The Ploughshares Monitorploughshares.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/2013autumnweb.pdfThe Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 2013 5 In 2010 it appointed a Director of Global Defence Sales

The Ploughshares Monitor | Sum- 1

Ploughshares MonitorThe

Canadian arms exportsexamining Canada’s push

into new markets

Iran’s nuclear programA Q&A with an expert

on nuclear weapons

SomalilandA study in the potential

of indigenous resources

Global armed conflictsThe 2013 Armed Conflicts

Report summary

AUTUMN 2013 | VOLUME 34 | ISSUE 3

A quarterly publication of Project Ploughshares • Available online: www.ploughshares.ca

Lessons

InsIde: Teaching Resources pullout section

from the classroom

Canada’s push into new arms marketsHow Ottawa is helping the military industry.by Kenneth Epps

The Ploughshares MonitorVolume 34 | Issue 3

The Ploughshares Monitor is the quarterlyjournal of Project Ploughshares, the peace centre of The Canadian Council of Churches.Ploughshares works with churches, nongovernmental organizations, and governments, in Canada and abroad, to advance policies and actions that preventwar and armed violence and build peace. Project Ploughshares is affiliated with the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies,Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo.

Office address: Project Ploughshares57 Erb Street WestWaterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2 Canada519-888-6541, fax: [email protected]; www.ploughshares.ca

Project Ploughshares gratefully acknowledgesthe ongoing financial support of the many individuals, national churches and church agencies, local congregations, religious orders,and organizations across Canada that ensurethat the work of Project Ploughshares continues.

We are particularly grateful to The Simons Foundation in Vancouver for its generous support.

All donors of $50 or more receive a complimentary subscription to The Ploughshares Monitor. Annual subscription rates for libraries and institutionsare: $30 in Canada; $30 (U.S.) in the UnitedStates; $35 (U.S.) internationally. Single copiesare $5 plus shipping.

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Photos of staff by Karl Griffiths-FultonPrinted at Waterloo Printing, Waterloo, Ontario.Printed with vegetable inks on paper with recycled content.

We acknowledge the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Canada Periodical Fund of the Department of Canadian Heritage.

Contents

CoVer: A young girl attends a school near Bhairawaha, Rupandehi District, Nepal. Kate Holt/IRIN

Iran’s nuclear programQuestions and answers with Yousaf Butt.

by Cesar Jaramillo

TeAChInG reSourCeS

on PeACe AnD DISArMAMenT

2013 Armed Conflicts Report Summary

3

8

10

11

Autumn 2013Kenneth epps

Debbie hughes

Charmila Ireland

Tasneem Jamal

Cesar Jaramillo

Matthew Pupic

Wendy Stocker

Barbara Wagner

John Siebert Executive Director

PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES STAFF

TeAChInG reSourCeS

Lessons from the classroomby Anna Jaikaran

12

Shedding light on private security companies in the CaribbeanHighlights of a report by Project Ploughshares.

by John Siebert

15

SomalilandA study in the potential of indigenous resources.

by Christina Woolner

19

Cover story

The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 2013 3

Canada’s push into new arms markets

By Kenneth epps

A look at how the federal government is helpingCanada’s military industry find new export customers

Billed as the world’s leading

defence and security

event, the Defence & Se-

curity Equipment Interna-

tional (DSEI) exhibition

in the United Kingdom showcases mili-

tary equipment from around the world

every two years. In early September 2013

it boasted over 1,500 exhibitors and

30,000 visitors. The Canadian arms indus-

try was there, led by the Canadian Associ-

ation of Defence and Security Industries

in the Canada Pavilion.

The arms industry was not alone. The

Canada Pavilion identified several Gov-

ernment of Canada ‘partners’. These in-

cluded major federal government

departments: the Department of National

Defence (DND); Foreign Affairs, Trade

and Development Canada (DFATD); In-

dustry Canada; and Public Works and

Government Services Canada (PWGSC).

ABoVe: A prototype of the

Canadian pavillion at

the Defence & Security

Equipment International

exhibition in the U.K.

in September. GES UK

The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 20134

Also there were a host of federal agencies:

Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency,

Canada Economic Development for Que-

bec Regions, Federal Economic Develop-

ment Agency for Southern Ontario,

Western Economic Diversification

Canada, Export Development Canada,

and the Canadian Commercial Corpora-

tion (CCC). Representatives of these gov-

ernment partners and the Alberta and

B.C. governments formed a “Whole of

Government Working Group” to provide

a pavilion program “to educate both for-

eign and domestic companies on the serv-

ices our government departments offer”

(CADSI 2013).

The number and range of government

departments and agencies at the DSEI ex-

hibition illustrate recent efforts by the fed-

eral government to help Canada’s military

industry find new export customers. The

Canada Pavilion hosted trade commis-

sioner briefings on India, Jordan, the

UAE, and Israel as part of a larger federal

effort to assist Canadian military indus-

tries in opening new markets. Most di-

rectly involved of many federal agencies

and programs are CCC, DFATD, and

PWGSC.

The Canadian Commercial Corporation

The CCC is the preeminent national

agency supporting the commercial export

of military goods from Canada. A Crown

corporation, the CCC operates like a bro-

ker between Canadian companies export-

ing military goods and services and

foreign government buyers (see Epps

2011). As well as helping to land foreign

military sales, the CCC arranges back-to-

back contracts that provide guarantees for

both contract parties.

As the CCC acknowledges, military

sales to the U.S. Department of Defense

“form the backbone of CCC’s business”

(CCC 2011, p. 3) and have for more than

50 years. Arms exports south of the bor-

der are more valuable than all other mili-

tary exports combined. Under the terms

of the Defence Production Sharing

Agreement between the United States and

Canada, the CCC is required to act as the

prime contractor for all Canadian con-

tracts with the Pentagon valued at more

than $100,000. This service is paid for by

the Canadian taxpayer through annual ap-

propriations from Parliament.

With the Pentagon facing budget cuts

CCC is eagerly seeking sales elsewhere.

ABoVe: The Canadian

Commercial Corporation

arranged the recent sale of

12 Twin Otter aircraft

produced by Viking Air in

British Columbia to

the Ministry of Defence in

Peru. Viking Air

CAnADA’S ArMS eXPorTS


In 2010 it appointed a Director of

Global Defence Sales to promote Cana-

dian military exports in new markets. Ac-

cording to the Corporation’s CEO Marc

Whittingham, the CCC is presenting it-

self as an alternative to the U.S. Foreign

Military Sales program, offering service

that is “faster, quicker and more flexible

than the United States system” (Meyer

2011, p. 11). The approach has had suc-

cess. The CCC arranged the recent sale

of 12 Twin Otter aircraft produced by

Viking Air in British Columbia to the

Ministry of Defence in Peru. The first

aircraft was delivered in 2011. In January

the CCC (2013) announced that it had

brokered a U.S.$65.3-million deal to sup-

ply 24 armoured vehicles built by Gen-

eral Dynamics Land Systems Canada to

the Colombian Army.

To ease access to untapped military

markets, in the past year alone the Crown

corporation has signed memoranda of un-

derstanding with the Philippines (Depart-

ment of National Defence, November 12,

2012), Trinidad and Tobago (Ministry of

National Security, April 25, 2013), and

Peru (Ministry of Defence, May 22, 2013).

The government enthusiastically claimed

that these MoUs would create “opportuni-

ties for Canadian businesses” (PM of

Canada 2013).

