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THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

CV 2014 -02841

CV 2014 – 02842

(Consolidated Claims)

CV 2014 - 02841

Between

Ricardo Jack

Claimant

And

The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago

Defendant

AND

CV 2014 - 02842

Between

Peter Griffith

Claimant

And

The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago

Defendant

Before the Honourable Mr Justice Ronnie Boodoosingh

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Appearances:

Mr Cedric Neptune and Mr Kayode Saunders for the Claimants

Ms Keisha Prosper, Ms Ronelle Hinds, Ms Sasha Sukhram, Mr Brent James, Ms Sunita Roberts

and Ms Janine Joseph for the Defendants

Dated: 20 July 2016

JUDGMENT

1. In the early morning of 26 August 2012 Tevin Alexander was found dead at the side of

the road at Cedar Hill, Claxton Bay. The police began an investigation. Both claimants

were arrested. They were each held for two and a half days. They were released. No

charges were brought against them. Someone else was charged. That person is before

the court for murder. These two claimants sued the State for false imprisonment. Their

claims were consolidated.

Law

2. The police must have reasonable and probable cause to arrest someone. Section 3(4) of

the Criminal Law Act Ch. 10:04 states:

“Where a police officer, with reasonable cause suspects that an arrestable offence

has been committed, he may arrest without warrant anyone whom he, with

reasonable cause, suspects to be guilty of the offence.”

3. Murder is an arrestable offence. In Nigel Lashley v The Attorney General of Trinidad

and Tobago, Civil Appeal No. 267 of 2011, delivered 25 July 2013, Narine JA said this:

“14. It is well settled that the onus is on the police to establish reasonable and

probable cause for the arrest: Dallison v. Caffery (1964) 2 All ER 610 at 619 D per

Diplock LJ. The test for reasonable and probable cause has a subjective as well as an

objective element. The arresting officer must have an honest belief or suspicion that

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the suspect had committed an offence, and this belief or suspicion must be based on

the existence of objective circumstances, which can reasonably justify the belief or

suspicion. A police officer need not have evidence amounting to a prima facie case.

Hearsay information including information from other officers may be sufficient to

create reasonable grounds for arrest as long as that information is within the

knowledge of the arresting officer: O’Hara v. Chief Constable (1977) 2 WLR 1;

Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (18th ed.) para. 13-53. The lawfulness of the arrest is to

be judged at the time of the arrest.”

4. Further, in Ramsingh v the Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [2012] UKPC

16 Lord Clarke said:

“8. The relevant principles are not significantly in dispute and may be summarised as

follows:

i) The detention of a person is prima facie tortious and an infringement

of section 4(a) of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago.

ii) It is for the arrestor to justify the arrest.

iii) A police officer may arrest a person if, with reasonable cause, he

suspects that the person concerned has committed an arrestable

offence.

iv) Thus the officer must subjectively suspect that that person has

committed such an offence.

v) The officer’s belief must have been on reasonable grounds or, as

some of the cases put it, there must have been reasonable and

probable cause to make the arrest.

vi) Any continued detention after arrest must also be justified by the

detainer.

9. These principles are established by a series of cases, both in England and in the

Caribbean. See in particular Dallison v Caffery [1964] 2 All ER 610, per Lord

Denning MR at 617 and per Diplock LJ, in a well-known passage at 619; and

Holgate-Mohammed v Duke [1984] 1 All ER 1054 per Lord Diplock at 1059. See

also two decisions in Trinidad and Tobago which make it clear that the lawfulness of

continued detention raises different questions from those relevant to the arrest: Mauge

v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago HCA No 2524 of 1997 and

Mungaroo v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago HCA Nos S-1130 and

1131 of 1998.

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10. The position after arrest in England is now to be found in Part IV of the Police

and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (“PACE”): see section 34. Section 37(2) provides

that, where a person is arrested without a warrant and the custody officer does not

have sufficient evidence to charge him, the person arrested must be released either

with or without bail “unless the custody officer has reasonable grounds for believing

that his detention without being charged is necessary to secure or preserve evidence

relating to an offence for which he is under arrest or to obtain such evidence by

questioning him.”

