The Peace Process in Colombia with the ELN: The Role of …27s Role in... · LATIN AMERICAN PROGRAM The Peace Process in Colombia with the ELN: The Role of Mexico By Ambassador Andrés

LATIN AMERICAN PROGRAM

The Peace Process in Colombia withthe ELN: The Role of MexicoBy Ambassador Andrés Valencia BenavidesEdited by Cynthia J. Arnson, Director, Latin American Program

L AT I N A M E R I C A N P R O G R A M S P E C I A L R E P O R T

Since President Álvaro Uribe took office inColombia in August 2002, efforts to find anegotiated settlement to the country’s internalarmed conflict have focused primarily ondemobilization talks with the AutodefensasUnidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Forcesof Colombia or AUC), a coalition of paramili-tary organizations. Peace talks with the largestguerrilla army, the Fuerzas Armadas de LiberaciónNacional (Armed Forces of National Liberation,or FARC), have mostly languished since thecollapse of negotiations in early 2002 underUribe’s predecessor, President Andrés Pastrana.Meanwhile, the Uribe administration has main-tained on-again, off-again conversations withthe smaller guerrilla army, the Ejército deLiberación Nacional (National Liberation Army,or ELN), meeting directly with ELN com-manders in Havana, Cuba, or attempting dia-logue through an intermediary.2

This publication highlights a little-knownchapter in the peace talks between the Uribegovernment and the ELN, involving Mexico’srole in attempting to jump-start a renewal ofdirect talks in 2004-2005. Third parties, includ-ing governments and civil society organizationssuch as the Catholic Church, have long beenengaged in dialogue efforts with the ELN; asthis account demonstrates, the participation ofColombian and international bodies in peacetalks has long been an explicit goal of the ELN,in order to establish linkages to civil society

and, ultimately, broadly engage Colombiansociety in a discussion of needed political andsocio-economic reforms.

Five countries—Cuba, France, Norway,Spain, and Switzerland—had been designatedas a “Group of Friends” (Grupo de Países Amigos)of the ELN peace process in June 2000 duringthe Pastrana government, and as far back as theadministration of President Ernesto Samper(1994-1998), Spain and Germany had encour-aged “pre-accords” between the guerrillas andmembers of civil society organizations in orderto foster direct negotiations with theColombian government. The role of Mexicothus did not represent a departure regardinginternational involvement with the ELN.Rather, the limited goals of the mediation—tobring the parties closer together and to createthe conditions for a meeting in Mexicobetween Mexican officials and ELN militarycommanders—demonstrated just how far thepeace process with the ELN had deterioratedduring the Uribe years.

For example, Colombian High Commissionerfor Peace Luis Carlos Restrepo had met withELN commanders in Cuba during the firstmonths of the Uribe administration. But as apre-condition for the inauguration of formaltalks, the government insisted on a priorcease-fire, a condition rejected by the ELN.These early talks fell apart in December 2002.They were not re-attempted in any serious

INTRODUCTION1

1. I am grateful to Latin American Program intern Julián Casal, an M.A. candidate in Latin American Studiesat Georgetown University, for research and translation assistance.

2. All three armed organizations—the AUC, FARC, and ELN—have been formally designated ForeignTerrorist Organizations by the U.S. government. The European Union also maintains such a designation.

MARCH 2006

way until Mexico became involved in mid-June2004, with the backing of both the Colombiangovernment and the guerrillas.

The Mexican facilitator in the ELN peace talks,Ambassador Andrés Valencia, spoke at an off-the-record session at the Woodrow Wilson Center onJune 21, 2005. The document that follows wasauthorized and cleared by Mexican authorities; itconstitutes Ambassador Valencia’s first-handaccount of the attempt to arrange a meeting onMexican soil between ELN military leaders andthe Mexican facilitating team, an attempt that,after many months, ended in failure. The exhaus-tive detail opens a window on the intricate,nuanced, and sustained diplomacy necessary forpeace mediation. At the same time, the reportunderscores several deeper, longstanding issues: theELN’s reliance on kidnapping as a source of rev-enue and its unwillingness to suspend kidnapping,even during a temporary cease-fire; the importanceto the ELN of contact with international anddomestic interlocutors; the government’s reluc-tance to permit the guerrillas to open or expandsuch political spaces; the difficulty of communicat-ing with ELN military commanders through theirpolitical representatives (primarily then-impris-oned ELN leader Francisco Galán); and thegovernment’s insistence on a cease-fire prior tonegotiations when, some would argue, a cease-firewould come precisely as a result of peace talks.

After the breakdown of the Mexican facilitationeffort in April 2005, the Uribe government soft-ened several of its positions, seeking talks with theELN outside of Colombia without requiring a priortruce. In addition, and to foster a more propitiousclimate for negotiations, President Uribe droppedhis longstanding insistence that there was no armedconflict in Colombia, but rather only terroristactions carried out by criminal organizations.Moreover, in September 2005, the government pro-visionally released ELN spokesman Francisco Galánfrom prison so that he could participate in andadvance exploratory talks. Meetings between ELNmilitary commanders and the government resumedin Havana in December 2005. Colombian novelistGabriel García Márquez, as well as diplomats fromCuba, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland, attendedsome of the meetings.

At what point the Uribe government and theELN will be able to move beyond “talking abouttalks” and instead engage on the multiple substantiveissues that divide them remains to be seen. It isunlikely that more than symbolic progress will takeplace prior to Colombia’s presidential elections inMay 2006. What happens when a new president isinaugurated in August 2006 remains to be seen.

CYNTHIA J.ARNSON

DIRECTOR, LATIN AMERICAN PROGRAM

MARCH 2006

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LATIN AMERICAN PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT

The Latin American Program serves as a bridge between the United States and Latin America, encouraging a freeflow of information and dialogue between the two regions. The Program also provides a nonpartisan forum for dis-cussing Latin American and Caribbean issues in Washington, D.C., and for bringing these issues to the attention ofopinion leaders and policy makers throughout the Western hemisphere. The Program sponsors major initiatives onDemocratic Governance, Citizen Security, Comparative Peace Processes, Creating Community in the Americas,U.S.-Brazilian relations and U.S.-Mexican relations.

The Program’s Project on Comparative Peace Processes has examined internal armed conflict in Colombia, ElSalvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru, to understand how and whether civil conflicts could be brought toan end through political negotiations, and if so, how to accomplish the key tasks of the post-conflict era.

Woodrow Wilson International Center for ScholarsOne Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20004-3027tel. (202) 691-4000, fax (202) 691-4001www.wilsoncenter.org/lap

Ambassador Andrés Valencia

This document presents an overview of themultiple conversations and exchanges thattook place not only between the Colombian

government, the ELN, and the facilitator, but alsothose that took place with numerous national andinternational political actors during thirteen visits toColombia between June 2004 and April 2005. Myaccount is limited by the need to maintain confiden-tiality regarding aspects of Mexico’s role in facilitatingthe peace talks. In addition, several of the documentsproduced during the talks have not been publishedand there is no certainty that they ever will be. Thoselimitations notwithstanding, I offer several personalobservations about the process.

This essay is divided into seven sections: 1) back-ground on the process of rapprochement betweenthe Colombian government and the ELN underPresidents César Gaviria [1990-1994], ErnestoSamper [1994-1998] and Andrés Pastrana [1998-2002]; 2) the administration of President ÁlvaroUribe [2002-present] and the origins of Mexicanfacilitation; 3) the initial positions of the two parties;4) the first stage of the process, from June toSeptember 2004; 5) the second stage, fromSeptember 2004 to March 2005; 6) the collapse ofnegotiations in March and April 2005; and 7) sometentative conclusions.

