P Nuclear Disarmament: Waterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2 An Action ...ploughshares.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/WP7.1.pdf · Nuclear Disarmament: An Action Agenda for Canada Ploughshares

ERNIE REGEHR

PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES57 Erb Street WestWaterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2 Canada519-888-6541 Fax [email protected]

Nuclear Disarmament:An Action Agenda for Canada

WORKING PAPER 07-1

project ploughshares

Nuclear Disarmament:

An Action Agenda for Canada

By Ernie Regehr

Ploughshares Working Paper 07-1 May 2007

About this Paper This joint brief by Veterans Against Nuclear Arms (VANA) and Project Ploughshares reviews the current nuclear disarmament agenda—an urgent agenda that requires the ongoing and active support of the Government of Canada—and proposes priorities for Canada. About the Author The principal author is Ernie Regehr, O.C., co-founder and former executive director of Project Ploughshares and a former member of the advisory board of the VANA research organization, Defence Research Education Centre (DREC). The text was prepared in consultation with Edward H. Shaffer and other VANA members and with the help of Sarah Estabrooks and Wendy Stocker of Project Ploughshares.

Veterans Against Nuclear Arms www.vana.ca

Project Ploughshares 57 Erb Street West Waterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2 Canada 519-888-6541 / Fax 519-888-0018 / [email protected] www.ploughshares.ca Project Ploughshares Working Papers are published to contribute to public discussion and debate of peace and security issues. The views and policies presented in this paper do not necessarily reflect the policies of the churches and agencies that sponsor Project Ploughshares. © Project Ploughshares 2007 ISSN 1188-6811 ISBN 978-1-895722-55-0

Table of Contents

Introduction 1 The Continuing Threat 1 Dangerous Doctrines 3 Nuclear Use Doctrines 4 NATO and Nuclear Weapons and Security 5 Selective Nonproliferation 6 The Faltering Disarmament Machinery 7 The NPT: Reinforcing the Central Pillar 8 Eroding Disarmament Commitments 9 Eroding Disarmament Consensus 10 The Disarmament Agenda 11 Preventing Use 11 Preventing and Reversing Vertical Proliferation 14 Preventing and Reversing Horizontal Proliferation 17 Making the Disarmament Machinery Work 21 The CD 21 The NPT Institutional Deficit 22 NGO Access 24 Priorities for Canada 24 Notes 27 References 29 APPENDICES I. Background Information on VANA and Project Ploughshares 34 II. The 13 “Practical Steps” 39 III. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 42

Nuclear Disarmament 1 Ploughshares Working Paper 07-1

Introduction Nuclear disarmament principles and practices are under severe threat. This means that all of us and the planet itself are under threat, confirmation of which is offered in the recent movement of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (2007) Doomsday Clock two minutes closer to midnight. The combination of nuclear use doctrines, modernization programs, inconsistent controls, thousands of nuclear weapons poised for instant use, and the danger of nuclear weapons spreading to more states and falling into the hands of non-state actors means that the possibility of nuclear catastrophe, whether by design or accident, remains a daily reality. Public opinion polls consistently show Canadians to be well aware of nuclear dangers and supportive of effective Canadian action to mitigate those dangers and to pursue the elimination of nuclear weapons. VANA and Project Ploughshares have been at the forefront of a Canadian community of research, education, and advocacy to end the nuclear weapons peril, urging the Government of Canada to assume a leadership role in global disarmament diplomacy.

The Continuing Threat Unfortunately, the nuclear threat did not go the way of the Berlin Wall. In the immediate post-Cold War period there were significant and welcome reductions in nuclear arsenals, but the “great” powers could not break their nuclear addiction. There are still some 27,000 nuclear warheads in the arsenals of nine states.1 Russia and the United States account for about 26,000 of these warheads, several thousand of which are on strategic missiles kept at high levels of alert and ready to be fired within minutes of an order to do so. The launch-on-warning policies still maintained by these two former rivals mean that retaliatory strikes could be authorized in response to warnings of attack, raising the possibility of a nuclear launch being triggered by a mistaken warning. So far, such false warnings have always been discovered before a retaliatory launch order was given—but there is no guarantee of such good fortune in the future. In comparison with Russia and the United States, China, France, and the United Kingdom maintain relatively modest arsenals, in the low hundreds of warheads, but all five of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) officially recognized as such by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are


committed to maintaining and modernizing their nuclear arsenals despite their obligation under the NPT to disarm. The US Defense Department is persistent in its efforts to develop new tactical nuclear weapons designed to destroy hardened underground targets—the controversial “bunker busters”2—and the US has recently moved toward the construction of a new facility to produce plutonium pits (Fetter & von Hippel, 2004), the core for nuclear weapons, on a large scale. The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program,3 which is intended to ensure that weapons in current stockpiles remain useable, is in fact a modernization program that replaces older warheads with newer versions with new capabilities. In the United Kingdom, the debate over replacing the Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile system, the UK’s only nuclear weapons system, continues (Johnson, Butler & Pullinger 2006)—although the Government took a decisive step toward modernization when Parliament voted in March 2007 in support of the Government’s proposal (BBC News 2007). Much of the argument insists that it is essential for the UK to retain a “seat at the top table of nuclear powers” (Ripley 2004), a logic that could persuade others to pursue nuclear weapons as a ticket to the tables of their choice. In 2005 Russia tested manoeuvrable intercontinental ballistic missiles designed to circumvent US ballistic missile defences (Norris & Kristensen 2006a, pp. 64-67). Both France and China are pursuing modernized delivery vehicles for their nuclear weapons (SIPRI 2006, pp. 655-659). Three additional states with nuclear weapons are outside the NPT. Israel refuses to confirm or deny its nuclear arsenal, but is understood to have at least several dozen warheads. Since 1998, when India and Pakistan made a particular show of testing nuclear warheads, both have developed dozens of warheads and ballistic missiles capable of delivering them (SIPRI 2006, pp. 660-668). North Korea, or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), had claimed in recent years to have built a warhead, and in October 2006 proved the point with an underground test explosion.4 The DPRK may have produced enough fissionable material for up to a dozen warheads (Albright & Brannan 2007). The DPRK was a signatory to the NPT but announced its withdrawal in 2003. In an early breakthrough in 2007, however, the DPRK agreed to end its nuclear weapons program in a deal linked to a number of economic and political arrangements (US Dept. of State 2007).


Iran’s nuclear program,5 which includes the enrichment of uranium, a technology useful for both the production of nuclear power and nuclear weapons, is also currently at the centre of public and diplomatic concern. Iran is party to the NPT and has consistently maintained that it is interested only in non-military uses of nuclear technology, but the fact that it carried out much of its research clandestinely has undermined the international community’s confidence in Iran’s peaceful intent. Despite being under Security Council sanctions,6 in April 2007 Iran announced a further expansion of its uranium enrichment program (Faithi & Hauser 2007). The nuclear programs of the DPRK and Iran have been directly linked to the clandestine nuclear technology ring of AQ Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist who admitted to illegally distributing nuclear technology (Corera 2006). All these threats emanate from state possession or pursuit of nuclear weapons, but a nuclear disarmament agenda also has to contend with the danger—by most accounts a seriously growing danger—that nuclear materials and even warheads could find their way to non-state terrorist groups. The level of the risk is not easily determined, but the worldwide dispersal of radioactive nuclear material and the possibility of further clandestine operations like those of AQ Khan mean that the risk of “dirty bombs”—i.e., the use of conventional explosives to disperse radioactive materials—must be taken seriously. While it is less likely that a non-state group will acquire a nuclear warhead, the extraordinary consequences of such a development mean that the international community’s obligation to address and take measures to prevent the possibility is indisputable.

