and Frantz Fanon (Kepel 2002, 37-8). He transposed Marxist language of class struggle into anIslamic vocabulary, distinguishing the mostakbirine (the arrogant) and the mostadafine (the disinherited oroppressed).32 See V.S. Naipaul, Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey (1981) for a description of a dakwah sessionat Salman Mosque and Beyond Belief: Islamic Excursions Among the Converted Peoples (1998). The usrohmovement was strong in the Syuhada Mosque and the Shalauddin Campus mosque at Gadjah Madauniversity in Yogyakarta and the Arif Rahman Hakim Mosque at the University of Indonesia in Jakarta SeeJohn Malcolm Brownlee, Scripturalism and Religious Liberalism on Yogyakarta Campuses, MA thesis,Ohio University 1997.

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A second stream of dakwah represents the Salafy school of thought33 of Saudi Arabia.This stream was initially used to prevent the influence of revolutionary Shiism from Iran.The study group that focused on Salafy school of thought concentrated at UniversitasIndonesia, IKIP Jakarta (Now become Jakarta State University), Universitas Trisakti, andother Jakarta institutions of higher learning. Later this group established an institute fordakwah development, Lembaga Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Dakwah (LPPD), toextend the reach of dakwah from university campuses to neighborhood mosques in areassuch as Jabotabek, the industrial zone around Jakarta. In the 1990s this group extended itsactivities to Kalimantan, Riau, NTT, and Irian Jaya, utilizing the network of DakwahInstitution for Campuses (LDK) graduates who went to work in different parts ofIndonesia.

Hizbut Tahrir (HT) is yet a third stream of dakwah that was established in Indonesia inthe 1980s. 34 Hizbut Tahrir was introduced to Indonesia by Abdurrahman Al-Baghdadi,the leader of Hizbut Tahrir in Australia, who moved to Bogor at the invitation of KHAbdullah bin Nuh, the head of Al Ghazali Pesantren. The movement spread from theBogor Agricultural Insitute (Insitut Pertanian Bogor or IPB) to other universities in Java(Padjadjaran University in Bandung, IKIP Malang, and Airlangga University inSurabaya) and to Hasanuddin University in Makassar through the LDK movement. Untilthe fall of Suharto, Hizbut Tahrir was almost an underground movement. Few reports oftheir activities appeared in the media until 2001. Hizbut Tahrir claims to have 100,000members with division in every province. Sidney Jones notes that HT has grown morerapidly than other radical Islamic groups, particularly in certain locations, such as SouthSulawesi. 35

Hibutz Tahrir emphasized on an educational (or moral) movement. The aim of dakwah isto show that Islam provides a solution to the multiple problems that confront society.They also believed that Islamic societies would become strong and respected if syariah

33 Wahabi refers to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahab (1703-1792), leader of an Islamic reform movement inSaudi Arabia. Salafy, which refers to devout ancestors or to the Prophet and his companions or the firstpious generation, is an Islamic movement of the second half of the 19th c. inspired by the writings of theSayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897) from Persia, Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) from Egypt, andRashid Rida (1865-1935) from Syria. Salafy teachers also draw on the teachings of Ibn Taymiyyah (1268-1328), who distinguished between the realm of Islam and the realm of jahiliyyah (a state of ignorance orbarbarism) and called for jihad against the “un-Islamic” Muslim rulers.34 Hizbut Tahrir (also transcribed Hizb ut-Tahrir) was founded in 1953 by Sheikh Taqiyuddin An-Nabhahani (also transcribed Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani) in Jerusalam in 1953. Nabhahani was a MuslimBrother, who was ousted from the movement for his views. He argued that Syariah (Islamic law) was thekey to restoring the greatness of Islamic civilization. In his view the focus on ethical teaching of Islam thattypified the Muslim Brotherhood and other dakwah movements drained energy away from the politicalstruggle: “The passions of the ummah have been defused by these boring, cheap and repetitive discourses . .. Nations are not [judged] by morality or ethics but by the faiths they embrace and the ideas they adopt andthe systems they implement.” Translation of Azzam Tamimi, “Hizbut-Tahrir Reflections on its origin andits ideas,” http://www.ii-pt.com/web/papers/tahrir.htm.35 Sadanand Dhume, “Hizbut Tahrir Using War in Iraq to Seek Converts” Far Eastern Economic Review,April 3, 2003.

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law is established in the society. The vision of establishing a khalifa is both a source ofstrength and weakness. Many young people are attracted to HT because of itsrevolutionary ideal and the argument that Islam is no longer a powerful force in worldpolitics because Muslims have been divided by a nation-state system and democracyimposed by the West. For them Democracy as a Western form of government is rejected,and involvement in the politics of a secular state is regarded as a useless diversion,therefore its members are not allowed to be involved in current political system. It is forthis rejection of the nation-state and democracy that Hizbut Tahrir can be considered themost revolutionary stream of dakwah, yet their movements are still on the democratictrack and no subversive action against the government was taken. But unlike Salafy andother dakwah activists, their concern on studying Islamic thought is the most serious one.However, critics find the goals of Hizbut Tahrir unrealistic.

In fact, it was Hizbut Tahrir that initiated the establishment of a network of dakwahactivists from university campuses called Dakwah Institution for Campuses (LembagaDakwah Kampus or LDK). LDK held its first gathering (Silaturahmi) in 1988. In the1990s the LDK conducted regular recruitment campaigns among incoming students. Bythe early 1990s, most of the LDK were led to form the Indonesian Muslim Student ActionUnion (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia or KAMMI), the organization ofIslamic students in support of the Reformasi movement to bring down Suharto. Both HTand KAMMI agree on the long term goal to apply Islamic values on state, but differ intheir view of the appropriate strategy. For HT the application of syariah will imposeIslamic values on society in a top down strategy. KAMMI adopt a bottom-up strategy ofIslamization in which the party attracts support through its adherence to Islamic valuesand comes to power through democratic means.

The fourth stream is the Association of Inter-Campus Muslim Student Activists, which isabbreviated into HAMMAS and the likes. HAMMAS, which was established in October1998 shortly after the fall of Suharto, claimed to have 10,000 members in August 1999,but this was most probably an over-estimate of its true strength. The name HAMMAS,chosen to declare militant support for Palestinians, reflects the militant and radicalorientation of this stream of the dakwah movement.These organizations were established by a younger generation of Muslim students atsecular universities, who came to maturity in the 1980s and 90s. They were disillusionedwith the promise of the secular nation state to bring prosperity and greater social andeconomic justice. However, most of the above dakwah activists at campuses had noIslamic studies background except from learning activities in their study group duringtheir free time of academic programs. Since most of them were not the student of Islamicuniversities, the subject matters in their study group were not as high as those who studyat the faculty of Islamic studies, yet their spirit to practice Islam in their daily life was sohigh. However, at Islamic universities campuses, the phenomena were the contrary. Therewere major tendencies to learn and adopt modern Western thought and ideologies. AtIndonesia Islamic University (UII) and State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN)Yogyakarta, for example there were groups of students having intensive studies on

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communism, socialism, the Left Islam (Islam Kiri), while other groups study capitalism,secularism and other Western thought.

