Page 1 of 13

Country Advice

Colombia Colombia – COL36831 – Santander –

National Liberation Army (ELN) – Frente

Efrain Pabon Pabon – State protection –

Internal relocation

19 July 2010

1. Was an ELN guerrilla group ‘Frente Efrain Pabon Pabon’ active in Santander in

2007/8? Is it active now? If so, in what parts of Colombia and who does it generally

target?

The National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, or ELN) guerrilla group

Frente Efrain Pabon Pabon was active in the department of Santander in 2007 and 2008,

as well as being active in the department prior to and since that time. It remains active in

other municipalities of Santander department, as well as in other Colombian departments.

Reports located regarding Frente Efrain Pabon Pabon activity in Santander refer to gun

battles with Colombian security forces in December 2005, July 2006 and March 2007.

Specific information on the targets of the Frente Efrain Pabon Pabon was not located, but

the ELN generally targets police and government security forces, members of the

Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de

Colombia, or FARC), supporters and members of paramilitary groups, politicians,

teachers, doctors, religious leaders, journalists, and civilians in conflict zones or in drug or

weapon transport corridors.

A Google translation of a document sourced from the ELN website „Patria Libre‟

indicates that the Frente Efrain Pabon Pabon was formed in 1983 to operate in the

province of Garcia Rovira, in the east of Santander Department and near the municipality

of Piedecuesta. According to this source, the Frente Efrain Pabon Pabon also operates in

the province of Pamplona in Norte de Santander, the neighbouring department to the

north-east of Santander and close to Piedecuesta.1 A 2002 article sourced from the

Venezuelan newspaper El Nacional, and purportedly based on a leaked Venezuelan

Military Intelligence Directorate document, claims that the “Efrain Pabon Pabon squad”

of the ELN is comprised of “3 commissions of 300 members”.2

1 Eastern Front War 2008, „Ephemeris: 28 Years of History‟, Google translation from Patria Libre website, 1

September

http://translate.google.com.au/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=http://www.nodo50.org/patrialibre/nuestravoz/nv2008_

80.htm&ei=gGY-

TN2dFIKmvgOU4Z2IDw&sa=X&oi=translate&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CCQQ7gEwAg&prev=/search%3

Fq%3D%2522efrain%2BPabon%2BPabon%2522%26hl%3Den%26safe%3Doff%26rlz%3D1T4EGLC_enAU3

86AU386%26prmd%3Do – Accessed 15 July 2010 – Attachment 1; „Santander Department (Colombia)‟ 2009,

Flagspot website, 2 October http://flagspot.net/flags/co-san.html – Accessed 15 July 2010 – Attachment 2. 2 „General News‟ 2002, VHeadline.com website, (source: El Nacional) 18 March

http://vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=8574 – Accessed 12 July 2010 – Attachment 3.

Page 2 of 13

The map below shows the location of Santander, Norte de Santander and Arauca

Departments (blue arrows), and the approximate location of Piedecuesta (pink arrow and

text).3

3 „Colombia‟ 2008, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, (source: Central Intelligence Agency)

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/txu-oclc-256488229-colombia_pol_2008.jpg – Accessed 19 July 2010

– Attachment 4.

Page 3 of 13

Frente Efrain Pabon Pabon activity in Santander and Norte de Santander in 2007-

2008

No references were located to Frente Efrain Pabon Pabon activity in Santander in 2007-

2008, but a report was located of an armed clash in July 2006. The website of the Second

Division of the Colombian Army reported the clash with members of the Frente Efrain

Pabon Pabon in the Cepita municipality of Santander Department.4 Cepita is to the

immediate south of Piedecuesta municipality.

A March 2007 report of the Colombian Army News Agency noted that two members of

the “Efrain Pabon Pabon”5 died in a clash with the Colombian armed forces in San Calixto

in the Norte de Santander Department.6 As noted, the municipality of Piedecuesta is close

to the border between Santander and Norte de Santander.

ELN activity in and around Piedecuesta in 2007-2008

Only one reference was located to ELN activity in Piedecuesta in the period 2007-2008. In

March 2007, Colombian security forces killed one ELN member from an unnamed front

during combat at “Umpala village, Piedecuesta municipality rural area, Santander

Department”, according to the website of the Colombian Army.7

Of the surrounding municipalities, according to an October 2007 briefing paper from the

International Crisis Group (ICG), as of November 2007 there were small ELN fronts

active in the Santander municipalities of Charta, Tona, Surata and Matanza, all to the

immediate north of Piedecuesta. Frente Efrain Pabon Pabon is not specifically mentioned

in this report as being among these active fronts; the Claudia Isabel Escobar front and the

