THE PRIMACY OF PERSONS :

Mi II\JVESTIGATION I N T O THE NATURE

ANE DJSTIFICATION OF THE

ASCRIPTION OF MEIJTALISTIC TERl'vlS

by

Pe te r John Smith

B . A . , Simon F r a s e r Univers i ty , 1969

A THESIS SUBMITTZD I N PARTIAL FULFILKENT OF

TiIE REyUIRENENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

i n the D e p a r h e n t

of

Philosophy

0 PETER JOHN SMITH 1971

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

March 1971

APPROVAL

Name : Pe te r John Smith

Degree : Master of Ar ts

T i t l e of Thes is : The Primacy of Persons: An I n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o t h e Nature and J u s t i f i c a t i o n of t h e Asc r ip t ion of M e n t a l i s t i c Terms.

Examining Committee :

Chairman : Raymond D . Bradley

e- , - . -

RaymgWd U . ~ ~ a d l e ~ #

Senior Supervisor

John H. T i e t z

- Donald G . Brown

Ex te rna l Examiner Professor

Un ive r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, Vancouver 8, B .C .

Date Approved :

( ~ b s t r s c t )

T i ; i s paFer i s a h o ~ t t'le p r . i losoph ica l ;?roblem of o t h e r miads, more

s p e c i f i c a l l y i t I s a h o a t recei:t t r e z t m e ~ t G:' s c e p t i c i s m about o t h e r minds,

t rea tmeri t of i s s u e s ir lvolved ir; t k e o t h e r niirids problem which a t t e m p t t o

show tk .9 s c e p t i c a l ~ o s i t i o r l l o g i c d l y u t e r i a b l e . I w i l l t r y t o show such

t r e a t r - e r i t s t h e n s e l v e s u n t e n a b l e , t h e y f a i l t o d o j u s t i c e t o t h e c l a i m s

of t h e s c e p t i c a l r h i l o s o p k e r , wkAle d i s t o r t , i n g o r f a i i i i l g t o account f o r

t h e impor tan t f e a t u r e s of our m e n t a l i s t i c vocabu lz ry upon which h i s

p o s i t i o n r e s t s . I n t h e course of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n v a r i o u s well-known and

well-worn a r g m e c t s and ~ o s i t i o n s w i l l be a s s a i l e d . But I w i l l a t t e m p t t o

show t h a t though a l l t h e a n t < - s c e ~ t i c a l arguments cons idered f a i l we need

n o t , f o r a l l t h a t , embraxe s c e p t i c i s m . What i s r e q u i r e d , and what I w i l l

try t o accomplish , i s a sk i f t i n t,he a n t i - s c e p t i c a l ~ o s i t i o n . Nor i s t h e

0113- b e n e f i t of t h i s s h i f t ari e scape from s c e p t i c i s m . T k i s move a l s o t a k e s

u s i n t o a riew way of s e e i n g tl-.e s u b j e c t s of t h e c o n t r c v e r s y , p e r s o n s and

t h e i r behav ior , wkich opens up f o r f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n t h e impor tan t

and much n e g l e c t e d s u b j e c t of P e r s o n a l Knowledge.

iii

"You w i l l v a i n l y wips t h e window-pane

arid Feer throxgk t h e g l a s s for t h e wi res"

john ;Jisdorn: "Other Minds" ( V I p.135 .)

My t h a n k s a r e due t o T r o f e s s o r R.iy Brad ley , who gave

t h e t h e s i s much of i t s d i r e c t i o n i n t h e e a r l y s t a g e s ;

t o Koenraad Kuiper wto proof-read t h e f i rs t and sub-

sequen t c o p i e s afid s t e e r e d it s a f s l g through t h e

b u r e - i u c r a t i c charmel:; an3 t o V a l e r i e Medlock and

G i l l i a n Boyd wkose c s r s f u l t y p i n g does them and my

manuscr ip t c r e d i t .

i Approval

ii Abst rac t

iii Quota t ion

iv Acknowledgment

v Table of Contents

v i Text

I What i s the Scep t i c Askinq?

The s c e p t i c I s p c s i t i o n s t a t e d .

I1 Earaches and Earwigs

The s c e p t i c ' s a s s e r t i o n "Twc persons c a n ' t have t h e same pain" discussed aqd defended a g a i n s t c r i t i c s m of Norman Malcolm.

I11 I d e n t i t y and Telepathy

The p o s s i b i l i t y of shar ing exper iences shown not incompatible with what the s c e p t i c i s saying about Other Minds. The ind iv idua t ion of s ensa t ions d e ~ e n d e n t on t h a t of persons.

Souls - The body a s necessary condi t ion f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and ind iv idua t ion of persons a s s ~ b j e c t s of exper i snce .

Evidence, Conclusions and Paradigm Cases

SubstarLce given t o s c e p t i c a l doubt beyond mere " l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y . " The i r r e l evance of t he "Paradigm Case Argument . I 1

Po la r C m c e r t s and the P r i n c i p l e of Non-Vacuous - contrast,^

C c m i d e r a t i o n of s c e p t i c a l argument t h a t "what some t i m s happens could alwsy s happen ." Defense cf t k i s aga ins t I1P.clar Concept Argument" i n Ryls and Ksnny. Confusicn of "P r inc ip l e of Kcn-Factual C c n t r a s t" with " P r i n c i p l e of Non- Vacuous Ccnt ras t" a s source of Polar Cor i ce~ t k r g ~ ~ m e n t ksre.

i i

iii

i v

v

v i

VII Mon-Contingent C o ~ n e c t i c n s

Out l ine of a kirLd of a n t i - s c e p t i c a l argument i n r e c e n t l i t e r a t u r e : t he claim t h a t t he re i s a l o g i c a l r e l a t i o r , between s ta tements about b,3kavior and staterrients a s c r i b i n g m e n t a l i s t i c Lerrris.

VIII The P r i v a t e Language Arement According t o Norman Malcolm --

Nslcolm's v e r s i ~ r i oY ?.L . A . a s argument of kind mentioned i n VIJ

1 . The I n t e r n z l Attack M a l c o h ~ ~ s i n s i s t e n c e on the need f o r independent ckeck on memory; shown unnecessary and unobtainable . Malcolm f a i l s t o show t h a t person c a n ' t fo l low r u l e p r i v a t e l y and t.keref ore t h a t p r i v a t e language impossible .

2. 'The Zxterna l Attack What " c r i t e r i o n " means. .,Nhy they a r e n ' t necessary. Condit ions of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y no t equal t o condi t ions of t r u e a s s e r t i o n . Malcolm's e x t e r n a l argument f a i l s t o show i m ~ o s s i b i l i t y of p r i v a t e language which if shown would not show s ta tements about behavior and s ta temsnts a s c r i b i n g m e n t a l i s t i c terms non-contingently r e l a t e d , s c 2 p t i c a l premiss f a l s e , or scept ic i sm nonsensical .

Balcc lx : Avowals

About "1 am i n ~ a i n " . Malcolm's f a i l u r e t o scow t h i s n o n - p - c ~ o s i t i o n a l . Having sensa t ions n c t equal t o kncwing t h a t one has. Ayer 's z c c o ~ n t of avowals defended aga ins t Malcolm. i r e oddi ty of "1 know I am i n pain." R 3 i t e r s t i o n cf s c e p t i c ' s worr ies .

S?,atement of Strawson' s argument. Ayer ' s oS.jection s t a t e d 2nd ~ u s t a i r ~ e d . Ascribing no t eyual to t ru tk i ' l l l ly a s c r i b i r ~ g .

v i i

XI l~d i t t eens t e in : - Sense and Nonsense

' d i t t gens t e in Is methods: automata and persons. Senses of "nonsense". Scepticism. Doubting aqd non-doubt ing behavior.

XI1 Eersonal Knowledge

"At t i t ude tow3rds a soul , " what t h i s means. The primacy of' persons. b! i t tgenstein 's aims. Perspicuous r e ~ r e s e n t a t i o n s . Misuses of "Language, Game s t ' and "Forms 02 L i f e . " Proving psrsons and personal knowledge.

XI11 Conclusion

v i i L i s t of References

v i i i

1. WHAT I S THE SCZiYTIC SAYING?

The s c e p t i c , a s I see and s h a l l r ep re sen t him, begins by no t i c ing

and f u l l y app rec i a t ing f a c t s such a s t hese :

- t h a t I may t k h k , be l ieve , In tend , d e s i r e , w i l l , be depressed

o r i n pa in e t c . - t h a t i t mag be tke case , snd s o m e t h e s i s , t h a t no one e l s e

knows tkese tlhir,gs a b c ~ t me.

- t h a t suck things - ma;J, a123 sometimes a r e t r u e of o t h e r s

without k~owing i t . and reaches t h e co!r,clusioi-L t l st, I am no t , can clever be, f u l l y j u s t i f i e d

i n ascri .bing s.dc:. "men ta1 i s~ l . c terms" (E.T . s ) t o o t h e r s f o r , a s it i s

o f t en pu t , a l l I cayi observe i s t k e i r "behavior." i3ut t h e f o r c e of t h i s

way of p u t t i n g i t i s hard te as ses s . For b ~ s i d e s what I hope t o show i s

t h e decisivel:: s i p i f icai i t q.destion, 'what i s "behavior"?, ' one might ask:

( a ) what more i s req : l i re i?

o r ( b ) wh7 i s n ' t "be3svior" erlough?

I t might appear t:f.at t ke "more" t h e s c e p t i c wants i s t h e "experience."

I t i s s a id t h a t I c a n ' t know t h a t another i .s , f o r examcie, depressed

because a l l I h a w t o go 02 i s t h a t he i s behaving i n c e r t a i n ways.

I c a n ' t f e e l what ( i f anything) t?,e o ther f e e l s , so I can ' t know what he

f e e l s or whether ke f e e l s anytk~ing a t a l l . I c a n ' t f e e l , f o r example,

a n o t h e r ' s pair1 s c I cayl ' t k:low .ti;at another i s i n pa in . What a r e we t o

make of t h i s ? Does t k e f a c t t k a t I c a n ' t f e e l a n o t h e r ' s pa in i n any way

involve t h e corLclusion t k a t I car l ' t know whet-her he F,as i t ? The f a c t s

t he s c e p t i c i s a s s e r t i n ? i.er2 can be expressed i n t he fol lowing s tatements:

2

"Only I can have my pa in . I'

"Two persons c a n ' t have t h e same pain."

which themselves seem t r u e if q u i t e harmless, i .e. i t i s y e t t o be made out

t h a t from t h e t r u t h of these s tatements t h e r e fo l lows t h e s c e p t i c ' s con-

clusior,s. But t k e s s ~ t a t e n ~ e ; ~ : s l a v e been a t t acked , not o,ily wi th r e s p e c t

t o t h e i r t r u t h but a l s o w i t i , r e s ~ e c t t o t h e i r very meanLngfulness. The

argument bz P!orr:ac Msinolm i n ?is a r t i c l e "The I r i v a c y of

~ x p e r i e n c e ' l ) s t a t e s , roa,gl--l]-, t k a t i n s o f a r a s t h e s e s t a t e n e n t s a r e

meaningful, they a r e f a i s e . blaicolmls argument i s ir, man;; ways t y y i c a l ,

i n i t s a ~ p r o a c ~ arid aim, of nany r e c e n t a n t i - s c e p t i c a l arguments. And it

i s the f i r s t of wr&h I w i l l s t t empt t o d ispose .

11. EARACHES 8i EARdIGS

The f a c t , ( i f i t i s one) t k a t t k e "contents t t of t h e mind of another

a r e , a t l e a s t sometimes hidden from me, s t a r t s t h e s c e p t i c on t h e way t o

h i s conclusion. He expresses t h e f a c t , i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case, i n t h e

a s s e r t i o n t h a t :

"Two persons can1 t kave t h e same pa in . ' I

Malcolm, i n t he a r t i c l e named above den ie s t h e s c e p t i c even t h i s s t a r t i n g

p lace . He says t h a t t he idea t h a t two Fersons c a n ' t have t h e same pa in i s

a "pure i l l u s i o n " (F.138), t k a t " t k e r e i s no sense of t h e express ion 'same

pa in1 such t h a t i t i s impossible f o r two persons t o have t h e same pain"

( ~ 0 1 4 5 ) .

I f t h i s could be shown i t would be a s i g n i f i c a n t r e f u t a t i o n of a t

l e a s t t h i s p a r t of t b e s c e p t i c s argument. But Malcolm does not show it.

1 w i l l argne t 5 a t t he c c e p t i c ' s claim kere i s not only s i g n i f i c a n t bu t

argument i s t h s t t h e r e i s ac sense i n whic?~ pa ins can bs individuated

has no a p p i i c a t i o r t o psis.

"Tkere i s no sense of ' d i f f e r e u t s ensa t ion ' such t k a t ysur s ensa t i cn and r2y sensat iorl mst be d i f f e r e n t ; j a s t an t h e r e i s Lo sense cf ' d i f f e r e n t c o l o r f such t h a t t he co lo r of two a r e a s Kus t be d i f f e r e n t (F.142) . . . Desc r ip t ions of s ensa t ions provide tke c r i t e r i a of i d e n t i t y f o r s e n s a t i ~ l ~ s . Siric? your se:lsation can have t h e same d e s c r i p t i o n a s n i ~ ~ e , you and I can have t h e same sensa t ion . (F.143j

Sensa t icns , s ~ c h a s pa ins , i4alcolm i s saying, can only be d e s c r i ~ t i v e l s

d i f f e r e n t , r~ot, nlmericall;r d i f f e r e a t . But t k e cons idera t ion of a simple

example w i l l s u f f i c e t o s!.ow I-lrri wrory on t b i s .

Say you and I botk have ~ e t earwigs. There i s a sense i n which we

can be sa id t o La-7e t h e sane pet!, i . e . ari earwig ( r a t k e r than, f o r

example, one of us having a f h a ) and a l s o a c l e a r sense i n which we can

be said t o kLave d i f f e re i , t p e t s . Y m i,ave ;-ours and I have mine. If we

name tkem, they w i l l l i k e l y i ave d i f f e r e n t names, yours I rv ing , mine

Richard; bu t of course i t wouli i l ' t make tk,em the same earwig i f they were

both ca l l ed Richard. This d i s t i n c t i o n , between senses of " the same" i s

roughly t h a t wkich i s n a r ked b7 t h e terms " q - ~ a l i t a t i v e ident i t ,yl1 and

"numerical i d e n t i t y . I 1 3-u two p e t s may be q u a l i t a t i v e l y t h e same, y e t

numerical ly d i f f e r e n t . ::ow consider t h e i r co lo r . Say t h e y ' r e both black.

Then they a r e t h e same co lo r , a r e " q u a l i t a t i v e l y i d e n t i c a l " wi th r e s p e c t

t o co lo r . Could a f u r t h e r ques t ion be asked whether they had numerical lv

t h e same co lo r? It could, i f f o r example, each was a unique shade of

black - I r v i n g Black and Ric?.ar? Black. Each of our earwigs would have

i t s cwn c o l o r . But if they were exac t ly tke same shade of black, then

could t h e r e be a f 7 i r t k e r questior? whether t k e co lo r of t h e one was

numerical ly i d e n t i c s 1 t o t k e co lo r of t h e o the r? No. "Same colorll here

means I1qua l i t a t i ve ly t h e same." G u a l i t a t i v e l y i d e n t i c a l c o l o r s a r e t h e

same. There i s no sense of "same color" sack t h a t two earwigs c a n ' t have

t h e same. A s Kalcolm no te s :

"It i s one of t,he most t r u i s t i c of t ru i sms t h a t t he very same shade of co lo r can be i n many p l aces a t t he same time. I n such cases t h e r e a r e n lmer i ca l ly d i f f e r e n t colored a r e a s colored tk.e same shade. " ( p . I 41 .)

So it i s , he says, with pa ins . But we can see t h a t i t i s n ' t by turn ing

our a t t e n t i o n from earwigs t o earaches. If'Walcolrr, i s r i g h t t h e r e could

be no answer t o t he ques t ion whether my earache i s t h e same, (numerical ly)

a s yours. Indeed, according t o i t could make no sense t o a s k the

quest ion. But t h e r e is a c l e a r answer t o t h e ques t ion whether my earache

i s numerical ly the same a s yours . And t h e answer i s t h a t of course it

i s n ' t . Earaches a r e , i n t h i s r e s ~ e c t , more l i k e earwigs than co lo r s .

Say our earaches a r e d e s c r i p t i v e l y t h e same, both answering t o a c e r t a i n

d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n , which m i & t even be l a b e l l e d by t h e medical

profess ion , f o r example, "Wendrixl Zarache". We both have q u a l i t a t i v e l y

t h e same pa in . But no t nuxe r i ca l ly . Yours might be t r e a t e d , g e t worse,

o r subside, o r bother you when you t a l k on t h e te lephone, none of which

may be t r u e of mine. And r e g a r d l e s s of how sympathetic e i t h e r of u s may

be the re remains a c l e a r sense i n which only I can s u f f e r from my earache,

and only you yours . Despi te N a l c o l m ~ s d i sc l a imer s t h e r e i s a c l e a r sense

i n which t h e not ion of numerical i d e n t i t y a p p l i e s t o earaches. I f we a r e

both i n t h e d o c t o r l s waiting-room, a c o r r e c t and appropr i a t e answer t o t h e

n z s e s ' ques t ion , "How mfi;i ehrackes have we t o t r e a t today?" would be

nTwo." Th i s of course i s a o t t o deny t h a t t he re i s a sense i n which we

can be sa id t o have t h e same pain, e.g. an earache, o r even the same ear -

ache e .g. "Hendrix' Zaracne ." But the f a c t remains t h a t t h e r e i s an

equal ly v a l i d sense of " sm.e pairl" i n which we can ' t . Strawson p o i n t s t h i s oxt by saying t h a t " s t a t e s or exper iences owe

t h e i r i d e n t i t y a s p a r t i c u l a r t o t k e i d e n t i t y of t h e person whose s t a t e s o r

experiences t k e ~ are ." ( " T n d i ~ i d u a l s ~ ~ p.93 .) (Xalcolm, i n h i s a r t i c l e g ives

t h e wrong page r e fe rence here - he f o o t n o t e s p .97. I"l1colm: op . c i t . ,p.l 56.)

So Malcolm's a t tempt t o andermine the s c e p t i c by saying t h a t two persons

can have t h e same pa in f a i l s . And t h e sense i n which two persons can have - t h e same pa in (same s o r t of Fa in ) i s i r r e l e v a n t t o whetiier one can

whether another f e e l s what I f e e l o r f e e l s anything a t a l l . Granted t h a t

we can both htive earaches . This d o e s n ' t t e l l m e how or whether I can know

when you do.

111. IDENTITY AND TZLZATHY

I sa id (above) t h a t t h e sense i n which two persons can have t h e same

pain, t h a t i s , q u a l i t a t i v e l y the same i s i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e ques t ion whether

one can know what or whether another f e e l s . This r a i s e s t h e ques t ion

whether t h e sense i n which the s c e p t i c c laims we c a n ' t have t h e same p a i n

(numerical ly the same) i s r e l e v a n t t o whether I can know what o r whether

another f e e l s . I w i l l a t tempt i n t h i s s e c t i o n t o answer t h a t ques t ion and

w i l l go about i t i n t h i s way:

6

F i r s t I w i l l t r y t o scswer the ques t ion whether i t i s - poss ib l e t r ia t two persons could have the same pa in .

and Second I w i l l t r y t o sa: whether t h e answer t o t h e f i r s t

ques t ion i s r e l e v a n t t o t h e ques t ion t h e s c e p t i c

has put t o us .

(1) To t h e f i r s t ques t ion I want t o respond wi th a c a r e f u l l y q u a l i f i e d

llyes." But, (and t h i s i s what I w i l l be a t g r e a t pa ins t o p o i n t ou t )

t h e sense i n which i t poss ib l e i s s t r i c t l y i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e "Problem

of OTHER MINDS." I w i l l a rgue, t h a t i s , t h a t the s o r t of s i t u a t i o n which

would have t o occur i n order f o r i t t o be t r u e t h a t two o r more persons

could hzve (numer ica l ly) t he same pa in would be t o o f a r removed from t h e

ordinary s i t u a t i o n s i n which we speak of knowing t h a t another i s i n pa in

t o serve a s a poss ib l e counter-exmple t o what t h e s c e p t i c c la ims t o have

discovered i n j u s t t h e s s ord inary s i t u a t i o n s . k h a t would be gained by

t h e a c t u a l i z a t i o n of t he imagined p o s s i b i l i t y would, a t t h e same time

and f o r t h e same reasons not be what t h e s c e p t i c says we l a c k i n t h e

ordinary s i t u a t i o n . Xhat I mean i s t h i s .

I f , a s I svggested above, earaches a r e l o g i c a l l y more ak in t o ear-

wigs than they a r e t o c o l o r s a s r ega rds t h e ques t ion of t h e i r i d e n t i t y

and ind iv idua t ion , tLen i t appears t h a t t o t h e e x t e n t they a r e l i k e ear -

wigs i t ought t o be ~ 0 s s i b l e f ~ r two or more persons t o have numerical ly

t he same one. For c l e a r l y two or more persons can be sa id t o have the same

earwig. I might go t o g e t - e r with a f r i e n d t o buy one, we might co-sign i t s

r e g i s t r a t i o n papers and so on. And if earwigs were p a r t i c u l a r l y expensive

o r I and my f r i e n d ~ z r t i c u l a r l y poor, s e v e r a l of u s might go toge the r i n

buying i t , a l l have our naqes on i t s papers e t c . , thus making i t a

7

com,unal earwig. Could t h e r e be an analogous s i t u a t i o n wi th pa in? I

th ink t h e r e could be, t h a t i s , t h a t such s i t u a t i o n s might a r i s e where we

would be a t l e a s t s o r e l y tempted t o desc r ibe them a s ca ses of two o r more

persons having numerical ly t h e same pa in . I w i l l now consider one such

s i t u a t i o n , and f o r s i m p l i c i t y ' s sake, l i m i t ny example t o two persons.

Very f r e q u e n t l y i n d i scuss ions of t h e "privacy of sensa t ion" the

p o s s i b i l i t y of t e l e p a t h y i s considered a s a p o s s i b l e counter-example t o

t he claim t h a t two persons c a n ' t have t h e same pa in . The s o r t of

s i t u a t i o n imagined i s gene ra l ly something l i k e t h i s :

Whenever person A i s i n pa in , person B i s too , and f o r no c l e a r

reason. Fo r example, A s i ts on an ice-pick. and B f e e l s p a i n i n h i s

p o s t e r i o r too , poss ib ly c r i e s ou t , u t t e r s oa ths and so on. Now c l e a r l y

such an unfor tuna te a b i l i t y on B ' s p a r t might be a way of t e l l i n g from h i s

own sensa t ions what A i s f e e l i n g . But i s t h i s r e a l l y e s s e n t i a l l y any - d i f f e r e n t from the ord inary ways we say we t e l l from our own sensa t ions

(an?ongst o the r t h i n g s ) wl-,at another i s f e e l i n g , t h a t i s , from o m

observa t ions of him i n c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s behaving i n c e r t a i n ways? Why,

f o r example, wouldn't succL a t e l e p a t n i c experience be j u s t another b i t of

evidence on t k e game l e v e l a s t h e kind of evidence we say we have and

which the s c e p t i c has questioned the s u f f i c i e n c y of? Kight n o t a s c e p t i c

simply regard such evidence a s every b i t a s much t h e contents of 2 mind

and a s such i n s u f f i c i e n t a s evidence concerning t h e con ten t s of ano the r ' s ?

( ~ i k s , f o r example, t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e word I1pain" appearing on the

forehead of another when ce s i t s on ice-picks e t c . ) To t ake t h i s p o s i t i o n

would be t o say tl.at t h e ~ o s s i b i l i t y of t e l e p a t h y would a t b e s t give u s an

experience which we might have every reason we now have t o be l i eve i s

a

cons tan t ly co r r e l a t ed witk anotk,erls pa in and t h i s experience i s every b i t

as ques t ionable a s everg tb ing e l s e we now o f f e r a s reasons f o r be l iev ing

another i s i n pa in .

But I introduced t e l e p a t h 7 t o cons ider t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of two persons

having numerical ly tk~e same pa in . Could we say t h a t were i t t o occur, they

did? Do A and B f e e l the same pain? (:ell, what pa in i s being asked about

here? Say we say, " t h e pa in produced by A ' s s i t t i n g on an ice-pick." They

both f e e l t h e same pain, t h a t one. A t l e a s t I d o n ' t see why o r where we

would be wrong i n s o saz ing . B i l t d o e s n ' t t n i s admission c o n t r a d i c t t h e

claim defended abcve, t k a t e x p r i e r l e e s owe t k e i r i d e n t i t y a s p a r t i c u l a r s t o

t h e person w'-ose exper iences cple-T a r e ? I t d o e s n ' t . Tne i d e n t i t y of pa in

a s a p a r t i c u l a r does not r .de o ~ t i t s being shared. It might be plausibl3-

s a id t h a t e i t r - e r :

( 1 ) i f A and 3 f e d the ssme pain, t h e one produced by A ' s s i t t i n g

e t c e t e r a . TLen t?.;,; ooth f e e l pain. 3 ' s f e e l i n g A ' s pa in does

not make i t B ' s ~ a i r l . If we say It doesmake i t B 1 s p a i n o n the

grounds t h a t a l l pairis B f e e l s a r e B ' s , then we no longer have t h e

s i t ~ a t i o n of B1s f e s l i n g A ' s pa in , but r a t h e r B ' s f e e l i n g h i s own

pa in . An event , A ' s s i t t i n g e t c e t e r a , causes two pains , A's and

B 1 s , wkich a r e d i f f e r s n t .