The Department of Foreign Affairs,

Trade and Development

For decades DFATD has managed contra-

dictory responsibilities for Canada’s export

of military goods. On the one hand,

DFATD’s Export Controls Bureau is man-

dated to authorize or deny arms exports, a

responsibility that includes the “close con-

trol” of military goods or services that

could contribute to human rights viola-

tions, hostilities, or breaches of UN arms

embargoes. On the other hand, DFATD’s

trade programs are eager to secure sales of

Canadian products, including arms.1

Two recent developments suggest that,

if there is internal wrestling with this con-

tradiction, the trade promoters at DFATD

are winning. Parliamentary data released in

January 2012 on the value of authorized

export permits since 2006 shows that in

recent years DFATD has been approving

arms sales that have a much greater value

than the shipments actually made (Epps

2012). Export permits averaging over $5-

billion per year were approved during a

period when average annual arms ship-

ments totaled less than $500-million. The

data points to a permissive export control

regime that authorized military exports to

126 states between 2006 and 2011, includ-

ing exports worth tens of millions of dol-

lars to states at war (such as Algeria,

Thailand, and Turkey) or where there

were serious government-perpetrated

human rights violations (such as China,

Egypt, and Saudi Arabia). The evidence

suggests that Canadian arms exports are

constrained more by decisions of foreign

governments than by Canadian export

control guidelines.

The other development is the recent

expansion of the Automatic Firearms

Country Control List (AFCCL). The

AFCCL is a uniquely Canadian export

control tool designed to restrict the for-

eign market for Canadian-sourced auto-

matic firearms to eligible countries (see AI

& PP 2012). A country not on the

AFCCL is automatically disqualified from

receiving Canadian firearms. When the list

was first announced in 1991, only 13

countries were eligible. By 2001 the num-

ber of countries had increased by one. In

the subsequent 12 years, the number of

countries listed has more than doubled,

including 11 added in 2008. With the most

recent addition of Colombia in early 2013,

the AFCCL now has the names of 34

countries. In the past year DFATD has



announced plans to add nine more states

including India, Kuwait, Brazil, Chile,

Peru, and South Korea. The AFCCL is

losing its restrictive nature and is rapidly

becoming a list of potential buyers of au-

tomatic firearms.

Public Works and Government Services

Canada and the Jenkins Report

PWGSC arranges contracts to supply

equipment and services to federal govern-

ment departments, including DND. This

role in military procurement has led

PWGSC to support military industry sales

to new markets.

In response to growing media and pub-

lic concern about Canada’s broken mili-

tary procurement system—exposed by

government plans to acquire F-35 Joint

Strike Fighters at expanding expense—an

advisory team led by private industry

CEO Tom Jenkins was mandated by then

Minister of Public Works Rona Ambrose

to provide recommendations on how

DND’s procurement system could pro-

vide advantages to Canada’s defence in-

dustry. The Jenkins report (PWGSC

2013), Canada First: Leveraging Military Pro-

curement Through Key Industrial Capabilities,

was released this past February. It pro-

motes the “market opportunity perspec-

tive” (p. xiv) to expand sales beyond

traditional markets such as the United

States and Europe to “emerging markets”

in the Middle East, Asia, and Latin Amer-

ica (p. 10). The report notes, for example,

that India’s defence market “is expected to

grow 5-10% annually in real terms over

the next fifteen years” (p. 10) (see Epps

2013a).

Since the release of the Jenkins Report,

PWGSC has endorsed its recommenda-

tions and begun to implement them. This

past May Ambrose met with defence in-

dustry representatives in Montreal and

Toronto to develop a series of interim

“key industrial capabilities” for new mili-

tary procurement projects. In August the

Minister announced additional govern-

ment investment in a military industry

support program, as recommended by the

Jenkins report. Henceforth, the pilot

Canadian Innovation Commercialization

Program will become the permanent $30-

million-per-year Build in Canada Innova-

tion Program. The goal behind the

expanded program is to make the Cana-

dian government a first buyer and user of

prototype products before they are mar-

keted to other customers (Vanguard 2013).

Renewed government support

raises questions

The recent initiatives of CCC, DFATD,

and PWGSC illustrate the many publicly

funded programs that have long sup-

ported Canada’s private military industry.

Industry Canada finances several incentive

and subsidy programs; foremost is the

Strategic Aerospace and Defence Initiative

(SADI), which provides “repayable” funds

to Canadian defence and security compa-

nies for research and development proj-

ects. In the Economic Action Plan 2013

the government included $1-billion for

five years of SADI funding. In September

Minister of Industry James Moore an-

nounced the launch of the Technology

Demonstration Program to support

“large-scale technology demonstration

projects” of the aerospace and defence in-

dustries. The new program, worth $54-

million “in each application cycle,” will

“contribute to greater Canadian success in

export markets around the world,” ac-

cording to one industry spokesman (In-

dustry Canada 2013).

These new programs raise fundamental

questions.

Will government-funded trade initiatives be

effective in helping Canadian companies win

Kenneth epps

is Senior

Program

officer

with Project

Ploughshares.

[email protected]




new military orders?

There is some evidence of early success.

CCC has reported recent military con-

tracts with Argentina and Bahrain in addi-

tion to the deals with Colombia and Peru

already noted. Longer-term prospects are

uncertain, however, as Canadian suppliers

face growing international competition.

The Stockholm International Peace Re-

search Institute (SIPRI 2013, p. 207) re-

ported a “new sense of urgency” in state

assistance to U.S. and European arms in-

dustries to pursue export markets. Aus-

tralia, Spain, and Sweden are the latest

supplier states to establish federal offices

to promote military exports.

The markets are also changing. Military

industries in South Korea, Singapore,

Turkey, South Africa, and Brazil, for ex-

ample, are emerging as significant suppli-

ers to their own governments and to

regional and global customers.

What risks are associated with exporting

military goods to new and emerging markets?

There are many. Supplying weapons to

several governments carries a substantial

risk that the weapons will be used in

human rights violations. In some targeted

countries such as Colombia and India in-

ternal armed conflicts correspond to the

“hostilities” that call for restraint under

Canadian guidelines. The international

arms trade is notoriously corrupt, with

bribes and kickbacks to procurement offi-

cials commonplace.

In such a problematic market, how will

Canada manage transfer risks while it is boosting

military exports?

It will not be easy to square this circle.

UN agreement on an Arms Trade Treaty

has introduced higher global standards for

arms transfer controls. The treaty pro-

vides the occasion for Canada to review

its export controls and procedures to en-

sure that they meet or surpass treaty stan-

dards. The need to amend some Canadian

regulations and practices is already clear

(see Epps 2013b). Until this review has

occurred, government programs to boost

arms exports should operate with due

caution. Canadian military goods must not

be sold into foreign markets without the

controls necessary to ensure that all provi-

sions of international human rights and

humanitarian law are observed. �

note

1. The department’s Global Opportunities for Associations (GOA) program, for exam-

ple, supported a 2011 defence trade mission to Kuwait that saw officials from DND,

DFATD, and CCC and Canadian military industry representatives “discuss with Kuwaiti

government and military leaders how Canadian and Kuwaiti businesses in the defence

and security sector can work together effectively in Kuwait and more generally in the

Gulf” (DFATD 2011).

references

Amnesty International & Project Ploughshares. 2012. Strengthening Canada’s unique

export control instrument: The Automatic Firearms Country Control List. May 4.

Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries. 2013. The Canada Pavil-

ion.

Canadian Commercial Corporation. 2013. Colombia.

_____. 2011. 2011│2012 → 2015│2015 Corporate Plan.

Epps, Kenneth. 2013a. Canada First in emerging military markets? Project

Ploughshares website, blog, February 15.