From these phenomena several points are worth noting. The political oppression towardsuniversity students by the New Order regime was not effective, but became the vehicle ofMuslim student mobilization. The embryos of Islamic movement were not from Islamicuniversities campuses, like IAIN and other Islamic universities or institutes. For thisphenomena Hefner provides several answer 1) there was an increase in literacy whichmade studying and adherence to Islamic customs and practices more likely, 2) the officialstate education curriculum had a religious component to it so more people were exposedto formal religious ideas; 3) participation in organized religion was a relatively safe outletfor expression and it was a sphere of life not totally controlled by the state. In fact by thistime, there was even some space for religious groups to influence public policy.36

However, there is no answer why the existing study group of Muslim student named HMI(Muslim Student Association) and PMII (Indonesian Muslim Student Association), hadno significant role in the above student movements. Perhaps, one most possible reasonwas that the HMI accept Pancasila as the basis of their association, which implies that theassociation was already under the control of the New Order government.

The impact on Political Movements

The impact of political oppression and depoliticization of Muslim organizations isanother interesting point to note. From the study group or dakwah activities at universitycampuses the student activities were steered to political movement. Among the firstpolitical movement that stemmed from dakwah activities at university campuses werePartai Keadilan,37 and Hizbut Tahrir. The former was ready to be involved in democraticprocess, whereas the latter refuse to join such a political process that came from theWestern civilization. Other political party that arose from Islamic organization or politicalparty in the past was Crescent and Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang), which derived theidea from Masyumi, the Islamic political party that was banned by Sukarno in 1960. Theother parties which were established by Muslim intellectual and clerics but adopt secularbasis are Nation Awakening Party (PKB), National Truth Party (PAN), Star ReformationParty (PBR). In a free democratic parliamentary election held in June 1999 forty-eightparties competing for 462 contested seats and resulted in seven most popular parties, fourof which were new Islamic political parties.38

From those political movements Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, PK) is the mostsophisticated and promising Islamic parties. It was set up shortly before the 1999 generalelections. Several of its leaders were educated in the United States, Europe and the

36 Robert Hefner, Civil Islam (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) 2000: 16.37 Partai Keadilan is now known as Partai Kedilan Sejahtera (Justice and Welfare Party).38 What is meant by Islamic political parties could be Islam-base parties or parties established by Muslimleaders and supported by Islamic organization, like PKB, PAN and PBR

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Middle East. Nurmahmudi Ismail, the first President of the party, for example was agraduate of Texas A&M University, became Abdurrachman Wahid’s Minister ofForestry. As we mentioned above it was the result of university student activities invarious campuses since the 1980s. PK campaigners in 1999 stressed not the Islamic statebut opposition to official corruption, their professional qualifications to govern, and anegalitarian economic policy balancing phased industrial development with self-sustainingagricultural growth. Their platform also proposed a sharper separation of executive,legislative, and judicial powers, with a Supreme Court no longer appointed by thepresident. The New York Times, 30, April, 2002, took keen interest on the emergence ofthe Justice Party, especially on its mission to “restore a moral focus in a country that hasfallen in chaos and widespread corruption”, 39 based on shariah (Islamic law).

Though their basic approach to Islam is moderate, many PK activists do not have roots inany of the pre-existing modernist organizations, such as Muhammadiyah or the DDII(Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesian). PK thus represents something new in Indonesianpolitics. Most of the party’s voters are urban and are particularly concentrated in theneighborhoods around major universities, where many leaders are lecturers andresearchers. In its first participation of 1999 parliamentary vote, PK gained 1.4 percent or7 seats but got significant increase in 2004 election into 7.3 percent equal to 45 seats.

PKB (Awakening Nation Party), which was founded in 1998 by the preeminent NUleader, Abdurrahman Wahid. PKB received 12 percent of the 1999 parliamentary voteequal to 51 seats, but only 10.57 percent in 2004 parliamentary vote equal to 52 seats.Though founded by NU and supported by Muslim traditionalists, PKB’s formalideological base is not Islam but Pancasila,40 adopted secularist policies in government.The party is open to non-Muslims membership, but few have joined. At the October 1999session of the People’s Consultative Assembly Abdurrahman Wahid was elected asPresident by a coalition led by “Muslim” parties and leaders.41 Wahid’s presidency wasseen as the first democratic transfer of power in Indonesia’s history.42 However, twentymonths later Wahid had been widely condemned as a failed leader. On July 23, 2001 hewas impeached by the congress because of his inability to address continuing corruptionat the highest levels, economic disorder, and separatist movements.43 Wahid had a

39 New York Times, 30 April 2002.40 The famous Indonesian five principles of belief in God, national unity, internationalism, democracy andsocial justice first enunciated by Sukarno in 1945.41 General Election Commission of Indonesia. Analyzing Indonesia’s Election, 1999. (Jakarta: IndonesianGeneral Election Commission) 2001. See also, Dwight King, 2003. Half-Hearted Reform: ElectoralInstitutions and the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia (Westport, CT: Praeger) see chapters 3 & 4 on the1999 elections.42 It was through the support his party that Abdurrahman subsequently became Indonesia’s firstdemocratically elected president, serving from October 1999 to July 2001, defeating MegawatiSoekarnoputri of PDI-P.43 Greg Barton, Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid (Jakarta: EquinoxPublications), 2002

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reputation within Indonesia as a liberal thinker with a pluralistic outlook. It was due tothis outlook and his authoritative approach that Wahid was defeated by Hasyim Muzadiin the election of the Chairman of NU at Boyolali in 2004 and by Muhamin Iskandar inthe internal dispute of PKB recently.

Another Islamic party is The Crescent and Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB). It wasestablished in 1999 campaigning for an Islamic state. Many of its leaders have familyconnections with Masyumi leaders of the 1950s. Given its tiny vote (2 percent = 13seats), compared to Masyumi’s 21 percent in 1955, PBB is considered by most observersto be a party of the past. However, in 2004 parliamentary vote its maintain its vote i.e2.62 percent.