BACKGROUND

Several aspects of the failed attempts over three pres-idential administrations to negotiate a settlementwith the ELN informed Mexico’s role as facilitator.First, earlier failures deepened the ELN’s convictionthat peace can only be achieved through a nationalconvention in which different sectors of societyagree on those political, economic and social trans-formations necessary to bring the armed confronta-tion to an end. Civil society—not the govern-

ment—would serve as the principal interlocutor inthis national convention, which would culminatewith the convening of a constituent assembly.

A second issue has to do with the way that dia-logue with the ELN in the midst of war createspolitical problems for the government. In fact,negotiations between the government and the ELNin Havana in 2001 and early 2002 had as their prin-cipal objective a cease-fire as the launching point forthe peace process. The parties almost reached acease-fire accord, called “The ComprehensiveAgreement on Truce, Cease-Fire, and Cessation ofHostilities.” Although the agreement was notsigned, the document nonetheless served as a pointof reference for Mexico’s facilitation.

A third important precedent emerging over thelast thirteen years involved national and internation-al facilitators; their existence reflects the politicalcapital accumulated by the ELN in its quest fornational and international recognition as a legiti-mate belligerent force. The various facilitating bod-ies include the Group of Friends (Grupo de PaísesAmigos), whose members are Cuba, Spain, France,Norway and Switzerland; the Colombian CatholicChurch; and finally, the Civilian FacilitatingCommission, composed of well-known business-men, academics, and politicians, many of whom areopponents of President Uribe’s policies. Such is thecase, for example, of Senator Antonio Navarro, thecurrent presidential candidate of the DemocraticPole (Polo Democrático).

A fourth precedent, begun during the days ofSamper, involves the designation of two seniorimprisoned ELN leaders—Commanders FranciscoGalán and Felipe Torres—as the ELN’s points ofcontact with the government and the various facili-tation bodies. Both men were incarcerated in Itagüíprison, although Torres was released in October2003. These two leaders were permitted to commu-nicate via radio-transceiver with the ELN’s Central

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THE PEACE PROCESS IN COLOMBIA WITH THE ELN: THE ROLE OF MEXICO

Command (Comando Central, or COCE), and havemore or less assumed the role of formal negotiatorsfor the ELN. Relevant to Mexico’s facilitationeffort was that Galán was formally namedCommissioner of the ELN following Torres’ releasefrom prison. On numerous occasions, however,Galán’s positions differed from COCE’s. These dif-ferences could reflect difficulties in communicationor they could be part of a conscious negotiationstrategy. Regardless, they have been a constantthroughout the many attempts at dialogue with theColombian government.

A fifth and final issue has to do with negativeimpact of publicity about the course of the negotia-tions, especially when results were made public pre-maturely. This explains the extreme confidentialityof our work.

THE URIBE ADMINISTRATION

In 2002, during the first months of PresidentUribe’s government, High Commissioner for PeaceDr. Luis Carlos Restrepo held four meetings inHavana with representatives from the COCE. TheELN decided to suspend the dialogue in December2002, claiming that the conditions for rapproche-ment with the new administration did not exist.

During 2003, it proved impossible to reactivatethe dialogue. However, following the ELN’s kid-napping of eight foreign tourists in the SierraNevada of Santa Marta in September, negotiationsled to their release. During those talks, there waseven a conversation via radio-transceiver betweenHigh Commissioner Restrepo and the ELN’s mili-tary chief, Commander Antonio García. García

appears to have assumed leadership of the guerrillaorganization, exercising greater authority than theother four members of the Central Command.

From the beginning of his term President Uribecalled on the ELN to engage in a peace process. Butthe condition demanded by the government—acessation of hostilities prior to the beginning oftalks—was unacceptable to the ELN. The require-ment—similar to that at the outset of the process ofparamilitary demobilization—was seen by the guer-rillas as a demand for submission or surrender.

In essence, the ELN refused to recognize theUribe administration as a viable interlocutor withwhich to negotiate a solution to the armed con-flict. The ELN proposed instead regional dia-logues to address the humanitarian crisis generatedby the conflict.

During an official visit to Mexico on May 29,2004, President Uribe reiterated his call to the ELNfor a peace process. He said that he was not demand-ing demobilization or disarmament in order to begintalks, but that he did demand a cessation of hostili-ties, to be guaranteed by the international communi-ty. The next day, Mexican President Vicente Fox andPresident Uribe held a joint press conference.President Fox was asked whether Mexico was will-ing to be the guarantor or one of the guarantors of acease-fire. Fox responded that Uribe could count onMexico for any kind of peace initiative.

The ELN responded immediately. On June 1,2004, the Central Command sent a letter toPresident Fox praising Mexico’s support for thepeace process and expressing the ELN’s willing-ness to establish direct communication with theMexican government.

The foreign ministers of Colombia and Mexicothen undertook to elaborate the details of Mexico’sparticipation. On June 8, 2004, in Quito, Ecuador,the foreign ministers agreed that the Mexican gov-ernment would appoint a facilitator to seek a rap-prochement between the Colombian governmentand the ELN. The facilitator would work towards acease-fire as the first step in the peace process. I wasappointed facilitator on June 16, 2004.

Why did the Colombian government and theELN attempt a dialogue once again, this time withMexican mediation?

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From the beginning of his term President Uribe calledon the ELN to engage in a peace process. But thecondition demanded by the government—a cessation ofhostilities prior to the beginning of talks—wasunacceptable to the ELN.

The answer is a matter of speculation. What issignificant, however, is the perception each of theparties had about the other’s reasons for engaging. Inthe eyes of the government, the ELN’s decision hadto do, among other things, with its growing militaryweakness; this situation was forcing the ELN toprivilege the political struggle in order to preserveits own identity vis-à-vis the FARC.1 According tothe government’s view, the electoral victories of theColombian left in some of Colombia’s most impor-tant mayoral races and the election of left-leaninggovernments in several South American countrieswas encouraging the ELN to explore the possibilityof laying down its arms. The government also per-ceived that the ELN’s inclusion in the EuropeanUnion’s list of terrorist organizations—a moveundertaken as a result of efforts by the Colombiangovernment—was eroding the status that the ELNhad achieved internationally as a result of priornegotiations. At the same time, the wide support inColombia for President Uribe’s democratic securitypolicy and the opening of talks between the govern-ment and the paramilitaries were isolating the ELNin the national political arena. In the government’sview, these factors made a cessation of hostilitiespossible to achieve within a relatively short time.

The ELN, for its part, believed that the Uribeadministration needed a process of dialogue withthe guerrillas in order to compensate for and offsetnational and international criticism of the negotia-tions with the paramilitaries. Hence, the guerrillasbelieved that the government would show greatflexibility with respect to the conditions necessaryto begin talks, allowing the ELN to reposition itselfnationally and internationally as a political inter-locutor with the Colombian state.

These assumptions, on both sides, proved exag-gerated.

THE INITIAL POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

My first visit to Colombia as facilitator took placebetween June 17 and June 24, 2004. By that time,however, the ELN had already publicly established itsposition regarding the negotiations with PresidentUribe. On June 4, 2004, during an International

Forum on Land Mines and Humanitarian Accordsheld in the Colombian Congress, CommanderFrancisco Galán read a statement by the CentralCommand proposing “to work for a humanitarianaccord in which, in addition to an agreement on theuse of mines and explosive devices, there would alsobe agreement on a general amnesty for political pris-oners and prisoners of war, and a bilateral, temporarycease-fire.” Such accords may open the way for apolitical solution to the Colombian conflict.

