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ISLAMIC POLITICAL ACTIVISIM IN INDIA The Rise and Fall of the Khilafat Movement Ahsan Akram History and Development of Islamic Political Thought Saeed Khan December 7, 2012

Islamic Political Activism: The Rise and Fall of the Khilafat Movement

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Analysis on the factors resulting in the formation and breakdown of the Khilafat Movement (1919-1924) resulting in the eventual mobilization of the minority Indian Muslims towards the creation of Pakistan.

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Page 1: Islamic Political Activism: The Rise and Fall of the Khilafat Movement

ISLAMIC POLITICAL ACTIVISIM IN INDIA The Rise and Fall of the Khilafat Movement

Ahsan Akram

History and Development of Islamic Political Thought

Saeed Khan

December 7, 2012

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Introduction

The Khilafat movement, beginning in 1919 and ending in 1924 is viewed as a “flash in

the pan” movement in Indian history. Its causes can be debated ranging from purely political and

nationalistic to unequivocally theological. Many papers have debated the true nature of the

movement along with its lasting impact on the constantly evolving Indian subcontinent. This

paper will attempt to dissect the underlying causes of the Khilafat movement along with focusing

on the presiding framework in the Indian subcontinent that allowed for such a movement to

occur.

It is important to first define the word Khalifa. Khalifa derives from the Arabic root

khalafa, which means “to follow” or “to come after”.1 It means “successor” in the sequential

sense, not in the sense of inheritance of properties or qualities.2 In the terms of Islam, the Khalifa

was the sequential successor of the Prophet Muhammad after his death. As a result, Abu Bakr

was a Khalifa of the prophet, therefore Khalifat al-Rasool Allah. His successor would be labeled

in a literal term as “Khalifat al-Khalif al-Rasool Allah”. Instead of using the “title” of Khalifa,

Abu Bakr and his subsequent three elected successors utilized the title of “Amir al-Mu’minin” or

“the Commander of the Faithful”.3

After the rise of the Ummayad Empire, the title of the leader was again in question. In

order to provide legitimacy to the new monarchy established under the Ummayad Dynasty, the

title of Khalifa was adopted. In this sense, it did not signify a successor, as the monarchy was a

new phenomenon after the rule of the Khulafa-e-Rashidun. The term “Khilafa” was now

transformed to represent an emperor or monarch, not a successor as the original meaning had

1 H. Alavi, "Ironies of History: Contradictions of the Khilafat Movement," Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 17, no. 1 (1997), 4 2 Ibid, 4 3 Ibid, 4

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intended it to be. This claim to the term “Khalifa” provided the Umayyad Dynasty the legitimacy

they were seeking as it connected their monarchy to the original leadership of Islam following

the death of the Prophet. As a result, it is necessary to understand that the title of Khalifa

throughout the Ummayads, Abbasids, and Ottomans was as a term representing the monarch, not

“successor” as originally intended.

Particular to the Khilafat Movement, the term Khalifa essentially expands and holds a

different defination for each class of society. The term is no longer associated or viewed

specifically as defining a leader, successor, or monarch. Instead, it stands as a symbol of Islam.

For the Ulema, the Khilafat represents a role of leadership as pertaining to the Islamic shari’a.

For the western-educated leaders of the Khilafat movement, the term holds an abstract idea of

self-determination for the Indian Muslims. Finally, the general masses that were for the most part

ignorant of what “Khilafat” actually meant, viewed the Khilafat as the direct representation of

Islam. This plays a major role in the mobilization of the masses during the Khilafat movement.

Connection Between the Ottoman Khalifa and the Indian Muslims

After the death of the Prophet in 632 AD, the budding Islamic state of Medina was faced

with a dilemma of what style of governance should be utilized. The Rashidun Caliphs tried to

maintain the traditional simplicity of Islam and the tribal values of an earlier age.4 By the abrupt

conclusion of Ali’s caliphate, the Islamic state transitioned into a monarchy beginning with the

Umayyad Dynasty. Arab expansion and wars of conquest resulted in a tremendous increase in

their wealth and the monarchy (caliphate) by the time of the Abbasids developed a “succession

from God” ideology.5 Social hierarchies developed as a result, the caliphate wearing the political

4 M. Shakir, Khilafat to Partition: A Survey of Major Political Trends among Indian Muslims During 1919-1947 (Kalamkar Prakashan, 1970), 3 5 Ibid, 3

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crown and simultaneously wielding a spiritual influence over the general population. This model

of the social and political hierarchy extended to the Indian subcontinent in the form of Mughal

shahs.

In pre-British rule, the Mughal emperors occupied themselves with political governance

while the Ulema handled Islamic jurisprudence in a favorable manner to the Shah’s ideology.6 As

a religion, Islam was spread to the common man through regional Sufis and Pirs rather than the

Ulema.7 This key point is very important in later understanding the process of Muslim

mobilization in India. Despite the separations in region, linguistics, class, and sects, the Muslim

minority was held together by the common religion of Islam and the connection to the religion of

the ruling Empire.8 This commonality, although not visible in everyday life for the common

Muslim, was a strong point in keeping a direct loyalty to the Muslim Shah. Minority status for

the Muslims allowed for the extraterritorial loyalty to the community of Islamic believers.9

The Muslim Mughal Empire held social, political, and economic power in India prior to

the British Raj. For example, the British East India Company derived authority in India from the

Mughals.10 In religious terms, the Mughal Shah’s name was used in the weekly sermon during

Friday jumma (congregational prayer). At face value, the divided Muslim minority shared the

common denominator of Islam amongst themselves and with the Shah. When this focal point of

connectedness was lost after the fall of the Mughals, the Muslims turned their association to the

Ottoman Empire and its hold on the Islamic Caliphate.