An old party supported by traditionalist party is PPP (Development Unity Party). It wasformed in 1973, during the Suharto dictatorship. It was a forced fusion of the four then-existing Islamic parties: NU, which had been a political party as well as a social andeducational organization from the early 1950s; Parmusi, the short-lived successor toMasyumi (Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations), the principal modernist-led partyof the 1950s, which had been banned in 1960. PPP with Islam as its ideology won 10percent of the 1999 vote (46 seats). PPP, PBB, and PK have all declared Islam as theirideology. Like other parties PPP gain less percentage in 2004 election (8.15 percent) butincrease its seats into 58 parliamentary seats.

Another new party established by Muslim activists is PAN (National Trust Party). It wasfounded and led by Amien Rais,44 in 1998 and like PKB, PAN was founded as an openparty with Pancasila as its ideology, and closely identified with modernists. Like Wahid,to attract both liberal or moderate Muslim and non-Muslims Amien appears to becommitted to pluralist vision. Nonetheless, he failed to get the vote from liberal Muslimand non-Muslim. In 1999 election PAN got only 7 percent vote and in the 2004 electionthe party cultivating only Muhammadiyah and other modernist voters, while Amin wasdefeated in the first round of presidential election. His party vote decrease in percentageform 7 percent into 6.44 percent, but the seats increase from 34 to 52 seats. For theideological basis of some prominent parties in Indonesia and their vote result from 1955,1999 and 2004 election see diagram below. PAN (National Message Party), gained 7percent or 34 seats;

Table 1. Indonesia’s Democratic Elections 1955, 1999 and 2004 45

1955 election % 1999 election % seats 2004 election % seats

44 Amin Rais is an American-educated professor of international relations, who later on chaired the People’sConsultative Assembly, a kind of super-Parliament whose responsibilities until very recently includedselection of the president and vice-president. In the 1990s Amien headed Muhammadiyah, the largestmodernist social and educational organization. He is still the most prominent Muhammadiyah personalityand modernist politician.45 William Liddle, “New Patterns of Islamic Politics in Democratic Indonesia”, Asia Report SpecialProgram, no.110, April 2003, p. 5

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PNI (nationalist/Sukarnoistideology,

22 PDI-P (nationalist/Sukarnoist ideology,

34 153 PDI-P (nationalist/Sukarnoistideology,

18.53109

Masyumi (Islamicideology, mass basemodernist andtraditionalistMuslim,

21 Golkar(universalistideology, but masspredominantlymodernist Muslim,

22 120Golkar(universalistideology, but masspredominantlymodernist Musl im,

21.58 128

NU or NahdlatulUlama (Islamicideology, mass basetraditionalistMuslim,

19 PKB (universalist ideology but masspredominantly NU,traditionalist Muslim,

12 51PKB (universalistide ology but masspredominantly NU,traditionalistMuslim,

10.57 52

PKI (communistideology, mass basesyncretist/non –Muslim,

17 PPP (Islamicideology, traditionalistand modernistMuslim,

10 58PPP (Islamicideology,traditionalist andmodernist Muslim,

8.15 58

PAN (universalistideology, but masspredominantlymodernist Muslim,

7 34PAN (universalistideology, but masspredominantlymodernist Muslim,

6.44 52

PBB (Islamicideology, massmodernist Muslim,successor toMasyumi)

2 13PBB (Islamicideology, massmodernist Muslim,successor toMasyumi)

2.62 11

PK (Islamic ideology,mass base Muslim butneither modernist nortraditionalist

1 7PKS (Islamicideology, mass baseMuslim but neithermodernist nortraditionalist

7.34 45

PD (DemocraticParty, secular,nationalist 7.5 57PDS (ChristianIdeology

1.6012

All other parties21

21 All other parties 12 All other parties 24.77 26

Total 100 Total 100 462 Total 100 550

Although most of the seats of parliament in 1999 election were still dominated by the oldparties established during Suharto regime,46 yet Islamic political parties gained almost 35percent of the total seats. However, in 2004 election the seats increased significantly,while the secular parties got lesser vote, except Partai Demokrat, PD (Democratic Party),a party that brought Susilo Bambang Yodhoyono into his Presidency.

The phenomena of the rise of Islamic political parties with the increased number ofparliamentary seats from 1999 to 2004 suggests that the claim of neo-modernist liberalMuslim figure Nurcholish Madjid in early 70s “Islam yes Islamic party no” is no moretenable. The statement apparently intended to entertain the New Order government whosestrategy was to depoliticize Muslim society. In fact, in the free democratic election

46 The seat gained by PDI-P (Indonesian Democracy Party-Struggle), was 34 percent of the vote and 153seats; Golkar, was 22 percent of the vote and 120 seats; PPP (Development Unity Party), was 10 percentand 58 seats.

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Muslims’ participations in political parties are manifest. There might be various factorsinvolved in the rise of new Islamic base parties. It could be the outcome of the longsuppressed political aspiration of Muslim society by authoritarian rule to enjoy spacegranted to them by democratic freedom. Another possibility, especially on the success ofthe PKS, was of its campaign on a platform of good governance based on Islamic moralvalues. This point is properly set at the moment when the fundamental problem ofgovernment administration is about cultural and moral issues. The intrusion ofmaterialistic worldview of Western civilization into the Indonesian middle class broughtabout the incessant case of corruptions in the government administration. Experience ofother countries suggested that a state incapable of bringing about justice and prosperity isthe best breeding ground for primordial sentiment, including Islam, to emerge. Unless theissue of social justice is addressed adequately, the spirit of radicalism that emerge fromMuslim, non-Muslim or secularist Muslim activists will always challenge thegovernment. In short, the advent of the “Justice and Welfare Party” (PKS), was welcomedby Indonesian. It is known not only as Islamic political party but also as a party that hasself-discipline, a gradual, peaceful approach to meeting reformist goals and commitmentto end corruption. It also plans to be a pioneer in upholding Islamic values within aframework of national unity and integrity. Hidayat Nur Wahid and Zulkiflimansyah state:

We must work hard to ensure the real voice of Islam is heard in Indonesia and even in theworld at large. We must speak out boldly in defense of a dynamic, moderate Islam—an Islamthat upholds the sanctity of human life, reaches out to the oppressed, respects men and womenalike, and insists on the fellowship of all humankind. Such is the true Islam of the Prophet, webelieve, that some are now seeking to destroy.”47

Unfortunately, many observers interpret the rising tide of Islamic politics as a sign thatIslam challenge to democracy or the rise of fundamentalism in politic. The interpretationis certainly biased. So far those parties are within the democratic track and commit nopolitical fraudulence. It should, therefore, be understood in term democratic atmosphere,since in the reformation era every citizen has full right to participate in democracyregardless of his religion and race. Justice and Welfare Party (PKS) and other Islamicparties had commitment to participate in democratic election and bound to adheredemocratic process, therefore there is no reason to fear the outcome of democraticprocess, or to refuse to acknowledge the democratic victory of an Islamic party.Otherwise it would risk the very principle of democracy, and is seriouslycounterproductive to democracy promotion.