( 2 ) (which den ie s t h a t a pa in owes i t s i d e n t i t y a s a p a r t i c u l a r t o t h e

s o l e i nd iv idua l whose experience i t i s ) t h a t t ke pa in owes i t s - i d e n t i t y a s a p s r t i c u l a r t o t h e (two or more) persons whose

experier,ce it i s . Here the pa in would be i d e n t i f i e d a s "A's and

B ' s pain."

But however we see f i t t o desc r ibe t h e s i t u a t i o n , (and we might desc r ibe i t

--

d i f f e r e n t l y f o r d i f f e r e n t purposes, f o r example, i f only B were i n our

presence, we might then r e f e r t o i t a s "B Is," i f only A , " A ' s " o r i f both,

"A and B 1 s , " o r i f it could only be t r e a t e d by a t t end ing t o A, " A ' s , ~ ' )

does t h i s g ive us a s i t u a t i o n where, con t r a ry t o what the s c e p t i c has been

arguing, it i s poss ib l e B knows t h a t A i s i n pa in? Wodd such a case

s a t i s f y t h e s c e p t i c , meet h i s demands? I suggest it shou ldn ' t f o r however

descr ibed , t he ~ a i n i n quest lor l i s not f u l l y A ' s . "A's pain" does not

here i nd iv idua te t k e pa in i n t ke way "A's p i n " does i n ord inary circum-

s tances , where t h e r e i s n c t t h i s kind of t e l epa thy . Whatever we c a l l what

B f e e l s it i s go t , s t r i c t l y s ~ e a k i n g , A's pain. It might be objected here

t h a t t h i s c laim or: rcy p a r t i s a pure ly g r a t u i t o u s one, t h a t so saying f o r c e s

t h e d e s c r i p t i o n cf t h e s i t s a t i c n i n t o an unnecessary, a r b i t r a r y and in-

adequate mould, t k a t what 1 Lave conceded i n conceding t h e example I have

t sken away by p m m a t i c a l f i a t . But t h i s "grammatical f i a t " i s an

a r b i t r a r y imposi t ion upon, bu t r a t h e r an account o f , a f a c t of our t a l k

about pa in . " A ' s ~ a i n " t o be & i n t h e f u l l sense i p j u s t t h a t pa in which

he and he alone f e e l s . I f such a s i t u a t i o n were t o occur a s t h e one

imagined where i t i s a t l e a s t not obviously wrong t o say t h a t B f e e l s i t

too, then, and t o t he same e x t e n t t h a t we a r e tempted t o say t h a t , it i s

not i n t he f u l l sense A's pa in a t a l l , bu t r a t h e r "A and B 1 s " o r (perhaps)

no t i n t he f u l l sense pa in ( n o t i n our sense "2 pa in" ) . Zach, i t might be

sa id , would have h i s own f e e l i n g of " the pain." But p r e c i s e l y t h i s shared

f e e l i n g of Itthe pain" would, i n pub l i c i z ing pa in , make "pain" mean some-

th ing d i f f e r e n t , pa in be something d i f f e r e n t , f m m what we nean by "pain,"

what pa in i s l i k g f o r us . Tains would then be more l i k e c o l o r s and "pain"

func t ion i n our language more l i k e "color ." To r e v e r t b r i e f l y t o earaches:

10

i f wcen A had an earad-Ley anotl-er, s e v e r a l o t h e r s o r even everybody had i t

too , f o r no c l e a r reason , we might w e l l come t o t a l k of earaches a s we now

t a l k o f , f o r example, sunse ts . Tveryone wko, under normal circumstances

looks, s ees , we say, t c e same s m s e t . But tile sunse t i s not t h e proper ty

of any one of f i f ' teei i '~e:,olders ( 0 - ~ s e r v e r s ) , ( p e r c e i v e r s ) . I t i s publ ic

proper ty . S i n i l a r l y , t c e r e might 5e a "p~b1i.c earache," so t h a t everybody

f e l t it. But here we a r e a lorig way from o-m ordinary concept of an ear -

ache. F a r enough away, I th ink , t o show kzw t h e imagined case of l ' shar ing

t h e same pain" wo~~l .3 not g ive what t he s c e p t i c den ie s we can have. For

sucl. an account of 3 f e e l i n g A ' s ~ a i n could no t a l low, would p o s i t i v e l y

d i sa l low " A ' s pain" having i t s proper p l ace , i t s normal, o rd inary p lace .

" A ' s pain" would not be enough "3.s" and A not enough "o ther .I1 The

exmip1.e does not g ive us an account of what we mean by "knowing another i s

i n pain" and hence the e x m p l e f i l l e d out and extended would no t give u s

what we mean by "knowledge of o t t e r minds . I T Such a s i t u a t i o n would be a

br idging of our s e ~ a r a t i o n from o the r s , an a l t e r a t i o n of c e n t r a l f a c t s

a b o : ~ t our s i t u a t i o n . And i t i s t h i s , our s i t u a t i o n t h e s c e p t i c f i n d s

problematic and which one who wishes t o r e f u t e t h e s c e p t i c must show un-

problematic , o r a t l e a s t not i n the way the s c e p t i c argues. So t h e

s i t u a t i o n offered z s being t h a t which the s c e p t i c wants, o r needs t o g ive

u s knowledge of o the r minds while r,ot " l o g i c a l l y impossible" i s i r r e l e v a n t

t o h i s , and t o what, we have made our problems.

To r e p e a t and summarize the argument of t h i s s e c t i o n then: a

s i t u a t i o n might o c c w which we might we l l desc r ibe a s two persons having

t h e sane (nvmerical) pain, bu t were a Ferson t o have t h e same pa in a s

another , t h a t pa in would be not enough t h e o t h e r ' s t o g ive u s what we mea.n

by howledge of o the r n inds . And nor would h i s having i t be enough t o say

t h e c t h e r had i t too, t k n t i s , t h e ques t ion how B could know t h a t A shared

the ~ a i n seems answerable only i n terms of whether B i s j u s t i f i e d i n tak ing

an experience of h i s own ( t o tble degree i t is h i s own) a s s u f f i c i e n t

evidence f o r making a knowledge claim about A's exper iences . And i t i s

not a t a l l c l e a r t - a t any such experience should be more p r i v i l e g e d , o r

taken a s being on a d i f f e r e n t i e v e l , than any o the r of B 1 s experiences,

a l l of which the s c e p t i c h s s ca l l ed i n t o ques t ion .

Telepathy tken, could not s a t i s f y the scept ic 's demands, could not

answer h i s ques t ions about o the r minds.

IV. SOLTLS

The preceding remarks concerning i d e n t i t y , i nd iv idua t ion and so on

lead convenient ly i n t o t h e t o p i c of t h e i d e n t i t y and mode of i nd iv idua t ion

of those i n d i v i d u a l s t o whom we p r i m a r i l y a s c r i b e M.T.s, namely persons.

I sa id t h a t t o the e x t e n t experiences were, i n t h e r e l e v a n t sense, shared

wi th another , t h a t being witk whom they a r e shared i s no t enough I'otherl1

t a count a s "ano t i e r mind," t h a t t he s o r t of s i t u a t i o n we would have t o

imagine f o r such shar ing , t o be poss ib l e i s t o o f a r removed from our

normal s i t u a t i o n i n which the s c e p t i c ' s problems a r i s e and which they a r e

about. I n s o doing, I s t r e s sed t h e uniqueness and i n d i v i d u a l i t y of persons

and the sepa ra t ion between them. I n t h i s s e c t i o n I wish t o emphasize t h i s

e s s e n t i a l s epa ra t ion by po in t ing out c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s of persons. I w i l l

not a t tempt t o give i n an;? way a f u l l account of what a person is but

r s t h e r t o show what a person i s n l t (andcannot be) by saying what i s

12

necessary t o rake sense of t k e i d e n t i t y and i n d i v i d u a l i t y of persons. I

w i l l atternpt t o show t k a t t he human body i s a necessary condi t ion of

personal i d e n t i t v snd i cd iv idua t ion xid so a necessary condi t ion of t h e

a p p l i c a b i l i t y t o Fe r so r~s of i ; .T . s . Tke p i c t u r e , o r concept of a person I wish t o argue aga ins t has come

t o be known, with perhaps some degree of h i s t o r i c a l i n j u s t i c e , a s

"Cartesian." I t i s t h e i d e a t h a t a person i s a combination of two types

of e n t i t y , m a t e r i a l body and immaterial sou l , o r ego. ( R y l e 1 s ghost i n

t he machine). This Ca r t e s i an idea of "soul" i s r a d i c a l l y mistaken. I t i s ,

a s Kant argued, and a s Strawson n e a t l y pu t s it i n 'The Bounds of Sense, ' "a

r e s u l t of conf l s ing t h e u n i t y of experience with t h e experience of un i ty"

( p . 73.) Le t me expla in . The s o u l i s sa id t o be immater ial , y e t t h e

sub jec t of experience. I t i s , I th ink , a f a i r ques t ion what "experience1'

can mean he re . "v i t tgens te in ( a s many before and a f t e r him) has cons t an t ly

reminded u s of the dangers of eniploying our concepts beyond t h e boundaries

of t h e i r l e g i t i m a t e use, which i s p r e c i s e l y , it seems, what t h e Ca r t e s i an

has done here . He ( a t l e a s t ) impl ies t h a t t h e s o u l could e x i s t and have

experiences a p a r t from any body. But how can an immaterial t h i n g have

(how a r e we t o make sense of i t s having) exper iences i n t h e absence of any

sense organs, nervous system e t c e t e r a ? Has i t immaterial sense organs? Do

they f u n c t i o n i n t h e same way m a t e r i a l ones do? How? O r i s t h e experience

of the s o u l d i f f e r e n t from what we c a l l experience? How d i f f e r e n t ? Why

c a l l whatever i t might have "experience" a t a l l ? For example, t h e "seeing"

of the soul : i s i t from a po in t of view? Then what one? The sou l ,

remember i s immaterial and not s p a t i a l l y l oca t ed . Is t h e s o u l i t s e l f a

p o i n t of view? How then can a po in t of view have experiences? The seas

of language, a s J i t t g e n s t e i n put i t , run mighty h igh here. Such ques t ions ,

if not unanswerabls, do r a i s e extremely d i f f i c u l t problems f o r t he Ca r t e s i an ,

d i f f i c u l t i e s wkich, t o miT knowledge, have not been anywhere adequately d e a l t

with. But t h e r e i s a f u r t h e r , perhaps more fundamental ques t ion about t h e

p r o p r i e t y of c a l l i n g the sou l a " tk ing" a t a l l . The problem i s t h i s : i f

t he s o u l i s a p a r t i c u l a r t h ing ( i n d i v i d u a l ) , it must i n p r i n c i p l e be pos-

s i b l e t o make an i d e n t i f y i n g r e fe rence t o i t . >Jere t h i s not poss ib l e , t h e r e

would be no grounds f o r c a l l i n g i t an ind iv idua l . Now we c a n ' t i d e n t i f y or

i nd iv idua te t he s o u l i n t he same way we could a m a t e r i a l th ing , f o r t h e s o u l

i s an immater ial th ing . I s t h e r e perhaps another way t h i s might be done?

To see t h a t t h e r e i s n ' t l e t u s t r y t o d i s t i n g u i s h the s o u l of say Descar tes

(D) from t h a t of h i s m i s t r e s s ( M ) . 1

I n t h e case of m a t e r i a l t h ings we can always make a t l e a s t one i d e n t i f y -

i ng r e fe rence t o t h a t t h ing , t h a t i s , one c o u l d ' d i s t i n g u i s h two apparent ly

i d e n t i c a l ho r ses by r e f e r r i n g t o one a s , f o r example,%he s t eed now n e a r e s t

t h e king." Here t h e beas t i s i d e n t i f i e d through, by means of i t s spa t io-

temporal l o c a t i o n . But we c a n ' t do t h i s wi th s o u l s because they a r e not

s p a t i a l l y anywhere. Nor w i l l i t he lp here t o r e f e r t o t h e bodies t o which

t h e s o u l s a r e (myster ious ly) r e l a t e d . We know how t o ; t h a t i s , we have

workable c r i t e r i a of i d e n t i t y which, were t h e occasion t o a r i s e , would en-

ab l e u s t o d i s t i n g u i s h ( D ) from ( M ) . The problem i s t h a t t h e s o u l s them-

se lves must be d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . And t h e appea l t o a "uni f ied consciousness"

t h e consciousness a s o u l has of a unique and un i f i ed s e t of experiences

g e t s u s no f u r t h e r . I t i s j u s t such an appea l which Strawson diagnoses a s

1 D e s c a r t e s d id have a t l e a s t one m i s t r e s s .

14

t h e cause of t ke i l l u s i o n of t?.e h d i v i d u a l immater ial sub jec t of conscious-

ness . Both Hme an? Kant pointed out t h a t a u n i f i e d consciousness does no t

e n t a i l t h e ex i s t ence of an immater ial e n t i t y . (Hume: ' T r e a t i s e ' I IV,p.6.)

Kant: ' C r i t i q u e of ?a re Reason' pp.413-420.)

There could, I tk ink , be no c r i t e r i a of i d e n t i t y f o r a s u b j e c t of

consciousness m t i r e l y unrelated t o a body. That t h i s i s s o can be seen by

considering the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t no t one b u t an i n d e f i n i t e number of s o u l s

ex i s t ed each having t h e same consciousness a t t he same time. It poss ib l e

t o imagine an i n d e f i n i t e number of persons wi th i d e n t i c a l consciousnesses

s imultaneously. ($:ass hypnosis might accomplish t h i s ) and i n such a case

ws could d i s t i n g u i s h them through t h e i r d i f f e r e n t s p a t i a l l o c a t i o n s . But

t h i s way i s closed t o u s with s o u l s and t h e r e appears t o be no o ther . And

here we mus tn ' t f a l l t o n o t i c e t h e f u l l fo rce of t h i s example. I t s p o i n t

i s t h a t t h e r e might happen t o be an i n d e f i n i t e number of s o u l s which

could not i n f a c t be d i s t i ngu i shed but r a t h e r t h a t i t i s q u i t e vacuous t o

speak he re of i n d i v i d u a l s o u l s i n t he way t h e Car t e s i an does. Where

ind iv idua t ion i s l o g i c a l l y impossible , i t makes no sense t o speak of

i nd iv idua l s . A p e r s i s t e n t Ca r t e s i an might r e p l y he re t h a t t h e sou l i t s e l f

i s anyway aware of i t s own i n d i v i d u a l i t y . But whatever evidence was brought

forward t o support t n i s claim would equa l ly support t he claim t h a t what we

have here i s an i n d e f i n i t e nunber of s o u l s i n s e r i e s , each pass ing on

consciousness t o tke next . (Kant : I b i d , p .363) . So i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e problem of g iv ing content t o t he i d e a of t h e s o u l

having experiences t r , e re a r e , i~ seems, insurmountable d i f f i c u l t i e s concern-

i ng the p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s very i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and i n d i v i d u a l i t y . No sense

has been given t o i t s oeirlg an a ~ p r o p r i a t e o r even poss ib l e sub jec t of

experience, o r of t he a s c r i p t i o n of i:.T.s. Yor, I th ink , could t h e r e be.

v Z V I D E N C J , CO:!CLJSI3!jS R:i3 2ARA3ZGbI CASES

The aim of t , .e precedi::~ sec t ion was t o r e j e c t a c e r t a i n p i c t u r e of a

person and t o ge t us t o look a t t he concept we have and wi th which we must

dea l . We have seen t h a t t o speak of a sub jec t of experience i s t o speak of

a body. And we dor, ' t a s c r i b e K.T .s t o a l l kinds of bodies bu t only

( s e r i o u s l y and s i n c e r e l y ) t o bodies wnich appear and behave i n c e r t a i n ways,

t h a t i s human bodies and those w?&h resemble and behave l i k e ( t o varying

degrees) those bodies we c a l l kurnan. So l e t u s consider t he f a m i l i a r

a s s e r t i o n t h a t "bekavior i s the grounds ( b a s i s ) of our a s c r i p t i o n of M.T.5

t o others ." T?is seems obviously t rue (what, e l s e could b e ? ) , bu t has been

thought problematic and puzzl ing. ?hy? Largely because of an ambiguity i n

I t he term llgrounds'l between necessary and s u f f i c i e n t condi t ions . To regard

behavior ( 3 ) a s s u f f i c i e n t seems t o commit u s t o too much, f o r example, t o

applying ?-i.T.s ir, s i t u a t i o n s where i t w ~ u l d be mistaken t o apply them, when

f o r example, anotker pretends t o be worr ied, angry, i n pa in e t c e t e r a , o r

perhaps t o commit us t o t t e view t h a t such behavior i s what i s meant by

the 14.T. ( a view st igmatized or embraced a s l o g i c a l behaviorism) or i t might

1 This m b i g u i t ; ~ a r i s e s a l s o i f o the r terms a r e s u b s t i t u t e d here f o r

"groundsll f o r example l l b a s i s , l l l l c r i t e r i a t l and so on: o r , i f t h e ambiguity

is done away with the problems which e i t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c a r r i e s with it

remain.

be thought t h a t i n a s c r i b i n g an M.T. t o another one i s making an i n f e r e nce

t o an experience from an observed c o r r e l a t i o n (known from one ' s own case)

between t h a t s o r t of behavior and t h e experience t h e M.T. denotes .

To regard B a s a necessary cond i t i on f o r a s c r i b i n g M.T . s t o o t h e r s

may be seen a s committing u s t o not enough, t h a t i s , t o a sc r ib ing

M . T . s t o o t h e r s when i t would be c o r r e c t t o do s o (when, f o r example,

t he c h a r a c t e r i s t i c behavior i s keld back) o r t o not applying them i n one 's

own case when the behavior i s held back or i r r e l e v a n t t o , no t used i n ,

t h e a s c r i p t i o n .

So long a s "grounds" i s m.biguous between necessary and s u f f i c i e n t

cond i t i ons i t i s not c l e a r what t he a s s e r t i o n t h a t behavior i s t h e grounds

of our a s c r i p t i o n of M.T . s t o o t h e r s i s sa;-ing.

And once the ambiguity Ss reso lved , e i t h e r way, t h e r e seem t o be

s s r i o u s , i f no t i n so lub le prcblems involved. To say t h a t behavior i s

e i t h e r necessary or s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e a s c r i p t i o n of I4.T. s t o o the r s seems

h ighly problematic i f no t o u t r i g h t f a l s e . Both views, it seems, f a i l t o

account f o r our ord inary use of our m e n t a l i s t i c vocabulary. Are we then

misconstruing the claims of one o r both views'? O r i s t h e r e a f u r t h e r no t ion

of "grounds" somewhere between necessary and s u f f i c i e n t cond i t i on and i s

t h i s what i s meant? Before d i scuss ing t h i s apparent dilemma f u r t h e r it - w i l l be u s e f u l t o in t roduce a dLs t inc t ion between two s o r t s of ques t ions

concerning t h e r e l a t i o n between bekavior and t h e a s c r i p t i o n of M .T . s which

fo l lowing Ter ry F o r r e s t ("P - Fred ica t e s " ) w i l l be c a l l e d " I n t e r n a l " and

"External" Ques t ions . I n t e r r ~ a l ques t ions a r e those which a r i s e l e g i t i m a t e l y

wi tk in t h e "language-game" of a s c r i b i n g M .T . s and concern t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n

of a s c r i b i n g a ~ a r t i c z l a r N . T . i n a p a r t i c u l a r case. Ex te rna l ques t ions

concern t h e leg i t imacy of t h s language-game i t s e l f , t h a t i s , of a s c r i b i n g

M . T . ' s g e n e r a l l v . Le t u s then apply t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n t o a case where a

M.T. ( ' lpain") i s ascr ibed t o another person and where t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n

of t h a t a s c r i p t i o n i s ~ ? ~ a l l e n g e d f i r s t by an i n t e r n a l ques t ion and

second by an e x t e r n a l one.

We see a young g i r l , c a l l her Helga, s e t upon and b i t t e n by a

S c o t t i s h T e r r i e r . Upon loosening the c r e a t u r e ' s jaws from he r ankle and

d ispos ing of t h e beas t we n o t i c e Helga ' s ankle badly swollen,blood oozing

tlhrough t h e wound. Her f a c e i s contor ted , she i s screaming, t r e ~ b l i n g ,

gasping and so orL. -$!s ask .-er :I' i t h u r t s and she manages t o b l u r t out

t h a t i t does. I tken rusk t o s doctor r e l a t e t o him t h e s t o r y of what I

saw, f i n i s h i n g with, "and she i s in t e r r i b l e pain.!' Now suppose my l a s t

remark were cl-Lallenged by t n e doc tor , t h a t is, t h a t he accep t s a s t r u e my

a c c o m t of what k a p ~ e n e 3 t o Helgs, how she c a r r i e d on and so on bu t he

ques t ions my a s c r i p t i o n t o her cf r a i n . ( I f necessary we can suppose t h e

Doctor a Ph.D. i n " r , i l o s o F r ~ - ) . F~otr can he do t h i s ? What might he mean

by saying, " a l l t ne same she migrt not be i n pain." I f h i s ques t ion i s

t he kind I have charac te r ized a s i n t e r n a l t h e r e a r e a number of poss ib l e

suggest ions he might make, far example, t k a t Helga was pretending, or

under a n a e s t h e t i c , o r merely ir a s t a t e of shock, t h e t e r r i e r t o o t h l e s s

and so on. Any cf t hese migrit hzve been the case and indeed t h e doc tor

might proceed t o show me t k a t one o r more cf h i s suggest ions was the case.

But i f h i s ques t ion i s an e x t e r n a l one, he t u r n s t h e t a b l e s on me

( o r a t l e a s t i n t ends t o ) b : ~ pitting t h e burden of proof on me t o j u s t i f y

18

a s s e r t i o n t h a t she was i n paix. The i n t e r n a l ques t ion ing procedes by

a kind of process of e l imina t ing ~ o s s i b i l i t i e s suggested by him; if s h e ' s

not pretending ~ e r k a p s she s numbed by a n a e s t h e t i c and if not t h a t ,

+,hen ... and i t i s up t o him t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t one of t hese i s t h e case

o r my a s s e r t i o n s tands . But i n asking the e x t e r n a l ques t ion he cha l lenges

not merely my r i g t t o supFose s r c k condi t ions a s he sugges ts absent , but

more fundamentally, my r i g h t t o a s c r i b e pa in t o he r a t a l l . How can I

a s s e r t my r i g h t t o do so i n tke f a c e of t h i s cha l lenge? It seems t h a t I

can do l i t t l e more than r e ~ e a t my gruesome t a l e and t h i s t h e doc tor may

wa l l accept a s t r u e y e t he may s t i l l ques t ion my a s c r i p t i o n t o he r of pa in ,

t h i s t ime on t l ~ e grounds t h a t pa in behavior and pa in i t s e l f a r e d i f f e r e n t 7

and d i s t i ngu i shab le an? t h a t i t i s always p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e one occur

without t h e otpLer. He p o i n t s out t h a t t h e r e a r e two ways we might be

mistaken: we aay ascribe pa in t o o the r s when a l l t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c

behavior i s p re sen t bu t no pa in o r we may f a i l t o a s c r i b e pa in where t h e r e

i s no pa in behavior but s t i l l ~ a i n .

There a r e , I th ink , two main p o i n t s t o t h e s c e p t i c ' s remarks here.

The f i rst concerns t h e not ion of " l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y " , t h e second an

argument t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t "what sometimes happens could always happen."

I w i l l cons ider t kese i n t u rn .

( a ) Lopica1 p o s s i b i l i t y : The s c e p t i c has s a id t h a t it i s p o s s i b l e t h a t

Helga was not i n pain, meaning t h a t she might be pretending e t c e t e r a ,

f o r then h i s ques t ion , "How do you know?" would be an i n t e r n a l one. He

means something e l s e , bu t what e l s e ? It might be suggested t h a t glJ he i s

suggest ing by asking t h e e x t e r n a l ques t ion i s t h a t it i s l o g i c a l l y poss ib l e

t h a t she no t be i n pa in , t h a t t,here would be no c o n t r a d i c t i o n involved

in a s s e r t i n g a l l I did i n der-ying t h a t she was i n pain. But i f t h i s is

a l l he i s sugges t izg , then he i s merely po in t ing out i n a misleading way

t h a t my statemerlt t h a t Iielga i s i n pa in i s a s ta tement of f a c t (an

empir ica l s ta tement ) . And of course t h i s i s t r u e but hard ly problematic

in t he way t h e s c e ~ t i c i n t ends . And it seems t h a t a p l a u s i b l e argument

can be constructed t o show t h a t t h i s i s a l l he could be suggest ing and

t h a t what seems problematic about h i s c laim here i s merely a r e s u l t of a

r a t h e r simple-minded confusion about t h e word " p o s s i b i l i t y . " The out-

l i n e of such an argument would be: my statement , "she i s i n pain" t h e

s c e p t i c says i s poss ib ly f a l s e . But t h e r e a r e two senses of l lpossibly

f a l s e . " ( 1 ) by "poss ib ly f a l s e " it might be meant t h a t t h e f a l s i t y of

my statement (s) i s not se l f -cont rad ic tory , t h a t is, t h a t

S i s poss ib ly f a l s e i n t h a t t h e f a l s i t y of S i s c o n s i s t e n t

wi th t h e laws of l o g i c ,

( 2 ) by "poss ib ly f a l s e " i t might be meant t h a t S i s f a l s e f o r

a l l we kr,ow, t h a t i s , "S i s poss ib ly f a l s e " i s c o n s i s t e n t

wi th a l l t h e evidence we might have.