Dangerous Doctrines When states parties to the NPT met for the 2000 Review Conference, they agreed to a set of 13 practical disarmament steps (see Appendix II), including a commitment to “a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination” (step 9e). This commitment notwithstanding, the NWS and their alliance partners have continued to elaborate and emphasize security doctrines that ascribe key roles to nuclear weapons in their national and alliance security policies, in


the process undermining multilateral nonproliferation and disarmament efforts. Nuclear Use Doctrines Traditional deterrence doctrine, while defining the central reason for possessing nuclear weapons as their deterrent effect on a nuclear-armed adversary, has always included a specific nuclear war-fighting element. That war-fighting was the original and central role assigned to nuclear weapons was confirmed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and retained under later ideas of escalation dominance. For example, the core of American deterrence doctrine has always been the assertion that its arsenal has to be large enough to ensure that when all the destruction is concluded the US will still have enough nuclear weapons to dominate or prevail in the post-war environment. Current doctrines are, if anything, more explicit in nuclear use scenarios. In January 2006, for example, French President Jacques Chirac declared, “The leaders of states who would use terrorist means against us, as well as those who would envision using … weapons of mass destruction, must understand that they would lay themselves open to a firm and fitting response on our part. This response could be a conventional one. It could also be of a different kind” (Moore 2006, p. A12). This threat of the first use of nuclear weapons in response to terrorist attacks or attacks by chemical or biological weapons echoes the earlier threat of the 2002 “nuclear posture review” in the United States. It contemplated the use of nuclear weapons in war-fighting and pre-emptive attacks against an enumerated list of non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS): “In setting requirements for nuclear strike capabilities, distinctions can be made among the contingencies for which the United States must be prepared. Contingencies can be categorized as immediate, potential or unexpected.… North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya are among the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies. All have longstanding hostility toward the United States and its security partners; North Korea and Iraq in particular have been chronic military concerns. All sponsor or harbor terrorists, and all have active WMD and missile programs” (GlobalSecurity.org 2002). The Weapons of Mass Destruction (Blix) Commission (2006) challenges both nuclear deterrence and explicit nuclear use doctrines. Nuclear deterrence in the post-Cold War context, it says, “is not likely to prevent


further proliferation of nuclear weapons or their actual use by governments acting recklessly or by terrorists” (WMDC 2006, p. 89). Explicit use doctrines are especially dangerous inasmuch as “military doctrines providing for the first or preventive use of nuclear weapons, or for use in retaliation for attacks with weapons other than nuclear, all tend to widen the license in the doctrine of nuclear deterrence for actual nuclear war-fighting. They all risk lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons” (WMDC 2006, p. 90). NATO and Nuclear Weapons and Security The Blix Commission also noted that “whenever a nuclear-weapons state declares that all options are on the table, that it reserves the option of using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon state, or that nuclear weapons are essential or vital for its security, other states take note and act accordingly” (WMDC 2006, p. 88). The reference to states that insist that “nuclear weapons are essential or vital for [their] security” specifically recalls current NATO (2005) doctrine, which maintains that nuclear weapons “continue to play an essential role in war prevention, but their role is now more fundamentally political,” acting to “preserve peace and prevent coercion.” Through NATO, Canada also claims nuclear weapons as essential to its security.7 Aside from the incongruity of finding security in the extraordinarily destructive power and indiscriminate mayhem promised by nuclear weapons, the commitment made by Canada in 2000 along with its NPT partners to work to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies is violated by continuing claims of indefinite reliance on them. The Strategic Concept adopted by the Washington NATO Summit in 1999 remains the Alliance’s official statement of purpose and outlines its approach to security, its force posture, and its nuclear doctrine. The statement did not alter NATO’s 1991 position on nuclear issues, reiterating the commitment to retain nuclear weapons indefinitely. It outlined a doctrine of deterrence dependent on nuclear weapons to ‘preserve peace’ (NATO 1999, para 46): “To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a minimum sufficient level. Taking into account the diversity of risks with which the Alliance could be faced, it must maintain the forces necessary to ensure credible deterrence and to provide a wide range of conventional response


options. But the Alliance’s conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.” The declared threat to use nuclear weapons is essentially open-ended. It implies the possible use of nuclear weapons against any aggressors, including NNWS. The implication of this doctrine in the context of NATO expansion is particularly significant, expanding the number of countries included in nuclear deterrence and nuclear use security policies. At the same time, NATO reports that the readiness level of European-based tactical nuclear weapons is now measured in months,8 making it all the more feasible to finally remove them entirely. Selective Nonproliferation Through the NPT the international community recognizes only five nuclear weapon states. The five are obligated to eventually eliminate their nuclear arsenals, and all other states are to remain non-nuclear weapon states. That basic formula is now essentially rejected in Washington by a policy of selective nonproliferation that says what really matters is who has nuclear weapons. The spread of nuclear weapons is now in practice accepted—if it is to the right regimes (that is, regimes currently friendly to the United States). “Israel, India, and Pakistan are not seen as antagonistic to U.S. interests, and therefore the current leadership in Washington does not consider their nuclear stockpiles a threat” (Kimball 2006). Indeed, the Bush Administration actually comes close to the view that some proliferation is welcome. In the case of its proposed deal for civilian nuclear cooperation with India, the United States is essentially welcoming India as a NWS with regional and strategic roles.9 Iran, on the other hand, viewed by the US as hostile to US interests, is treated according to a completely different standard. The Blix Commission, reflecting the broad view of the international disarmament community, “rejects the suggestion that nuclear weapons in the hands of some pose no threat, while in the hands of others they place the world in mortal jeopardy” (WMDC 2006, p. 60). Prime Minister Harper’s (2006) very brief reference to the nuclear threat in his 2006 UN General Assembly speech focused on the threat of nuclear proliferation, but the two questions which he asked could be read as expressing some sympathy for the selective nonproliferation approach. First he asked: “Are we prepared to ensure that Security Council decisions will be


implemented fully?” Then he asked, “Will we act to halt activities that have no reasonable purpose other than the acquisition of nuclear weapons?” Both are sensible questions, if they apply equally to all, but in the context they appear to be veiled references to Iran. We are probably safe in assuming that the Prime Minister, in asking the first question, did not have in mind UN Security Council Resolution 1172, which calls on India and Pakistan “immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programmes, to refrain from weaponization or from the deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, to confirm their policies not to export equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering them and to undertake appropriate commitments in that regard.” Nor is it likely that he is referring to UNSC Resolution 984, which commits NWS not to threaten the use of nuclear weapons against NNWS. The context suggests that, in the second question, the Prime Minister was not talking about NWS but was singling out Iran. In other words, in the absence of explicit calls on the NNWS to fulfill their disarmament obligations, he seems to be worried more about who has nuclear weapons than about advancing the global norm, indeed the law, that nuclear weapons be eliminated from all states.