On the other hand, Islamic movements, like PKS, are challenged to shift from slogans toprograms. They are required to keep the balance between social activism into intellectualactivism. They are urged to elaborate the whole Islamic concepts, especially those whichare urgently required by current situation, such as tolerance, human right, justice, welfareand the like. They must become more self-critical, and speak out some un-Islamic

47 Hidayat NurWahid and Zulkiflimansyah, “The Justice Party and Democracy: A Journey of a ThousandMiles Starts with a Single Step” in Asia Program Special Report, April 2003, no 110, p.20

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practice in political and social affairs both national and international level including theacts of terrorism by extremists, corruption, oppression etc.

The Current Religious Cleavage

The current political situation and its future could be best understood from Islamicworldview by which we may sketch the position of every group in relation to Islam and toIndonesian political setting. To deal with religious movement presupposes theunderstanding of religion, which is generally defined as a system of belief. System ofbelief or religion can be seen from mental phenomenon that deals with a matter ofbelieving or social phenomenon that concern about a feeling of belonging.48 However,system of belief in present situation can be best seen as worldview. It is an integratedsystem of basic beliefs about the nature of ourselves, reality, and the meaning ofexistence.49 It is also defined as a belief, feeling and thought that functions as a motor ofsocial and moral change.50

To see Islam from the worldview perspectives is to see the whole concept of Islam assystem of belief and of social life. As a system of belief it embraces the belief that God’srevelation is preserved in the Qur’an, so too Muhammad’s words and deeds werecollected in narrative report or hadith attributed to the Prophet. The system of social life isto be found in those two sources of Islamic worldview. Much of the content of the Qur’anconcern not only guidelines for worship, but also regulation governing marriage,inheritance, business contracts, criminal punishment, the conduct of war. It is plausibletherefore, that Prophet Muhammad was not only the religious leader, but also the chiefexecutive, judge, and commander in-chief of the Medinan state. He is he role model forMuslim, represented the totality of all embracing nature of Islamic worldview. As aworldview Islam provide guidelines for private and public life, duties to God and dutiesto society. In Islamic civilization religion has occupied an important place in public life:in the ideology of state and its institution and in the conduct of politics. Islam isincompatible with secularism or secular worldview. Ideologically, the Islamic community(ummah) was a religio-political state or empire. Muslim rulers (caliph or sultan)Muhammad’s successors as had of state, were to assure government according to Islamand to spread and defend Islamic rule.51 In addition, Islam also gives full protection toother religions. They are permitted to practice their religion and to be governed by their

48 Wald, Kenneth D, and C.D.Smidt, “Measurement Strategies in the Study of Religion an Politics”Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American politic, edited by David C Leege et al. Aemonk, N.Y:R.E.Sharpe, 1993, 32.49 Thomas F Wall, Thinking Critically About Philosophical Problem, A Modern Introduction, Wadsworth,Thomson Learning, Australia, 2001, 532.50 Ninian Smart, Worldview, Crosscultural Explorations of Human Belief, Charles Sribner's sons, NewYork, n.d. 1-251 Esposito, John L, (ed) Islam in Asia, N.Y. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987, see editor Introduction,12-13

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own religious leaders, law and courts. They are also protected by Muslim from externalaggression. No oppression and compulsion towards other religious adherent to embraceIslam is allowed. Islam has its own ways to deal with other religions, since it has a richexperience to live with other traditions, beliefs and religions. All those principle had beenpracticed during the golden age of Islamic civilization from 7th until 19th century.

However, essential modification in understanding Islam occurred due to orientalisttradition to study Islam, and fundamental change in the practice of Islamic teaching takeplace under the pressure of colonialism. Esposito conspicuously states:

By the late nineteenth and twenty centuries European legal codes had replaced Islamic andlocal customary laws. The political economic and legal penetration of Muslim societies by theWest was further extended as modern Western educational reforms were introduced.Traditional Political and religious elite saw their power, prestige and way of life (custom andvalues) progressively altered by new modern Western oriented classes of professional andtechnocrats. By twenty the century, the West reigned supreme, dominating much of theIslamic world politically and economically. Its impact on social and cultural life was no lessthreatening.52

In fact, in some cases Western colonialism employed Orientalist for their understandingand interpreting Islam and Muslim society. Therefore Edward Said’s work suggests thatorientalist understandings were generally colored with Western worldview and politicalinterest.53 Such kind of understanding influenced the modernist Muslim intellectuals,especially those who studied in Western universities.

From this situation at least two emerging religious orientations come to materialize, thatin turn became two lines of religious cleavage: one approved and adopt the WesternOrientalist approach to Islam, whereas other resisted it. In Indonesia, during Suhartoregime, the former promoted secularism and rationalism, two important doctrine ofmodernism. After the fall of Suharto this group advocated the postmodern doctrine suchas relativism, religious pluralism, nihilism, and the likes. These intellectuals are knownamong the Indonesian Muslim as liberal Muslims but they called themselves LiberalIslam (Islam Liberal). On the contrary, the latter disseminated the spirit of Islamic revivaland maintaining the traditional understanding of Islam. Some are against the West, butothers are rationally critical or both Islam and the West. These two lines of religiouscleavages are supportive of socio-political movement in current Indonesia situation.

Therefore, to use a fair and objective designation to depict Muslims movement in relationto Islamic worldview and the present political situation, I avoid using the liberal-literaldivision, and instead I would prefer to employ liberal and non-liberal category. Sinceliberal-literal usually suggest that the former is positive, whereas the literal is negative.

52 Esposito, John L, (ed) Islam, 15-1653 Edward Said identified three fundamental misunderstanding of the Orientalism in his work Orientalism,

but to grasp directly the three point see Keith Windschuttle “Edward Said’s Orientalism revisited” TheNew Criterion Vol. 17, No. 5, January 1999, 5.