6 Ibid, 11 7 A.F. Buehler, Sufi Heirs of the Prophet: The Indian Naqshbandiyya and the Rise of the Mediating Sufi Shaykh (Univ of South Carolina Press, 1998), 169 8 M. Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims (Allen & Unwin London, 1967). 9 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 2 10 Ibid, 5

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The legitimacy of the Ottoman Caliphate in the Indian subcontinent is a topic worthy of

discussion. By the late 19th century, the Ottoman sultans decided to lay claim to the Universal

Caliphate.11 In order to establish legitimacy, the Ottoman Empire launched a campaign of the

mythical transfer of the Caliphate to Selim by al-Mutawakkil in 1517.12 The Ottomans had to

show that the transfer of the Caliphate was a legitimate process from the Abbasids, the former

owners of the position of Caliph. Heavy propaganda was distributed in India through Urdu

journalism, the main form of Muslim media. During this time period, Indian Muslims were

devoid of a symbolic religious commonality after the fall of the Mughal Empire in 1857. As a

result, the story of the transfer of Caliphate power from al-Mutawakkil to Selim was generally

accepted in India without much questioning or backlash.

Two groups of thought did emerge on the topic of the Ottoman Caliphate. The first group

subscribed to the Barelvi tradition, refusing to accept the legitimacy of the Ottoman claim on the

Caliphate by not questioning the story, but by affirming the Prophet’s saying pertaining to the

title of Caliph staying within the Quraysh clan.13 The Ottomans, not being of Qurayshi descent,

failed to qualify for the position of Caliph. The second group however believed and readily

accepted the story presented by the Ottomans. This allowed for the void of the Mughal

figurehead to be replaced with one from the Ottoman Empire.

Growing Ottoman sympathies from India were demonstrated with Imams beginning to

use the Sultan’s name in Friday congressional prayers. Muslims launched funds to provide for

11 H. Alavi, "Ironies of History: Contradictions of the Khilafat Movement," Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 17, no. 1 (1997), 2 12 Ibid, 2 13 Ibid, 3

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Turkish relief during the Turkish War of 1877-78 and during the Greco-Turkish war of 1897.14

This developing support for the Ottoman Empire was a clear sign of the religious alliance

forming within Indian Muslims towards Turkish causes. When it was claimed that the Muslims

of the Indian subcontinent owned allegiance to the Sultan of Turkey, no British or Hindu

eyebrows were raised and the claim was accepted at its face value.15 Sultan Abdul Hamid II also

became very active in flexing his proverbial caliphate muscles in order to gain pan-Islamic

support from India and abroad against encroaching European powers. Ultimately, Muslims in

India began to view the Ottoman Caliphate and as an extension, the Ottoman Empire as the

symbol of Islamic unity and international power.

Dynamics Between the Indian Muslims and the British

The relationship between the British rulers and English residents of India with the Indians

was a strained and distant one. Imperial domesticity was believed superior to native Indian

domesticity for the English.16 Areas with British population had detailed set of rules and

regulations enacted that upheld a British standard in English homes along with maintaining a

superiority complex with the native Indians. British individuals prevented their children from

spending too much time with other Indian children or with their ayah (nanny) in fear that their

children would learn the Hindi language.17 The Hindi or Urdu languages were looked down upon

along with the people who spoke such languages. Surprisingly, English-speaking Anglo-Indians

14 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 5 15 I. Rome Sultan, "The Role of the North-West Frontier Province in the Khilafat and Hijrat Movements," Islamic Studies 43, no. 1 (2004), 51 16 Blunt Alison, "Imperial Geographies of Home: British Domesticity in India, 1886-1925," Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 24, no. 4 (1999), 422 17 Ibid, 434

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were not considered equals either as they were often deemed untrustworthy or castigated for their

distinctive accent.18

Despite all of this hostility towards the locals, it is surprising that the Indian Muslims

were still somewhat supportive of the British prior to the beginning of World War I. Although

there was a Muslim mutiny in 1857 against the British, the Muslims largely were not militantly

rebellious to the British. They were more concerned with purifying their own religion against a

backdrop of threats from Hinduism and Christian Missionaries. The development of the local

sufi sects after the decline of the Mughals created an initiative to promote a purer vision of

Islamic life and society.19

Along with Islamic reforms domestically, the Ottoman Empire also played a role in

increasing Muslim India’s support for the ruling British. During the mutiny in 1857 for example,

the Ottoman sultan called Indian Muslims to remain loyal to British rule.20 A direct intervention

by the Caliphate allowed for the settling of the mutiny. A divergent result was that the anti-

western Ulema lost power and influence over Indian Muslims after the fall of the Mughals.21,22

Due to the political alliance of the Ottoman Empire and Britain during the time period, the

Muslims viewed the British as an entity that was attempting to help maintain the Ottoman

Dynasty and as a derivative, the Muslim Caliphate. Thus, the British were not viewed in a

negative light.