The Faltering Disarmament Machinery The Cold War saw the development of an elaborate arms control system, characterized by protracted negotiations among the major powers that led most often to agreements that were oriented toward managing nuclear and conventional arsenals rather than reducing them. Even though the negotiations were ongoing, they were focused heavily on just two nuclear weapon states—albeit the two most egregiously at odds with their NPT commitments—and thus failed to establish an overall culture of disarmament. In the immediate post-Cold War period, American and Russian leaders took advantage of that arms control infrastructure, along with a radically changed political environment, to reach agreements on substantial arsenal


reductions. In that climate of general détente there was also a broad global move to scale back substantially on conventional weapons arsenals and on military spending generally. But the post-Cold War era gave way to the post-9/11 era and the international community now faces an environment that is increasingly suspicious of multilateral arms control, in which the arms control infrastructure is in serious disrepair, and in which the political climate generally does not favour arms reductions or reductions in military spending. The United Nations disarmament machinery is essentially nonfunctional. The Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) has been stalemated for a decade, held hostage by a consensus rule that is all too readily exploited by states interested in frustrating disarmament efforts. The New York-based First Committee of the General Assembly has evolved into a welcome and expansive discussion chamber. But, while its resolutions offer a reliable measure of the status of global agreement or disagreement on disarmament measures, it has also effectively been reduced to a talking shop from which only occasionally do real initiatives or agreements emerge. The UN Security Council, the body most directly responsible for forging concrete measures in response to threats to international peace and security, of which bulging nuclear arsenals and uncontrolled arms acquisition and trading are prominent examples, is hobbled not only by the competition and suspicion that characterize relations among its permanent five members, but also by the fact that the P5 are the chief offenders in the accumulation of the arms that the disarmament machinery is challenged to control. The NPT: Reinforcing the Central Pillar When the NPT was agreed to more than 35 years ago, there were predictions that more than 20 states might eventually hold nuclear weapons if nothing were done to prevent proliferation. Only five states had nuclear weapons at the time. They were recognized as Nuclear Weapon States and in time all five committed to disarmament by signing onto the Treaty (China and France did not join until 1992). The ongoing refusal of the NWS to make time-bound commitments to the implementation of their Article VI disarmament obligations is the most serious challenge to the NPT.


The Treaty has become the central pillar of the nuclear disarmament regime and as such has been remarkably affective in stemming the entry of new states into the nuclear weapons club. India, Israel, and Pakistan have acquired nuclear weapons, but they never signed onto the Treaty and are not recognized as nuclear weapon states within the nonproliferation regime. The challenge now is to deal with the reality of their arsenals and to bring them into the nuclear nonproliferation system so that they also accept the obligation to disarm that is embodied in Article VI of the NPT. Other states that demonstrated nuclear ambitions—including Argentina, Brazil, Iraq, Libya, and South Africa—abandoned those ambitions and instead joined the NPT as NNWS. Only two NPT signatory states are currently in open defiance of their Treaty and related safeguards obligations: the DPRK and Iran. Currently, the DPRK’s October 2006 test of a nuclear weapon is the most immediate challenge to the NPT. While the DPRK had announced its withdrawal from the NPT prior to the test, the materials and technology to build a weapon were acquired while it was a party to the Treaty. NPT members, acting together, have been largely ineffective in mounting any credible response. In 2007, the Six Party talks with the DPRK reached a new agreement, the ultimate objective of which is the DPRK’s return to the NPT. Eroding Disarmament Commitments The optimism that came with the end of the Cold War and resulted in significant nuclear reductions has waned. It is clear, not only from their modernization programs and nuclear use doctrines, that NWS disarmament commitments are eroding. Although substantial reductions in both strategic and tactical systems occurred in the 1990s, the commitment to the permanence and verifiability of reductions has been largely abandoned. The most recent bilateral agreement between Russia and the US, the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (commonly called the Moscow Treaty), calls for significant strategic reductions of operational weapons, to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by 2012 (White House 2002, Article 1). However, the Treaty contains no requirement that the scheduled reductions be made irreversible or verifiable. Without irreversible dismantlement of the systems withdrawn from deployment, there is no guarantee that the weapons will not be brought out of storage or reassembled after 2012.


Eroding Disarmament Consensus The nuclear nonproliferation regime, including treaties, agreements, and international institutions, limits the availability and testing of nuclear warheads and imposes safeguards on nuclear technologies and materials—but it is in a state of extreme tension. The sense of optimism that accompanied the 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT, the 1996 adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty10 and the consensus reached at the 2000 NPT Review Conference has now been reversed. Multilateralism is increasingly abandoned in favour of informal “coalition of the willing” approaches. The Proliferation Security Initiative is one such informal mechanism through which likeminded states have voluntarily committed to a set of general principles for the interdiction of nuclear materials in transit. Another is the G8 Global Partnership Program to secure former Soviet nuclear facilities and stockpiles. While there are important and positive elements to these programs, they are pursued outside the multilateral nonproliferation regime and lack accountability to the broader international community. The 2005 NPT Review Conference was notable primarily for its refusal, especially at US insistence, to recognize the consensus reached and commitments made in the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. The NPT discourse has also suffered from a conceptual shift, led primarily by the NWS, to prioritize the nonproliferation commitment over disarmament obligations. Many nonaligned states view as hypocritical the NWS focus on nonproliferation while continuing to regard nuclear weapons as essential to their own security.

The UN World Summit of September 2005 showed the extent of division on nuclear issues. Because proposed US revisions to the language on nuclear threats in the original document were unacceptable to the majority of states, all references to nuclear weapons were removed from the final document. A Summit heralded by Kofi Annan to “take action on grave global threats that require bold global solutions” (UNGA 2005) could not agree even that nuclear weapons are a threat. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty lost another opportunity with its 2005 Entry into Force Conference as 10 of the 44 nuclear capable states still refuse to ratify the Treaty; all 44 must agree before the treaty enters into force.


Perhaps the greatest example of the current disarmament stalemate is the Conference on Disarmament, which has languished for 10 years without agreement on a program of work. There is wide support for the most recent program, which would establish four subcommittees to ‘deal’ with nuclear disarmament, discuss the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and negative security assurances, and negotiate a fissile material control instrument. There was some progress in 2006, with a series of informal debates under the leadership of the year’s six Presidents; however, there is still no approved program of work. Key holdout states are blocking consensus and without agreement negotiations cannot commence. Speaking to the CD in June 2006, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (UNSG 2006) said, “The international community seems almost to be sleepwalking down the latter path [to nuclear proliferation and possible terrorism]—not by conscious choice, but rather through miscalculation, sterile debate and paralysis.”