José Fernando Porras front are the two ELN fronts named.8

There are reports of ELN activity in Santander Department outside of the specified time

period which may be of interest. The Colombian Air Force website carries a December

2005 article sourced from the Santander newspaper Vanguardia Liberal which reports a

gunfight between soldiers and ELN members at Sevilla, in Piedecuesta municipality, in

which one ELN member was killed and two surrendered.9

It may be of further interest to note that the ELN does have a history of attacking

politicians in Piedecuesta; in February 1994, ELN members bombed four political party

4 „Blow to the structures of ELN‟ 2006, Google translation of Segunda Division Ejercito National website, 26

July

http://translate.google.com.au/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=http://www.segundadivision.mil.co/index.php%3Fidcat

egoria%3D107841&ei=gGY-

TN2dFIKmvgOU4Z2IDw&sa=X&oi=translate&ct=result&resnum=10&ved=0CEYQ7gEwCQ&prev=/search%

3Fq%3D%2522efrain%2BPabon%2BPabon%2522%26hl%3Den%26safe%3Doff%26rlz%3D1T4EGLC_enAU

386AU386%26prmd%3Do – Accessed 15 July 2010 – Attachment 10. 5 This is the same group as Frente Efrain Pabon Pabon (Frente translates as „front‟).

6 „Guerillas fighters die in combats against the Army‟ 2007, Republic of Colombia Army website, (source: Army

News Agency), 2 March http://www.army.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=190131 – Accessed 15 July 2010 –

Attachment 9. 7 „Eleven criminals die in combats with the Army‟ 2007, Republic of Colombia Army website, 29 March

http://www.army.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=190611 – Accessed 15 July 2010 – Attachment 6. 8 International Crisis Group 2007, Colombia: Moving Forward with the ELN?, Latin America Briefing No. 16,

11 October, p. 3 – Attachment 5. 9 „ELN had camp in Sevilla‟ 2005, Colombian Air Force website, (source: Vanguardia Liberal), 12 December

http://www.fac.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=6357 – Accessed 16 July 2010 – Attachment 7.

Page 4 of 13

offices in and around the capital of Santander Department Bucamaranga, including in

Piedecuesta.10

Recent reports on Frente Efrain Pabon Pabon and the ELN in Santander and nearby

departments

Recent reports sourced from the Colombian media, the Colombian military, and

international media and governmental sources indicate that the Frente Efrain Pabon Pabon

arm of the ELN and the ELN more broadly continue to operate in Santander and in other

departments.

On 20 June 2010, the day of the presidential run-off election in Colombia, seven

police officers died in a minefield laid by the ELN in Norte de Santander

department.11

On 17 April 2010, Colombian media sources Radio Santa Fe and El Tiempo

reported the arrest in La Palma, in the municipality of Piedecuesta, of a member of

the “Mario Efrain Ramirez Ortiz Pabon Pabon Front” of the ELN. The man,

known as “Pipe”, is reported to have carried out kidnappings and extortion in the

villages of Cubin, Sevilla, La Palma and Crystals, in Piedecuesta municipality, and

in the neighbouring municipalities of Santa Barbara and Guaca, over the previous

ten years.12

The USDOS March 2010 human rights report on Colombia lists Santander as

being among the “high-conflict areas” in Colombia “where the military was

involved in active hostilities against insurgents”, including the ELN.13

The website of the Republic of Colombia Army carries a report claiming that in

February 2009 a member of the Efrain Pabon Pabon “voluntarily turned himself in

at Samore, Santander” to troops from the army‟s Second Division.14

The newspaper El Colombiano reports that at least nine people died in conflict

between members of the ELN and FARC in Arauca department in north-east

10

„Political party offices bombed in Santander Department‟ 1994, BBC Monitoring Service: Latin America,

(source: EFE news agency), 7 February – Attachment 8. 11

Bristow, M. 2010, „Colombian Election-Day Violence Claims 7 Police, 3 Soldiers‟, Bloomberg Businessweek,

20 June http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-20/colombian-election-day-violence-claims-7-police-3-

soldiers.html – Accessed 16 July 2010 – Attachment 11. 12

„Captured one of the most sought after Santander‟ 2010, Google translation from Radio Santa Fe, 17 April

http://translate.google.com.au/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=http://www.radiosantafe.com/2010/04/17/capturan-a-

uno-de-los-mas-buscados-de-santander/&ei=gGY-

TN2dFIKmvgOU4Z2IDw&sa=X&oi=translate&ct=result&resnum=8&ved=0CDsQ7gEwBw&prev=/search%3