18 Ibid, 434 19 R. A. Geaves, "India 1857: A Mutiny or a War of Independence? The Muslim Perspective," Islamic Studies 35, no. 1 (1996), 31 20 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 6 21 Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968), 43 22 Mushirul Hasan, "Religion and Politics: The Ulama and Khilafat Movement," Economic and Political Weekly 16, no. 20 (1981)

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Muslim opposition to the British began to grow in the years 1911-1913 when the Balkan

wars became another source of anxiety to Muslims.23 Muslims began to believe the conspiracy

that encroaching Christians were ultimately pursing the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and

along with it, the Islamic Caliphate. With the loss of another major Islamic identifier, Indian

Muslims were highly nervous of losing their Islamic identity with the large Ottoman Empire and

ultimately losing out to the majority Hindus.

The rift between Indian and British relations further splintered in 1912 when the British

Empire refused to grant Aligarh Muslim University the licensure to become an educational

institution. The Aligarh movement originally displayed a firm loyalty to British rule.24 Students

of Aligarh were considered westernized products from the education received at the institution.

Surprisingly, many of these westernized students were the ones to denounce their loyalty to the

British Crown and instead begin supporting an anti-British stance. Many of these rebelling

students would go on to begin the foundations of the Khilafat movement and help it become

mainstream in Indian society. These Aligarh products included Muhammad Ali, Maulana Abdul

Bari of Firangi Mahal, Maulana Mahmud al-Hasan of Deoband, and Maulana Abdul Kalam

Azad.25 It is important to note the distinction of the Islamic schools of thought that each

individual belonged to and the developing cooperation and unity between the different sects in

order to attain their goals.

Aligarh Muslim University

The shift in alliance of the Muslim University against the British Raj can be attributed as

the biggest chain reaction that helped kick-start Muslim political activism. It makes sense to

23 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 10 24 Ibid 25 Ibid

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breakdown the leadership of the Aligarh Muslim University and understands why it became the

roots of a major movement in India.

The attempted creation of a Muslim University was an effort on the part of the founders

to create an all-India Muslim constituency and to carve out for it a decisive piece of political

power.26 The Western-educated founders of the University believed that it was necessary for the

cultivation of cultural and philosophical ideals in an institution grounded to an internationally

recognized political and educational powerhouse. The University would also serve as a direct

challenge to the British control of the educational access to power.27 The education establishment

would also serve as a “factory” in developing the next generation of Muslim political thinkers. It

was becoming a priority for the Muslim leaders in India to establish a social and political hub

and stake their claim in the discourse of developing Indian politics in order to prevent

marginalization by the Hindu majority. Thus, it was necessary to develop an educated youth in

order to maintain autonomy in the political scene. The Muslim leaders understood that the

minority Muslims could only stay relevant and with specialization in their social and political

ranks.

The Muslim University was created to function as a base for emerging leaders of Muslim

India. There was no distinction set for the cultural or political identities that each individual

could choose. The proposed university would be modern, but it would be universally Muslim.28

These ground rules from the University establishment allowed for the spread of ideas and

26 Gail Minault and David Lelyveld, "The Campaign for a Muslim University, 1898-1920," Modern Asian Studies 8, no. 2 (1974), 145 27 Ibid 28 Ibid, 149

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inadvertently resulted in bitter factionalism, which became a chief characteristic of the

University.29

Aligarh served as a hotbed for ideologies from differing sects of Islam. For example,

students of the Deoband and Firangi Mahal schools of thoughts both studied at the University.

The differing religious viewpoints resulted in divisions in the University. The rifts in ideologies

led to the formations of leagues within the University, ultimately nurturing future development of

political parties such as the Muslim League. These parties would later go on to play a role in the

political landscape of India post-British Raj and into the partition arguments.

In 1911, the Government of India submitted a request for Aligarh Muslim University to

be recognized as an official international University in the British Empire. Britain instead

decided that the University should instead remain a ‘federal’ university of closely neighboring

colleges.30 The British also were not keen in including the term “Muslim” in the title of the

University, rather preferring it be named ‘The University of Aligarh’. The Muslims representing

Aligarh University quickly grew impatient and took to the Urdu newspapers in demanding the

development of the University on their own terms. Muhammad Ali, the head of the Old Boys

Association at Aligarh, reiterated the demand for an all-India affiliating institution run by

Muslims with minimum of government interference in his newspaper Comrade.31

By June 1912, the British Empire had decided to reject the University proposal according

to what the Muslim leaders of Aligarh were demanding. The Muslim University movement had

aimed at the development of a distinguished educational institution which would be the outward

and visible sign of Indian Muslim cultural and political regeneration as well as the center of an

29 Ibid, 145 30 Ibid, 169 31 Ibid

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autonomous network of Muslim educational institutions throughout India.32 By rejecting the

proposal for the University, the British reaffirmed their authority over the Muslims and

inadvertently stripped the minority Muslims of their attempted establishment of a source of

identity. The British were not supporting Islam in India as the Indian Muslims once thought,

instead they were taking away the identity marker and grounding establishment the Muslims

were trying to claim. This event, along with the growing British threat towards the Ottoman

Empire helped create a massive push towards heavy anti-British sentiment in Muslim society.

Development of the Khilafat Movement

Following the breakdown of the establishment plans for Aligarh University, the divided

Muslim community of Aligarh gradually became united under the banner of anti-British rule.