As Clayton and Tomlinson put it in their Law of Human Rights, 2nd edition (2009), at

para 10.56, the police must justify detention on a minute by minute basis.

11. Although PACE does not directly apply in Trinidad and Tobago, section 37(2)

reflects the correct approach at common law. Thus in the instant case the person who

decided to continue the appellant’s detention pending the obtaining of a report upon

the medical state of the victim must have had reasonable grounds for believing that

the appellant’s detention without being charged was necessary pending the securing

of that evidence.”

5. In Trevor Williamson v The Attorney General [2014] UKPC 29 Lord Kerr, in respect

of the idea of detaining for questioning, stated:

“19. Mr Beharrylal conceded that Mr Williamson had been arrested at his home on 28

July 2004. The Board considers that this concession was correctly made. In the first

place in his witness statement, Mr Williamson himself said that he had been arrested.

Secondly, Constable Caldeira gave evidence that he went with other officers to Mr

Williamson’s home to “make the arrest”, although a short time later he said that Mr

Williamson was not in fact arrested but was “detained for questioning”. It is, of

course, the position that there is no power to “detain for questioning”. The power to

arrest is contained in section 3(4) of the Criminal Law Act, chapter 10:04 which

provides that where “a police officer, with reasonable cause, suspects that an

arrestable offence has been committed, he may arrest without warrant anyone whom

he, with reasonable cause suspects to be guilty of the offence.” There is no statutory

power to detain solely for the purpose of questioning.

20. It is clear that, however Constable Caldeira chose to describe it, Mr Williamson’s

detention and his being taken into custody amounted to an arrest. The plain fact of the

matter is that Mr Williamson was detained and was under compulsion to come to the

police station and he knew the reasons that this was required of him. That was, as Mr

Beharrylal accepted, sufficient to constitute a valid arrest. As Viscount Simon put it

in Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573, 587-588, “The requirement that the person

arrested should be informed of the reason why he is seized naturally does not exist if

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the circumstances are such that he must know the general nature of the alleged

offence for which he is detained … a person is … required to submit to restraints on

his freedom if he knows in substance the reason why it is claimed that this restraint

should be imposed.”

6. The court must consider what was in the officer’s mind. His suspicions can be based on

what he is told or information given to him anonymously. In O’Hara v Chief Constable

of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1996] NI 8 the headnote reads in part:

“Whether such information provided reasonable grounds for the officer’s suspicion

depended on its source and context, viewed in the light of the whole surrounding

circumstances.”

7. In Cummings and Others v Chief Constable of Northumbria Police [2003] EWCA

1844 Latham LJ noted:

41. In my view, there is nothing in principle which prevents opportunity from

amounting to reasonable grounds for suspicion. Indeed in some circumstances

opportunity may be sufficient to found a conviction. That would be the case where

the prosecution can prove that no one else had the opportunity to commit the offence.

The question in the present case is whether opportunity is sufficient to be reasonable

grounds for suspecting six people when the likelihood is that it was only one or

perhaps two of those six who were responsible. Again there can be nothing in

principle wrong with arresting more than one person even if the crime can only have

been committed by one person: see Hussein. Where a small number of people can be

clearly identified as the only ones capable of having committed the offence, I see no

reason why that cannot afford reasonable grounds for suspecting each of them of

having committed that offence, in the absence of any information which could or

should enable the police to reduce the number further.

8. In Fayed v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2004] EWCA 1579 it was noted

by Auld LJ:

“82...In any event, cases such as these, where the subject's loss of liberty is known to

be for a relatively short period for the purpose of an interview to which he was, in any

event, prepared to submit, and which may or may not lead to him being charged, do

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not seem a logical or proportionate basis for narrowing the Wednesbury

reasonableness test for exercise of the power to arrest - certainly not so as to

substitute for it a test of necessity. However, that is not to dismiss the possibility that

Wednesbury-plus reasonableness in this context might approach the test of necessity

where the intrusion on a person's liberty is of an egregious and/or public a nature and

/or for such length of time and/or accompanied with harsh treatment.