Fq%3D%2522efrain%2BPabon%2BPabon%2522%26hl%3Den%26safe%3Doff%26rlz%3D1T4EGLC_enAU3

86AU386%26prmd%3Do – Accessed 15 July 2010 – Attachment 12; „Santander caught in a „Pipe‟, a member of

the Front of the ELN Efraín Pabón Pabón‟ (undated), Google translation from El Tiempo,

http://translate.google.com.au/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/oriente/ARTICUL

O-WEB-PLANTILLA_NOTA_INTERIOR-

7611910.html&ei=Fd8yTOqFGs2LkAX5v6ihDA&sa=X&oi=translate&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBoQ7gE

wAA&prev=/search%3Fq%3DFrente%2BEfrain%2BPabon%26hl%3Den%26safe%3Doff%26rlz%3D1T4EGL

C_enAU386AU386%26prmd%3Do – Accessed 6 July 2010 – Attachment 13. 13

US Department of State 2010, 2009 Human Rights Reports: Colombia, 11 March – Attachment 14. 14

„Army continues offensive action in Santander‟ 2009, Republic of Colombia Army website, 21 February

http://www.army.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=215785 – Accessed 15 July 2010 – Attachment 15.

Page 5 of 13

Colombia in June 2010. It is not known how many of the dead were members of

either group, or how many were local civilians caught in the fighting.15

In May 2010, El Colombiano reported that a local ELN leader had been killed by

the Colombian military in Lebanon municipality, Tolima department.16

A BBC News report from November 2009 states that members of the ELN broke a

top ELN leader out of prison in Arauca Department in October 2009; this report

claims that the ELN is influential and has “deep roots” in the community in

Arauca.17

According to the 2010 USDOS human rights report on Colombia, ELN members

killed three police officers and three civilians in an ambush in Norte de Santander

Department on 12 February 2009.18

A February 2010 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

(UNESCO) report on attacks on teachers and educational facilities in Colombia

notes that on 15 June 2008, the ELN burned down a village school near

Sabanalarga. There are three towns named Sabanalarga in Colombia, and this

report does not specify in which town this attack took place.19

ELN activities and targets in Colombia

As noted above, the Frente Efrain Pabon Pabon is reported to have been active in the

Santander, Norte de Santander, and Arauca Departments. Although the specific targets of

the group were not located, it is a front of the ELN, which is reported to target police and

security forces, members of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas

Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC), supporters and members of

paramilitary groups, politicians, teachers, doctors, religious leaders, journalists, and

civilians in conflict zones or in drug or weapon transport corridors. Given the little

information located on the activities of the Frente Efrain Pabon Pabon in Santander, the

information that follows refers to ELN targets in Colombia generally.

The US Department of State‟s (USDOS) March 2010 human rights report on Colombia

provides the following summary of ELN and FARC activities and targets (a similar

paragraph was also used in the 2008, 2007 and 2006 USDOS human rights reports, which

could indicate the consistent nature of ELN and FARC activity over the past several

years):

…The FARC and ELN committed the following human rights abuses: political

killings; widespread use of landmines; killings of off-duty members of the public

security forces and local officials; kidnappings and forced disappearances; massive

forced displacements; subornation and intimidation of judges, prosecutors, and

witnesses; infringement on citizens‟ privacy rights; restrictions on freedom of

movement; widespread recruitment of child soldiers; attacks against human rights

15

„ELN-FARC left nine murders‟ 2010, Colombian Air Force website, (source: El Colombiano), 2 June

http://www.fac.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=52236 – Accessed 16 July 2010 – Attachment 16. 16

Giraldo, J.C. 2010, „Die heads of FARC and ELN‟, Google translation from El Colombiano, 13 May

http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=en&u=http://www.elcolombiano.com/BancoConocimiento

/M/mueren_jefes_de_farc_y_eln/mueren_jefes_de_farc_y_eln.asp&rurl=translate.google.com&usg=ALkJrhhXR

VHvntjLyh8Buq9Mc2AtCnYr7A – Accessed 16 July 2010 – Attachment 17. 17

McDermott, J. 2009, „Colombia‟s ELN rebels show new vigour‟, BBC News, 5 November – Attachment 19. 18

US Department of State 2010, 2009 Human Rights Reports: Colombia, 11 March – Attachment 14. 19

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 2010, Education under Attack 2010 –

Colombia, 10 February – Attachment 20.

Page 6 of 13

activists; violence against women, including rape and forced abortions; and

harassment, intimidation, and killings of teachers and trade unionists.

The 2010 USDOS report goes on to claim that “FARC and ELN guerrillas killed

journalists, religious leaders, candidates for public office, local elected officials and

politicians, alleged paramilitary collaborators, and members of government security

forces”, although few examples are given of when and where such activities took place. In

one instance, ELN members killed three police officers and three civilians in an ambush in

Norte de Santander Department on 12 February 2009, as previously noted.