Muhammad Ali, Shaukat Ali, Abdul Bari, and Maulana Mahmud al-Hasan emerged as the

leaders of the anti-British movement.33 The Ali brothers along with Abdul Bari and Maulana

Mahmud al-Hasan took a theological approach against the British. They believed politics could

not be divorced from religion unlike what western thought presented.34 The post-Aligarh

political activism obtained a new rally point against British Raj after the Ottoman Empire

declared war on the British during World War I.

Indian Muslims began to believe their religion was on a decline due to expanding western

powers. Fazlul Haq, President of the annual session of the Muslim League in 1918 said “the

future of Islam in India seems to be wrapped in gloom and anxiety. Every instance of a collapse

of the Muslim powers of the world is bound to have an adverse influence on the political

32 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 54 33 Ibid, 10 34 Ibid, 56

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importance of our community in India”.35 There was a direct threat on the Muslim identity and

political strength in India due to the dwindling political powers of their international Islamic

associates. To make matters worse, the symbolic head of Islam was now under attack from

Britain during World War I. It became the duty of the Indian Muslim to not only take a stand for

their symbolic head in Istanbul, but also fight to maintain their own weakening identity.

Although this identity crisis was taking center stage for Muslims in India, it is important

to realize that this was not the case for the rest of the world. Most Muslims outside of India

rejected the pan-Islamic ideology. For example, developing Arab nationalism resulted in Arabs

having no desire to be ruled by Turkey and felt no allegiance to the Sultan of Turkey as their

Khalifa.36 Even inside the Ottoman Empire, Turkish nationalism led by the Young Turks was

developing, resulting in the idea of having a sovereign Turkish state without ties to the rest of the

Muslim world. On the contrary, the Muslims in India were not familiar with the concept of

Nationalism because of their isolation in the Indian commonwealth along with the resistance

against British cultural influence. As reiterated before, the Muslims in India were devoid of a

social or political identity, thus seeking to connect themselves with extra national entities such as

the Ottoman Khalifa. It is from this non-connectedness on the part of the Indian Muslims that an

attempt to save the Ottoman Khalifa, their only identity marker, emerged.

The main catalysts for the development of the Khilafat movement were the Aligarh

educated Ali brothers. Both Muhammad and Shaukat Ali took upon roles as “Maulanas” and

began preaching their anti-British ideologies through khutbas at jumma prayers. The brothers

would reiterate the message of objections against the government and “pray for God to grant

35 Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968), 38 36 Ibid, 39

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victory and succor to the caliph”.37 In some instances, the Ottoman Sultan would be praised and

prayers offered for the success of his sword and his armies and the destruction of the infidels.38

The British, although aware of such actions, did not act against the Ali brothers due to the

sensitive issue of tampering with religious sermons. As a result, the Ali brothers were able to

spread their message through local mosques without much resistance from the British.

The Ali brothers stated the Indian Muslims’ demands for the Khilafat to Britain through a

series of letters. They demanded that: there should be no attempt by non-Muslims to interfere in

the free choice by the Muslims of the Khalifa, the sovereignty of the Khalifa over the Holy

places should not be dismembered “even among Muslim governments”, Egypt and the other

territories of the Ottoman Empire should be restored to the Khalifa, Muslim religious places

should not be occupied or controlled by non-Muslims, Muslims should not be asked to assist in

the prosecution of war against the Khalifa, no Muslims should be punished for promoting

sympathy with his brother Muslim, and the British Government should pay more respect to the

sentiments of Muslims in India.39 The failure of the British government to respond to these

demands touching the fate of the Ottoman Empire resulted in the emergence of the Khilafat

Movement.40

In order to increase Hindu awareness for the Khilafat cause, the Ali brothers decided to

enlist the support of Gandhi, a Hindu lawyer. Although neither Muhammad nor Shaukat Ali were

able to personally contact Gandhi, they were able to communicate with him through their

spiritual mentor and fellow Aligarh alumnus Abdul Bari.

37 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 55 38 Ibid 39 Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968), 40 40 Ibid, 41

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With support from Gandhi, it became easier for the Muslims and Hindus to begin talks

for an alliance against the British. In 1916, the Muslim League, with Muhammad Ali in

representation, and the Indian National Congress met in order to discuss the potential self-

government goals of India. The resulting Lucknow pact allowed for the control of all India’s

internal affairs by these legislatures through the power of the purse and furthermore, agreed that

Muslims, who comprised a minority of some 21 percent, should have constitutional safeguards in

form of separate electorates with weighted seats.41 The pact not only insured that the Muslim

voice would be heard in the developing all-India governing body, but helped the Muslims gain a

larger voice then their collective minority population would normally allow for. Although this

caused some nervousness within the Hindu community leading to riots and Hindi uprisings, it

essentially put both Muslims and Hindus on a level playing field in the game of politics. The

concerns of the Muslim minority would now have to at least somewhat have an impact on the

national conversation of India.