On June 14, 2004, the Central Command broad-ened its proposal through a public communiquéstating that:

1. The root causes for the existence of theColombian guerrillas involve antidemocratic andunjust structures that the state has refused toreform, at the same time violently repressingmovements for reform.Thus, “a political solutionwill only be possible if there are social, economic,and political transformations.”

2. The Colombian government was unable to adopta peace policy because it was committed to a strat-egy of war against the popular movement.Therefore, “we cannot have illusions that theroads to peace will open during this govern-ment… But be it now or in the future, it is ourobligation to work toward that goal.”

3. “With the goal of opening new avenues that canmake a political solution viable, we have pro-posed a humanitarian accord… the first step inbuilding this road to peace.The second step is theelaboration—with society’s participation—ofproposals for the transformations the countryneeds in all arenas.”

4. “The state and the insurgency must foster the cre-ation of spaces that will enable society in its entiretyto participate in the construction of proposals toresolve the crisis…. this process of participation inwhich society plays a direct and leading role is whatwe refer to as the national convention.”

5. “We advocate a process that is open to interna-tional contributions. Like Mexico, other nations

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have been supporting and facilitating peace initia-tives, based, however, on the premise that the res-olution of the conflict is a sovereign affair and aprincipal task of all Colombians.”

Four days later, we learned the basic elementsof the government’s position. These conversationswere aimed at informing the facilitator, not atestablishing a public position toward the ELN.The government’s position contained the follow-ing elements:

1. The government could not accept a bilateral cease-fire as proposed by the ELN, because such anagreement would place the Colombian armedforces on the same plane as the insurgent organi-zation. Neither, however, would the governmentdemand a unilateral cease-fire. Rather, in a recip-rocal fashion, the government would be willing tocease military operations against the ELN if theELN were willing to suspend all of its violentactions against state forces, the civilian popula-tion, and the country’s infrastructure;

2. In a peace process with the ELN, no issue wouldbe excluded from the negotiations. However, thefundamental interest of the government was toachieve a cessation of hostilities, given that thenegotiation of broad reforms of the Colombianstate—both its institutions and its policies—wasnot viable as long as the conflict with the FARCcontinued unabated.

3. The Colombian government believed thatMexican facilitation, at least during the initialsteps of the process, should be exclusive in thesense that no other national or international bodywould be involved in the facilitation process.

4. The Colombian government was aware that atsome point the facilitator would need to meet withthe Central Command, given that FranciscoGalán would not have the authority to concludeagreements.These meetings would have to takeplace in Mexico, given that, for political and secu-rity reasons, it would be very difficult to hold themeetings in Colombia or a third country. At the

same time, the government believed it was prefer-able to refrain from adopting the legal and mili-tary measures necessary for members of theCentral Command to travel to Mexico, until theELN’s political willingness to enter into agree-ments could be better ascertained. Otherwise, atrip to Mexico by representatives of the CentralCommand would only serve to reposition theguerrilla group internationally.

In this context, what were the objectives ofMexico’s facilitation? It was clear that a peace accordwould only be possible in the long term, given thegovernment’s reluctance to negotiate with the ELNthose political, economic, and social transformationsthat the guerrillas considered indispensable fordemobilization and disarmament. The ELN itselfwas of the mind that “the paths to peace” would notbe possible with the Uribe government. It was alsoclear that the time available to reach an understand-ing was limited. Previous negotiations had shownthat progress in the negotiations or their successfulconclusion would not be possible as national presi-dential elections approached. We calculated that wehad at most twelve months.

Our objective, then, was to reach a limitedaccord. We urged the two parties to agree on thenecessary conditions for beginning a process ofdialogue and negotiation. We pointed out that,given the government’s position, one of the con-ditions that had to be considered was a cessation ofhostilities, which could be based on the ELN’sJune 2004 proposal for a humanitarian accord. Anagreement on this issue did not seem impossible,particularly if the advances made in Havana in

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It was therefore worth exploring whether theELN would be willing to agree to a cease-firein exchange for specific concessions in thepolitical and social arena. Such an agreement,although modest, could nonetheless be signifi-cant, in that it would represent an irreversiblestep that would foster the trust necessary tomake more ambitious agreements possible.

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2002 were reintroduced. In fact, the proposal foran “Integral Truce Accord” (Acuerdo Integral deTregua) elaborated in Cuba included mechanismsfor implementing, verifying, and financing acease-fire and cessation of hostilities. The proposalalso contained political elements, most notably adialogue between the insurgents and various socialgroups and sectors, on such issues as the design ofregional development programs, the eradication ofillicit crops, attention to displaced persons, andthe removal of antipersonnel mines in specificareas. It was therefore worth exploring whetherthe ELN would be willing to agree to a cease-firein exchange for specific concessions in the politi-cal and social arena. Such an agreement, althoughmodest, could nonetheless be significant, in that itwould represent an irreversible step that wouldfoster the trust necessary to make more ambitiousagreements possible.

THE FIRST STAGE OF THE PROCESS: JUNE

TO SEPTEMBER 2004

Hopes and wishes aside, the first interview withCommander Francisco Galán on June 23, 2004,made clear that any and all discussions of a cease-firewould have to be postponed. Galán had instructionsto discuss only two issues: a proposal for multiplefacilitators, and a demand for a formal, public, andwritten response by the Colombian government tothe ELN communiqués of June 4 and 14, 2004,described above.

With respect to “multiple facilitation,”Commander Galán expressed the ELN’s desire forthe participation, in addition to Mexico, of othernational and international actors that had beenactive in previous dialogues with the Colombiangovernment. This position, as I stated before, wastotally unacceptable to the Colombian government,which wanted at all costs to prevent the ELN fromusing the talks for the sole purpose of regainingpolitical space vis-à-vis national and internationalpublic opinion. The proposal for multiple facilita-tors also generated significant obstacles for the effec-tiveness of Mexican representation. The presence ofmultiple facilitators—in the absence of rigorouscoordination—would give rise to multiple messagesthat, in the end, would make an orderly dialoguewith precise objectives impossible. Nor was it viablefor the Mexican representative to have to coordinateall of his actions with the diverse governments thatmake up the Group of Friends, the various person-alities that make up the Colombian CivilianFacilitating Commission, and the multiple voices ofthe Catholic Church.

To address this problem, Commander Galán pro-posed a formula by which the ELN would agree tothe exclusive facilitation of the Mexican govern-ment during the first phase of the negotiations, withthe understanding that as the process advanced andas the facilitation activities became more diversifiedand specialized, the Mexican representative wouldcarry out his work with the support of other bodies.From the outset, Galán made it clear that the for-mula was subject to the approval of the Central

From left to right: Andrew Selee, Director, Mexico Institute; Amb. Andrés Valencia; Cynthia Arnson

Command; although there was never an officialcommuniqué on the matter, it appeared that at leastuntil February 2005, the Central Command accept-ed these terms. It is worth mentioning that through-out our work, we kept the Civilian FacilitatingCommission, the Group of Friends, and theCatholic Church informed; generally speaking, wealways had their active support.

As for the ELN’s demand for a response to theJune 4 and June 14 documents, it was evident thatthe Uribe administration would find it difficultpolitically to formally address an organization classi-fied as “terrorist,” or to formulate a counterproposalthat would encourage dialogue rather than set cer-tain positions in stone, making them hard to reverse.This explains Commander Galán’s request to theMexican representative that he ask the Colombiangovernment to announce that it had taken note ofthe ELN’s positions and that it had asked the facili-tator to explore them in greater detail. The govern-ment issued this statement the very next day.