[83] With those observations in mind it may be helpful for me to set out a number of,

mostly unoriginal, propositions that I derive from the authorities:

1) In determining all Castorina questions the state of mind is that of the arresting

officer, subjective as to the first question, the fact of his suspicion, and objective as to

the second and third questions, whether he had reasonable grounds for it and whether

he exercised his discretionary power of arrest Wednesbury reasonably.

2) It is for the police to establish the first two Castorina requirements, namely that an

arresting officer suspected that the claimant had committed an arrestable offence and

that he had reasonable grounds for his submission - Holgate Mohammed, per Lord

Diplock at 441F-H, and Plange, per Parker LJ.

3) If the police establish those requirements, the arrest is lawful unless the claimant

can establish on Wednesbury principles that the arresting officer's exercise or non-

exercise of his power of arrest was unreasonable, the third Castorina question -

Holgate-Mohammed, per Lord Diplock at 446A-D; Plange, per Parker LJ; and

Cumming, per Latham LJ at para. 26.

4) The requirement of Wednesbury reasonableness, given the burden on the claimant

to establish that the arresting officer's exercise or non-exercise of discretion to arrest

him was unlawful, may, depending on the circumstances of each case, be modified

where appropriate by the human rights jurisprudence to some of which I have

referred, so as to narrow, where appropriate, the traditionally generous ambit of

Wednesbury discretion - Cumming, per Latham LJ at para 26....

5) It is a legitimate, but not on that account necessarily Wednesbury reasonable use of

the power, to arrest in order to interview and/or to seek further evidence - s 37(2) and,

Holgate-Mohammed, per Lord Diplock at 445E-G.

6) It may be Wednesbury reasonable to use the s 24(6) power of arrest as a means of

exercising some control over a suspect with a view to securing a confession or other

information where there is a need to bring matters to a head speedily, for example to

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preserve evidence or to prevent the further commission of crime - see eg Cumming,

per Latham LJ at para 44.

The Evidence of Ricardo Jack

9. Jack gave evidence and called his mother as a witness. He said he was arrested around

11.30 am on Sunday 26 August 2012 at Homicide Office San Fernando and then at the

Couva Police Station. He was released on Tuesday 28 August at 11.30 pm. Before the

incident he had not been convicted of any offence.

10. He said Tevin was his cousin. He had gone to a party with some friends and Tevin on 25

August 2012 at Side Bar, Claxton Bay. Sometime in the morning Tevin was found dead.

About 3.25 am Jack got some information and went up to the Cedar Hill Road, a short

distance away. He saw an ambulance. He did not see any police officers at that time. He

stayed there a while. Then a friend dropped him off at his aunt’s place in San Fernando.

At the time he lived in Claxton Bay. About 10.30 am his mother called him and told him

the police were looking for him. He went up to the Homicide Office about 11.30 am. He

told them who he was. Two police officers told him they were investigating Tevin’s

death. He was not cautioned and told of his rights. He told the police he was not

involved in the death of Tevin. Sergeant Halls interviewed him between 1.00 and 3.00

pm. He did not get the chance to speak to a lawyer before the interview. He told the

police he was liming with Tevin but he did not know how he died. The police told him

they wanted the clothes he was wearing. He was taken to his home and they took one of

his boxer shorts. They also swabbed him. He was then taken to the Couva Police

Station. There he was placed in a dirty cell, smelling of urine and faeces. He slept on the

concrete floor. He was not allowed to bathe or brush his teeth. There were cockroaches.

He felt humiliated and embarrassed and has suffered stress, and disgrace. On 27 August

his attorney came and spoke to him about 8.15 pm. He was released on 28 August. The

only interview he gave was on Sunday from 1:00 pm to 3:00 pm.

11. His mother Barbara Toby-Cummings gave evidence that her sister in law contacted her

and told her the police were looking for her son Ricardo Jack. This was Sunday morning.

She called him. After 30 hours had passed and he was in custody she was worried. She

contacted an attorney to visit him. She paid the attorney $2,500.00 for his visit to the

police station.

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Cross Examination

12. Jack said he willingly went to the police station when his mother called him and told him

the police were looking for him. He said he willingly gave the statement and

accompanied the police to his house. He said he was told he was a suspect. Curiously it

was put to him that he was not under arrest at homicide office that Sunday morning. If he

was not under arrest, then the question arises why was he detained?