Both the ELN and FARC are reported to have threatened and harassed doctors and nurses

in high-conflict areas, and to have “prevented or limited the delivery of food and

medicines to towns and regions in contested drug trafficking corridors”. The ELN were

also responsible for the forcible displacement of peasants “to clear key drug and weapons

transit routes in strategic zones and to remove individuals who collaborated with the

government”. They are also reported to have “threatened, displaced, and killed educators

and their families for political and financial reasons”, and to have “harassed, threatened,

and sometimes killed religious leaders and activists, although often for their role as

community leaders rather than for religious reasons”.20

The most recent Amnesty International annual report on Colombia, from May 2010,

claims that the ELN and FARC continue to commit human rights abuses and serious and

repeated violations of international humanitarian law, including the killing of civilians, the

recruitment of children and hostage-taking.21

The peace process and strength of the ELN

The ELN continues to be active, although its operational capacity and number of members

have been considerably reduced since the early 2000s by the Colombian government‟s

military campaign against the ELN and FARC.

According to an October 2007 briefing paper from the International Crisis Group (ICG), a

peace process between the ELN and the Colombian government formally began in

December 2005, but this did not result in a ceasefire or put an end to kidnappings and

other ELN activities. This report notes that the military capabilities of the ELN are

“considerably reduced since the late 1990s” and that its numbers may have halved, due to

military actions and conflict with FARC and paramilitary groups. Colombian government

sources claim that “from 2002 to 2007 ELN military actions, including combat with

security forces, ambushes, piracy and acts of terrorism, have gradually fallen from 195 per

year to nineteen”.22

More recently, the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) produced research in

April 2009 sourced from a report by the Colombian Foundation for Security and

Democracy (Fundación Seguridad y Democracia – FSD). The FSD report states that

between 2002 and 2008 the number of attacks committed by the ELN decreased by 77

percent, while the number of kidnappings decreased by 96 percent. Of the 29 kidnappings

that did take place in 2008, 14 were in the department of Norte de Santander, to the

20

US Department of State 2010, 2009 Human Rights Reports: Colombia, 11 March – Attachment 14. 21

Amnesty International 2010, Annual Report – Colombia, 28 May – Attachment 21. 22

International Crisis Group 2007, Colombia: Moving Forward with the ELN?, Latin America Briefing No. 16,

11 October, p. 3 – Attachment 5.

Page 7 of 13

immediate north-east of Santander and near Piedecuesta.23

Additionally, in December

2009, an ICG report quoted Colombian Ministry of Defence figures which claim that at

least 2,742 ELN members have deserted the group since August 2002. Nonetheless, the

report claims that the “ELN have adopted an approach of protracted resistance,

demonstrating they still have the capacity to adapt to a changing security environment and

gain new recruits mostly among the rural poor”.24

As an arm of the ELN, it may be reasonable to conclude that the activities of the Frente

Efrain Pabon Pabon have also diminished in recent years; however, kidnappings by the

ELN in Norte de Santander account for nearly half of all ELN kidnappings nationally.

2. What protection is likely to be available by the authorities from threats or attacks by

this group (or, if information on the group can’t be located, by the ELN generally)?

No information was located on the availability of state protection for persons under threat

or attack from the Frente Efrain Pabon Pabon specifically. Notwithstanding this, as Frente

Efrain Pabon Pabon is part of the ELN, it is reasonable to think that information on state

protection relating to the ELN also applies to its individual „frente‟ (fronts).

The 2010 USDOS report on human rights in Colombia provides some detail on the

government‟s protection programme (administered by the Ministry of Interior under „Law

418 of 1995‟25

) which extends to trade union leaders, journalists, human rights advocates,

and “social leaders”. Despite the development of protection programmes, the report

recognises that in 2009 “serious problems remained”, noting among these issues relating

to governmental human rights abuses; unlawful and extrajudicial killings; forced

disappearances; impunity; an inefficient judiciary subject to intimidation; corruption; and

harassment of human rights groups. 26

According to a June 2010 ICG report, Colombia‟s security forces lack a strategy to

effectively protect citizens from the various armed paramilitary and guerrilla groups

operating within the country, including the ELN. The size and range of the armed groups

involved, “the fragmented nature of the groups and the unpredictability of their

interactions complicate their identification and control”. This fragmentation is “adding a

new dimension to the Colombian conflict, leading to a deterioration of security and

endangering the civilian population”. 27

However, while protection is not universal, it has

been increasing. In February 2010 the Immigration & Refugee Board of Canada (IRB)

undertook research into the viability of internal relocation in Colombia, and quoted a

professor of Sociology at the National University of Colombia who claimed that while