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the liberal is more democratic, moderate, tolerance, humanistic, rational, whereas theliteral are not. Moreover, to place liberal vis a vis literal is to neglect the non-liberal andnon-literal approach to Islam which in turn would generalize that all Muslims areliteralist, fundamentalist and terrorist. This, according to Esposito, tends to be misleading,as he states that,

To equate Islam and Islamic fundamentalism uncritically with extremism is to judge Islamonly by those who wreak havoc--a standard not applied to Judaism and Christianity...54

Cheryl Bernard’s classification of the Muslims into: fundamentalist, traditionalist,secularist and modernist55 also appears problematic, since it is hard to distinguishbetween fundamentalist and traditionalist, because as I mentioned above, Muhammadiyahis modernist but by no mean liberal, while NU is traditionalist and could be in a sensefundamentalist. The same case is with Justice Party, which is modernist in a sense andfundamentalist in another. Also, between secularist and modernist, the two in some casesoverlaps. Therefore, the category of liberal and non-liberal would be appropriate inrelation to approach to Islam.56

The Non-Liberal groups

Non-liberal approach to Islam refers to general understanding the Sunni school of thoughtor Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah, the largest school of thought adhered by IndonesianMuslims and Muslim in the world. It is within this school that Maliki, Hanafi, Hanbaliand Syafii schools of jurisprudence, as well as Asy’ari and Maturidi schools of theologyexisted. In this school there are different ways to interpret Islam, many theories how tointegrate reason and revelation, various legal decisions to deal with non-Muslims andwomen, but their approach are still within the ambit of the worldview of Islam.

In the case of Indonesian Muslims the non-liberal approaches are divided into groupseach of which has its own particular interest. As was explicated above among the largestgroups or organization are: Muhammadiyah, (emphasizes on social movements),Nahdatul Ulama or NU (maintaining traditional spirit of Islam), and al-Irsyad (stressingon understanding Islam based on the Salafi school of thought) and traditional Islamicboarding school, named Pesantren, spread all over Indonesian regions. So far thoseorganizations and education institution played a pivotal role in the struggle for Indonesiaindependence and therefore militancy in Indonesia can be said to go back to the early

54 Esposito, John L, “Political Islam: Beyond the Green Menace”, Originally published in the journalCurrent History, January 1994. cited from http://www.arches.uga.edu/~godlas/espo.html on September 25,2008.55 The modernist meant by Cheryl is in fact the liberalist. See Cheryl Bernard, Civil Democratic Islam,Partners, Resources and Strategies, RAND Corporation, Pittsburgh, 2003, 44-55.56 Liddle depicts the religious cleavage into Liberal and Islamist, but by Islamist he refer only to the radicalgroup excluding the moderate one. See William Liddle, “New Patterns of Islamic Politics in DemocraticIndonesia”, Asia Program Special Report, April 2003, no.110.

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attempts of these organizations and other Muslim organization to struggle against thePortuguese and later Dutch colonizers. After the independence these organizationsbecame a force for progressive political change, advocating religious tolerance, moderateposition, protecting civil rights, empowering women for social activities,57 and helpingthe poor. Besides, they also promote Islamic values, traditions and practices, and in somecases may advocate Islamic law, however, they are committed to working within the law,and as part of the political system to advance their goals.

Be that as it may, voice of Islam in Indonesia is not represented only by these large,powerful, and moderate organizations. Other than those moderate organizations,historically, there were also “radical” movements in Indonesia whose membership in partconsisted of Indonesian military and civilian combatants demobilized after theestablishment of the Republic. The organization which is stigmatized as militant Islam inIndonesia is Darul Islam (D.I). Darul Islam began as separate rebellions in West Java,South Sulawesi and Aceh in the late 1940s and early 1950s. D.I seeks to create an Islamicstate, Negara Islam Indonesia (NII). In fact, the movements emerged due to conflictoccurred between the military and Soekarno’s authoritarian strategy. But the militarysubsequently took refuge under the umbrella of Islam, declaring the establishment of aseparate Islamic state. This became strategic reason for the Indonesian Army duringSuharto regime to be highly suspicious of political Islam with the same degree as thecommunists.58 Such a suspicion was inappropriate for it included the moderate Muslimsin general. It also too early to consider the present social and political movements as thereemergence of those radical and separatist movements (Darul Islam), yet furtherresearch is needed.59

At present the groups which are usually blamed as fundamentalist in Indonesia areIslamic Defend Front (FPI), Mujahidin Council of Indonesia (MMI), Lasykar Jihad, andone other group which known as Jamaah Islamiyah, which was accused of October 2002bombings in Bali, followed in 2003, 2004 and 2005 by the bombing of the Marriott Hotel,and the Australian Embassy in Jakarta.

The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) is a group formed in 1998 and led by Habib Rizq, anArab Yemeni descent, who graduated from Ummul Qura University and University ofMalaya, Malaysia. Its member is young activists partly uneducated and partly the activistof various mosques. It is now the largest Muslim pressure group in the country. It wasable to organize demonstrations of over 10,000 people in Jakarta in October 2001. The

57 For this purpose Muhammadiyah formed women organization named Aisyiah, while Nahdatul Ulama hasMuslimat for women and Fatayat for girl.58 Further discussion about this see C. van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: the Darul Islam inIndonesia. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff), 1981.59 It is because Dijk explains that from 1977-1982 virtually the entire leadership of Darul Islam wasarrested, while there are split and power struggles at the top. See C. van Dijk, Ibid. And, International CrisisGroup, “Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing.” Asia Report,No. 92, Feb. 22, 2005.

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primary concern of this group is to act upon the Prophetic injunction that “Whoeverobserve objectionable deed should change with his hand, if he is powerless he shouldchange with his tongue and if he is powerless he should change with his heart and that isthe weakest faith” (al-Hadith). Therefore the targeted objects of FPI are the public placesthat for them facilitate the practices of objectionable deeds (munkarat) such as gamblingdens, discos, nightclubs and bars that serve alcoholic beverages, and brothels that areconsidered as haram (legally forbidden). The objective of this group is that the Islamiclaw be applied in the Muslim society in Indonesia, while Indonesia is regarded as theplace of Muslim society. In many occasions Habib Rizq acknowledge that he never desireto use violence. Before he and his members force the closure of any forbidden places, hetakes legal procedure by warning the owner of those places to close, and then by askingthe formal and written permission of police as well as the approval of the surroundingsociety. Nevertheless, in practice the violence has to be taken.60

Such kind of movements reminds us to Hanbalite school of thought in jurisprudence,whose founder Ahmad ibn Hanbal claimed to be follower of Salaf. The characteristic ofthis school is its fanaticism and its frequent conflict with others without argumentationand demonstration, but only with act and deed. Their disagreement with rationalinterpretation of the Qur’an is also salient feature of the Salafi school. Their movement issimply to perform the Islamic obligation “to command the good and forbid theobjectionable” (al-amr bi al-ma’ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar). Ibn Athir sketched thisschool as follows:”…if they found singer they beat them and break the music instrument;if they saw man, women and a child walk together they asked their marital status. If theydid not respond they would beat them and bring them to police”.61 Because of thisattitude, according Abu Zahrah, people run away from them.