_____. 2013b. Additions and amendments. The Ploughshares Monitor. Vol. 34, Issue

2.

_____, 2012. Neither clear nor transparent. The Ploughshares Monitor. Vol. 33, Issue

2.

_____. 2011. Canadian Commercial Corporation: A Crown company as arms middle-

man. The Ploughshares Monitor. Vol. 32, Issue 1.

Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada (DFATD). 2011. CADSI leads de-

fence trade mission to Kuwait. News release, December 9.

Industry Canada. 2013. Harper Government launches Key Aerospace and Defence

Program. News release, September 4.

Meyer, Carl. 2011. CCC sees ‘untapped market’ for Canadian arms. Embassy Maga-

zine, June 15.

Public Works and Government Services Canada, Special Advisor to the Minister.

2013. Canada First: Leveraging Defence Procurement Through Key Industrial Capabili-

ties. February.

Prime Minister of Canada. 2013. Canada strengthens defence and security ties with

Peru. News release, May 22.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 2013. SIPRI Yearbook 2013. Ox-

ford: Oxford University Press.

Vanguard. 2013. New name, more support for defence innovation. August/Septem-

ber, p. 8.


Iran’s nuclear program

and the international

community

Few countries have had their

nuclear programs subjected

to as much scrutiny and

media attention as has Iran. Yet key

questions about the nature and ex-

tent of this program remain unan-

swered or in dispute.

Some Western countries accuse

Iran of clandestine efforts to divert

its nuclear energy program to the

production of nuclear weapons.

Iran’s response: its nuclear energy

program is exclusively for peaceful

purposes and permitted by the Nu-

clear Non-proliferation Treaty

(NPT), to which it is a party. Espe-

cially skeptical of Iran’s claims are

the United States and Israel, both of

which possess nuclear arsenals them-

selves—the latter outside the nearly

universal NPT.

Rounds of talks (the first in 2006)

to resolve the impasse over the Iran-

ian nuclear program between Iran

and the P5+1 (the five permanent

members of the UN Security Coun-

cil and Germany) have yielded few

tangible results. Also, beginning in

2006, the UN Security Council

passed a number of resolutions that

imposed crippling economic sanc-

tions on Iran in response to its re-

ported refusal to meet International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safe-

guard requirements and to stop en-

riching and reprocessing uranium.

Further sanctions have been imposed

unilaterally by the United States,

member states of the European

Union, and other countries. Critics

contend that not only do these meas-

ures constitute a thinly veiled attempt

at regime change, but that they have

done more to harm to the average

Iranians than to persuade the Iranian

government to change its nuclear

posture.

The IAEA—the organization

tasked with monitoring Iran’s nuclear

energy program—has never defini-

tively claimed that Iran has a nuclear

weapons program. However, it has

not been able to fully certify that Iran

has NOT diverted nuclear material

for military purposes, in part because

Iran ceased to implement the IAEA

Additional Protocol (AP), which

strengthens the classic safeguards

system with more stringent inspec-

tions of declared and undeclared fa-

cilities, in 2006.

Iran has accused the IAEA of a

pro-Western bias. In a 2009 U.S. State

Department cable revealed by Wik-

ileaks, a U.S. diplomat stated that

IAEA chief Yukiya Amano “was

solidly in the U.S. court on every key

strategic decision, from high-level

personnel appointments to the han-

dling of Iran’s alleged nuclear

weapons program.”

Iranian officials have repeatedly

asserted that Iran is not willing to re-

nounce its right to enrich uranium

for peaceful purposes. But the facili-

ties, processes, and technical expert-

ise required for a peaceful nuclear

energy program are to a great extent

also essential for a nuclear weapons

program.

Project Ploughshares Program Of-

ficer Cesar Jaramillo posed the fol-

lowing questions to Yousaf Butt, a

nuclear physicist who has written ex-

tensively on the subject of Iran’s nu-

clear program. Dr. Butt is currently

scientist-in-residence at the James

Martin Center for Nonproliferation

Studies at the Monterey Institute of

International Studies in California.

Questions for Yousaf Butt


Q&A

CJ: Let’s start with the basics: is it ac-

curate to speak of Iran’s “nuclear

weapons program,” as some public

figures and news organizations have

done?

YB: No, there is no known Iranian

nuclear weapons program. Western

intelligence agencies confirm this. A

research-level effort prior to 2003

may have examined some aspects of

nuclear weapons, but even that was

not a bomb factory.

CJ: Are there legitimate concerns

about the possible diversion of nu-

clear material by Iran to produce nu-

clear weapons?

YB: As nuclear technology is dual

use there are always such concerns, as

there are with several other nations.

But the IAEA monitors the inven-

tory of such nuclear material and has

confirmed the non-diversion of de-

clared nuclear material consistent

with Iran’s Safeguards Agreement.

CJ: Is Iran in violation of its NPT

obligations by enriching uranium

below 20 per cent? Is there a ‘red

line’ beyond which it would become

clear that it has chosen to pursue nu-

clear weapons?

YB: Iran is not currently in violation

of the NPT, and is also, since 2008,

abiding by the letter of its safeguards

agreement. As long as the IAEA can

confirm the non-diversion of nuclear

material to weapons uses that is the

only legal ‘red-line’.

CJ: Who has the primary responsibil-

ity to resolve the deadlock over Iran’s

nuclear program? Are those with sus-

picions required to prove that Iran is

working to acquire nuclear weapons

or should Iran prove that its nuclear

program is solely for peaceful pur-

poses?

YB: The onus should be on trying to

get Iran to abide by the voluntary

Additional Protocol; as nuclear tech-

nology is inherently dual use it is im-

possible to “prove” things one way

or the other.

CJ: If Iran’s nuclear program is solely

for peaceful purposes, would it not

be in its best interest to adhere to the

IAEA Additional Protocols?

YB: Yes and Iran voluntarily abided

by the AP for a few years; most likely,

it could be induced to do the same if

some of the important sanctions are

lifted.

CJ: It is often reported that Iran is X

months or years away from acquiring

a nuclear weapon. In your view, how

quickly could Iran develop a nuclear

weapon?

YB: Such scenarios are purely hypo-

thetical. In the early 1990s [Israeli

Prime Minister] Netanyahu predicted

that Iran was only a few years from a

bomb. As long as Iran does not have

a weapons program it cannot be X

months from a bomb.

CJ: What other countries have nu-

clear capabilities similar to Iran’s?

YB: Brazil, Argentina, Japan are all

examples of nations that have similar

or even more developed nuclear

technology sectors. Brazil and Ar-

gentina also do not abide by the AP.

CJ: Why do you think efforts to end

the stalemate over Iran’s nuclear pro-

gram have been largely unsuccessful?

YB: Mainly because there has been

reluctance to offer significant sanc-

tions relief.

CJ: Are chances of progress in nego-

tiation better under recently elected

President Hassan Rouhani?

YB: I remain hopeful, but honestly

doubt that the situation will be re-

solved, since the reluctance to lift

sanctions is a problem in the Western

polity.

CJ: The imposition of sanctions

against Iran has been a key strategy

of both the UN Security Council and

the United States. How effective is it?

YB: It does not appear to have made

a big difference in Iran’s nuclear tech-

nology development, but has pun-

ished the common people. It has also

enriched the black-market profiteers

and the [Army of the Guardians of

the Islamic Revolution].

CJ: In your view, does Iran’s nuclear

program currently constitute a credi-

ble security threat for Israel or the

United States?