The Evidence of Peter Griffith

13. Griffith is a 30 year old security guard. He was a customs clerk at the time of his arrest.

He had never been arrested or charged with any offence before. He was held from 10.30

am on Sunday 26 August 2012 to 11:30 pm on Tuesday 28 August 2012. He went to the

party with the deceased and friends at Side Bar, Claxton Bay on the night of 25 August.

In the early morning he found out the deceased was dead. He went up the road to Cedar

Hill and saw the deceased on the ground dead. He saw an ambulance. He did not know

how he had died. He was home sleeping about 10:30 am. Police came. He was asked his

name. The police asked for his clothes. He gave it to them. One of the officers said they

were investigating Tevin’s death. He was arrested. His hands and the back of his ears

were swabbed. They arrested him. He told them he was not involved in the death of

Tevin. He was not cautioned nor told of his rights. He was taken to Mon Repos Police

Station. He was placed in a dirty cell. He was told he was on inquiries and was a murder

suspect. He repeatedly told the officers he was not involved in the death of Tevin and did

not know how he died. He was interviewed by officers of the Homicide Bureau on

Monday 27 August 2012 between 3:00 pm to 6:00 pm by Officer Hosein. His mother

was present. No lawyer visited him. He spoke to no lawyer before his interview. On 28

August Mr Neptune visited him at the police station about 8.05 pm. He was told his

father paid $2,500.00 for him to visit.

14. Griffith said he was released about 11:30 pm when the police told him he was free to go.

He had to sleep on the concrete floor. Before the interview he was allowed to bathe. He

felt humiliated, embarrassed and disgraced.

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15. His mother Joan Griffith gave evidence. She confirmed the police came on Sunday

morning. They asked for his clothes. She saw them swab him. She did not hear them

tell him of his rights or caution him. They took him away. She took something for him

to eat that day. She got a call on Monday 27 August he would be interviewed and to

attend the interview. She went at 2:45 pm and was present for the interview. She

contacted his father the next day and they got Mr Neptune to visit him.

Cross Examination

16. Griffith said that night he was not aware the police had found blood in the white AD

wagon. He did not know Antonio, Tevin’s brother, was charged for his murder. He said

Antonio was with them that night. He said he did not touch Tevin when he saw him in

blood. Others had. They could have walked from where they were to where the gun shot

was fired. He accepted he was with Tevin shortly before he was killed.

Defendant’s Evidence

17. The evidence for the defendant consisted of Assistant Superintendent Sharon Cooper,

Sergeant Ashley Mongroo and PC Nishad Hosein.

18. Superintendent Cooper stated she was an Acting Inspector at Homicide on 26 August

2012. She received a call from a junior officer about the murder of Tevin Alexander.

She went on the scene. She spoke to the senior officer there, Corporal Mongroo. Her

role was supervisory. While there a man came up to her. He had come out of a vehicle.

He did not want to give his name. He told her the deceased was liming with some men

from the area. He gave her information about a white AD Wagon. The man gave some

names including one Linton Barclay. He provided information of where the vehicle

could be located. They then went to Valley Road Extension Diamond Road, Claxton Bay

where they saw the AD wagon. She saw blood on the hood of an AD wagon. A man

came out. It was Barclay. He said he was the driver of the vehicle. He gave her keys.

She opened it. She saw blood on the floor and panel door. She was told that one Ryan

Toby was one of the men liming with Tevin. She got information about where he lived.

That morning they visited Peter Griffith’s home. He was taken to Mon Repos Police

Station.

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19. Ashley Mongroo was on duty when a report was received. He went to the scene at Cedar

Hill. Inspector Cooper gave him information obtained from the informant. He went in

search of the AD Wagon. He saw blood on it. He met the owner, Barclay. He met Ryan

Toby. He got information that both Griffith and Jack were with the deceased a short time

before his death. They went to Griffith’s home a little later in the day. Griffith was told

that he was with Tevin before his death. Mongroo told him of his rights but did not

caution him. They got his clothing he was wearing the day before. He gave evidence,

which was puzzling, that Griffith was not cautioned because “police officers are not

required to caution persons in the absence of evidence against them”. Griffith was told of

his constitutional rights by PC Hosein.