Another group is Lasykar Jihad, which was formed in 1999, to support their Muslimsbrothers who were in conflict with Christian in Ambon, Maluku. In fact, the population ofthe region is almost evenly divided between Christians and Muslims, and no physicalconflict was ever happened in the history of the region. By June 2000, the newlyestablished Laskar Jihad sent 3,000 members to Ambon. With the support of someIndonesian military, Laskar Jihad hoped to establish control over Ambon, thus upsettingthe fundamentalist Christian to establish a separate Christian state. While a settlementwas reached on February 12, 2002 and a zone of neutrality established between the twosides, 5,000 people were slaughtered and 700,000 people became refugees. However, thisgroup is not well organized, no formal structure, no long term objectives and program62

and after the conflict, it disbanded its 15,000-member organization.

60 Personal discussion with Faried, one of FPI members, at Jakarta, on 23, August, 2003.61 Ibn Athir, “al-Kamil Fi al-Tarikh”, as quoted by M.Abu Zahrah, Tarikh al-Madhahib al-Islamiyah, fi al-Siyasah wa al-Aqaid wa Tarikh al-Madhahib al-Fiqhiyyah, vol. 2, Dar al-Fikri al-Arabi, 1987, 54362 For a discussion of the creation of Laskar Jihad, see Noorhaidi Hasan, “Faith and Politics: The Rise of theLaskhar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia”, Indonesia, 73 (April 2002) pp. 145-169.

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A survey conducted in November 2002 by the Center for Study of Islam and Society(PPIM) at the State Islamic University in Jakarta showed that 71 percent of respondentssupported the application of syariah (Islamic law) by the state to all Muslim men andwomen, and 54 percent said that radical Islamist movements to implement syariah, suchas the radical Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam or FPI) and Laskar Jihad)must be supported.63 While many people question the accuracy of the poll, almosteveryone agrees that disillusion with secular democracy is growing and more people areturning to Islamist solutions.

Another group which is regarded as the most radical Islamic group operating in Indonesiais Jama’ah Islamiah (JI) and its alleged leader Abu Bakar Ba’ashir. In fact, the extremeposition of Ba’ashir was taken since the Suharto regime, during which he was against theuse of national anthem and flag, Pancasila as the state principle and other nationalattributes. He is in the opinion that Indonesia should be Islamic states and apply shari’alaw. It was due to this position that he escaped to Malaysia in 1985 to avoid continuedimprisonment by the Soeharto government. Returning to Indonesia in 1999, Ba’ashirestablished the Indonesian Mujaheddin Council (MMI). According to Ba’ashir, “TheMMI is an institution where a lot of people from a lot of Muslim groups including the NUand Muhammadiyah gather at one table to discuss how to get our vision of shari'aimplemented into national laws…As long as Muslims are the majority, the country shouldbe ruled by shari’a”64

All those radical movements do not represent the whole Muslim organization andmovement, proponents of radical Islam remain a small minority, while others devoutpractitioners who took moderate positions would never dream of using violence.However, the responses against these groups seem exaggerate, the most extreme one isfrom the liberal group which took liberal approach to Islam. Even though, all is to be alertto the possibility of individuals making common cause with international criminalsdisregarding religious denomination.65

The liberal Group

The Liberal approach to Islam emerges only recently, almost at the same time as the riseof radical movement after the Reformation era, yet its root refer to secular notion byNurcholish Madjid in 1970s. Liberal Islam was first enunciated in 1999, initiated by agroup of Jakarta-based intellectuals led by Ulil Absar Abdalla, a graduate of Saudi ArabiaInstitute of Islamic Studies Jakarta (LIPPIA), and Luthfi Assyaukanie, graduate of

63 Tempo December 24-30: 32-43 for a series of articles responding to this poll.64 As quoted by Lawrence C. Reardon, A Rational Choice Interpretation of Political Islam’s Challenge toSoutheast Asia,a paper presented at the New England Political Science Association Annual MeetingPortsmouth, New Hampshire, 30 April 2004, 13; see also Zachary Abuza. “MMI Concludes its firstCongress Since the Release of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.” Counterterrorism Blog,http://counterterrorismblog.org/2006/07. (7/27/06)65 (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1765&I=1)

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University of Jordan and ISTAC Malaysia. Its acronyms was known as “Islib”, but laterin March 2002, they alter the name with the Liberal Islam Network (Jaringan IslamLiberal) to disseminate their views through the media networks. Islib was originated froman intensive group discussion of young intellectuals at Paramadina University. Since itwas allegedly not welcomed by the university lecturers, they moved to Utan Kayu streetunder the support of Gunawan Muhammad, former editor in chief of TEMPO magazine.

The movement became more intensive and come up with extreme ideas after the dramatictragedy of 11/9. They established active website (www.islamlib.com) and a moderatedchat group, islamliberal@yahoogroups.com. From these two medium they debate issues,criticize current understanding of Islam, cite the Koran to support their arguments inliberal fashion etc. In addition, members of “Liberal Islam” write a syndicated Sundaycolumn published in the widely circulated Jawa Pos daily newspaper and forty regionalIndonesian language newspapers including Riau Pos (Pekan Baru) and Fajar (Makassar).It has also a weekly talk show broadcasted every Thursday by Radio 68H and is relayedby 20 other radio stations throughout Indonesia. They have formed the Liberal IslamWriters Syndicate and have published booklets and pamphlets on controversial issuessuch as jihad, the sharia and the establishment of houses of worship.66 Their agenda is todisseminate secularism, liberalism, emancipation, religious pluralism, gender andfeminism, democratization, tolerance and human rights. Other than “Liberal IslamNetwork” there are numerous newly established NGOs and study groups promoting theliberal thought. Among the lecturers of State Islamic Universities (UIN) and StateInstitute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) there are activists who disseminate the liberal thought.

The fundamental ideas brought by “Liberal Islam” are parallel to religious liberalism thatprevailed in the West. It advocates secular, relativist and rationalistic approach to Islamwith special emphasis on liberal interpretation of the Qur’an. The principle look simpleand rational, but in the writing of its exponent in media, books or article in journalbecome so extreme that provoke negative response from not only the radical group butalso the moderate Muslim whole Muslim. Some of point of disputes of the liberalprinciples that have created controversies and criticism consist of the following:67

First, opening the gate of ijtihad for all aspect of Islam. This is not new for SunniMuslims, but ijtihad for all aspect of Islam is a controversial point. It is because in thehistory of Islam there was no ijtihad on the definite matter (muhkamat) such as on theprohibition of alcoholic drink, obligation of five times prayers, hajj, fasting and followingthe rule of inheritance (fara’id) and the likes. The liberal refer to no authority in theirijtihad, and as a result they justify the practice of gay68 and lesbianism,69 prohibit

66 Santi W.E. Soekanto, “ ‘Liberal’ and ‘Literal’ Islam must sit and talk together”, The Jakarta Post, 1March 2002; see also Adian Husaini & Nuim Hidayat, Islam Liberal, Sejarah, Konsepsi, Penyimpangandan Jawabannya, Gema Insani Press, 2002, 4.67 See Website of “Liberal Islam”, www.Islib.com68 A group of liberal lecturers at State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) Semarang wrote a book entitled“The Beauty of Homosexual marriage”, see Ahmad Khairul Umam et al, Indahnya Kawin Sesama Jenis,

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polygamy,70 and others. These and other provoking thought look strange among thescholars (ulama).