YB: As Iran’s current nuclear pro-

gram does not have a weapons com-

ponent, it is not a threat. But all

efforts—such as lifting of sanc-

tions—should be made to persuade

Iran to ratify the AP. �

Cesar Jaramillo is a Program Officerwith Project [email protected]


The number of armed

conflicts was unchanged

in 2012. No conflict tak-

ing place in 2011 concluded in

2012 and no new conflicts began.

Worldwide there were 26 armed

conflicts active in 23 countries. The

regional distribution of armed con-

flicts also was unaltered, with the

greatest number of conflicts in

Africa and Asia (10 and nine respec-

tively) and the fewest in Europe and

the Americas (one in both cases).

The Middle East continued to host

five armed conflicts in 2012. These

did not represent a major portion of

the global total, but with only 14

states the Middle East remained the

region most affected by war.

Syria suffered the most deadly

armed conflict during 2012. In its

second year, this conflict dominated

media headlines as it descended into

full-scale civil war. Clashes between

armed opposition groups and gov-

ernment security forces, with heavy

shelling of cities, resulted in a death

toll that surpassed 70,000. Humani-

tarian concern naturally grew as na-

tionwide anti-regime protests

increased and the international com-

munity remained divided and impo-

tent to stop the killing or address un-

derlying causes. By year’s end, more

than three million Syrian people were

internally displaced—more than 80

per cent newly displaced during 2012.

An additional 730,000 Syrians had

fled the country as refugees by the

end of 2012.

The crisis in Syria brought re-

newed attention to the costs of war

beyond injury and death. The United

Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees reported that more people

were refugees or internally displaced

persons in 2012 than at any time

since 1994. More than 45.2-million

people were in situations of displace-

ment at the end of 2012, up 6 per

cent from 2011. �

COUNTRIES HOSTING ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2012

Civilian and military deaths during current phase of conflict(s)

1,000 – 10,000

H

t

0

COUNTRIES HCOUNTRIES H

Civilian and milita

1,01, 00 – 10,00

10,000 – 100,000Over 100,000

2013ArmedConflictsReportSummary

For the full report, visit www.ploughshares.ca.


No matter how old I get, or how long it’s been since I was a student, the sights and smells of fall always remind me

that it is time to go back to school. The lazy days of summer are over. The rhyme is reversed: we return to pencils,

books, and teachers’ questioning looks—or something like that.

Formal classroom learning is not the only way to learn, but it is a particularly important way to learn for most of us

in Canadian society. Many of our ideas, convictions, and attitudes are formed in a classroom as we take the yearly

steps up the school ladder.

People committed to the mission of Project Ploughshares, especially those involved in local Ploughshares groups

across the country, don’t want students to be left out of the quest to create a more just and peaceful world. This insert

points teachers to web-based curriculum resources that they can use in the classroom to inform students and to use as

the basis of discussions on what peacebuilding and disarmament mean for our troubled world.

But all teachers know that learning is not just about curriculum. The best resource materials in the world don’t

guarantee student engagement. Anna Jaikaran’s article on the next two pages describes the learning curve she and

Martha Goodings have been on in talking to high school students in Toronto about nuclear disarmament.

The questions they asked themselves along the way are familiar. Why don’t students get it? Why don’t they care as

much about the nuclear threat as I do? What do we need to do differently to really communicate what we want to say?

As a scientist and a communicator Jaikaran looked for and found some answers to these questions.

John Siebert

DIMENSIONS OF WAR AND PEACE: A TEACHING UNIT FOR GRADE TEN

ploughsharesedmonton.org/dimensions.pdf or ploughshares.ca/about-us/students-educators

For a number of years members of Project Ploughshares’ local group in Edmonton, some of whom lived through the Sec-

ond World War, spoke to grade seven classes in Edmonton when they were studying a unit on Japan. They gave guest talks

on the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The children showed great interest. More recent discussions

with teachers at a workshop sponsored by the Alberta Teachers Association resulted in a request for further curriculum re-

sources. Social studies teachers suggested that materials aimed at the high school level would be welcome and would fit

the curriculum.

As a result, Project Ploughshares Edmonton partnered with the John Humphrey Centre to develop a resource on war,

nuclear war, and taking action through nonviolence and peacebuilding. The 40-page online guide provides four lesson

plans:

Lesson Plan 1 - Why War?

Lesson Plan 2 - Nuclear Warfare

Lesson Plan 3 - Children and War

Lesson Plan 4 - Action through Nonviolence and Peace.

The lesson plans include videos, suggested learning activities, and questions to address.

Teaching resources on Peace and Disarmament

Do you know a teacher who might be interested in curriculum resources on issues of peace and disarma-

ment? Detach these four pages from this issue of The Ploughshares Monitor and pass it along. If you are a

teacher, please let us know if these resources are helpful. What needs to be changed? What’s missing?

Send your comments to [email protected].

TeAChInG reSourCeS PuLLouT

Cont’d on page 14


We are not experts. We’re activists—our group is

called no-2-nuclear-weapons. When we

started, we had vaguely imagined that most

students were in favour of nuclear disarmament. Now we

realize that most students never think about nuclear

weapons; if they do, they see them as only one of a num-

ber of looming threats. As a friend in her twenties told me,

“People have been telling me the world was going to end

my whole life.”

Teenagers meet nuclear weapons

We have been giving presentations about nuclear weapons

in high schools for four years now and have spoken to

over 2,000 students. After almost every talk we ask the stu-

dents to fill out a feedback sheet to give us an idea of what

they picked up and what they thought about it. So we talk

and test, talk and test.

The school board did not give us free rein to convert

their students into anti-nuclear-weapons activists. The

board has guidelines for dealing with controversial and

sensitive issues, which state that “controversial material

must be treated in a fair manner that is thorough, balanced,

and free of unfair biases.”

We begin every presentation by telling the students what

a nuclear weapon is. We show a diagram of the structure

of an atom and explain that the energy for a nuclear explo-

sion comes from disrupting the nucleus. We do this not be-

cause it is important that they know how a nuclear weapon

works, but because it is crucial that they understand that

nuclear weapons are distinct from conventional weapons.

Of course, nuclear weapons are the most powerful

weapons, but we also emphasize some of the other conse-

quences: radioactive fallout and nuclear winter. We sum up

the section on basic facts by quoting the International

Court of Justice on the unique characteristics of these

weapons: only nuclear weapons “have the potential to de-

stroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet”

(ILPI 2013). This statement was made by a panel of 14

judges from different countries, elected by the United Na-

tions General Assembly and Security Council, after listen-

ing to months of expert testimony. We believe the in-

evitable conclusion is that nuclear weapons must be abol-

ished.

We have not, however, found the statement to be partic-

ularly powerful in the classroom.

We have tried to increase the emotional impact of our

message. We explain that radioactive fallout causes cancer

and birth defects. We show a photograph of a woman

from the Marshall Islands, which were contaminated by

fallout from nearby U.S. nuclear testing, and read her de-

scription of the most common birth defect in her country,

jellyfish babies (Ware 2007). Then we show a photo of a

deformed Marshallese child who will die before she is six

months old (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation 2013). We ex-

plain that her condition is the result of nuclear bombs det-

onated before she or even her parents were born. Students

often mention this image on their feedback sheets. But it

doesn’t seem to be enough to interest them in nuclear

weapons.

Deterrence vs. disarmament

The effects of using a nuclear weapon are not disputed;

the disagreement lies in the best way to prevent the

weapons from being used—deterrence or disarmament.

We often discuss the pros and cons of both approaches

and are frequently dismayed when deterrence gets a sub-

stantially better reception.

We used the example that convinced former U.S. Secre-

tary of Defense Robert McNamara to work for nuclear

abolition: the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 (Morris 2003).