20. On Mongroo’s return to Mon Repos Police Station he was told by Sergeant Halls that

Halls had interviewed Jack. He went with Jack to his home. This was around 4.10 pm

when they left. Mongroo met Jack’s grandmother there. He asked the grandmother for

Jack’s clothes. She said she had burnt it. This raised an “aura of suspicion” in his mind.

He also retrieved a pair of blood stained boxer shorts. He told the grandmother that Jack

would be detained at the Couva Police Station.

21. On 27 August 2012 Mongroo reported for duty. He detailed officers to take statements

from other persons who were detained at various stations. He conducted an interview

with Ryan Toby between 11:45 am to 6:00 pm. He saw from the records that PC Hosein

had interviewed Griffith between 3:00 pm and 6:00 pm.

22. The next day the post mortem report was done. He went to Claxton Bay to confirm

information given by the detainees in their statements. He compiled a file. He was told

by Superintendent Harry that the claimants were released on 28 August 2012.

23. Nishad Hosein, a police constable at the Homicide Bureau, also gave evidence. He

confirmed what Copper and Mongroo said. He said he told Griffith of his rights at his

home. They took him with them. They later proceeded to Jack’s residence. He was not

at home. At Mon Repos, Sergeant Hall told them Jack was with Tevin shortly before his

death. They decided to go for his clothes. He said at this time “Jack was still a civilian

assisting us with our investigations”. The grandmother at his home told them she had

burnt the clothes. He found this suspicious.

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24. On 27 August 2012 Hosein reported for duty. He went to Gasparillo Police Station on

orderly duty. He returned with a detainee. He went to Mon Repos. He told Griffith of

his intention to record a statement. Hosein told Griffith he could have a legal adviser or a

relative or friend present. Griffith elected to have his mother be present. Hosein made

the arrangements. He also arranged for Griffith to have a bath. He recorded the

statement between 3:00 pm and 6:00 pm. In that statement Griffith indicated he was

liming with Ryan Toby and he was with the deceased a short time before his death. On

28 August Hosein was on sentry duty at Homicide.

Cross examination

25. Assistant Superintendent Cooper said certain persons were arrested including Peter

Griffith. She said she had information about him. She did not have evidence against

him. She did not give instructions to arrest him. She said she had received the

information. She saw no need for her to personally tell him the information. She,

however, was not aware of how Jack came into custody.

26. Officer Hosein said he went with the other police officers to Jack’s home. He said Jack

could have left homicide if he wanted, but he did not tell him so. He said Corporal

Mongroo had spoken to Jack’s grandmother, Dorian Toby. He, Hosein, did not speak to

her. He said Mongroo told him certain things after speaking to the grandmother. He,

Hosein, then arrested him. But he was not arrested because he was a suspect. He said

they had reasonable cause that “he had information to assist”. This was based on credible

information. He did not ask the grandmother why she had burnt the clothes or whether

Jack had told her to do so. He considers now that would have been relevant. He said

Jack was a “person of interest”. He accepted that the station diary had Jack described as

a suspect. He then said Jack could not have left if he wanted to. There were other

persons the police were getting information from. He said his only credible information

was that the grandmother had burnt the clothes. He said they arrested several persons.

He was aware Jack came in voluntarily. He said Inspector Cooper instructed him to

arrest Jack. Inspector Cooper also instructed him to arrest Griffith. He had conducted no

inquiries before he arrested Griffith. He said he told Griffith of his rights.

27. Alarmingly, Hosein said he would not agree that there is a need for a proper investigation

before an arrest. He said there was not sufficient evidence to charge them. He had not

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read Jack’s statement until after he was released. Hosein said he had no evidence to

arrest them but he had information. He said evidence would have made them a suspect.