The Disarmament Agenda Through the NPT itself, as well as the agreements reached at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, the international community has developed a broad consensus, though obviously not unanimity, on the core nuclear disarmament agenda. That agenda, confirmed and elaborated in the Blix Commission report, is designed to achieve three broad objectives: a) prevent the use of existing arsenals, b) prevent the expansion or enhancement of existing arsenals and make progress toward their elimination, and c) prevent the horizontal proliferation of weapons through the diversion of nuclear materials for military use within NNWS or to non-state groups. Preventing Use 1. Abolition: The only way to prevent the use of nuclear weapons is to eliminate them. Indeed, their elimination is the formal objective of Article VI of the NPT, and in 1995 and 2000 the NPT states parties set out steps toward that end. Step 6 of the 13 steps agreed to in 2000 is “an unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.” Canadian policy (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada 2006) agrees that “the most viable and practicable way forward is by a


continuous step-by-step process to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons through steadily advocating national, bilateral and multilateral measures.” RECOMMENDATION The fundamental commitment to the abolition of nuclear weapons should be reiterated by each new Government and we encourage the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs to find an early occasion to restate Canada’s commitment to the elimination of all nuclear weapons as central to Canada’s pursuit of international peace and security. 2. Negative security assurances: Until nuclear arsenals are eliminated, NWS agreed in 2000 to work toward “a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination” (step 9e). In 1995, in a move intended to take nuclear weapons out of the equation in their relations with NNWS, the NWS provided assurances to all NNWS in the NPT that nuclear weapons would not be used or threatened against NNWS (unless they were attacking in cooperation with a NWS).11 Such statements by all five of the NWS were acknowledged in UN Security Council Resolution 984, which also affirmed the right of NNWS to bring any violation or suspected violation to the attention of the Security Council. In the 1995 Review Conference the NWS agreed that consideration would be given to reinforcing these security assurances through the negotiation of a legally binding instrument. The Blix Commission also said that “the CD could consider moving forward with negotiations on a universal, multilateral treaty containing effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons” (WMDC 2006, p. 73). Further action has been held up in the stalemate that has demobilized the CD over the past decade. RECOMMENDATION We urge Canada to continue to press NWS to enter into formal negotiations, either in the CD or another appropriate forum, aimed at elevating the negative security assurances to formal legal obligations. 3. De-alerting: Commitments to reduce the operational status of their nuclear weapons systems (de-alerting) were made by NWS in 2000 (step 9d). Yet the US and Russia still keep thousands of strategic missiles on a high-alert status that would allow for launching within minutes of a


launch order. It would therefore be possible to launch an immediate retaliatory strike in response to a false warning of attack. The typical strategic justification for such a launch-on-warning policy is that, if the missiles were not launched in response to warning of attack, they could be destroyed in their launch silos (use ’em or lose ’em). But in today’s strategic environment there can be no possible justification for such a dangerous, reckless posture since the large numbers of dispersed nuclear arsenals, some in submarines, make a successful pre-emptive first strike impossible. A reported US plan to adapt some intercontinental missiles to carry conventional explosives would add greatly to the danger of misinterpreting a perceived attack. For example, Ted Postol, a physicist and professor of science, technology and national security policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Pavel Podvig, a physicist and weapons specialist at Stanford, believe that “Russian military officers might misconstrue a submarine-launched conventional D5 intercontinental ballistic missile” as a nuclear attack on Russia. Russian forces would go on alert, and while that would not necessarily trigger “a retaliatory hail of Russian nuclear missiles,” Postol argues that “there can be no doubt that such an alert will greatly increase the chances of a nuclear accident involving strategic nuclear forces” (Rosenberg 2006). De-alerting nuclear forces involves the imposition of physical impediments to an immediate launch. The most reliable measure is to separate warheads from their delivery vehicles. The United Kingdom, for example, reports that the Trident submarine (normally there is only one on patrol at a time) “is normally at several days’ notice to fire” (UK House of Commons 2004). It is understood that France and China maintain their arsenals on similarly low levels of alert. States with nuclear weapons that are not considered nuclear weapon states under the NPT—India, Israel, and Pakistan—are believed to be at lower levels of alert, maintaining a weapons capability but not actually deploying any with military forces. Short of de-alerting by the two largest nuclear weapon states, which could only be reliably achieved through a negotiating process and agreement on mutual verification mechanisms, others have advocated that the United States and Russia each simply replace their launch-on-warning policy with one that considers a retaliatory launch only after detonation (a concept dubbed RLOAD). By a simple policy decision that could be made


immediately, both Russia and the US would agree to not authorize retaliation against a suspected incoming nuclear missile attack before a first detonation was confirmed. At that point they could obviously retaliate, although the proposal certainly does not suggest or imply that they should. Such a policy would effectively eliminate the possibility that a false warning would cause a nuclear war.12

RECOMMENDATION Canada should continue to urge nuclear weapon states to fully de-alert their arsenals, both as a risk-reduction and a confidence-building measure. Furthermore, Canada should actively encourage the United States and Russia, in the interests of global safety, to immediately renounce launch-on-warning postures. Preventing and Reversing Vertical Proliferation 1. CTBT: The Blix Commission concluded that “the single most helpful step to revitalize non-proliferation and disarmament today would be ratification of the CTBT by all states that have nuclear weapons” (WMDC 2006, p. 61)—such ratification being necessary for the Treaty to enter into force. The entry into force of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was central to the disarmament objectives articulated in 1995 and 2000 (steps 1 and 2) and is fundamental to efforts to prevent the development of new nuclear weapons, either by existing NWS or by any states keen to acquire them. US refusal to ratify is a key political obstacle to other ratifications and to movement toward entry into force. The US-India nuclear cooperation deal of 2005 raises an interesting connection to the CTBT. For the CTBT to enter into force, India, Israel, and Pakistan must also ratify it (of the three, only Israel has signed and none have ratified). Legislation in support of the US-India deal stipulates that US bilateral cooperation will end if India tests another nuclear device. At a minimum this commitment should be extended and multilaterialized to make CTBT ratification a precondition, among others, for any civilian nuclear cooperation with states outside the NPT and not under full-scope safeguards.


RECOMMENDATION Canada should continue to promote CTBT ratification. When the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) considers rule changes related to nuclear cooperation with India, Canada should insist that NSG guidelines preclude nuclear cooperation with any state that has not ratified the CTBT. 2. FMCT: A related strategy is to prevent the further production of fissionable material for weapons purposes (step 3 in 2000 Review Conference). The need for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) has essentially been agreed to by all NWS, but the matter has been held up in the CD. A related measure is a commitment by NWS to place fissile materials that they have defined as surplus to their needs under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) control (step 10). Again, the US-India deal figures into the equation. Even though India already has enough fissile material to meet any requirements of its declared “minimum deterrence” doctrine, and even though it has declared its support for negotiations toward an FMCT, India appears determined to increase and accelerate fissile material production for weapons purposes while the Treaty negotiations drag on (assuming they ever get started). For India the NSG exemption is essential to meeting that goal.13 The change now being pursued by India and the US is an India-only exemption to a key nonproliferation rule established through the NSG, namely, that states do not enter into nuclear cooperation arrangements (e.g., trade) with non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT or states outside the NPT that are not under full-scope safeguards—that is, states that maintain nuclear programs and facilities that are not subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. A 2006 report (Mian et al. 2006) of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, based at Princeton University, points out that India’s civilian and military programs are currently both constrained by their reliance on its own limited domestic uranium, so if India were to gain access to the foreign sources of uranium that the deal would open up for its civilian programs, it could then funnel all its domestic supplies into an expanded military program. Under the changed rules, within a decade India could accumulate enough plutonium for an arsenal of more than 300 nuclear warheads, which would rival or exceed those of the UK, France, and China.