After the enactment of the Lucknow pact, tensions between the Muslims and Hindus

heightened. In September 1917, Hindu’s began objecting the Muslim slaughtering of cows in

Shahabad, resulting in riots erupting throughout the city.42 Relations between the Hindus and

Muslims continued to deteriorate in October of 1917 when the Hindu festival of Dussehra and

the Shia Muslim observance of Muharram coincided.43 Further violence and protesting erupted

from this exchange between the two faiths. The Muslim Ulema, now headed by Abdul Bari

claimed that there was oppression of Islam resulting from the Hindus. These riots and protests

41 Hugh F. Owen, "Negotiating the Lucknow Pact," The Journal of Asian Studies 31, no. 3 (1972), 561 42 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 58 43 Ibid, 59

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caused two changes to occur in the political landscape of Muslim India. First, the Muslim

population began to look to the Ulema for leadership and guidance (a first since the 1857

mutiny) instead of the Muslim League. The Muslim population placed some of the blame on the

occurrences of rioting on the Muslim League because it was their Lucknow pact that began the

animosity of Hindus towards the Muslims. Second, the Muslims again affirmed their alliance

towards Istanbul, as they no longer viewed themselves as an autonomous group among the

“infidels” in India.

Following the increasing animosity and rioting between Hindus and Muslims between

1917 and 1919, one major event occurred in 1919 that helped unify the bickering sides along

with uniting them on a common goal. On March 18, 1919, the British government passed the

Rowlatt Act. Rumors about the Act spread throughout India. It was said that the police would be

free to search and arrest whomever they pleased and keep him under lock and key without trial,

and that the law abolished the right of appeal and imposed new and severe taxation.44 All aspects

of Indian society, whether it was the prince or peasant, Hindu or Muslim, were fervently opposed

to the passage of the Act.45 These bills helped unite the divided Indian population towards one

goal of eliminating British rule and establishing Indian independence.

The one symbol that quickly connected both Hindus and Muslims was the Khalifa. The

symbolic Khalifa was the epitome of anti-Britishness. The Hindus embraced the symbol because

it represented an enemy to the British Raj. The Muslims on the other hand continued their

support of the symbol because it was symbolic of their religion identity. If the Khilafat was to be

damaged by the British, so to were the Muslims. The Muslims needed the assistance of the

44 Ibid, 69 45 L. Rai, The Political Future of India (BW Huebsch, 1919), xi

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Hindus in mounting an agitation to bring pressure on the British while the Hindus could not build

an all-embracing national movement without the cooperation of the Muslims.46

Gandhi was quick to act on the connecting point of the Caliphate. He turned to the Ali

brothers’ camp to gain their support in his satyagraha (non-violence) technique of resistance and

was also quick to enlist Abdul Bari and the Ulema to his principles of satyagraha.47 Gandhi was

intelligent in understanding that not only was he enlisting the support of the “western” political

activists in the Ali brothers, he was also insuring the support of the Muslim masses through the

now allied Ulema. Gandhi also viewed India as a whole, thus it was necessary for both the

Hindus and Muslims to act together because without one, there was no whole.48

On September 21, 1919, a conference of Muslim leaders was held in Lucknow pertaining

to the developing Khilafat movement. The group set October 17 as Khilafat day, a day of fasting

and prayer.49 Gandhi also urged Hindus to join the observation, stating, “Their sorrows must be

our sorrows”.50 Throughout India, Muslims and Hindus both observed Khilafat day, symbolizing

the beginning of a political collaboration between Hindus and Muslims. October 17, 1919 can

also be viewed as the official beginning of the Khilafat Movement. Hindu-Muslim relationships

were forged along with adapting Muslim-Muslim relationships, allowing for the powerful

beginning of the movement.

46 Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968), 41 47 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 69 48 K. L. Motvani, "Propaganda in Mahatma Gandhi's Movement," Social Forces 8, no. 4 (1930), 575 49 Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968), 41 50 Ibid

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Within the Muslim community, the Ulema and Western-educated politicians drew closer

together after the beginning of World War I and continued the relationship into and throughout

the Khilafat Movement. The old Muslim League was soon replaced with the All-India Khilafat

Committee, a politically oriented party, and Jamiat al-Ulama-e-Hind, an Ulema influenced party.

In February 1920, the Khilafat Conference, led by Shaukat Ali, established the Khilafat

Manifesto listing the goals of the Khilafat Movement.51 The constitution of the All-India Khilafat

Committee spelled out four aims of the organization: to preserve the Khilafat as a center for the

Muslim world, to keep the jazirat al-Arab free from non-Muslim control, to work in India for the

attainment of self-government, and to organize Indian Muslims for religious, educational, social,

and economic benefit.52 These claims first and foremost laid out a plan for the establishment of

Muslim identity and sovereignty in the developing Indian social, political, and economic climate.

Second, the pan-Islamic connection was also necessary for Muslim identity and the preservation

of the Khilafat along with Khilafat control over Arab lands maintained that. Finally, the All-India

Khilafat Committee acknowledges the establishment of India as a sovereign nation, mainly in

order to align themselves against British rule. These set goals somewhat overlap with the

demands presented by the Ali brothers during the outbreak of World War I.

Role of the Ulema in the Khilafat Movement

Although the Ali brothers were powerful in the terms of leading the Muslim League,

helping push the All-India Khilafat Committee, create alliances with Gandhi, and become the

strategists behind the Khilafat movement, the Ulema played a massive role in the mobilization of

the masses.

51 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 93 52 Ibid

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For the majority of Muslims in India, neither the state of the Ottoman Empire nor the

description of the caliphate mattered. What mattered was the connection to the symbolism of

Islamic figures, sanctuaries, and holy places in the area known as Jazirat al-Arab.53 The Khilafat

played a role as the symbolic head of Islam and the protector of the holy places of Islam. This

figurehead was the all-encompassing earthly entity that a Muslim could look towards in relating

with pan-Islamism. Any danger presented to these symbols or sanctuaries by foreign influence

such as the British was a motivating factor in rebelling against such transgressors.