President Kennedy took his nuclear forces to defense readi-

ness condition two, ready to deploy and engage in less than six

hours—the only occurrence in U.S. history (FAS 1998).

Kennedy and Soviet Premier Khrushchev were drawn

closer and closer to a military confrontation neither of

them wanted (Kennedy 1969). We told the story of the So-

viet submarine, with no communication with Moscow,

armed with nuclear-tipped torpedoes while the crew be-

lieved that the war had started (Lloyd 2002; PBS 2012). If

they had launched their torpedoes, it is almost certain that

Lessons from the classroomBy Anna Jaikaran



the situation would have escalated to nuclear war. Still the

students were not impressed.

We usually have to squeeze our message about nuclear

disarmament in around the edges of curriculum material in

history, civics, or occasionally science. We were given an

unprecedented opportunity to speak to a Grade 10 class

for four periods over a month. We showed them the entire

documentary Countdown to Zero (Walker 2010), which fo-

cuses on the current threat from nuclear weapons. And

then we discussed it.

The students remained skeptical. They wanted to know

how the weapons could be eliminated physically. They

wanted to know what could be done if countries agreed to

get rid of their nuclear arsenals and then cheated. They

wanted to know how countries could ever be persuaded to

give up the strongest weapon. We could answer their ques-

tions, but we could not make disarmament a perfect solu-

tion.

We took a closer look at the feedback sheets. We had in-

cluded a new question: “Do you think nuclear disarma-

ment is realistic?” They did not.

It made sense that people would not get behind nuclear

disarmament if they did not think it was possible.

A realistic solution

We now talk about the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

and the commitment made by the United States, Russia,

the United Kingdom, France, and China to eliminate their

nuclear weapons, albeit at an unspecified time in the future

(check the Project Ploughshares website for more informa-

tion about the NPT). We describe the extensive monitoring

system already in place for the Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty: 321 monitoring stations and 16 laboratories around

the world to detect nuclear testing anywhere, including un-

derground (CTBTO Preparatory Commission 2013). We

show a map that highlights the six land-based nuclear-

weapons-free zones, in which all countries have voluntarily

pledged not to possess, develop, or use nuclear weapons

(OPANAL n.d.). We point out that the number of nuclear

weapons has decreased from a high of almost 70,000 in

1986 (Norris & Kristensen 2010) to 17,300 today (FAS

2013) and that South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kaza-

khstan have all given up their nuclear arsenals (Campaign

for Nuclear Disarmament 2013).

Students are much more receptive to the idea of nuclear

disarmament when they know about the progress that’s

been made. And each example of a successful arms con-

trol agreement—against chemical weapons, biological

weapons, or landmines—strengthens the narrative. We in-

vent certain classes of weapons, realize they are too dan-

gerous to use, and negotiate treaties to ban them.

It turns out that we don’t just have to sell the problem

of nuclear weapons; we have to sell the solution as well.�

Anna Jaikaran belongs to the Toronto group

no2nuclearweapons. She is a member of Science for Peace

and the Canadian Voice of Women for Peace, and is a Cam-

paigner for the 2020 Vision Campaign of Mayors for Peace.

[email protected]

To read the full version of this article, visit www.ploughshares.ca.

references

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. 2013. Nuclear weapons:

who’s got them? cnduk.org/campaigns/global-abolition/nuclear-

armed-countries.

Federation of American Scientists. 2013. Status of world nuclear

forces. fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html.

_____, 1998. DEFCON DEFense CONdition.

fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/c3i/defcon.htm.

International Law and Policy Institute. 2013. The ICJ advisory

opinion. nwp.ilpi.org/?p=1218.

Kennedy, Robert. 1969. Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban

Missile Crisis. New York: Norton.

Lloyd, Marion. 2002. Soviets close to using A-bomb in 1962 crisis,

forum is told. The Boston Globe, October 13.

latinamericanstudies.org/cold-war/sovietsbomb.htm.

Morris, Errol. 2003. The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life

of Robert S. McNamara. Documentary film.

Norris, Robert & Hans Kristensen. 2010. Global nuclear weapons

inventories, 1945-2010. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July. thebul-

letin.org/2010/julyaugust/global-nuclear-weapons-inventories-

1945%E2%80%932010.

Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. 2013. Marshall Islanders affected

by US nuclear weapons testing.. NuclearFiles.org.

nuclearfiles.org/menu/library/media-gallery/image/testing/marshall-is-

lands.htm.

OPANAL. n.d. Nuclear-weapon-free zones around the world.

opanal.org/NWFZ/nwfz.htm.

PBS. 2012. The man who saved the world. Secrets of the Dead.

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban

Treaty Organization. 2013. Verification regime. ctbto.org/verification-

regime.

Walker, Lucy. 2010. Countdown to Zero. Documentary film DVD.

Ware, Alyn. 2007. The human factor—revising Einstein. SGI Quar-

terly, July. sgiquarterly.org/feature2007Jly-7.html.



CREATING A CULTURE OF PEACE

projectpeacemakers.org/content/resources

As a peace education organization, Project Peacemakers in Winnipeg is committed to raising public awareness about chil-

dren and war, nuclear abolition, violent video games, and building peace through play. Project Peacemakers has a number

of teaching resources on its website, including:

Creating a Culture of Peace: Early Years – Grades 1 to 4 (142 pages)

Theme 1: Peace and conflict

Theme 2: Peaceful play

Theme 3: Children around the world

Annotated resource list

List of teacher resources

Creating a Culture of Peace: Senior Years 2013 (245 pages)

Theme 1: Creating a Culture of Peace

Theme 2: Power, Conflict and Cooperation in the Global Village

Theme 3: Media Literacy

Annotated resource list.

GEEZ MAGAZINE: THE RISE OF THE UNRECOGNIZED PEACE ACTIVIST (SEPT. 2013)

geezmagazine.org (for limited article selection)

Project Ploughshares and Geez magazine out of Winnipeg collaborated on an issue devoted to

peace in September. Geez styles itself as a bit of “holy mischief in an age of fast faith.”

This irreverent but not irrelevant take on peace and the pursuit of it will appeal to students in high

school, college, and university and to learners of any age who have a sense of humour and an

open mind.

Project Ploughshares has a limited number of complimentary copies of this issue of Geez for

Ploughshares’ supporters in return for the $5 cost of shipping. Order by sending a message to

[email protected]. Or go directly to Geez and purchase a subscription.

ARMED CONFLICTS REPORT

ploughshares.ca/programs/armed-conflict/armed-conflicts-report

Project Ploughshares has been monitoring armed conflicts worldwide since 1987 and publishing the annual Armed Conflicts

Report. The Armed Conflicts Report consists of a 22 x 34-inch poster, which includes a map and accompanying graphs that

provide a visual representation of the impact of global armed conflict. Expanded conflict descriptions are updated annually

and published on the Ploughshares website with links to graphics and background information. The ACR can be used as a

primary source of information about current wars and how the international community through the United Nations is re-

sponding to these conflicts.

TeAChInG reSourCe PuLLouT


Shedding light on private securitycompanies in the Caribbean

By John Siebert

A report by Project Ploughshares and The University

of the West Indies provides new data on the industry

The private security in-

dustry in the

Caribbean has dra-

matically grown over

the past two decades.

Despite the fact that in many

Caribbean nations the number of

private security employees surpasses

the number of police, this key indus-

try is inadequately regulated by virtu-

ally all Caribbean governments. This

raises basic issues related to social eq-

uity—do all enjoy security or only

those who can afford it?—and strikes

at the heart of one of the primary

functions of the modern nation

state: maintaining a monopoly on the

legitimate use of force.