28. Ashley Mongroo said Griffith was not a suspect but a “person of interest”. He said no

one gave instructions to arrest him. He then said the claimants were suspected of having

committed an arrestable offence. He said Toby, Wright, Barclay and Griffith were

arrested. He said Jack was not under arrest before they went to his home. He said you

cannot arrest any person if you think he had information that can assist with

investigation. Something more than that, would be needed. He said he had information,

not evidence, to detain them for the two days. He did not ask the grandmother why she

had burnt the clothes or if Jack had told her to do so. He said Antonio confessed to

having a firearm and that he shot deceased. As a result of this confession Jack was no

longer a person of interest. He had no evidence to hold him. He had them in custody

because the police could have kept them in custody. He repeated that the claimants were

“persons of interest”. He defined a person of interest at the Homicide Bureau as one

where “we have reliable information to show that person may have been involved in a

homicide”.

The Statements Given by Griffith and Jack to the Police

29. The statement recorded from Griffith showed that he had been with Tevin that night. At

some point a white wagon had pulled up. He saw Tevin talking to the driver for a while.

Then Tevin got in to the wagon. About 20 minutes after, he heard a gunshot. A man in a

passing Corolla told them something had happened further up the road. They went up

and saw that Tevin was shot. Ricardo Jack was holding him to see if he was alive and

telling him Tevin, get up. They were all crying.

30. Jack’s statement said they were all liming before. Tevin was with his brother Antonio,

liming also. There was a scuffle at the bar and people started to run out. He left with

Peter Griffith and others. They were walking, including Tevin. A vehicle picked him up.

He couldn’t remember who went in the vehicle with him but others did. He dropped out

and was walking into where he lived. Somebody said Tevin dead. He started to cry and

ran up the road. He saw Tevin. He held him. He got blood on his clothes from doing

this. He said he had heard Tevin used to have firearms, but he never saw him with any.

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31. Both statements were therefore exculpatory. They admitted to being with Tevin earlier

but were not present when he was shot. They both admitted to going up and seeing him.

Jack said he touched the body and got blood on his clothes. Griffith did not touch Tevin.

32. Also to be noted is that neither of these statements were caution statements. They were

flat statements with no indication that the claimants were being interviewed as suspects,

that they were cautioned, or told of their constitutional rights.

Issues

33. The two main issues were:

(1) Was there reasonable and probable cause for the arrest of each claimant?

(2) If there was reasonable and probable cause, was each detention too long in the

circumstances?

Findings

34. My first observation on the evidence is that the police in this matter were completely

confused about what was the status of these claimants. The claimants were described as

“suspects”, as “persons of interest”, as “not suspects”. The police officers were

contradictory about if the claimants were under arrest or not. At times it was expressed

that they were free to leave. At other times it was said they were not. It was said Jack

was arrested, but not as a suspect. Even the State attorney at one stage appeared to be

unsure since it was put to Jack he was not under arrest on the Sunday morning.

35. I find as a fact that howsoever the police described the claimants, as in the Williamson

case above, they were both arrested on Sunday 26 August 2012 in the morning. Jack was

arrested when he went to the police station voluntarily. Griffith was arrested at his home.

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36. Howsoever described, they were both suspects. If they were not, then the police would

have acted in a completely arbitrary manner in denying the claimants their liberty.

37. Having accepted they had been arrested, the first task is to decide if there was reasonable

and probable cause for their arrest.

38. Applying the Cummings case, opportunity to commit a crime can in an appropriate case

be a sufficient reason to arrest. It all depends on the context.

39. In this case the offence was murder. The both claimants were in the company of Tevin

within half hour of his death. There were a limited number of persons in that category.

They both fell into the category of half a dozen or fewer persons. True, their explanation

was that he had left them. But having received credible information which led to the

vehicle in which Tevin was in, and having also received credible information about who

was among the last with him, it would have been reasonable in my view to have arrested

the claimants as suspects, from which arrest they could then be questioned under caution.

Notwithstanding the obvious flip flopping and confusion by the police officers it is clear

that they considered both claimants to be suspects.

40. Furthermore, in respect of Jack, they had interviewed him shortly after his arrest. When

he was taken to his home, one suspicious fact came to light. It was that Jack’s

grandmother had burnt his clothes. This must have excited in the minds of the arrestors

cause for suspicion. And how would the grandmother have known or thought to burn it?

One explanation is that it may have had some incriminating evidence on it. Another

explanation could be it was done in panic. It may have been done with Jack’s knowledge,

or not. But this would have to be carefully considered and tested first.