I f by "poss ib ly f a l s e " t h e s c e p t i c means ( I ) , then we must ag ree wi th him

but t o do so i s merely t o agree t o t h e t r i v i a l po in t t h a t S i s not

n e c e s s a r i l x t r u e ; t h a t i t s d e n i a l i s no t con t r ad ic to ry . But while we

wouldn't want t o deny t h i s we needn' t . For i f t h e s c e p t i c i s saying ( a s

he in t ends and purpor t s ) something s u b s t a n t i a l , t hen he must be making

t h e s t ronge r claim t h a t t h e f a l s i t y of S i s c o n s i s t e n t wi th a l l t h e

evidence we could have. But t h i s ( t h e argument goes on) i s j u s t f a l s e .

2 0

The f a l s i t y of S i s a c o n s i s t e n t with a l l t h e evidence we have. I f

evidence i s t o count a s evidence f o r anything it must count f o r t h e t r u t h

of S and so be i n c o n s i s t e ~ ~ t wLtk t h e f a l s i t y of S. What t h e s c e p t i c has

done i s t o s u b s t i t u t e ( 2 ) f o r ( I ) , t h e subs t an t ive claim f o r t h e t r i v i a l

ore . Having c a g i l j got u s t o agree wi th ( 1 ) he s u b s t i t u t e s ( 2 ) f o r ( 1 )

t hus at tempting t o persuade u s of t h e t r u t h of ( 2 ) which i s here j u s t

f a l s e .

So goes t h e argument. But i s t h i s r e a l l v an adequate d i agnos i s of

t h e s c e p t i c ' s claim? I s n ' t i t p r e c i s e l y h i s p o i n t t h a t we never do i n

f a c t have evidence f o r t h e t r x t h of such s ta tements a s "she i s i n pain."

The s c e p t i c , t h a t i s , i s c a l l i n g i n t o ques t ion t h e c e n t r a l no t ion of

evidence i t s e l f , cha l lenging our very r i g h t t o c a l l t h e kinds of t h i n g s

we c a l l evidence, evidence. It i s a t t h i s po in t a r a t h e r cu r ious a n t i -

s c e p t i c a l argument might be employed, t h e so-called "Paradigm Case Argu-

ment. " On any ord inary understanding of evidence, i t i s sa id , t h e kinds

of t h i n g s Helga did a r e t h e very paradigms of t h e kinds of t h i n g s we c a l l

evidence, which c o u l t a s evidence; t h e s i t u a t i o n a s descr ibed i s a very

paradigm of someone's being i n pain. But of course, t h e s c e p t i c knows

t h i s , knows t h a t t h i s i s what we o r d i n a r i l y c a l l evidence, c a l l "being i n

pain." What he i s saying i s t h a t such "evidence" f a l l s s h o r t . The Para-

digm Case Argument j u s t f a i l s t o t ake t h e s c e p t i c s e r i o u s l ~ enough, o r

even t o t a k e him a t h i s word, and so f a i l s a s an adequate resDonse t o him.

But, it might y e t be r e p l i e d , when t h e s c e p t i c says such evidence " f a l l s

shor t" , s t i l l , a l l he i s saying i s t h a t t h i s evidence f a l l s s h o r t of

proving S i n t h e l o g i c a l sense of proving. C l e a r l y t h e s c e p t i c i s

opera t ing throughout with c r i t e r i a drawn from t h e language of l o g i c r a t h e r

than with c r i t e r i a drawn from d i scour se about m a t t e r s of f a c t . But i s it

r e a l l y so c l e a r t h a t t h i s i s what t h e s c e p t i c i s doing? He c e r t a i n l y

doesn ' t mean t o do so. But wkat e l s e could he mean? Here a passage from

John Passmorels t '?ki losop15cal Reasoning" seems t o t h e po in t . Passmore

says, i n d i scuss ing t h e Faradigm Case Argumnt:

"Don't ask what t h e phi losopher could mean. Look and see what he mean - i f t h a t i s our motto we s h a l l no t f i n d much use f o r t h e Paradigm Case Argument"

(p.118 .)

I t h i n k t h e fo l lowing p o i n t s a r e c l e a r about what t h e s c e p t i c a l phi losopher

does mean: when he says t h a t what we c a l l paradigm cases of evidence f o r

knowledge of o ther minds f a l l s h o r t and paradigm c a s e s of what we c a l l

knowledge of o ther minds a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t l y j u s t i f i e d he i s not saying

merely t h a t t h e d e n i a l s of s ta tements l i k e S (above) a r e n ' t se l f -cont ra -

d i c to ry . He saying t h a t behavior and experience a r e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e

and separable and t h a t a l l we have access t o i n t h e case of o t h e r s i s

behavior and t h a t t h e r e f o r e we c a n ' t claim t o know t h a t another has t h e

experience. A l l we can claim t o know about i s how t h e o the r behaves. But

what i s t h e po in t of speaking of t h e l a c k of conclusive evidence if it i s

una t t a inab le? The s c e p t i c however i s no t saying it una t t a inab le . He i s

q u i t e f r e e t o maintain t h a t conclusive evidence & a t t a i n a b l e , bu t only t o

a l imi t ed number of persons, i n t h i s case t h e l i m i t being one and t h e

person Helga h e r s e l f . S& ( h e says) has access t o c e r t a i n evidence which

no one e l s e has or can have. So it appears t h a t we a r e back i n t he

p x i t i o n where we must prove o r somehow show t h a t such evidence ( t h e

experience) i s n ' t necessary, t h a t what we can and do have i s s u f f i c i e n t .

22

And it i s n ' t s u f f i c i e n t t o show t h i s t o merely po in t out t h a t i t i s a para-

d ign of what we c a l l " s u f f i c i e n t " here . We must f i n d another and d i f f e r e n t

approach t o t ke problem. 3 u t before going on t o cons ider o the r approaches

t h e s c e p t i c Is second argument (above p.2. ) must be d e a l t with.

VI . P O L A R C O N C E P T S AND THZ P R I N C IFLE O F NON-VACUOUS C O N T R A S T S

I n t h i s s e c t i o n I want t o d ispose of another form of a n t i - s c e p t i c a l

argument, one which pu rpor t s t o be a r e f u t a t i o n of t h e s c e p t i c ' s c laim

( ~ . ~ 9 ) t h a t "what sometimes happens could always happen ." The d i scuss ion

here w i l l l ead us t o a cons ide ra t ion of f u r t h e r a n t i - s c e p t i c a l arguments

and of t h e problems r a i s e d near t h e end of t h e preceding sec t ion .

What sometimes happens could always happen": we a r e , t h e s c e p t i c

argues, sometimes mistaken i n a sc r ib ing M.T.s t o o the r s , t h e r e f o r e we might

always be. I s t h i s r i g h t ? An argument designed t o show t h a t i t i s n ' t can

be found on p.j3of Anthony Kennyls "Action, Emotion and W i l l . " Here Kenny

i s arguing aga ins t t h e suggest ion t h a t it would be poss ib l e f o r a l l emotions

t o be concealed, a d i f f e r e n t suggest ion from t h e s c e p t i c s bu t s i m i l a r enough

f o r our purposes and, more important ly, based on s i m i l a r reasoning. Kenny

says :

"It i s poss ib l e f o r f e e l i n g s of emotion t o be kept t o oneself and i n t h a t sense, t o be p r i v a t e . But it does not fo l low from the f a c t t h a t some emotions a r e p r i v a t e events t h a t a l l emotions could be p r i v a t e events . '>/hat sometimes happens could always happent i s a f a l l a c y . It i s t h e case t h a t some money i s forged; i t could not be t h e case t h a t a l l money was forged . Some men a r e t a l l e r than average; it could not be the case t h a t a l l men were t a l l e r than average." ( p . j3).

2 3

I s "what sometimes happens could always happen" a f a l l a c y ? Well, it

i s n ' t always a f a l l a c y . It i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t some of us a r e some-

times mistaken aboat c e r t a i n t h ings , f o r example t h e d i s t a n c e from e a r t h

t o P lu to . And i t i s a l s o c e r t a i n l y poss ib ly t r u e , (and almost c e r t a i n l y

i n f a c t t r u e ) t h a t we a r e always mistaken about t h i s . But l e s t t h i s

example be thought t r i v i a l or i r r e l e v a n t (though I d o n ' t see why i t should)

l e t u s lo3k a t olie of Kenny's own examples. Some money, he says i s forged,

bu t a l l money cou ldn ' t be. Why not? Why, f o r example, cou ldn ' t a l l " r e a l "

money suddeA-i j u s t d i sappear or decompose? Pecu l i a r bu t poss ib l e . O r

again, suppose a l l n a t i o n s agreed t o adopt a po l i cy of u n i v e r s a l currency

and having f ixed what denominations and va lues e t c e t e r a , of co ins and

b i l l s t o be produced, destroyed a l l t h e old money i n p repa ra t ion f o r man-

u fac tu r ing t h e new, so t h a t f o r a while t h e r e was = money, per iod . And

suppose f u r t h e r t h a t some e n t e r p r i s i n g f e l low ( ' c a l l him en nett) decided

i n the in te r in i t o make h i s own ( a f t e r t he proposed models) then , f o r t h a t

psr iod , while t k e only money i n ex i s t ence was Bennett-made, money would

be forged. And I t h i n k t k a t Kenny7s o ther example about average he ight

could be d e a l t with i n a s i m i l a r way. Not a l l men, he says could be t a l l e r

than average. Say t h e p r s sen t average he ight of a man i s 5'10" and t h a t

suddenly a l l men under 6 ' were t o d i s so lve , d i e , o r r a p i d l y grow t o over

6 ' . It might be argued here t h a t were t h i s t o happen, t h e average he ight

of a man would t t e n be perhaps 6 ' 3 " i n s t ead of 5I10l7 a s i t used t o be.

But t o say so seems q u i t e g r a t u i t o u s . We might we l l want t o cont inue say-

i ng t h a t t h e average he ight of a man was 5I1Or' even though t h e r e were, now

no members of tkLe c l a s s of men of average he igh t , e s p e c i a l l y i f we had

reason t o be l i eve t h i s condi t ion of un ive r sa l t a l l n e s s would be shor t -

l i v e d , o r perhaps f o r so dubious a purpose a s t h e build-up of t h e co l lec-

t i v e male ego. A t l e a s t I d o n ' t see t h a t o r why we should have t o dec ide

one way o r t h e o the r . So "what sometimes happens could always happen

i s n ' t always a f a l l a c y .

Vhat l i e s behind t h e b e l i e f t h a t it i s a f a l l a c y ? I t h i n k perhaps a

( r a t h e r cormon) confusion between what might be ca l l ed t h e "P r inc ip l e of

Non-Factual Cont ras t" and the "Pr inc ip le of Non-Vacuous Cont ras t .I1 Kenny

seems here t o have cor~fused the former p r i n c i p l e , which s t a t e s , f a l s e l v ,

something l i k e , "a p red ica t e i s s i g n i f i c a n t i f and only i f i t i s i n s t an -

t i a t e d and has a s i g n i f i c a n t and i n s t a n t i a t e d c o n t r a s t " with t h e l a t t e r ,

which s t a t e s t k a t "a p red ica t e i s s i g n i f i c a n t (non-vacuous) i f and only

i f i t has a s i g ~ i l i c a n t (non-vacuous) con t r a s t . " Now, while t h e p r i n c i p l e

of Non-Vacuous Ccn t r a s t i s t r u e and can be r a t h e r u s e f u l i n d ispos ing of

some s o r t s of a r g m e n t s , i t wcn't do t h e job Kenny r e q u i r e s of i t . Th i s

can be i l l u s t r a t e d by cons ider ing the probable parent of Kenny'slTorging

example" i n G i l b e r t Ryle dilemmas . I 1 Ryle says:

"A country wkiz'c had rAo coinage would o f f e r no scope f o r counter- f e i t o r s . There would be notk-ing f o r them t o manufacture o r p re s s c o u n t e r f e i t s c f . . . . . . . . . t ke re can be f a l s e co ins only where t h e r e a r e co ins made of t ne proper m a t e r i a l s by the proper a u t h o r i t i e s ...... a judge who has found a l l t o o many wi tnesses i n t h e p a s t innaccura te acd d iskones t may be r i g h t i n expect ing today ' s t e s t - imonies t o break down under e x m i n a t i o n , but he cannot d e c l a r e t h a t t h e r e arg r ~ o suckl t h ings a s accuracy and honesty i n t e s t i f y i n g . " ( p.94-5) .

But i f my Bennet t -s tory was i n t e l l i ~ i b l e , or would be with perhaps more

c o l o r f u l d e t a i l s hddgd, then Ryle i s j u s t wrong here . For what t h a t s t o r y

sh~wed was t h a t t h e r e needn ' t be "co ins made of t he proper m a t e r i a l s by

the proper a u t k o r i t i e s . " A l l t h a t i s requi red i s poss ib l e l e g i t i m a t e

coinage o r , b e t t e r , a c t u a l l e g i t i m a t e currency, l e g i s l a t i o n and models.

25

And R y l e l s o ther example works no b e t t e r . I t i s q u i t e i n t e l l i g i b l e t o say

t h a t t h e r e i s i n f a c t no accuracy o r honesty i n t e s t i f y i n g . Each and

every i n d i v i d u a l who t e s t i f i e d might be i n f a c t a muddle-headed hypocr i te

o r a f o r g e t f u l l i a r , a t l e a s t while t e s t i f y i n g . But t o admit t h i s i s not

t o say t h e r e cou ldn ' t ke. Accuracy and honesty may be unrea l ized y e t

poss ib l e a t t r i b u t e s of t e s t i f i e r s . A l l Ryle has shown, ( i f t h i s ) i s t h a t ,

f o r " the re i s no konesty e t c e t e r a " t o be s i g n i f i c a n t , " the re i s honesty

e t c e t e r a " must a l s o be. This i s t h e F r i n c i p l e of Non-Vacuous Cont ras t .

A p red ica t e which f a i l e d t o meet t h i s requirement would be vacuous, t h a t

i s i t s p r e d i c a t i o n of a sub jec t would make no d i f f e r e n c e , would say nothing

about t h e sub jec t . I f ( a ) "No men a r e honest" i s t o count a s a s i g n i f i c a n t

propos i t ion , then ( b ) "Some men a r e honest" must a l s o be a s i g n i f i c a n t pro-

p o s i t i o n . But (b ) need not be a t r u e p ropos i t i on . ( b ) might we l l be f a l s e

without ( a ) being meaningless, f o r ( a ) could be' a s s e r t i n g something

( t r u t h f u l l y ) of men, t h a t they a r e no t what they might be. So Kenny's and

R y l e l s arguments do no t , a s they s tand, r e f u t e t h e s c e p t i c . If "what some-

times happens could always happen" i s n ' t always a f a l l a c y it might no t be

one here . That t bx re i s something conceptua l ly wrong with t h e s c e p t i c ' s

a s s e r t i o n t h a t we might always be wrong or mistaken i n a s c r i b i n g M.T.s t o

o t h e r s r e q u i r e s f u r t h e r a r g m e n t . And i n f a c t s e v e r a l arguments at tempting

t o do j u s t t h i s kave appeared i n r e c e n t yea r s . We w i l l now go on t o cons ider

some of t hese a n t i - s c e p t i c a l arguments.

26

V I I . NON-CONTI?!GENT CONNECTIONS

The s c e p t i c a s s e r t s (and t h i s i s f o r him .t& c r u c i a l premiss) t h a t

exper iences and t h e i r beaav io ra l man i f e s t a t ion a r e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e and

separable , t h a t t he connection between them i s a cont ingent one, a t t h e

s t ronges t a causa l one. Th7~s he could claim t h a t a l l t h e s ta tements I

offered i n support of mj- claim t h a t Helga was i n pa in might be t r u e with-

out my claim i t s e l f being t r u e . Pain, he says can occur independently of

(what i s c a l l e d ) ~ a i n behavior and one can behave a s i f one were i n pa in

when one i n f a c t i s n ' t . A l l of t h i s can be summed up by saying t h a t t h e r e

i s no l o g i c a l connection between s ta tements about behavior (B.s.) and

s ta tements a sc r ib ing m e n t a l i s t i c terms (M .S .) Thi s seems p l a u s i b l e but

has r e c e n t l y been f r equen t ly challenged. These cha l lenges have taken

va r ious forms but most seem t o have t h i s i n common: t h a t they at tempt t o

r e f u t e scept ic i sm by showing t h a t t h e r e are l o g i c a l ("non-contingent, or

"conceptual r e l a t i o n s " o r " t i e s " j between B .S . and M .S. and fur thermore

t h a t t h i s l o g i c a l r e l a t , i o n i s an en ta i lment r e l a t i o n . The views I

wish t o consider do not hold, f o r example, t h a t a B.S. ( o r s e t of B.S.)

e n t a i l s a r I4.S., o r t h a t an 1VI.S. e n t a i l s a B .S. ( o r s e t of B .S.) . These

views wish t o allow f o r such p o s s i b i l i t i e s a s a p e r s o n ' s f e e l i n g pa in with-

out expressing o r i n any way mani fes t ing it and a pe r son ' s behaving a s i f

he were i n pa in when i n f a c t he i s no t . They want t o admit t h e p rop r i e ty

of speaking of conceal ing o r f e ign ing f e e l i n g s e t c e t e r a i n t h e way we some-

t imes do, t h a t i s t o admit and account f o r t h e s e p a r a b i l i t y of B.S. and M.S.

i n some cases . But they a l s o want t o deny what t h e s c e p t i c i n s i s t s on;

t h a t t he r e l a t i o n between B.S. and M.S. i s cont ingent . I w i l l now cons ider

two such a t tempts , those of Malcolm and Strawson,and at tempt t o show t h a t

27

both a t t e n p t s f a i l . But i t sk,ould be re-emphasized here e x a c t l y what i t

i s tkey f a i l t o do. i;jr argument i s q u i t e simply t h a t tkey f a i l t o e s t a b l i s h

t h a t t h e r e i s a non-contingent r e l a t i o n s h i p between B.S. and M.S. and i n

f a i l i n g , f a i l t o r e f u t e t he premiss which i s e s s e n t i a l t o t h e scep t i c . I

w i l l argue t h a t t h e argxnents of ;Lalcolm and Strawson a r e t o t a l

f a i l u r e s . They a r e n ' t any more than they have s i n g l e aim. Indeed both

make wkat seem t o me important po in t s , even i f t h e importance of t hese p o i n t s

has been overs ta ted (and not only by them) and while p r imar i ly concerned

wi th undermining t h e i r c laims about non-contingent connect ions I w i l l no t

h e s i t a t e t o make what seems t o me a more reasonable i f l e s s f a r reaching use

of some of t hese i n s i g h t s .

V I I I. TH2"PRIVATZ LAIJG5AGE ARGUMENT1 ACCORDING '~'O-NOWJN IfNLCGDI1r

Malcolm's views, t h e ones I wish t o consider here , a r e s e t f o r t h i n two

a r t i c l e s , h i s "Review of : ! i t t gens t e in ' s Ph i lo soph ica l Inves t iga t ions" and

"Knowledge of Other 14inds . I r H i s a t t a c k on what I have sa id i s t h e c r u c i a l

s c e p t i c a l premiss (s.P.) t h a t B.S. and K.S. a r e con t ingen t ly r e l a t e d i s

contained i n ve r s ion of the "P r iva t e Language Argument" (P .L .A. ) . B r i e f l y h i s argument i s t h a t S .T . presupposes a " p r i v a t e language" (P. L .)

and t h a t s i n c e a P.L. i s impossible , S.P. i s f a l s e . This b e a r s s c ru t iny .

Malcolm says:

"The i d e a of a P.L. i s presupposed by every program of i n f e r r i n g o r cons t ruc t ing t h e e x t e r n a l world o r o the r minds. I t i s contained i n t h e philosophy of Descar tes and i n t he theory of i d e a s of c l a s s i c a l B r i t i s h Empericism a s we l l a s i n r e c e n t phenomenalism and sense- datum theory. A t bottom, i t i s t h e i d e a t h h t t h e r e i s only a con- t i n g e n t and not a n e s s e n t i a l connection between a s ensa t ion and i t s outward express ion - an idea t h a t appea ls t o u s a l l . " ( ~ e v . p.66 .)

But a s appeal ing and widespread a s t h i s i d e a may be i t i s nonetheless ,

Malcolm says, mistaken, f o r t k e r e cannot be a F.L. or , a s he p u t s i t (wi th

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c c l a r i t y ) a ? .L . " i s no t a language" (Rev. p. 75 . ) So Malcolm

i s maintaining t h a t S.2. presupposes t h e i m ~ o s s i b l e ( t h e ex i s t ence of a P.L.)

But w'iat p r e c i s e l y is i t S .?. presupposes? And how does i t "presuppose"

t h i s ? Kalcolm e x ~ l a i n s what he means by a F.L. (w i th numbered r e fe rences t o

t h e " ~ n v e s t i ~ a t i o n s .")

"3y a P.L. i s meant one t h a t not merely i s no t b u t cannot be understood b j anyone o ther than tne speaker. The reason f o r t h i s i s t h a t t he words of h i s language a r e supposed t o r e f e r t o what can be known t o only one psrson, t o k i s immediate p r i v a t e s ensa t ions (p. 2.43. ) What i s supposed i s t h a t t o a s s o c i a t e words with sensa t ion and use the names a s descr ip- t i o n s . I f i x my a t t e ~ t i o n on e sensa t ion and e s t a b l i s h a connection between a word and a sensa t ion ( p .258.)11 (Rev. -p.66. )

Now, Kalcolm's P.L.A. can only show S.7. f a l s e i f t he argument, i t s e l f i s

sound and a l s o i f t h e t r u t h of S .P. does depend on t h e i r being a P .L. That

is , t o show S.2. f a l s e IIalcolm must prove both:

( a ) t h a t a ?.L. i s impossible

( b ) t h a t un le s s t h e r e a P.L., S.?. i s f a l s e .

I be l i eve he does n e i t h e r .

( a ) Why should a P.L. be impossible o r "not a language"? Malcolm employs

two arguments t o show why:

(1) he a t tempts t o prove, by a r e d u c t i o ad absurdurn, t h a t a P.L. i s

n o t a language. This he c a l l s t h e " I n t e r n a l Attack" (Rev. p.75 .)

( 2 ) he a t tempts t o prove t h a t one cou ldn ' t "know from one ' s own case

what pa in , t i c k l i n g , consciousness e t c e t e r a a r e and then t r a n s f e r

t h e s e i d e a s t o o b j e c t s ou ts ide myself''. This he c a l l s t h e

"Externa l Attack" (Rev. p. 75 .)

29

1 . TdE 1IJTER;AL. ATTACX - i ;a lcolmls i n t e r n a l a t t a c k OT t h e i d e a of a ?.L. i s e s s e n t i a l l y t h e i d e a

t h a t " t h e r e c a n ' t be such a trLng a s fo l lowing a r u l e i n a P.L., no such

th ing a s naming something of which only I can be aware, "pain," then going

on t o c a l l t h e same t,xing pa in wl-enever i t occurs. (Rev. p.73.) Why can

t h e r e be no such th ing? Because, he says, t h e r e could be no way of decid-

i ng whether the word was being used c o n s i s t e n t l y . He asks "what would be

t h e d i f f e r e n c e between my having used it c o n s i s t e n t l y and i t s seeming t o

me t h a t I have? O r has t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n vanished? kJhat i s going t o seem

t o me r i g h t i s r i g ? t . And tl-iat only means we c a n ' t t a l k about ' r i g h t .'

(Rev. p.68.)

For "pain" t o he a word r a t h e r than a mere sound it must be used con-

s i s t e n t l y a c c o r d k g t o a r u l e . Th i s much seems unobject ionable. But why

shouldn' t one be a b l e t o fo l low a r u l e p r i v a t e l y ? What Nalcolm sa id was

Whatever i s going t o seem t o me r i g h t i s r i g h t . And t h a t only means t h a t

we c a n ' t t a l k about ' r i g h t ' . "

'rlhy c o u l d n ' t a speaker of a P.L. have t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between "seeming

r i g h t " and "being r i g h t ? " 3 e could s u r e l y have it i n t h e sense t h a t he

could say t h i n g s l i k e " t h i s seems t o me t o be t h e same fee l ing . ' ' That i s

he could make such u t t e r a n c e s i f he could make any a t a l l . li'hat 14alcol.m

means however i s t h a t t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n would be f o r him, i d l e , t h a t i t

would have no l e g i t i m a t e use , could do no work. :dhy? Say t h e speaker of

a 2.L. says upon having a c e r t a i n s ensa t ion , I t t h i s i s pain" and l a t e r , upon

t h e o c c m n c e of s very s i m i l a r s ensa t ion says the same th ing . Now it seems

q u i t e c l e a r t h a t e i t h e r Lie i s r i g h t and the sensa t ion i s t h e same, o r wrong

and i t i s n o t . B d t 1~:alcolm's argument i s t h a t no-one could know which:

3 0

another pe r son couldn 1 t ( t h e language i s l o g i c a l l y p r i v a t e ) and the speaker

himself cou ldn ' t because he could never prove himself r i g h t ( o r wrong).

"There could not be i n a F.L. any conception of what would e s t a b l i s h a

memory claim a s c o r r e c t , any conception of what " co r rec t " would mean he re . "

(Rev. p.70j.

But why cou ldn ' t one, f o r example:

(1) make a claim; "This i s what I c a l l ' pa in1 . "

(2) on t h e b a s i s t h a t "I ca l l ed t h i s ' p a i n ' before."