The Ulema played a heavy influential role for most Muslims because they were directly

involved with the weekly sermons, daily prayers, and religious identity on a local level. They

were also teachers, writers, and preachers in the local communities. The leaders of the Khilafat

Movement made it a point to urge Maulanas, Sufis, and local Pirs to lead their congregations and

spread the message of the Khilafat Movement.54 The Ulema developed a powerful political

mobilization from the use of religious rhetoric.

Jamat al-Ulama-e-Hind developed as a political party bringing together different schools

of though for the Ulema and allowing for the unification of voice and ideas. Leaders of the

Ulema, such as Maulana Abdul Bari emerged with the reins of politics in their control. Abdul

Bari along with the Ulema and its associations with local pirs helped bring the Khilafat

Movement from the western-educated and middle-class Khilafat campaigners to the isolated

rural Muslims.55

53 Mushirul Hasan, "Religion and Politics: The Ulama and Khilafat Movement," Economic and Political Weekly 16, no. 20 (1981) 54 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 130 55 Shabnum Tejani, "Re-Considering Chronologies of Nationalism and Communalism: The Khilafat Movement in Sind and Its Aftermath, 1919–1927," South Asia Research 27, no. 3 (2007), 253

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The Ulema and local pirs issued fatwas (juristic ruling) calling on thousands of spiritual

disciples to participate in demonstrations and boycotts.56 Fatwas became a major tool for

implementing control over the Muslim population. There was a proliferation of the direct issuing

of fatwas from the Ulema to the believers.57 For example, in order to rally Indian Muslims

following the Barelvi tradition of rejecting the Ottoman Caliphate, Maulana Abdul Bari issued a

fatwa in February 1919 laying down rules clarifying that Qurayshi descent was not a necessary

condition for the Khilafat.58 The Ulema’s support also allowed for the strengthening of Gandhi’s

non-cooperation movement in the Muslim community after the passage of fatwas by Abdul Bari,

considering it Islamically unlawful to buy foreign goods.59This allowed for Barelvi Muslims to

join the forces with the majority in upholding the Ottoman Caliphate.

The support from the Muslim Ulema allowed for the Khilafat Movement to gain a strong

and influential religious tone. This was not only appealing to the masses, but also to the

Westernized Muslims leading the Khilafat movement. These men began to grow a beard and

otherwise conform to the tenants of orthodoxy.60 For example, a picture taken of Muhammad Ali

in 1913 shows him in a Western style dress along with a large moustache. By 1921, he was

wearing a full beard with traditional Indian clothing in his portrait. The shift in attention to

religious affiliation and symbolism was very prominent from the way the style of clothing and

appearance changed dramatically. The beard and traditional dress became memes for the Khilafat

Movement and representation of Islam.

56 Ibid 57 R. A. Geaves, "India 1857: A Mutiny or a War of Independence? The Muslim Perspective," Islamic Studies 35, no. 1 (1996), 35 58 H. Alavi, "Ironies of History: Contradictions of the Khilafat Movement," Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 17, no. 1 (1997), 6 59 Ibid 60 Mushirul Hasan, "Religion and Politics: The Ulama and Khilafat Movement," Economic and Political Weekly 16, no. 20 (1981)

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The Hindu-Muslim Alliance

In order for any powerful activism to occur in India, both the Hindu and Muslim

population realized that they needed the support of each other. Although the Hindus were the

majority religion, they could not stage an all-Indian movement without including the largest

minority present in the country. Similarly, Muslim political activism in support of the Khalifa

would not contain any weight if they created powerful demands from the position of a minority.

It became necessary for the cooperation of both sectors of society and leaders from both sides

understood this. Thus, the opportunity for an alliance emerged within these circumstances.

The major figures forming the Hindu-Muslim alliance were Mohandas Gandhi and

Muhammad and Shaukat Ali. Gandhi took the Ali brothers as his own brothers during the course

of the movement in order to set an example for the Hindu population.61 Gandhi understood that

the unity of the nation was important in order to represent a powerful and undivided force acting

against the British. In order to gain the trust of the Muslims, Gandhi picked up the idea of saving

the Khilafat in Turkey, despite knowledge of the Ottoman Empire falling apart and newfound

Turkish nationalism finding no use for the Ottoman sultan.62 Although Gandhi claimed that “the

Muslim’s goal is a Hindu’s goal”, it seems he was only playing on religious emotions to create

alliances.

The Muslims, in return of Gandhi’s extension for alliance, symbolically made him

president of the first All-India Khilafat Conference held in Delhi on November 23-24, 1919.63

Whether or not the Muslim leadership understood the level of Gandhi’s genuine attachment to

61 K. L. Motvani, "Propaganda in Mahatma Gandhi's Movement," Social Forces 8, no. 4 (1930), 578 62 D. Barsamian, Eqbal Ahmad: Confronting Empire (South End Press, 2000), 24 63 Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968), 42

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their cause, they knew that Hindu support was necessary in order to gain ground. The Muslims

made appearances at Hindu temples and participated in their worship while the Hindus began

visiting Muslim mosques.64 The alliance became more known for their superficial acceptance of

each other, masking the tensions hidden underneath symbolic gestures. The Khilafat and the Cow

became interchangeable collective representations in the terminology of Indian nationalism.65

The major opposition Gandhi and the Ali brothers faced in the formation of the Hindu-