The Central Command never acknowledgedthe government’s statement and instead reiteratedits demand for a public response. Hence, on July 3,2004, High Commissioner for Peace Restrepowrote to the Mexican representative and raisedsome issues to be shared with Francisco Galán. Inthe letter, Restrepo explained that the June 14communiqué clearly defined two distinct but inter-related steps. The first, which the ELN referred to asthe humanitarian accords, had the objective of cre-ating the conditions necessary to realize the secondstep, the holding of a National Convention. TheCommissioner highlighted what he considered tobe similarities between the ELN’s and the govern-ment’s proposal: both envisioned a similar startingpoint—a mutual cessation of hostilities—thatwould, in turn, open the way for a later phase ofdialogue oriented toward the building of peace.Restrepo also specified that in the first phase, theobjective would be to create the basis for trust sothat the negotiation process could move forward.

Restrepo’s letter contained four elements thatMexico considered crucial to achieving rapproche-ment. First was the idea that the government wouldsuspend its military actions against the ELN inexchange for a cease-fire. Second was the

government’s explicit acceptance of the link betweenthe humanitarian accord and the NationalConvention. Third was an understanding of theNational Convention as a space for broad political dia-logue with all of society. And fourth was a clear defi-nition of the objective for the first phase; it was toopen the door to an initial accord that would establishthe bases for a process of dialogue and negotiation thatwould include issues beyond those of a strictly militarynature. The government included these four elementsat the request of the facilitator, despite the objectionsof some in the administration. Restrepo’s letterdemonstrated flexibility and was respectful in tone.Commander Galán’s first reactions were positive.

There was a great deal of surprise, then, whenCommander Galán sent a letter to the Mexican rep-resentative on July 9, 2004, immediately releasing itto the press. Galán stated that High CommissionerRestrepo’s July 3 letter to the facilitator could in noway be construed as a response to the proposals ofthe Central Command, given that it was written tothe facilitator and contained no clear statement ofthe Colombian government’s peace policy.

The government again showed flexibility inresponding to Galán’s letter. On August 3, 2004, theHigh Commissioner for Peace sent a letter to theCentral Command reiterating and expanding uponthe earlier proposals. The letter left open the possibil-ity of granting pardons to members of the ELNaccused of rebellion in exchange for the release ofELN hostages and the initiation of programs toremove anti-personnel mines in specific regions. Theletter touched upon each of the elements included inthe proposal for the humanitarian accord. It also

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The ELN’s September 6, 2004, letter…showed that communicating solely throughCommander Galán was not allowing for aprecise understanding of the ELN’s positions.The sense of progress after each interviewwith Galán at Itagüí prison would later bereversed once Galán received instructions fromthe Central Command or the COCE releasedan official statement.

expressed the government’s commitment to find thenecessary financial resources for subsequent phases ofthe process. In addition, the letter spelled out thegovernment’s willingness to explore a mechanism formultiple, progressive, and specialized facilitation thatwould allow for the gradual incorporation of othernational and international actors. Finally, the letterrecognized that the government’s democratic securitypolicy needed to be complemented by dialogue andnegotiation, arguing that peace could only beachieved through a debate on the comprehensive setof issues facing the nation. In this way, the letter man-ifested the government’s willingness to consider theproposal for a National Convention.

The letter of August 3, 2004, was unprecedent-ed. For the first time, the Colombian governmentwas directly addressing the commanders of an insur-gent organization, presenting its proposals for peace.Francisco Galán reacted positively to the overallcontents of the letter as well as its concrete propos-als, event though the government maintained itsposition of no negotiations preceding the cessationof hostilities and called explicitly for the suspensionof kidnapping.

The Central Command responded to the HighCommissioner’s letter on September 6, 2004.Within days, both letters were made public in thenews media.

The ELN praised the government’s willingnessto carry out a dialogue, but argued that the HighCommissioner’s failure to refer to the ELN’s June 4proposal demonstrated that “we are speaking dif-ferent languages.”The letter stated that “…we haveadvanced some. At least we realize that we arespeaking to one another, even if we do not under-stand each other.” The COCE also stated that thegovernment was reducing the solution of the con-flict to demobilization and disarmament, andbefore that, to a unilateral cease-fire. The ELNthus ruled out the possibility that it would end“retentions” or kidnappings. It proposed clarifyingthe visions of peace held by both parties, includingthe issue of whether or not achieving peacerequired social and political transformations.Finally, the letter invited the government to showgreater flexibility in examining the ELN’s propos-als, and asked national and international facilitators

to re-elaborate initiatives based on its proposal for ahumanitarian accord.

THE SECOND STAGE: SEPTEMBER 2004 TO

MARCH 2005

The ELN’s September 6, 2004, letter demonstratedthat a dialogue via the exchange of correspondencehad reached it limits. It also showed that communicat-ing solely through Commander Galán was not allow-ing for a precise understanding of the ELN’s positions.The sense of progress after each interview with Galánat Itagüí prison would later be reversed once Galánreceived instructions from the Central Command orthe COCE released an official statement.

The Mexican facilitator thus suggested toCommander Galán on September 9, 2004, thatthere be a meeting in Mexico between the CentralCommand and the facilitator. Such a meetingwould provide us with a way of assessing immedi-ately whether the ELN was open to a cessation ofhostilities that would include a suspension of kid-nappings, and if so, what it would demand inexchange. If the meeting were successful, we hopedit would pave the way for direct dialogue betweenthe government and the ELN.

For reasons of space, it is not possible to recountall of the smaller negotiations that took placebetween September 2004 and January 2005 to makethis meeting possible. Nonetheless, it is important tohighlight the gradual movement in the positions ofthe two parties, as well as the role played by theMexican representative and other national andinternational actors to make the meeting possibledespite the unfavorable political climate.

Initially, the government reacted coldly to theidea of a meeting between representatives of theCOCE and the facilitator. In the government’s view,the ELN’s September 6 letter showed no sign of itswillingness to formally initiate a peace process. TheHigh Commissioner made a counterproposal thatthere be a period of clarification during which heand Francisco Galán could meet in the presence ofthe Mexican representative; this meeting couldresult in consultations via walkie-talkie with theCentral Command.

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Subsequently, the High Commissioner sent a let-ter to the Mexican representative on November 2,2004. He accepted that “if the ELN believes thatthere are conditions for moving forward in thesearch for peace, there could be a direct meetingbetween the guerrilla group and AmbassadorValencia in the Mexican Embassy in Bogotá, as longas the guerrilla organization declares a prior cease-fire, even if it is only temporary.” The government’sproposal represented an important concession, inthat it mentioned the possibility of a temporarycease-fire; this position was certainly different thanits earlier insistence on an indefinite suspension ofhostilities, analogous to the one declared in princi-ple by the paramilitaries.

Finally, in December, Restrepo informed thefacilitator that he would not rule out adopting thenecessary political and security measures to makethe meeting possible, so long as the ELN made acommitment to the Mexican government that therewould not be violent actions while the meeting wastaking place. What was being talked about was a sus-pension of hostilities lasting only a few days, and acommitment solely to the Mexican government,not the Colombian government, something thateliminated any perception of submission.

The ELN’s positions also gradually became moreflexible. For example, on October 8, 2004, theCentral Command wrote the Mexican facilitator toevaluate “your possibly meeting with us, somethingwe are willing to do.” This letter made no mentionof our September 9 proposal for just such a meeting.Yet the Central Command, through Galán, rejectedboth the government’s proposal to hold the meetingin the Mexican Embassy in Bogotá and the govern-ment’s demand for a temporary cessation of hostili-ties; the ELN argued that that latter provision wouldset a precedent that could allow the government todemand a temporary cease-fire for any and all con-tact between the ELN and a mediator. In the firstweek of January 2005, Commander Galán told thefacilitator that the Uribe administration’s demandwas disproportionate, in that, “we are obliged tomeet the condition of the Colombian governmentfor a cessation of hostilities in order for the topauthorities of the ELN to meet with you, as a repre-sentative of the Mexican government.”