(3) have a s reason f o r ( 2 ) "I remember t h a t I d id .'I

(4) and be ab le t o claim t h a t ( 3 ) i s s u f f i c i e n t reason f o r ( 2 ) .

( 5 ) and be r igh t ' ?

Malc01m's'~argument'~ t o show one cou ldn ' t i s d i s t r e s s i n g l y t e r s e and no t even

remotely conclusive. It i s t h a t "memory i s no t a cou r t from which t h e r e i s

no appeal."(Rev. p . 69.) J u s t t h a t ; though I t h i n k i t f a i r t o c r e d i t him

wi th t h e c l e a r e r , i f ha rd ly more succes s fu l claim, t h a t ' t h e r e must be

independent checks on memory'. But then he does n o t say & we must o r

even how we could have independent checks on memory i t s e l f . How we check

p a r t i c u l a r memory claims? Here a r e a few ways: h his b r i e f account makes

no at tempt a t conclusiveness but is , I th ink , important here.)

We check memories by o the r memories:

( a ) of temporal ly preceding even t s e t c e t e r a . For example, I might

check on my memory impression t h a t I was cold t h i s morning by

remembering t h a t I crawled s l e e p i l y i n t o t h e ice-box l a s t n igh t .

(b) of simultaneous even t s e t c e t e r a , f o r example I might check my

memory t h a t I was i n pa in a t a c e r t a i n time by remembering t h a t

my ankle was i n t h e jaws of a S c o t t i e .

3'

( c ) of subsequent even t s e t c e t e r a , f o r example I might check my memory

of hearing Nixon1s a c c e ~ t a n c e speech i n Miami by r e c a l l i n g my

severe nausea snortl:, t k e r e a f t e r .

( d ) by concent ra t ing on i t , reasoning about it, cons ider ing a l t e r n a t i v e s

e t c e t e r a , f o r example when asked whether I ' m su re i t was a Volks-

wagen i n the pool I might thin^; was i t r ea l ly ' ? 'Ahat e l s e might

i t have been? Iii9ht covljure up images, t r y t o remember how much I

I had had t o d r ink , whether I had r e c e n t l y had the pool cleaned and

s o on. his s o r t of caecking would involve combinations and com-

p l i c a t i o n s of t he o ther kinds and f u r t h e r cons ide ra t ions , t he whole

ma t t e r becoming d r e a d f u l l y complex and poss ib ly q u i t e expensive) .

And a s more and more d e t a i l s a r e added my memory claims become in-

c r eas ing ly r e l i a b l e , they w i l l begin t o f i t toge the r i n t o a coherent

i f somewhat unpleasant s t o r y , f o r example, I might remember being

cold t h i s morning because I s l e p t i n t he ice-box having been ill a s

a r e s u l t of hearing Nixon, whom I c o u l d n ' t t u r n of f due t o my i n t e n s e

p s i n from having been b i t t e n by a S c o t t i e , e t c e t e r a , e t c e t e r a .

But Malcolm would argue t h a t though t h i s i s t h e s o r t of t h i n g we do, we

cannot t h i n k of these a s independent checks on memory and it i s these

l a t t e r we r e a l l y need t o prove our memory claims. The s o r t of t h ings I have

been mentioning, one can 1:ear I",lcoln; mut te r , i s analogous t o checking one

copy of t h e morning paper, by reading another copy of t he same paper.

(Rev. p.6$ . ) But of course i t i s no t q u i t e l i k e t h i s , bu t more l i k e check-

i ng one paper , f o r example "Tpe SIX" a g a i n s t another , f o r example "Gramma"

where the checking i s no t only a g a i n s t something independent, bu t a g a i n s t

something which may and f r e q u e n t l y does c o n f l i c t a s perhaps i n t he two

32

papers ' accounts of Cuba's sugar product ion o r Canadian s a l e s of a r m s t o t h e

U.S. or t h e deat'r. of Cke Guevara, i n a way analogous t o how my memory

impression may c o n f l i c t , f o r exan-.ple my impression t h a t I had paid t h e den-

t i s t wi th my ( b e t t e r supported) impression t h a t I had spent my l a s t penny

on a f l i g h t t o Zurope.

But Xalcolm's more s t r i k i n g and over r id ing claim i s t h a t j u s t a s t h e r e

must be independent checks on newspapers a s such ( t h e f a c t s ) so theremust

be on memory a s such. But t he re are cases where even a p a r t i c u l a r memory

claim i s uncheckable. There might be no way t o check on mj; memory impres-

s i o n t h a t I had thought of b;.B. ' i ea t s while l o s t and a lone a t c p b u n t F u j i .

Indeed it i s hard t o s ee how t h i s could be checked even if t h e r e were o t h e r s

p r e s e n t if I had kept my e x o t i c tLoughts t o myself. But s u r e l y it is

e i t h e r t r u e o r f a l s e t h a t I had these thoughts and t h a t i t makes sense t o

say t h a t I d i d . Here !:alcolm would very l i k e l y appeal t o t h e genera l re -

l i a b i l i t y of rr,emory while i n s i s t i n g on the dependence of t h i s gene ra l

r e l i a b i l i t y or- the p o s s i b i l i t y of independent checks. I t might have been

t h e case t n a t I wrote mj tkoughts i n the snow. The"independent check" t h a t

I had then wmld be then perhaps t o r e t u r n t o t h e peak t o s ee whether they

were s t i l l t h e r e . I f no t , t h i s d o e s n ' t show they never were. Obviously

it might have snowed on them, e t c e t e r a . O r i f t h e wr i t i ng I had expected

o r pred ic ted was t z e r e , t h i s d o e s n ' t prove my memory impression c o r r e c t ,

nor , and t h i s i s t h e important po in t , could it i n the way Malcolm wants.

This can be seen by simply asking a few ques t ions such a s how do I know

t h e wr i t i ng was pu t t h s r e by me, t h a t t h i s i s Mount F u j i , t h a t I am t h e same

person who made the o r i g i n a l memory claim e t c e t e r a . The knowledge of t hese

s o r t s of t h ings , t h a t w r i t i n g doesn ' t j u s t appear on mountains, themselves

endure through time, d o n ' t move around from p lace t o p l ace e t c e t e r a involves

f u r t h e r and more genera l b e l i e f s about the world and the p a s t which a l s o

involve memory. Any check on memory seems t o involve memory. So we c a n ' t

have independent ckecks on memory i t s e l f . But n e i t h e r do we need them. As

A.J. Ayer suggests i n "Sari Tkere Be a ?ri .vate Language?" u n l e s s something i s

recognized without being r e f e r r e d t o a fur tkler t e s t , no th ing can be t e s t e d :

"Since every process of ckecking must te rmina te i n some a c t of r ecogn i t i on , no process of checking can e s t a b l i s h anything un le s s s m e a c t s of r ecogn i t i on a r e taken a s v a l i d i n themselves." (p.42)

Xalcolm a t l e a s t has given no reason t o suppose t h a t memory i s no t an inde-

pendent check beyond which the re a r e no checks. Indeed he himself i s very

fond of c i t i n g \ / i t t g e n s t e i n t c the e f f e c t t h a t j u s t i f i c a t i o n comes t o an

end, t h a t we med a bedrock cei-ond wrich t k e r e can be no appeal o ther than

" t h i s i s simply wbat 1 do1' (Rev. pp.88, 92 . ) Why shou ldn ' t such a bedrock

be memory? I check my b e l i e f t h a t t h i s p re sen t s ensa t ion i s what I c a l l

pa in by appeal ing t o n;, rerrcry of i t s previous occurence. So i n pos tu l a t -

i ng memory a s a check It doesn ' t fol low t k a t I c a n i t i d e n t i f y and name a

sensa t ion and subseq~e1:ti;~ r e i d e n t i f y a q u a l i t a t i v e l y s i m i l a r one;

c o r r e c t l y o r i n c o r r e c t l y . ~ ~ ~ a l c c l m t s " i n t e r n a l argument1! f a i l s t o show t h a t

I c a n ' t fo l low a r u l e p r i v a t e l y and t h a t t h e r e cannot therei 'ore be a P.L.

f2) THE EXTZRYAL ATTACK

Malcolm's second a rg~u ien t aga ins t t he p o s s i b i l i t y of a P.L. ( t h e

e x t e r n a l a t t a c k ) i s d i r ec t ed aga ins t !Ithe assumption t h a t once I know from

my own case what pa in , t i c k l i n g , consciousness i s then I can t r a n s f e r t h e

i d e a s of these th ings t o ob jec t s ou ts ide myself" ( ~ e v . p.75). H i s ob j ec t ion

34

t o t h i s assumption i s t h a t i t l e ads , n e c e s s a r i l y t o so l ips i sm, ( a n out-

come which, of course, would be q u i t e amenable t o t h e s c e p t i c ) . But does

t h i s assumption, t h a t one l e a r n s t h e meanings of I4.T.s from o n e ' s own case

have so l ip s i sm a s a necessary consequence? Malcolm has two arguments

which a t tempt t o show t h a t i t does, t he f i r s t of which appeared i n t h e

o r i g i n a l vers ion of h i s review of t h e I - n v e s t i ~ a t i o n s t h e second i n a

l a t e r r e v i s i o n of t h a t a r t i c l e and i n &-iowledcze of Other E n d s . The first

a t t e n p t s t o stow t h a t t he above assumption would make it l tcont rad ic tory l l

t o speak of t k e ~ a i n s e t c e t e r a of another , t h e second t n a t it would make

i t " u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . " These two arguments d i f f e r i n c e r t a i n i n t e r e s t i n g

ways but both r e s t u l t i n a t e l y on t k e same c la im t h a t :

" I f I were t o l e a r n what pa in means by perce iv ing my own pa in then I should, n e c e s s a r i l y , have learned t h a t pa in i s some- th ing t h a t e x i s t s only wherL I f e e l i t - i t w i l l be p a r t of my conception of pa in t h a t I am t h e only being t h a t can experience i t . I 1

(Rev., pp. 75-6. )

This , I/alcolm exp la ins , i s because I would have no " c r i t e r i o n " of the

mental phenomena of another , no c r i t e r i o n , f o r example, f o r t h e ex i s t ence

of a ~ a i n I do not f e e l . (Rev. ,p.76.,K.O.M., p.379.) To eva lua t e t h i s

ws must f i n d out ( 1 ) what Kalcolm means by " c r i t e r i o n t t ( 2 ) why one must

have " c r i t e r i a t t (3) why one who l e a r n s t h e meaning of M.T . s from h i s own

case could not have c r i t e r i a f o r a s c r i b i n g them t o o the r s .

( 1 ) I n h i s Review of t he b i e s t i e a t i o ~ ;iaicolni says, i n in t roducing h i s

d i scuss ion of " c r i t e r i o n " t i - a t i t i s " w i t 2 some r e luc t ance" t h a t he goes

i n t o t h i s llmost d i f f i c u l t reg ion of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s philosophy". It i s

somewhat s u r p r i s i n g then t h a t t h i s r e luc t ance t o d i scuss t h e no t ion doesn ' t

c u r : over i n t o h i s own LSE, of' t he term which r a t h e r than being employed

r e l u c t a n t l y and with ca re we f i n d I*:alcolm us ing wi th b rea th t ak ing

abandon i n j u s t those c r u c i a l a r e a s where a c l e a r explana t ion would

seem e s s e n t i a l .

What he says i s t h a t i f Y i s a c r i t e r i o n of X t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of

'i e s t a b l i s h e s t h e ex i s t ence of X be;~ond ques t ion . This i s a ma t t e r no t

of experience but of d e f i n i t i o n . ( R e ~ . , ~ . 8 4 . ) Yet t,he s a t i s f a c t i o n of

Y does no t l o g i c a l l y imply ;i f o r (he says) "a c r i t e r i o n i s s a t i s f i e d

only i n c e r t a i n circumstances" (Rev.,p.85.) a complete l i s t of which

c a n ' t be formulated. But the l i s t i s no t i n f i n i t e bu t i n d e f i n i t e . There-

f o r e en ta i lment cond i t i ons can ' t be formulated. There a r e none . ( ~ e v . ,p.86.)

These remarks a r e hard ly e s c l e a r a s they might be ( a t l e a s t a s one would

hope they might b e ) . Le t u s then focus on the most unc lear and see what

can be made of them.

I f Y i s a c r i t e r i o n of X (Malcoln says) the' s a t i s f a c t i o n of Y p u t s t h e

ex i s t ence of X beyond ques t ion , bu t does not l o g i c a l l y imply X. Why?

Because c r i t e r i a a r e s a t i s f i e d only i n c e r t a i n circumstances. Very wel l ,

bu t what circumstances? I~~a lco lm says we c a n ' t say. Eow does he know

t h i s ? How, s p e c i f i c a l l y , does he h o w t h a t t he l i s t of such circumstances

i s " i n d e f i n i t e " r a t h e r t l ~ a " i n f i n i t e " ? And why, i f no t i n f i n i t e , c a n ' t

such a l i s t be formulated? Why cou ldn ' t i t be made d e f i n i t e and form-

u l a t ed? Why does Malcolm say " i n d e f i n i t e " r a t h e r than simply "very long".

Because, presumably, he wants t o deny t h a t en ta i lment cond i t i ons could

poss ib ly be formulated. K O s e t of B . 3 . i n any circumstances e n t a i l t h e

a s c r i p t i o n of a M.S. On t h i s Malcolm and t h e s c e p t i c agree. Where they

d i sag ree i s i n t he accounts they g ive of whs t h i s i s so. And i t seems

t o me t h a t t h e s c e p t i c ' s account i s more convincing. HI says t h a t

en ta i lment condi t ions c a n ' t be formulated because B.S. and K.S. a r e

cont ingent ly r e l a t e d . :b;alcolm says because t h e l i s t i s i n d e f i n i t e . But

h i s f a i l u r e t o g ive an account of t h i s i s s o (an account d i f f e r e n t

from the s c e p t i c ' s ) would make i t appear t h a t we must s o f a r accept t h e

account of fe red by t h e s c e p t i c , i f only by d e f a u l t .

( 2 ) But l eav ing i n abeyance f o r t he moment t h e ques t ion of whether

Malcolm ( o r anybody e l s e ) could give an a l t e r n a t i v e account of why the

l i s t i s i n d e f i n i t e l e t u s r e c a l l what Malcolm says c r i t e r i a a r e and

consider whether they a r e necessary i n a s c r i b i n g M.T.s t o o the r s . A

c r i t e r i o n i s something t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of which p u t s t he ex i s t ence of

whatever it i s a c r i t e r i o n f o r "beyond quest ion" without e n t a i l i n g i t .

The s c e p t i c of course den ie s t h a t any such s e t of s ta tements p u t s t h e

a s c r i p t i o n of a i4.T. beyond ques t ion . Vhy d o e s ' ~ a 1 c o l m say they must do?

The c l e a r e s t account of h i s reasoning here i s t h i s ; from "Knowledge of

Other Minds" where ke says of a phi losopher who b e l i e v e s t h a t one must

l e a r n t h e meanings of 14.T.s from one ' s own case t h a t i t i s t h e essence

of h i s viewpoint t o r e j e c t circumstances and behavior a s a c r i t e r i o n of

mental phenomena i n o the r s . And what e l s e could serve a s a c r i t e r i o n ?

He ought t he re fo re t o draw t h e conclusion t h a t t h e not ion of th inking ,

f e a r , o r pa in i n o t h e r s i s i n an important sense meaningless. He has

no i d e a what would count f o r o r aga ins t i t . "That t h e r e should be

th inking o r pa in o the r than my own i s u n i n t e l l i g i b l e " he ought t o hold.

This would be a r i go rous so l ips i sm and the c o r r e c t outcome of t h e

assumption t h a t one can know only from one ' s own case what t h e mental

phenomena a r e . ( K .O .M ., p. 379. )

3 7

So i f a person daesr , I t hsve " c r i t e r i a " f o r t he use of a M.T. t h a t

term i s f o r him meaningless, t h a t i s , i f a person d o e s n ' t know what b

would "completely v e r i f y " a s ta tement a s c r i b i n g t h a t term (Rev.,p.87.)

o r put i t beyond ques t ion ( ~ e v . , p . 8 4 . ) then t h a t s ta tement i s f o r him

u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . Th i s seems t o be a c o r r e c t account of what Ilalcolm has -

t o say i n the remarks quoted above, and i f it i s what he i s saying, then

what he says i s j u s t f a l s e . I t i s f a l s e t h a t f o r a s ta tement t o be

i n t e l l i g i b l e f o r a speaker he must know what would completely v e r i f y i t

o r put i t beyond ques t ion . I t i s f a l s e t h a t Malcolmian c r i t e r i a a r e

necessary i n order t o use words (gene ra l ly ) i n t e l l i g i b l y . Consider t h e

fo l lowing s tatements:

( a ) Herac l i t u s bel ieved i n pe r iod ic u n i v e r s a l con f l ag ra t ion .

( b ) There a r e e x t r a - t e r r e s t r i a l conscious beings.

( c ) T r o l l s d r i n k milk.

( d ) Witches were burnt i n Salem.

( e ) Heidegger b e l i e v e s i n God.

( f ) Martha loves Wil ly.

A l l of these a r e i n t e l l i g i b l e . But I d o n ' t have, here and now, such

knowledge a s could be formulated i n any number of p ropos i t i ons which would

"completely ve r i fy" o r pu t any of them "beyond q u e ~ t i o n . ~ ! I f c r i t e r i a

a r e what b!alcolm says they a r e , then they a r e n ' t necessary f o r a term or

express ion t o be meaningful. And u n l e s s M.T.s and express ions a sc r ib ing

1J.T. s a r e l o g i c a l l y unique i n t h i s r e s p e c t (and Malcolm nowhere a s s e r t s

o r i n any way i n d i c a t e s they a r e ) then c r i t e r i a a r e n ' t necessary i n order

f o r M.T.s t o be meaningful e i t h e r . The u n a v a i l a b i l i t y of Kalcolmian

c r i t e r i a , then, cannot be a reason f o r denying e i t h e r t h e i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y

o r p o s s i b i l i t y of a s c r i b i n g M.T.s t o o the r s .

(3 ) Our t h i r d questiori (above) was why a man who learned the meaning of

M.T.s from h i s own case c o u l d n ' t have c r i t e r i a f o r a s c r i b i n g them t o

o the r s . Our answer t o t h i s migkt be t h a t such c r i t e r i a c a n ' t be had,

pe r iod . But t h i s obviously wouldn't s u i t Malcolm. And we have j u s t seen

t h a t a speaker of a pub l i c language (;nglish) even i f he could have

c r i t e r i a needn ' t and i n f a c t o f t en d o e s n ' t . By the same token i t seems

a speaker of a P.L. n e e d n ' t . B:2t i s i t ever t r u e ( a s Malcolm says) t h a t

he couldnl t have? I t i s n I t . Consider what Malcolm says about p u t t i n g a

claim beyond ques t ion :

"-dhat we sometimes do i s t o draw a boundary around t h i s behavior i n these circumstances and say, 'any a d d i t i o n a l c ircumstances t h a t might come t o l i g h t w i l l be i r r e l e v a n t t o whether t h i s man i s i n pa in ' . I 1

( ~ e v . ,p .88 .)

A s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of . i i t t g e n s t e i n t s :

"3ut i f you a r e c e r t a i n i s n ' t i t t h a t you a r e shu t t i ng your eyes i n f a c e of doubt'? - They a r e shut ."

( ~ . 1 . , ~ . 2 2 4 )

Malcolm's remarks l eave more than a l i t t l e t o be des i r ed . And a s an

account of what we do they a r e j u s t f a l s e . (when would i t be j u s t i f i a b l e

t o say t h a t ? ) But i f Xalcolm can ''draw a boundary" so can t h e speaker of

a P.L. If t h e a t t a i n i n g of c r i t e r i a i s merely a mat te r of s t i ~ u l a t i o n

t h e P.L. advocate i s a s f r e e t o s t i p u l a t e a s i s Malcolm.

So Malcolm f a i l s t o show t h a t the phi losopher who b e l i e v e s one l e a r n s

M.T.s from one ' s own case i s committed t o so l ips i sm, t h a t c r i t e r i a f o r

M.T .s i s a necessary condi t ion of t h e i r i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . But what i f he

39

had succeeded? What i f i t were the case t h a t f o r o the r a s c r i p t i o n s of

M.T.s t o be meaningful one would have t o have c r i t e r i a f o r t h e i r use?

Would t h i s r e f u t e t he s c e p t i c ? C l e a r l y i t would i f "having c r i t e r i a "

f means ( a s Malcolm says) completely v e r i f y i n g . But t h i s equat ion of

cond i t i ons of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y with condi t ions of making a t r u e a s s e r t i o n

i s i t s e l f f a l s e . What i f we view " c r i t e r i o n " i n a l e s s r e s t r i c t i v e sense

( a s i n most contemporary d i scuss ions ) s o t h a t having c r i t e r i a f o r x i s

a necessary condi t ion of us ing x i n t e l l i g i b l y where "using x i n t e l l i g i b l y "

does n e c e s s a r i l y involve knowing what would make x t r u e , pu t x beyond

ques t ion o r completely v e r i f y x . Would t h i s be s u f f i c i e n t t o r e f i i t e t he

scep t i c? It wouldn ' t ; even were i t t r u e , f o r example, t h a t t h e r e must be

pub l i c c r i t e r i a ( i n t h i s sense) f o r an express ion t o be i n t e l l i g i b l e t h i s

doesn ' t mean we must use the express ion t o say something t r u e . There may

have t o be publ ic c r i t e r i a f o r t h e use of such terms a s "witch" or " t r o l l " - f o r t hese terms t o be i n t e l l i g i b l e , but t h i s d o e s n ' t mean t h a t i n using

t h e s e terms i n an express ion , f o r example, "witches were burnt i n Salem",

even i f I use them c o r r e c t l y , t h a t i s , i n p e r f e c t accord with these pub l i c

c r i t e r i a , t h a t I say something t r u e . The r igh teous c i t i z e n s of Salem were

wrong when they a s se r t ed of c e r t a i n old hags o r young a d u l t r e s s e s t h a t they

were witches, but t h e i r mistake was a f a c t u a l one, no t a grammatical one.

Malcolm's e x t e r n a l argument then f a i l s , a s d id t h e i n t e r n a l one, t o

show t h a t t h e r e cou ldn ' t be a P.L. Thus h i s a t tempt t o d isprove S.P. by

showing a P.L. impossible f a i l s . I t might be the case , however, t h a t

though Malcolm has f a i l e d t o show it, a P.L. is impossible . But this

p o s s i b i l i t y i s a t h r e a t t o S.P. only i f i t s t r u t h is dependent on t h e r e

beicg a P.L. I f , tk,en,it can be shown t h a t t h e t r u t h o r f a l s i t y of S.P.

i s l o g i c a l l y independent of the p o s s i b i l i t y o r i m p o s s i b i l i t y of a P.L.

t hen f u r t h e r a n t i - s c e p t i c a l arguments w i l l be needed t o d isprove S.P.

and i n t h i s wa;T show scept ic i sm sense l e s s . And I t h i n k S.P. i s i n t h i s

way independent.

The i m p o s s i b i l i t y of a 2.L. would, i f shown, e s t a b l i s h t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y

of our l ea rn ing N.T.s, of acqui r ing our m e n t a l i s t i c vocabulary, un le s s i nne r

exper iences had c h a r a c t e r i s t i c behaviora l express ions o r mani fes ta t ions .

( 1 t would i f t h e forgoing i s c o r r e c t show t h e n e c e s s i t y of having

Malcolmian "outer c r i t e r i a " ) . i3ut would t h i s prove t h e r e l a t i o n between B.S.

and N.S . non-contingent, t h a t i s , prove S.P. f a l s e ? I t i s no t obvious t h a t

i t would and Ayer, f o r one, argues t k a t it wouldn't :

"For even i f one g r a n t s the premiss t h a t we should not i n p r a c t i s e bs ab l e t o acqui re our understanding of words which r e f e r t o i nne r s t a t e s o r experiences un le s s t hese inne r s t a t e s were outwardly d e t e c t a b l e i t does no t seem t o fo l low t h a t once our understanding of t hese words has been acquired we cannot d ivorce them from t h e i r o r i g i n a l a s soc i a t ions . Indeed i t i s admitted t h a t we can do s o i n p a r t i c u l a r i n s t ances and i t i s not c l e a r what should prevent u s from doing so i n a l l . I f the suggest ion i s t h a t we should then be landed i n a con t r ad ic t ion I can only remark t h a t I do not see where t h i s con t r ad ic t ion l i e s ."

( uTke C o n c e ~ t of a Person," p.101.)

Zveri if a F.L. were i ~ ~ p o s s i b l e , t h a t i s , even i f t he only way we could

s c a u i r e our m e n t a l i s t i c vocabulary were through our i nne r s t a t e s having

behaviora l express ions , wky just t he behaviora l express ions they have?

.;:%at, f o r exmple, i f persoris with earackes acted u t t e r l y d i f f e r e n t l y from

. . tow they now do? doald what tkey had and expressed (by say, laughing) no

1o1:ger be an earsche? Sure ly i t i s not necessary t h a t people wi th earaches

behave a s they do. And if tk-ey d i d n ' t , then what we c a l l c r i t e r i a f o r

a s c r i b i n g earact-es t o o t h e r s wouldn't be, might cease t o have anything t o do

41

with earaches. S t i l l , it might be argued, t h e r e must be some outer-

expression. But note t h a t the concession t h a t t h e r e i s a merely con-

t i n g e n t r e l a t i o n between what we now c a l l earache - behavior and ear -

aches al lows t h a t t h e r e be no outer express ion a t a l l , o r no c o n s i s t a n t l y

r e l a t e d one. Yould we then l o s e our concept of an earache? Whether o r

no t we would seems a l s o a mat te r of contingency r a t h e r than of l o g i c .