Muslim alliance was Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Gurudev Tagore. Jinnah claimed Gandhi was

bringing religion into politics, saying it was a method likely to backfire.66 Jinnah understood that

although Gandhi was upholding Islamic symbols in order to appease the Muslims, his switch to

Hindu symbols to maintain majority Hindu support would cause massive paranoia in the Muslim

population. The Muslims were likely to begin fearing a Hindu Raj following the overthrowing of

the British Raj.67 Tagore also was vocal in claiming that Gandhi’s movement would also tend to

divide the Hindus from Muslims and create deep fissures in Indian society.68 Tagore argued that

nationalism tended to created emotions of exclusion and separation based on differences, not

commonality.69

Despite the claims against Gandhi’s political ideas, which would prove to be correct after

the collapse of the Khilafat movement, the Muslim leaders remained in support of Gandhi. They

64 K. L. Motvani, "Propaganda in Mahatma Gandhi's Movement," Social Forces 8, no. 4 (1930), 579 65 K. L. Motvani, "Propaganda in Mahatma Gandhi's Movement," Social Forces 8, no. 4 (1930), 579 66 D. Barsamian, Eqbal Ahmad: Confronting Empire (South End Press, 2000), 24 66 Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968), 24 67 P. Kidambi, "Nationalism and the City in Colonial India Bombay, C. 1890-1940," Journal of Urban History 38, no. 5 (2012), 962 68 Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968), 25 69 Ibid

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viewed Gandhi’s policies as an infallible way to gain British attention and put pressure on

Britain. Gandhi was skilled at speaking in accepted British terms to a British audience, leaving

them uncomfortable with their own conscience.70 His non-cooperation movement allowed for

demonstrations to occur without having entered into a war against Britain. The Muslims were not

attempting to break away cleanly from British rule as the Hindus were, they were instead

attempting to maintain their sovereignty and identity in the social and political landscape in India

and internationally through the Ottoman Empire. By participating in a national movement allied

with the Hindus, the Muslims could voice their opinion with a greater authority and not fear

discrimination in favor of the Hindus as the British rule previously did against Muslim

uprisings.71 The Muslims understood that their role in the non-cooperation movement put them

on the proverbial loudspeaker and gave them leverage by having the power to potentially disrupt

Britain’s own colonial rule.

Urdu Media and its Role in Mobilization

Despite Muslim alliances with within themselves and with the Hindus, the true essence of

the Khilafat movement spread through the Urdu media, allowing for mass mobilization of the

people. Major political figures such as Muhammad Ali, Shaukat Ali, and Maulana Abdul Azad

were able to spread their ideas to the Muslim masses through Urdu newspapers such as

Comrade, Hamdard, Al-Hilal, Al-Balagh, and Zamindar.72 These papers were widely read by the

Muslim middle-class, the major actors at the political forefront. They became a means of

communication between political elites in a public atmosphere. The middle class, on both the

70 Vithal Rajan, "Gandhi: The Colonising Object," Economic and Political Weekly 41, no. 15 (2006), 1426 71 D. Barsamian, Eqbal Ahmad: Confronting Empire (South End Press, 2000), 28 72 ijaz Ahmad, "Frontier Gandhi: Reflections on Muslim Nationalism in India," Social Scientist 33, no. 1/2 (2005) 23

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Hindu and Muslim side were the western-educated lot who were in position to take over the

government positions that would be vacated from the departure of colonial rule.73 They stood to

gain the most from these movements and thus were open to the ideas presented by the Ali

Brothers and religious leaders such as Maulana Abdul Azad and Maulana Abdul Bari. The

religious Ulema, also active in publications, were the means used to communicate with the

majority lower class through published fatwas and religious essays.

One major literary technique the political activists and the Ulema used in obtaining

support for the Khilafat Movement was Urdu poetry. Poetic recitation became a part of political

mass meetings; poetry became a means of communicating between the politicized elite and their

common audience.74 Poetry also spoke to the emotions, resulting in the connection forged with

the hearts of Muslims who prior to the poetic recitation were uninterested in the political

movements. These forms of communication allowed for the public discourse between political

leaders of the Khilafat movement and between the leaders and the rest of the community.

Fall of the Khilafat Movement

As predicted by Jinnah and Tagore, the Hindu-Muslim alliance was built on an unstable

religiously symbolic base, resulting in an easy break in the association from a few violent

setbacks. Although Gandhi called for non-violence in his non-cooperation movement, he failed

to realize that any violent threat to the Hindu or Muslim commonwealth could result in a

pushback to maintain their place in society. Gandhi also was relying on the fact that the majority

Hindu and minority Muslims would maintain a balanced alliance without allowing for their

73 Sukumar Muralidharan, "Religion, Nationalism and the State: Gandhi and India's Engagement with Political Modernity," Social Scientist 34, no. 3/4 (2006), 14 74 Gail Minault, "Urdu Political Poetry During the Khilafat Movement," Modern Asian Studies 8, no. 4 (1974), 461

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majority/minority status to interfere. The alliance enjoined by a thread came crashing during the

Mappilla Rebellion.