It was not until January 12, 2005, that the ELNwrote back. The letter said that, even though thegroup did not demand that the government suspendits offensive operations as a pre-condition for themeeting between the Central Command and theMexican representative—and even though the ELNcould not renounce the right to defend itself ifattacked—the group had “every intention and willto avoid incidents that could jeopardize the successof the meeting.”

The ELN’s reply came in the midst of a markeddeterioration in the political climate from lateSeptember 2004 through the end of the year. Thepress acquired several taped conversations betweenthe High Commissioner for Peace and leaders of theparamilitary forces in Santa Fe de Ralito.2 Corneredby these revelations, government representativesargued that there was a strict equivalence betweenthe paramilitary forces and the insurgent groups,something that reduced the spaces for negotiationwith the ELN. Soon thereafter, President Uribereferred in public to the confidential communiquéssent by the Central Command and the HighCommissioner for Peace to the facilitator inOctober and November 2004; Uribe went so far asto suggest that the Mexican government had adopt-ed the position of the Colombian government.These declarations generated more mistrust. Twoother developments in late December and earlyJanuary—the government’s extradition to theUnited States of FARC Commander “SimónTrinidad” and the arrest in Caracas of mid-levelFARC commander Rodrigo Granda—createdmore fear about the future of the talks.3

Throughout this time, however, we took stepsto convince the Colombian government to adoptthe necessary measures to permit a meeting inMexico between COCE representatives and thefacilitator. We also attempted to persuade the ELNthat its refusal to accept a cessation of hostilitieswould lead to a dead end in the talks. We main-tained contact with the Catholic Church, theCivilian Facilitating Commission, and the Groupof Friends, which both privately and publiclycalled on the parties to be more flexible. Otherinternational actors made this same appeal.

Assuming a more active role, the Mexican facili-

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tator worked with Commander Galán to devise dif-ferent formulas by which the ELN could satisfy thedemands of the Colombian government. OnDecember 10, 2004, for example, we asked theCentral Command if it would be willing to committo refraining from carrying out “acts of war” whilethe meeting was taking place. We also asked themif, during the meeting with the facilitator, theywould be willing to discuss the possibility of acease-fire and a cessation of hostilities. And weasked them whether they would agree to meet at alocation in Mexico that would not be disclosed tothe press or to other parties. In essence, we wereexploring whether the ELN would accept a meet-ing with a relatively limited agenda and conditions.We also wanted to make the meeting appealing tothe government, by dealing with its priorities. Webelieved that under the proposed conditions, themeeting would not arouse government suspicionsthat the ELN was using the opportunity solely toreposition itself before national and internationalpublic opinion. The Central Command’s letter ofJanuary 12, 2005, (mentioned above) was aresponse to these suggestions.

The ELN’s response demonstrated significantflexibility. Yet it was also clear that its commitmentto “avoid incidents that could jeopardize the suc-cess of the meeting” did not go far enough toassuage the government’s concerns. Hence, onJanuary 17, 2005, the facilitator and CommanderGalán submitted to COCE a document entitled“Itinerary for an Eventual Meeting in Mexicobetween the COCE and the Facilitator.”4 Thedocument proposed that the COCE communicateto the Mexican representative its “complete will-ingness to refrain from carrying out acts of vio-lence during the course of the meeting so as to notdisrupt it, [without] renounc[ing] the legitimateright to self-defense if attacked.” The key to theletter was the replacement of the phrase “to avoidincidents that can disrupt the success of the meet-ing” with the phrase “to refrain from acts of vio-lence during the course of the meeting.” TheMexican government would then simply informthe Colombian government that, as a reciprocalcommitment (that is, from the beginning to theconclusion of the meeting), the Colombian gov-

ernment would suspend military operations againstthe ELN.

The itinerary proposed, moreover, that thatagenda include an evaluation of the exploratoryphase of the dialogue and an analysis of the futuredirection of the process, based on the public posi-tions of the two parties. It also mentioned the possi-bility of an extension of the period during whichthe ELN would maintain its commitment to refrainfrom acts of violence, in case the Mexico meetingconsolidated the possibilities for further dialogue.

High Commissioner Restrepo was enthusiasticabout the proposal. He stated that it would be noproblem for the government to adopt the followingmeasures to make the meeting possible: a) the sus-pension of arrest warrants for COCE membersattending the meeting; b) the suspension of the peti-tions filed with Interpol for the arrest of these sameindividuals; c) authorization for Francisco Galán toattend the meeting; and d) the granting of the nec-essary security guarantees.

The ELN Central Command responded to thesuggestions in the itinerary on January 24, 2005.The unpublished letter was addressed to the facilita-tor and stated:

“We have closely examined your proposal.We viewit favorably and consider that it can make it possibleto hold the meeting to which we have invited you.

We will refer directly to the points you outline.

1. The paragraph that you suggest we change, sothat the text is more objective and acceptable to

The government’s proposal represented an importantconcession, in that it mentioned the possibility of atemporary cease-fire; this position was certainlydifferent than its earlier insistence on an indefinitesuspension of hostilities, analogous to the onedeclared in principle by the paramilitaries.… TheELN’s positions also gradually became more flexible.

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all, should read: ‘on our part there is a completewillingness to avoid any and all military actionsduring the course of the meeting so that it is notdisrupted, but we cannot renounce our legitimateright to self-defense if we are attacked duringthat time.’

2. We agree with what you propose:‘Naturally, as areciprocal commitment during the same time, andwith previously agreed upon dates for the meet-ing’s beginning and end, the government wouldsuspend its military operations against the ELN.’

3. The continuation of this suspension of militaryactions is contingent on a cease-fire agreement.Wecannot continue without rigorous verification thatsuch a suspension is actually taking place.Webelieve that the issue of a cease-fire is a subject forthe negotiating table and not for the facilitator.

4. The agenda should have as its essential featurean evaluation of this exploratory process, ananalysis of the existing difficulties, and an explo-ration of ways to overcome these difficulties, inorder to make a dialogue between the ELN andthe Colombian government possible.”

The letter indicated that the Central Command’sposition had shifted in order to satisfy the govern-ment’s concerns. There was still doubt as to whetherthe suspension of “military actions” would includethe so-called “retentions”—a nonnegotiabledemand of the Uribe administration. FollowingCommander Galan’s interpretation that such a read-ing was possible, we indicated that we would suggestto the government that it not demand explicit lan-

guage on this matter. Instead, we proposed thatwhen the government announced publicly its will-ingness to hold a meeting, it also would make clearits understanding that the ELN’s commitmentincluded the suspension of kidnappings. Clearly, thegovernment would not agree with the ELN’s state-ment regarding an eventual extension of the cessa-tion of hostilities, but we felt that the governmentcould overlook this discrepancy.

With this hope in mind, we met on January 28,2005, with the High Commissioner for Peace. In amatter of hours, he canvassed the country’s highestauthorities. After this consultation, he accepted theformula for the suspension of “military actions” aswell as the facilitator’s suggestion with respect tokidnappings. He allowed, at least for the moment,that it was not necessary to work out an agreementconcerning an extension of the cessation of hostili-ties. He merely suggested that, for the purpose ofreciprocity, the language concerning the govern-ment’s obligations to suspend operations against theELN parallel the language and terms of the COCE’sown commitment.

Thus, after months of work, we had an agree-ment. To be sure, it was a triangular accord mediat-ed by the facilitator. But the accord without a doubtconstituted a set of agreements between the ELNand the Colombian government. Therein lay theirimportance. The next step was to suggest ways toformalize the agreements. With this goal in mind,we met with Commander Francisco Galán onJanuary 29, 2005.