(we w i l l have more t o say about t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of such dramatic a l t e r -

a t i o n s of human behavior and i t s s ign i f i cance l a t e r ) . L e t u s f o r now

merely summarize what has been sa id , which was t h a t even i f a P.L. were

impossible , even i f we cou ldn ' t a cqu i r e our m e n t a l i s t i c vocabulary un le s s

our i nne r s t a t e s had outward mani fes t ions o r express ions , t h i s d o e s n ' t

show t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n between B.S. and M.S. i s no t cont ingent ; and such

p o s s i b i l i t i e s of r a d i c a l a l t e r a t i o n s of human behavior a s suggested above

suggest , r a t h e r s t rongly , t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n between them is contingent .

Thus f a r , then, tke S.P. appears l o g i c a l l y sound, and t h e sceptic 's s t a r t i n g

p o s i t i o n unshaken.

IX MPLCOLN: AVO':JALS

We saw e a r l i e r (11) how Nalcclm attempted t o undermine t h e s c e p t i c ls

p o s i t i o n by denying t h a t t he re was a sense of t h e express ion llsame pain"

such t h a t two persons could not have t h e same pain. There he attempted

t o show t h a t a s ta tement i m ~ o r t a n t t o t h e s c e p t i c ' s p o s i t i o n was "sense-

l e s s 1 ' . That a t tempt was, I argued, a f a i l u r e . Malcolm a l s o a t tempts t o

undermine another fundamental assumption of t h e s c e p t i c ( o r a t l e a s t t h e

importance t h e s c e p t i c a t t a c h e s t o t h a t assumption) namely t h e assumption

t h a t a person bows (of h imsel f ) t h a t he i s i n pa in . I n a way s i m i l a r

t o t h e way he sa id t h a t two persons can have the same pa in , Malcolm

a t tempts t o show t h a t a person doesn ' t know he i s i n pa in . I want now

t o i n v e s t i g a t e what Malcolm says, show where and why he i s wrong i n

what he says and. now what he says f a i l s t o undermine the s c e p t i c i n

t h e way he intended.

Malcolm's arguments here involve a suggest ion t h a t we look a t f i r s t -

person psychological sentences (avowals) i n an " e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t l i gh t1 '

(K .O .N . , p.383.) from tkLe view ( i m p l i c i t i n t h e c lo s ing remarks of t he

previous s e c t i o n ) t h a t avowals a r e s ta tements r e f e r r i n g t o i n n e r s t a t e s .

I t i s Malcolm's view t h a t avowals a r e not s ta tements , do not r e f e r t o

i n n e r s t a t e s , o r , more c o r r e c t l y , t h a t i n s o f a r a s they do, t h i s i s un-

important o r i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e i r " l o g i c a l s t a t u s " which i s t h e same a s

t h a t of our p r i n i t i v e n a t u r a l express ions of t hese inne r s t a t e s :

Wy sentences about m y preser-t s ensa t ions have t h e same l o g i c a l s t a t u s a s my o u t c r i e s o r f a c i a l expressions."

This suggest ion, t h a t f i r s t -pe r son a s c r i p t i o n s of H.T.s, f o r example, "I

am i n pain" a r e t o be thought of a s on a l o g i c a l par with n a t u r a l non-

l i n g u i s t i c express ions of psychological s t a t e s and t h a t " the use of t h i s

sentence has nothing t o do with recogniz ing o r i d e n t i f y i n g o r observing a

s t a t e of onese l f" ( K . O . ~ ; . , p.382.) has, Malcolm claims, a t l e a s t two

important mer i t s :

F i r s t , it breaks t h e hold on u s of the ques t ion , 'How does one &w

when t o say "my l e g hur t s l 'P1 f o r i n t h e l i g h t of t h e analogy t h i s w i l l be

a s nonsensical a s t h e ques t ion "How does one know when t o limp, c ry , o r

I hold one ' s l e g ? Second, i t exp la ins how t h e u t t e r ance of a f irst-

person psychological sentence by another person can have importance f o r

u s al though not a s an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n f o r i n t h e l i g h t of t h e analogy "it

w i l l have t h e same importance a s t he n a t u r a l behavior which serves a s our

preverba l c r i t e r i o n of t h e psychological s t a t e s of others.I1 (K.o.M., p.383.)

What can be said f o r 14alcolm1s sxggest ion? Much more could be said

about i t than f o r i t and much more about i t than I w i l l say here . Malcolmls

" d i f f e r e n t l i g h t " i l l umina te s a t b e s t only a p a r t i a l view of f i r s t - p e r s o n

psychologica l sentences and t k a t a r ea of t h e i r use it l eaves i n t he da rk

i s j u s t t h a t a r ea i n which we a r e most concerned. That is , Malcolm g ives

only a l imi t ed account of t h e func t ion and na tu re of avowals and i n

ignor ing t h e o ther a spec t s of t h e i r use and na ture , those a s p e c t s t he s c e p t i c

p o i n t s out and uses , he makes h i s argument i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e r e a l i s s u e .

A s a way of avoiding scept ic i sm, Malcolm's argdnent i s a mere evasion of

t h e troublesome f a c t s and claims t h e s c e p t i c b u i l d s from those f a c t s .

An i n i t i a l d i f f i c u l t y i n eva lua t ing Malcolm's view i s t h e d i f f i c u l t y of

knowing what i t i s , t h a t i s , t h e d i f f i c u l t y of knowing t o what ex t en t

Malcolm wants t o "a s s imi l a t e " f i r s t - p e r s o n psychological sen tences t o non-

l i n g u i s t i c express ions of psychological s t a t e s . Complete a s s i m i l a t i o n

would l eave Malcolm open t o h i s own objec t ions :

"3y saying t h e sentence one can make a s ta tement , i t has a con t r ad ic to ry , it i s t r u e o r f a l s e , i n saying i t one l i e s o r t e l l s t h e t r u t h and so on. Bone of t hese th ings exac t ly can be sa id of c ry ing , l imping, holding o n e ' s leg."

(K.O.N., p.383.)

and those of Bruce A u ~ e (&nowledge, Fiind and Nature, ~h.4.) Aune c o r r e c t l y

p o i n t s out t h a t were a ch i ld merely ab l e t o u t t e r "1 am i n painf1 i n

response t o c e r t a i n s t i m u l i , h i s l i n g u i s t i c s o p h i s t i c a t i o n would be on

i i n pein" i n response t o p a i n f u l s t imu l i . The a b i l i t y t o do

s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n s t i t u t e an understanding of t hese words i n

guage .

sounds " A i am

t h i s i s not - a common lan-

"To understand t h e convent ional s ign i f i cance of a group of words i s a t l e a s t t o understand what one who says them i s saying or doing. Yet, merely t o exe rc i se a h a b i t of responding wi th s p e c i a l no i se s i n s p e c i a l circumstances i s no t , by i t s e l f , t o use language a t a l l . One t y p i c a l l y uses something f o r a purpose o r end, one uses it t o inform, t o amuse, t o deceive and so on." (p.87.)

I t might be objected here t h a t c ry ing , limping e t c e t e r a can a l s o be used t o

inform, deceive, amuse and so on. Th i s i s t r u e , bu t does no t support

Malcolm's a s s i m i l a t i o n of avowals t o n a t u r a l express ions ; o r r a t h e r , t he

t r u t h of t h e objec t ion equal ly suppor ts a r eve r se a s s i m i l a t i o n ; t h a t i s

i n t he same way and t o t he same e x t e n t avowals can be a s s imi l a t ed t o n a t u r a l

express ions , n a t u r a l express ions can be a s s imi l a t ed t o sentences. "It

hu r t s ! " can escape from one, l i k e a scream, but so can a scream be used t o

inform someone e l s e t h a t one i s i n pa in . Avowals can be used non-

p ropos i t i ona l ly , bu t they c l s a r l y a r e n ' t always so used. And n a t u r a l ex-

pe r i ences can be used p ropos i t i ona l ly . To say of t he former t h a t they

a r e n ' t even p ropos i t i ona l would be a s mistaken and misleading a s t o say of

sentences i n the i n d i c a t i v e mood t h a t they a r e always so used. Thus t h e

" a s s i m i l a t i o ~ " Nalcolm speaks of c a n ' t be taken a s complete bu t only

p a r t i a l ; t h a t i s avowals a r e l i k e n a t u r a l express ions i n t h a t they a r e used

l i k e them sometimes and t o varying degrees. But then the analogy does g&

have t h e f i r s t mer i t Malcolm claims f o r i t ; t h a t i s it does not show t h e

I ques t ion how I kr-ow wner. t o s.i; y7 i e g k ~ r t 8 i s a nonsens ica l one . Indeed, i t ska i ld be q u i t e cbvio-JS t i l t i t t he qaes t ion is p e r f e c t l y s e n s i b l e

i n c e r t a i n con tex t s , wkici. i s dl o m c a l f a i r l y a sk of an:l. ques t ion . Any

quest iof i t h a t has a p lece cs- a l s o be, and j u s t t he re f o re , out of p lace .

For example, I nay kcow t l ~ t I s'r.o;lcl say "I am i n pain" when asked s in -

c e r e l y whether : am, or wf.e,. ; seek com~ass ion or condolence, o r help, o r

when I want t o ge t oxt of d n i l i g son=.t:;irlg, o r t o a t t r a c t a t t e n t i o n t o my-

s e l f e t c e t e r a . And, it rriec? be p o i ~ t e d out , it i s l a r g e l y j u s t because

avowals do have t h e var ie t . ; of ;ses tkey do t h a t they have what Malcolm

mentioned a s t h e second n e r i t of his view, t h a t i s t h e importance they have

f o r us , t he importznce of l , l~l ic i~ i c c i d e n t a i l y Malcolm s e e m t o cons iderably

and not a l t o g e t h e r artlessl: : , s inpi i f ; :

"1 r e a c t t o h i s suf fer ing . I look a t him wi th compassion and t r y t o comfort him." (Rev., r. 31 .)

t h e s u f f e r i n g of ailother ma:- b r l q u s t o compassion and comforting, b u t of

1 Of course, evep il' c o r c ~ l e t s a s s i m i l a t i o n could be c a r r i e d out , t h i s

would not show t:e q d e s t i o - m::sersical un le s s i t were a l s o showing t h a t t he

ques t ion , kow does m e luzow whm t o c ry i s i n f a c t nonsens ica l , a c laim

whick Nalcola mrsl; t akes l o r granted. 1'1% not even su re t h a t t h e l a t t e r

ques t ion is i o r , s e r s i ca l . ii - aA.swer rniekt , f o r example, be "when i t hur t s . "

A t l e a s t i t can be said t r z t l:alcolm h a s n ' t shown t h e ques t ion or such an

answer " n ~ n s e r ~ s i c a l . I' O r i ideed what t 'nonsensical" means ; a f a c t which

ought t o make us rick our e a r s i f no t a c t u a l l y bare our t e e t h .

course i t d o e s n ' t always. I may be i n d i f f e r e n t t o it, o r de l igh ted . Nor

one such r e a c t i o n s always i r ~ a p p r o p r i a t e , f o r example a surgeon would i n a l l

l i ke l ihood make f requent unfor tuna te s l i p s were he not t o remain i n d i f f e r e n t

t o t he su f f e r ing of h i s p a t i e n t , l ikewise a ~ a r e n t might we l l be considered

no t inhuman were he t o be de l igh ted t h a t h i s prev ious ly t o t a l l y paralyzed

o r apparent ly dead ch i ld f e l t pain. (Such cons ide ra t ions a s t hese , which

complicate t h e o f t e n narrow view Malcolm seems t o t ake of in te r -personal

r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i l l t ake on more importance l a t e r when cons ider ing "forms of

l i f e . " ) D i f f e r e n t u ses of avowals may have d i f f e r e n t importance f o r us .

And i t i s by no means c l e a r t h a t only because they sometimes func t ion a s

mere express ions of pa in t h a t they a r e important . When they func t ion d i f -

f e r e n t l y they w i l l and do have d i f f e r e n t importance f o r us.

But we seem to have s t rayed f a r from t h e i s s u e of "Other Kinds" which

f i r s t l ed us i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . We have, bu t it i s important t o see &

and i n so doing t o throw ourse lves back i n t o con f ron ta t ion wi th the s c e p t i c .

The s c e p t i c i n Wi t tgens t e in says:

"Only I can know I am r e d l y i n pa in , another person can only s, lrmise i t ." (?.I., p.245. )

Dis regard ing f o r now (what w i l l become important l a t e r ) t h e use of "another

person" here , l e t u s concent ra te on "only I can know.. . . . I 1 Malcolm t a k e s

i s s u e wi th t h i s , no t (p r imar i ly ) by denying t h e "onlyf' bu t by denying t h e

"I can know". Th i s argument i s no t t h a t it i s no t t h e case t h a t I (only)

can know bu t t h a t I c a n ' t know, because t h i s i s something I must remain

ignorant of but because i t makes no sense t o say e i t h e r t h a t I do o r d o n ' t

know t h i s of myself:

"'I know I am i n p a i n 1 and 'I d o n ' t know whether I ' m i n pa in ' a r e both sense l e s s . Jhe reve r i t i s meaningless t o speak of ' f a l s e be l ie f ' . "

i t i s a l s o meaningless t o speak of 'knowledge' and wherever you c a n ' t say 'I d o n ' t know' you a l s o cannot say, '1 know.' Of course a p h i l - osopher can say of me t h a t I know I am i n pa in . But what i s t h i s supposed t o mean except perhaps t h a t I am i n pain?" (Rev., p.81.)

Now, however, t h e i s s u e i s a s t o whether "I d o n ' t know whether I ' m i n pain"

I i s o r i s n ' t a s i g n i f i c a n t expression (and I be l i eve it can b e ) . It seems

t h a t even i f i t were nonsens ica l , t h i s i n i t s e l f , would be i n s u f f i c i e n t t o

show "I know I am i n pain" no r~sens i ca l .

The a b i l i t y t o speak a language i s s u r e l y n e i t h e r a necessary nor a

s u f f i c i e n t condi t ion of one ' s ever being i n pa in . Snakes, aardvarks, any

young i n f a n t s o r deaf-mutes d o n ' t u s u a l l y speak a language, bu t t h i s d o e s n ' t

prevent them from f e e l i n g , being i n pain. I l l i t e r a c y i s no anaes the t i c .

The ques t ion i s , do ( can ) they know t hey a r e i n pa in? I t seems we can

answer yes o r no. We might, f o r example want t o say they can know what

they f e e l (be aware of i t ) y e t know what it i s they f e e l . I d o n ' t

t h i n k we would want t o deny ( a t l e a s t no t deny the s i g n i f i c a n c e of s a ~ i n ~ )

t h a t t he snake f e e l s pa in and y e t does not know t h a t what i t f e e l s i s

ca l l ed "pain." S i m i l a r l y , a person may be aware t h a t he i s i n pa in ( t h a t

i s f e e l pa in) and s t i l l no t know t h a t it i s pa in he f e e l s . And i f t h i s i s

poss ib l e , then of him anyway i t can be sa id , s i g n i f i c a n t l y and t r u t h f u l l y ,

or example, a person who had never f e l t pain, bu t had heard o t h e r s

speak of i t , seen o t h e r s s u f f e r , read about i t and so on suddenly f e e l s what

he th inks i s pa in , but i s n ' t sure . Why cou ldn ' t he say "1 d o n ' t know whether

I a m i n pa in" and why wouldn't t h i s be s i g n i f i c a n t or even true?

t h a t he is i n r a i n but 'doesn ' t krfi i t , t h a t i s doesn ' t know t h a t i t i s

pa in he i s i n ( f e e l s ) . The d i s t i n c t i o n here marked between being i n pa in

and knowing one i s i n pa in i s the d i f f e r e n c e between being i n pa in and being

a b l e t o m, s i g n i f i c a n t l y , t k a t one i s . A s i m i l a r account of t he d i s t i n c -

t i o n between being i n pa in and knowing t h a t one i s i n pa in has been given

by Ayer :

"Knowing what o n e ' s thougbts and f e e l i n g s a r e a s d i s t i n c t from merely having t,hem mej be taken t o c o n s i s t i n being ab le t o give a t r u e r e p o r t of them. (I1?rivacy", .63. )

And, a s proof t h a t one can give a t r u e r e p o r t of them Ayer n o t e s t h e f a c t

( a l s o noted bj Kalcolm!) t h a t one can about them:

"To t e l l a l i e i s no t j u s t t o make a f a l s e s ta tement , i t i s t o make a s ta tement one knows t o be f a l s e ; and t h i s imp l i e s denying what one knows t o be t r u e . I 1 ( "Privacy", P .60.)

If a proof t h a t one can know t h a t one i s i n pa in i s r equ i r ed , t h i s c e r t a i n l y

seems t o be an adequate one. But Malcolm has t r i e d t o show elsewhere ("The

Privacy of ZxperienceI1 : note N0.40, p .157.) t h a t it i s n ' t . I t i s worth

quot ing Malcolm here, t o show t o what depths of evasion and m y s t i f i c a t i o n

the e f f o r t t o r e f u t e scept ic i sm has reached:

"Ayer g ives t h e fo l lowing proof t h a t i f we a r e i n pa in we know it, namely t h a t one can t e l l l i e s about o n e ' s sensa t ions . . . . I should t ake t h i s a s a proof t h a t t e l l i n g a l i e i s not , i n a l l cases , s t a t i n g what one knows t o be f a l s e . The word ' ly ing ' l i k e t he word 'game1 i s appl ied over a broad range of d i v e r s e ca ses . I' (p .l57. )

The f i r s t t h ing t o note about t h i s i s t h a t i t d i s t o r t s what Ayer i s saying.

He does intend t h i s a s a proof t h a t "if we a r e i n p a i n we know it1' a s

i s p a i n f u l l y obvious from h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between having sensa t ions and

being a b l e t o give a t r u e r e p o r t of them ( ~ ~ e r : "Privacy", .63.! Rather ,

what Ayer i s at tempting t o show (and succeeds i n showing) i s t h a t it makes

sense t o say "I know I am i n pain ." And a s f o r Nalcolm' s remark t h a t he

"should t a k e t h i s a s a proof t h a t l y ing i s no t , i n a l l cases , s t a t i n g what

one knows t o be f a l s e " I can only say t h a t he c e r t a i n l y should so take

i t . I t i s j u s t no argument t o say t h a t " the word ' l y i n g f l i k e the word

'game1 i s appl ied over a broad range of d i v e r s e cases ." Minimally, Malcolm

should have sa id i n what r e s p e c t s t he wide range of ca ses a r e d ive r se ,

s p e c i f i c a l l y , whether t h e two cases mentiorled a r e , i n t h i s r e s p e c t , d i v e r s e . 1

Malcolm has not shown Ayerls argument i n v a l i d and h i s conclusion , I s h a l l

t ake i t , s tands . "I know I am i n pain" i s a s i g n i f i c a n t t 1 s tatement . And

though t h e r e i s something & about i t , i t s oddi ty can be accounted f o r i n

those cases where i t is odd and it can be shown t h a t t h e r e a r e s i t u a t i o n s

where i t would be a ( t h e ) most n a t u r a l t h ing t o say. I w i l l t r y t o b r i e f l y

i n d i c a t e t h e source of t h e f e e l i n g of oddi ty surrounding "I know I am i n

pain" and t o a l l e v i a t e some misgivings about it. I w i l l t hen at tempt t o

show what I t h i n k i s a r e a l oddi ty about t he d e n i a l of i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e and

indeed t o aggravate whatever misgivings we might have about t h i s den ia l .

'one should a l s o mention i n passing (cquic kly) E.lalcolml s ever-pre s e n t

r e l i a n c e on Wit tgens te in ( " ly ing" l i k e "game". . .) whose words he seems some-

how t o t w i s t i n t o wands hoping t o conjure away a l l problems and thought.

One would have hoped t h e time had passed f o r s o l u t i o n s t o problems cons i s t -

i n g i n t he mere invoca t ion of a u t h o r i t y , however i l l m t r i o u s .

"I should no t l i k e my wr i t i ng t o spare o the r people t h e t roub le of think- ing . But i f poss ib l e t o s t imu la t e someone t o thoughts of h i s own." ( d i t t g e n s t e i n , ?.I. preface, p. VIII .)

I w i l l t r y t o show t h a t the d e n i a l of t he sense of "I know I am i n pain"

i s l e s s a f a c t about our language than an unsuccessfu l and perhaps

obsfuscatory attempt t o evade some of t he genuine d i f f i c u l t i e s about know-

ledge of o the r minds which the s c e p t i c c o r r e c t l y p i cks out , even i f he

makes t o o much of tF1em.

I suggested above t h a t we seem t o have d r i f t e d away from the problems

which o r i g i n a l l y engaged u s t o br ing us back t o t h e c e n t r a l cons idera t ion ,

t h e problem t h a t , a s t h e s c e p t i c p u t s i t , one cannot know t h e minds of

o t h e r s a s one does one ' s own and t h a t what commonly passes f o r knowledge of

o the r minds i s i n important and s i g n i f i c a n t ways inadeauate , no t vorthy of

being c a l l e d "knowledge" a t a l l . The a t tempt , suggested by Wit tgens te in

and msde much more of by Iialcolm was t o undermine t h e s c e p t i c by denying

t h a t I have i n my own case what he says I l a c k i n t he case of o the r s , t h a t

i s knowledge of my own mind. A somewhat i n t u i t i v e r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e i d e a

t h a t i t makes no sense t o say of myself, f o r example, t h a t "I know I am i n

pain" i s ( can be used a s ) a s i g n i f i c a n t a s s e r t i o n was supported and es tab-

l i shed by Ayer. The a t t e m ~ t t o show t h a t t h e problem the s c e p t i c b r ings up

i s i l l u s o r y on the groimds t h a t I d o n ' t have i n my own case what t h e s c e p t i c

main ta ins I do have, f a i l s . This does n o t , of course, v i n d i c a t e t h e

s c e p t i c ' s f u r t k e r c l s ims t h a t such knowledge i s something I only have i n

my own case (and i n no o t h e r s ) and something, t h a t only I have i n my own

case (and no oce e l s e ) .

But if "I h o w I am i n pain" i s n ' t nonsens ica l , t h e r e i s something odd

about i t , and t o f u l l y s a t i s f y ourse lves about i t ' s leg i t imacy some account

of t h i s oddi ty should be given. An important f e a t u r e of t h i s "oddity" has

been pointed out by Ayer:

"What i s t r u e i s t h a t we seldom, i f ever , f i n d occasion t o use such sen tences a s , 'he knows t h a t he i s i n p a i n t o r 'I know t h a t I am th ink ing about a ph i lo soph ica l problem', o r even, '1 know t h a t I am looking a t a shee t of pape r ' . The p r e f i x i n g of t h e words, 'I know t h a t o r 'he knows t h a t make what would otherwise be r e spec t ab le i f no t very i n t e r e s t - ing sen tences appear somewhat r i d i c u l o u s . But the reason f o r t h i s s u r e l y i s no t t h a t t he claim t o knowledge i s inapp l i cab le i n t h e s e cases but rat?-er t h a t i t i s superf luous."

( "Privacy", p. 59. )

I f "1 know I am i n pain" i s odd i t i s no t because, a s Malcolm argues,

it i s s ense l e s s but because xhat i t a s s e r t s i s and gene ra l ly can be taken

f o r gran ted . I f a person can a s s e r t t h a t he i s i n pa in , has t h e concept

of pa in , knows whst " ~ a i n " means, then i f he i s i n pa in he knows it.

And when a person says "I am i n pain" such f a c t s a r e gene ra l ly taken f o r

granted. We a s s - n e , t h a t i s , t h a t he knows what he i s saying. And a s

knowicg one i s i n pa in a s d i s t i n c t from merely being i n pa in i s a ~ a t t e r

of being a b l e t o say t h a t one i s , o r give a t r u e r e p o r t t o t h a t e f f e c t

t h e s u p e r f l u i t y of p re f ix ing "1 know t h a t " should be hard ly s u r p r i s i n g .

Malcolm admits t h a t pk i losophers might say such th ings a s , "he knows

he i s i n pain" but s t r ange ly seems t o regard t h i s a s i r r e l e v a n t t o the

ph i lo soph ica l d i s m s s i o n of o ther minds o r perhaps a s an i n d i c a t i o n of t h e

p e r v e r s i t y of such usage. But t ,here i s nothing perverse about r ep ly ing

t o Malcolmls f a l s e ~ k i l o s o p h i c a l remark t h a t i t makes no sense t o say,

"I know I am i n pain" with the t r u e phi losophica l remark t h a t i t does.

But i t i s n ' t even t r n e t h a t "I know I am i n pain" makes sense, has a use,

only i n t h e context of ph i losophica l d i scuss ions . Wi t tgens te in p o i n t s out

t h a t t h e express ion might be used a s a joke. Other not so r a r e cases

could be a s an expression of exaspera t ion , a confession, an answer t o

t h e ques t ion , "wtat do you know?" o r , "who here knows they a r e i n pain?"

t o agree , t o admit, t o acknowledge, t o deny t h a t one i s n ' t , t o i n d i c a t e

who does know t h i s and so on. To l i m i t i t s use merely t o phi losophica l

d i scuss ions ( a s Malcolm does) not only doesn ' t e s t a b l i s h the meaningless-

ness of t h e expression, i t doesn ' t give a t r u e account of i t s poss ib l e

range of uses . So c lose and unprejudiced look a t language could, i t

seems, have l e f t Malcolm w i t k the conclusions he makes here. And

conclusions about t h i s i f they a r e not t o c a s t susp ic ion on h i s i n t e n t i o n s

must be simply t h a t he i s wrong. "I know I am i n pain" and s i m i l a r

express ions a r e not only not nonsensical , they a r e no t even a l l t h a t

unusual.