23

Immigration & Refugee Board of Canada 2009, COL103020.FE – Colombia: Crime in Bogotá and Cali,

activities of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia,

FARC) and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Libéración Nacional, ELN) in those cities, government

actions to combat the activities of these groups, and protection offered to victims, 16 April – Attachment 22. 24

International Crisis Group 2009, Uribe’s Possible Third Term and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, Latin

America Report N°31, 18 December, pp. 3-4 http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-

america/colombia/31_uribes_possible_third_term_and_conflict_resolution_in_colombia.ashx – Accessed 19

July 2010 – Attachment 23. 25

„Antecedents‟ (undated), Ministry of Interior and Justice, Colombia website, Google translation of

http://www.mij.gov.co/pagina1_detalle.asp?doc=152&pag=591 – Accessed 5 February 2007 – Attachment 24.

Please note that this translation is rough. 26

US Department of State 2010, 2009 Human Rights Reports: Colombia, 11 March – Attachment 14. 27

International Crisis Group 2010, Improving Security Policy in Colombia, Latin America Briefing No. 23, 29

June, pp. 11-12 http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-

america/colombia/B23%20Improving%20Security%20Policy%20in%20Colombia.ashx – Accessed 19 July

2010 – Attachment 25.

Page 8 of 13

“the capacity of the central State to provide protection is still insufficient, and it does not

include the totality of the territory … [this capacity] has been increased as far as the

capacity to protect threatened or vulnerable people”.28

Another area of weakness in the capacity of the state to protect citizens was noted in the

December 2006 Overseas Development Institute29

(ODI) background paper on state

protection in Colombia. The report claimed that, historically, the Colombian government

and armed forces “have been as great a threat to the civilian population as Colombia‟s

other armed groups”. The ODI report notes that the Colombian government‟s response to

the lack of security and protection faced by much of the country‟s population is through

widespread military deployments, which is problematic given government and

government-backed forces have committed “widespread atrocities” with impunity. The

state protection programmes initiated by the government, while welcomed by international

actors such as UNHCR, are “greeted with distrust and derided by many civil society

organisations” in Colombia, because they rely for their effectiveness on state military or

other armed forces that have been responsible for past atrocities. In addition, once outside

Bogota or other large urban areas, the “government‟s ability to deliver protection on the

ground when it is urgently required is highly questionable.” Notwithstanding this, the ODI

report does claim a noticeable improvement in the behaviour of the Colombian armed

forces over recent years, and notes that the government is establishing programmes to

protect threatened individuals.30

In addition to the problems posed by relying on government forces given their previous

conduct, the UK Home Office reported in 2006 that the Colombian authorities‟

willingness to offer protection to those at risk of harm is countered by the lack of

effectiveness of any such protection. The government lacks the authority to counter the

activities of guerrilla and paramilitary groups in many regions of the country, and these

groups operate nationwide. As a result, the UK Home Office claimed that the Colombian

government “cannot currently offer sufficient protection from these groups”. 31

Furthermore, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported in

March 2005 that “the inadequacy of state protection” in Colombia leaves citizens from all

social strata and regions vulnerable to mistreatment by irregular armed groups of

substantial size and with a national presence. The report also notes that seemingly

innocuous actions or characteristics can result in persons being stigmatised as opponents

of a particular group, whether it be the government, guerrilla or paramilitary.32

These

findings appear to remain current given the abovementioned ICG report which observed

the lack of an effective strategy to protect civilians in Colombia.

28

Immigration & Refugee Board of Canada 2010, COL103286.E – Colombia: Whether the Revolutionary Armed

Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo,

FARC-EP), the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Libéración Nacional, ELN) and the former United Self-

Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodenfensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC) pursue victims who relocate to another

area; whether these groups track their victims over the long term, even if the latter return to Colombia after an

extended period of time, 23 February – Attachment 26. 29

ODI is a British think tank on international development and humanitarian issues. 30

Bonwick, A. 2006, Protection in Colombia: a bottom-up approach, Humanitarian Policy Group background

paper, Overseas Development Institute website, December http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/289.pdf –

Accessed 19 July 2010 – Attachment 27. 31

UK Home Office 2006, Operational Guidance Note – Colombia, UK Home Office website, 18 September

http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/countryspecificasylumpolicyogns/colombiaogn?view=Binary –

Accessed 13 April 2007 –Attachment 28. 32

UNHCR 2005, International Protection considerations regarding Colombian asylum-seekers and refugees,

March – Accessed 19 July 2010 – Attachment 29.