A research report published in

September by Project Ploughshares,

in collaboration with the Institute of

International Relations of The Uni-

versity of the West Indies, sheds new

light on Caribbean private security

companies (PSCs). Based on field re-

search for case study reports on St.

Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Ja-

© VIP Protection Services


maica, the report provides unique

data on PSCs in these countries. It

then offers recommendations for a

concerted effort by government reg-

ulators, in partnership with the pri-

vate security industry, to create

modern, transparent, and democrati-

cally accountable regulatory regimes

for PSCs that will enhance security

for all citizens and support the so-

cioeconomic development of the

Caribbean.

Legality, legitimacy,

and accountability of PSCs

The problems posed by inadequate

regulation are well known. CARI-

COM Crime and Security Strategy 2013:

Securing the Region (IMPACS 2013)

neatly summarizes both the impor-

tance of PSCs in the overall security

architecture of the Caribbean and the

sorry state of their regulation in most

Caribbean Community (CARICOM)

member states:

1.38. The private security industry

has grown rapidly over the last

decade in CARICOM, and private

security employees may now out-

number their counterparts in law

enforcement in many Member

States. Individuals working within

the private security industry make

a significant contribution to the

everyday safety and security of the

Region. However, in the absence

of effective legal or regulatory

structures to ensure proper vet-

ting, the activities of private secu-

rity companies raise issues of

legality, legitimacy and accounta-

bility in the sphere of security pol-

icy. The integration of the private

security industry into any security

plan is therefore critical in achiev-

ing a safe and secure environment

for CARICOM, and has an im-

portant role to play in reducing

crime in the Community. (p. 19)

Because PSCs are a key feature of

the security landscape, their inade-

quate regulation raises important

PrIVATe SeCurITY CoMPAnIeS

LeFT: Project Ploughshares,

in collaboration with the Insti-

tute of International Relations

of The University of the West

Indies, published a report in

September based on field re-

search for case studies on St.

Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago,

and Jamaica.



legal and accountability issues:

Poorly regulated possession and

use of firearms by PSC personnel

could result in misuse of firearms

and leakage of guns and ammuni-

tion to the illicit market.

PSCs and their employees, some

of them armed and undertrained,

present a potential challenge to the

state security apparatus and the

state’s monopoly on the legitimate

use of force.

Privatization of security services

raises a question of social equity if

those who can afford to pay re-

ceive greater protection of their

persons and property than those

who cannot.

The role of the private security in-

dustry has not been included in

most national and subregional se-

curity strategies, despite the

prominence of PSCs and their

contribution to safety and key eco-

nomic activity across the

Caribbean.

Key research findings of the report

The dramatic increase in violent

crime rates over the past decade in

some Caribbean countries has been

linked to a corresponding growth in

the number of PSCs. But the private

security industry has also grown sig-

nificantly in more stable and less

crime-affected countries. Other rea-

sons were cited for the increased

number and size of PSCs:

Government choices about invest-

ing in formal security mechanisms

of the state—police, military, in-

telligence—have played a role, as

more public services are priva-

tized. In the Caribbean, national

governments are often the largest

clients for PSC services. For exam-

ple port and airport security is

often provided by PSCs.

Commercial entities and individu-

als don’t trust policing services or

the broader judicial or political

systems.

PSCs can be more flexible and in-

novative than public security serv-

ices and can be engaged for

shorter, defined periods for events

or at particular locations.

The subregion has experienced

overall economic growth or

growth in sectors such as tourism

and resource extraction, which

have defined security needs.

PSCs are fully integrated into the

economies of the Caribbean (as in all

modern societies), providing vital

services such as secure cash transfers,

securing financial and government

institutions, and protecting tourist

and resource extraction sites. They

play an important role in the socio-

economic development of the subre-

gion. PSCs provide a significant

number of jobs, particularly for

entry-level workers, including many

women. But internal advancement of

women may be limited.

The regulatory regime—legisla-

tion, regulations, and state-directed

bodies that implement policy and

oversee PSCs—in virtually all CARI-

COM member states has not evolved

to keep pace with the growth in the

private security industry. Jamaica has

the most comprehensive regulatory

regime in the Caribbean, but even it

has a number of shortcomings.

A tension exists between active in-

dustry participation in developing

regulatory regimes and appropriate

state control. Owners are afraid of

too much government control, while

states cannot settle for a self-policing

private security industry.

The Caribbean PSC industry is

segmented into entry-level firms with

basic guarding or watchman services

and those that are more technically

and professionally sophisticated.

Some PSCs must adhere to interna-

tional standards—for example, in the

petroleum industry and at ports and

airports; these standards often far ex-

ceed current or planned national PSC

regulatory standards.

There is no evidence that PSCs

have a direct impact on violent crime

rates. There may be radiating security

benefits to neighbourhoods close to

sites where PSCs provide security.

The presence of PSCs may increase

perceptions of safety, which can be

as important as perceptions of crime

rates in making public policy.

The limited research findings on

PSC gun possession and use did not

provide substantial evidence that

guns are being misused by PSC per-

sonnel, but anecdotal evidence sug-

gests guns are sometimes rented out,

used in crimes, or sold to criminal

gangs.

Recommendations

In June 2013 a policy roundtable that

included representatives from PSCs

and the relevant government min-

istries and bodies from the three

case-study countries reviewed the

draft report and its recommenda-

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•



tions. Practical suggestions were of-

fered to make the recommendations

more relevant and to increase the

possibility of implementation by pol-

icymakers. Four sets of recommen-

dations are found in the research

report; three are specific to the case-

study countries and the fourth relates

to the whole CARICOM subregion.

The recommendations can be sum-

marized as follows:

Legislation and regulation

All CARICOM member states

should establish national legislation,

regulations, standards, and oversight

and monitoring bodies to regulate

the private security industry. These

national regulatory regimes should

reflect common principles among

CARICOM members and emerging

international standards for PSCs. At

the same time, the particular circum-

stances of each state must be consid-

ered. Developing national standards

will be challenging; if standards are

set too high, PSCs offering basic

services may skirt regulation to re-

main profitable. Regulatory authori-

ties should have sufficient staff,

funding, and resources to function

effectively.

Because PSCs pose latent or po-

tential threats to public order if they

align with or are controlled by gangs

or organized crime, vetting PSC own-

ers and directors is particularly im-

portant. Regulations must ensure that

only “fit” persons own and direct

PSCs, in addition to vetting individ-

ual PSC employees to ensure that

they have no links to criminals.

Sharing Jamaica’s regulatory experience

The Jamaican experience with the

Private Security Regulatory Agency

should be shared with appropriate

regulatory agencies and other rele-

vant parties in all CARICOM mem-

ber states.

Industry code of conduct

National PSC industry associations

and member companies should

adopt and modify for local circum-

stances the principles of the volun-

tary International Code of Conduct

for Private Security Service Providers

(Switzerland 2010).

Firearms

In addition to national firearms acts,

there should be specific guidelines

for the monitoring, management, and

stockpiling of firearms in PSC indus-

try regulations. Regulations should be

strictly enforced.

Training and employment standards

Initial and ongoing training of PSC

personnel is key to improved service

and the effective adoption of new

technologies by the industry. Na-

tional training standards should be

established and credentialed PSC ed-

ucational facilities set up to provide

PSC personnel with induction and

ongoing, in-service training. Industry

standards and best practices should

be established in relation to em-

ployee benefits and working condi-

tions.