Before going on it w i l l be worthwhile t o r e i t e r a t e t he s c e p t i c ' s

main worr ies here , which a r e e loquent ly condensed i n John Wisdom's remark:

"The p e c u l i a r i t y of t he s o u l i s not t h a t it i s v i s i b l e t o none bu t t h a t i t i s v i s i b l e onl;: t o one ."

(Other Minds, p.226.)

The s c e p t i c ' s c laim, y e t t o be shown mistaken, nevermind nonsens ica l ,

i s t h a t I myself am i n t h e b ~ s t poss ib l e pos i t i on t o know whether I am i n

pa in and t h a t fur thermore no one e l s e i s i n a good enough p o s i t i o n t o know

t h i s . There i s , i n my own case, t he c r u c i a l f a c t t h a t I have access t o

what you d o n ' t , t h a t i s , t h e experience ( f e e l i n g ) and t h i s i s necessary

t o j u s t i f y a knowledge claim. With t h e experience the re i s adequate grounds,

without it t h e r s cannot be.

I t i s wi th " f&c t s f1 such a s these t h a t we dea l .

5 3

X STRA'tJSON: "THZ ASCRIFTION ARGU143YTJT"

I n "Tersons", t h a t remarkably dense t h i r d chapter of P.F. Strawson's

I n d i v i d u a k , t1,ere i s an argmeri t which pu rpor t s t o r e p ~ t d i a t e scept ic i sm

about "Other Minds" on l o g i c s 1 g r o ~ w d s . I t h i n k t h i s arg.ment, l i k e t h e

o t h e r s so f a r considered, i s a - L s ~ c c e s s f u l though i t dces br ing us a s t e p

c l o s e r t o what m i g ~ t be a solct . ion, even i f no t i n t he way Strawson in t ends .

The argument I wish t o cons ider can be ca l l ed the "Ascr ip t ion Argument" and

seen a s a f u r t t e r development of tne argument of V I I I (above) t h a t an

avowal such a s "1 am i n pain" i s no t merely an express ion of pa in , on a

l e v e l wi th c r i e s and grimaces but a l s o a s ta tement , an a s c r i p t i o n . It

was argued the re t h a t f o r "I am i n paint ' t o be used a s an express ion i n a

language, t h a t express ion must be understood by the speaker a s say ing

something and t n e speaker , on a t l e a s t some occasions t o be us ing i t t o

g ive a t r u e r e p o r t . Th i s i s p a r t of what i t i s ' f o r t h e u t t e r a n c e t o be a

speech a c t i o n r a t h e r than a mere r e a c t i o n t,o c e r t a i n s t i m u l i . Such

condi t ions were seen t o be necessary t o g ive substance t o , and exp la in t h e

substance o f , t he s c e p t i c ' s c laim t h a t one knows t h a t and when oneself i s

i n pa in . S t rawson ' s a s c r i p t i o n argument r e v e a l s what t h i s involves , t h e

claim being t k a t it involves being ab le t o a s c r i b e M.T.s t o o t h e r s a s wel l .

But what i s t b e f o r c e of "being ab le t o a s c r i b e them t o o thers?" I mention

t h e fol lowing p o s s i b i l i t i e s :

( 1 ) t h a t one nave t h e a b i l i t ~ t o do so.

( 2 ) t h a t one have and exe rc i se t h a t a b i l i t y .

( 3 ) t h a t one have and exe rc i se t h a t a b i l i t y and i n so

doing makes t r u e a s c r i ~ t i o n s .

Each of these a r e poss ib l e readings of S trawson Is s c a t t e r e d remarks

i n "Persons." But before determining which of t hese d i f f e r e n t c laims

Strawson is making i t must be noted t h a t only (3 ) w i l l s u f f i c e t o r e f u t e

t h e s c e p t i c . He can maintain, a s he does, t h a t one can and does t r u t h -

f u l l y a s c r i b e M.T.s t o onese l f , admit t h a t t h i s involves e i t h e r t he

a b i l i t y t o a s c r i b e them t o o t h e r s o r t h e a b i l i t y t o do so and i t s

e x e r c i s e and s t i l l be s c e p t i c a l about o the r minds on the grounds t h a t

f o r a l l he knows (and of course f o r a l l we know) h i s o the r a s c r i p t i o n s

may no t be v e r i d i c a l . So, f o r t he a s c r i p t i o n argument t o serve a s a

r epud ia t ion of scept ic i sm i t must be taken a s claiming (3 ) . But so taken

it i s , I be l i eve , unproven.

That t h e r e is such ambiguity i n Strawson's remarks can be seen by

cons ider ing the fo l lowing quota t ions :

"It i s a necessary condi t ion of one ' s a s c r i b i n g s t a t e s of consciousness exper iences t o onese l f , i n t h e way one does t h a t one should a l s o a s c r i b e them o r be prepared t o a s c r i b e them t o o thers . "

(p.94.)

Which? "ascr ibe"? or Ifbe prepared t o ascr ibe"? Strawson seems t o opt f o r

t he former:

"One can a s c r i b e s t a t e s of consciousness t o oneself only i f o2e can a s c r i b e them t o other ."

(p.96.)

But how i s "can" t o be taken kere? The problem becomes c l e a r e r i n a

l a t e r , s t ronge r ve r s ion of the argument:

"There i s no sense i n t he idea of a s c r i b i n g s t a t e s of con- sc iousness t o oneself un le s s t h e a s c r i b e r a l r eady knows how t o a s c r i b e a t l e a s t some s t a t e s of consciousness t o others ."

(p.102.)

But t h e s c e p t i c could admit Strawson's c laim t h a t i n order t o a s c r i b e

I4.T.s t o himself he must know how t o a s c r i b e them t o o the r s . I n f a c t he

5 5

ag rees t h a t one knows how t o do so and a l s o agrees with Strawson about

how t h i s i s done:

"One a s c r i b e s ?-predicates t o o t h e r s on the s t r e n g t h of observa t ion of t h e i r behavior ."

(p.102.)

And r i g h t here t h e s c e p t i c h e s i t a t e s . It i s , he says, j u s t because we

so a s c r i b e M.T.s t h a t we can never know our a s c r i p t i o n s a r e v e r i d i c a l .

We do a s c r i b e M.T.s t o ourse lves and i t may be t h a t i t i s a necessary

cond i t i on of our being ab le t o do s o t h a t one a l s o be prepared t o or

a c t u a l l y a s c r i b e them t o o the r s . But we a r e s t i l l l e f t w i th determining

t h e substance of Strawson's claim. He makes t h e fol lowing remark i n a

foo tno te :

"The main p o i n t here i s a pure ly l o g i c a l one; t he i d e a of a p red ica t e i s c o r r e l a t i v e with t k a t of a range of d i s t i ngu i sh - a b l e i n d i v i d u a l s of which the p red ica t e can be s i g n i f i c a n t l y though not n e c e s s a r i l y t r u t h f u i l y aff i rmed,

(p.95.)

What a r e we t o make of t h i s " s i g n i f i c a n t l y though no t n e c e s s a r i l y t ru th -

f u l l y , aff i rmed"? It seems, on the f a c e of i t no t incompatible wi th the

s c e p t i c l s c laims, f o r what he wants t o say i s t h a t i t might w e l l be the

case t h a t we might never a sc r ibe M.T.s t o o t h e r s t r u t h f u l l y . He doesn ' t

deny t h a t they are ascr ibed t o o the r s , nor does he deny another of

Strawson's c laims " t h a t t h e a sc r ib ing phrases a r e used i n j u s t t he same

sense when t h e sub jec t i s another a s when the sub jec t i s oneself .I1 (p.95.)

These p o i n t s must be noted f o r i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o t he f o r c e of t h e

s c e p t i c a l argument t h a t he be taken a s denying t h a t what we do we can

( j u s t i f i a b l y ) do. H i s d e n i a l t h a t we can know t h a t an M.T. a p p l i e s t r u t h -

f u l l y t o another would become q u i t e u n i n t e r e s t i n g were he arguing t h a t

what we do i s n ' t a s c r i b i n g M.T.s t o o the r s , o r t h a t we d i d n ' t mean the

same i n s e l f a s i n othe

5 6

r a s c r i p t i o n s . kJhy the s c e p t i c i s worrisome i s

because he admits we do w k t we do and mean what we mean but denies t h a t we

a r e j u s t i f i e d i n so doing.

But i s Strawson making t h e s t rong claim t h a t i n order t o a sc r ibe

M .T . s t o oneself one a c t u a l l y a s c r i b e them v e r i d i c a l l y t o others?

Th i s i s t h e claim be must make t o r e f u t e the s c e p t i c . And i n f a c t Strawson

does t ake h i s argument t o be a r e f u t a t i o n of the scep t i c . He says of the

a s c r i p t i o n argument t h a t :

"The p o i n t i s no t t h a t we must accept t h i s conclusion i n order t o avoid scept ic i sm but t h a t we must accept i t i n order t o explore t he ex i s t ence of t h e conceptual scheme i n which t h e s c e p t i c a l problem i s s t a t e d . But once t h e conclusion i s accepted, the s c e p t i c a l problem does n o t a r i s e . So with many s c e p t i c a l problems; t h e i r s ta tement involves a pretended acceptance of a conceptual scheme a t t h e same time t h e s i l e n t r epud ia t ion of one of the condi t ions of i t s ex i s t ence . That i s why they a r e i n t he terms they a r e s t a t e d , i n s o l u b l e .I1 ( p. 103. )

So Strawson does take h i s argument a s r epud ia t ing scept icism. But the

argument f a i l s . The acceptance of the conclusion of the a s c r i p t i o n argu-

ment, t h a t I must be ab l e t o a s c r i b e M.T.s t o o t h e r s does n o t show t h a t I

must be ab l e t o do so t r u t h f u l l y . Strawson has no t shown t h a t a person

could not be inva r i ab ly mistaken i n a s c r i b i n g M.T.s t o o thers .

I n "The Concept of a ?ersonr ' Ayer imagines a c h i l d brought up i n a

community of automatons, from which he l e a r n s how t o apply the concept of

a person and s a t i s f i e s Strawson's requirement of being ab le t o a s c r i b e

M.T.s t o o the r s , b u t t he o t h e r s a r e a l l automatons, Ayer goes on:

The example shows no t only t h a t one might be ab l e t o a s c r i b e ex- pe r i ences t o oneself which being i n v a r i a b l y mistaken i n a sc r ib ing them t o o t h e r s bu t a l s o t h a t the c r i t e r i a which a r e taken t o be l o g i c a l l y adequate f o r a sc r ib ing experiences t o o the r s may de t e r - mine no more than t h a t some l o c a t i o n i s c o r r e c t , t h a t i n such and such condi t ions t h i s I s t he proper th ing t o say; i t does no t n e c e s s a r i i y fo l low t h a t what he says i s t rue ." ( ~ y e r , p.108.)

And what i f the child were an i n f s n t phi losopher and wondered whether t n e

o t h e r s around ?-in r e a l l y h2d experiences? Ayer s a ~ - s :

"Sjkatever co-c1:sion be c w ~ e t o h i s scept icis l r , would no t be sense l e s s . bow could i t be i f i t were a c T & a l l y j u s t i f i e d ? " ( p . l eg . )

;t might be q u i t e c o r r e c t , r i g k t , j u s t i f i a b l e , app ropr i a t e or whatever

f o r t he c k i l d t o s sy of t r e automatons t h i n g s l i k e "he i s i n pain" y e t what

he s q s be f a l s e . He may be ~ e r f e c t l y r i g h t t o s ay of an automaton, "he i s

i n pain" i n tsrms of h i s c r i t e r i a f o r applying "pain" t o another , y e t

p e r f e c t l y wrong i n what he s a i d . Strawson has n o t only not shown t h a t the

s c e p t i c a l problem does not a r i s e f o r t he c h i l d ; he h a s n ' t shown t h a t it

c a n ' t a r i s e f o r the s c e p t i c . Even i f an understanding of M.T.s involves

t h e a b i l i t y and e x e r c i s e of t h a t a b i l i t y t o a s c r i b e them t o o the r s , t h i s

d o e s n ' t prove t h a t oce must do so succes s fu l ly , t h a t i s t r u t h f u l l y . The

acceptance of t he "conceptual sckiemel' i n which we a s c r i b e M . T . s does no t

have a s a necessary condi t ion , of e i t h e r t h e acceptance o r t h e ex i s t ence

of t h a t scheme, the a c t u a l ex i s t ence of o the r persons. The ex i s t ence of a

p o t e n t i a l l y i n t e r p e r s o n a l language does not prove t h e ex i s t ence of o ther

persons. The having of a concept and i t s a c t u a l i n s t a n t i a t i o n a r e two

d i f f e r e n t ms t t e r s . I

his i s of course, the substance of Kant l s r e f u t a t i o n of t he

t lOntological ArgmentU which, Yorman Ib:alcolm notwithstanding, i s s t i l l v a l i d .

And what i n Strawson i s vaguely reminiscent of t h e Onto logica l Argument be-

comes i n Malcolm an u ~ d i s g u i s e d and apparent ly b landly admitted v a r i a t i o n of

i t . But then Malcolm t h i n k s the Ontological Argument i t s e l f works. ( s e e

below).

- 2 WITTGZNSTZIM: ;Zi'!S3 A X JdIJSZiu'S7

Both s c e p t i c and a n t i - s c e p t i c agree t h a t I do a s c r i b e M.T.s t o

o t h e r s which I anyway t ake t o be persons. But t h e f o r c e of Ayer 's

argument was t h a t i t i s conceivablji the case t h a t I merely t ake them

t o be persons, t h a t 1 might, f o r a l l I know and f o r a l l t h e a n t i -

s c e p t i c a l arguments s o f a r considered have sa id , be i n v a r i a b l y mistaken.

It seems then t h a t , so f a r , a l l those beings around me which I t ake t o be

persons, which behave l i k e I do, might be mere automata. There seems t o

bs nothing about me, no t t h e f a c t t h a t I speak a language, have a

m e n t a l i s t i c vocabulary, have t h e b e l i e f t h a t t hese beings are, as I take

them t o be, persons, which r u l e s out t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y . I n f a c t , i f t h e

s t a t e of a f f a i r s Ayer d e s c r i b e s is a poss ib l e one, then a l l t he a n t i -

s c e p t i c a l arguments t o show scept ic i sm impossible , incoherent o r non-

s e n s i c a l n e c e s s a r i l y f a i l . 3ow could i t be nonsens ica l , i f , a s Ayer

s u c c i n t l y remarks, i t were j u s t i f i e d ? And aga in it seems t h e s t a t e of

a f f a i r s Ayer desc r ibes is r o s s i b l e . But i t seems t h a t i t s seeming

p o s s i b i l i t y i s i n some way a func t ion of my rjwn s i t u a t i o n , here and now

(musing i n a ph i lo soph ica l s o r t of way) znd t h e t were my s i t u a t i o n

r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t t h e " p o s s i b i l i t y " of Ayer ' s example would seem t o me

t o a l t e r r a d i c a l l y (were I , f o r example, t e l l i n g a joke t o some people,

o r making l o v e ) . Such th ings a r e undoubtedly t r u e , but a r e they of any

s i g n i f i c a n c e and i f so, what'? V i t t g e n s t e i n , f o r one, thought such f a c t s

extremelv s i g r i f i c a n t . I n f a c t , i n one p lace i n t h e Ph i lo soph ica l

I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , be desc r ibes h i s whole technique as br inging words back - from t k e i r " m e t a ~ h y s i c a l " t o t h e i r everyday use, t o t h e i r " o r i g i n a l home"

(?.I., p . l l ~ . j

He says t h a t ph i losophica l problems a r i s e when language goes on

hol iday (P.I., p.38.) when it i s i d l i n g , no t doing work (P.I., p.132.)

Me a r e beckoned "back t o t he rough ground" (?.I., ~ . 1 0 7 . ) and t o l d t o

"look and see" (P . I . , p.66.) r a t h e r than merely th ink i f we a r e t o

understand t h e workings and meanings of our words, our concepts, our

language and our th inking .

Now i t i s t r u e t h a t we l e a r n and use our m e n t a l i s t i c vocabulary t o

t a l k about "o ther persons" and i n our day t o day dea l ings with them.

What Ayer has shown i s t h a t one could have learned t o use and go on using

M.T.s even i f these "others1 ' weren ' t persons but r a t h e r automata, which

appears t o show t h e problem of "Other Kinds" a t l e a s t not a pseudo-one.

Can t h e technique of "bringing words back borne" d i s p e l t h i s appearance?

And, i f so , how? I n t e r e s t i n g l y , J i t t g e n s t e i n cons iders a suggest ion very

s i m i l a r t o Ayer l s . He asks:

"But c a n ' t I imagine t h a t the people around me a r e automata, l a c k consc io~s r i e s s even though they behave i n t he same way a s u sua l? I f I imagine t h i s now - alone i n my room - I see people with f ixed looks ( a s i n a t r ance ) goicg about t h e i r business - t h e i d e a i s perhaps a l i t t l e uncanny. But j u s t t r y t o keep hold of t h i s i d e a i n t he midst of your ordinary in t e rcour se wi th o the r s , i n the s t r e e t , say! Say t o your se l f , f o r example, 'The ch i ld ren over t he re a r e mere autcmata; a l l t h e i r l i v e - l i n e s s i s mere automatism!' And you w i l l e i t h e r f i n d these words become q u i t e meaningless o r you w i l l produce i n yourse l f some kind of uncanny f e e l i n g o r something of t he s o r t .

Seeing a human being a s an automaton i s analogous t o seeing one f i g u r e a s a l i m i t i n g case o r v a r i a n t of another; t he cross- p i eces of a window a s a swaztika, f o r example."

(P.I. , p.420.)

Now it i s probably t r u e t h a t Ayer thought up h i s example alone i n

h i s room. ( I d o n ' t know about ~ ~ e r ) . But what we must ask i s whether

he or anyone e l s e , must have imagined i t i n such o r s imi l a r circumstances.

t wi th o the r s? Because one c a n ' t phi losophize on s t r e e t s ? Soc ra t e s would

have something t o say about t h i s ! Because t o do so would i n t e r f e r e wi th

"normal i n t e rcour se"? But one ' s normal i n t e r c o u r s e wi th o t h e r s on s t r e e t s

f r equen t ly b e l i e s t h i s claim; tkink, f o r example, of Wall S t r e e t . Indeed

such s i t u a t i o n s a r e perhaps amongst the most conducive t o t h ink ing of

o t h e r s a s automatons. 3.~3 what i s happening when t h i s happens? - "You

w i l l produce i n yourself sorae kir~d of uncanny f e e l i n g " - Perhaps. But

i t might make no d i f f e r e n c e a s t o how one f e e l s . T h i s depends t o a l a r g e

degree on how one f e l t about "o the r people" before , o r normally. I t might

be the case t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r person f e l t about o t h e r s i n much t h e way

most people f e e l about automatons, Thinking of o t h e r s a s automatons

might leave him cold , o r even give him warm f e e l i n g s of s e c u r i t v (one

might imagine S a r t r e t o be such a person; one could hard ly f e e l "ashamed"

before t he "look" of what one thought was an automaton). But, f o r a l l

t h a t , i t i s probably p r e t t y s a f e t o say t h a t many people would f e e l some-

what uncanny a t the tkought: "These o t h e r s i n t he s t r e e t - a l l automatons!!"

Yet i t seems t h a t t h e most t h a t can be made of t h i s i s t h a t scept ic i sm

would be uncomfortable, o r unconventional.

X i t t g e n s t e i n l s more i n t e r e s t i n g claim was t h a t , " i n t he s t r e e t " t he

words " t h e c h i l d r e n a r e mere automata, a l l t h e i r l i v e l i n e s s mere automatism"

( k n c e f o r t h abrevia ted 'C I) would "tend t o become q u i t e meaningless."

I t i s a l s o of course a f a r s t ronger claim and one t h a t i s far more d i f f i c u l t

t o e s t a b l i s h .

What does Wit tgens te in mean by "meaningless" here? Without going

i n t o a d e t a i l e d study of "m?sningl' I th ink w 3 can g e t a good i d e a of what

he was g e t t i n g a t .

a r e put r a t h e r t h a r ~ t h e i r Inrrr,. And i t i s poss ib l e t c t h ink of many

s i t u a t i o n s where "C" might bs -2sed qyiite msmingfu l ly , f o r e x m p l e ,

( a ) a t a17 I .3 .M . e x h i b i t i c:?

( b ) a t a l a r g e high sck~col

( c ) a t a H i t l e r Youth Ra l ly

( a ' ) t o say t h a t those th ings which look and c a r r y on l i k e

c h i l d r e r ~ a r e r e a l l y very complex machines

1 ( b ) t o say t h a t t h e ch i ld ren t h e r e a r e incapable of any

bu t t?:e most mechanical, unc rea t ive thought

( c l ) t o say t h a t t he ch i ld ren move and apbear l i k e machines

And i t i s ju s t a s easy t o t h ink of ca ses where "C" would be q u i t e

meaningless, f o r example, were i t given a s a r e p l y t o t h e ques t ion , "How

old a r e you?" Here l t C " would be a meaningless t h ing t o say. I t might

of course be objected here t h a t "C" would be meaningful even he re , t h a t

what t h e speaker meant by it was, f o r example, "I r e f u s e t o answer such

a quest ion." But i t i s important t o note t h a t i n g iv ing such an account

of what I 1 C 1 l means one i s forcsd t o say t h a t and how i t means something

o the r than what i t ( c ) says. We might speak of i t s "hidden meaning" bu t

t h e hidden meaning i s hidden by the non-hidden msaning of t h e u t t e r ance .

And i t i s t h e very meaninglessness of saying C i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n t h a t

a l lows it t o func t ion a s it does.

Now, i f an express ion vi!ich i s meaningful i n c e r t a i n con tex t s can

be ~ s a ~ i n g l e s s irl ot,i1srs kr+cciuse i t says notking i n tk,is l a t t e r c o ~ t e x t

o r tk.5 speaker wk1o u t t e r s It s l y s rlnthing i n u t t e r i n g i t , then we can

L see how an expression cat become memingless , t k a t i s , by being u t t e r ed

k i n s s i t a a t i o n wF.ere i t i s ccn tex tua l ly i nappropr i a t e . Tkis i s what

Wi t t eens t e in clalms h a ~ 9 e n s wten C i s used irA tne s t r e s t . An express ion

i s neaningfu l only i n c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s , not i n o t h e r s . And a s t he

s i t u a t i c n and c i r c ,ms tacces of a s ~ e a k e r ck.ange an express ion may bscome

q u i t e meaningless i n i t s now sixroundings. I t may become u s e l e s s , come

t o say nothing. An ex&~.ple nligkt, ke lp c l a r i f y t h i s : "This senteace i s

red" i s meaningful and tr i e when used t o r e f e r t o a given sentence w r i t t e n

i n red ink . The same e>rpressicrL i s meaningful bu t f a l s e when used t o

r e f e r t o a sentence wr i t t en i q green ink . B a t i t would be q u i t e mean-

i n g l e s s t o use i t t o r e f e r 50 a spcken sentecce, a s t r i n g of reaningful

sounds which a r s n c i t ? ? r colorod nor not cc lored . Tkis i s t o ignore t h e -- phenorriena of s y n ~ s t k ~ s s i a , but s-lck complicat i ons can, I t h ink , be s a f e l y

ignored he re . And suerL ~ x t i n p l e s can be m l ~ l t i p l i e d till they become t i r e -

some which they s l r eady pr?bably would have t o t h e s c e p t i c whom we may

imagine t o impa t i en t ly i n t w j e c t s r t h i s po in t say ing; " O . K . , c e r t a i n

e m r e s s i o n s a r e s o m s t i m ~ s memingflil , somefimes no t whim may be phi lo-

sopb ica l ly i n t e r e s t i n g , even important . But t h i s i s a l l bes ide the p o i n t .

Yo2 naven ' t shown "C" meaningless i n t h s s t r e e t and Ayer has shown t h a t i t

i s meaningful t,h.;re. So T suggest t h a t yob sdd t o your l i s t of examples

t h i s : C i s mssningful i n t b s s t r e a t . If Wi t tgens t e in den ie s i t , he i s

j u s t wrong . I 1

6 3

We must t r y t o anFwer t h i s c'r..sllenge, which I w i l l t r y t o do by

s p s c x l a t i n g as t o wk,at :E! i t tgensts inl s own r e p l y might be . ( '13psculation11

h e r e d o e s n ' t msan L d l s p e c u l a t i o n . I w i l l a t t e m p t t o suppor t my remarks

and c la ims . I j u s t d o n ' t want t o g i v e t h e i m p r s s s i o n t h a t my remarks a r e

t o be t aken , o r t ,hat I t a k e them t o be a u t h o r a t i v e a c c o u n t s of "what

W i t t g e n s t e i n meant") . " J u s t t r y , i n a r e a l c a s e - t o doubt someone e l s e ' s p a i n o r f e a r "

(P.I., p.303.) T h i s a c i d conqent of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s i s o f t e n t a k e n a s

a c l e a r v i n d i c a t i o n of lrcommon-sense", a s a f o r c e f u l r e f u t a t i o n of

s c e p t i c i s m . I t i s impor tan t t o s e e t h a t and why i t i s n ' t . F o r , f i rs t ,

t h e s c e p t i c n e s d n l t be t a k e n a s a c t i v e l y d o u b t i n g t h a t a n o t h e r i s i n p a i n ,

o r a f r a i d . I t would be more a c c u r a t e t o c h a r a c t e r i z e h i s p o s i t i o n a s

s imply s a y i n g t h a t i t cannot be g roven t h a t he i s . And t h i s may make no

d i f f e r e n c e bfhat so3ver t o h i s own behav ior . The' e x p r e s s i o n , "Perhaps he

i s n ' t i n pa in" n s e d n ' t be an e x p r e s s i o n of doubt ( though of c o u r s e it 2%

b e ) . An m l i g h t e n i n g c o q a r i s o n can be found i n r e l i g i o n . I t i s q u i t e

c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a p e r s o n ' s m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t he cannot prove t h e e x i s t e n c e

o f God, t h a t t h i s make no d i f f e r e n c e whatever t o him i n s o f a r a s h i s a c t i o n s

are concerned. He mag a c t j u s t a s if he knew o r could prove t h e r e were a

God. And h e may b e l i e v e t h e r e i s ( f a i t h ) , o r even wi thhold b e l i e f .