Commander Galán’s report to the CentralCommand, which we wrote jointly, noted the gov-ernment’s position. The report’s operative portionsstated that:

A. The Central Command should send a letter withthe following principal elements:

1. In accordance with the January 12 and January24 communiqués sent by the COCE to the facil-itator, the ELN reiterates its commitment to thegovernment of Mexico—and asks that it makethis commitment known to the Colombian gov-ernment—that, to make it possible for COCErepresentatives and the facilitator to meet in

Thus, after months of work, we had an agreement.To be sure, it was a triangular accord mediated by thefacilitator. But the accord without a doubt constituteda set of agreements between the ELN and theColombian government.

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Mexican territory, the ELN is completely willingto do everything possible to avoid military actionsduring the course of that meeting, so as not to dis-rupt it. But the ELN cannot renounce its legiti-mate right to self-defense if it is attacked duringthat period.

2. Naturally, the Central Command would expectthat, in reciprocity, the government would demon-strate its complete willingness to avoid taking mil-itary actions against the ELN during the meet-ing, except in the event that its forces wereattacked.

3. The agenda for the meeting with the facilitatorwould seek to evaluate this exploratory process,analyze existing difficulties, and seek solutions tothese difficulties, in order to make a dialoguebetween the ELN and the Colombian govern-ment possible.

B. As soon as the facilitator receives the letter fromthe COCE, it will deliver it to the Colombiangovernment, which will immediately make publicits commitment to adopt the measures necessaryfor the meeting to take place.”

I should add that both Commander Galán and Ishared the document with High Commissioner forPeace Restrepo as it was being drafted. It thusseemed to all of us—the government, the ELN, andthe facilitator—that we had finally reached anunderstanding.

Nonetheless, on January 31, 2005, CommanderGalán asked me to travel to Itagüí immediately todiscuss some clarifications requested by the COCE.The next day, the ELN sent a letter signed by theCentral Command, stating the following:

We feel obliged to raise a number of questions regard-ing what you stated to Francisco [Galán]:

1. You ask us to write a letter to the Mexican gov-ernment, and then tell us what we must say inthat letter.We find this request rather disrespect-ful. You also leave the impression that your

government learned only today of what we havebeen working on for months.

2. You also ask that we adopt one of your suggestionsas our own, making it seem as if we have askedthe Colombian government for reciprocity, whenyou are the one who formulated this proposal.

3. We do not understand how you can ask us for aletter to the Mexican government, which wouldimmediately be delivered to the Colombian gov-ernment, which would then “make public itscommitment to adopt the measures necessary fora meeting to take place.” Only then would theletter be delivered to your government. Pardonour frankness, but it seems that the facilitator isacting as if he were the Colombian government,and as if the Colombian government were facili-tating the meeting between the CentralCommand and the Mexican facilitator.

4. In previous letters you asked us to maintaincomplete confidentiality and discretion withrespect to the media.You even proposed that themeeting be confidential and that the media beabsent. But now, even before the Mexican gov-ernment knows the content of the letter youhave requested, you are proposing that theColombian government speak publicly aboutit. So that we fully understand each other, it isvery important to us to hear your views onthese matters.

How should this letter be interpreted? The sug-gestions formulated only two days before did notinclude anything that had not been the subject ofprevious communications…The “Itinerary”already envisioned that the COCE would send aletter to the facilitator expressing its commitmentto the Mexican government to suspend acts of vio-lence, a commitment about which the facilitatorwas to inform the Colombian government. At onepoint, this proposal did not bother the CentralCommand. Why, then, did the suggestion that theELN send a letter containing these elements subse-quently seem “rather disrespectful?” Doesn’t thestatement, “you ask us to write a letter to the

Mexican government, and then tell us what wemust say in that letter” appear as a deliberateattempt to take our suggestion out of context?Why did the COCE air its concerns in a formalletter, knowing that it was likely to be made pub-lic? If this was a genuine attempt to clear up mis-understandings, then why did the COCE notcommunicate its concerns through CommanderGalán, so that they could be resolved through thatvery channel?

We firmly believe, for reasons about which wecan only speculate, that the ELN decided to backout of the process of rapprochement with the gov-ernment. And to justify this move, it chose to blamethe facilitator.

Due to its highly inappropriate tone, theCOCE’s letter deserved an energetic response fromthe Mexican representative, even at the risk of end-ing the facilitation effort. We thus made a formalrequest that the letter be withdrawn, and asked for aconversation via walkie-talkie with CommanderAntonio García, in order to clear up any possiblemisunderstandings.

That conversation took place on February 4,2005. The Mexican representative explained indetail why the COCE’s January 31 letter was unac-ceptable. Following Commander García’s insistenceon discussing the specifics of that letter, the facilita-tor gave detailed responses to each of the COCE’ssupposed concerns. Because we wanted to maintaina conciliatory tone, we stated that we could notexclude the possibility that the interpretations con-tained in the letter “could be the product of thelimitations of our form of communication, giventhat the dialogue between the facilitator and theCOCE had never been direct and immediate, and inthe best of cases, had taken place through letters.”

The facilitator also stated that the letter ofJanuary 31 had implications beyond the issue of pos-sible misunderstandings. The letter seemed toexpress a deep dissatisfaction with the work of theMexican representative. This dissatisfaction, more-over, only made sense if the ELN expected that theactions of the Mexican government would takeplace within parameters that were completely differ-ent from those that had been established for ourwork. The facilitator gave a detailed explanation of

the criteria of objectivity, impartiality, and confi-dentiality that had guided our work.

Our points of view aside, Commander Garcíarefused to withdraw the letter. He said it would serveas a document for internal reference and that the ELNhad no interest in publishing it. And, in response toour indication that it was not certain given the cir-cumstances that the Mexican government would con-tinue to play the role of facilitator, the ELN com-mander stated that—although he hoped we wouldcontinue our work—the COCE had yet to receive anapology from the Mexican representative.

It was not easy for the Mexican Foreign Ministryto decide what to do. Continuing under these con-ditions ran the risk that the Central Commandwould no longer engage in the process with therespect and consideration due a sovereign govern-ment. At the same time, we did recognize that it wasnot a simple matter for Commander García toaccede to the facilitator’s request during theFebruary 4 conversation via walkie-talkie; anyonewho wanted to could have listened in on it.Nevertheless, it was difficult to explain why our pri-vate request through Commander Galán had notbeen considered from the outset. The absence ofany other conciliatory gesture by the ELN was alsodifficult to explain, notwithstanding the messagesreceived through official channels in the hours thatfollowed. The political climate deteriorated evenfurther after President Uribe made a public state-ment in which he described ELN militants as “pro-foundly arrogant, messianic, fundamentalist andschematic in their discourse—cowards at themoment of truth…despite their denials, they do notrenounce drugs, nor do they renounce the FARC,whom they fear.” Later, President Uribe referred toCommander García as “a saboteur of peace.”

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We firmly believe, for reasons about which wecan only speculate, that the ELN decided toback out of the process of rapprochement withthe government. And to justify this move, itchose to blame the facilitator.

These difficulties aside, and following an explicitrequest from the Colombian government, theMexican team decided to continue its efforts.However, under orders from the Foreign Ministry,the facilitator sent a letter on February 16, 2005, tothe Central Command thoroughly explaining thework that had been carried out since September,and again outlining the reasons that the January 31letter and the COCE’s refusal to withdraw it wereunacceptable. The letter also stated that it was up tothe ELN to decide whether the facilitator shouldcontinue his work and whether the conditionsexisted to advance the process of rapprochement.The letter demanded an unequivocal response tothe following questions:

A. Did the COCE accept and agree with theparameters within which the Mexican facilitatorcarried out his work?

B. Did the COCE agree that the relationshipbetween the ELN and the facilitator should becharacterized by the respect and considerationowed a sovereign government?