Page 9 of 13

3. Are there any practical barriers to relocating within the country (to, for example,

Bogota)?

The 2010 USDOS report on human rights in Colombia states that freedom of movement

within Colombia is allowed by law, and the Colombian government generally respects this

right except where rural conflict areas are affected by military operations and

occupation.33

In February 2010 the Immigration & Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) undertook research

into the viability of internal relocation in Colombia, consulting a senior researcher with

Human Rights Watch, a professor of Sociology at Acadia University in Canada, and a

professor of Law at Stetson University, Florida, who agreed that Colombian guerrilla

groups, including the ELN, have the capacity to pursue victims throughout much of the

country. The IRB also consulted a professor of Sociology at the National University of

Colombia, who provided a contrasting perspective and claimed that it is “likely

impossible” for a group such as the ELN to track a victim to another part of the country.

The IRB research follows:

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a senior researcher with Human

Rights Watch indicated that “[d]ue to their presence in vast sectors of Colombia, it

is likely that the FARC, ELN and successor groups to the AUC have the capacity

to pursue victims throughout many regions of the country” (9 Nov. 2009). This

information was corroborated by a professor of Sociology at Acadia University and

research member of the Atlantic Canada-Colombia Research Group, who, in

correspondence with the Research Directorate, stated that, “[the FARC-EP and

ELN] most certainly have the capacity and fortitude to continue targeting persons

[they perceive] to be „class enemies‟ or deterrents to their political and ideological

objectives” (19 Jan. 2010).

Similarly, in correspondence with the Research Directorate, a professor of Law at

Stetson University in DeLand, Florida and expert on international law and

international criminal law, indicated that, “the FARC, and to a lesser extent the

ELN, are absolutely capable of pursuing individuals nearly anywhere within the

Colombian national territory if the individual‟s threat or interest to either group

warrants such effort” (21 Jan. 2010). In addition, she noted that these groups have

the capacity to engage in intelligence gathering (Professor of Law 21 Jan. 2010).

Furthermore, addressing the FARC “with the understanding that [these] statements

apply to the ELN, as well”, she added that,

Colombia‟s illegal armed groups …have access to private bank records and

credit card activities; they can track someone down based on their paper

trail. They can eavesdrop on family members to determine where a target is

located, or bribe acquaintances and neighbours for information.

…Colombia‟s societal characteristics also play a role in the ability of an

individual to resettle in a different part of the national territory. … Regional

identity is very important, especially among rural inhabitants of Antioquia

(who are known as paisas), and it is virtually impossible to relocate from

one part of the country to another without someone taking note.

…Whether the FARC would choose to continue pursuing a relocated

individual depends greatly on the value of that individual to the FARC. If

we are talking about a person of humble origins being relocated to another

part of Colombia, it is possible that he could live in peace from further

33

US Department of State 2010, 2009 Human Rights Reports: Colombia, 11 March – Attachment 14.

Page 10 of 13

FARC harassment. … If the relocated individual is a member of the political

elite, business class, academia, or professional class and was targeted by the

FARC for extortion or coercion to cooperate and provide technical

assistance to the FARC, that would render the individual a high-value target

to the FARC. (ibid.)

However, in correspondence with the Research Directorate a professor of

Sociology at the National University of Colombia (Universidad Nacional de

Colombia) and author of articles on the armed conflict in Colombia stated that it is

[translation] “likely impossible” for the FARC, ELN and former AUC to track

their victims when they relocate from one part of the country to another (13 Jan.

2010). According to him, these groups do not have the capacity to carry out

operations throughout the country (Professor, National University of Colombia 13

Jan. 2010).34

The UNHCR examined the possibility of internal flight or relocation “for an individual

fleeing non-state agents” in its March 2005 report on state protection in Colombia. After

examining the general situation of the conflict and violence in Colombia, the report

concluded that:

…it will be extremely difficult for an individual fleeing non-state agents of

persecution to find an alternative area of relocation which could be considered

safe. In regard to areas under the control of the authorities, the network of the

irregular armed groups along with their ability to pursue their targets would

continue to pose a threat to the individuals concerned, while the authorities will not

be in a position to extend their protection to them. As a result, in many cases IDPs

are repeatedly internally displaced due to recurring threats to their lives and

security. There may also be reasons for such individuals not to approach the

authorities since the authorities may perceive them as members of armed groups,

and, furthermore any contacts with the authorities may expose the individuals

concerned to further risks of being targeted by the irregular armed groups.