41. Additionally, his clothing which was handed over had blood on it. This suggested he was

in contact with the deceased. It would have merited further investigation by way of

analysing and testing the version by whatever else the investigation revealed.

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42. I accepted that the police considered the both claimants to be suspects. The arresting

officers must have honestly believed that they had been involved in the commission of an

arrestable offence.

43. I also find that there were reasonable grounds for them so considering. Both subjectively

and objectively therefore the police officers met the test.

44. With regard to Griffith, the arrest posed a different difficulty. He was not interviewed

until 3 pm on the following day, approximately 29 hours after his arrest. A weak

explanation can be discerned from putting together the pieces from the different versions

of the police. However, in the context of this case, where all they had against Griffith

was that he was among the last seen with Tevin, greater alacrity was clearly needed in

interviewing him. This was to get any version he wished to advance and to test whatever

version he gave against what else the police knew.

45. Had Griffith been interviewed on Sunday and the police then had taken a reasonable time

to verify his explanation, there would likely have been no need to keep him until 11.30

pm on Tuesday 28 August.

46. In making the finding that they had reasonable cause, however, I am mindful that all they

had on the claimants was that they had opportunity and had been among the last to be

with the deceased. It is also clear from the questions posed to them that they had some

information about Antonio Alexander, the person eventually charged with Tevin’s

murder, because specific questions were asked of them about what kind of person

Antonio was and the nature of the relationship between him and Tevin. This suggests

that the police did have a clear lead, but they may have wanted to verify if others were

involved and if there had been participation by others as a joint enterprise or as

accessories to an arrestable offence.

47. The next matter however goes to the length of the detention. This case is different from

the Williamson case. The matter of the length of the detention has been raised in both

the pleadings and cross-examination and has been addressed in submissions. The police

have given an account of what they were engaged in, unsatisfactory though it is.

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48. The court has to look at all the circumstances to decide on the reasonableness of the

detention. From the evidence of the police officers about 4 to 6 persons were held. This

took place on the Sunday since the men lived in the same area. They apparently were

taken to different locations to avoid collusion. It would have been reasonable to expect

that by the end of Sunday statements should have been taken from the detained men. The

better part of the next day could then be reasonably spent comparing their versions and

verifying their stories. The evidence is that neither claimant was approached to give a

further statement or to clarify anything. Thus nothing arose from their statements that

required anything further to be put to them.

49. During the course of the Sunday and Monday also, the police ought reasonably have been

attempting to speak to other persons who may have had information. By the end of the

following day then, which was Monday 27, the police ought to have been in a position to

make whatever determination that they had to regarding the claimants.

50. The police have not advanced any evidence that they were actively involved in verifying

the versions given by the claimants. There was nothing further being done regarding

them. I have already indicated that in the case of Griffith they ought reasonably to have

interviewed him well before the time he was. There is no evidence that during this time

the police were engaged in gathering evidence or information on Griffith.

51. There is also no evidence from the police that the continued detention of the claimants

was necessary to preserve evidence since swabs and clothing had already been taken.

There is also nothing to suggest that it was necessary to prevent concealment of evidence

or to prevent witness intimidation or the like as contemplated by the Cummings case

above.

52. In the circumstances, I hold that any detention of the claimants beyond the night of

Monday 27 August was unreasonable and unlawful. It is to be noted that the police

always had the option of releasing the claimants and re-arresting them later on if it

became necessary or if they received further information or evidence against them. In

this case neither claimant evinced any intention to evade the police. Jack came in to the

police station voluntarily and Griffith was arrested having been sleeping at his home.

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53. They both voluntarily gave statements to the police detailing their version. They

demonstrated that they were co-operative up to that point. There is nothing to suggest

that they could not be found if released.

Damages

54. I therefore next turn to damages for their unlawful detention from the night of 27 August,

a period of 24 hours. The claimants say they were in dirty cells (separately) that smelled

of faeces and urine. First, there is no contrary evidence by the defendant of the condition

of the cells in which the claimants were kept. While police cells are not required to be

luxurious, they must meet basic acceptable standards to detain persons in. I accept that

the conditions as stated by the both claimants in their witness statements were less than

acceptable given the evidence that the cells were not cleaned and smelled filthy. Griffith

says he was allowed to bathe on the Monday. Jack said he was not. They slept on the

floor. They must have been uncomfortable.