Integration of PSCs into national and

subregional security strategies

The important role of PSCs in pro-

viding public safety and securing vital

economic interests should be re-

flected in national security strategies

of CARICOM member states and in

CARICOM subregional security

strategies.

Conclusion

Growth of the PSC industry in the

Caribbean may be levelling off as the

effects of the 2008 recession linger.

Cheaper electronic surveillance can

replace onsite personnel in some in-

stances. And some countries could

be experiencing market saturation.

But the need for updated regulation

remains.

Reports from several CARICOM

member states indicate plans to pres-

ent legislation for parliamentary de-

bate or to modify or add to existing

PSC regulatory regimes. These devel-

opments point to the timeliness and

relevance of this research and its rec-

ommendations. �

John Siebert is Executive Director

of Project Ploughshares.

[email protected]

references

Implementation Agency for Crime and

Security. 2013. CARICOM Crime and Secu-

rity Strategy 2103: Securing the Region.

Adopted at the twenty-fourth inter-sessional

meeting of the conference of heads of gov-

ernment of CARICOM, 18-19 February

2013, Port-au-Prince, Republic of Haiti.

Institute of International Relations, The

University of the West Indies & Project

Ploughshares. 2013. Private Security Com-

panies in the Caribbean: Case studies of St.

Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica.

Waterloo: Project Ploughshares.

Switzerland. 2010. International Code of

Conduct for Private Security Service

Providers.


‘Somaliland? Is that, like,

Somalia? Are you sure

it’s safe?”

So went the usual re-

sponse when I told peo-

ple of my plans to spend a term in

Somaliland, teaching peace and conflict

studies at the University of Hargeisa. This

query, of course, is warranted in many re-

spects. Mention the word ‘Somalia’ and

images of AK-47-toting teenagers, pirates

in fishing boats, and a series of failed in-

ternational interventions to restore peace

are often what spring to mind.

As it has yet to receive international

recognition two decades after declaring in-

dependence, most people’s lack of aware-

ness of Somaliland can be forgiven, even

though it functions with most of the trap-

pings of a modern nation-state: a consti-

tution, elections, a flag, national anthem

and currency, visa requirements for for-

eigners (like me!), and fairly well respected

borders. While south-central Somalia has

remained embroiled in an ever evolving

civil war, Somalilanders picked up the

pieces that remained after violence ran-

sacked the region in the late 1980s/early

1990s, elected a government and drafted a

constitution, rebuilt their cities, and en-

deavored to return to life as usual.

Yet because of the violence that has

plagued its southern neighbour for two

decades, the story of Somaliland’s rela-

Somaliland

By Christina Woolner

A study in the potential of indigenous resources

ABoVe: A painted wall in

Somaliland reads: "Peace

and Milk,” a Somali saying

used to describe peace and

prosperity/well-being.

Christina Woolner


tively peaceful existence has largely been

overlooked. In many ways, however, the

lack of foreign attention to Somaliland

has been more of a blessing than a curse.

Indeed, many Somalilanders credit their

use of indigenous conflict resolution

practices and governance mechanisms for

the relative peace they experience today.

The fact that the populations of Soma-

lia and Somaliland are ethnically, linguisti-

cally, culturally, and religiously the same

thus begs a series of questions: What al-

lowed Somaliland to regain a semblance of

order, while south-central Somalia remains

entangled in war? What role did local and

international actors play in each of these

settings, for better or worse? And what

might this case be able to teach us about

the dynamics of so-called liberal peace-

building models (top-down, institutional),

and grassroots movements that draw on

local knowledge, language, and experience?

Full answers to these questions are be-

yond the scope of this article. Yet in what

follows, I attempt to unravel some of the

differences in experiences between Soma-

liland and south-central Somalia, while

also considering broader questions of

agency, ownership, and the interaction of

local and international knowledge and ac-

tors in the peacebuilding process.

Somaliland: A brief history

Somaliland and Somalia’s paths arguably

diverge with European colonialism. While

Italy claimed south-central Somalia,

Britain formed “British Somaliland” in the

north. Somaliland was a ‘peripheral’

colony within the British empire, gov-

erned by ‘indirect rule’; Britain’s main in-

terests in the region were maintaining

control of the strategic coastline. They

had little interest in developing inland

(Bradbury 2008, pp. 24-25; Lewis 2002).

The Italians, however, had very different

designs for the region and sought to de-

velop a ‘true colony’ by extending their

political and territorial authority as far as

possible (Lewis 2002, p. 85). These differ-

ences would come to play a role in the na-

ture of post-independence political

developments.

Despite their different colonial pasts,

upon independence in 1960 British and

Italian Somaliland ‘re-unified’ to become

the Republic of Somalia. Disparities be-

tween the north and the south soon

emerged: Somaliland was politically and

economically marginalized by Siad Barre’s

regime (1969-1991), and resistance to the

federal government operating in Mo-

gadishu grew in the north, culminating in

armed resistance led by the Somali Na-

tional Movement (SNM) throughout the

1980s. Although the SNM was not initially

a separatist movement, heavy fighting be-

tween government forces and the SNM in

1988 mobilized many of the Isaaq clans

of the north; by early 1991 the SNM had

gained control of most of the northwest

(Bradbury, pp. 60-63).

An end to hostilities between northern

clans was declared in February 1991, and

following the ‘Grand Conference of the

Northern Peoples’ Somaliland declared in-

dependence in May. The process of state-

building and postwar recovery began.

Meanwhile, in the south, Barre was over-

thrown and the armed resistance move-

ment splintered. The region dissolved into

a civil war that continues to this day.

Grassroots peacebuilding:

The Somaliland experience1

Somalis have a rich tradition of conflict

resolution that is rooted in kinship link-

ages; respect for elders (caaqilo); a strong

emphasis on dialogue and oral expression;

and an evolving system of customary law

(xeer), which on an ongoing basis com-

bines Islamic law with local customs and

political treaties negotiated between clans.

Christina

Woolner is

currently

studying for an

MPhil in Social

Anthropology

at the univer-

sity of Cam-

bridge. A former program

officer with Project

Ploughshares, she spent the

last two years teaching peace

and conflict studies at Wilfrid

Laurier university, the univer-

sity of Waterloo, and the uni-

versity of hargeisa.

[email protected]

SoMALILAnD


SoMALILAnD

It is precisely these traditions, and the val-

ues embedded in them, that Somalilanders

credit for the relative peace and prosperity

they experience today.2

Before any formal negotiations began

in Somaliland, women (who are usually

excluded from the political process) pre-

pared the way for dialogue; due to multi-

ple clan affiliations gained through

marriage, women have long served as in-

formal diplomats in interclan feuds.3 This

informal diplomacy was followed by a

grassroots movement by a group of elders

calling themselves dab damin (fire extin-

guishers), who set out to engage various

groups in the dialogue necessary to stop

the fighting.4 This travelling group of eld-

ers/mediators—called ergo in Somali—set

out to persuade other clan leaders to par-

ticipate in a series of guurtis—gatherings

of elders, poets, and other representatives

of various subclans—to discuss how to

resolve the conflict. Over the next three

years, a series of local and national inter-

clan meetings and conferences were

held—often under the shade of acacia

trees—in which new political treaties (xeer)

to end the fighting and compensate in-

jured parties were established (Bradbury

2008, pp. 102-103).

These meetings culminated in the six-

month Borama conference in 1993, which

laid out plans to increase security and ter-

ritorial control, a new constitution, and

the establishment of a bicameral parlia-

ment. The conference itself was infused

with tradition and Somali values at every

stage; poets and other artists played as im-

portant a role as the elders at the negotiat-

ing table, bringing a sense of cultural

legitimacy and continuity that allowed ne-

gotiations to proceed.