C. Was it possible to advance the process of rap-prochement based on the January 29 proposals?Misunderstandings aside, did the proposals them-selves give rise to any core concerns that theCentral Command did not wish to make explic-it? Did the January 31 letter [from the COCE]represent a change of position?

The Mexican representative did not release thisletter to any third party, but the Colombian govern-ment, the Group of Friends, and the CivilianFacilitating Commission were duly informed of itscontents. The Civilian Facilitating Commission itselfhad received a February 18 invitation from the ELNto “creatively project its facilitation work as a pluralendeavor in the national and international arenas.”Several days later, the COCE even expressed itsdesire that the Commission be present at an eventualmeeting with the Mexican representative. We thuswere back to the positions set forth in June 2004.

The ELN did not respond to our letter until March2, 2005, and did so verbally through Commander

Galán. In its reply, the Central Command asked thatMexican facilitation continue. The COCE indicatedthat the letter of January 31 was the product of a mis-understanding, and stated that it recognized and val-ued the ways that the facilitator carried out his work.Nevertheless, the COCE did not respond to thedeeper question: did the letter of January 31 representor not a change of position with respect to the agree-ments reached two days earlier.

The conversations with Commander Galán madeclear that the ELN had, in fact, changed its position.The principal modifications had to do, first, withthe ELN’s desire to include other actors—not justthe COCE and the Mexican facilitator but otherssuch as the Civilian Facilitating Commission—inthe meeting in Mexico. Second, the ELN wouldnot include kidnappings as part of the suspension ofmilitary activities, but rather, only attacks against thearmed forces and the country’s infrastructure.

As could have been expected, the HighCommissioner for Peace was far from pleased. OnMarch 5, 2005, he sent a letter to the Mexican rep-resentative stating the following:

A. The unilateral change in the agreed upon formatfor the meeting in Mexico ignored the January 29agreement and seemed to indicate that there willbe two parallel negotiating tables—one withMexico and one with those that the ELN choosesto accompany the meeting.

B. The decision to exclude kidnapping from the mil-itary actions that the ELN was to suspend beforethe meeting, as well as changes leading to theestablishment of a parallel agenda about whichthe Colombian government was not informed,demonstrated the lack of a serious and construc-tive attitude on the part of the ELN.

C. It was necessary to return to the proposals ofJanuary 29, making clear the Colombian govern-ment’s non-negotiable position that the cessationof military actions by the ELN included the sus-pension of actions against the security forces, thenation’s economic infrastructure, and civil society.For this reason, the suspension of kidnappingswas indispensable.

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D. If the ELN refused to return to a discussion ofthe January 29 proposal that was agreed to withFrancisco Galán, the government would see thatthe conditions for initiating a truthful, serious,and useful dialogue for national peace do notexist, and would seek to protect Colombians fromyet another round of frustration.

On March 7, 2005, the facilitator delivered acopy of the High Commissioner’s letter toCommander Galán, informing him, at the requestof the Colombian government, that if there were noresponse within ten days, the government wouldmake the letter public.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

The ten days came and went, with no responsefrom the guerrillas. But the government decidednot to publish its March 5, 2005, letter to the facil-itator. Instead, an aide to the High Commissionerfor Peace, General Eduardo Herrera, met personal-ly with Francisco Galán at the Itagüí prisonbetween March 14 and March 18. These meetingsraised the possibility of a direct meeting in Mexicobetween the Central Command and theColombian government. This was to mark the cul-mination of the exploratory phase of the dialogueand would open the way for ongoing facilitation.No agreement, however, was reached on the issueof kidnappings.

In this context of this back-and-forth, theCentral Command sent a message on March 27,2005, to the presidents of Brazil, Venezuela, andSpain, who were to meet with President Uribe inGuyana City two days later. The message askedthese leaders to look favorably upon the process ofrapprochement between the ELN and theColombian government. The message referred to“the Colombian conflict’s important implicationsfor the destabilization of the region,” and statedthat “the absence of a political solution to theconflict surely merits analysis and considerationduring the presidents’ meeting in Guyana City.”

During the presidential summit on March 29,President Uribe—not knowing that his remarks

were being broadcast live by the media, andbelieving that his words were being heard only byhis colleagues and their delegations—referred tothe process of rapprochement with the ELN. Herecounted a telephone conversation he had hadthe previous day with Francisco Galán concerninga possible meeting in Mexico between the COCEand the Colombian government, and made publicthe key point of disagreement: the ELN’s refusal tosuspend kidnappings.

Commander García’s response came in aninterview appearing in the Colombian daily ElColombiano on April 4, 2005. He reiterated theELN’s refusal to suspend “retentions,” because itneeded to finance its social and political activitiesand financially support its men. García also saidthat President Uribe’s breach of the dialogue’sconfidentiality in Guyana City had hardened thepositions of the two parties.

Notwithstanding García’s comments, theBrazilian, Venezuelan, and Spanish ambassadors toColombia were directed by their respective presi-dents to meet with Commander Galán in Itagüí,to deliver a message to the ELN. That meetingtook place on April 8, 2005. The ambassadorsunderscored the need for a cessation of hostilities,including a suspension of kidnappings, in order tomake a meeting between the Colombian govern-ment and the ELN possible. The ambassadors alsoexpressed their support for the Mexican facilita-tion effort.

On April 12, 2005, we met yet again withCommander Francisco Galán. The idea was to givecontinuity to the process of rapprochement. Wejointly drafted a query for consideration by theCOCE: was it possible that the ELN would recon-sider its publicly-stated position regarding thesuspension of kidnappings, in exchange for someconcession or political gesture by the government?We mentioned some examples of possible conces-sions, including the opening of parallel spaces forpolitical dialogue with civil society and the interna-tional community at the time of the meetingbetween the ELN and the Colombian government.Another example was the possible judicial review oflegal cases currently open or already settled against acertain number of ELN militants.

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The ELN gave no response to the query. Instead,on April 18, 2005, it made public a communiquédated the previous day. As evidence that the Mexicangovernment was not prepared to serve as the facilita-tor of the peace process in Colombia, it cited,among other things, Mexico’s vote against Cuba atthe annual meeting of the United Nation’s HumanRights Commission [in Geneva].5 The communiquéadded that “the ELN... reaffirms its respect for thework of Ambassador Valencia and understands thatthe policies of his government are what prevent himfrom continuing his work as facilitator.”

In a press release that same day, the MexicanForeign Ministry announced the end of its facili-tation effort.

The Colombian government simultaneouslyexpressed its gratitude for the efforts of theMexican government, and stated that “the terror-ist ELN’s reasons for suspending Mexico’s fraternalcooperation reflect the offensive, arrogant, andmendacious attitude of this group, which refusesto suspend the terrorist practice of kidnapping inorder to initiate a peace process.”

SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS

In light of what is described above, I offer some ten-tative conclusions.

• It would appear that, in principle, the ELNwas never willing to adopt a potentially irre-versible measure like a cessation of hostilities.Rather, the ELN’s objective—through theattempted rapprochement with the Colombiagovernment—had more to do with reestab-lishing the political spaces for dialogue that ithad built nationally and internationally formore than a decade.

• The ELN clearly backed out of the agree-ments reached on January 29, 2005, but it isnot possible to say with certainty whether thisdecision was influenced by third parties. Somespeculate that the FARC had a decisive influ-ence. If this is true, then one has to doubt thepossibility for a separate dialogue with theELN that, in practice, would isolate the morepowerful guerrilla organization.