Canada had earlier signaled its opposition to rule changes at the NSG that would permit continued Indian production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. In December 2005 Canada told US officials that, while it welcomed efforts to deal constructively with states like India outside the NPT, “the deal would have been more positive if the United States had obtained an Indian commitment to freeze production of fissile material for nuclear weapons” (Squassoni 2006, p. 15). It is a mild statement that nevertheless embodies a principle that Canada should promote and the NSG should make its own. RECOMMENDATION Civilian nuclear cooperation with India or any de facto nuclear weapon state outside the NPT should also be conditional on their imposing a verifiable freeze on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes until their adherence to an FMCT that converts such a freeze into a permanent ban. 3. Irreversibility and verifiability: The disarmament agenda also places high priority on the irreversible and verifiable reduction of existing arsenals (steps 5 and 13). Greater transparency and reporting (step 12) by NWS regarding their arsenals and their inventories of weapons-related materials were also called for in 2000. Nuclear weapons slated for reduction and ultimate elimination must obviously include tactical or non-strategic weapons as well. Irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency are the foundation for building confidence in the disarmament commitments of the NWS. RECOMMENDATION Canada should call on the US and Russia to implement the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty with the verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of the nuclear arms to be taken out of deployment by the agreement. 4. NATO and tactical nuclear weapons: In 1999 the Government of Canada stated that it would “continue to stress the necessity to devalue the political significance of [nuclear] weapons,” a commitment that runs counter to its ongoing commitment as a member of NATO. NATO nuclear policy, which holds that nuclear weapons are “essential to preserve peace,” accords them rather high political value. For Canada and


its NATO partners there is an urgent need to revisit the NATO nuclear weapons issue. RECOMMENDATION Canada should work with likeminded states to call for a new review of NATO nuclear policy with a view to renouncing the policy of relying on nuclear weapons “to preserve peace.” As a minimum first step, the NATO Doctrine should be rewritten to reflect the NPT consensus that the security of all states requires that nuclear arsenals be eliminated, not retained indefinitely. At the very least, NATO’s nuclear doctrine should describe the deployment of nuclear weapons as a temporary measure in the context of efforts towards balanced nuclear disarmament, explain that the only role of nuclear weapons in such an interim is to deter the use of nuclear weapons by others, and declare that NATO therefore will adopt a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. NATO doctrine should acknowledge that nuclear weapons represent an unacceptable risk to humanity, and that their early elimination is essential to human security. In the course of revisiting its own nuclear doctrine and the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons in certain NNWS in Europe, NATO should engage Russia on the reduction and elimination of all non-strategic nuclear weapons. 5. Transparency, reporting, and accountability: All NWS states in particular should meet their reporting obligations (step 12). This would also serve as a baseline for future disarmament efforts involving all NWS. RECOMMENDATION Canada should continue to press for detailed NWS reporting on holdings of fissile material for weapons purposes, nuclear weapons arsenals, and progress made toward their elimination. Preventing and Reversing Horizontal Proliferation 1. Safeguard inspections: The centrepiece of nonproliferation is the NPT’s provision for all NNWS to enter into agreements with the IAEA to provide for the inspection of any nuclear-related facilities to confirm that none are being used in support of a weapons program. An Additional Protocol has been developed to extend standard IAEA safeguard agreements to provide for broader and more intrusive inspections and monitoring; most states, as well as the Blix Commission (WMDC 2006, p.


65), now agree that the provisions of the Additional Protocol should be the minimum standard for safeguard agreements. The Blix Commission emphasized the importance of multilateral safeguard agreements and inspections: “National surveillance systems may supplement international verification but, as experience has repeatedly shown, particularly with Iraq, such systems do not offer a panacea” (WMDC 2006, p. 53). RECOMMENDATION Canada should continue to insist on the Additional Protocol as the minimum global standard in the context of strengthening multilateral, non-discriminatory approaches to inspections and verification. 2. Dealing with the Cold War legacy: The G8 Global Partnership Program Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GPP) is a practical disarmament measure that is focused on meeting the challenges of the legacy of the Cold War’s nuclear arms race. The primary effort is to improve controls over the vast facilities and nuclear materials that remain in the former Soviet Union. The program also includes the destruction of chemical weapons stocks. It assists in the dismantling of nuclear-powered submarines, providing for the physical security of, and accurate accounting for, nuclear and radiological materials, the employment of former weapons scientists and technicians, the control of dangerous pathogens, and other related measures. The GPP is creating an important understanding of the cost, time, and political requirements for disarmament to proceed. The program partners have committed to raise $20-billion for activities to reduce proliferation threats in, or emanating from, the Russian Federation. RECOMMENDATION Canada’s commitment to the program is $1-billion over 10 years and should be maintained until the dangers are satisfactorily addressed. 3. Export controls and the NSG: Exports of nuclear materials are governed by NPT articles I, II, and II and subject to voluntary guidelines established through the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The proposed civilian nuclear cooperation deal between the United States and India, whether or not it goes through exactly as proposed, signals that there will continue to be pressures on the international community to modify the current formula for dealing with the three states that are still outside the NPT and that have nuclear weapons.


At the 2005 Review Conference Canada repeated the approach that has prevailed to date toward these three states: “Canada calls upon the three States which have yet to adhere to the Treaty—India, Israel and Pakistan—to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States” (Wright 2005). That is obviously a desired outcome, but it has become a pro forma call that the international community regularly makes, knowing it is not about to be heeded. At the same time, the alternative (the essence of the proposed US-India arrangement) is to accept India as a de facto nuclear weapon state and to permit it the basic prerogatives of a NWS (i.e., the operation of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities without any penalty), without requiring it to accept the NPT’s formal Article VI obligation to pursue disarmament, or to sign onto the various commitments that NWS have made through the NPT review process. As a result, India would gain access to nuclear materials and technology that is otherwise available only to states that are in verifiable compliance with the NPT as NNWS (and Israel and Pakistan would demand the same treatment). This is a critically important issue for Canada, not only because India used Canadian technology, in violation of commitments made, throughout its pursuit of nuclear weapons, but especially because the proposed changes will have implications far beyond the Indian case. The role and responsibility of Canada and other NSG states, therefore, must be to ensure that any change does in fact produce a nonproliferation benefit. RECOMMENDATION Canada should explore a compromise arrangement (including in the NSG) that would permit the international community to acknowledge the reality of nuclear weapons in India, Israel, and Pakistan and that would in return require these de facto nuclear weapon states not to expand their respective arsenals (defined as the combination of warheads and stocks of fissile material for weapons purposes) and to formally accept the same legal obligation to disarm that applies to the states that are bound by Article VI of the NPT. 4. Fuel cycle control: The greater the number of states that enrich uranium and reprocess spent nuclear fuel, the greater the number of states with expertise and opportunity to divert nuclear materials for weapons purposes. It follows that, if the more sensitive elements of fuel production (those which have application for weapons purposes) can be confined to a very few countries, the capacity to detect and prevent diversion will improve. At the same time, the restriction of these