S i m i l a r l y , a s c e p t i c who d e n i e s we can j u ~ n t h i n g s l i k e t h a t a n o t h e r i s i n

p a i n , may b e l i e v e t h a t t h e y a r e , o r wi thhold judgement. None of t h e s e

p o s i t i o n s i s incompat ib le w i t h s c e p t i c i s m . Nor, it i s worth n o t i n g , d i d

W i t t g e n s t e i n t h i n k t,hey were;

"But a f t e r a l l , n e i t h e r does t h e s o l i p s i s t want any p r a c t i c a l ad van tag^ when he advances h i s view.!'

(P.I., p.403.)

cha l l eags then r e f u t e him? Not i f oae succeeded i n doubting i n r e a l

cases . But even i f he d i d n ' t succeed, i t i s no t c l e a r t h a t t h i s would

r e f u t e him e i t h e r . Such i n s b i l i t y t o d o ~ b t i n r e a l ca ses might have any

number of explana t ions . Here i t i s worth r e c a l l i n g Bumets remarkable

d i scuss ion of t he r e l a t i o n s h i p between scept ic i sm and our common b e l i e f s

i n the T r e a t i s e (Bk.1, p t .4 . ) He mentions s e v e r a l f a c t o r s which, he

1 says prevent him from exe rc i z ing h i s scept ic i sm i n o rd ins ry l i f e , f o r

example, c s r s l e s s n e s s and i n a t t e n t i o n (p.21 8 . ) s o l i t u d e , abandonment,

d i sconso la t ion (p.264.) even the p l easu re of back-gammon (p . 269. ) And

t h e r e a r e , of course, many o the r p o s s i b i l i t i e s . He could r e a s o m b l y

main ta in i t was L i s weakness, t h a t h i s emotions and condi t ion ing inva r i ab ly

overcame h i s b e t t e r judgement, cr t h a t he feared the behavior of o t h e r s

towards him i f he d id e x e r c i s e h i s ph i lo soph ica l doubt ( ' these he f e a r s

need n ~ ? t be, of course, bel ieved t o be Persons) o r he might t h i n k h i s

dogbt though reasonable , i n s u f f i c i e n t r e a s m t o remain i n d i f f e r e n t t o

what might be the a c t u a l s u f f e r i n g s of o t h e r s ; a kind of Pasca l ian wager

on other-minds . So t h e f a c t t h a t it i s extrsmely d i f f i c u l t i n many cases t o doubt

a n o t h e r ' s pa in e t c e t e r a , d o e s n ' t upse t t h e s c e p t i c ' s p o s i t i o n . For

( a ) he needn ' t doubt o r ( b ) i f he does he needn ' t exe rc i se i t .

But W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s s i g n i f i c m t a t t a c k on the s c e p t i c ' s p o s i t i o n i s

i n h i s a s s e r t i o n t h a t "C" i n a r e a l case becomes meaningless i n t h a t i t

a s s e r t s no th ing an.3 den ie s nothing i n sach ord inary circumstances, t h a t

I r o n i c a l l y ? Ferhsps. But i rony , remember, c u t s more ways than ons.

i s , t h a t one who a s s e r t s o r d e n i e s "C" c o a l d g i v e n c answer t o t h e q u e s t i o n

"What d o you ~ e s n ? " which wculd amomt t o a n y t h i n g more t h a n a r e p i t i t i o n

of t h a t a s s e r t i o n o r d e n i a l . Th i s so_%nAs_ very much l i k e thn a t t a c k

b r m g h t a g a i n s t t h e s c e p t i c i n S e c t i o n I V ( a b o v e ) . W i t t g e n s t e i n w r i t e s :

l lSuppsse I say of a f r i s n d ; 'He i s n ' t an automaton' what i n f o r m a t i o n i s conveyed by t ' r i s an3 t o whon would i t be i n f o r m s t i o n ? To a human b e i n g who mes t s him i n o r d i n a r y c i rcumstances? What i n f o r m a t i o n could i t g i v e him? (At t h e v e r y most t h a t t h i s man a lwsys behaves l i k e a human b s i n g and n o t o x a s i o n a l l y l i k e a machine) 'I b e l i e v e t h a t he i s n ' t an automaton1, j u s t l i k e t h a t , s o f a r makes no s m s e ."

(P . I . , p.173.)

But n o t e he s a y s " S O f a r makes no sense ." But of c o u r s e t h e s c e p t i c

c l a i m s t o have g i v e n i t , and "C1' s ense . What sense? J u s t t h a t suggested

by W i t t g e n s t e i n i n ?.I., p.420., t h a t i s , t h a t i n s a y i n g of t h e c h i l d r e n

o r t h e f r i e n d they a r e n ' t automata one i s s a y i n g t h a t have what

automata l a c k , t h a t i s , consc iousness .

So t h e mesning of t h e s z e ? t i c 1 s s t a te inen t "C" i s t h a t ( a g a i n ) t h e

c h i l d r e n might l a c k consc iousness , o r b e t t e r , t h a t what one b e l i e v e s t o

be r s a l c h i l d r e n might n o t be, t h a t t h e grounds f o r t h a t b e l i e f a r e in -

adequs te . But r i g h t h e r e W i t t e n s t e i n mskes a s t r i k i n g and s i g n i f i c a n t

move .

"Ny a t t i t u d e to~,J .~Lds him i s an a t t i t u d e towards a s o u l . I am n o t af t h e op in ion t h a t he h a s a sou l . "

( p . 1 ., F.1r73.)

Wky "no t of t h e op in ionT1? An1 what d o s s W i t t g n n s t e i n mean h e r e by

"at t i t . l ;del '? How i s t h i s c r y p t i . c passage t o be unders tood? Answering t h e s e

q l e s t i o n s wmld be a r e a l s t e p towards an unders tand ing of W i t t g e n s t e i n

and, I t h i n k , towards a s o l u t i o n t o t h e problems of o t h e r minds.

L e t me beg in by sayirig tk,at I c a n ' t h e l p b u t t h i n k " a t t i t u d e 1 ' t o 3

wesk a w x d t o e x p r e s s W i t t g e n s t e i n l s t h o u g h t s h s r e , a f a c t which might

l e a d t o a misunders tand ing ( o r compls t e m i s s i n g ) o f t h e d i s t i n c t i o n

be ing msrked. What, e x a c t l y , j.. t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n ' ? I wznt t o s a y so.ns-

t h i n g l i k e : my o p i n i o n s a r e something I merely hsve o r d o n ' t hsve and

t o v a r y i n g d e g r e e s ; uiy a t t i t u i e i s c o n s t i t u t i v e of me. My o p i n i o n of a

pe rson i s what I t h i n k of him. I may be of t h e o p i n i o n t h a t he i s

dependable , t r u s t w o r t h y , overweight , somewhat p r e t e n t i o u s , a good g u i t a r

p l a y e r , more i n t e r e s t e d i n money t h a n ph i l3sophy and s o on. Opinions ars

on t h e s a n e s c a l e , and lower t h a n b e l i e f and knowledge. They may be

a l t e r e d i n t h e f a c e of f u r t h e r e v i d a ~ c e , may change from mere o? in ion t o

b e l i e f o r even kno-dledge. I f I hsve an o p i n i o n ' l may be r s a s o n a b l y asked

t o g ive a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of j t , r e a s o n s f o r h o l d i n g i t . But c a n ' t t h e

sane be s s i d of my a t t i t u d e s towsrd a n o t h e r p s r s o n ? I may have v a r i o u s

a t t i t u d e s towards him: r e s p e c t , contempt, f e a r , h a t r e d , f r i e n d l i n e s s t o

ment ion j u s t a few. Ny a t t i t u d e s t o o msy change and I may be asked t o

j u s t i f g them, tg g i v e r e a s o n s f o r hsv ing them, f o r example, Why do you

r e s ~ e c t that h y p o c r i t e ? "

Now, a l l of t h i s i s t r u e b u t h e r e a l s o m i s s e s t h e p o i n t . And an

e x p l a n s t i o n of w h s t h e s e f a c t s m i s s t h e p o i n t w i l l be a n e x p l a n a t i o n of

why I s a i d " a t t i t u d e 1 I s5emed t o o weak a word. Perhaps t h i s can be seen

by t r y i n g t o un-fers tand what kind of a t t i t u d e a n " a t t i t u - l e towards a

s u ~ l " i s . I t i s n o t a p s r t i c u l a r kin? of a t t i t u d e towards a n o t h e r b u t a

c a t e g o r y encompassing tiis p s r t i c u l a r a t t i t u d e s I might have towards

a n o t k r i n terms of which such p a r t i c u l a r a t t i t u d e s a r e t o be understood,

w i t h o u t which they would n o t be u ~ d e r s t ~ d a b l e . It i s a m a t t e r of s t a n c e

towards o r comoittment t o a n o t h e r , n o t t y p of s t a n c e o r form of committ-

ment. Nor i s i t p r i m a r i l y a m a t t e r of thought abou t a n o t h e r . I may

f a i l t o hsve an op in ion a b o ~ t a n n t h e r a s I msy f a i l t o have any p s r t -

i c u l a r a t t i t u d e towards him. But I may not f a i l t o have towards him a n

a t t i t u d e towards a s o u l . Even u t t e r i n d i f f e r e n c e i s , i n t h i s s e n s e , an

a t t i t u d s and one f o r which we have v a r i o u s nsmes, d i s t i n g u i s h i n g i t s

v a r i o u s modes, f o r example, l l c a l l o u s n e s s " , "co ldness" , "mauvsis f o i s . 'I Any s t a n c e I t a k e tnwards a n o t h e r p s r s o n i s a n a t t i t u d e t o x a r d s a s o u l , -

even t u r n i n g away. I t i s a m a t t e r of how I l o o k a t people , how I t r e a t

them, how I a m towards them and w i t h them.

A man c o n f r o n t s a n o t h e r , a p e r f e c t s t r a n g e r . Be may have, a s y e t ,

no o p i n i o n s about him, no p a r t i c u l a r a t t i t u d e s . ' Another marl msy immed-

i a t e l y form o p i n i c n s , have a t t i t u d e s , f o r example, he may t h i n k t h e o t h e r

l o o k s t h r s a t e n i n g and f e a r him. But both men b e t r a y and cannot f a i l t o

b e t r a y a n a t t i t u d e towards a s o u l . And i t ' s n o t t h a t t h e y c a n ' t as a

m a t t e r of f a c t f a i l , b - ~ t t h a t t h e y c a n ' t i~ a m a t t e r of what W i t t g e n s t e i n

c a l l e d "grammar." And t h i s i s a t t h e same t i m g a m s t t e r of how t h e y s e e ,

o r f a i l t o 533 t h e man. T h i s t e l l s u s what kind of a t t i t u d e " a t t i t u d e

towards a sou l" i s , what " a t t i t u d e towards a s o u l " means. I t c o n s i s t s i n

s e e i n g and t a k i n g o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l s a s p e r s o n s , a s human b e i n g s . And

t h i s i s n o t a m a t t e r of op in ion .

Say t h e y do, a s t h e s c e p t i c s a y s t h e y may, r e g a r d t h e s t r a n g e r as

a n automaton. Wit, tgenstein s a y s ;

"be ing a l i v i n g human being a s an autoinston i s analogous t o s e e i n g one f i g u r e a s a l i m i t i n g c a s e o r v a r i a n t of a n o t h e r , t h e c ross - p i e c e s of a window a s s swaz t ika f o r example." (P.I., p.420.)

What you s e e ? 1 , i k e l y a window. T o s s i b l y a swaz t ika , o r a c r o s s , o r t h e

c o r n e r of a c h s s s bosrd , o r p w t of a c h o c o l a t e b a r . Say a person l o a k s

a d does s e e s swaz t ika . P o s s i b l y he i s a Nazi, i s used t o s e i n g them. He

s e e s them e v e q w h e r e and they mean something tr, him. A p s i n t e r may s e e

forms everywhere. Xhst one s e e s depends t o s l a r g e e x t e n t on what one i s

i n t e r e s t e d i n , on o n e ' s h i s t c r y , e d u c a t i o n , background and s o on. Most

p e a ~ . l e wwAd see 5 window a s a window probsbl;. because they l e a r n about

windows b e f o r e p o l i t i c s and r e l i g i o n . T h i s i s n o t t o say t h a t those who

s e 3 sc lazt ikas a r e wrong. These t h i n g s can be seen t h e r e , b u t a l l t h e same

a window i s a window. I t i s n 3 t r e d l y a swaztTka.

Coqpnre s?oke=l words. Thes5 can be t aken a s mere sounds, o r even as

v i b r a t i o n s . A p3rson who d i d so would p robab ly have a s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t i n

them as s m n d s . ( ~ e might be a l i n g ~ i s t ) -r, h s might n o t know t h e language

i n which t h e y a r e spoken ( o r any language st a l l ) . But t h e spoken words of

a lang- age a r e n o t , f o r a l l t h a t , mers sounds o r " r s a l l y " mere v i b r a t i o n s .

And one who s o took t3em wto f a i l e d t o t a k e them, f o r whatever r e a s o n , a s

words, would n o t unders tand what was being s a i d , what t h e words s a i d , o r

meant.

What a b o ~ t s e e i n g a person a s an automaton? Well , t h i s i s a p o s s i b l e

i f impover i sh ing , way of look ing a t o t h e r s . Ayer h a s s5own t h a t t h e sap-

p 2 s i t i o n t h a t wbat we t a k e a s p? rsans a r e r e 3 l l y automata i s n o t nonsens-

i c a l . But t o do s o i s t c t ake a n o t h e r a s s " l i m i t i n g c a s e o r v a r i a n t of

a n o t h s r , " a p s r s x a s an a u t o m ~ t m . And t o s s y t h a t e i t h e r way of t a k i n g

them i s t o have ?I-, h t t i t d - l e towards a s o u l i s t o say t h a t t h e concept of

pe rson i s pr ina r ; , t a s i ~ , 3rd s 1 take;: i n e s c a p s b l e . One might say t h a t no

m a t t e r how we t a k e tk.er,, Fsrsorls & r e p e r s o n s . F a i l u r e ( f o r r e a s o n s ) t o s o

t a k e them i s t c f s i l t o u r L l e r s t m J trem ( a s w i t ? wzrds as wards) and we

ars h2l-l r e s p m s i bli. ( r iot on1 J m c r a l l v bu t ramm ma tic all/) f o r any a l t e r n -

- 2 tr,ern. a t i v e wsy of t~ik;L~=

Ons might, l e a r n t h a t wnat ? r e i? f a c t F5rsons a r e " r e a l l y " on ly

automata, be taup'ct t h a t t h e y a r e automata rnd grov up s o t a k i n g them.

( ~ r a ~ i c s i m i l a r i t i e s r m be seen i n t h e c a s e s of what was t a u g h t o r l e a r n e d

by young Greeks of s l a v e s , ? . az i s cf Jews, y?ung Alabamans of b l a c k s ) . But

u n l e s s t h e o t h e r s l e s r n e 3 t h i s t o o , and accepted t h e i r r o l e s he would have

a d i f f i c u l t t ime keeping h i s b e l i e f ( cou ld he r e a l l y i g n o r e t h e i r l a u g h t e r ,

c o n t e m ~ t , d s s i r e s , words, f eLna les , mental i n s t i t u t i o n s . . .) But i f m e wguld

have a bard t ime keeping tlre b e l i e f t h a t o t h e r s were automata when o r i g i n a l l y

t a u g h t t h s t they werP, hod mijcn more d i f f i c u l t t o u n l e a r n t h a t t h e y a r e

pe rsons . For t h i s would i n v o l v e t ak ing , s s e i n g as b a s i c , a s t h e r e , mere

b o d i l y mo.\rernents r a t h e r t h a n what wa & s e e , t h a t i s , ) e x p r e s s i v e behav ior

and a c t i o n s , human b s h a v i o r . What i s i t t c s e e , what i s involved i n s e e i n g

hunan bshav ior?

Imsgine a young msn a w a i t i n g t h e a r r i v a l of h i s beloved. There i s a

knock a t t h e door , he r u s h s s t o answer . . . . . the o f f i c e r s t a n d i n g t h e r e s e a s

t h e f a c e of t h e young msn a s he opens, se?s h i s e x p r e s s i o n of joyous expec-

t a t i o n change t o bewilderment, t h e n t o unspeakable g r i e f a s h e t e l l s him of

t h e wet road and ho-,J t h e t r u c k d r i v e r t r i e d t o sdarve o u t of t h s pa th of

h e r madly sk idd ing ca r . . . There i s no doubt t h a t t h e o f f i c e r d o e s n o t s e e

- 7 mers movemxts zf : 'dcial r w s c i 5 s . 2 2 see: t h e e x p r e s s i o n o; t h e f a c e a s

hsv ing a c e r t a i n s i g r L i f i c a n n e se2s i t a s g r i e f , human g r i e f . And g r i e f i s

a c o i c e p t a c q u i r e d , a s c m c e ~ ts s r e , wi th tr,e a z q u i s i t i o n of l angusge . Witt~s .1~ k i n c e n 3 t z i ~ e i v e r n p r ~ ~ i z e s a d t a k e s s e r i o - a s l v t n e f a c t t h s t we

b s g i n cJr l i v e s a s c h i l d r e n ( a s ~ r ~ r i s i n g l y l i t t l e emphasized a s p s c t of

W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s l ? t e r philosopi-y : a n o t a b l e e x c e p t i o n , Sts is, C a ~ e l l ,

"Exis:ential ism a r~d A n s l y t i c ~ l - i l o s o ~ h ~ " ) . We l e a n t c use words, and

t h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l v t r u e of M . T . s , i n s i t u a t i o n s where we a r e more a c t i v e

p w t i c i p r n t s t h s r ~ s s s i v e o b s s r v 3 r s . 'dc s . m ~ z t l ~ i z e w i t h g r i e f , r a t l l r n l o g e

r e c o i l from h a t r e d and sc on. O f course we a l s o r a a c t i n ways o t h e r t h a n

t h e s e t y p i c a l w3ys ( though it i s impor tan t t h a t t h s s e ways ars t g p i c s l ) .

B a t t h e p o i n t i s t h s t we d c n ' t merely observe , o r observe t h e n i n f e r .

Les rn ing t o see h u m a ~ b e h s v i o r a s kxprnss ive i s l i k e l e s r n i n g t o r s s d , an3

humsn b e h s v i o r i s l i k e l s n g m g e .

But t o say "w? s s e g r i s f i n t n e f a c e cf t h e o t h e r " whi le t r u e may be

m i s l e a j i n g . I t may, f c r exanyle l e s d u s i n t g t h e " d e n i a l ?f f e s l i n g s . "

But were one t o b e l i e v ~ , he c o u l ~ l l i t e r a l l y see_ a l l t h e r e was t o g r i e f , he

wouldn ' t know what it was, t h a t " g r i e f " meant. T h i s t r d s n b r i n g s o u t , I

t h i n k , t h e i m p x t ,ant t r ~ ~ t h i n t h e t r a d i t i o r i a l a r g ~ m s n t from Anology . Fo?

i f t h e o f f i c e r i n tk,e ~ r e v i c i l s example had never f e l t g r i e f , o r a n y t h i n g

l i k e i t , he w o g l d n t t r s s l l y unilerstand what was be ing expressed . Suoh

examples can be m u l t i p l i e d i n d e f i n i t e l y , i n f s c t many a r e themselves al-

most c l i c h e s about human f e e l i n g s - t h e r ick. d o n ' t know what hunger i s ,

most of u s d m ' t know what l o v e i s , o r s .~ffer ing,weight lessness and s o on.

( ~ h o u g h t h e r e are o t h e r ways of f i n d i n g o u t abou t t h e s e f e s l i n g s wi thou t

having them; a r t i s ~ e r h a p s t i e s J p r s a e e x a n p l e ) . And i t i s i m p w t a n t t o

I r e a l i z e , i f t h e o f f i c e r had f a l t g r i e f and knew what i t was he exps r ienced ,

what he must h o w a b w ~ t i t . 5 e m u s t kxod what i t would mean t o say of

a n o t h e r t h a t he f e l t g r i e f , f o r ths meaning of " g r i e f " i s t h e same i n f i r s t

and o t h e r p s r s o n a s c r i p t i o i l s ( abovs, p. 56) must kno-,.! t h a t o t h e r s a s c r i b e

i t t o him on %he b a s i s of h i s behav ior and t h a t he must a s c r i b e i t t o

o t h e r s on t h e b a s i s of t h e i r behsv ior . He f e 3 l s h i s g r i e f b - ~ t d o s s n l t

n e c e s s a r i l y s s e i t , o t h e r s s e 3 it and n e c e s s a r i l y , d o n ' t f e e l i t . Such

f a c t s a r e t aken i n t o a c c o m t by t h e Argument f ram Analogy. Doss t h i s mean

w s need t h e a r g m e a t t o j u s t i f y c a r c l a i m s abou t knowledge of o t h e r minds?

D e s p i t e t h e l a r g e nmber of arguments and a t t e m p t s t o show t h e Argument

f o r Analogy i n a d e y , ~ a t e , i n c o h e r e n t e t c , I 'rn n o t s d r e t h a t i t i s . Ayer,

i n s e v e r a l a r t i c l e s h a s g iven w f . a t seem t o me p l a u s i b l e , i f n o t f u l l y con-

v i n c i n g d e f e n s s s a g a i n s t t h s s s a t t a c k s . Th2ss i s s u e s a r ? beyond t h e scopa

of t h i s p a p e r . But i t c m be s a i d t h a t whether o r n o t t h e Argument from

Analogy can work we d o n ' t need i t . F o r t h e s imple t r u t h i s t h a t wa d m ' t

u s e i t and were w s t o use i t t h e r e i s no r s a s o n t o t h i n k we would ( o r

shou ld) be any more c e r t a i n t h a t i t i s a v z l i d argument t h e n I would be

t h a t Helga, b i t t e n by t h e S c o t t i e , was i n p s i n . B l u n t l y I c a u l d n ' t be

more c e r t a i n t h a n I am aboxt that. And i t i s t h i s c e r t a i n t y , which I hsve

(and hsd w i t h o ~ t even h e a r i n g qf t h e Argument f r ~ m ~ n a l o ~ ~ ) which t h e

s c e p t i c c h a l l e n g e d . I t i s wi th t h e grounds of t h i s c e r t a i n t y w s =e con-

ce rned .

The way i n wniqh I a c q ~ i r e d my m e n t a l i s t i c vocabu la ry , t h a t i s a s

c h i l d - a c t o r i n s i t u a t i o n s r a t h e r t h a n as s ~ e c t a t o r a t e x h i b i t i o n s a l l o w s

fo- t h e p m s i b i l i t y of my be ing a b l e t o a s c r i b e M.T.s t o o t h e r s wi thou t

having had t h e r e l e v a n t exper ience myse l f . But I waul~dn' t f u l l y know what

I was saying of o t h e r s wauldnt t knox what tile express ive behavior was ex-

p re s s ive o f . What we l e a r n arid cor robora te i n our own expsr ience i s t h s t ,

f o r example, g r ie f -behrv ior i s exprsss ive of g r i e f . WS d o n ' t l e a r n t h a t

such behavior i s always express ive of g r i e f or t h a t g r i e f i s always

expressed. But i f no t e x p r s s s ~ d , then it i s held back. To not express

o2e1s g r i e f i s t o do something.

Yet t h e f a c t t h a t c e r t a i n behavior exp2sssive of g r i e f i s cont,in-

gent . Our bodies being how they a r s we could express g r i e f va r ious ways.

And were our bodies r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t we would behsve d i f f e r e n t l y . I f ,

f o r example, everyone resembled r a t h e r l a r g e eggs we would have t o express

g r i e f d i f f e r e n t l y . &J d i f f e r s n t o m bodies could be f o r u s t o remain

psrsons I d o n ' t know. To decide t h i s ques t ion would r e q u i r e a f u l l in-

v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o the concept of a person. But i t i s c l e a r t h a t our bodies

coxld be somewhat d i f f e r m t and t h s t some d i f f e r e n c e s would make a d i f -

fe rence i n how we behave bu t not n e c e s s a r i l y i n how we f e e l . More t o t he

p o i n t i s t h a t given the bodies we do have i t i s q u i t e poss ib l e , even

r e a d i l y conceivable t h a t g r i e f - s t r i c k e n people, o r people with earaches,

cease behaving i n t he way they do and e i t h e r ( a ) behave i n a d i f f e r e n t y e t

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c way ( a new c h a r a c t e r i s t i c way) o r ( b ) come t o behave i n no

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c way a t a l l o r ( c ) behave i n va r ious d i f f e r e n t and charac te r -

i s t i c ways.