…Accessibility to alternative relocation areas may also not be safe given that there

are large numbers of illegal checkpoints on travel routes throughout the country

where individuals concerned may run the risk of indiscriminate violence or being

identified and targeted. Given the widespread network of the irregular armed

groups, the risk of being identified exists in rural areas as well as in big cities.

…given the situation in the country, the application of the internal relocation

concept may generally be considered as irrelevant, unless in extremely clear-cut

cases.35

UK Home Office advice from September 2006 draws the same conclusion, based on the

abovementioned UNHCR report.36

The weight of evidence suggests that relocation can be

problematic for those individuals in which the ELN and FARC have a particular interest.

34

Immigration & Refugee Board of Canada 2010, COL103286.E – Colombia: Whether the Revolutionary Armed

Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo,

FARC-EP), the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Libéración Nacional, ELN) and the former United Self-

Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodenfensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC) pursue victims who relocate to another

area; whether these groups track their victims over the long term, even if the latter return to Colombia after an

extended period of time, 23 February – Attachment 26. 35

UNHCR 2005, International Protection considerations regarding Colombian asylum-seekers and refugees,

March – Accessed 19 July 2010 – Attachment 29. 36

UK Home Office 2006, Operational Guidance Note – Colombia, UK Home Office website, 18 September

http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/countryspecificasylumpolicyogns/colombiaogn?view=Binary –

Accessed 13 April 2007 – Attachment 28.

Page 11 of 13

Attachments

1. Eastern Front War 2008, „Ephemeris: 28 Years of History‟, Google translation from Patria

Libre website, 1 September

http://translate.google.com.au/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=http://www.nodo50.org/patrialib

re/nuestravoz/nv2008_80.htm&ei=gGY-

TN2dFIKmvgOU4Z2IDw&sa=X&oi=translate&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CCQQ7gE

wAg&prev=/search%3Fq%3D%2522efrain%2BPabon%2BPabon%2522%26hl%3Den%2

6safe%3Doff%26rlz%3D1T4EGLC_enAU386AU386%26prmd%3Do – Accessed 15 July

2010.

2. „Santander Department (Colombia)‟ 2009, Flagspot website, 2 October

http://flagspot.net/flags/co-san.html – Accessed 15 July 2010.

3. „General News‟ 2002, VHeadline.com website, (source: El Nacional) 18 March

http://vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=8574 – Accessed 12 July 2010.

4. „Colombia‟ 2008, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, (source: Central Intelligence

Agency) http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/txu-oclc-256488229-

colombia_pol_2008.jpg – Accessed 19 July 2010.

5. International Crisis Group 2007, Colombia: Moving Forward with the ELN?, Latin

America Briefing No. 16, 11 October.

6. „Eleven criminals die in combats with the Army‟ 2007, Republic of Colombia Army

website, 29 March http://www.army.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=190611 – Accessed 15

July 2010.

7. „ELN had camp in Sevilla‟ 2005, Colombian Air Force website, (source: Vanguardia

Liberal), 12 December http://www.fac.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=6357 – Accessed 16

July 2010.

8. „Political party offices bombed in Santander Department‟ 1994, BBC Monitoring Service:

Latin America, (source: EFE news agency), 7 February. (FACTIVA)

9. „Guerillas fighters die in combats against the Army‟ 2007, Republic of Colombia Army

website, (source: Army News Agency), 2 March

http://www.army.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=190131 – Accessed 15 July 2010.

10. „Blow to the structures of ELN‟ 2006, Google translation of Segunda Division Ejercito

National website, 26 July

http://translate.google.com.au/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=http://www.segundadivision.mil.

co/index.php%3Fidcategoria%3D107841&ei=gGY-

TN2dFIKmvgOU4Z2IDw&sa=X&oi=translate&ct=result&resnum=10&ved=0CEYQ7gE

wCQ&prev=/search%3Fq%3D%2522efrain%2BPabon%2BPabon%2522%26hl%3Den%

26safe%3Doff%26rlz%3D1T4EGLC_enAU386AU386%26prmd%3Do – Accessed 15

July 2010.

11. Bristow, M. 2010, „Colombian Election-Day Violence Claims 7 Police, 3 Soldiers‟,

Bloomberg Businessweek, 20 June http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-

20/colombian-election-day-violence-claims-7-police-3-soldiers.html – Accessed 16 July

2010.

Page 12 of 13

12. „Captured one of the most sought after Santander‟ 2010, Google translation from Radio

Santa Fe, 17 April

http://translate.google.com.au/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=http://www.radiosantafe.com/20

10/04/17/capturan-a-uno-de-los-mas-buscados-de-santander/&ei=gGY-

TN2dFIKmvgOU4Z2IDw&sa=X&oi=translate&ct=result&resnum=8&ved=0CDsQ7gEw

Bw&prev=/search%3Fq%3D%2522efrain%2BPabon%2BPabon%2522%26hl%3Den%26

safe%3Doff%26rlz%3D1T4EGLC_enAU386AU386%26prmd%3Do – Accessed 15 July

2010.

