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The Prisoners’ Dilemma and IR theories International Relations

The Prisoners’ Dilemma and IR theories International Relations

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Page 1: The Prisoners’ Dilemma and IR theories International Relations

The Prisoners’ Dilemma and IR theories

International Relations

Page 2: The Prisoners’ Dilemma and IR theories International Relations

Understanding the Prisoners’ Dilemma

International politics is unique: absence of higher authority Main actors (states) are functionally similar

Friday, 1/25/2008 Hans Peter Schmitz

Page 3: The Prisoners’ Dilemma and IR theories International Relations

What is the Prisoners’ Dilemma?

Player 2

Player 1

Confess (defect) Don’t confess (cooperate)

Confess (defect)P1: 3 years – P2: 3 years

(1)

P 1: Free – P2: 25 years

(2)

Don’t confess (cooperate) P1: 25 years – P2: free

(3)

P1: 3 mon/s – P2: 3 mon/s

(4)

Friday, 1/25/2008 Hans Peter Schmitz

Page 4: The Prisoners’ Dilemma and IR theories International Relations

The pay off structure

For player 1: 2 > 4 > 1 > 3 For player 2: 3 > 4 > 1 > 2

Most likely outcome is: 1 (both confess to avoid 25 years).

However, this is collectively suboptimal and results in prison terms for each person (3 years).

Why?: lack of communication and self-interest Friday, 1/25/2008 Hans Peter Schmitz

Page 5: The Prisoners’ Dilemma and IR theories International Relations

Nowak/May reading

Anarchy and anarchism Hobbes vs. Darwin Competition/free-riding vs. cooperation/reciprocity Kin aid vs. reciprocity

Solutions: enforcement, tit-for-tat.

Friday, 1/25/2008 Hans Peter Schmitz

Page 6: The Prisoners’ Dilemma and IR theories International Relations

Nowak/May reading

Results (p. 5 of 10): Cooperation is more likely over the long run. Collapse of cooperation is always a possibility. Pavlov: win-stay, loose-shift. Pavlov survives after more earlier punishment for non-

cooperation. ‘shadow of the future’ Spatial games: do outsiders spoil cooperation?

Friday, 1/25/2008 Hans Peter Schmitz

Page 7: The Prisoners’ Dilemma and IR theories International Relations

Theories of IR

Neo-Realism: Prisoners’ Dilemma best describes international politics. Cooperation is unlikely because states are threatened by other states (self-interested survival under anarchy).

Institutionalism: PD can be overcome by building international institutions and communication (self-interested solution to collective action problems).

Constructivism: PD neglects identities and norms. States may share identities (democracy) and naturally cooperate (appropriate behavior expressing one’s identity).

Friday, 1/25/2008 Hans Peter Schmitz

Page 8: The Prisoners’ Dilemma and IR theories International Relations

Solving the Prisoners’ Dilemma

Neo-Realism: States must attain a position of strength to secure survival. Other states will interpret such efforts as threats and also strengthen their military: prisoners’ dilemma

Institutionalism: States have an incentive to work together to overcome the prisoners’ dilemma.

Constructivism: States are driven by norms and ideas: “Anarchy (PD) is what states make of it” (Alexander Wendt)

Friday, 1/25/2008 Hans Peter Schmitz

Page 9: The Prisoners’ Dilemma and IR theories International Relations

Who, what, why, and how?

Realism Institutionalism Constructivism

What is the organizing principle?

Anarchy Interdependence Norms/ideas

Who are the main actors?

States States States/IGOs/NGOs

What are their main goals?

Survival/power(protect domestic population)

Economic gain and cooperation (maximize domestic well-being)

Solving global problems (maximize everyone’s well-being)

What are the core capabilities?

Military Technologic and economic

Knowledge

Friday, 1/25/2008 Hans Peter Schmitz