Such p o s s i b i l i t i e s a r e suggested by Wit tgens te in ( P .I., p .l,!J. ) w!~ere he

spsaks s p s c i f i c a l l y of ( b ) :

"And i f t h ings were q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from what they a c t u a l l y a r e - i f t h e r e were, f o r i n s t ance , no c h a r a c t e r i s t i c express ion of p s in , of f e a r , of joy; if ru l e becane except ion and except ion r d e ; o r i f both becaqe phenomena of roughly equal frequency - t h i s would mske O W normal language gsmes l o s e t h e i r po in t - t he precedent of

p u t t i n g a l m p of cheese on a balance and f i x i n g the weight by the t u r n of the sca l e would loose i t s po in t i f it f r e q u e n t l y ksppened f o r such lumps t o suddenly grow or shr ink f o r no obvious reason."

Nothing in su res t h a t such th ings don ' t occur, t h a t i s , t h e r e i s no l o g i c a l

o r ph i losophica l reason why these th ings must be and remain a s they a r e .

That they a r e a s they a re , t h a t i s , t h a t t he re a r e the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c - express ions of g r i e f , pain, joy, f e a r e t c e t e r a . That t h e r e a r e , i s , a s

i s the f a c t t h a t lumps of cheese d o n ' t suddenly and haphazardly grow or

sh r ink i s what Wittgenstein r e f e r r ed t o a s a "general f a c t of nature"

(note : p.56, P t . l . , P.I.2, Sec. XII.) Upon such genera l f a c t s , such

widespread contingencies a s these r e s t s t he formation and s i g n i f i ~ a n c e

of our concepts. They give our language games t h e i r po in t . Wi t tgens te in

w r i t e s t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t of the philosopher i n t hese genera l f a c t s of

na tu re i s not t h a t of the n a t u r a l s c i e n t i s t o r h i s t o r i a n , f o r "we can

a l s o inven t f i c t i t i o u s n a t u r a l h i s t o r y f o r oar purposes" ( F t .2, ~ e c .XIT .)

Whst purposes? To answer J b A quest ion would be t o say what Wi t tgens te in

understood as "the purpose of philosophy", a quest ion t o which there i s

no (one) answer. But one of the purposes and one of t he p o i n t s of

W i t t g e n s t e i n t s f i c t i t i o u s n a t u r a l h i s t o r y , of h i s parables and jokes and

I imaginary language games i s t o ge t us t o see d i f f e r e n c e s and i n so doing

t o acqui re uperspicuous representa t ions" of " the way we look a t th ings"

(P.I., p.122.) We do look a t c e r t a i n behavior a s express ive of g r i e f ,

I owe t o Michael Tanner knowledge of the s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t t h a t

Wi t tgens te in had thought of using, a s the "motto" of the I n v e s t i g a t i o n s

t h i s quo ta t ion from Kine: Lear, "1 w i l l teach you d i f fe rences ."

though t h e r e i s no n e c e s s i t y about e i t h e r the f a c t t h a t we do o r t h a t i t

i s . The c r u c i a l ques t ion i s what i t would be l i k e i f we d i d n ' t o r i f

t h e r e wasn ' t . What d i f f e r e n c e would t h i s make t o our concepts, language,

thought and l i v e s and what can we l e a r n from such cons ide ra t ions about

what we say and do, about our way of looking a t t h ings .

I n P a r t 11, p.233 of t he I n v e s t i g a t i o n s Wit tgens te in says t h i s ;

"We a l s o say of some people t h a t they a r e t r anspa ren t t o us . i t i s a l s o important however a s r ega rds t h i s observa t ion t h a t one human being can be a complete enigma t o another . We l e a r n t h i s when we come i n t o a s t r ange country wi th e n t l r e l y s t range t r a d i t i o n s ; and what i s more even given a mastery of t he count ry ls language. We 30 not understand t h e people. ( ~ n d not because of no t knowing what they a r e saying t o themselves .) We cannot f i n d our f e e t with them."

I n h i s pene t r a t ing and u s e f u l a r t i c l e , ' I 1 T h e A v a i l a b i l i t y of

W i t t g e n s t e i n l s La te r Philosophy" S tan ley Cave l l no te s t h a t i n German the

las t sentence of the above employs an idicm which l i t e r a l l y says:

"de cannot f i n d ourse lves i n them." (Cavel l , p.179; my emphasis)

Personal knowledge c o n s i s t s i n f i n d i n g ourse lves i n o the r s , being ab le

t o speak t o and f o r o the r s . How do we f i n d ourse lves i n o t h e r s and

o t h e r s i n ourselves? To r e f e r back t o our example of g r i e f ; t o under-

s tand the g r i e f of another i s t o acknowledge i t . (1n some unpublished

no te s Wit tgens te in says t h a t knowledge, i n the end, comes t o acknowledgment.)

And while I am f r e e t o r e e ~ c n d i n any number of ways t o ano the r ' s g r i e f ,

I a m not f r e e no t t o acknowledge i t . Again, whatever s tance I t,ake

towards a person i s an a t t i t u d e towards a sou l . I sa id before t h a t t h i s

was a "grammatical" renark , not an empir ica l one. It i s now time t o see

more f u l l y j u s t what t h a t comes t o .

O u r r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o o t h e r s , t a k e t h e e a r l y s i t u a t i o n s i n which

we acqu i red our m e n t a l i s t i c vocabu la ry a r e n o t s t a t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s of

mutual o b s e r v e r s b u t dynamic ones of mutual a c t o r s o r a g e n t s , o f pe rsons .

T h i s n o t i o n of agency o r personhood i s more t h a n d e e p l y inbedded i n our

language. O u r language is a language of agency, a human language.

Nor i s "agency" r e v e a l e d on ly i n our m e n t a l i s t i c vocabu la ry . We speak

o f houses, r o a d s , t o o l s , v iewpoin t s , h o r i z o n s , n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s , food,

o b s t a c l e s . . . We s e e t h o s e a s p e c t s and f e a t u r e s of t h i n g s , t h o s e u s e s

of t h i n g s w i t h which we i n t e r - r e l a t e i n c o u n t l e s s ways and i n which we

have a n i n t e r e s t .

Our language i s s a t u r a t e d i n and animated by our humanity ( n o t

humanity. ) Language bespeaks t h e e x i s t e n c e of o t h e r s .

The " P r i v a t e Lsnguage Argument" a t t e m ~ t e d t o prove, from t h e f a c t

t h a t t h e r e s language, t h s t t h e r e must ( l o g i c a l l y ) be " o t h e r minds."

What I have be5n s a y i n g i s t h a t , i f you l i k e , t h e f a c t t h a t our language

i s l i k e i t i s r e v e a l s t~ u s t k a t t h e r e a r e o t h e r p e r s o n s . But t h e f a c t s

I n o t s a r e n o t t o be t a k e n a s s "proof" , i n any o r d i n a r y sense of t h e

word. I have t r i s d t o show t h a t such a l tp roof l ' i s n o t t o be had. But

i t d o e s n ' t have t o b e ; whick b r i n g s u s back t o W i t t g e n s t e i n .

P robab ly t h e most famous, misunderstood and misapp l ied n o t i o n s i n

W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s l a t e r phi losophy a r e t h e c l o s e l y r e l a t e d ones of "language

ganest t and "forms of l i f e . " A ~ p l y i n g t h e s e concep t s t o what I have been

say ing , I might kave s a i d t h a t t o unders tand t h e n a t u r e and j u s t i f i c a t i o n

of t h e a s c r i p t i o n of M.T.s t o o t h e r s i t i s n e c e s s a r y n o t t o e x p l a i n why,

t o j u s t i f y what we do b u t t o n o t s t h e language-games we p l a y w i t h our

M.T.s, t h a t t h e p r o p e r r e p l y t o t h e s c e p t i c ' s i n c e s s a n t q u e s t i o n i n g i s

s imply t o p o i n t o u t t o him what we d o and i f asked t o j u s t i f y t h a t t o r u s h

o u t my copy of t h e I n v e s t i ~ a t i o n s and d e c l a r e :

" I f I have exhausted t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n I have reached bedrock and my spade i s t u r n e d . Then I am i n c l i n e d t o s a y ' t h i s i s s imply what I dof . I f (?.I., p.217.)

To e x p l a i n t o him referab ably i n solemn v o i c e ) t h a t ;

"What h a s t o be accep ted , t h e g iven , i s - s o one could say - forms of l i f e . " ( P . I . 11, p.226.)

What I have been t r y i n g t o say might have been s a i d l i k e t h i s , and i f I ' m

r i g h t , what I have been say ing i s a t l e a s t i n t h e s p i r i t of what

W i t t g e n s t e i n meant. T h i s d o e s n ' t prove t h e e x i s t e n c e of o t h e r minds, or

j u s t i f y our c l a i m s t o know them. But n o r d b e s i t f a i l t o d o s o . What I

mean by t h i s can be seen by showing ( a ) why i t d o e s n ' t prove any th ing ,

and ( b ) what i t does do. And i n s o do ing I hope t o show what I t h i n k

a r e two s e r i o u s l y mis taken ways of t a k i n g W i t t g e n s t e i n remarks . I w i l l

t h e n conclude by say ing what I t h i n k t o be a more c o r r e c t way of t a k i n g

them and showing why even if n o t a " t r u e " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of W i t t g e n s t e i n

it one which w i l l r e p a y i n v e s t i g a t i o n .

My f i r s t e x a m ~ l e of how & t o r e a d and u s e t h e n o t i o n s of "language-

game" and "form of l i f e " comes from Norman Malcolm's "Anselmls O n t o l o g i c a l

Arguments" ( i n A . P l a n t i n g a ( e d ) The O n t o l o ~ i c a l Argument . Here we f i n d

Malcolm d i s c u s s i n g t h e p r o p o s i t i o n "God n e c e s s a r i l y e x i s t s " s p e c i f i c a l l y

a t t e m p t i n g t o defend i t a g a i n s t what he ( m i s t a k e n l y ) t a k e s t o be Humens

o b j e c t i o n t o t h e "Onto log ica l Argument," namely t h e c l a i m t h a t " l o g i c a l

n e c e s s i t y merely r e f l e c t s t h e use of words ." "God n e c e s s a r i l y e x i s t s , "

s a y s Malcolm, c l a i m s t o be an e x c e p t i o n t o t h a t view and must be examined

on i t s own mer i t s . He says "we must look a t t h e use of words and not

manufactuse a p r i o r t h e s i s about it" (p.153) which he proceeds t o do i n

t h e fo l lowing remarkable passage on t h e Nineteenth Psalm.

" 'Before t he mountains were brought f o r t h , o r ever thou hads t formed the e a r t h and world, even from e v e r l a s t i n g t o e v e r l a s t i n g thou a r t God.' Here i s expressed the idea of t h e necessary ex i s t ence and e t e r n i t y of Gcd , an ides which i s e s s e n t i a l t o t he J ~ w i s h and C h r i s t i a n r e l i g i o n s . In these complex systems of thought, these

1 language games,' God has t he s t a t u s of a necessary being. Who can doubt t h a t ? Here we must say, with Wit tgens te in ; 'The language-game i s p l a y e d ' . I be l i eve we might r i g h t l y t ake the ex i s t ence of t hese r e l i g i o u s systems of thought i n which God f i g u r e s a s a necessary being t o be disproof of the dogma t h a t no e x i s t e n t i a l p ropos i t i on can be necessary .I1 ( p .l53.)

An i n c r e d i b l e b i t of reasoning. Of course we can say with Wit tgens te in

( o r anyone e l s e f o r t h a t ma t t e r ) t h a t " t h i s language-game i s played."

Obviously i t i s : if i t weren ' t t he problems and ques t ions about t he

"Ontological Argument" and God s "necessary ex is tence" wouldnl t a r i s e .

But nothing i s gained by saying t h i s . Of course t h e r e a r e " r e l i g i o u s

systems of thought" i n which God f i g u r e s a s a "necessary beingn but s o a r e

t hese "systems of thought" i n which God doesn ' t s o func t ion and i n which

he d o e s n ' t f unc t ion a t a l l . On Malcolm's reasoning these might j u s t a s

we l l be taken a s proofs of " the dogma t h a t no e x i s t e n t i a l p ropos i t ion

can be necessary." On h i s reasoning any language-game i n which the pro-

p o s i t i o n "no e x i s t e n t i a l p ropos i t ion can be necessary" has t h e s t a t u s of

a t r u e propos i t ion proves, merely by being, t h a t no e x i s t e n t i a l pro-

p o s i t i o n can be necessary.

Furthermore t h e r e a r s language-games i n which two, t h ree , many Gods

f l a t e a r t h s , witches, c o n t r o l of human a c t i o n by t h e p o s i t i o n of t he

heavenly bodies , Super-Sargasso Seas enveloping t h e e a r t h are e s s e n t i a l .

(See Char les F o r t : 'The Book of t he Damned' f o r a l l s o r t s of e s s e n t i a l

f e a t u r e s of va r ious f a s c i n a t i n g language-ganes) . Malcclm g ives no reason

f o r c ls iming the Judeo-Chr is t ian language-gane more on to log ica l ly

pr iv i leggd i n t h i s way than any o t t e r . And on h i s argument, i f God comes

they come; i f m y go, so m i l s t God. The f a c t t h a t t h e r e i s a language-

game does not p 3 v 9 t h a t m y being e s s e n t i a l t o t h a t game e x i s t s . Nor

does t h e f a c t , made much of by Malcolm i n t h i s same a r t i c l e , t h a t a s

Wi t tgens te in noted, '!cur language-games have 3 point. '! Of course the

C h r i s t i a n language-game, i f i t must be so-cal led, has a po in t , has mean-

i ng f o r C h r i s t i a n s (no t t o mention n o n - ~ h r i s t i a n s ) . But b e l i e f , however

meaningful o r f e r v e n t l y held j u s t d o e s n ' t e s t a b l i s h t r u t h .

But n e i t h e r a r e t h ings made any b e t t e r by saying, a s far example,

David Pole does i n 'The L a t e r Philosophy of Wi t tgens te in , ' :

"That a language-game i s played i s no more than a ma t t e r of f a c t , i t i s always conceivable t h a t i t should not have been played. I t may be said t h a t t he ques t ion r a i s e d is, a s t o whether it ought t o be played and t h i s formulat ion - one t h a t Wi t tgens te in does n o t d i s c u s s - comes nearer I be l i eve t o t h e h e a r t of t h e matter ."

Wi t tgens t e in d o e s n t t d i s c u s s whether our language-games ought t o be played

and i t should be c l e a r t h a t such a ques t ion i s nowhere near t h e h e a r t of

t h e ma t t e r with which we ( o r ~ i t t ~ e n s t e i n ) be now concerned. Cave11

remarks t h a t asking whether our language games ought t o be played would

amount t o asking whether human beings ought t o behave a s t he c r e a t u r e s we

t h i n k of a s human o r whether the world ought t o be d i f f e r e n t from what i t

i s ("The A v a i l a b i l i t y of W i t t gens t e in l s L a t e r Philosophy, " p.158. )

W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s concern i s with what d i f f e r e n c e i t would make i f t he

genera l f a c t s of na tu re by which the formation of our concepts can be

explained and which expla in the s ign i f i cance of our concepts were

d i f f e r e n t , & what t he cons idera t ion of such poss ib l e a l t e r n a t i v e s shows

us about t h e concepts we have, about our 1ar:guage and our l i v e s . The

ques t ions with wk.ick1 Wit tgensteir , i s concerned a r e not whether we ought

t o be l i eve i n God o r a s c r i b e 14.T.s t o o t h e r s but what t hese th ings mean,

what i t i s we a r e doing when we do; t o ge t u s t o see c l e a r l y what we do

and how we look a t t h ings . Tc see what we a r e .

One of my ob jec t ions t o Malcolmts use of t h e not ion of a "language

g a ~ e " was t h a t i f the C h r i s t i a n language-game Froves the ex i s t ence of

God, anc ther language-game can disprove i t 2nd we end up proving both

H i s ex i s t ence and non-existence by t h e same argument. This , bes ides being

absurd i n i t s e l f a l s o impl ies t h a t Malcolm sees (here anyway) language-

games a s being, a s i t were, s e ~ a r a t e and autonomous quasi-organisms

("systems of thought") with sharp ly demarcated boundaries, i n the case

of C h r i s t i a n i t y f o r i n s t ance c l e a r l y d iv id ing a ' s a c r e d i n s i d e from the

profane ou t s ide . But t h i s i s not only wi ld ly u n f a i t h f u l t o W i t t g e n s t e i n t s

words ( see e s p e c i a l l y P .I., p .65 - 75 on "games" and llfamily-resemblances")

b u t j u s t f a l s e . Our language-games a r e , on t h e cont ra ry , i n t e r - r e l a t e d ,

inter-dependent with no c l e a r boundaries. And t h e whole; human language

and the a c t i o n s i n t o which it i s woven i s as complex a s i s human l i f e .

Most s e r i o u s C h r i s t i a n s would, I daresay, be more than a l i t t l e

offended a t Malcolmts p i c t u r e of them a s enclosed wi th t h e i r t i g h t l y

i s o l a t e d , wholly i n s u l a t e d , "language-game." A C h r i s t i a n i s a t the same

t ime a person and ( a t the r i s k of being misunderstood 1'11 say) a person

f i r s t and a C h r i s t i a n a f t e r the f a c t , and a s a person i s a p a r t i c i p a n t

i n a more encompassing, all-encompassing "language-game", t h a t i s , h i s

whole language. Now, a s God f i g u r e s a s an e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e of t he

C h r i s t i a n language-game, so persons f i g u r e a s e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e s of

what might be ca l l ed t h e hwr-an language game, or l e s s p re t en t ious -

sounding, language-game. And j u s t a s t h e C h r i s t i a n language-game

d o e s ~ l t prove by i t s mere ex i s t ance the ex i s t ence of God, n e i t h e r does

our language-gme prove t h e existerice of other-minds, though i t i s j u s t

worth not ing t h a t while God i s s f e a t - m e of only the one game, r e l a t i n g

t o and f r e q u e n t l y c o n f l i c t i n g with o the r s , persons a r e presupposed i n

language i t s e l f . Nor does the p o i n t of our language-game prove t h e

ex i s t ence of other-minds any more tban the po in t of t he C h r i s t i a n one

proves t h e ex i s t ence of God. 'dhat, anyway, could be ca l l ed the po in t

of e i t h e r language-game?

The s c e p t i c says we be l i eve i n o the r minds; then ques t ions t h a t

b e l i e f . Malcolm as seve ra t e s t h a t we do, and saps the re fo re t h e r e can be

no ques t ion . To say t h a t our problems about other-minds (if we go so f a r

t o admit them a s problems) presuppose an unproblematic contex t ("language-

game", "form of l i f e " ) w i t h i r ~ which o r a g a i n s t which such problems a r i s e

i s t o l eave unexamined and unc la r i f i ed the very meaning of "context" ,

"language-game" and 'If orm of l i f e . I1 To c a r r y out such an examination i s

t o ask what i t i s t o t ake sonetking a s unproblematic. And t h i s r e q u i r e s

a s h i f t i n pe r spec t ive , away from an a t t i t u d e of acceptance t o an

a t t i t u d e of r e f l e c t i o n , of i n v e s t i g a t i o n .

From such a pe r spec t ive i t then becomes poss ib l e t o see our use of

words, language-games, forms of l i f e ; t o ga in a perspicuous r ep re sen ta t ion .

We see the coimectinns which t h e r e a r e between words, between words and

a c t i o n s , and a l l t h e t h i n g s which go t o makt? up our l i f e . We see how

we look a t t h ings . Among the th ings we lock a t a r e persons.

We see c e r t a i n be ings as persons, some of t h e i r movements a s

a c t i o n s , t h e sounds they make a s words, t he changes i n t h e i r counten-

ances a s express ive . Taken t h i s way, t o say t h a t a l l we have d i r e c t

access t o i n the case of o the r minds i s what they say and do, t h e i r

behavior , i s j u s t t o say t h a t we have a l l we need and could poss ib ly

have. To see another sav ing and doing anything is t o see another person

and not t o observe t h a t va r ious sounds a r e escaping from a moving ob jec t

which i s merely before me.

There i s no n e c e s s i t y i n t h i s ( l o g i c a l or ph i losophica l ) beyond o r

beneath what we do. And t h a t we do it doesn ' t prove we a r e n ' t mistaken.

But t he f a c t t h a t t he re i s no n e c e s s i t y d o e s n ' t mean we can s e n s i b l y a sk

whether we ought t o do what we do, be what we a r e . There i s no ques t ion

of our ga ther ing toge the r and dec id ing e i t h e r t o cont inue i n our way o r

t r y something e l s e . The s c e p t i c ' s sugges t ions a r e n ' t nonsens ica l , bu t

nor were they intended t o be p r a c t i c a l l y appl ied e i t h e r i n how we see

o t h e r s o r as l i n g u i s t i c recommendations t o cease saying th ings l i k e "I

know s h e ' s i n pain" o r perhaps t o c r o s s our f i n g e r s when we do so. He

does po in t out t h a t personal i s o l a t i o n i s a s r e a l a f a c t and as must a - problem of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y a s a r e t h e f a c t s of cornmimication and

community. And taken s e r i o u s l y he f o r c e s u s t o come t o terms wi th both.

But if t h e s c e p t i c ' s c laims a r e no t nonsens ica l they are unbel ievable.

The ph i lo soph ica l r e f l e c t i o n which c o n s i s t s i n t he at tempt t o ga in under-

s tanding of what we take f o r granted b r ings t o t h e su r f ace t h e hidden,

o r f o r g o t t e n r o o t s of our knowledge of other-minds, t h e e x p e r i e n t i a l

b a s i s of t h i s knowledge, t he common everyday f a c t s about our growing

and l i v i n g toge the r with o the r s , which weave toge the r i n t o t h e p a t t e r n s

of our l i v e s . We f i n d ourse lves t he re , i f anywhere, i n o the r s .

XI11 CONCLUSION

The ph i lo soph ica l problem of "Other Minds" i s without doubt one of

t he most maddening, perplexing and exaspera t ing conundrums ever constructed

by man. Once i t has i t s hold on one i t becomes an obsession. Deny it , and

i t w i l l l e e r back a t you from the darkness t o which you have r e l ega t ed i t .

Try t o ignore i t and i t haunts you l i k e t h e phantom i n your childhood

c l o s e t . I t i s t h i s perhaps and the shocking absu rd i ty of t h e s c e p t i c ' s

c laims and conclusions which have engendered t h e somewhat h y s t e r i c a l

a t tempts t o solve i t , some of which I have discussed i n t h i s paper . Imagine

t r y i n g t o prove t h a t o the r persons e x i s t o r t h a t we can know t h a t another

i s i n pa in is a p e c u l i a r endeavour i f ever t h e r e was one - I have t r i e d

t o show i t a l s o very l i k e l y a f u t i l e one. There a r e problems ( r 3 a 1 ones)

about our knowledge of other-minds and t o deny these by misrepresent ing

them o r by d i s t o r t i n g or ignor ing c e r t a i n f a c t s about our m e n t a l i s t i c

vocabulary i s simply t o br ing the i s s u e s which if they d o n ' t worm t h e i r

own way back out w i l l be dug up a l l over aga in by o the r s . ( ~ h u s a r e

ph i lo soph ica l j ourna ls f i l l e d ) . H G W we have knowledge of o the r minds, a s c r i b e M.T . s t o o thers?

This i s a ques t ion about how we can do what we do. Wi t tgens te in sugges ts

t h a t what i s requi red i s a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e kind which g ives u s a c l e a r

view of words, a "perspicuous r ep re sen ta t ion" which enables u s t o see

connect ions and u l t i m a t e l y , the way we look a t t h ings and the very genera l

f a c t s of na tu re on which these th ings depend.

I have t r i e d t o suggest t h a t we look a t t h i n g s a s persons do and a t

o t h e r s a s persons. I have t r i e d t o show t h a t behavior, understood a s

p r i m a r i l y express ive behavior i s enough f o r t h e a s c r i p t i o n of M.T.s t o

o t h e r s and t h a t t he re i s nothing conceivable which could be added t o it

t o give u s a higher degree of what we would be content t o c a l l "personal

knowledge." Any d e s c r i p t i o n of language which f a i l e d t o inc lude t h i s

primacy of t he personal would no t be a d e s c r i p t i o n of our language. But

how can a d e s c r i p t i o n of language prove t h e r e a r e o ther persons and t h a t

we can have knowledge of them? I wwld r a t h e r say t h a t i t r e v e a l s t h a t

t h e r e a r e o the r s , how and what i t means t o know them. What then i s l e f t

of the Problem of "Other Minds" and the worrying a s s e r t i o n s of t h e s c e p t i c ?

To each a cha l lenge . The problem i s n o t pseudo o r even n e c e s s a r i l y s i l l y .

I t i s r e a l and can be s e r i o u s . And by t h i s I d o n ' t mean a s an excuse i n

Woing p h i l ~ s o p h y . ~ ~ O u r problems about o the r minds may serve a s i n v i t a t i o n s

( o r make it a t o r t u o u s n e c e s s i t y ) t o i n v e s t i g a t e and see anew and more

c l e a r l y , our language, what we say and do, how we come t o know o the r s and

f i n d ourse lves i n o the r s . I t may sound odd o r even comic t o suggest t h a t

t h e s c e p t i c wi th in ourse lves may be our means t o self-knowledge. The ques t

f o r self-knowledge may i t s e l f be an odd or even comic a f f a i r . But t he f a c t

t h a t we dont t even know L h h seems d i s t u r b i n g l y suggest ive.

L i s t of References

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Ayer, Alfred J.

Cavel l , S.

F o r r e s t , T .

F o r t , C .

Hume, David

Kant , Imrnanuel

Kenny, Anthony

Malcolm, Norman

-

Pole, David

Ryle, G i l b e r t

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