Second, giving a preference to contextual interpretation of the Qur’an; This principle isnot always consistently followed by them, for when the text is against their ideas theyinterpret it contextually, conversely when the text agree with their argument they takeliterally. The extreme position is their emphasis to the context led them to denigrate thetext and would result in the assumption that numbers of Qur’anic verses are irrelevanttoday. This position is intended to counter the literal interpretation of the Hanbaliteschool, but the drawback is that they only emphasize the contextual interpretation. TheSunni scholars keep the balance between the textual and contextual interpretation, andthis is the serious point of dispute with the liberal group. A point the sound quite strangeamong the scholars of Tafsir is that they employ a method of biblical hermeneutic tointerpret contextually the Qur’anic text. Their extreme position is known when they holdthat the science of Tafsir constructed by Muslim scholars in the past had caused moral,political and cultural decadence of the Muslims, a big claim that would risk the existingIslamic education institution and against the majority of Muslims scholars.

Third, believing that truth is relative; the principle led to the belief that no one knows thetrue teaching of Islam and no one know the truth according to the will of God. Only Godknows the absolute truth. Therefore, there is no claim of absolute truth. This principle isthe foundation of pluralism, but the liberal activists deny this. Some hold that pluralism isadmitting the plurality of religions or religious tolerance, 71 but some other argues thatpluralism is a belief that all religion is different ways to God. The most crucial point thatdiametrically opposes the fundamental belief of the Muslim is the asserting that Islam isnot the only true religion and Allah is a name of God in exoteric level but there is anotherGod in esoteric level. Therefore, they believe that all religion is true and the goal ofworship in all religion is one that is towards The One.72 This idea is purely derivation ofJohn Hick’s conception of Global theology. In fact, pluralism is problematic not only forthe Muslims but also for the adherent of Christianity.73 However, there is no cleardefinition of pluralism among the liberal proponents.

Demokratisasi dan Perlindungan Hak-hak Kaum Homoseksual, Artikel di Jurnal Justisia, IAIN WalisongoSemarang.69 Recently pronounced by Prof. Dr. Musdah Mulia that lesbianism is legally allowed in Islam.70 Counter Legal Draft of Compilation of Islamic Law, compiled by team chaired by Dr. Musdah Mulia,Research and Development of Religious Affair Department.71 H.Nuhrison M.Nuh, Faham-faham Kewagamaan Liberal di Kota Medan, a paper presented at a seminaron Liberal thought at Rural Communities, Research and Development Bureau (Litbang), Department ofReligious Affair, Nopember, 15, 2006, 12.72 Statement of Nurcholis Madjid as quoted by Achmad Rosidi in Liberal Masyarakat Kota Yogyakarta, apaper presented at a Seminar of Research Result about Liberalism Thought in Rural Community atYogyakarta, 2006, held by Research and Development Bureau, Department of Religious Affair, Jakarta,November 2006, 31.73 Kenneth R. Samples, “The Challenge of Religious Pluralism,” in Christian Research Journal, Christian

Research Journal, Summer 1990, 39.

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Fourth, believing in the religious freedom; this principle is derived purely from theprinciple of religious liberalism implying that full religious freedom means not only freeto perform religious duties or to believe in one religion but also free not embrace anyreligion or free to become atheist.74 In Islam one is free to embrace Islam or otherreligion, but it is not free for Muslims perform their religious duties as they wish.Indonesia is neither religious nor secular state, but atheism as adhered by communism hasno place, since it is against the first principle of Pancasila (Five Principles) i.e. “Belief inthe Absolute One God”

The other liberal principle is a secular one, namely separating the worldly and religiousauthority, and that of religion and politic. Many if not most aspects of social life,including the state, are outside the direct purview of religion. This idea might effectivelyprevent the idea of Islamic state, but to isolate socio-political activities of the Muslimsfrom their religious obligation is impossible. For the moderate Muslim no aspect of sociallife, most especially the state, is outside religion. The extreme position held by theexponent of liberal group is the demand of to abolish the Department of Religious Affairsand Ulama Council of Indonesia (MUI),75 for the two are symbols of integration ofreligion and state, placing religion as a question of public concern and not as a privatematter.

It is not hard to trace the origin of these liberal thought. It was initially motivated by thespirit to respond Western notion of modernism. Among the early exponents of liberalthinkers were Harun Nasution and Nurcholish Madjid,76 both are the graduate of Westernuniversities. However, the other exponents like Masdar F Masud, Hussein Muhammad,Hamid Basyaib, Ulil Absar Abdalla, Luthfi Asysyaukani and others were not Westernuniversities graduate. Surprisingly, most of them were the graduate of either traditional ormodern religious school (pesantren) and except Ulil Absar Abdalla they were the activistsof Muslim Student Association (HMI). However, there is no indication that the root oftheir liberal thought were not of their creative and innovation understanding (ijtihad) ofIslamic tradition, but from their attempt to apply their understanding of PostmodernWestern thought into Islamic thought. Therefore, the idea of liberal exponent mostlyperplexed the student of traditional schools (pesantren), for there is no trace in theMuslim intellectual traditions. It is the reason that the liberal thought popularly spread

74 Nicholas F. Gier, “Religious Liberalism and The Founding Fathers”, dalam Peter Caws, ed. TwoCenturies of Philosophy in America, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers, 1980), hal. 22-45.

75 The idea was pronounced in a session of VIIth National Symposium of Human Right, held by NationalCommission of Human Right (KOMNAS HAM), Borobudur hotel, Jakarta, 8-11 June, 2008.76 Harun Nasution, the graduate of McGill Islamic Studies, Canada, and Nurcholish Madjid the Chicagotrained Islamic scholar, play a pivotal role in disseminating secularism, rationalism, religious pluralism andother fundamental ideas of liberalism. They were also known as scholars who promote a version of Islamthat was acceptable to New Order Government. See Malcolm Cone, “Neo-Modern Islam in Suharto’sIndonesia”, New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, 4, 2 (December, 2002): 52-67.

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only among young Muslim scholars in big cities, yet it caused curiosity, criticism, hatredas well as confusion of the masses.