55. Given especially that they both had no convictions before, this episode must have been

embarrassing for them and would have injured their feelings and reputation. They were

arrested for murder, the most serious of offences. It was in respect of a person who was a

friend. Their liberty was denied: See Terrence Calix v The Attorney General of

Trinidad and Tobago [2013] UKPC 15. I have considered the awards made in the

cases cited and in particular in Kennty Mitchell v The Attorney General CV 2007 –

3220; CV 2007 – 01952 Stephen Lewis v The Attorney General; CV 2009 – 03089

Bisham Seegobin v The Attorney General; CV 2007 – 2686 Lennon Richardson v

The Attorney General.

56. Further, they were not afforded the opportunity to have duty counsel since arrangements

were not made by the police in breach of the Legal Aid and Advice Amendment Act,

No. 3 of 2012, section 15B. This is an aggravating factor.

57. I accepted the evidence by the police officers that they were told of their rights, although

curiously they were not cautioned. This failure to caution arose in my view from lack of

understanding on the part of the police rather than malice on their part.

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58. In all the circumstances an award of $50,000.00 compensation in respect of each claimant

is appropriate. I also accepted the claimants’ evidence that $2,500.00 each was paid for

legal fees to have an attorney at law visit them. They are each entitled to this sum as

special damages. Interest will run at 3% per annum in respect of both general and special

damages from the date of the filing of the claim forms on 5 August 2014 to the date of

judgment.

59. Prescribed costs are to be paid to both claimants by the defendant to include both general

and special damages and the interest calculated up to the date of judgment.

60. There are no circumstances here to merit an award of exemplary damages nor are there to

make an award for breach of constitutional rights.

Endnote to Police Officers

61. The evidence in this case has shown that there is a great deal of confusion among some

police officers about their powers. Just as in the Williamson case where it was made

clear that the police do not have the power to detain someone for questioning without

more, I note here that police officers have no power in this jurisdiction to detain a

category of persons labelled as “persons of interest”. It is either a person is a suspect or

not. The police have the power to arrest someone without a warrant whom they

reasonably suspect to have committed an arrestable offence.

62. When persons are arrested certain formalities must follow. They must be cautioned.

They must be told of their constitutional rights. If they are a suspect for the offence of

murder the police must comply with the requirements of the Legal Aid Act in terms of

duty counsel. The police only have power to arrest persons without a warrant who are

reasonably suspected to have committed an arrestable offence or in circumstances where

statute permits. They are not entitled to detain persons as “a person of interest”, “for

questioning” or to “assist with investigations”. Those concepts, which may apply in

other jurisdictions, are not part of our law. If someone is assisting with investigations

then such assistance must be voluntary, that is, they must be free to leave and they must

be told so. The police must be straightforward with persons under their control.

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63. Further, by variously describing persons as “persons of interest” or “being detained for

questioning” or “assisting with investigations”, the police are not allowed to deny

suspects the right to communicate with duty counsel.

64. They may detain such a person for only as long as is reasonable necessary to conduct or

complete any investigations or to lay a charge. When a person is arrested the police must

proceed as diligently as possible with their investigations to ensure the period of

detention is for the least time necessary. Where, having arrested a suspect on reasonable

grounds, it becomes clear that there is insufficient evidence to lay a charge the police

must release the person immediately. As Lord Clarke noted, the police must be able to

justify detention on a minute by minute basis. There is no set time allowed (such as 2

days or 4 days) for arresting someone unless this is provided for in statute for specific

offences. A shorter period than 2 days or one day or even hours can be held to be

unlawful in the context and circumstances of a case.

65. The police are advised to read and digest the cases on this point. A good starting point

will be the Williamson and Ramsingh cases referred to above. State attorneys must

provide guidance to police officers on powers they have and do not have since there are

too many cases which have come before the court where persons have been falsely

imprisoned.

Ronnie Boodoosingh

Judge