technologies and materials cannot credibly be pursued as one more double standard or class division. Uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing cannot be left to national prerogatives and should not be confined to or left under the national control of a few states. The point of multilateral control of the fuel cycle is to ensure that all states that meet safeguard requirements have equal access to the legal product of those technologies (e.g., civilian reactor fuel) on a non-discriminatory basis. If the international community is to avoid a double standard between “haves” and “have nots” in the development of multilateral controls on fuel cycle technologies, it will have to find a way to develop collective controls that have the confidence of states that are asked to forgo national development of relevant technologies. Iran, for example, is suspected of insisting on developing its own technology and expertise in uranium enrichment so that it can in the future apply it to weapons production if it so decides, but it is also the case that Iran and other countries seeking nuclear power claim that they are not confident that they can rely on external sources. Hence, the Arms Control Association of Washington says that it will be difficult to persuade Iran to give up its nuclear technology ambitions unless it has confidence that the international community, and especially those states that control fuel enrichment and reprocessing, will respect and honour its legitimate nuclear energy ambitions (Kimball 2006). Canada is a supplier of nuclear material and so is poised to be an important player in this debate. The key international venue for the debate is the IAEA, and the Blix Commission calls on states to “make active use of the IAEA as a forum for exploring various ways to reduce proliferation risks connected with the nuclear fuel cycle, such as proposals for an international fuel bank; internationally safeguarded regional centres offering fuel-cycle services, including spent-fuel repositories; and the creation of a fuel-cycle system built on the concept that a few ‘fuel-cycle states’ will lease nuclear fuel to states that forgo enrichment and reprocessing activities” (WMDC 2006, p. 77). RECOMMENDATION Canada is in a position to make an important contribution to the enhancement of nonproliferation standards by encouraging multilateral attention to the development of a non-discriminatory international system to control the nuclear fuel cycle in the interests of nonproliferation and appropriate peaceful uses.


5. Non-state actors: The growing danger that non-state groups could acquire either radioactive nuclear materials or an actual warhead has already prompted a broad range of multilateral responses. In 2002 the G8 launched the Global Partnership to deal with the legacy of Cold War weapons of mass destruction, especially in Russia. The 2003 Proliferation Security Initiative has a particular focus on intercepting unauthorized shipments of materials related to weapons of mass destruction. In 2004 UN Security Council Resolution 1540 focused on legally binding measures against “any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.” All states are required to establish national laws and regulations toward that end. In 2006 the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (White House 2006) was launched by the G8 plus a small number of additional countries; in support of this initiative Canada is scheduled to host an international workshop on the physical protection of high risk radioactive sources. The imperative of preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons or nuclear materials is self-evident and has a high priority. But it cannot supersede the urgent need to deal with the threatening arsenals of nuclear weapon states and the dangers of horizontal proliferation to other states.14

RECOMMENDATION Canada should continue to encourage implementation of the various multilateral mechanisms to prevent nuclear terrorism, working to ensure that all measures are pursued within the framework of international law, and with ongoing urgent attention to the nonproliferation and disarmament agenda.

Making the Disarmament Machinery Work

The CD The CD is the one United Nations body with an explicit mandate to negotiate multilateral disarmament agreements, but its work has been blocked by the failure of states to agree on four key elements of action: a fissile materials treaty, preventing an arms race in space, negative security assurances, and nuclear disarmament. In spite of the modest


breakthrough in the CD in 2006, by which the four key elements were at least the focus of scheduled discussions, there is still no program of work to guarantee that these discussions will continue in 2007, much less expand to include formal negotiations. The CD has agreed to work toward a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty. While a broad consensus on the measure has been undercut by some objections regarding verifiability, the only thing that blocks negotiation is the linkage of this issue to the three other main items on the CD’s agenda. One of these is the proposal to negotiate an international instrument to “prevent an arms race in outer space” (PAROS), essentially a treaty to prevent the weaponization of space. In addition, the CD has also been charged with negotiating a legally binding instrument to embody Negative Security Assurances (NSAs)—assurances by NWS that they will neither use nor threaten to use nuclear weapons against NNWS signatories of the NPT. And finally, NNWS members of the CD have also insisted that the program of work include a special committee to address the broad program of nuclear disarmament and measures to meet the objectives of NPT Article VI and of the very first resolution of the UN General Assembly, A/RES/1/1 of January 1946, which called for the phase-out of all nuclear weapons. In the fall of 2005 Canada explored the possibility of submitting a resolution to the First Committee of the General Assembly (the disarmament committee) that called on it to approve four ad hoc committees to begin discussions on each of the four key issues, and to continue the discussions until such time as the CD was prepared to take up substantive action on each. Because the proposal met with strong objections from the NWS, especially the United States, it was never formally put forward, but it was effective in pushing the CD to organize focused discussions on each of the issues during its 2006 session. RECOMMENDATION The challenge now is for the CD to move from discussion to actual negotiation. Therefore, we encourage Canada to put increased pressures on the CD to act; should the CD remain deadlocked Canada should commit to the pursuit of each of the four issues in another forum or process. The NPT Institutional Deficit The NPT is hampered by the absence of an effective institutional infrastructure to manage the Treaty. It does not have a secretariat and


there are no means by which states parties to the treaty can take action between Review Conferences, which occur every five years. The Blix Commission has therefore recommended that states “establish a secretariat to handle administrative matters for the parties to the treaty. This secretariat should organize the treaty’s Review Conferences and their Preparatory Committee sessions. It should also organize other treaty related meetings upon the request of a majority of the states parties” (WMDC 2006, p. 188). It is a matter of some urgency, for example, that the states of the Treaty have a mechanism to use in cases of serious violation of the Treaty or when a state seeks to withdraw from it. A procedure is needed to ensure the basic principle that a state is not absolved from compliance requirements simply by withdrawal. In other words, a state cannot violate the provisions of the treaty while it is a party to it and then avoid the consequences by simply withdrawing from the Treaty. If a state party to the treaty commits to using nuclear materials, equipment, or technology only for peaceful purposes, it must still fulfill that commitment even when it withdraws. In 2000, states agreed to report regularly on their holdings of nuclear materials and their actions to implement the treaty, but without a secretariat there is no body in place to receive such reports, except the Review Conferences. Canada has been active in addressing the institutional deficit. In order to garner greater support, it has kept its proposals fairly modest. For example, instead of proposing a secretariat, Canada has called for an annual decision-making meeting or conference as well as a standing five-person bureau (chair of the Review Conference and the chairs of the annual meetings, elected at the end of each Review Conference). This bureau would provide continuity and oversight, and would convene extraordinary sessions “when situations arise that threaten the integrity or viability of the Treaty,” with the specific provision that an extraordinary meeting be called within two weeks of any state’s withdrawal notice (Government of Canada 2005).