13. „Santander caught in a „Pipe‟, a member of the Front of the ELN Efraín Pabón Pabón‟

(undated), Google translation from El Tiempo,

http://translate.google.com.au/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=http://www.eltiempo.com/colom

bia/oriente/ARTICULO-WEB-PLANTILLA_NOTA_INTERIOR-

7611910.html&ei=Fd8yTOqFGs2LkAX5v6ihDA&sa=X&oi=translate&ct=result&resnu

m=1&ved=0CBoQ7gEwAA&prev=/search%3Fq%3DFrente%2BEfrain%2BPabon%26hl

%3Den%26safe%3Doff%26rlz%3D1T4EGLC_enAU386AU386%26prmd%3Do –

Accessed 6 July 2010.

14. US Department of State 2010, 2009 Human Rights Reports: Colombia, 11 March.

15. „Army continues offensive action in Santander‟ 2009, Republic of Colombia Army

website, 21 February http://www.army.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=215785 – Accessed

15 July 2010.

16. „ELN-FARC left nine murders‟ 2010, Colombian Air Force website, (source: El

Colombiano), 2 June http://www.fac.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=52236 – Accessed 16

July 2010.

17. Giraldo, J.C. 2010, „Die heads of FARC and ELN‟, Google translation from El

Colombiano, 13 May

http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=en&u=http://www.elcolombiano.co

m/BancoConocimiento/M/mueren_jefes_de_farc_y_eln/mueren_jefes_de_farc_y_eln.asp

&rurl=translate.google.com&usg=ALkJrhhXRVHvntjLyh8Buq9Mc2AtCnYr7A –

Accessed 16 July 2010.

18. Begg, K. 2010, „13 guerrillas arrested in La Guajira‟, Colombia Reports website, (source:

Radio Santa Fe), 19 April http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/9214-

authorities-arrest-13-guerrillas-in-la-guajira.html – Accessed 16 July 2010.

19. McDermott, J. 2009, „Colombia‟s ELN rebels show new vigour‟, BBC News, 5

November. (CISNET Colombia CX236109)

20. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 2010, Education under

Attack 2010 – Colombia, 10 February. (CISNET Colombia CX239851)

21. Amnesty International 2010, Annual Report – Colombia, 28 May. (CISNET Colombia

CX244673)

22. Immigration & Refugee Board of Canada 2009, COL103020.FE - Colombia: Crime in

Bogotá and Cali, activities of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas

Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) and the National Liberation Army

(Ejército de Libéración Nacional, ELN) in those cities, government actions to combat the

activities of these groups, and protection offered to victims, 16 April. (REFINFO)

Page 13 of 13

23. International Crisis Group 2009, Uribe’s Possible Third Term and Conflict Resolution in

Colombia, Latin America Report N°31, 18 December, pp. 3-4

http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-

america/colombia/31_uribes_possible_third_term_and_conflict_resolution_in_colombia.a

shx – Accessed 19 July 2010.

24. „Antecedents‟ (undated), Ministry of Interior and Justice, Colombia website, Google

translation of http://www.mij.gov.co/pagina1_detalle.asp?doc=152&pag=591 – Accessed

5 February 2007.

25. International Crisis Group 2010, Improving Security Policy in Colombia, Latin America

Briefing No. 23, 29 June, pp. 11-12 http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-

america/colombia/B23%20Improving%20Security%20Policy%20in%20Colombia.ashx –

Accessed 19 July 2010.

26. Immigration & Refugee Board of Canada 2010, COL103286.E – Colombia: Whether the

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas

Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP), the National Liberation

Army (Ejército de Libéración Nacional, ELN) and the former United Self-Defence Forces

of Colombia (Autodenfensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC) pursue victims who relocate to

another area; whether these groups track their victims over the long term, even if the

latter return to Colombia after an extended period of time, 23 February. (REFINFO)

27. Bonwick, A. 2006, Protection in Colombia: a bottom-up approach, Humanitarian Policy

Group background paper, Overseas Development Institute website, December

http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/289.pdf – Accessed 19 July 2010.

28. UK Home Office 2006, Operational Guidance Note – Colombia, UK Home Office

website, 18 September

http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/countryspecificasylumpolicyogns/colombia

ogn?view=Binary – Accessed 13 April 2007.

29. UNHCR 2005, International Protection considerations regarding Colombian asylum-

seekers and refugees, March.