• The disagreements that came to light regard-ing the suspension of kidnapping came at ahigh political cost to the ELN. This costwould have been even greater had the negoti-ations continued. This explains the guerrillaorganization’s decision to suspend the process,thereby crippling the facilitation effort.

• A resumption of dialogue is not likely to beviable during this term of the Uribe adminis-tration, despite a call by the government to dojust that. In the eyes of the ELN, new contactswould contribute Uribe’s reelection.

• As long as the government is unwilling toallow the ELN to recover political space, theviability of international facilitation in futuremediations is doubtful. Thus, it would appearthat the Catholic Church could be calledupon to facilitate, at least initially.

• Finally, it is quite clear that communicationwith Commander Francisco Galán is not suffi-cient for the process to advance. What isrequired instead is direct dialogue with theCentral Command.

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Ambassador Andrés Valencia Benavides entered the Mexican ForeignService in 1973. Since that time, he has served in a number of diplomaticposts, including Ambassador to the Organization of American States,Consul General in Atlanta, Georgia, Director of Bilateral Affairs in theForeign Ministry, Ambassador to Colombia, and Ambassador to Israel.

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Notes1. The Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional, Armed Forces of National Liberation. [Ed.] 2. Demobilization talks between the Colombian government and the Autodefensas Unidas de

Colombia (United Self-Defense Forces), the principal paramilitary coalition, formally opened in asafe haven centered on the town of Santa Fe de Ralito, Córdoba, in July 2003. One of the thorniestissues in the talks involved the conditions under which paramilitary leaders accused of major humanrights violations or drug trafficking would demobilize. According to taped conversations leaked tothe media, High Commissioner for Peace Luis Carlos Restrepo told AUC leaders that “homicidesare being committed that compromise those who are inside the [safe haven]. It is a matter which wehave handled very carefully to avoid a public scandal which would harm us.” Andrew Selsky, “Tapeson Colombian Killings Leaked,” Associated Press, September 28, 2004. [Ed.]

3. FARC leader Rafael Palermo, “Simón Trinidad,” was captured in Ecuador in January2004 and subsequently extradited to the United States on drug trafficking charges.

In January 2005, the Venezuelan government accused Colombian authorities of bribingVenezuelan National Guardsmen to capture Rodrigo Granda, a senior FARC official living openlyin Caracas, and deliver him to police authorities in Colombia. Diplomatic relations between thetwo neighbors deteriorated sharply, with Venezuela claiming that Colombia had violated its sover-eignty and Colombia arguing that Venezuela sheltered guerrilla operatives and had ignored numer-ous international arrest warrants for Granda. The dispute escalated when Venezuela withdrew itsambassador from Bogotá and suspended agreements with Colombia, partially closing the border tobilateral commerce. Pressed by leaders in Brazil, Cuba, and Peru, President Uribe and VenezuelanPresident Hugo Chávez of Venezuela reconciled their differences in mid-February 2005. [Ed.]

4. This document was contained in a report of the ELN Commissioner to the organization’ssenior leadership.

5. By a margin of 21 to 17, with 15 abstentions, the Human Rights Commission voted to ask apersonal representative of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to report on the humanrights situation in Cuba. Among the countries voting in favor of the resolution were the UnitedStates, Canada, Costa Rica, France, Guatemala, Honduras, Italy, and Japan, in addition to Mexico.Among the countries abstaining were Argentina, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador,Paraguay, and Peru. [Ed.]

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Publications on Colombia of the Project onComparative Peace Processes

Cynthia J. Arnson, ed., The Peace Process in Colombiawith the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia—AUC,Woodrow Wilson Center Reports on theAmericas #13, February 2005.

Cynthia J. Arnson, ed., “The Social and EconomicDimensions of Conflict and Peace in Colombia,”Latin American Program Special Report, October2004.

Conflicto y Paz en Colombia: Consecuencias yPerspectivas para el Futuro, Woodrow WilsonCenter, Fundación Ideas para la Paz, KelloggInstitute of International Studies (Bogotá:Alfaomega, 2004).

Peace and Security in Colombia, Woodrow WilsonCenter, United States Institute of Peace, andInternational Crisis Group, January 2003.

“Human Rights and International HumanitarianLaw in the Colombian Peace Process,” LatinAmerican Program Special Report, February2002.

Instituto de Derechos Humanos y RelacionesInternacionales de la Pontificia UniversidadJaveriana, Woodrow Wilson Center, InternationalPeace Research Institute (Oslo), and Centre forHumanitarian Dialogue (Geneva), Reflexiones sobrela Suscripción de un Acuerdo para la Humanización delConflicto Armado Colombiano, Relatoría, noviembrede 2001.

“El Proceso de Paz en Colombia y la PolíticaExterior de los Estados Unidos,” Latin AmericanProgram Working Paper 247, junio de 2000.

“The Peace Process in Colombia and U.S. Policy,”Latin American Program Working Paper 246,May 2000.

“Peace and Human Rights in Colombia inComparative Perspective,” Special Edition,Noticias, December 1998. (Also appears in JamesL. Zackrison, ed., Crisis? What Crisis? SecurityIssues in Colombia (Washington, D.C.: Institutefor National Strategic Studies, National DefenseUniversity, 1999).

Centro de Estudios Internaciones, FESCOL, andWoodrow Wilson Center, Relatoría: Procesos dePaz y Negociación en Colombia (Washington, D.C.:Latin American Program, October 1996).

Centro de Estudios Internacionales, ColombiaInternacional, Special Edition, “Seminario SobreProcesos de Negociación y Paz,” October-December 1996.

“Colombia: Human Rights and the Peace Process,”Latin American Program Working Paper 212,1995.

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BOARD OF TRUSTEESJoseph B. Gildenhorn, ChairDavid A. Metzner, Vice Chair

Public Members: James H. Billington, Librarian ofCongress; Allen Weinstein, Archivist of the UnitedStates; Bruce Cole, Chair, National Endowment for theHumanities; Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary, U.S.Department of Health and Human Services;Condoleezza Rice, Secretary, U.S. Department ofState; Lawrence M. Small, Secretary, SmithsonianInstitution; Margaret Spellings, Secretary, U.S.Department of Education. Designated Appointee ofthe President from Within the Federal Government:Tamala L. Longaberger

Private Citizen Members: Carol Cartwright, Robin B.Cook, Donald E. Garcia, Bruce S. Gelb, Sander R.Gerber, Charles L. Glazer, Ignacio Sanchez

ABOUT THE WOODROW WILSON CENTER

The Woodrow Wilson Center is one of Washington’smost respected institutions of policy research andpublic dialogue. Created by an act of Congress in1966, the Center is a living memorial to PresidentWoodrow Wilson and his ideals of a more informedpublic policy community in Washington. It supportsresearch on international policy issues; organizes con-ferences, seminars, and working groups; and offersresidential fellowships for scholars, journalists andpolicymakers. Center director Lee H. Hamilton is awidely respected former member of Congress whochaired the House International Relations Committee.The Latin American Program focuses attention onU.S.-Latin American relations and important issues inthe region, including democratic governance, citizensecurity, peace processes, drug policy, decentraliza-tion, and economic development and equality.

ONE WOODROW WILSON PLAZA, 1300 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, NW, WASHINGTON, DC 20004-3027

SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE $300

THE WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARSLee H. Hamilton, President and Director

Documents

The Peace Process in Colombia with the ELN: The Role of …27s Role in... · LATIN AMERICAN PROGRAM The Peace Process in Colombia with the ELN: The Role of Mexico By Ambassador Andrés