In the South Indian Malabar district, this disparity in the balance of power between the

landlord Hindus and peasant Muslims (Mappillas) was at a high tension in 1921. On August 20,

the Hindu police raided a mosque to find the Khilafat leaders who were claimed to have a hand

in a recent burglary of a Hindu landlord’s house. A rumor spread of the desecration of the

mosque, causing a rebellion by the Muslim pheasants. During the rebellion, Khilafat flags were

in evidence and in a couple of villages, “Khilafat kingdoms” were proclaimed.75 Although the

name of the Khilafat was used as a reason for rebelling, the true reason behind the pheasant

rebellion was social and religious unrest between the two groups resulting from distress caused

by recent monsoon and resulting famine. The Hindus throughout the country began to fear a

massive Muslim rebellion while the Muslims were again uneasy about their delicate position in

society.

Further weakening the movement was the arrest of the Ali brothers in the month

following the Mappilla rebellion. Without a strong leadership, the Khilafat movement began to

unravel. Maulana Abdul Azad took over leadership of the Khilafat movement, yet he did not

have a clear goal or vision of where to take the movement. Gandhi’s plans for his Civil

Disobedience demonstration was put on indefinite hold because of various outbreaks of violence

and escalating arrests in November 1921.76 Furthermore, a money scandal erupted in the Khilafat

movement leading to distrust developing within the leadership. After Gandhi’s arrest and

sentencing in 1922, the movement lost its only link with the Hindus, resulting in widespread riots

75 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 147 76 Ibid, 177

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and unrest throughout the country. A large power vacuum developed with the absence of the Ali

brothers and Gandhi, resulting in the destabilization of the political structure.

Post-Khilafat Movement

On March 3, 1924, the newly established Republic of Turkey formally passed a motion

for the abolition of the Caliphate.77 The original goals of maintaining the Ottoman Khalifat and

control of the Ottoman Empire over the jazirat al-Arab had both failed. What was left of the

Khilafat Movement was not only thunderstruck, but also unable to take a strong new position.

The Khilafat Committee’s new leadership decided to transition into a pro-Indian movement. The

Ulema however maintained that the goal should still be the implementation of a new caliphate

according to shari’a.78 This caused a major divide in the movement: first removing the purpose

of the movement for which it was named after, and second losing support of the masses which

looked to the Ulema for guidance.

With the loss of support from the Ulema, the Khilafatists were reduced to an isolated

faction.79 Further divides rocked the fragile Khilafat committee after Sharif Husain of the Hijaz

claimed the caliphate. Husain was viewed as an instrument of the West, thus resulting in his

damnation by one side of the committee. The other side was supportive of Husain however due

to the reestablishment of the caliphate. Further bickering tore the committee apart, ultimately

resulting in the death of the Khilafat Movement.

77 "The Destruction of the Ottoman Caliphate," Advocate of Peace through Justice 86, no. 4 (1924), 215 78 Mahmoud Haddad, "Arab Religious Nationalism in the Colonial Era: Rereading Rashīd Riḍā's Ideas on the Caliphate," Journal of the American Oriental Society 117, no. 2 (1997), 273 79 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 206

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Conclusion

Although the Khilafat Movement seems to be a failure in creating a united Muslim front

in India, upholding the power of the Ottoman Khilafat, and erecting a permanent Hindu-Muslim

alliance, it played a major role in helping mobilize the Muslim masses for radical changes further

down the road. The major debate pertaining to the Khilafat Movement is whether it was a

religious or nationalistic movement. In my opinion, the Khilafat Movement was more religious

than nationalistic. Although the phenomena of nationalism was spreading through the Arabs and

in Turkey, the Indian Muslims were not privy to that idea. If it was not for religious fatwas for

supporting nationalist mobilization, the movement would have died a while before the

abolishment of the Ottoman Khilafat. Further, when the Ulema pulled their support from the

movement after the change of vision to nationalism in 1924, the movement lost its legs and was

more or less considered dead.

The Muslims of India were desperate for a connection to a body of power that they could

relate to while living as a minority in a Hindu dominant country. After the fall of the Mughal

Empire in India, the Muslims felt marginalized in their own homes. The only “stable” structure

that was visible to them was the Ottoman Khilafat. By utilizing the idea of equality in Islam,

Indian Muslims took upon the pan-Islamic ideology not to challenge the British or Hindus for

their own power, but rather develop their own identity as a force in the social and political

discourse backed by the international Muslims powers. Once the Khilafat was abolished, the

Muslims hit a dividing wall. The Ulema continued to fight for authority by demanding the

reconnection to a pan-Islamic religious identity while the westernized Muslim leaders began to

view national freedom as the only opportunity to gain leverage in visibility in a Hindu dominant

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country. This nationalistic attitude further cultivated into the development of an all-Muslim state

called Pakistan.

Although the Khilafat Movement began and maintained itself as a majority religious

movement, it planted the seeds for future nationalistic mobilization. The movement allowed for

Indian Muslims to cultivate their own sense of nationalism over the course of Muslim-Hindu

alliances and further Muslim-Hindu turmoil. It was necessary for the cultivation of the idea of

nationalism to occur for the Muslims in order for there to be an understanding of a post-

Caliphate world without a pan-Islamic identity but a nationalistic identity. For the majority of

Muslims, the use of religious symbolism allowed for the mobilization of masses, resulting in a

first hand experience of entering the social and political discourse, rather than being isolated as

was the case pre-Khilafat Movement. Although the Khilafat Movement did not attain its set of

goals, the activists were successful in incubating the raw idea of nationalism through a religious

oriented movement, resulting in a minority Muslim population gaining a new, yet mature

independent identity.

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