RECOMMENDATION We encourage Canada to continue to press its proposals for reform of the institutional infrastructure of the NPT, considering also the related proposals of the Blix Commission, with a view to ensuring a more active and accountable collective effort to implement the terms of the NPT, the foundational global agreement by states to permanently eliminate nuclear weapons. NGO Access Civil society participation not only advances the goals of accountability and transparency, but encourages action on the global disarmament agenda. RECOMMENDATION Canada should continue to champion extensive and effective participation of NGOs and civil society in the NPT review process.

Priorities for Canada In 1999, through the official response to a report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Government of Canada declared that “Canada’s objective has been and remains the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.” This position has been held through successive changes in Government and enjoys support across the political spectrum. Working within that broad national consensus Canada has been active in multilateral forums such as the NPT Review Conferences, the Conference on Disarmament, the First Committee, and the Disarmament Commission in encouraging a deepened international commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons, and specific commitments to advancing the disarmament agenda. RECOMMENDATION Each new Canadian Government should, as a matter of course and at the highest level, reaffirm Canada’s fundamental commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons. With that unwavering goal always at the core of its efforts, Canada should continue to support the broad nuclear disarmament agenda described above, giving priority to particular issues that it is in a good position to


influence. There will necessarily be some shifts in priorities according to changing circumstances, but currently at least four of the issues deserve the focused attention of Canada. 1. The disarmament machinery: Nuclear disarmament depends first and foremost on the political will of states to simply do it, but the institutional mechanisms through which they pursue that fundamental and urgent agenda are critically important. The mechanisms can themselves become obstacles to effective process, and it is clear that in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament and the NPT Review Process there are institutional arrangements and practices that serve to impede the disarmament progress. These impediments require urgent attention and Canada, having developed significant proposals to address the “institutional deficit” within the disarmament system, is well placed to work with likeminded states to press for constructive change. 2. The internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle: The conflict regarding Iran’s uranium enrichment program raises important issues about the spread of sensitive civilian technologies—to which all states in compliance with non-proliferation obligations are legally entitled—that have immediate relevance for the pursuit of nuclear weapons. It is in the interests of nuclear disarmament that these technologies be severely restricted, but such restrictions must obviously be nondiscriminatory. Canada should take an active role in investigating and promoting international mechanisms toward that end. 3. Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines for civilian nuclear cooperation with de facto nuclear weapon states: The US-India civilian nuclear cooperation deal has led to proposals to exempt India from the current guidelines of the NSG, and Canadian technology and interests are directly engaged. Canada must be at the fore of international efforts to universalize the NPT and to bring India, Israel, and Pakistan under the rules and discipline of the nuclear nonproliferation system, ensuring that nonproliferation objectives are not only uncompromised but strengthened through any NSG action to modify its guidelines. 4. Resolving the NATO/NPT contradiction: As a NATO country Canada is juggling two conflicting commitments. Through NATO Canada insists that nuclear weapons are essential to its security and are thus to be retained for the foreseeable future. Through the NPT and related disarmament forums Canada promotes the elimination of nuclear


weapons at the earliest possible date. This conflict must be resolved in favour of the second commitment.


Notes 1. The Nuclear Notebook of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council (Norris & Kristensen 2006b) provide the following breakdown of the number of warheads held as of 2006: United States: 10,104; Russia: 16,000; UK: 200; France: 350; China: 200; India: 55; Pakistan: 45; Israel: 70; North Korea: 10. 2. “The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) program no longer appears in NNSA’s [National Nuclear Security Administration’s] unclassified budget. Upgrades continue to the B61-11, the earth-penetrating weapon, or ‘bunker buster’, already a part of the current U.S. stockpile” (Ellison 2007). 3. “The first warhead that the RRW program is slated to replace is the W76 warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles. In principle, RRW models are supposed to replicate the capabilities and purposes of the warheads they replace, but NNSA officials say the program eventually could tailor bombs for new missions” (Boese 2007). 4. Some analysts rated the test as a likely failure. See Kang & Hayes 2006. See also Regehr 2006b. 5. For further analysis, see Regehr 2006a. 6. UN Security Council Resolution 1747, 24 March 2007. 7. For further analysis, see Regehr 2005a. 8. “In 1995, in a first major step of relaxation, the readiness posture of dual-capable aircraft was greatly reduced, so that nuclear readiness was measured in weeks rather than in minutes. In 2002, in a second step, the readiness requirements for these aircraft were further reduced and are now being measured in months” (NATO 2005). 9. For further analysis, see Regehr 2005b. 10. The CTBT is pending entry into force, which requires that instruments of ratification be submitted by 44 states considered to be “nuclear capable.” Ten of these states have yet to ratify the Treaty. Three


of those 10—India, North Korea, and Pakistan—have yet to sign the Treaty. 11. The statement by the United States is as follows: “The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon state-parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a state toward which it has a security commitment carried out, or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state.” Security Council Resolution 984 (1995) on Negative Security Assurances refers to the individual declaration by each NWS (document S/1995/265 for the United States). See Arms Control Association 2002. 12. The proposal has been developed by Alan Phillips and Steven Starr and has been presented by them and Robin Collins to officials of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (see Phillips 2002; and Phillips & Starr 2004, pp. 20-22). 13. All five NWS have adopted a voluntary freeze on production, although China has not officially confirmed its freeze. 14. Christine Wing (2007) provides a good discussion of three sometimes competing views of the priority nuclear challenge.


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Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. 2006. Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms. Stockholm. http://www.wmdcommission.org. White House, The. 2002. Text of Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty. 24 May. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020524-3.html. ———. 2006. Fact Sheet: The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Washington http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/print/20060715-3.html. Wing, Christine. 2007. Nuclear Weapons: The Challenges Ahead. Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series. New York: International Peace Academy, April. http://www.ipacademy.org/asset/file/158/CWC_Working_Paper_NUKES_CW.pdf. Wright, Jim. 2005. Statement on behalf of the Government of Canada to the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 2 May. http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/statements02may.html.