The National Charter and government

that came out of this meeting drew heav-

ily on long engrained practices and values.

Xeer was elevated to the national level; So-

mali cultural values were enshrined in the

Charter; and elders were officially incor-

porated into the governing structure—the

upper house of the bicameral parliament

is known as the Guurti (Bradbury 2008, p.

100). Today, places like the Institute of

Peace and Conflict Studies where I taught

have incorporated the lessons and values

of this peace process into their teaching

and research agenda. While Somaliland

has faced its challenges in the last 20 years,

and lack of international recognition has

ABoVe: Somaliland functions

with most of the trappings of

a modern nation-state: a con-

stitution, elections, a flag, na-

tional anthem and currency,

visa requirements and fairly

well respected borders.

Christina Woolner


SoMALILAnD

meant very little financial support for re-

construction efforts, the relative peace and

stability in the region speak profoundly to

the success of grassroots-led, culturally

embedded conflict resolution practices.

Lessons going forward:

Accounting for cultural continuity

and change in peacebuilding

Since Boutros Boutros-Ghali popularized

the term ‘peacebuilding’ in his 1992 Agenda

for Peace, the term has undergone an evolu-

tion of sorts. In most circles, even today,

the ‘liberal’ model of intervention has pre-

vailed: post-conflict reconstruction efforts

have followed a blueprint of democratic

institution-building, market liberalization,

and promotion of the rule of law. While

this model has certainly seen success, in re-

cent years it has been criticized for, among

other things, failing to take into account

local realities and approaches to peace that

are arguably necessary to make peace sus-

tainable. More attention is thus finally

being paid to ‘elicitive’ and bottom-up

peacebuilding models, indigenous conflict

resolution mechanisms, and even the ‘hy-

brid’ forms of peace that emerge when in-

ternational actors pay better attention to

local contexts.5

The lessons that can be drawn from the

Somaliland peacebuilding experience are

both straightforward and complex. On the

surface of things, the divergent paths

taken by south-central Somalia and Soma-

liland illustrate the pitfalls of liberal inter-

ventionism and the potential of utilizing

local conflict resolution mechanisms in

pretty stark terms. Beginning with the cat-

astrophic UNOSOM-backed U.S. inter-

vention in 1993, international

interventions in the south have not only

failed to bring peace, but have, at times,

arguably exacerbated the situation, radical-

ized opposition groups, and led to a more

entrenched conflict. The Somaliland expe-

rience, which is notably devoid of foreign

involvement, underscores the immense

potential of indigenous knowledge and re-

sources, and the need for peacebuilding to

proceed on terms that make sense to the

local population. Indeed, the need for

local ownership is a theme that is finally

coming to characterize more and more

peacebuilding agendas, including those ad-

vanced in Somalia (see Donais 2012;

Siebert 2012).

Yet the answer to south-central Soma-

lia’s woes will not be simple. When I asked

my class at the University of Hargeisa why

they believed the situation in Somaliland

was so different from the one in the

south, the answers I got were compli-

cated. Students pointed out, for example,

that Somaliland’s experiences under Barre,

and under European colonialism, were

much different than those in the south.

While the British utilized traditional gov-

ernance mechanisms in their indirect rule

of the region, Italian rule eroded these

systems. Two decades of clan warfare and

the more recent phenomenon of al

Shabab have significantly undermined the

delicate balance of kinship networks that

historically functioned to maintain peace

and have also eroded respect for the posi-

tion of elders. While sustainable peace will

only be achieved through a locally owned

process that draws on deeply held cultural

values, the dynamics of contemporary So-

malia may go beyond the scope of situa-

tions that traditional conflict resolution

mechanisms were ever meant to address.

In a recent article Nathan Funk (2012)

The Somaliland experience, which is

notably devoid of foreign involvement,

underscores the immense potential

of indigenous knowledge and resources.


SoMALILAnD

highlights the importance of valuing the

local in international peacebuilding

processes, but also suggests that privileg-

ing the local over the non-local is not

enough, because “if local resources were

fully developed and operational, the local

peace would already be made” (p. 401).

Instead, he suggests that peacebuilding

can be seen as “a process of cultural in-

trospection and reconstruction”—a

process of dialogue and critical reflection

on the elements of culture that both pro-

mote and impede peace. While peace-

building must “proceed on an authentic

and locally valid basis or rationale,” Funk

contends that an essential element of

peacebuilding is “balancing cultural inno-

vation with cultural continuity” (p. 400).

Conceiving of peacebuilding as a

process of cultural introspection does not

preclude the involvement of foreign ac-

tors. It does, however, limit their potential

role to one of facilitation. In Somaliland,

this involvement was not necessary. In So-

malia, foreign involvement into the fore-

seeable future is a given. For this

involvement to be positive, however, inter-

national actors would do well to consider

the Somaliland experience, the immense

value of local resources, and the need for

local ownership. And for their part Soma-

lis, too, need to step back and reexamine

their rich history of conflict resolution

practices, take stock of the values and

ideals they wish to carry into the future,

and together reimagine how historical tra-

dition and recent innovations may shape a

more peaceful future. �

notes

1. The author would like to acknowledge and thank the members of her “Foundations in Peace and Conflict Studies” course at the Institute of

Peace and Conflict Studies (University of Hargeisa), who offered invaluable insight into the peacebuilding process in Somaliland and the use of in-

digenous conflict resolution practices both past and present; and the Director of the Institute, Adam Haji Ali Ahmed, for reviewing a draft of this arti-

cle.

2. For a good discussion of indigenous conflict resolution practices and their use in Somaliland, see Walls et al. 2008.

3. For more on the role of women in Somali peacebuilding processes, see Jama 2010, pp. 66-67; Farah 1993.

4. For an account of these ‘wandering elders’, see Lederach & Lederach 2010.

5. The term ‘elicitive’ peacebuilding was first used by John Paul Lederach in 1995. For some interesting critiques of the liberal peacebuilding

model, see Aggestam & Björkdahl 2013. For a discussion of local ownership and the concept of ‘hybridity’, see Donais 2012.

references

Aggestam, Karin & Annika Björkdahl, eds. 2013. Rethinking Peacebuilding: The quest for just peace in the Middle East and Western Balkans.

London & New York: Routledge.

Bradbury, Mark. 2008. Becoming Somaliland. London: Progressio.

Donais, Timothy. 2012. Peacebuilding and Local Ownership: Post-conflict consensus-building. New York: Routledge.

Farah, A.Y. 1993. The roots of reconciliation. London: Action Aid.

Funk, Nathan. 2012. Building on what’s already there: valuing the local in international peacebuilding. International Journal, Spring.

Jama, Faiza. 2010. Somali women and peacebuilding. Whose peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and international peacemaking. Ed. Mark

Bradbury & Sally Healy. Accord Issue 21. London: Conciliation Resources.

Lederach, John Paul. 1995. Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Lederach, John Paul & Angela Jill Lederach. 2010. When Blood and Bones Cry Out: journeys through the soundscape of healing and reconcilia-

tion. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Lewis, I.M. 2002. A Modern History of the Somali, 4th ed. Oxford: James Currey.

Siebert, John. 2012. Turning a corner? The Ploughshares Monitor, Vol. 33, Issue 4.

Walls, M., K. Mohammed & M.O. Ali. 2008. Peace in Somaliland: An Indigenous Approach to Statebuilding. Hargeisa/Geneva, Switzerland: In-

terPeace and the Academy for Peace and Development.

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