US Involvement

One of the most instrumental factors for the spread of the liberal movement is financialsupport the United State government. This matter was widely known by most ofIndonesian Muslims, especially after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Thetarget of US government is not only the terrorist but to change Muslim world attitudestowards the United States. The targets are the extremist Muslim activist or the“fundamentalist” in Western sense of the words, which are regarded as part of terrorism.To crush terrorism and fundamentalism the US government give financial support toNGOs and Muslim organization to disseminate the idea of democracy, human rights,religious pluralism, moderation, modernity, civil society, gender and feminism and thelike. US funds are used to broadcast Islamic radio and TV shows, democracy training,develop curriculum in Muslim schools on civic education, holding seminars and meetingson civil education and other programs that promote liberal Islam.

USAID is actively involved in this movement and it is done through the Muslim WorldOutreach and Engaging Muslim Civil Society Program. USAID funds go through theAsia Foundation (TAF) to a wide range of 32 organizations and institutions. The AsiaFoundation’s overarching program is called Islam and Civil Society (ICS) andcollaborates with Muslim leaders and organizations to support democracy training andcivil society development. These are offered at the State Islamic University in Jakarta andat Muhammadiyah University in Yogyakarta. Among other groups that it funds, ICPcoordinates with and financially supports JIL’s radio talk show on “Islam and Tolerance”,and it helps fund the young women’s corps of Nahdlatul Ulama in establishing 20domestic violence counseling centers and women’s advocacy centers. It also providesfinancial assistance to Muhammadidyah and NU for a variety of educational initiatives(like those mentioned above). The program has contributed to strengthening the localIndonesian partners, and has widened a national conversation about democracy, humanrights, and gender equality, but USAID and the Asia Foundation never realize the impactof this liberalization movement on the non-liberal groups. Apart from political interest themost serious problem with liberal thought concern the fundamental matter of Islamicteaching, some are mentioned above.

Since the approach of “Liberal Islam” towards Muslim are unsympathetic and suspicioustowards the liberal movement, the popularity of the US government under Bushadministration decreased significantly. One of the exponents of Liberal group admits thathis liberal colleague “are sometimes too direct in their approach, insensitive in manycases to the feelings of their fellow Muslims, and too selective in the themes and subjectsthey address.” …..they depend too much on Western sources in defending their ideas, and

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there-fore are susceptible to identification with a Western agenda. These two factorsreduce the influence of their appeals and the promise of liberal Islam in Indonesia.77

The responses towards liberal movement were not only negative but also filled withhatred and animosity. There are various kind of response from activist, scholars, ulama,and public figures. For the non-liberal activists “Liberal Islam” is an anathema. Instead ofa strict adherence to doctrines and teachings of Islam, the exponent of “Liberal Islam” areperceived as reinterpreting texts handed down by the Prophet to suit their ownconvenience. ‘Islib’ is regarded as a group of secularists who are spreading confusion anddisinformation among the masses. Ironically, the debate between the Muslimfundamentalists and liberals mirrors similar debates between Christian fundamentalistsand liberals.78

In its 7th Congress the Indonesian Ulamas Council (MUI, "Majlis Ulama Indonesia"),which took place in Jakarta in late July 2005, issued a fatwa declaring religiousliberalism, secularism, and religious pluralism as haram (forbidden), because these valuesare described as being incompatible with the true Islam. In its statement, the councildefines religious liberalism as Islamic thought that is not based on a religious foundation,but which instead subscribes to the freedom of human intellectual capacity. Officially, theMUI fatwas have the backing of 26 Islamic organisations. These have, however, issuedstatements calling on the people to take up the fatwas in a considered and calm way, andto resolve any differences of opinion in a "civilised" manner through dialogue andencounters. This fatwa is a definite blow for the growing influence of progressive andliberal Muslim movements like the Liberal Islam Network ("Jaringan Islam Liberal",JIL).

According to Ma’ruf Amin, the chairman of Fatwa Commission of Indonesia UlamaCouncil (MUI), liberal movement has deviated (from the teaching of Islam). First theirmethod of thinking is not based on Islamic approaches, they departed from theapproaches settled by ulama. Second, they consider the Qur’anic verses as irrelevant fortoday needs and therefore they modify its meaning to fit with global situation. Moreover,he denies that MUI is kills the freedom and diversity, MUI only kills the deviation.“Ahmadiyah, secularism, pluralism and liberalism are not diversity in Islam, butdeviation, since we have our own standard of tolerance.”79

The resistances of moderate groups against the liberal proponents were proven by theelection of Hasyim Muzadi as the chairman of Nahdatul Ulama, and the defeat ofAbdurrahman Wahid the liberal figures, and also the election of Din Syamsuddin, the nonliberal figure as the chairman of Muhammadiyah organization. In addition, the liberal

77 M. Ihsan Alief, “Political Islam and Democracy: A Closer Look at the Liberal Muslims” Asia ProgramSpecial Report, April, 2003, no.110, 15.78 For criticisms of “Liberal” by supporters of non-liberal approach to Islam, see the website of theIndonesian Islam Information and Communications Centre (www.alislam.or.id.)79 Kampanye JIL Bukan Sekedar Wacana (Liberal Network is not Only Discourse, Hidayatullah, 1st

Edition/XIX, Media, 2006 Rabiuthani, 1427.

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exponent used to throw controversial ideas through mass media which are pronounced ina subjective fashion and without prior studies of the religious text. Open discourse withthe liberal group in an academic atmosphere had failed, due to different approach. Theliberal interprets the texts with logical tool, while non-liberal understands the texts withreason and authority.

Conclusion

The gulf that is growing between the supporters of a liberal interpretation of religion onthe one hand, and fundamentalist, and radical Islamic currents on the other is quitedangerous for the future unity of Indonesia nation, especially for the Muslims community.The two were caught up in an extreme approach, one condemn the other. The seriousproblem is that the liberal blame not only the radical interpretation but attack almost thewhole Islamic tradition including the fundamental teaching of Islam.

I believe that militant Islamic groups have no enough support to be considered as majorthreat to the stability and viability of democracy. There are still many moderate Muslimsthat can handle the militant Islamic group and no need to face them with liberalapproaches. Elections and the democratic processes that have taken root since 1999 haveshown several important things: first, Islamic parties that run on a religious platform andthat propose implementing Islamic values nationally win a preponderance of votes in2004 election. Secondly, the parliamentary members of Islamic parties to some extenthave better moral reputation than the member of liberal and secular party. Thirdly, theIslamic parties win the election of several governors and the head of sub-regions. Finally,the future of Islamic political parties would be in the hand of the moderate Muslims whoare tolerance to non-Muslim, appreciating the diversity of races and religions, promotingnot only human right but also human obligation to God, helping the poor and cooperativewith other nations in political, economic, education and social welfare of human being.

Jakarta, 11 October 2008