Appendix I Background Information on

VANA and Project Ploughshares Veterans Against Nuclear Arms (VANA) VANA was formed in 1982 in response to the Canadian government’s decision to permit the testing in Canada of air-launched cruise missiles. Alarmed by this development, four distinguished World War II veterans met in Halifax to protest against it. They were Dalhousie University faculty members Giff Gifford and Kell Antoft; Lloyd Shaw, a prominent Halifax businessman; and Hugh Taylor, the Nova Scotia provincial archivist. All served in the air forces during World War II. They called the organization Veterans for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament (VMND) and set about to organize branches throughout the country. By 1987 they had established branches in Vancouver, Victoria, Nanaimo, Penticton, Edmonton, Saskatoon, Winnipeg, North Bay, Toronto, Ottawa, and Montréal. Throughout the country new leaders sprang up, among whom were Colonel Woody Coward and Colonel Norm Hoye in Vancouver; Peter Davies, Marion Frank, and Mark Frank in Toronto; Alan Phillips in Hamilton; Commodore Bob Cox in Halifax; and Major-General Leonard Johnson in Ottawa. At about the same time the name was changed to VANA. While its original focus was on nuclear weapons, it was later changed to opposition to war. It was felt that an emphasis on nuclear weapons might give the impression that VANA favoured other type of weapons and that it was not opposed to war as a means of settling international disputes. In 2000 VANA modified its original Statement of Purpose by adding the bottom line. VANA’s goal is to ensure a secure future for the human race: - by achieving common security for all nations; - by finding non-military solutions for international conflicts; - by establishing the rule of international law through the World Court; - by joining with veterans and others in a global quest to end the arms race; - by working for the total abolition of nuclear weapons and war.


VANA has taken part in peace marches, lobbied federal and provincial officials to take stands for peace, and published a newsletter, the VANA UPDATE. During the Cold War it arranged for visits with Soviet veterans and placed their grandchildren in each others’ summer camps. In Vancouver it participated in the annual Remembrance Day parades under a banner that read “Let Peace Be Their Memorial,” which always received an enthusiastic response from the onlookers. Members Woody Coward, Bas Robinson, and Art Laing spoke to school children under the auspices of the federal government’s “Memorial Project.” In addition it created an organization, Defence Research Education Centre (DREC), which researched and published materials on peace issues VANA has achieved international recognition. The late Sir Dr. Joseph Rotblat and Dr Hans Bethe, both Nobel Laureates, agreed to accept honorary membership in it. Other honorary members are Mordechai Vanunu, the Israeli peace activist; Dr. Helen Caldicott, the founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility; and Cindy Sheehan, the American peace activist. Time, however, has taken its toll on VANA. Many of its members, including its four founders, have either passed away or become less active. Only three functioning VANA groups remain. The ON-QUE Region is an amalgamation of the branches in Ontario and Quebec. Audrey Tobias is its Coordinator; other active members are Alan Brown in Montréal and Jordan Bishop in Ottawa. The Saskatoon Branch, led by John Bury and Betsy Bury, has monthly meetings with Ploughshares and is playing a major role in the Saskatoon Peace Coalition. The Vancouver Branch, led by Ed Livingston, is an important member of the local Stop War coalition. Despite its declining membership VANA is still active in the peace movement. Early in 2005 ON-QUE Region member James Kafieh, former president of the Canadian Arab Federation, sent a letter, which was endorsed by national president David Morgan, to all Members of Parliament, urging them to vote against a proposal to participate in the United States Ballistic Missile Defense Program. Montréal member Alan Brown made arrangements to translate that letter into French. Their efforts, along with those of other peace organizations, paid off. Parliament turned down the proposal.


VANA is currently participating in a campaign to urge the nuclear powers to abandon their Launch-On-Warning (L-O-W) doctrine. Under this doctrine they will immediately launch missiles in response to a perceived nuclear attack. Since in the past there have been numerous false missile sightings, there is the possibility that a nuclear war, in which millions of people might be killed, could be triggered because of an error. This is why the movement to abolish nuclear weapons and war must be strengthened. And this is why VANA has decided to work with Project Ploughshares to bring about a world without war. Project Ploughshares Project Ploughshares was established in 1976 as an agency of The Canadian Council of Churches to work with churches and related organizations, as well as governments and nongovernmental organizations, in Canada and internationally, to identify, develop, and advance approaches that build peace and prevent war, and promote the peaceful resolution of political conflict. The name and mandate for Project Ploughshares come from the ancient biblical vision of Isaiah, which sees the material and human wealth consumed by military preparations for war transformed into resources for human development—a transformation that goes to the roots of war itself:

… and they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation; neither shall they learn war any more. (Isaiah 2:4)

The peacemaking and peacebuilding initiatives of Project Ploughshares are organized under four themes in pursuit of policies and practices designed to

• advance the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction that are a threat to local and global security,

• progressively reduce the resort to military force in response to political and social conflict,


• advance controls on the supply of arms to reduce the availability of the weapons that transform political and social conflict into war and violence, and

• support positive measures to build conditions of sustainable peace that enhance the security of people in their homes and communities.

The cornerstone of this policy work is analysis based on carefully researched information and engagement with NGO and government policymakers in the development of policy options. Policy work on peace and security issues is also informed and strengthened by direct involvement with partners in conflict zones. Current focus areas include the non-weaponization of space; nuclear nonproliferation challenges in such countries as Iran, North Korea, and India; controls on the international transfer of weapons, including small arms; support for the implementation of the peace agreement in southern Sudan and regional security arrangements in the Horn of Africa; and Canadian security policy and spending that address both the military and nonmilitary dimensions of security. Program implementation is frequently carried out in collaboration with other nongovernmental organizations, in Canada and internationally. Project Ploughshares is a member of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation, the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Mines Action Canada, the International Action Network on Small Arms, the Arms Trade Treaty Steering Committee, as well as other working groups. In Canada local congregations and a network of Ploughshares local groups promote the mission and program objectives of Project Ploughshares at the community level. Project Ploughshares is sponsored by the following eight Canadian churches and church agencies that take responsibility for governing Project Ploughshares on behalf of The Canadian Council of Churches: The Anglican Church of Canada, Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, Canadian Unitarian Council, Canadian Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends, Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada, Mennonite Central Committee Canada, The Presbyterian Church in Canada, and The United Church of Canada. Project


Ploughshares is affiliated with the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies at Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario. Thousands of individuals, as well as many churches, congregations, religious orders, and organizations across Canada, support Project Ploughshares each year. The Simons Foundation in Vancouver provides invaluable annual operating and program support. In addition, grants from governments and foundations support specific program initiatives. To contribute to informed public discussion and debate of peace and security issues, Project Ploughshares publishes comprehensive information through regular publications such as The Ploughshares Monitor (quarterly) and the Armed Conflicts Report (annual), as well as through occasional publications such as Working Papers, Briefings, conference reports, and other resources. All publications are available on the Ploughshares website, www.ploughshares.ca. In addition, the Ploughshares E-Newsletter (www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/PloughsharesNews.htm) is a regular source of news and information about Ploughshares programs.


Appendix II The 13 “Practical Steps”

Paragraph 15 of the section on Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 (of the NPT) in the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, FINAL DOCUMENT, Part I. 15. The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”: 1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. 2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty. 3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non- discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years. 4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.


5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures. 6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI. 7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions. 8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency. 9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all: · Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally · Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament · The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process · Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems · A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination · The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons 10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international


verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes. 11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control. 12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996. 13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.


Appendix III The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(NPT)

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty,

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,


Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.


Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment


for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such


Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the


amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.


5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.

ERNIE REGEHR

PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES57 Erb Street WestWaterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2 Canada519-888-6541 Fax [email protected]

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